0:00 This is a special archive recording of Paul Sztorc appearing on 0:04 What to Expect When Expecting Forks, 0:07 hosted and recorded by the MARA Foundation on July 30th, 2026. 0:13 This was not an eCash X Space, but eCash, $ECX, 0:17 was one of the main topics. 0:20 Follow the MARA Foundation on X at MARAFoundation underscore. 0:24 Now, here's the conversation. 0:27 Hi, guys. Diego, can you hear me? 0:32 Yes, I can. 0:35 Hi. Yay. Okay. Okay, good. I'm glad that we were able 0:38 to figure out how to turn off the music. 0:41 Yay. Oh, my gosh. Okay, so we've got, we're just getting 0:45 everyone on stage, guys. Bear with us for a moment. 0:52 I see Matt's on stage, Paul's on stage, Vlad's on 0:56 stage. I think Rob, Portland, and Peter, do we see, 1:02 are they here or are they not here? They are here, 1:04 but we need to get them on stage, right? If you're 1:07 still a listener, if you can accept my invite, that'd be great. 1:12 Very cool. Portland, are you on stage or no? Rob, Portland? 1:18 Let's try to get Rob and Portland up here. 1:22 Cool. 1:24 Rob is ready. 1:27 Yay. All right. Yeah, exactly. Sometimes I can't tell who's up 1:30 because I don't think this thing refreshes super consistently. 1:35 Hi, guys. Thank you so much for being 1:39 here. I am really excited about this space. 1:43 I feel like this has been kind of a long time 1:45 coming, this space. And, yeah, we've got a very big 1:49 month, the month of August, coming up with two 1:53 special forks, one soft and one hard. 1:57 Let's talk about it. 2:01 So, yeah, I think we'll probably start talking with, we'll 2:06 probably start chatting about BIP-110. We've got some folks up 2:09 here who are very expert in that subject matter on both 2:13 sides. We're going to try and keep this as neutral and 2:16 balanced as possible. Thank you in advance to Matt Hill, who 2:19 will be repping the BIP-110 sympathizing 2:24 side of things. So very grateful to you for bringing the 2:27 balance to the panel. And then, yeah, we're going to also 2:29 be talking about eCash, which is a hard fork initiated 2:33 by Paul Sztorc, who's on stage. 2:35 And that will be, I think, set to be coming up 2:39 just a couple of short weeks after the potential BIP-110 2:42 soft fork. So, yeah, got a lot to chat about today. 2:45 Really quickly, I'll just introduce myself for folks who are new. 2:49 My name is Isabel Fox in Duke. I lead the MARA Foundation. 2:53 MARA Foundation is sort of leading Bitcoin strategic initiatives for 2:58 MARA, the Bitcoin miner, 3:01 including Bitcoin R& D, Bitcoin education. 3:03 Lots of fun stuff that we're working on here at the 3:05 MARA Foundation. So feel free to give us a follow if 3:08 you're interested in kind of consuming educational content like this, especially 3:12 on the technical side and mining side of things. 3:16 And, yeah, I'm just, like, thrilled with everyone here. 3:19 Paul Sztorc, I've already kind of semi-introduced, author of Drive 3:23 Chains, BIP300, BIP301, and also the mastermind behind 3:28 the hard fork that will be coming up in a few 3:31 weeks. eCash, which we'll get into. 3:34 Leo, I am very excited to have you here as well, 3:37 repping the spammers, as they may say, which I say is 3:41 a term of endearment at this point. I think we should 3:44 reclaim that term, Leo. And, yeah, I'm excited to kind of 3:47 get your point of view on this. Rob and Portland, so 3:51 happy to have you here. Hopefully be the voices of reason 3:55 on the technical side of things. 3:57 Repping Anchor Watch, one of the coolest companies in all 4:02 of Bitcoin, in my opinion. 4:04 And, yeah, I'm really also thrilled to have Chris and Vlad 4:07 here who have been really covering these, both of these forks, 4:11 I think, pretty well. You guys make amazing Bitcoin 4:15 content, and I'm very glad to have you hopefully help me 4:19 kind of wrangle this crew a little bit. 4:22 And, yeah, see, I see Stu down there. 4:24 That was, I was going to say, maybe we'll have to 4:26 bring up Stu at some point as well. He also makes 4:28 amazing content on these topics. 4:30 So, yeah, I think I have introduced just about everyone. 4:35 And, yeah, I'm just really excited to dive in. 4:39 So, without further ado, I would love to just set the 4:42 container. Again, for anyone, I think most of the folks listening 4:46 may already kind of be slightly familiar with the 4:50 BIP-110 TLDR. 4:52 What is this thing? Why is this thing? 4:55 But, yeah, I think it would be probably useful just to 4:58 get a little bit of an introduction. I'm hoping maybe Matt 5:02 will be the person who can kind of get us 5:06 started with just giving like just straight up a little overview. 5:10 What is BIP-110 and why? And then I, you know, 5:13 anyone else on stage can feel free to jump in and 5:16 maybe offer, you know, a counter argument. But, yeah, Matt, would 5:20 you be would you be willing to do that? Would you 5:22 be willing to give a little introduction to kind of BIP 5:24 110 and the intention behind it and kind of why this 5:28 is being put forward? 5:32 I can try. I'm definitely not the best person in the 5:37 world to kind of describe the gritty details and 5:42 rationale and motivation behind BIP-110. I'm definitely in 5:47 the loop enough to try to speak on behalf of that 5:51 camp. I personally would like to see the fork succeed, 5:55 but I definitely am not the most outwardly spoken proponent 5:59 of that BIP. I tend to focus on Bitcoin 6:04 governance. I like to talk about how Bitcoin works and its 6:08 political nature a lot. 6:10 I'm also very outwardly spoken in favor of spam mitigation 6:15 through policy and network rate limiting. 6:19 But BIP-110 itself, I have been less 6:24 focused on and less of an expert on. 6:27 But I will do my best. Fair enough. BIP-110, insofar 6:31 as, again, I understand all the details, 6:35 broadly speaking, 6:37 is an effort to reassert Bitcoin and 6:41 the network's willingness to fight spam. 6:45 I believe that is the overarching motivation is to reassert 6:50 hostility towards spam and the network's 6:55 willingness to continue fighting against it. 6:58 I believe that proponents of BIP-110, again, 7:02 myself included, 7:04 believe that if BIP-110 fails, the will 7:08 to fight spam will go with it. 7:11 That it will essentially be a permanent surrender to 7:15 the idea that spam cannot be fought on 7:20 Bitcoin and therefore no attempt to fight it should be made. 7:25 And so I think a lot of people supporting this soft 7:28 fork are not willing to make that concession at this time. 7:31 And they view BIP-110 as a necessary 7:36 event in order 7:40 to reassert that will. BIP-110 itself does not stop spam. 7:44 I don't think anybody makes that claim. 7:47 But it does reassert the community's will to fight spam. 7:51 So I think that's the best I can give. 7:54 Matt, would you mind giving, and I know this is, I 7:58 mean, maybe you disagree that this is a subjective term, but 8:01 would you mind giving your definition of spam? 8:04 Like, what is spam? 8:09 Yeah, fun. 8:11 So, you know, I think spam can be 8:16 defined as you know it when you see it. It's something 8:19 that you don't want. So, for example, when it comes to email, 8:24 everyone can agree what spam is. And it's any emails 8:29 that you receive that are of no interest to you that 8:34 you do not want and sort 8:38 of are a nuisance. They are annoying to you. 8:42 They are distracting to you. 8:44 And in a worst case scenario, they're actually causing harm to 8:48 your system, right? Like, for example, the denial of service attack 8:52 of just information could be classified as spam. 8:56 That's on the extreme end of, 8:59 you know, you would no longer call that spam. You would 9:01 call that an attack. But spam is sort of the lesser 9:05 manifestation of a denial of service attack. 9:08 It's just stuff you don't want being thrown at you, even 9:11 though you don't want it. 9:14 So it's subjective in the sense of, you know, what I 9:18 don't want being thrown at me is not what somebody else 9:21 might want. One person's spam is another person's gold. That's fine. 9:25 But I think in aggregate, most people would agree on what spam is. 9:32 That doesn't mean somebody else can say it's not spam. 9:35 They're welcome to do that. But most people would agree. 9:38 And therefore, that is sort of how it gets the badge 9:40 of spam. If a super majority of people agree that it is. 9:45 Leo, I'm wondering if you would mind kind of offering your 9:49 counter just because it's probably like the most opposite, like 9:53 I would imagine, of Matt's. Like, you're probably like on the 9:56 as, you know, somebody who's was very deep in the Ordinal's 10:00 ecosystem. I would say you're probably have like the most far 10:04 reaching outer end of this debate. 10:07 And so I would love for you to maybe chime in 10:10 on comment on whatever you think the counter might be here. 10:14 And then, yeah, and then we'll open it up to the 10:17 rest of the group. But I would I would love to 10:18 get Leo's take first just to kind of set the polls. 10:25 I mean, look, I don't really disagree with anything Matt just 10:28 said. Like, if somebody wants to define something as spam, that's 10:31 their opinion. They can do that. Obviously, to fork the Bitcoin 10:35 network and make it the canonical Bitcoin network, you need to 10:39 convince a lot of people to agree with you, which I 10:43 think it's really it's really hard to do that. 10:46 I think you're going to find out that this 110 is 10:49 definitely not going to succeed. 10:53 And, you know, I think that's just the obvious outcome here. 10:57 But I think it's an interesting conversation to have. 11:00 I'm happy to get into the details with Matt if he wants to. 11:04 I actually think it's interesting that Matt's on this stage. 11:07 I hadn't heard of Matt personally. I knew Start9, didn't 11:10 didn't know the founders read a post the other day that 11:14 Matt had worked on a protocol called Worker a few years 11:18 back in 2019, where he developed an OP_RETURN based inscription 11:22 protocol for basically essentially building like a Twitter clone 11:27 on top of Bitcoin, using Bitcoin to store the tweets and 11:30 the social graph and that sort of thing where you would 11:33 like make a post and then it would make 189, you 11:37 know, transactions. Each 80 byte OP_RETURN transaction, essentially 11:43 storing tweets and whatever information you want to put on Bitcoin. 11:48 I didn't know that. Just respect to Matt. 11:51 I think that's super cool. I think it's kind of unfortunate 11:53 to hear that maybe Matt's, you know, not still 11:58 interested in doing experiments like that on Bitcoin anymore. 12:01 But I just thought that was kind of neat. I hadn't 12:03 really heard of anybody doing that before. And I had actually 12:06 thought of that like years ago when Ordinal started. 12:10 Like, wow, that would be pretty cool. 12:12 To my knowledge, nobody's actually built that other than Matt that 12:15 I just found out about. So I just wanted to kind 12:18 of maybe pose Matt a question here. 12:21 Like, why did you stop working on that? Like, what were 12:23 your learnings? What was it that caused this sort of change 12:26 of heart where maybe you're against that sort of activity on Bitcoin now? 12:34 Well, I appreciate the compliment. And the reason I posted that 12:37 was, you know, it wasn't to make a point, wasn't to 12:41 brag. It was just to provide some context in hopes, 12:46 I guess, that people would understand that I'm not coming at 12:47 this blindly. Right. Like, I've been in the space for a 12:50 while and I built data protocols on top of Bitcoin. 12:54 And now we actually, you know, did most of the 12:58 borking, so to speak. A borker is a dog that barks 13:01 a lot. That's why we called it borker as opposed to 13:03 Twitter, right? Just a bird that chirps. 13:08 So and it aligned with Dogecoin as well, which is where 13:11 we did most of our testing. 13:13 It's where people were actually engaging. And the reason that we 13:17 did it on Dogecoin, for obvious reasons, is that one, it 13:20 was extremely cheap fees. Like every transaction on Doge back in 13:24 2019 was one Doge, which at that time was, I think, 13:28 you know, a fifth of a penny. So it was really, 13:32 really cheap to do, even for, you know, long form posts. 13:36 Block times were also one minute. 13:38 And, you know, we didn't rely on mempool visibility for 13:43 borks to show up in your feed. 13:45 We actually relied on it being mined first. 13:48 And so the one minute blocks were really, really useful there 13:52 as well. Dogecoin also, you know, comparatively has a reasonable amount of protection. 13:58 The hash rate is fairly high since it's merged mined with 14:01 Litecoin. So for all of those reasons, we were like, yeah, 14:03 this sort of makes sense to, like, have the main, you 14:07 know, network and interactions taking place on Dogecoin. 14:10 But it was chain agnostic. Any UTXO based blockchain 14:14 that supported OP_RETURN could accommodate it, which means in the 14:18 web UI that we built, we never actually got to this 14:22 because we moved on, you know, and are very focused on 14:25 Start9 first. But you would be able to choose your 14:28 chain. So when you went to put together a post or 14:31 a bork, as we call them, you would say, I want 14:34 to post this on Bitcoin, Litecoin or Dogecoin. 14:36 You basically have your kind of gold, silver and bronze selection. 14:40 And the idea was, well, if you're willing to pay Bitcoin fees, 14:45 then this this message is really important. And so it carries 14:48 more weight. So in people's feeds, right, we were 14:52 we were indexing. We actually built a bespoke indexer for 14:56 Dogecoin that we called Super Doge. That was basically an Electrum 14:59 server for Dogecoin. 15:01 But there was nothing like it out there and we couldn't 15:03 use Electrum off the shelf. So we had to build our 15:05 own indexer. But the idea is that the Borker server that 15:09 you ran, which was an open source piece of software, would 15:12 connect to indexers for each chain. 15:16 And you would run those nodes yourself on your own server 15:19 and basically have this self-sovereign feed coming from multiple blockchains 15:24 where you could see all of the posts that people had 15:26 made on the various chains. And you could filter for I 15:29 only want to see posts that are on Bitcoin because those 15:31 are the most valuable, the most important. Or I want to 15:34 see everything or you could rank them differently, etc. 15:37 And an algorithm that's also self-hosted could determine what you 15:41 see and when you see it. You could follow people. 15:44 You could block people. You could flag posts as inappropriate and 15:49 run an indexer that would filter those out locally for like 15:52 child protection and stuff. I think we really thought this through. 15:54 We built Twitter, 15:56 a multi-chain Twitter that used Operaturn 16:01 for all of this. 16:03 And because of the 83 byte limit, we're very familiar with 16:07 how this limit affected us because we had to design around 16:11 it. We had to crack a message up into 180 16:16 transactions like I posted about is Francisco de Ancona's 16:20 money is the root of all good speech. I put that 16:23 entire speech on Bitcoin, but it took 183 transactions. 16:28 But the Borker protocol did it automatically. I just pasted the 16:31 speech in, hit enter and 183 transactions spanning, I don't know, 16:35 like five or six blocks, each linking to the prior one. 16:39 It's just a linked list is on Bitcoin. 16:41 And I posted the link to that transaction. The question is, 16:44 why are you on the 110 side? 16:49 Well, so I don't know. 16:53 I learned a lot over the last seven years. 16:57 I feel like I've, 16:59 you know, a lot has happened in my life and in my business. 17:03 And sure. But, you know, the idea that someone like Peter 17:05 Todd can't just come up with some other linked list, which, 17:09 of course, would take him 15 minutes. 17:13 Yeah. So. 17:16 I have come to recognize, 17:20 so we worked around the 83 byte limit, 17:23 but it was work. 17:25 It was far more costly to do it that way than 17:29 it would have otherwise been. 17:31 But even that could have been filtered out. 17:36 Right. Basically, for any method of embedding data, 17:42 there can emerge a method of of stopping. 17:47 And it's an endless cat and mouse game. 17:50 Every way of stopping it, the way of getting around it. 17:53 And, of course, at that point, you would a reasonable person 17:55 would look at the cost benefit on both sides of like, 17:58 how long does it take to coordinate the 110 soft fork? 18:03 Well, you're not even going to get, by the way, because 18:06 it's like probably nothing will happen on August 9th or whatever. 18:09 But but, you know, it's taking months and months of planning 18:12 versus then it just takes whoever wants to get around it. 18:15 Just like, you know, well, that's a very small amount of 18:18 effort. So I was very involved in the policy debates of 18:22 2025. OK, and and this was the essence of that debate 18:25 is, OK, well, you're going to you're going to filter some 18:30 type of transaction. And you need to get everyone on the 18:34 network. Right. Like 90 percent of the nodes on the network 18:36 to agree with your filter to adopt this filter for to 18:40 have any effect whatsoever. 18:42 I shouldn't say that it'll have some effect around maybe 80 18:45 percent. It's still kind of a quite imperfect figure, but above 18:49 90 and it starts to become quite effective. 18:53 So, one, you're going to be chasing this thing forever. 18:55 Cat and mouse. And two, even if you do get the 18:58 90 percent adoption, people can still build preferential relay networks 19:02 and sideload to miners. And this was the essence of the 19:05 debate. And where I came down on that debate was, yeah, 19:10 it's cat and mouse forever. 19:12 Preferential relay networks will emerge and can also be mitigated through 19:16 spoofed nodes, things like garbage man. 19:19 So there are basically, you know, offsetting 19:23 tool sets, but there's no way to win. 19:27 You just sort of this is a very small point, but 19:29 I think it's worth clarifying. It's not a matter of really 19:32 percent. It's not a matter of 80 percent or 90 percent. 19:34 It's like one adversary can can get around the wall. 19:38 That's what MARA did with Slipstream, right? 19:41 Essentially, the miners. It's not a matter of percent. 19:43 It's just the attacker can do as they like. You know, 19:46 the strong do as they like in the weak, suffer what 19:48 they must. Yeah. So there's there's two ways to get around. 19:52 I got to go point out just regarding the 19:56 preferential relay networks. While lever relay isn't 20:01 that great at dealing with spoofing. 20:04 We do have technology coming down that essentially deals with that 20:07 perfectly to the point where spoofing is just not a thing anymore. 20:19 Matt, your Borker protocol actually would have been more efficient and 20:23 less harmful to the network if you weren't forced to use 20:25 OP RETURN at 83 bytes. If you had your OP RETURN 20:28 already lifted to consensus, you would have just been able to 20:32 do one transaction with less overhead. 20:41 Because of the filter, we had to do 20:45 it differently. We had to put in more effort and more 20:49 cost. Now, we did it anyway. Well, I shouldn't say that. 20:53 We did this on Dogecoin because Bitcoin was going to be 20:56 too expensive. Now, that could have been the case even if 21:00 OP RETURN was open, just because fees in general are higher 21:02 on Bitcoin. But it 21:07 was not nothing. It was something. 21:09 It was an obstacle we had to work around. But if 21:12 there was sufficient demand for your service on Bitcoin, it could 21:15 have been just ported straight to Bitcoin regardless. The demand creates 21:19 the spam at the end of the day. 21:23 It's what keeps it around. Sure. Yeah. 21:25 I mean, someone can come up with something and if nobody 21:28 cares or wants it, it just fizzles away, which is what 21:30 we've seen a lot of the time. 21:33 And ultimately, it was the case with Borker. There were some 21:35 people that really, really liked this and thought it was just 21:38 the coolest thing ever. We had quite a few people interacting. 21:42 I'm sure at some point in the future, somebody might scan 21:45 the Dogecoin blockchain and find our markers and recreate the social 21:49 commentary that happened. 21:51 Probably not because nobody cares. But that was where we moved 21:55 on. It just wasn't interesting. 21:57 We're doing it at Start9. I think it's really, really interesting 22:00 and we love it and we think it's important. 22:02 What we were doing with Borker was like a science experiment. 22:05 We were just kicking rocks. 22:09 It was fine. Okay, so I got a follow-up question 22:12 to this. You weren't able to quite concisely define spam. 22:15 You said you know it when you see it. So, because 22:18 of the way that BIP-110, 22:20 which is a consensus change that potentially may cause a fork, 22:24 defines these eight rules of consensus to essentially eliminate spam, what 22:29 do you think about the fact in the future other types 22:33 of spam being defined? Because we don't have a clear definition 22:35 of these bytes are spam or these aren't. Some of the 22:39 views I could take, I guess, would be that potentially banks 22:41 are large buyers of block space. What about in the future? 22:43 Are those people that compete for that block space, then are 22:47 they spam? What if an actor uses inefficient transactions at scale? 22:51 What about whales just buying up block space for the sake 22:53 of buying up block space through monetary transactions? 22:56 It sounds like at the end of the day, 23:00 whatever is spam to somebody is really an attempt to reduce 23:04 competition of the free market and the mempool. 23:07 All right, well, let me do something here because I don't 23:09 want to monopolize this. I know this is a conversation 23:13 about forks in particular, and I feel like we're sliding into 23:16 the policy debate again. So let me do two things in 23:19 one. Quickly sum up why I think policy is the correct 23:23 place to be combating spam, however you define it, and not 23:27 consensus, right? And then we can actually talk about consensus. 23:30 Maybe I assume that's what Isabel wants to do. On the 23:33 policy side, I don't think anyone 23:37 on that side of the debate believes that spam can be 23:40 perpetually and effectively fought using soft forks. 23:44 They're slow, they're contentious, they're risky. 23:49 It's not the right tool in the toolbox for something that 23:53 can move so fast, 23:55 like different ways of embedding data of which there are infinite 23:58 and arbitrary. So you need an equally agile 24:03 tool, right? So if somebody comes up with some new protocol 24:06 of embedding data, 24:09 at first, you don't care. You don't care that it exists. 24:12 You don't need to react at all, right? Because it doesn't 24:14 matter. It's not a nuisance. There's nobody using it. 24:17 And as it starts to grow, maybe you start to take 24:20 notice. And you're like, hey, there's this thing and it's kind 24:23 of becoming a nuisance. And there's this niche market that is 24:27 like really hitting it. Or maybe it's literally an attack, right? 24:31 Like maybe somebody well funded is just trying to spam the 24:33 network in order to flood it and raise fees, whatever. 24:37 At some point, you okay, we should we should react to 24:42 this. And it's not a fork, right? 24:44 It's either an update to the node software, like the 24:49 newest version of core or not has this filter built in. 24:53 Or there is a method of sideloading 24:57 filters, which is what we proposed, right? Like our proposal to 25:00 the Bitcoin mailing list in 2025 was something that we called 25:04 user defines dynamic filters, which would have removed policy from Bitcoin 25:08 altogether would have removed the policy code policy dot CPP from 25:12 Bitcoin forever and replaced it basically 25:16 with a function call where it's just like, 25:21 you know, a transaction comes in. 25:23 And your node says, is this thing standard, and it sends 25:27 it off to a sidecar, it sends it off to like 25:30 a different engine. And you can load whatever scripts you want 25:33 into that engine, they could be, you know, JavaScript scripts, or 25:36 Lua scripts, it doesn't really matter just the scripting engine. And 25:39 if all the scripts pass with, you know, zero, then it 25:42 comes back and it's like, yep, this is standard accepted into 25:45 the mempool relay. And if any of them fail, it drops 25:49 it. And so we thought this was really, really clever, because 25:52 it would have allowed Bitcoin Core as an organization to 25:56 wipe their hands of policy forever, and just outsource it to 25:59 this community driven community adopted second 26:04 layer to network of spam filters. 26:07 And just sort of like antivirus filters exist for your computer, 26:11 right? Sure, Windows and Mac might ship some. 26:14 Yeah, but he's also missing the point, like, imagine those filters 26:17 just filtered everything. And then Peter Todd builds Libre one Libre relay. 26:21 And the miners connect to it, because 26:24 Sorry, 26:27 guys, can we dog? Yeah, you're 26:32 right. You're right. Oh, man, I really backslid there. 26:36 Yeah. So policy behind it didn't work. 26:39 Okay. Like, we couldn't agree. A huge chunk of the community 26:42 decided, all right, we really want to do filtering and policy. 26:47 And so we're going to soft fork to eliminate the current, 26:51 current, you know, methods of embedding data that are being 26:55 abused. Knowing that there are others that will emerge. 26:59 However, the success of the soft fork will one eliminate those 27:02 methods, potentially causing some harm to the capital that has been 27:06 invested in them as a punishment, so to speak. 27:11 And secondly, we'll reassert the community's will to 27:16 fight spam in policy, that is the hope of BIP-110 27:19 is that if BIP-110 succeeds, 27:21 what it does is it doesn't portend future soft 27:26 forks to fight spam, it brings policy back into the debate. 27:30 That's the point. 27:57 theoretically activates. 27:58 But yeah, Chris, go ahead. 28:26 is like a guardrail against a transaction relay, 28:31 where the underlying like risk is a resource exhaustion. 28:36 So like the protection of your node is the objective of 28:40 policy. It's not deciding whether a 28:45 economically like valid use case of block space is legitimate. 28:48 And like historically, 28:51 in addition to that, like the direction has always been to 28:53 remove or to relax those very policy guardrails. 28:58 So that's the software is like, I don't know, from Parliament, 29:03 like multi sick, like went from non standard to standard. 29:07 went from zero to 80. 29:10 And not went down to 40. Again, but then now we 29:13 removed it. So various script constructions became reliable. 29:19 And today, like any, like, resource consumption problem appears. 29:23 And then the goal is not to fix it by like 29:26 a policy filter, but by just writing better software, which 29:30 we've seen with core version 3031 32. 29:33 Like there have been tremendous amounts of efforts put into making 29:38 even low compute hardware like Raspi still re index and yeah, 29:43 be able to participate and sink to the chain tip, even 29:47 though we are like 17 years in. So like these, these 29:51 additional restrictions that the policy has brought, we're never to 29:56 to to mitigate or make spam more expensive. 29:58 It's always just resource economics. 30:01 Like we have a dust filter we have. 30:03 What is it low as like these are like just for 30:07 like transactional ability or like other things, but they're never to 30:11 decide, you know, what kind of valid use case do I 30:15 personally deem as worthy of block space? 30:18 Like, I think Portland said, like, the definition of spam is 30:21 any transaction other than mine. I want to be in the 30:25 block. I don't care about your transaction. 30:27 And yeah, really, a policy will never go back to being 30:31 a spam mitigation because it never was. 30:34 So like, it's always about disproportionate CPU and memory cost. 30:39 And like, we, we surprisingly, 30:41 like, if all the spam went into up return, it 30:45 would be the most resource efficient way to to like deal 30:49 with this data for like a Raspberry Pi. So it is 30:52 about dust protection. It's not about spam. 30:55 And if you can't even agree on spam, 30:59 like, how would be ever, you know, gets Peter thoughts to 31:02 stop spamming our notes. So it doesn't make any sense to 31:05 have this discussion in policy. 31:07 Adding on to this before we move on to like consensus, 31:11 like consensus is way too slow to act on that. 31:14 So like the only way in moving forward, if you don't 31:17 want people to waste their Bitcoin on like 31:21 data embedding, make it expensive for them. 31:24 Because, you know, tragedy of the commons, if nobody uses it, 31:28 people will put graffiti, whatever on the Taj Mahal. 31:32 But if there's enough people there, and if you bring all 31:34 your friends, we have a lot of visitors and nobody can 31:38 put graffiti on the Taj Mahal. So instead of playing a 31:41 cat and mouse game, which you can never win. 31:44 Yeah, the only winning move is not to play, just get 31:46 more people into this building. And we don't have to 31:50 soft fork every six months. 31:56 One thing I want to quickly point out is most of 32:00 the policy rules in Bitcoin Core are really about making 32:06 sure people don't prematurely use upgrade hooks. 32:09 That is things like weird transaction version numbers, 32:13 you know, op nops, op successes, etc. And one way you 32:17 can think about that is the goal there is so that 32:19 if you have a Bitcoin Core node and you're mining with 32:22 it, after a soft fork, you should still be producing valid 32:26 blocks, provided that other people are producing valid blocks. 32:30 And this commercial demand, if you will, for violating 32:34 those upgrade hooks is low. 32:39 I was on the topics of like forks and consensus versus 32:43 policy. Policy does not present any risk of forking. 32:47 Consensus does. And consensus essentially is when like BIP-110 or 32:51 whatever, it's essentially participants on networks saying I need these rules 32:56 to be enforced, versus it's okay if mempool 33:00 essentially accepts, but the blocks will contain that information will be 33:04 considered valid. That's actually a really great segue. 33:08 I want to hear a little bit more. I want to 33:09 understand the technical risks or have like explainers for the audience 33:13 of the technical risks of this particular soft fork. 33:16 But before we do that, Leo, yeah, jump in. 33:19 Yeah, not to drag us into the weeds on the Vorker 33:23 stuff too much more. But basically, I still don't understand 33:27 the motivation for why you've sort of had this change of heart, 33:33 Matt. And I would love if you wanted to take one 33:35 more stab at maybe explaining and I'm almost just giving you 33:38 an opportunity here because I think there's this default assumption. 33:40 And I'm not the one saying this, but I've heard people 33:43 say it, that this is sort of a sales strategy for 33:46 your company. Right. And I've seen a lot of KOLs on 33:49 X basically spread a pervasive lie to the Bitcoin Knots and 33:54 BIP-110 community over the past couple of years, that if 33:57 you have a certain amount of nodes running relay filter 34:01 policy stuff that are blocking these, you know, spam 34:06 transactions, quote unquote, from being relayed around the Bitcoin network. 34:09 There's some magical number, you know, 80 percent, 90 percent, 95 34:13 percent, where all of a sudden you guys have this glorious 34:17 victory and there's no longer spam. 34:19 And I think a couple individuals on here already pointed out 34:22 that through preferential pairing, through dark pools, there's 34:27 many ways that even, you know, one person, a dozen 34:31 running a dozen nodes of preferential pairing, running a single inscription 34:36 website that you can connect your wallet to and pay them 34:39 to inscribe something for you gets around, you know, literally a 34:43 billion Start9 nodes running this sort of policy stuff. 34:47 Right. So I just don't understand why. 34:51 I don't understand why so many people have come to me 34:56 telling me that I'm screwed because they're about to take over 35:00 the network with their nodes and like the amount of misinformation 35:04 and miseducation that these people have is it's very shocking to 35:07 me how uninformed they are. And I just wanted to hear 35:11 from you, you know, that default assumption is that you are 35:15 part of this kind of lie because it's very profitable for 35:19 your company. And I wanted to hear from yourself, you know, 35:23 if you think that characterization by a lot of people is 35:25 correct or if you wanted to defend yourself. Oh, God, that's so loaded. 35:31 I want to be very cautious right now and respectful of 35:35 the topic of this. 35:37 I am happy to answer that. I'm not dodging at all. 35:40 I just it's nuanced. 35:43 And, and there's some history, right? 35:46 And there's going to be objections. And it's just going to 35:49 it's going to sort of drag us back into the why 35:52 I think policy filters 35:56 adopted at scale result in effective rate limiting of 36:00 of certain types of transactions in an emergent way, right? 36:04 No single party gets to like decide what is spam and 36:08 what should be rate limited. But if through an emergent process 36:11 of everyone making individual decisions on the edges, if there 36:16 emerges consensus, right, a super majority of people, I shouldn't have 36:19 used the word consensus, there emerges a super majority of nodes 36:22 like 90% plus why that actually is a highly effective 36:26 tool to rate limit the spam 36:31 on Bitcoin. It's just not the topic of this. 36:34 So I just I just explained to you that it literally 36:37 has zero impact. You guys haven't stopped a single inscription from 36:40 going on chain. There's 126 million of these files on Bitcoin. 36:44 So are you basically just saying you agree that there's a 36:47 magical number of these nodes? And that's that is your belief. 36:50 I assume you don't actually believe that. 36:53 But it sounds like maybe you're saying that you do. 36:56 I would love to just hear like maybe specifically on that point. 37:00 What do you think actually happens when 90% of the Bitcoin 37:03 network is Start9 knots nodes? Like what do you what 37:06 do you think happens? Do you think we can't inscribe anymore? 37:08 Do you think anything changes? Because I'm telling you, like, it's 37:11 simply a fact that it doesn't. It would have 37:16 the effect that you would not be able to use the 37:18 primary peer to peer network to get those transactions 37:23 to miners. I've done the math on this. 37:26 Go ahead. 37:29 Yeah, I've done the math on this. The number the percent 37:32 of nodes before you start having issues on your first like 37:36 set of peers, 125 or sorry, I use 10 in my 37:39 example is 94% of nodes need to be running a relay 37:44 policy. That does not mean you can literally just disconnect your 37:47 node and restart it to get a new set of peers. 37:50 The ultimate filter for policy exists at the level of mining. 37:54 Miners control what go into the blocks. If the miners ignore 37:56 the policy, it doesn't matter how many peers run a filter. 38:01 The miners, if a transaction can get to them, it will 38:04 and it will get mined. And also as a note, as 38:08 a note, there were basically super nodes peering with 10, 000 38:11 peers ran really loose policy. 38:14 Sorry. Can you explain? No, no, no. I want to just 38:16 like, like, have full clarity on this 94% number. 38:20 So this math means that 94% of nodes need to be 38:24 running filters in order exactly for what in order for individuals 38:29 to not be able to use public mempool in order to 38:32 get inscription transactions through consistently. 38:35 Let's pretend we're filtering. Let's pretend we're filtering inscriptions today. 38:38 Okay. At 0% filter on the broader network. 38:41 My method is will the first attempt to send raw transaction. 38:45 That means I have this transaction. I want to send it 38:48 to the network at 0% filters. There's 100% success rate. 38:51 It's going to get to a minor because of the fact 38:53 that it will propagate at 50%. 38:56 That number is still 100% almost. 38:58 And then only once you get up to 94%, 39:03 do you actually start hitting 75% was my measurement of 39:07 a success rate. So you lose 25% of the time you're 39:10 going to fail. That's a 94%. 39:13 And so with that stated, yeah, that was my metric. 39:18 And I did this at pleb fine. 39:20 So I think also, so this is like an important point 39:24 is like is one. One thing I just want to be 39:27 clear what you know what the scenario we're talking about is 39:31 when someone isn't even trying to get their transaction correct. 39:34 That's when you know they're not doing anything interesting. 39:37 Like when they're actually trying the number is essentially 99. 39:41 999% Yeah, that is absolutely correct. 39:45 And a note here is I used a default 10 connections 39:49 outbound on this note. I didn't even do the hey my 39:52 ports open I get inbound as well. So I thought of 39:55 it from the worst case perspective from trying to get a 39:59 transaction out to the network and the number is still insanely 40:01 high in terms of the number of nodes that need to 40:04 be running this to even make it have any effect on 40:08 somebody trying to broadcast a transaction at all. 40:10 Unless you have a number higher than that nobody even noticed 40:12 that it existed. 40:14 Really, and in practice, I mean the way the way people 40:17 use things like inscriptions usually they just do it through third 40:20 party websites anyway, the third party website can go and do 40:22 whatever they need to go make this stuff work. 40:25 mempool. space right there appeared very, very well, you can literally 40:29 just use their broadcast transaction, and you will very likely bypass 40:34 filters, even at that rate, or that that percentage. 40:37 Rob, do you want to jump in? 40:40 I would love to, since we're like 45 minutes in, I 40:43 don't want to try and moderate the panel, but we have 40:46 a soft fork happening in nine days, and the consensus stuff 40:50 is way more interesting at this point to talk about where 40:53 we're at. Okay, so Rob, do you want to maybe take 40:57 a crack at just actually like sort of explaining like, okay, 41:00 what's going to happen on August 9th? What can people expect? 41:03 And for me personally, I'm just like, okay, like, what are 41:05 the risks to users? Like, what do users on the mining 41:08 side and the node runner side, and just general users of 41:12 Bitcoin kind of need to understand or what should they be 41:14 concerned about in terms of risks associated with what is going 41:18 to go down on August 9th? Yeah, and we do have 41:21 two forks that we're talking about, because Paul is here too, 41:24 right? And so there's a clear difference up front between a 41:26 hard fork and a soft fork. 41:28 Paul has a set block height, and at that time, there'll 41:31 be a new set of rules being applied, whereas the BIP 41:33 110 one is a soft fork, which is, you could best 41:37 say, an attempt to try and bring everyone along with them, 41:40 whereas Paul is explicitly changing rules in a way that would 41:43 just cause an immediate break off, and you have to run 41:45 Paul's software specifically to make that happen, right? 41:48 So just to lay out there, for August 9th, this is 41:51 depending on where you are in the world, because it's either 41:53 the evening of August 8th or the morning of August 9th, 41:56 there is going to be the end of a difficulty adjustment 42:00 period, and with that is going to a set block height 42:04 in which new rules, there's a divergence between 42:09 consensus of what nodes will accept. 42:12 The default nodes don't do anything, the BIP-110 42:17 user-activated soft fork nodes are now looking for 42:21 blocks to be produced with a certain version bit. 42:24 This is what's called mandatory signaling. With mandatory signaling, there 42:28 are no consensus rules being enforced yet, it's just a requirement 42:32 that the miners, when they produce blocks, must have a particular 42:36 version bit in their block header flipped on, saying that they're 42:38 aware of this thing happening, and it's something that they're signaling 42:43 for interest in being able to build upon. 42:46 The initial thought is that, 42:49 one, at that moment in time, if you want to be 42:51 very risk-averse, as a user of the Bitcoin network, you 42:54 would hold off on transacting on Bitcoin for a time until 42:57 you see an emerging consensus of blocks being built on 43:01 one chain or the other. 43:04 Once we hit that block height, the more blocks that get 43:08 built on a given chain, the higher confidence you could have 43:11 at that point. As of today, we have one 43:15 and a half, two percent of hash rate that are signaling 43:19 already today for BIP-110, 43:22 the remaining 98% are not. 43:26 The first time after this mandatory signaling period starts, there 43:30 is a block which does not signal, there will be a 43:33 split in consensus, a chain split between the BIP-110 nodes 43:37 and the non-BIP-110 nodes. From a risk-averse perspective, 43:40 if you're transacting on Bitcoin, maybe you wait a couple hours. 43:43 If you are a miner, you should be aware that 43:47 this is happening to monitor both sides of the chain, and 43:51 understand what's happening, 43:53 and understand that if you mine on the wrong chain as 43:56 a miner, your work may get thrown out, and that goes 43:59 for both sides of the chain. If you build on 44:04 top of the mandatory signaling, and the rest of the network 44:07 does not care, you will have put the energy to make 44:09 that block for no economic upside, because that chain will be 44:13 different, and vice versa as well. 44:16 There's one small caveat that's often made within the game theory 44:19 of these, is that the BIP-110 nodes are a subset 44:22 of the consensus rules that the other nodes follow, and what 44:25 that means is, hypothetically, you could have a situation where the 44:29 BIP-110 chain can wipe out the work of the other 44:31 miners. I would, as a closing comment, say, at the current 44:35 levels of hash rate, that does not seem likely. BIP 148, 44:38 which is the SegWit soft fork, the last user-activated soft 44:42 fork that, you know, had something like this happening, we had 70% 44:46 of miners flipping the BIP showing signaling. 44:50 Today, it is 1% to 2%. 44:52 While it's often pointed to as a comparison, it's not really 44:55 the same in terms of network adoption. Just for clarity, Rob, 44:59 does this mean, I mean, if you're a miner, and you're 45:03 just completely financially motivated, and you really don't care, you just 45:06 don't want to lose money, right? Is the recommendation to just 45:10 be mining on whatever chain just has the most hash rate, 45:14 essentially, at any given point in time, and that's really all 45:18 you can do, and if something goes wrong, that's, you know, 45:21 you did the best you could? I think there's a very, 45:25 very big caveat there, which is that many people 45:29 believe that the BIP-110 chain is going to be propped 45:33 up by rented hash power. And in that circumstance, even 45:38 if you're a miner who just wants to, you know, go 45:40 with the flow, if you will, you've got to think a 45:42 little more long term than like the next X blocks, because 45:45 it may be the case that this rented hash power is 45:48 active for like a day or two, then just all goes 45:49 offline when they run out of money. And under that circumstance, 45:52 you may still think through, you know, a week or two 45:55 ahead and say, well, I'm still going to mine on core 45:58 rules rather than, like, preemptively 46:03 switch, if you will. Now, that's complicated by the 46:07 fact that this is soft fork. So, you know, it may 46:10 be the case that, like, say there's 25% hash power on 46:13 BIP-110 chain, and some people would argue, no, no, you should go switch. 46:18 Whereas under this circumstance, you know, you probably should, even, 46:22 you know, especially taking into account rented hash power. 46:25 But it's, you know, it's a complex thing. And I think 46:28 the good thing is more likely than not, they're going to 46:31 be under 10%. And this will be a pretty clear decision. 46:33 But let's say it is 10%. 46:36 The recommendation for people just doing transactions remains very true. 46:41 Because even just by luck, you know, the moment BIP-110 46:49 mandatory activation enables, 46:52 it's quite possible for you to just get that sort of 46:54 one in 100 chance that's, or sorry, like one in 100 46:58 chance that you get, say, two, you know, two block reorg, 47:01 which is much more likely than it usually is. 47:04 So basically, yeah, wait for more confirmations around that exact moment. 47:07 Yeah. And one last thing, there actually may be a hidden 47:09 third fork, which may appear this month, because Luke and Mechanic 47:13 have already signaled in the event that the Bitcoin network refuses 47:17 to follow them, they will hard fork to do a proof 47:20 of work change. So they are very coy on talking about 47:24 the details of that. But there could be even a third 47:27 fork, which means that this month, we'll have one soft fork 47:29 and two hard forks. 47:32 What was what is the point of the third fork? Like, 47:34 what is it? It's because so once you have the chain 47:37 split, and you have one side, basically, the BIP-110 side does not get adopted. 47:42 The belief is at that point that they need to change 47:46 the proof of work algorithm to fire the miners because they 47:48 have shown to be malicious because they disagree with Luke. 47:51 And because they disagree with Luke, they are no longer allowed 47:54 to be part of the Bitcoin network. And to change the 47:57 proof of work algorithm is a hard fork. And Luke has 48:00 precedent for this. He wrote code changes to change the proof 48:03 of work algo a decade ago. You can go on GitHub 48:06 and you can see the commit. So it's something he may 48:08 very well have in his pocket waiting to kind of drop. 48:13 They've said that to discuss the hard fork is to increase 48:16 the likelihood that the hard fork would happen, which is why 48:18 the BIP-110 proponents do not engage around the 48:23 mechanisms of them doing a hard fork. 48:26 Well, the reason why they would need a hard fork is 48:28 because if they don't obtain the hash rate, that their chain 48:31 will continue to produce blocks at a very, very slow pace 48:34 until they have to hard fork because you can't just soft 48:37 fork in an easier difficulty or a proof of work change. 48:41 You have to literally go in and then say, hey, update 48:43 your nodes because we're going to change this so that we 48:46 can get the chain reset so we can produce blocks at 48:49 a decent rate. That's why the chain's insecure then, right? 48:52 If you have 1% of the hash rate, the rest of 48:54 the network could 51% attack you trivially at a moment's notice. 48:58 So you need to change the proof of work algorithm to 49:00 keep your security. And can I can I also bring up 49:02 the fact of like, okay, like why would transacting potentially be 49:06 dangerous in this very small chance of a like, basically 49:11 your chain gets wiped out and that there are two reasons 49:13 for that. One is replay. So because there is no replay 49:17 protection, any money that you move on one chain, if you're 49:21 110 or the standard chain, it's going to move on the 49:24 other side as long as that UTXO still exists. 49:27 And the other side of this is if you take a 49:29 payment on one side and that chain gets wiped out, that 49:33 transaction probably is on the other side, but it is not 49:37 a guarantee. So that's kind of why you wait for it 49:39 to settle and you determine the winner of this, which I 49:43 believe will be very quick and concise before you basically accept 49:47 transactions or even if you you spend on one chain, just 49:50 like understand it's moving on both sides potentially. 49:54 And just for clarity, if the reason that they execute a 49:57 hard fork is because they didn't have enough miner support to 50:01 get a soft fork over the line, doesn't that, you know, 50:04 mean that this hard fork risk is going to be pretty 50:07 negligible by definition in terms of just like how it could 50:11 potentially harm Bitcoin users? Like it sounds like at that point, 50:14 they're just sort of by definition would be creating like some 50:17 minority shit coin, essentially, excuse my language. 50:21 Yes. 50:22 Yeah. 50:24 This would be the exact same this would be the exact 50:28 same scenario as Paul Sztorc's hard fork, where the only concern 50:31 there is maybe you want to do replay protection. 50:34 And now one thing we should have a conversation. 50:38 Yeah. Yeah. Well, one thing one thing that actually comes to 50:41 mind, I don't know if anyone's pointed out is another approach 50:45 that they may go use to go and 50:49 potentially get their get their chain back moving fast 50:53 enough in a reasonable amount of time might actually be some 50:56 kind of time warp attack on their own chain. 50:59 I haven't actually thought through the details. You can't do it. 51:02 Portland and I thought through this already. You can't do it. 51:04 Oh, you did? Yeah. Well, they're already going to be achieving 51:08 the maximal difficulty adjustment because they have such a low hash 51:12 rate that the time warp attack doesn't really make much sense 51:14 anyways. They still have to get through the first and second 51:17 and third difficulty periods. 51:19 Yeah. Perfect. There's your answer. Yeah. The problem is that basically 51:23 to do the time warp attack to get your minus 75 51:25 if you wanted to go this route, you would still need to produce 51:30 2016 blocks. If you're producing a block a day, that's three 51:33 years before your chain is able to get to your first 51:36 minus 75 percent, which if you take three years to get 51:40 that far anyways and you get to your first difficulty adjustment, 51:43 even if you were honest about your timestamps, you would still 51:45 get your minus 75 percent. That's not a concern. 51:49 And yeah, and it will be the key value will be 51:51 the one hundred block maturity period also, because in this case, 51:54 it's normally just one day, but it's so slow. 51:57 In this case, it would be so long that people will 52:00 despair of ever collecting. They have to pay one hundred percent 52:02 of the cost. I just want to clear. 52:05 So I worry 52:06 just a quick thing with 100 blocks. So I do have 52:09 to point out that they could go and apply a financial 52:13 solution to this by having people go mine to their accounts 52:16 and pay them out. So, you know, that's not that's not 52:18 a guarantee that that it's true, but it's kind of just 52:22 shifting the risk. And that does help letting you do like 52:25 specialization of labor. But basically, it's just pushing the risk on 52:29 to whoever's willing to assume it. 52:31 So I think it's still an interesting thing that I think 52:34 a lot of people would overlook that the miners don't get 52:37 paid at all until there's one hundred people behind 52:41 you in line basically to get paid. 52:44 And so but I just want to boil it down. Most 52:46 people listening, I think we can boil it down to like 52:49 there's basically only two scenarios possible. And then the first one 52:53 is more likely is that this the one ten soft fork 52:57 just fails completely and it doesn't it fails to get, 53:01 for example, even one hundred blocks and basically nothing happens. 53:03 And it's very, very embarrassing for one ten. And it is 53:06 just like a bloodbath crushing defeat. 53:09 I suppose we have to acknowledge that the second possibility, I 53:12 mean, basically hinges on whether or not a large percent of 53:15 hashrate joins one ten or does not. 53:17 And they try to draw comparisons to SegWit, which is a 53:21 whole different thing we could discuss that I think this is 53:24 nothing like SegWit. But really, it does hinge on, you know, 53:28 because even SegWit had something like 20 something percent. 53:31 It was 70 percent called the last two weeks before activation. 53:35 It was 71 percent of blocks had the bit flipped. 53:39 71. 53:40 But for SegWit, but I was talking about even during the 53:43 contentious SegWit2x period, it was like, oh, yeah, and even 53:46 the people between 30 and 40 during that period, I suppose 53:50 we can now since if people want to talk about this, 53:52 we can go down the list right now about the long 53:55 list of differences between SegWit and one ten there, of which 53:59 there are two that are very, very big, very significant. 54:03 The first is even the miners who didn't like SegWit openly 54:07 admitted that it had nothing to do with SegWit at all. 54:09 They liked SegWit and they thought it was a good idea. 54:12 They were just kind of like holding it hostage, so to 54:15 speak. So you can't hold something hostage unless you think it's 54:18 valuable. You know what I mean? You don't hold like a 54:20 bag of trash hostage. They liked everyone. 54:23 It was totally and one million percent agreed throughout 54:27 the whole. And this kind of bleeds into my second reason, 54:30 which is that SegWit was to support lightning. There had been 54:33 like a multi-year 54:35 process involving the scaling Bitcoin conferences. 54:38 SegWit had been discussed. Everyone like knew about it at the 54:41 time. It was constantly discussed on social media. 54:44 Even normal people kind of knew about it. 54:46 And and so this this idea that it's related that, you 54:50 know, what they have done, Luke and and Chris and these 54:53 other people, they have extrapolated the situation where not me, the 54:57 other Chris, Chris G. 55:02 They have extrapolated the situation where it's like one tiny minority 55:05 of nodes can just 55:08 do a a transaction. And another thing is that we 55:12 could just keep going down this road, but there's a long 55:14 list of reasons. I'll stop after this third one. 55:17 But really, SegWit was not about shrinking the quantity of 55:21 transactions and neither is what I'm going for with BIP300 and 55:25 with eCash hard fork is also part of expanding the 55:28 quantity of transactions. And also that was kind of what SegWit 55:31 was trying to do as well. Even if you ignored the 55:34 block size increase and just forgot about it for a second 55:37 so that it's not distracting. The idea of SegWit was that 55:40 you take, you know, there would be new types of L1 55:42 transaction possible. So the whole thing was expanding the network, 55:47 expanding the use cases, whereas 1. 10 is shrinking things. 55:52 It does a whole lot else besides, but that's some things 55:54 I want to mention. But I wanted to really get that 55:56 point in there, but we can shrink it to two scenarios. 55:58 One is just basically fails long before it would have even 56:01 activated in the mandatory signaling period, which is August 8th, 9th. 56:05 And then the second possibility is that for whatever reason, the 56:09 miners feel bullied or they just decide to just 56:13 for fun experiment. You know, 56:19 whatever, they just decide to do 1. 56:21 10. We don't have to rethink about what exactly happened, but 56:24 I suppose it's possible that they get some kind of large 56:27 hash rate majority and then everyone else falls in line and 56:31 jumps on to that. And in that case, I don't think 56:34 it would really be because of the spam. 56:37 I think it would just be because they didn't want to. 56:40 It would say a bunch of other weird things we'd have 56:42 to investigate and figure out. But those are really the only 56:45 two possibilities as far as I see it. 56:48 And of course, the first is very, very likely because as 56:51 people have pointed out, that even now when the signaling is 56:55 cheap, the signal doesn't cost anything at all. 56:58 It's still only at 1%. 57:01 And even the 1% could be fake because you 57:05 could just signal, but then not when push comes to shove, 57:07 not be willing to do it. So those are some things 57:09 I wanted to clarify. I mean, the phrase signaling is 57:14 cheap is a little tricky here, though, because one of their 57:16 strategies could be to have agreements to rent a ton of 57:19 hash power and start signaling in a large quantity, or 57:23 maybe combine this with some sort of attack on 57:27 the current Bitcoin Core group of miners to try to get 57:31 their hash rate to go down for whatever reason. 57:37 Yeah, it's all cheap talk because anyone could rent the hash 57:40 rate for any reason, or they could say, 57:43 our plan is to lull them into a false sense of 57:47 security by not signaling until the last minute in order to 57:50 build momentum. And so that's why the whole field of game 57:53 theory has this cheap talk idea about like, there's nothing like 57:57 harming you if you signal, 57:59 you know, if you signal for 1. 10 and then back 58:02 out, or vice versa. So it's kind of like, what does 58:05 it really mean? This is all like a bizarre reinterpretation of BIP9. 58:10 And so it's interesting that Peter and I know how this 58:12 all came to be. 58:16 I don't think it's worth boring everyone else with it. But 58:18 originally, the signaling was like as a courtesy, and originally is 58:22 95%. But it's not really that important for anyone listening. 58:26 So it doesn't matter. One funny note, renting hash rate after 58:29 the mandatory signaling split happens, you can rent hash for 58:34 the non 1. 10 side and in the random chance that 58:37 rollback happens that the 1. 10 proponents say, then you get 58:40 your money back anyway. 58:44 Peter, I'm curious if you can just 58:50 quickly explain also this like poison block attack risk. 58:53 I'm like hearing rumblings about a potential poison block attack 58:58 against core perspectively, although I guess it could go 59:02 either way. But how would that work? And like, how concerned 59:05 should we be about something like that? And what would that mean? 59:09 I think Portland's the one to talk about this. 59:12 No, Peter can go. That's fine. 59:16 Yeah, I'll give my shot at it. So it is true 59:19 in Portland's and certainly put a lot of thought into this. 59:22 But essentially, we're using the term poison block here 59:26 for a block that is trying to go and take advantage 59:30 of sort of quadratic slowdowns related to 59:35 signature hashing. And that's one of the things the Great Consensus 59:37 Cleanup wants to go and fix. And this basically happens because 59:41 signature hashing inversion, you know, the very first version of Bitcoin 59:44 just wasn't designed very well. So you can make the validation 59:47 time kind of blow up from quadratically. 59:50 Now, 59:52 concretely, what this means is, you can make a block that 59:55 just takes a very long time to validate. 59:58 And there may be with I mean, first of all, the 1:00:00 there are there have been a bit not not 1:00:04 people who said that they would do, you know, some kind 1:00:07 of attack like this would happen. No clear details or anything. 1:00:12 But there's been rumblings of it. And maybe one way this 1:00:15 could play out is maybe they use this against core by 1:00:19 mining blocks that are not BIP-110 1:00:23 compliant, that try to disrupt mining 1:00:28 on the core chain, you can't do it. 1:00:31 Well, I don't think it's that simple. Like, They can 1:00:36 potentially use some hash power to try to mine blocks like 1:00:39 that, and the outcome of 1:00:43 this may not be directly trying to make money off of 1:00:46 this. It may be a PR attack. It may be something 1:00:49 where they're trying to go and just disrupt things to try 1:00:53 to convince hashers, ultimately placing their hash power to go switch. 1:00:59 I agree with you saying that, yeah, this isn't 1:01:03 necessarily a profit-making attack, but there are potentially ways you 1:01:06 can go spin this PR-wise. Now, the good thing about 1:01:09 this is you do get warning because to set up these 1:01:12 kinds of attacks, you've got to go create blocks with transactions 1:01:15 with old-school script pubkeys in them that 1:01:20 contain basically a lot of checks. You get warning that this 1:01:23 is happening, but it is something that they could go do 1:01:25 just before and try to go play the PR game and 1:01:28 say, hey, our stuff goes as quick as this. 1:01:31 Look at how the core chain fails to go stop spam. 1:01:34 I was going to state that they 1:01:39 would need basically about 150 blocks worth of setup 1:01:43 transactions to get a decent payload out to cause 1:01:48 a DOS block, essentially, to be put out to the network. 1:01:51 Those blocks would contain fully transactions that would be seen on 1:01:55 mempool. space, non-standard transactions, op check sig, 1:02:00 a bunch of data, op check sig. 1:02:02 Essentially, that's why I think it's impossible at this point to 1:02:05 really pull off because even if they use MARA's hash rate 1:02:08 starting today, I don't think they could get enough setup transactions 1:02:12 into the chain. 1:02:14 They're buying all of MARA's blocks through Slipstream, and that's not 1:02:17 even allowed through Slipstream, but let's just entertain it. 1:02:21 I don't think by August 8th or 9th they could pull 1:02:24 off a DOS block. Even if they had, they couldn't get 1:02:27 enough setup transactions into the chain. And then as a side note, 1:02:32 you could also do the same thing to Nott's nodes to 1:02:36 a degree because BIP-110 doesn't actually stop DOS blocks completely. 1:02:40 There's also the script sig way. 1:02:43 If you do a pay2script hash transaction, you can create a 1:02:47 less powerful DOS block. But yeah, I just don't see at 1:02:50 this point the ability for an attacker to set up a 1:02:54 true DOS block to kind of like, hey, our Nott's nodes 1:02:57 are protected from this with BIP-110, and the core nodes aren't, 1:03:00 so I'm going to lob this thing at them. You're right, 1:03:02 reputational damage could occur because if a pool like MARA starts 1:03:06 mining these transactions, these setup transactions, people will get very upset. 1:03:10 Like, why are you doing this? But the actual ability to 1:03:13 execute on that will be incredibly low. 1:03:17 I agree with you there, and I think this overlaps 1:03:21 with them renting hash power in degrees that we didn't expect. 1:03:28 Hypothetically, if they go and convince Foundry, maybe, but the 1:03:33 time window is certainly running out, so you do get warned. 1:03:35 Yeah, and the fact is, miner centralization as well right now 1:03:39 is kind of like becoming a guardian of the network too. 1:03:42 Like I've said this for a couple of years, these publicly 1:03:45 traded companies or whatnot, they don't want to be mining these 1:03:48 blocks. MARA will not mine these setup transactions for that reason, 1:03:52 right? It would be reputational damage to the company. 1:03:54 Foundry doesn't want to be caught mining these blocks. 1:03:57 F2Pool probably doesn't want to be caught mining these blocks. 1:04:00 Are there any other kind of risks or 1:04:05 set of preventions or precautions that either miners or 1:04:09 node runners should be aware of and executing 1:04:14 on before August 9th? 1:04:18 So one thing we haven't gone and brought up is legal attack. 1:04:23 And it may be that the Knots guys come up with 1:04:26 some kind of legal attack against, especially publicly traded miners in 1:04:30 the U. S. I mean, maybe it's something as simple as 1:04:32 just filing lawsuits. Maybe it's something as convoluted as putting 1:04:37 data in the core chain and trying to go and wind 1:04:40 up with some legal theft. It's hard to say. Now, the 1:04:43 one good thing is the fact there is a mandatory signaling 1:04:47 period where these rules aren't enforced could potentially 1:04:51 mean that you could disrupt this to a degree by mining 1:04:55 blocks on the Knots side that mine the transactions 1:05:00 they're claiming are bad or so on. 1:05:02 But like I say, it's a legal attack, and that's kind 1:05:04 of it's a harder thing to go predict. 1:05:08 Paul, I'm wondering if now's a good time for us to 1:05:11 maybe kind of chat a little bit more about eCash 1:05:13 specifically and kind of what people can expect when eCash 1:05:17 goes live. I mean, like, how would you TLDR that for people? 1:05:25 Creative destruction and chaos. Well, you know, the irony is I 1:05:29 planned out and announced this months in 1:05:33 advance what 1. 10 is going to like kind of do 1:05:36 like scrambling at the last minute, which is very bizarre, because 1:05:39 I was kind of like, well, hey, there's we have it's 1:05:42 very simple. There's many ways in which it's very similar, which 1:05:45 is ironic to me, because I think that, you know, it's 1:05:48 also like they have just some of the worst ideas in 1:05:50 the whole world. And I think I have really good we 1:05:53 have really good ideas over there. 1:05:55 But basically, I have also put out a soft 1:06:00 fork, which is BIP300/301, which is the enforcer that 1:06:03 anyone could run at any time. And we could activate it 1:06:05 with hash rate support. And it's kind of like it's there 1:06:08 and we're just giving it away for free. So you could 1:06:10 take it if you want. And then I'm like, you know, 1:06:13 no one no one is right now. 1:06:16 And of course, you know, it's hard not to take that 1:06:18 personally. But, you know, we have a cat and we have 1:06:21 all these other things that haven't gotten through either. 1:06:25 Basically, nothing is almost nothing has gotten through. If 110 activates, 1:06:28 it would be very embarrassing that that's the so. So the 1:06:30 point is, I also have like a soft fork and a 1:06:32 hard fork. So it's kind of like I have my soft 1:06:34 fork, which is the BIP300/301 activator. And you could 1:06:37 just take it if you want it. But I'm kind of 1:06:39 like, well, kind of no one is taking it. 1:06:42 So now I'm doing the basically what Luke would call the, 1:06:46 you know, the proof of work. I'm not changing the proof 1:06:47 of work, but I'm lowering the difficulty, which is more very, 1:06:51 very similar. And so that's basically all we do is we 1:06:55 lower the difficult. So it's very funny that what I'm doing 1:06:57 will be very similar to what Luke will scramble to do 1:07:00 on like August 10th. And I'm going to mine is going 1:07:03 to be around August 23rd again because of time zones and 1:07:06 because of block, 1:07:09 you know, block times. We don't actually know the exact moment. 1:07:14 So I'm not sure, you know, and of course, when I 1:07:15 did this, I was just thinking I want to announce it 1:07:17 before the Las Vegas conference. And I just saw four months. 1:07:21 It's probably enough time to like get it onto people's calendar 1:07:24 and stuff. So it's very bizarre for me to watch the 1:07:26 110 people. They're just kind of like complete Yolo, this soft 1:07:30 fork that's almost certainly going to fail. And then they're going 1:07:32 to scramble. And then, you know, I have to, you know, 1:07:34 from personal experience, I know that there's an awful lot of 1:07:37 details. The name, the domain name, like the GitHub or how 1:07:41 do people how can you let people know how they can 1:07:43 find? A lot of people are going to ask these questions like, 1:07:47 how do you derive addresses, blah, blah, blah. So there's like 1:07:50 kind of a lot of questions you have to answer just 1:07:52 to launch the hard fork. And so I'm kind of curious 1:07:55 as to what the 110 people are, you know, what they 1:07:59 are. Are they, you know, are they planning to I agreed 1:08:02 with what someone said before about I think for them to 1:08:06 discuss the hard fork. 1:08:07 They think it makes it it's defeatist and it makes it 1:08:10 seem like that they're not confident in the soft fork. 1:08:15 Personally, I don't think so at all. I think it's, you 1:08:17 know, imagine a military general is like trying to like invade 1:08:19 a country or something. You know, you would not want them 1:08:22 to just be like you'd want them to be confident, but 1:08:25 you wouldn't want them. I would have more confidence in 110 1:08:28 soft fork if they had actually like laid out like some 1:08:31 kind of document with like, this is what we're going to 1:08:34 this is what we're going to do. We're thinking about all 1:08:36 these issues. So it is intriguing that I'm 1:08:40 more surprised than you are more surprised than anyone. 1:08:43 There's a lot in common. I'm kind of like further along 1:08:46 in the I'm like my soft fork has pre failed, so 1:08:51 to speak. Notice I made a lot less noise about it 1:08:54 because I think it'll be just crushingly humiliating for 110 1:08:59 people on August 10. Paul, I think I would just say 1:09:02 that, like, I think the way you're going about it is 1:09:04 the more direct, honest way of going about like, hey, here's 1:09:06 my intentions. I wanted this is how I'm going to go 1:09:08 about it. I'm going to like put this all up front. 1:09:11 There are no tricks here. To be clear, that is mechanics 1:09:14 position that to discuss it is to admit defeat. 1:09:17 And I think it is also an attempt of what you're 1:09:21 doing with a hard fork. You're saying, hey, Bitcoin's going to 1:09:23 continue building on its chain over here and I'm going to 1:09:24 do my own thing, whereas they are trying to take the 1:09:28 mantle of we are the real Bitcoin, just like the B 1:09:30 cashers. Right. And I just haven't found anyone on 1:09:35 the 110 side who wants to talk about the mechanics of 1:09:39 the hard fork in detail. 1:09:41 It's to me at this point come off as a unified 1:09:44 party line and it's difficult to do a proof of work 1:09:46 change like you have to pick an algorithm and then you're 1:09:50 going to have winners and losers of people who know on 1:09:52 the inner circle. If you kind of drop it like you 1:09:54 to do it as a fair distributed kind of like we're 1:09:56 going to try and reset this. I'm assuming they're going to 1:09:59 try and do one with ASICs because if you use one 1:10:01 that doesn't use ASICs, all of these AI data centers are 1:10:04 going to be able to 51 percent attack trivially because they 1:10:07 have these H200s and H300s with CUDA. 1:10:10 Those are like FPGA ASICs that are going to out dwarf 1:10:13 anything. So you could just like rent a data center for 1:10:15 a couple hours and 51 percent attack the new network. 1:10:18 So like it's a rough spot to be in. 1:10:21 And I think because they're trying to manufacture this idea that 1:10:24 they are the real Bitcoin, they have to go about it 1:10:26 this way and make it look like an emergency. Remember, BIP-110 1:10:29 is an emergency. That's why it's a temporary soft fork. I'm 1:10:32 very glad. I know we have four hands up, but I 1:10:35 think you hit on two things that would really clarify for 1:10:37 lots of people, but maybe Isabel wants to. Well, I want 1:10:40 Matt to jump in if he has a comment on this. 1:10:45 I'm curious to get his take. 1:10:48 Yeah, I mean, there's there's been a lot and I just 1:10:50 wanted to weigh in on some of it real quick. 1:10:53 I think on this whole panel, I'm probably the only person 1:10:56 on the wanting to see BIP-110 succeed side. 1:10:59 So I think it'd be good to balance it a little 1:11:01 here. So earlier, Paul said a couple of things that I 1:11:05 want to comment on, especially since, like he said, there are 1:11:08 some some corollaries here between what he's doing and what BIP-110 1:11:12 is doing. Obviously, there's huge differences, too, in methodology and the 1:11:16 reason behind it. 1:11:18 So but one is that there's been multiple references to sort 1:11:22 of Luke soft forking the network. 1:11:25 I want to make it very clear to frame this properly, 1:11:28 that there are many thousands of 1:11:32 people in the world like real people who are 1:11:37 ideologically aligned with Bitcoin and who are politically kind 1:11:41 of libertarian and anarchist and who want to separate money from 1:11:44 state like good people. There are many, many thousands, which is 1:11:49 actually a meaningful portion of the Bitcoin community and network who 1:11:54 are very, very aggressively and passionately fighting for this fork. 1:11:57 So if you say that, like Luke is forking the network 1:12:00 is is is wrong to the point of being 1:12:05 dishonest and malicious. Right. It is a lot of people trying 1:12:09 to fork the network right now, like a lot. OK, so 1:12:12 I think that's important to keep in mind. Number two, Paul 1:12:15 had said something that caught my ear, which was, well, there's 1:12:18 this other scenario that could happen. And let's say, you know, 1:12:21 for some reason, all the miners start signaling before the mandatory 1:12:25 signaling period and it snowballs. And then everyone sort of has 1:12:27 to go along with this because of the fork dynamics and 1:12:30 game theory behind it. And that, for some reason, was 1:12:34 very just hand waved away. And there actually is an extremely 1:12:38 good and powerful reason why that could 1:12:43 happen. And it is because each large 1:12:48 miner or collection of small miners. 1:12:51 Right. So we'll call it some meaningful amount of hash. 1:12:54 Has the ability right now between now and 1:13:00 mandatory signaling or even right at mandatory signaling, but 1:13:04 probably before has the ability. 1:13:08 To avoid everything that we have been talking about on this 1:13:11 entire space, all of the risks, 1:13:13 all of the confusion, all of the chaos, everything. 1:13:17 Every large miner, a collection of medium miners or small miners 1:13:21 has the ability right now to pull out of their pocket 1:13:23 a avoid the whole thing card. 1:13:25 But you're imposing your will on them that at that point, 1:13:28 you're basically saying you must you must do this. 1:13:31 Otherwise, I am not talking about the 1:13:36 morality of it. I'm not talking about the motivation behind it. 1:13:40 I'm not talking about whether people like it or not. I 1:13:41 am saying a simple fact that every miner on the planet 1:13:45 right now has the ability to pull out of their card, 1:13:49 has the ability to pull out of their pocket the avoid 1:13:51 the whole thing card. 1:13:53 Let's just be very clear what we're saying when we say every miner. 1:13:57 We're saying a group of miners with at least 50 percent 1:14:01 hash power. Not 50. 1:14:03 This snowballs way before 50 because the risk of wipeout rises 1:14:07 with each percent. 1:14:09 It is just not that clear. It really isn't. 1:14:13 I mean, if this was sitting at 25, the way 1:14:17 this could play out could easily be the other way. Plus, 1:14:19 I mean, there are things that miners can go do to 1:14:22 go and make this wipeout risk go away. I mean, they 1:14:24 can go and react to this and do another soft work. 1:14:28 But hold on. Hold on. I want to be clear here. 1:14:31 There is no. 1:14:34 There's no good reason. So Paul was saying earlier, like for 1:14:38 some reason. Right. What is the reason on the other side? 1:14:41 Why wouldn't a miner pull this out of their pocket? 1:14:44 What is the harm to them? So let's say you're a 1:14:46 huge miner or you're a couple of small miners and you 1:14:49 pull this card out right now. It's risk free, as we've 1:14:51 all stated, because you pull it out now and you can 1:14:53 retract it before mandatory signaling. So there's this sort of risk 1:14:56 free reconnaissance or hedge that you can take right now as 1:14:59 a miner and be like, OK, I'm going to show this 1:15:01 thing. I'm going to signal. Let me finish. I'm going to 1:15:04 signal. Right. Just to see what happens, because ultimately, 1:15:09 if I signal and a few other people signal, the whole 1:15:11 risk vanishes. The network just moves on like it like it 1:15:15 always is really symmetric. You understand. 1:15:17 It's totally symmetric. So there's there's a there's a Queen song, 1:15:21 Hammer to Fall. And there's this lyric that says, what the 1:15:25 hell are we fighting for? Just surrender and it won't hurt 1:15:28 at all. And that's the joke of the lyric is that 1:15:31 people fight because, 1:15:33 yeah, of course, if some one side surrenders, the fight's over. 1:15:35 But, you know, it doesn't mean so. You're assuming the miners 1:15:38 have some kind of opposition to this card. 1:15:41 Anyone could say Peter could say the miners can just pull 1:15:44 out this card that says we will avoid all this by 1:15:47 just ignoring one time and not signaling. 1:15:49 And then they also avoid the whole thing. Well, but I 1:15:52 want to be clear. There's a very good reason for miners 1:15:56 to oppose this, which is that it's bad to set precedents 1:15:59 that we should do. And the technical change is the Bitcoin 1:16:02 consensus without good reasons. 1:16:04 And it is perfectly reasonable to go and take that viewpoint. 1:16:08 And it's also like you're letting the terrorists win, you're shrinking 1:16:12 the transaction fee revenue. So there's a lot of a lot 1:16:16 of you. I think there's a lot in a way. 1:16:18 Right. Imposing your own belief of what is good for Bitcoin 1:16:21 onto the miners. 1:16:26 It's not that there are opinion lists. It's not that there 1:16:29 aren't people at mining companies that have opinions about BIP-110 1:16:33 or not. Right. It's that doesn't it doesn't the indifferent person 1:16:38 win? It's really interesting. Totally symmetric. 1:16:41 Continue this. Right. I've triggered something. You know what you understand 1:16:44 what I'm saying? I'm trying to I'm trying to create 1:16:49 a vision here, a picture of something. 1:16:52 And when I'm done, I think it's really useful to kind 1:16:55 of debate it. Right. But there's emotions all of a sudden. 1:17:01 I'm just trying to paint a game theoretical picture for a moment. OK. 1:17:07 If there are people at mining companies that have opinions about 1:17:10 BIP-110, et cetera, that's fine. And I'm not saying that 1:17:12 they won't act on those opinions, that those opinions will not 1:17:15 sort of infiltrate the decision of the company. 1:17:18 But fundamentally, miners are rational economic actors. 1:17:22 Their goal is to make money. 1:17:27 Right. Their goal is to spend energy in order to mine 1:17:30 blocks in order to get Bitcoin rewards. It's not that simple 1:17:34 because they have an enormous amount of money tied up in 1:17:37 ASICs and they have to go think about longer term than 1:17:41 just tomorrow. Yeah, I think you'd have a better point if 1:17:43 mining didn't have ASICs in what you say. 1:17:46 Hypothetically, we're in a world where it was all, you know, 1:17:49 the AI people just mining on the side and their only 1:17:51 cost was electricity. But miners do have to think many weeks, 1:17:55 many years even down the road. And under that type of 1:17:58 circumstance, you certainly don't want to set precedence to turn on 1:18:03 bad technical changes. 1:18:05 Well, hold on. So you're making the claim right now that 1:18:09 you're speaking sort of on behalf of the largest miners in 1:18:12 the world, that they think that if BIP-110 activates, 1:18:16 it dooms Bitcoin and ruins their future. 1:18:20 I'm saying that it's perfectly reasonable for them to take that 1:18:24 position. I have a question slash like mild point 1:18:28 of view, but like maybe this is just a question I'm 1:18:30 not really sure. But I think, you know, if the argument 1:18:33 if the if the challenge with filtering, you know, for instance, 1:18:36 even at the policy level is that you'd have to kind 1:18:38 of like update the filters every six months to combat like 1:18:41 the newest way of getting arbitrary data in. 1:18:44 I would imagine the incentive for the miners to say no 1:18:48 to this would be. And again, this is just me spitballing 1:18:52 here. I'm not speaking on behalf of anyone, of course, would 1:18:55 be. Well, we don't want to have to be dealing with 1:18:57 the soft fork thing every six months, every time consensus needs 1:19:01 to upgrade to figure out how to block the next wave 1:19:04 of spam. Right. I mean, like I could see why that 1:19:07 would be a very reasonable, like a rational reason not simply 1:19:11 to fold to BIP-110 or any other similar soft fork 1:19:14 exclusively for the purpose of, you know, avoiding, you 1:19:19 know, having potential contention the day of. 1:19:24 So here's let me fast forward a little, because I'm trying 1:19:27 to get somewhere and I understand that, you know, there's. 1:19:32 I welcome honestly, because we already know, I 1:19:36 think, where you're trying to go. And that's that's the interruption. 1:19:40 The emotion is boredom. 1:19:43 Where I'm going with this. OK, and this should apply to 1:19:46 you. You should appreciate this. There are a few sort of 1:19:49 tenants in, you know, freedom circles and in Bitcoin. 1:19:53 OK, we say that often everyone does, which regardless of which 1:19:56 side you're on, which is, you know, you can just do 1:19:59 things. It's better to beg forgiveness than ask permission. 1:20:04 The question isn't who is going to let me. It's who's 1:20:06 going to stop me. I would argue that these these 1:20:11 phrases embody the essence of progress. 1:20:15 It's how things happen in the world and in Bitcoin. 1:20:18 Right. People just they have an idea. 1:20:22 They do it and they try to get support behind it. 1:20:25 OK. And the process of soft forks over the years. 1:20:30 has largely been, and again, there's not a whole lot of 1:20:32 precedent here, has largely been what you do, which is you 1:20:35 come up with an idea. And then you go try to 1:20:38 convince everyone, the technical community and everything, that it is what 1:20:42 we should do. And what you're hoping to get out of 1:20:45 this is a sort of social consensus. You're hoping to get a, 1:20:48 you know, some magical number in your head or from some 1:20:52 certain people, right? Maybe it's core developers, maybe it's miners, 1:20:56 whatever, you're just trying to get some adequate collection of people 1:20:59 in sufficient volume to support your idea before you're like, okay, 1:21:03 we're going to move forward with it. We kind of, we 1:21:05 have consensus. That is asking permission. 1:21:08 That is not begging forgiveness. That is asking permission. 1:21:10 And my point is that nothing will ever happen if that 1:21:14 is how Bitcoin governance works, because we're never, Bitcoin is too 1:21:17 big, too important, and too broad at this point to ever 1:21:20 get any kind of majority, right? 1:21:23 Consensus is not democracy, to get any kind of majority buy- 1:21:27 in on anything except maybe some kind of zero-day vulnerability 1:21:32 where the threat is so 1:21:34 obvious that even mis-and disinformation online can't 1:21:39 dissuade a meaningful amount of people from it. Paul, I'm curious 1:21:42 what you think about that, because I feel like you've said 1:21:45 similar things. I think we should just ignore all of that, 1:21:48 because isn't it all obvious? And I would rather go back 1:21:50 to what Rob was talking about. It was way more interesting 1:21:53 in every way, but we could continue to dwell on-see, 1:21:56 he was saying that we can't get consensus on a soft 1:22:00 fork anymore, and I agree. We can. I mean, this is, 1:22:02 again, part of the similarities between 1. 10 and myself, which 1:22:05 is that we both think that Bitcoin Core is mostly lazy, 1:22:08 they have bad priorities, they're corrupt, they're pretentious, 1:22:13 they're not great, and so we need more competition. 1:22:18 So I agree with that. I mean, I think it's a 1:22:20 terrible-what 1. 10 is doing, because 1. 10 has chosen 1:22:22 a losing issue, they've chosen a bad side of a bad 1:22:25 issue, and they have terrible strategy and terrible execution, and so 1:22:29 it will probably be an embarrassing failure, and it will probably 1:22:32 make everyone think, oh, core is infallible after all, and that 1:22:36 will be a huge setback for the critics of core, and 1:22:38 everyone will just think, yeah, we should just do whatever Gloria 1:22:42 Zhao or name whatever fake villain you like. 1:22:45 We should just do whatever Vladimir says forever, and they should 1:22:50 rule us as a king. That's what 1. 1:22:53 10 is going to actually achieve on August 10th, I think. 1:22:56 I hope that we get some momentum out of the-which 1:23:00 was-this was a nice thing about 1. 10, was that core was 1:23:05 uncriticizable for years, and then finally we had some criticism 1:23:09 of core, which I thought was overdue. 1:23:14 But otherwise, I don't think it's that interesting. I'd rather talk 1:23:16 about this whole idea of the real Bitcoin, 1:23:19 and this idea of why change the proof of work versus not. 1:23:24 That's what Rob started us on. Then we got sucked back 1:23:26 into the vortex of 1. 10. We can't stop talking about 1:23:29 it, which is perfectly fine. If that's what you want to 1:23:32 talk about, we can. I just-I personally think the audience 1:23:35 will get way more out of it. I want to get 1:23:38 back to a second, though, to a technical point about this 1:23:40 idea that you can just signal with no cost. 1:23:45 Actual miners do invest a lot of money into their software 1:23:49 setups, and there's a lot of risk associated with changing them. 1:23:52 At the moment, Bitcoin Core is offering 1:23:56 that if you just keep doing what you're doing, 1:23:59 more likely than not, the network's going to just keep doing 1:24:01 what it does, and you're not going to have to change 1:24:03 anything. Whereas, if you signal for BIP 1. 10, 1:24:09 you are setting in motion a thing where suddenly in less 1:24:13 than two weeks, you now potentially need to update your software. 1:24:19 There's a very strong reason not to go do that. 1:24:22 Really quickly, I want to- 1:24:25 I think Peter is right, actually. I would accept that as 1:24:27 a correction. I would actually say that the fact- 1:24:31 if you do signal and you appear on a Wicked Smart 1:24:34 Bitcoin's site, that does mean that at least you were willing 1:24:38 to actually go in and change the software from whatever it 1:24:42 was doing. Actually, that probably means that signaling is slightly more 1:24:46 reliable, which is even worse news for 1. 10, if you 1:24:49 think about it, because the number is so low. The reliable 1:24:52 signal is low. Think about another BIP, BIP 54. 1:24:55 We have 34% of miners signaling for that with their Coinbases. 1:25:00 The miners will signal when there's an incentive for them to 1:25:03 signal. BIP 54 is not some surprise activation like, hey, we're 1:25:06 all going to change our Coinbase and lock times and our 1:25:09 in-sequence value. It's like a slow grind to find consensus, 1:25:12 which that's why I believe it's possible to find consensus in Bitcoin today. 1:25:17 I'm just noting, miners are willing to change their software. 1:25:23 They are from OrangeSurf, who I know has done 1:25:28 a ton of interesting research on this, but Chris, go ahead. 1:25:33 Yeah, I just wanted to ask while Matt is here, and 1:25:36 we talked about proof-of-work chains, as the CEO of 1:25:40 Start9 and a big, big proponent of implementation diversity, my 1:25:45 curiosity would be, are you also happily going to support and 1:25:48 distribute a node implementation in StartOS that changes the proof-of- 1:25:52 work, or does your sense of diversity acquire boundaries there? 1:25:57 And will you also support an 1:26:00 implementation of Paul's eCash? 1:26:04 Yeah, this is an easy answer, finally. 1:26:08 So StartOS and the marketplace ecosystem are designed that we can't, 1:26:12 no matter how hard we tried, no matter what we did, 1:26:14 prevent anyone from distributing anything, including blatant malware, to other 1:26:19 people who willfully download it. Obviously, we won't list anything like 1:26:23 that on our hosted registry, and we have two. 1:26:27 One is the community registry, and one is the Start9 registry. 1:26:30 Community registry get cursory vetting. We look at them, we don't 1:26:34 vouch for them, but we do put them through the ringer, 1:26:36 just like Apple or Google would before something goes on their 1:26:38 store. And then we warn users like, hey, we have not, 1:26:41 we don't totally vouch for this, we don't necessarily recommend it, 1:26:43 but they can still download it with minimal effort from one 1:26:48 of our default registries, we call it the community registry. 1:26:51 The Start9 registry has a much higher bar. It means that 1:26:55 we vouch for, maintain, 1:26:58 recommend, and understand so that we can provide support for all 1:27:01 of the services in that registry. 1:27:04 What determines whether something goes on the community registry or the 1:27:07 Start9 registry is quality of the service, which is highly subjective, 1:27:11 basically, whether I think it's good enough to be on our 1:27:13 Start9 registry and that we're willing to put our brand behind 1:27:15 it. And two, that it is in 1:27:21 demand, that people want it. 1:27:23 So the answer is, if people want to run a Bitcoin 1:27:27 implementation that implements a proof of work change, or to run 1:27:31 Paul's fork, and they are technically sound, 1:27:36 then we would host them on the Start9 registry. 1:27:39 If people don't really care that much, or we think they're 1:27:43 really, really stupid and don't want to attach our brand in 1:27:45 any way to it, it would go on the community registry. 1:27:48 So it's very subjective. Do you have like a limit in 1:27:51 terms of like, is there a threshold, like for example, Ethereum 1:27:53 or Solana on a Start9 platform and the primary registry? 1:27:58 Or is like, what's, where's the point where like, hey, our 1:28:01 boundaries, we can't do this. The primary registry, and I wrote 1:28:05 a blog post about this at one point is, it checks 1:28:07 all the boxes, right? It's like, we think that this is 1:28:11 quality software, we recommend that you run it, or at least 1:28:14 we don't recommend that you don't run it, right? It's like, 1:28:16 we're not saying you should stay away from it. We're not 1:28:19 embarrassed by it. Like, it's not something that we're gonna, you 1:28:23 know, take a lot of flack for. It's very delicate. And 1:28:25 it mostly comes down to just kind of me deciding whether 1:28:29 this fits with the company's brand and mission. 1:28:33 For example, like Bitcoin Cash is on the community registry, right? 1:28:39 As in it passed the technical spec, it's not malware, somebody's 1:28:42 going to install it, and it's not going to blow up 1:28:43 their server. But it's also not something that we, you know, 1:28:47 are personally willing to kind of, you know, put alongside Bitcoin 1:28:51 Core and Bitcoin Knots, which are much more legitimate. I just 1:28:54 want to say I'm so impressed with the way that Portland 1:28:56 is very seriously asking those questions, as if it matters at 1:29:01 all to anything. 1:29:03 What kind of nodes Matt approves or doesn't approve on his 1:29:06 node, like the poorest, most broke people in Bitcoin 1:29:10 are running Start9 nodes. It absolutely doesn't matter what you guys 1:29:15 do list or do not list and which repository, yes or 1:29:18 no, like who the fuck cares, guys? It's like, that's the 1:29:20 most irrelevant question I've ever heard. In Portland, I'm so 1:29:25 impressed that you are asking it with a straight face as 1:29:28 if it has any meaning whatsoever, and if it matters to anything. 1:29:32 Well done. 1:29:33 25% of the Bitcoin network is running on Start9 servers. 1:29:35 You can run 900% if you want, it doesn't matter, like 1:29:39 there's nothing less relevant than your user base. 1:29:42 I cannot imagine anything that's less relevant to Bitcoin than your 1:29:46 user base. Okay, so you're here to troll and start fights, 1:29:49 not to have a meaningful discussion. It's not a troll, it's 1:29:51 not a troll. Everyone here knows it's true, like everyone is 1:29:53 pretending as if like this is a serious conversation. Everyone on 1:29:55 stage and everyone in the audience knows that it's absolutely immaterial 1:29:59 what your user base has in the community repository or the official repository. 1:30:04 Nothing is less important than that question. Okay, all right, okay. 1:30:08 Do you have any idea what we do? I don't think 1:30:10 you understand what we do. 1:30:13 No, I understand very well. Do you prefer a Bitcoin node? 1:30:16 Yeah, Matt, do you want to respond? Yeah. 1:30:20 I mean-You don't have to. Not really. You don't have 1:30:23 to. No, I mean, he's here for, he's obviously here to 1:30:26 disrupt conversations and if I was moderating this-I'm saying what 1:30:29 everybody here thinks. There's not a single person who doesn't agree 1:30:32 with me right now. Not a single person other than Matt, 1:30:34 and Matt agrees with me too, he just can't say it. 1:30:37 Okay, we're gonna-I disagree with Leo Mattis. 1:30:41 All right, there is an issue here 1:30:45 where, so the term that's often used is an 1:30:50 economic node for the obvious reason that, you know, anyone can 1:30:53 go spin up nodes on, say, AWS or something, and it 1:30:56 certainly is an interesting question what BIP-110 support actually looks like 1:31:01 in terms of economic nodes, that is, nodes associated with very 1:31:05 large amounts of coin purchasing. Because ultimately, when you look at 1:31:08 the feedback loop of mining, what ultimately matters is, are people 1:31:11 willing to buy miners' coins? And with that, things like Michael 1:31:15 Saylor, for instance, coming out saying he's against BIP-110 is quite relevant. 1:31:21 But for Michael Saylor, when he runs a node, is it 1:31:24 in the community repository or in the official repository? 1:31:27 That matters a lot for the weight of Michael Saylor's decisions. 1:31:36 Well, ultimately, when Michael Saylor quote-unquote runs a node, of 1:31:40 course, what he's actually doing is telling an employee of his 1:31:43 to go call up Coinbase and verify what nodes they're running. 1:31:47 But, you know, the economic decision is still the same there. 1:31:50 I honestly, jokes aside, I'm not even sure how that terminology 1:31:54 of economic node came to be. I mean, I know the 1:31:57 history and the legacy of it, but, like, 1:32:00 it's not really, like, the word inside of the term economic 1:32:04 node, the word node is not playing any part. 1:32:07 You can just say, like, economic actor. Whether or not the 1:32:11 economic actor is running a node is completely irrelevant. 1:32:15 To have his voice heard, that's, like, absurd. 1:32:21 The node does not play a part in the economic node. 1:32:25 I think it does, though, actually, because you could say if 1:32:28 one person is going to be receiving all of the incoming 1:32:31 transactions for the next two weeks, 1:32:34 they would look at their node to see if they're actually 1:32:37 being paid. If they want, they can manually do it with 1:32:40 a pen and paper. Like, it doesn't matter if they run 1:32:42 a node or not. That's completely orthogonal. 1:32:47 Well, I mean, in the example of Michael Saylor, the important 1:32:49 thing is, like anyone, 1:32:52 ultimately, for him and his purpose, 1:32:57 ultimately, somewhere out there, there's a node running. 1:33:00 Now, this may not be quite as controlled as if I 1:33:04 personally happen to run a node on my laptop, but there's 1:33:07 always issues around control there. 1:33:09 I mean, one example is maybe my laptop's actually compromised, and 1:33:13 what I think is my node isn't quite so much my 1:33:15 node. But the important thing is that the intent is there. 1:33:19 Michael Saylor intends to go run a node that ignores Bitcoin 1:33:22 10, and ultimately, that filters out to some node that's actually 1:33:26 sitting somewhere, probably in the data center. Just for the purpose 1:33:29 of education, and I think we'll wrap up this but I 1:33:32 do think it's a fair one, just the conversation about economic 1:33:35 nodes and sort of the power differentials between nodes, right, because 1:33:39 there is maybe this misunderstanding, right, that the absolute 1:33:43 number of nodes on the network running a soft fork, you 1:33:46 know, kind of, quote, unquote, matters, maybe more than it does, 1:33:50 when perhaps it's actually kind of the transaction volume that's running 1:33:53 between those nodes that's more meaningful in terms of putting pressure 1:33:57 on miners to change. 1:34:00 I don't know if anyone wants to kind of add to 1:34:02 that or just sort of, again, give like a TLDR explainer 1:34:05 on that. Just one last thing, and I don't mean to 1:34:08 be offensive to anyone, but I do think when people say economic nodes, 1:34:13 the node is orthogonal, and that's kind of like, we could 1:34:16 have also said like economic wives, like there are holders of 1:34:20 Bitcoin, and some of them have wives, and maybe some 1:34:24 of the wives have an opinion about Bitcoin forks. 1:34:28 So we could like do a survey of economic wives in 1:34:30 the network and see like, hey, for some 1:34:33 wives support BIP-110, and some wives don't. 1:34:37 But like the truth is, it's not about the nodes, and 1:34:39 it's not about the wives, and it's not about anything, it's 1:34:41 about the economic actors, and what they actually want and what 1:34:45 they actually support. Yeah, some of them have nodes, some of 1:34:48 them have wives, some of them have like horses. We can 1:34:51 talk about the economic horses and if they want BIP-110 1:34:54 or not, but like it doesn't matter. The point is, there's 1:34:56 an economic actor that holds Bitcoin, maybe buys more Bitcoin, maybe doesn't. 1:35:01 And it's really a question about who's buying or accumulating Bitcoin 1:35:05 and not really who already holds it, because for example, out 1:35:08 of the BIP-110 people, they might own like 0. 1:35:12 0002 BTC, but they're not planning to transact with them, they're 1:35:16 not planning to buy more. 1:35:18 So their opinion doesn't really matter that much. 1:35:22 So the whole conversation about economic nodes, it's just like, it's 1:35:26 not the nodes, man. The nodes don't matter, they don't really 1:35:28 play a part in this at all. 1:35:31 Well, anyway, economic nodes is a term that 1:35:39 gets used in the discussions of this stuff. Obviously, it's a 1:35:42 shorthand for a very complex concept, but it's reasonable 1:35:47 to use that shorthand and that's just kind of standard in this industry. 1:35:51 Really quickly. 1:35:52 Yeah, you can have an economic node without any Bitcoin. 1:35:55 And as long as you route many transactions, that is an 1:35:58 economic node. It's just about the impact that that node would 1:36:02 have if it goes down. And I think Michael Saylor met 1:36:06 us, even though he doesn't have a wife. 1:36:09 Have we asked him what Saylor thinks of eCash? 1:36:11 He's not telling us about it. 1:36:15 I'm pretty sure that Michael Saylor would not be a 1:36:19 fan of eCash, which I think is 1:36:23 probably evidence that eCash will do really well in the long 1:36:26 run. Because, I mean, when has Michael Saylor actually been right 1:36:29 about anything? The fact that he is against 110, I think 1:36:32 that has put more fear into me that we may be 1:36:36 on the wrong side of history than anything else in this whole saga. 1:36:40 So, I mean, it's just the eCash idea and BIP300 in general, 1:36:45 it completely obliterates his... 1:36:48 Michael Saylor has this idea that he wants to be able 1:36:50 to explain Bitcoin to his congressperson in 30 seconds or something. 1:36:53 And I'm opening it to an infinitely expanding canvas of L2s 1:36:58 and I'm throwing open this developer paradise 1:37:04 or playground or whatever you want to call it. And I 1:37:07 have this idea of infinite growth. So I'm rejecting all this 1:37:10 idea of stasis and overconfidence and complacency. 1:37:14 And then again, he is representing this view that Bitcoin has 1:37:16 already won. We don't need to lift a finger. 1:37:19 We don't need to change anything in Bitcoin. We don't need 1:37:20 to do anything in Bitcoin. In fact, everything we do might 1:37:23 be a mistake. So I think he would be against it. 1:37:26 But I'm not worried about that because he's also been describing 1:37:29 Bitcoin as Manhattan real estate, space 1:37:35 rocket fuel, digital credit, digital whatever. 1:37:38 So he's just got a new explanation every week. 1:37:43 And I don't think anything... You can go down the line 1:37:45 of everything Michael Saylor has attempted, 1:37:48 including the treasury companies. 1:37:53 And I don't know. But all this stuff was shuttered and 1:37:56 it was ultimately not successful. So I'm not sure what he's 1:37:59 done that actually has ever succeeded. Did you consider adding digital 1:38:02 credit to eCash? 1:38:05 Yeah, I'll get right on that. We're going to close the 1:38:08 loop on Michael Saylor. 1:38:10 I really would like to hear from OrangeSurf because he's done 1:38:13 some really excellent research on this. And then I want to 1:38:16 bring up Ryan Dowell, who currently doesn't have space on the 1:38:19 stage. So OrangeSurf, 1:38:21 go ahead. 1:38:23 So the first thing I was going to say is earlier 1:38:26 on, Matt claimed that he was underrepresented. 1:38:28 But I think actually, when you look at the 2% signaling, 1:38:31 he's pretty reasonably represented in this group. 1:38:35 In terms of signaling, I mean, basically the mandatory signaling to 1:38:39 hit that now, you're going to have to have like over 1:38:41 81% of the remaining blocks signaling. So that's 1:38:49 just the BIP-110 specification. 1:38:52 So, I mean, it's not really compatible with Bitcoin 1:38:56 10. So I think they should probably try and fix that. 1:38:59 And then the cost for a mining pool really signaling Bitcoin 1:39:01 10 is that miners are going to move away from the 1:39:03 pool because they want to mine Bitcoin. And they're going to 1:39:06 look embarrassed and foolish if it fails, which obviously it's going 1:39:10 to fail. So, I mean, the fact that we're not really 1:39:12 seeing any BIP-110 supporters with significant influence developing any widely 1:39:17 used product services or tools is basically like quite high signal. 1:39:21 And yeah, that's my contribution. 1:39:24 Thank you for that contribution. Okay. 1:39:27 I am going to bring up Reindell, because I 1:39:32 feel like he had something to say. And now we're going 1:39:35 to bring him up, one of my favorite speakers on this 1:39:37 subject. If anyone else has comments that they want to make, 1:39:42 this has been riveting, you guys. 1:39:45 I'm curious, Paul, actually, if you want to just kind of 1:39:48 maybe share a little bit about, you know, kind of your 1:39:51 vision for eCash. Like, where do you see this going? 1:39:54 I mean, is it, what's the reason to do this? 1:39:57 I mean, to everyone else's point, you're not trying to be 1:40:00 the next Bitcoin. You're not claiming like this is the real Bitcoin. 1:40:04 You're kind of just going and doing your own thing. Like, 1:40:06 why? Like, what are you, what are you trying to create? 1:40:09 And what's your end goal here? 1:40:12 Well, I do think there's only room for one cryptocurrency in 1:40:16 the long run. So the question is, how long is the 1:40:19 long run? And I don't know, but probably it's like 10 1:40:22 years in this case, because the strong network effects. 1:40:26 So I do think that in the end, there will only 1:40:28 be one currency that survives. I was more interested in like 1:40:31 the gravitational pull because Rob brought up this idea of the 1:40:35 real Bitcoin, and he brought up the psychology of the 110ers. 1:40:39 And it's about how it's really important to them to 1:40:43 win over the whole community. And they purport to represent this 1:40:49 conception of the public good of Bitcoin or something. 1:40:53 It doesn't occur to them to just create a new thing 1:40:56 as a demo or even a competitor. 1:40:59 And I think I just wanted to point out that that 1:41:02 is very, very, very, that's a very mesmerizing and 1:41:06 tempting thing that has caught a lot of people. 1:41:09 It's like the siren music, you know, from the Odyssey. 1:41:12 And you can see, you can go back to Roger Ver 1:41:14 and all these people. So a lot of people have been 1:41:17 caught in this whole the real Bitcoin thing. 1:41:20 And I do think it's unusual for me to, but even 1:41:23 I had like registered some domains in the past, I was 1:41:25 like, I'm gonna do my own thing. And I'm going to 1:41:27 call whatever Bitcoin extended or something like that. 1:41:30 So it's very tempting. And I think people really invest a 1:41:33 lot of their identity in being a Bitcoiner. 1:41:36 And I think that that deranges people. And it's not, it's 1:41:40 not good for you or anyone else. It's not necessarily good for Bitcoin. 1:41:44 Maybe it is because it creates this big cult. But I 1:41:46 think it's very smart of us to shine some light on 1:41:49 this phenomenon. If we can just be armchair psychologists, and 1:41:54 say that, yeah, it's very tempting to want to be like, 1:41:56 oh, I am the savior of Bitcoin, or I represent Bitcoin 1:41:59 or blah, blah, blah, I think that is very, very, very 1:42:02 common. And a lot of people have suffered enormously by giving 1:42:06 into that temptation. And I think the 110 people will be 1:42:09 the latest in a long line of people who have suffered 1:42:14 similarly. So that was a determination of mine was eventually, 1:42:19 at first, I was kind of like, not sure. But at 1:42:21 some point, I was like, okay, I just have to pick 1:42:22 something as a completely different name, completely different brand, you know, 1:42:26 different colors, ideally different, whatever. It's hard to make it all 1:42:29 different. But I was thinking like, it has to be a 1:42:32 different thing than Bitcoin. So that it's clear that, you know, 1:42:34 I'm just giving this making this new thing, giving everyone a 1:42:37 bunch of free coins. And I think that that's much more 1:42:40 sane. And I hope that I can kind of maybe set 1:42:42 a tiny example, maybe, where new people who think they have 1:42:46 the most important idea in Bitcoin, 1:42:48 just copy that, and they just give us all free coins 1:42:50 with a different name. And then it's easier to talk about 1:42:52 these things. I think one thing that's quite funny is that 1:42:55 people when they talk about the inevitable hard fork, they end 1:42:58 up using these phrases where they say, Oh, you have to 1:42:59 buy Bitcoin over here, and then you have to buy 110 1:43:02 coins. So that's the thing is, if you don't pick the 1:43:04 name, then the name is going to be picked for you 1:43:07 by by the people in, you know, in an x space 1:43:10 somewhere, they're just going to start calling it 110 coin, because 1:43:12 you and then you Yeah, I think that is a funny 1:43:16 name, or because that's a very, very witty name, but I 1:43:19 don't know how many other people will get that. joke. And 1:43:22 so and then, but it's funny that there's, I mean, 1:43:26 Paul, hard forking Bitcoin into a shitcoin that nobody cares about 1:43:30 is not novel. 1:43:32 Many people have done it before you. 1:43:34 And yet, how do you know how many people will care 1:43:37 about it? Before launch? It's not fair to because people are 1:43:40 still going to care about it, when Luke does it for 1:43:43 the proof of work change. So like people get to care 1:43:45 about the things they care about. And we can't really tell 1:43:47 them like, yeah, it won't be interesting or new. 1:43:50 It won't be Bitcoin anymore. But like, that is the survival 1:43:53 mode. Luke and mechanic have both staked out that they are 1:43:56 willing to go down burning with the ships. And I think 1:43:59 to Paul's point, it's a healthy way to just sort disagreements 1:44:01 and move on. See, I think if they were smart 1:44:06 about it, they would actually be trying to hype up the 1:44:10 proof of work change now. Because they could say like, hey, 1:44:14 you know, 15 years ago, you could mine Bitcoin on your 1:44:17 home computer. You haven't been able to do that in a 1:44:19 long time, we're going to change your proof of work algorithm 1:44:22 that you can you can make bitcoins on your computer again. 1:44:25 And that could be like a fun new thing that people 1:44:27 would actually be excited about. Yeah, no, if if the BIP 1:44:31 110 soft fork fails, and there is a move to proof 1:44:34 of work change and hard fork, and there is incentives to, 1:44:38 you know, mine, and it's for the plebs, etc. It's going 1:44:41 to be like a meaningful network, there will actually be users, 1:44:44 it's not going to be Bitcoin, right? Or, I mean, it depends. 1:44:48 But, but, like what Paul's doing, like, there's no, it's, it's 1:44:51 sort of, you know, it's just dead, like, nobody cares. 1:44:54 It's just a hard fork into a shitcoin. I do want 1:44:56 to just call out, I just pinned the tweet. 18 months 1:44:59 ago, I told Luke, he was gonna have to change, fire 1:45:02 the miners and change the proof of work to fix this. 1:45:04 And his response to me was liar. And here we are 1:45:07 two weeks out. It looks like that's about what's about to happen here. 1:45:11 I mean, if you want to play, 1:45:13 but yeah, yeah, Rob, if you want to play that game, 1:45:16 I wrote a shell script three years ago, that rejected 1:45:20 blocks that had inscriptions in them. And Luke said that it 1:45:23 was malware and blocked me. So like, you know, lots of 1:45:28 prior art for for people foreshadowing Luke, and then him telling 1:45:32 them that they're liars. 1:45:36 I think a great deal, you can go to, for example, 1:45:39 LayerTwo Labs. com slash friends. And you can see all 1:45:42 the people who have endorsed the 300, at least. 1:45:46 And this includes people like Adam back. 1:45:48 Robin Linus, these are like a lot of people, and they 1:45:52 seem to think that it is actually the best L2 1:45:55 out of everything available. 1:45:58 So there are quite a few people who are interested. 1:46:00 And I think, you know, I'm in a completely different realm 1:46:03 than 110. 110 wants to shrink some transactions that they call 1:46:07 spam, but which are actually very easy for the network to 1:46:11 process and store. And I'm trying to expand it so that 1:46:15 8 billion people can use Bitcoin. 1:46:18 I'm trying to add Zcash level privacy, I'm trying to add 1:46:21 like, the ability to endlessly add new L2s if the existing 1:46:25 set of L2s is insufficient. 1:46:28 With the CUSF activator, the L1 is the same as Bitcoin 1:46:32 Core, it's exactly the same as Bitcoin Core. So anything you 1:46:34 like about Bitcoin Core, you can keep on L1. 1:46:37 And then we can also do with the CUSF activator, we 1:46:40 can do quantum, we can do all this stuff without changing 1:46:42 any lines of code. In Bitcoin Core, so I think I'm 1:46:45 in like a completely different realm of solving like, like all 1:46:49 of the biggest problems in the entire cryptography, crypto coin cryptocurrency 1:46:53 industry. Like we have like kind of already solved are on 1:46:57 the way to solving. 1:46:59 And it's like, that is way more important than this fake 1:47:03 spam crusade that's going to just crash and burn and by 1:47:06 hitting a rocket on August 9, it's like completely different realm 1:47:10 of conversation. In fairness, to you, but not to 1:47:14 all the thousands of people fighting online about it. 1:47:16 Like clearly, many, many, many people care. So one of the 1:47:20 things that's interesting, Well, I just want to say, in fairness, 1:47:22 Paul, like, 1:47:24 you may have that viewpoint, but your viewpoint that Drivechain 1:47:27 solve these things is not widely shared. And in that regard, 1:47:31 it's not unlike, say, the BIP-110 issue. 1:47:34 But my point is, you have to go as soon as 1:47:36 my coworking space mats, but it's closed. 1:47:40 So good luck guys. Peter, thank you. It is certainly admit 1:47:45 that it is, you know, controversial, 1:47:49 but we have many supporters. So I think that that alone 1:47:52 means that it's kind of an open question. 1:47:55 But you don't feel the same way about BIP-110. 1:47:58 Like BIP-110 has orders of magnitude more supporters than drive 1:48:01 chains. I've only actually met like three or four people in 1:48:05 person who support one 10. 1:48:08 So maybe it's a representative. 1:48:10 Yeah, that's yours. That's yours. I've met thousands of real people. 1:48:14 Theoretically, I can't imagine a reason why someone would support one 1:48:18 10, because it doesn't actually stop the spam. And stopping the 1:48:21 spam is not actually a good idea. Because of course, You 1:48:24 keep fixating on your own opinion and projecting it onto the 1:48:27 world. What I'm saying is that thousands of real people passionately 1:48:30 disagree with that. Thousands of real people are less interesting than 1:48:34 a hundred people who are not broke. You keep forgetting that you are not broke. 1:48:40 It's just less interesting. It's a little bit interesting, but it's 1:48:43 not very interesting. People's right to spam. 1:48:46 They're not broke. They bought a Stardust for thousands of dollars. 1:48:50 They're clearly not broke. But they're also complaining that like having 1:48:54 to buy a new hard drive every 10 years is too 1:48:56 expensive. So like, I don't know. 1:48:59 But I'm looking at the BIP-110 company directory 1:49:03 that got passed around. And like, if you scroll through the 1:49:08 directory of companies who have claimed that they're going to support 1:49:11 BIP-110, it's like, you know, Start9, 1:49:15 Bitcoin University, and then a bunch of people who like, you 1:49:19 know, sell one t-shirt. And some of the, if you 1:49:21 click through the links for like the proof that they actually 1:49:23 support it, some of it is very spotty. 1:49:26 And it's like not at all clear that, you know, these 1:49:29 people actually support 110 or not. So I think part of 1:49:32 the reason why miners are ignoring this and are safe to 1:49:35 ignore it is because all of the actual economic actors on 1:49:39 the network are ignoring it. Like miners at the end of 1:49:42 the day have to sell their coins to somebody. So getting 1:49:45 back to the whole like economic node thing, a thought experiment 1:49:48 is imagine there was a chain split for like a hard 1:49:51 fork. And on one side of the chain split, there's 1:49:56 a million nodes running on EC2 that never buy Bitcoin. 1:50:00 And on the other side of the chain split is one 1:50:03 guy who has infinite bid and will buy all of the 1:50:06 Bitcoin. Like, where are the miners going to mine? 1:50:09 They're going to mine where they can sell their Bitcoin. So 1:50:12 like if there's no exchanges or merchants or big buyers 1:50:16 or anything supporting 110, then like why is there going to 1:50:20 be economics on that side? Because I think it's really important 1:50:22 to recognize that like this is not a hard fork. 1:50:25 There is no choice that the miners have to make. 1:50:28 They're not choosing between the BIP-110 people and the core people. 1:50:32 What they're choosing between is everyone and the core people. 1:50:36 They have the option to keep the entire network. 1:50:39 I disagree with this. You keep saying that it's important to 1:50:43 distinguish, but it's not important to distinguish. Actually, it's not important 1:50:46 to talk about this at all. Nothing, nothing is going to 1:50:49 change whether or not we talk about this. Nothing is going 1:50:50 to, the outcome is going to be identifiable. Why are you 1:50:54 here that all you do is, all everyone does is talk 1:50:55 about this? Why are you here if you don't want to 1:50:57 talk about it? Because it's fun and there's nothing else to 1:50:59 talk about. I'm having fun. So it's fun, it's interesting. 1:51:02 It's like, you're stating all the reasons why miners 1:51:07 would want to keep this contingency. Miners will, okay, will 1:51:11 when, Ben? At some point, you're going to need to say 1:51:15 miners did not. 1:51:17 What is the date when you're going to say that this 1:51:19 is going to pass? At some point, which might be August 1:51:21 8th, there will come a day when it is clear that 1:51:25 mining is centralized enough and corrupt enough to willfully 1:51:29 carve off 15% of its economy when it doesn't talk to 1:51:33 it. Did you rehearse this before you came here? This is 1:51:36 so, this is such bullshit. 1:51:39 There is no way you believe what you say right now. 1:51:43 There's no way you believe this. How do you keep a 1:51:46 straight face saying this? 1:51:50 I just want to go back to a different point that 1:51:52 I think is more interesting, which is this idea of 110 1:51:55 versus BIP300 or eCash, whatever you want to call 1:51:59 it, which is that I think a lot of people, 1:52:02 when they learn more about each of the two options, they 1:52:06 will actually like eCash more and they will like 110 less. 1:52:11 Matt brought up this point about, oh, well, maybe people don't 1:52:15 care as much. But when I talk to people personally, they 1:52:19 usually say, well, I don't really know a lot 1:52:21 about BIP300. If I talk to them a little bit 1:52:24 about it, they seem to like it more. If I talk 1:52:27 to people who dislike it, either it's clear that they have 1:52:30 gravely misunderstood it, or at least that's my opinion, and they 1:52:34 don't actually understand it, or when you talk to them about 1:52:36 it, they sort of like it more. Whereas, I think with 1:52:38 110, there's a lot of... 1:52:41 I think we can all tell that from the caliber of 1:52:45 the discussion, if these people actually studied it for 10 years, 1:52:49 they would not be saying the things that they're saying. 1:52:51 And in fact, the 110 people have very frequently shifted their 1:52:54 story. Remember, the original story was that Core V30 will be 1:52:58 coming out in three months, and it has a change that 1:53:00 will destroy Bitcoin or something. That was the original story. 1:53:04 Then they learned more about it, and they were like, well, 1:53:06 we have to change our story to some other thing. Like, 1:53:09 it might hypothetically cause some future... It's really important that you 1:53:11 stop applying the reasons behind it and your own opinion. 1:53:16 I'm trying to state a simple fact. It's not going to 1:53:19 change the outcome. It's not important if he stops at that. 1:53:21 You gotta let me talk. The outcome is going to stay 1:53:22 the same. You gotta let me talk. Ryan Dell... Wait, wait, 1:53:25 wait. Hand is up, and I'm going to try to bring 1:53:28 some decorum to this space. Ryan Dell, would you feel free to chime in? 1:53:33 Yeah, I mean, so to Paul's point just a second ago, 1:53:37 like the reason for BIP-110 to exist, which used to be 1:53:41 444, has gone through a bunch of big arcs and changes 1:53:45 over the last like six or nine months, right? 1:53:47 It used to be there's going to be this change in 1:53:51 Bitcoin V30 that's going to brick all of the nodes running 1:53:54 on cloud infrastructure. So this is going to be... 1:53:56 The reason why it's a one-year change is because we 1:53:59 need to hit an emergency panic button, and then that'll bias 1:54:03 the time to go and do it correctly. 1:54:05 And then like V30 came and went, and the network didn't 1:54:09 explode. So then it became about like rug the spammers. 1:54:13 But like the spammers already rugged themselves because markets do that. 1:54:16 And then after that, it became all about like we have 1:54:19 to fire core, and we have to like increase the decentralization 1:54:22 of the network, which, you know, moving to an implementation with 1:54:25 a single maintainer, who's also the chairman of the one mining 1:54:29 pool that's mining these blocks, that increasing decentralization somehow is 1:54:33 like still lost on me. So like the story keeps changing. 1:54:37 And to Matt's point about signaling for 1. 1:54:40 10 being a riskless option, it's not a riskless option because 1:54:43 like 1. 10 is this, you know, solution looking 1:54:48 for a problem. It doesn't actually fix any of the things 1:54:50 that it purports to fix. And making technical changes 1:54:55 to Bitcoin consensus rules for no good reason, but just because 1:54:59 like, there's a bunch of people yelling about it on Twitter 1:55:02 and yelling about it on GitHub comments is not a good 1:55:05 reason to change Bitcoin. And I think if you have millions 1:55:09 of dollars invested in ASICs, or if you have a business 1:55:12 behind Bitcoin, you don't want to support people changing 1:55:16 consensus rules because of Twitter politics, like that would actually 1:55:20 destroy Bitcoin. And so it's not, you know, a free option. 1:55:24 Like on the one hand, if you signal for BIP 1. 1:55:28 10, you are setting a horrible precedent that this is not, 1:55:31 you know, the strongest money ever. This is money that is 1:55:34 subject to the whims of Twitter mobs. On the other hand, 1:55:38 if you don't signal 1. 10, then you have an opportunity 1:55:41 to force like the most annoying and most hostile 1:55:45 group of Twitter users to fork themselves off the network, which 1:55:48 is like a phenomenal opportunity. So it's miners are incredibly 1:55:53 well incentivized to not signal for 1. 1:55:56 10, especially because as I pointed out earlier, there aren't any 1:56:00 real like major businesses that are saying that they're going to 1:56:03 buy 1. 10 coins. Right now, I'd even make it just 1:56:06 one step bigger. It's not just businesses not running it. 1:56:08 The people who are running 1. 10 themselves are not economically signaling. 1:56:13 Eight months ago, I built a trustless on-chain fork futures 1:56:16 contract where the Bitcoin blockchain is the oracle. 1:56:20 In a narrow domain, guys, we solved the oracle problem. 1:56:23 Since we're betting on Bitcoin consensus and we're understanding what do 1:56:26 we think is going to happen, there is this belief that 1:56:29 one, I built that contract, fully open sourced it. No one 1:56:32 wanted to take me up on it. No one wanted to 1:56:34 take me up on it at reduced odds. This is provably 1:56:36 auditable. You could dump it into Chad TPT or Grok or 1:56:39 Kimmy or whatever. And this is the thing is when a 1:56:43 chain split happens, miners are only able to mine one block 1:56:46 at a time. They cannot mine both blockchains. 1:56:49 And because of that, you need to not look at the 1:56:51 count of nodes, but how much is going to be put 1:56:54 on the line. Say what you will about Roger Ver and 1:56:57 Jihan, they put up hundreds of thousands of Bitcoin because they 1:57:01 believed in a different vision for what Bitcoin should be. 1:57:03 And in a chain split, we're capitalizing and economically supporting their 1:57:08 side of the chain. It's not just that there's no businesses 1:57:10 and there's no exchangers and there's scant little mining pools outside 1:57:13 of ones that are being rented. It is the fact that 1:57:15 every user who is saying that they are going to do 1:57:18 this and they will drag the whole network kicking and screaming 1:57:20 along with them. None of them want to put a Bitcoin 1:57:23 with this belief of, oh, I don't want to participate in 1:57:25 markets. I'm gambling. First off, I don't believe buying Bitcoin is 1:57:29 a gamble, right? It is not gambling. When you buy Bitcoin, 1:57:32 you are betting on yourself in the future and the prosperity 1:57:35 of the network. And if you think buying Bitcoin is gambling, 1:57:38 maybe that's for you then. But like it's investing. 1:57:41 That's incredibly important. And also, by not participating in the market, 1:57:44 you are providing a market signal. There's one little prediction market 1:57:48 that has about four Bitcoin in volume on it right now. 1:57:50 And that is largely because the pro 110 side of the 1:57:53 argument does not want to economically engage. They have a belief 1:57:56 that if they run software and they yell at people online, 1:57:58 they're going to be able to persuade and move the entire 1:58:01 network. And to Reindell's point, that would be a really weak, 1:58:04 bad thing for the Bitcoin network if people can socially peacock 1:58:07 and run software but not engage in economics. 1:58:10 And they would be able to influence the network. That would 1:58:12 be the end of Bitcoin, the experiment of Bitcoin being decentralized money. 1:58:18 Portland, go for it. 1:58:21 I don't think I can follow up after Rob. I just 1:58:23 had a point about signaling and why miners wouldn't flip the 1:58:26 bit just out of safety, essentially, to mine on both chains. 1:58:34 You would be the person that I would want to have 1:58:36 respond to that. OK. Yeah, basically, the reason why specifically 1:58:40 signaling is communication of intent. So it's like, am I ready 1:58:43 to enforce this rule or not? Essentially, if you have a 1:58:46 bunch of miners that don't intend to enforce the 1:58:51 rules come the enforcement date, you walk into essentially a fog 1:58:54 of war. The miners, if they all flip the bit, but 1:58:56 we don't know who's signaling, they then have to communicate amongst 1:59:00 themselves outside of the chain to go, OK, I will be 1:59:03 not running the rules anyways. I was just kind of like 1:59:06 trying to be nice here and ensure like I got my 1:59:09 Coinbase rewards. And so that could cause a lot of confusion. 1:59:13 And at the end of the day, like if they don't 1:59:15 coordinate well enough internally instead of externally through signaling, you 1:59:19 end up with a scenario potentially where essentially like some miners 1:59:22 might be running the enforcing client and some might not be. 1:59:25 And you end up with like a 30-70 split of 1:59:28 hash rate because of that. And then they would all have 1:59:30 to kind of scramble to figure out their situation. So I 1:59:33 don't believe it's truly costless just to flip this bit. 1:59:36 You're essentially obfuscating your true intent to signal if you just 1:59:41 signal because you want to mine these blocks on both chains 1:59:45 without any actual plan to run the enforcement mechanism. 1:59:55 Thoughts? 1:59:56 We're kind of about to be wrapping up on time. 1:59:59 This was riveting, you guys. So this is a good opportunity 2:00:01 if people have final thoughts. 2:00:08 Well, this was fun. This was fun. Leo, what's up? 2:00:13 Yeah, I mean, look, I still haven't gotten an answer from 2:00:17 Matt on why the guy who created Borker is pandering to 2:00:21 like this spam haters now. And I think it's a great 2:00:25 opportunity. We've got some people here listening who I think genuinely 2:00:29 would be curious to hear your counterargument to the prevailing narrative 2:00:33 that you're trying to sell overpriced raspberry pies to people. 2:00:36 And you saw a great opportunity to do that. And that 2:00:39 is what most people believe. And I'm not saying I believe 2:00:41 it, Matt. But that is the belief. And I'm just curious 2:00:44 if you have any sort of answer to that. 2:00:47 Because the first two times I asked it, you failed to 2:00:49 answer the question. So yeah, Borker guy, really cool thing you 2:00:54 built. All of a sudden, you're not a huge fan of 2:00:58 people inscribing arbitrary data into Bitcoin. 2:01:01 What happened? I'm going to read. 2:01:03 It's really interesting because Leonidas is the guy who made the 2:01:06 Start9 nodes useful. Like, there's no point to start 2:01:10 nine nodes. The only good thing they do is they're storing 2:01:13 valuables in a decentralized way. 2:01:16 And Leonidas created that use case for him. 2:01:18 And instead of like thanking him, he's like making this whole 2:01:21 story about miners being centralized and whatnot. 2:01:25 I mean, we're literally helping you build your company. 2:01:28 We're attempting to keep this as respectful as possible. 2:01:31 This is an official organizational Twitter space. 2:01:35 But Matt, I will... Isabel, I also have a question. 2:01:38 And sorry for interrupting. And I'm trying to keep this professional 2:01:41 and organizational and whatever. What's up? 2:01:45 What's your favorite Drivechain? My favorite Drivechain? 2:01:49 I want to hear people... So Matt is not going to 2:01:52 answer your question. It's like we've been on here two hours. 2:01:55 It's the only interesting question we've talked about. 2:01:58 And Matt's just not going to answer it. I might rephrase 2:02:02 it because I actually... I mean, I think we all know 2:02:04 the answer. I mean, I think that like you are kind 2:02:07 of trolling. OK, well, I think Matt doesn't know the answer. 2:02:10 I personally think I would rephrase that question, which is just 2:02:13 like, we haven't really done just like the basic education of 2:02:17 explaining like, why are these transactions with arbitrary data? 2:02:21 Like, why do you now consider them harmful when maybe you 2:02:23 previously historically didn't? I mean, I think that that's like a 2:02:26 fair question to ask. But I think we can ignore the 2:02:28 whole, you know, are you trying to sell nodes part of 2:02:31 the question? No, I think he's asking the question in good 2:02:34 faith. I mean, Udi's clearly on the attack. 2:02:37 But I think Leonidas is asking the question in good faith. 2:02:39 He wants to understand why the change, right, over the years. 2:02:43 And the answer is not complicated, right? 2:02:46 People change their minds over the years. 2:02:49 Back in 2019, when I was really learning Bitcoin 2:02:54 development, right, not just from the economic and political side, which 2:02:58 is what attracted me to it, but when I actually wanted 2:03:00 to start, you know, understanding technically how it worked, this was 2:03:03 a really interesting project to work on to help educate me, 2:03:06 right? Like reading Mastering Bitcoin like four times over and then 2:03:09 getting into the code and, you know, building something like Borker 2:03:12 was an educational experience. 2:03:15 I thought it was neat and cool. 2:03:17 But ultimately, it was just a science experiment that nobody cared 2:03:20 about and wasn't actually interesting. I know you think it was, 2:03:24 but ultimately, I viewed it as like, you know, just some 2:03:26 child's tinkering thing and moved on. 2:03:30 And over the years between 2019 and now, I believe 2:03:34 that I have come to understand Bitcoin dynamics and governance 2:03:39 and its nature better than I did. 2:03:41 And I believe that spam can absolutely effectively be 2:03:46 mitigated through policy and network rate limiting. 2:03:49 And I also am even more interested in soft fork dynamics 2:03:53 now that I've really kind of dug into it. 2:03:56 And I think that one way or another, an extremely valuable 2:04:00 lesson is about to be learned in the next week and 2:04:02 a half. And I think we all can agree that it's 2:04:05 an exciting moment where one way or another, somebody is going 2:04:09 to get punched in the face and learn a hard lesson. 2:04:10 I think that's fine. Right. I want to hear from Reindell, 2:04:13 but Matt, really quickly, what is your projection? I mean, we 2:04:16 haven't heard from you on like, I mean, it seems like 2:04:18 everyone seems to think this is just going to like DOA 2:04:20 and like not a big deal, nothing burger. Like what is 2:04:23 your projection as to like what's going to happen? 2:04:25 What do you speculate is going to happen on August 9th? 2:04:30 It's hard to put percentages on, but I think that there 2:04:33 is a meaningful non-zero chance that between now 2:04:37 and the mandatory signaling period, you will see a 2:04:42 rapid and then overwhelming rise of signaling and hash supporting Bitcoin 2:04:47 10. I think that there is a meaningful chance that that 2:04:49 happens, but I am curious to see, right? 2:04:53 I'm very, very curious to see how this plays out. 2:04:56 Yeah. Reindell, you want to jump in? Yeah. 2:04:59 Two things that Matt said that I think are really important 2:05:02 that I just want to like massively plus one. 2:05:05 The latter one, which is, you know, in whatever, nine days, 2:05:09 10 days, something, 2:05:10 a whole bunch of people are going to learn something, which 2:05:13 I think is great. I think everybody's going to learn something. 2:05:16 And like, that's just always good. And then the other thing 2:05:19 that he said, he said, you know, he picked up this 2:05:21 project as a way to learn development of Bitcoin. 2:05:24 I, 2:05:26 you know, the first time that I really understood how Taproot 2:05:28 worked was actually contributing to Ord. 2:05:32 Because Ord was like a very approachable code base, and it 2:05:36 was an interesting thing to work on that required actually, 2:05:40 you know, building tap trees and like actually like building those 2:05:44 transactions. And it kind of gave me a reason. So I 2:05:46 would just say for anybody out there listening, 2:05:50 finding novel ways to shove data into Bitcoin transactions is 2:05:54 actually a very good constructive way to learn Bitcoin development. 2:05:58 And I think we've seen over the last three years, you 2:06:03 know, there's more developers in the world who know how 2:06:07 to work on Bitcoin because of things like Ordinals than before. 2:06:12 You know, for a really long time, if you wanted to 2:06:15 like build software on Bitcoin, you could build a wallet or 2:06:17 a block explorer, and that's it. 2:06:20 There wasn't really thing else much to build. 2:06:23 And, you know, like, it's been great to get more 2:06:28 developers working on Bitcoin, thinking on Bitcoin, doing Bitcoin things. 2:06:32 So I strongly co-sign what Matt was saying about sticking 2:06:36 arbitrary data into Bitcoin transactions is a great way to learn 2:06:39 about Bitcoin, and I encourage more people to do it. I 2:06:41 have to seriously-I'd like to respond to that. 2:06:44 I want to respond to that real quick once you're done 2:06:46 as well. Okay, Matt, you go ahead, and then I'll say 2:06:49 my point and I'll wrap up. 2:06:51 Yes, one, thank you. And two, I agree. And I'll take 2:06:54 it even further, which is the more barriers that we put 2:06:58 up in policy and consensus to prevent arbitrary data in Bitcoin 2:07:02 actually pushes that envelope further, 2:07:06 right, forcing people to get increasingly creative about how to embed 2:07:10 data. Because if it becomes standardized, it gets boring, right? 2:07:13 Like if one emerges and nobody fights it, and there's nothing 2:07:18 to learn, and it's all just AI copy pasting from patterns 2:07:21 and templates, then you're not going to learn Bitcoin development. 2:07:23 You're not going to learn how it works. So you guys 2:07:26 should be, you know, fighting tooth and nail for policy and 2:07:28 consensus to block all this stuff so that people can come 2:07:30 up with increasingly creative ways to do it. 2:07:33 Fair point, yeah. If anybody wants to see, I put up 2:07:37 in the nest the thing that I was referencing 2:07:40 with Bitcoin Purifier. It's a project that's on GitHub. 2:07:43 It's only about 80 lines of shell. 2:07:46 I put it out on Christmas day in 2023. 2:07:50 My family was super mad at me because instead of hanging 2:07:52 out with my, you know, children on Christmas morning, I was 2:07:56 writing code to help the org disrespector crowd. 2:08:00 That's how much I love them. And so I put up Bitcoin Purifier. 2:08:06 You know, some people in the 110 crowd didn't like it 2:08:09 and said that it was malware, but it was actually really 2:08:12 the proto 110. So I feel like 110 is actually kind 2:08:17 of, you know, the intellectual nephew of my 2:08:21 own work, and I'm thrilled to see it flourishing. 2:08:25 Love that, love that. I don't know about intellectual, but it's 2:08:27 a nephew. Full circle moment, Reindell. 2:08:30 Thank you for bringing that home for us. 2:08:33 This was really fun. You know, I feel like we kept it like 2:08:39 somewhat professional in this very professional, 2:08:43 highly organized space. Thank you guys so much for joining. 2:08:48 And yeah, I am going to close down now, but you 2:08:52 guys are awesome. And this was really fun. So thank you 2:08:53 so much for joining me and talk to you soon. And 2:08:55 special shout out to Matt for holding it down for his 2:08:58 crew. You did not have an easy job today, and I 2:09:01 think you actually did incredibly well. So thank you, Matt. 2:09:04 All right. Bye, guys. 2:09:06 Thanks. 2:09:08 Knots Army.
