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Hello, and welcome to Drivechain Twitter Spaces.

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Today is July 14th, 2023, and we at LayerTwo Labs

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are thrilled to have yet another awesome conversation.

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These are recorded spaces.

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I'm your host, Henry, and LayerTwo Labs

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provides these spaces to encourage understanding

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and interest in Drivechain,

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which is Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 300 and 301.

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Everyone who would like to come up to the stage

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and speak is welcome to.

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We invite everyone, including our most enthusiastic fans

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and our most ardent skeptics,

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to join us in this conversation

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for the benefit of the Bitcoin community.

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The goal is to make sure everyone,

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to the greatest extent possible,

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understands the tremendous potential promise

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of this new, important technology,

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which we believe has enormous potential

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to strengthen Bitcoin in many ways.

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To improve Bitcoin's security,

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to improve Bitcoin's narratives,

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to improve Bitcoin's breadth of user base,

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to increase the number of people using Bitcoin,

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the number of ways you can use Bitcoin.

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There are so many different aspects

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to how this can strengthen the Bitcoin community.

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Most fundamentally of all,

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it's about reducing the desire of developers and builders

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to go to altcoins.

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Instead, they can stay with Bitcoin and build

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and create value on Bitcoin sidechains.

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Bitcoin sidechains are optional.

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No one has to use them,

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and therefore it is a powerful system

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for enabling the many different kinds of Bitcoiners

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to all be happily using Bitcoin in different ways.

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We envision a future where Bitcoin sidechains

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are the largest and most successful part

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of the Bitcoin ecosystem.

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People using Bitcoin sidechains for greater privacy,

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for greater scaling,

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and for many other kinds of developments that Bitcoin needs.

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Thanks to those who've joined already.

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We're excited to have this conversation today

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as we do every Friday.

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Last time we had hundreds of people listening to our space

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and discussing it and tweeting about it.

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Sometimes these spaces go for as many as six hours.

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Today, we're gonna aim for just a couple hours.

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Welcome to the space, Paul.

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How's it going?

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Happy Friday.

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Hello, happy Friday.

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We had a lot of people after the last podcast,

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I mean, or whatever space,

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they were like wanting to discuss further.

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So we told them all to come.

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It'd be very interesting if,

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because they seem to be a champing at the bit,

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like on Saturday,

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but I guess six days is a long time.

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They don't seem to be very punctual,

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but I think,

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yeah, what was that guy?

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Mike or whoever?

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It seems like we had quite a few people who

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Yeah.

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ask a bunch of questions, so.

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We had a great conversation.

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Last week, I think it was last week that we had that

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extensive discussion with Bob McElrath.

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It was a good discussion.

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We dug into some details and explored different ideas.

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It was very nice to have Bob here.

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I hope he comes back soon.

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Well, I'm optimistic we'll get a great space today.

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There's so many different ways to look at drivechain.

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People have all kinds of different ideas,

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depending often on their level of reading.

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If they've studied it extensively,

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they might have more interesting and novel concerns.

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And if they are totally new to it,

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they can bring a fresh perspective.

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And the guy who wanted to talk,

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maybe we should drag him back in here.

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Sure.

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I forget exactly the full name of who.

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It was like a full large blocker guy who was

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Oh, yes.

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absolutely determined to spend

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hours and hours of my time

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texting people.

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Oh, yes, yes.

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Let me find his name.

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I know who you mean.

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So I actually had some DMs regarding that,

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and I think I understand what's going on.

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His name was Matthew, and then it began with a Z.

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Something with

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I was like,

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Let me see.

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Yeah, and if you don't want to hear

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yet another large blocker conversation,

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I've heard thousands in my life,

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then we'll get someone else to come up here and speak.

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That person was absolutely determined

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to message me over and over again.

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His name is

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His name is Matthew Zietzke.

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Z-I-E-T-Z-K-E.

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I had a DM with someone who I think is his friend,

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and I think that Matt is just someone who generally prefers

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to have Twitter written conversations.

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He's not much of a

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Yeah, but that's not intellectually honest,

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because the issue with when you speak

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Of course.

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it conveys much more, much more

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Some people have some kind of reason

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like they're trying to remain anonymous

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because they're like criticizing Vladimir Putin

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or something, and their family will be killed.

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So that's a real reason, but not something like this.

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And so what this person is,

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what people like to do is they want it

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to make it like go on forever.

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Whereas if you just talk to someone,

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you can just go back and forth.

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It's people put their cards on the table.

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You see how confident people are about different things.

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Of course.

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So that's actually cool.

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So if people can't do,

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I mean, human beings evolved to do this conversation thing.

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The text, a lot is lost in the text message.

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Different groups will read it differently.

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So like, if you're from a camp,

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you know, Republicans and Democrats texting at each other,

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you know, like, what about like,

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if two people are getting into like a romantic fight,

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should they be texting at each other?

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It's always a bad idea in my experience.

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Always a bad idea.

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Yeah.

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Like, you have a problem at work,

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should you send in a work email?

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I can tell you, like, if I have a disagreement with my wife,

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I do not text it to her.

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I wait until we're face to face so I can, you know,

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there's a higher quality of communication that's possible

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only with verbal discussion.

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Yeah.

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And it's not just the two people talking,

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it's the audience as well.

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So I don't know if that person's, you know,

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that's why it's the other thing is that the space is like,

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this is going to go for like whatever,

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two hours or three hours, then it'll be over.

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So, whereas the text thing will just go on and on

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for an unlimited amount of time.

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And you'll never know,

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like if you have the person's attention or whatever.

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So I don't know.

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And they don't,

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we have like a long list, honestly,

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of people who wanted to talk,

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but maybe they're not here.

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I exactly have 107.

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So I have now sent him by a DM to my,

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I have a DM going with some large blockers.

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It's, you know, they're very nice people.

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I've tried everyone.

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They are very nice.

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Yeah, so it's a DM with like Jerry Chan and Hector.

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Yeah, Jerry Chan is nice.

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I've met Jerry Chan.

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He's a nice guy.

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I mean, he's like, some of these people are like ancient.

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They are, they have been around.

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Jerry is actually, Jerry's named in the block size word

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by Jonathan Beer, you know,

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where it quotes like a paragraph of him talking

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in Hong Kong in 2012 about Bitcoin.

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Jerry's an OG.

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And then, you know, this,

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so I invited basically these people,

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Hector, Jerry, Matt, and Daniel Krawitz

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to like join our space if they want.

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Oh, Daniel Krawitz is great.

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Daniel Krawitz is ironically a huge fan of Drivechain

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or he was before I think he just decided

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that BTC is sort of a lost cause.

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Yeah.

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Daniel Krawitz is an absolute genius.

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He's like, his little movies and posts are all like,

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impression doesn't even begin to describe it.

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He's like on a completely different level.

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But unfortunately, as with such people,

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they sometimes, they're so smart

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that they don't fit into their time and place.

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I think that-

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And also this makes him unrelatable

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to the network effects of Bitcoin.

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Like he just doesn't realize that so few people,

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you know, are willing to take

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full large blockism seriously or Craig Wright

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as anything other than a menace.

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It's interesting how they have a technical argument,

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which it's so interesting that you

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and the other small blockers who share your vision

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have not succeeded in coming to terms

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with these intellectuals in the large blocker camp

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who seem to think that there is a technical line

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of reasoning that everyone can just do a lot of pruning

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or some such to, and then the large blocks work.

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And that like, why it's a shame

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that they haven't just fully grokked your understanding

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that others share, but that they-

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I certainly meet them like more than like,

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I mean, what I say is everyone with Drivechain,

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it's sort of like the main complaint of the large blocks

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is that this is the set of stuff that everyone must do

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to run the node.

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So since everyone must do it,

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then it's kind of, that's the problem.

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And so with Drivechain, it's kind of like

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each person can choose what level they want to opt into.

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So Drivechain is kind of like a sort of a pruning

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of a type of thing.

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And then I say, anyone can just go on any block size

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they want, they can have large block, small block,

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whatever.

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Oh, we have them.

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And so I would say that it should be allowed,

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as long as it doesn't interfere with the people

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who want small blocks.

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The small block position, I think is pretty simple,

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which is that they want to,

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everything that happens on the network is something

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that they have to monitor every transaction

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for double spends, see if the block is valid or not.

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And they just want this list of,

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it's like a list of chores.

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They just don't want it to be very long.

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I wanted to introduce someone who I just invited up

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to the stage, Paul.

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This is a professor and we've had a number of very nice DMs

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over the last year.

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He's written an excellent book on the game theory

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and mathematics of Bitcoin and Bitcoin mining.

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He's one of my favorite people to follow on Twitter.

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And he recently has been asking excellent questions

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about Drivechain.

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So maybe you and he can spend some time today

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if he's interested in hearing his latest set of questions.

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Yeah, I have some formal training in game theory

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and like PhD microeconomics and I'm a big fan,

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casually, of like Tom Schelling and other people.

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Tom Schelling, he doesn't really fit at all with,

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like someone would be taught game theory in school.

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He's like, I think.

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Professor Warner, take it away, Professor Warner.

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Okay, thanks.

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Yeah, let's see.

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So yeah, I'm Micah Warren.

267
00:11:54,894 --> 00:11:58,334
I guess my name's a little bit of a mixed up letter thing.

268
00:12:01,014 --> 00:12:03,934
Yeah, I just started looking into Drivechain.

269
00:12:03,934 --> 00:12:06,494
I've heard about it and I've kind of casually looked at it

270
00:12:06,494 --> 00:12:09,853
and I kind of jumped into it a little bit,

271
00:12:09,853 --> 00:12:12,293
actually read the details this week,

272
00:12:13,454 --> 00:12:16,694
trying to understand it.

273
00:12:16,694 --> 00:12:19,773
And so I have, I think some, I have some questions.

274
00:12:19,773 --> 00:12:23,173
I think I answered some of them when I looked closer,

275
00:12:23,173 --> 00:12:26,254
just trying to figure out how it works.

276
00:12:26,254 --> 00:12:30,254
So to start, like there's no,

277
00:12:30,254 --> 00:12:32,733
if somebody wants to propose a sidechain,

278
00:12:33,574 --> 00:12:36,934
this can be anybody for anything

279
00:12:36,934 --> 00:12:41,934
with any sort of method of determining whether the,

280
00:12:41,934 --> 00:12:45,173
you know, how the payments work on the sidechain

281
00:12:45,173 --> 00:12:46,254
whatsoever, right?

282
00:12:47,254 --> 00:12:51,494
The idea is to kick that problem from layer one

283
00:12:51,494 --> 00:12:54,934
to the layer two, like the designer or the developer

284
00:12:54,934 --> 00:12:57,894
and say, it's kind of like you have an opportunity.

285
00:12:57,894 --> 00:13:00,413
It's like you have the layer one is like a ball

286
00:13:00,413 --> 00:13:01,254
or something.

287
00:13:01,254 --> 00:13:03,093
It's like, if you want to open your restaurant

288
00:13:03,093 --> 00:13:04,613
or your store in this mall,

289
00:13:05,494 --> 00:13:07,973
I give you the opportunity to succeed,

290
00:13:07,973 --> 00:13:10,613
but not, you won't necessarily succeed.

291
00:13:10,613 --> 00:13:13,934
So, but I, the default thing would be, you know,

292
00:13:13,934 --> 00:13:15,934
like a merged mind blockchain,

293
00:13:15,934 --> 00:13:17,533
but it actually does not have to be that.

294
00:13:17,533 --> 00:13:20,973
The only requirement is that 32 bytes,

295
00:13:20,973 --> 00:13:23,454
that the miners be able to find this 32 bytes

296
00:13:23,454 --> 00:13:25,733
of the real withdrawal hash every three months

297
00:13:25,733 --> 00:13:29,033
so that they can figure out which withdrawals are real.

298
00:13:30,033 --> 00:13:32,074
If they can't do that, then there's no one will know

299
00:13:32,074 --> 00:13:35,874
which withdrawals are real and which are theft,

300
00:13:36,913 --> 00:13:39,994
making it pretty likely that it will be stolen.

301
00:13:39,994 --> 00:13:42,473
So where does this hash come from?

302
00:13:42,473 --> 00:13:44,834
I guess we'll ask a different question.

303
00:13:44,834 --> 00:13:47,473
Suppose I just say, I'm, you know,

304
00:13:47,473 --> 00:13:49,473
let's say I have a hundred Bitcoin

305
00:13:49,473 --> 00:13:53,153
and I want to will it to my children.

306
00:13:53,153 --> 00:13:57,033
Can I just go deposit that and say, I'm, you know,

307
00:13:57,273 --> 00:14:00,074
when my, when I die and my kids want my Bitcoin,

308
00:14:00,074 --> 00:14:01,834
the miners will just approve it is,

309
00:14:01,834 --> 00:14:04,153
or does there need to be some way?

310
00:14:04,153 --> 00:14:07,434
No, I think the way that I would maybe explain it

311
00:14:08,634 --> 00:14:11,554
is that the problem that it's solved,

312
00:14:12,473 --> 00:14:14,473
or the problem that BIP300 tries to solve

313
00:14:14,473 --> 00:14:17,074
is this idea that we have basically these alt coins

314
00:14:17,074 --> 00:14:19,773
and we have disputes over what the blockchain should contain.

315
00:14:19,773 --> 00:14:22,793
So there's the large block, small block dispute.

316
00:14:22,793 --> 00:14:24,374
And I was just saying,

317
00:14:25,374 --> 00:14:27,773
you can get like with merge mining,

318
00:14:27,773 --> 00:14:30,894
you can run two blockchains at the same time for free

319
00:14:30,894 --> 00:14:35,533
and with one chain, so the goal would really be

320
00:14:35,533 --> 00:14:38,733
to have this only work for blockchain.

321
00:14:38,733 --> 00:14:40,754
So if you wanted to leave the money to your kids,

322
00:14:40,754 --> 00:14:43,853
you would do that on like the layer two chain

323
00:14:43,853 --> 00:14:46,054
or the layer one chain or whatever.

324
00:14:46,054 --> 00:14:48,574
I guess I'm not asking like what it was intended to solve,

325
00:14:48,574 --> 00:14:52,014
but it might solve, what other problems could it solve?

326
00:14:52,093 --> 00:14:56,033
I think because the idea is that on the blockchain,

327
00:14:56,033 --> 00:14:58,773
everything is compressed to hash Merkle root

328
00:14:58,773 --> 00:15:01,213
or just this 80 byte header.

329
00:15:01,213 --> 00:15:03,554
So you kind of have strengthened numbers

330
00:15:03,554 --> 00:15:06,353
that used to be like an unofficial motto of Bitcoin

331
00:15:06,353 --> 00:15:09,973
because everyone's fee added to the same coin base

332
00:15:09,973 --> 00:15:11,973
and everyone was in the same blockchain.

333
00:15:11,973 --> 00:15:13,293
So if they reorg the blockchain,

334
00:15:13,293 --> 00:15:15,454
it would just reorg everyone's blockchain.

335
00:15:15,454 --> 00:15:19,134
And so that's like the idea

336
00:15:19,134 --> 00:15:22,694
because it's the same 32 bytes withdrawals for everyone,

337
00:15:22,694 --> 00:15:24,814
everyone using the sidechain in that three months.

338
00:15:24,814 --> 00:15:29,814
So it's pouring all the hopes and dreams and fears

339
00:15:30,494 --> 00:15:33,574
and whatever people onto this one simple thing.

340
00:15:33,574 --> 00:15:36,494
And that's what kind of would make it more likely to work,

341
00:15:36,494 --> 00:15:38,894
but there's never inevitable that it would work.

342
00:15:40,033 --> 00:15:44,093
Yeah, so the withdrawals don't have to happen, right?

343
00:15:44,093 --> 00:15:47,613
I mean, like it can be a one way thing

344
00:15:47,613 --> 00:15:50,934
that just stays there for a long time, right?

345
00:15:50,934 --> 00:15:52,973
Like, I mean, that's why I'm asking about the wheel.

346
00:15:52,973 --> 00:15:55,574
I can just, like I put this a hundred Bitcoin

347
00:15:55,574 --> 00:15:59,814
in like this lockbox and then the miners,

348
00:15:59,814 --> 00:16:01,533
apparently I could propose this,

349
00:16:01,533 --> 00:16:05,293
the miners would hack it and say, we're cool with this.

350
00:16:05,293 --> 00:16:08,194
And then, you know, 2060 or whatever.

351
00:16:09,213 --> 00:16:10,494
But I wouldn't do that though,

352
00:16:10,494 --> 00:16:14,093
because what you want is the-

353
00:16:14,093 --> 00:16:16,334
You being me or you being the miner?

354
00:16:16,334 --> 00:16:18,213
You being you, me being you.

355
00:16:20,134 --> 00:16:22,173
Because I would, you'd want the,

356
00:16:22,173 --> 00:16:24,773
you'd want it to be something where there's,

357
00:16:24,773 --> 00:16:26,894
you want the strength in numbers effect,

358
00:16:26,894 --> 00:16:29,374
where you want the chain to be generating a lot of fees.

359
00:16:29,374 --> 00:16:32,213
See, if you just do that on the layer two chain,

360
00:16:32,213 --> 00:16:37,093
then there's like a game theoretic idea

361
00:16:37,093 --> 00:16:39,374
that if they're going to steal something from,

362
00:16:39,374 --> 00:16:42,173
the hash is either going to match or it's not.

363
00:16:43,093 --> 00:16:44,413
I'm curious about this,

364
00:16:44,413 --> 00:16:47,173
like I don't follow what you mean by the hash.

365
00:16:47,173 --> 00:16:50,213
I mean, there's at some point, so 2060,

366
00:16:50,213 --> 00:16:52,374
my son is going to go to a lawyer

367
00:16:52,374 --> 00:16:55,413
and he's going to take my will.

368
00:16:55,413 --> 00:16:56,613
He's going to publish the will.

369
00:16:56,613 --> 00:16:59,454
He's going to say, here's my output address.

370
00:16:59,454 --> 00:17:01,934
I'm creating this bundle, which is just one transaction,

371
00:17:01,934 --> 00:17:03,454
which takes this 100 Bitcoin

372
00:17:03,454 --> 00:17:06,413
and it deposits to this address.

373
00:17:06,413 --> 00:17:08,454
And this is in 2060.

374
00:17:08,454 --> 00:17:10,454
Now the miners then include this

375
00:17:10,454 --> 00:17:12,454
and then they have to vote yes or no

376
00:17:12,454 --> 00:17:17,454
for the next 13,000 or whatever, 1300 blocks, right?

377
00:17:18,614 --> 00:17:20,734
Right, but again, I wouldn't do this type of thing.

378
00:17:20,734 --> 00:17:22,974
This is an example of a restaurant in the mall

379
00:17:22,974 --> 00:17:26,653
that is likely to go out of business, I think.

380
00:17:26,653 --> 00:17:28,373
I just wouldn't do it that way.

381
00:17:28,373 --> 00:17:30,653
Yeah, no, you're talking, well, I have nothing,

382
00:17:30,653 --> 00:17:33,734
I mean, you're saying you wouldn't do that,

383
00:17:33,734 --> 00:17:35,413
but I have really bad habits.

384
00:17:35,413 --> 00:17:39,574
I'm saying there's a way to accomplish the same thing.

385
00:17:39,574 --> 00:17:40,533
What's that?

386
00:17:40,533 --> 00:17:41,373
Well, I was saying there's a way

387
00:17:41,373 --> 00:17:42,934
to accomplish the similar thing

388
00:17:42,934 --> 00:17:46,334
where you store it cryptographically on layer two

389
00:17:46,334 --> 00:17:47,734
and then it's doing everyone,

390
00:17:47,734 --> 00:17:50,694
there's like a will store or whatever

391
00:17:50,694 --> 00:17:52,094
that's doing everyone's will.

392
00:17:53,173 --> 00:17:54,614
Okay, but I don't want to like say

393
00:17:54,614 --> 00:17:56,173
that I don't know how that thing exists.

394
00:17:56,173 --> 00:17:59,013
I don't trust the people that are running it.

395
00:17:59,013 --> 00:18:01,373
You know, I don't know, I'm Kanye West or somebody

396
00:18:01,373 --> 00:18:05,133
and like people know me and I just,

397
00:18:05,133 --> 00:18:06,493
I have bad password hygiene.

398
00:18:06,493 --> 00:18:09,373
I don't trust people to remember my passwords.

399
00:18:10,133 --> 00:18:11,734
And I say, hey, I can just do this.

400
00:18:11,734 --> 00:18:14,814
Allow me to try to help out, you know,

401
00:18:14,814 --> 00:18:16,893
because being much less technical than you,

402
00:18:16,893 --> 00:18:19,013
it's sometimes is useful for the audience and myself

403
00:18:19,013 --> 00:18:22,574
just to kind of make sure we're all on the same page.

404
00:18:22,574 --> 00:18:26,054
Professor Warren mentioned a day or two ago, Paul,

405
00:18:26,054 --> 00:18:27,734
in a tweet that was very interesting.

406
00:18:27,734 --> 00:18:32,734
He asked, could a celebrity make a BIP300 transaction

407
00:18:34,334 --> 00:18:36,934
where the goal of the sidechain is to be

408
00:18:36,934 --> 00:18:39,413
the celebrity's personal funds

409
00:18:39,413 --> 00:18:40,974
that don't involve the celebrity

410
00:18:40,974 --> 00:18:42,814
having to remember a password

411
00:18:42,814 --> 00:18:45,454
and that the miners would do the peg out

412
00:18:45,454 --> 00:18:48,854
when the celebrity wants.

413
00:18:48,854 --> 00:18:50,094
Is that right, professor?

414
00:18:51,773 --> 00:18:54,094
Yeah, that's precisely the question.

415
00:18:54,094 --> 00:18:55,974
Well, it's a little bit like saying,

416
00:18:55,974 --> 00:19:00,653
can a celebrity go into the mall and start a restaurant

417
00:19:00,653 --> 00:19:03,373
where they're the only employee that works there?

418
00:19:03,373 --> 00:19:04,694
Where like the answer is yes,

419
00:19:04,694 --> 00:19:06,694
but it does seem a little confused.

420
00:19:07,454 --> 00:19:08,814
I think this is an example of a very interesting

421
00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:13,054
and novel, like imaginative thought experiment.

422
00:19:13,054 --> 00:19:16,054
However, I think that the answer that Paul's giving

423
00:19:17,934 --> 00:19:22,734
is right, which is that the way that sidechains will succeed

424
00:19:22,734 --> 00:19:25,253
is through being very-

425
00:19:25,253 --> 00:19:26,814
Okay, but I don't care.

426
00:19:26,814 --> 00:19:29,054
I don't care if sidechains succeed.

427
00:19:29,054 --> 00:19:30,773
I mean, I just want to make sure that I don't,

428
00:19:30,773 --> 00:19:31,614
I just don't want to forget.

429
00:19:31,614 --> 00:19:33,133
Yeah, I'm saying, I'm trying to say

430
00:19:33,133 --> 00:19:34,614
not sidechains generally,

431
00:19:34,614 --> 00:19:37,133
but any individual sidechain is kind of like,

432
00:19:37,133 --> 00:19:38,734
as Paul is saying, a restaurant.

433
00:19:38,734 --> 00:19:41,614
And his point there, the thrust of his point

434
00:19:41,614 --> 00:19:44,013
is that restaurants very often fail.

435
00:19:44,013 --> 00:19:46,413
So the way that a sidechain will succeed

436
00:19:46,413 --> 00:19:49,533
and become large and understood to be reliable

437
00:19:49,533 --> 00:19:53,094
and successful is if it provides consumers

438
00:19:53,094 --> 00:19:56,413
exactly what they want in a very effective way.

439
00:19:56,413 --> 00:20:00,173
So a niche, tiny, unusual sidechain

440
00:20:00,173 --> 00:20:02,133
that doesn't have to do with many people

441
00:20:02,133 --> 00:20:06,854
is not going to leverage the technology of drivechain

442
00:20:06,854 --> 00:20:08,454
and persist probably.

443
00:20:08,798 --> 00:20:10,798
It'll fail.

444
00:20:10,798 --> 00:20:19,798
No, no, so, but my only, I mean, I don't understand that because my, like, I just have one goal and that's to save my money. I don't care about, like, my goal is-

445
00:20:19,798 --> 00:20:36,798
Are you familiar, I know, but are you familiar with the concept that the sidechains cannot be launched by an individual person? They are launched through a process that involves the vast majority of hashrate confirming the initiation of the DIP 300 sidechain.

446
00:20:37,798 --> 00:20:40,798
Right. So it's 90% over the first two weeks.

447
00:20:40,798 --> 00:20:53,798
So Kanye West is never going to succeed in, oh, Paul can answer the technicals on that, but Kanye West is never going to succeed, probably, in saying, hey, world, I want the whole Bitcoin community to kind of, like, orient towards me.

448
00:20:53,798 --> 00:20:56,798
Is that right, Paul? It probably would never happen that way.

449
00:20:57,798 --> 00:21:02,798
There probably would not be this celebrity sidechain that is just unique to one person.

450
00:21:02,798 --> 00:21:22,798
Well, I mean, yeah, it's a good question, but, like, we don't know. I mean, say it's 2031, drivechains, it's finally, you know, it gets passed and, you know, it's accepted and the software happens and then three weeks go by and there haven't been any solid proposals.

451
00:21:23,798 --> 00:21:35,798
And then Kanye West steps up and people say, hey, this is great. We're going to, like, this is a good way to bring, you know, some popularity and, you know, attention to this thing.

452
00:21:35,798 --> 00:21:37,798
Maybe he, maybe it doesn't.

453
00:21:37,798 --> 00:21:40,798
So I think you asked a great question because you.

454
00:21:41,798 --> 00:21:43,798
I mean, it's possible and you can certainly try.

455
00:21:43,798 --> 00:21:55,798
And the ordinary sidechain proposals that people contemplate, Professor, have to do with a privacy sidechain, a large block sidechain and others that are quite obvious examples of technology.

456
00:21:55,798 --> 00:22:13,798
Since they're already a blockchain, it's like it's already something where all of the activity that happens can just be compressed into one little 32 byte hash, which is just something that the human eye can at a glance look at and compare to something else.

457
00:22:14,798 --> 00:22:27,798
So let's try to get to the give him an answer exactly to what he asked, which I think we haven't yet crystal clearly done, which is he's asking, if I understand correctly, could there be a sidechain using BIP300 and 301?

458
00:22:27,798 --> 00:22:39,798
The only purpose of which is to provide Kanye West with miner, you know, custody, quote unquote, of his funds without him using a password ever.

459
00:22:39,798 --> 00:22:41,798
Is that possible, Paul?

460
00:22:41,798 --> 00:22:43,798
Conceivably?

461
00:22:43,798 --> 00:22:47,798
Conceivably possible, yes.

462
00:22:47,798 --> 00:22:48,798
OK, yeah.

463
00:22:48,798 --> 00:22:52,798
So what I'm getting at is it seems like there's a political aspect to this.

464
00:22:52,798 --> 00:22:55,798
Like you're saying, well, no, you shouldn't do this.

465
00:22:55,798 --> 00:22:56,798
That's kind of silly.

466
00:22:56,798 --> 00:22:59,798
That's you're sort of misusing this whole process.

467
00:22:59,798 --> 00:23:07,798
This is made for privacy chains and like, I don't know, fast confirmation chains and like, you know, large block chains or whatever.

468
00:23:07,798 --> 00:23:09,798
This is designed for this.

469
00:23:10,798 --> 00:23:14,798
It's basically kind of like a normative political statement.

470
00:23:14,798 --> 00:23:17,798
You're saying, well, we didn't intend this for Kanye West.

471
00:23:17,798 --> 00:23:21,798
We didn't intend this for, I don't know, a CBDC.

472
00:23:21,798 --> 00:23:29,798
We maybe we don't want the Chinese government running a CBDC or maybe, you know, this is completely against the intent.

473
00:23:29,798 --> 00:23:42,798
And so if you can get 10 percent, I guess, you know, to be safe, 13 percent or something of miners to just say we don't like this, they're going to veto this right from the get go.

474
00:23:42,798 --> 00:23:43,798
13 percent?

475
00:23:43,798 --> 00:23:49,798
Well, I don't actually agree because it's not a question of like politics or values.

476
00:23:49,798 --> 00:23:50,798
Really, it is all of them.

477
00:23:50,798 --> 00:24:01,798
What the miners have to do is maximize the total transaction fees and also the market, you know, the fiat exchange rate of Bitcoin.

478
00:24:02,798 --> 00:24:08,798
So that is really the criteria by which they would assess all of the sidechain drop ad decisions.

479
00:24:08,798 --> 00:24:21,798
They'd say, well, is this going to make our coins more valuable if we do it or less valuable if we if we attack or less or more valuable if we do the withdrawals the right way or if we advance the block?

480
00:24:21,798 --> 00:24:31,798
So I think that is in that sense, it's actually like an objective economic consideration that does not necessarily have any political dimension at all.

481
00:24:31,798 --> 00:24:35,798
I would disagree. I mean, I think like it's not completely deterministic.

482
00:24:35,798 --> 00:24:42,798
It becomes like the block size wars where the small blockers were saying, you know, we're trying to maximize the the long term.

483
00:24:43,798 --> 00:24:51,798
You know. Well, I'm going to go ahead.

484
00:24:52,798 --> 00:24:56,798
Yeah, I mean, you're on the I think you're definitely on the right track there.

485
00:24:56,798 --> 00:25:01,798
But there was a problem with this large blocker view, which is that they did not.

486
00:25:01,798 --> 00:25:05,798
You know, this is the idea that you can't beat something with nothing.

487
00:25:05,798 --> 00:25:11,798
And what they ended up proposing, they proposed many things like halfheartedly and they had a very disorganized approach, to say the least.

488
00:25:11,798 --> 00:25:15,798
So just this is a this is a topic that could fill many hours.

489
00:25:15,798 --> 00:25:20,798
But first, they my current proposed Bitcoin XT, which had eight megabytes.

490
00:25:20,798 --> 00:25:22,798
But then it was withdrawn or delayed.

491
00:25:22,798 --> 00:25:25,798
And then there was Bitcoin Classic and that was withdrawn.

492
00:25:25,798 --> 00:25:26,798
And then there was SegWit.

493
00:25:27,798 --> 00:25:41,798
This is my one thing is that I'm going to say, though, is that when they actually had an alternative once, there were futures markets on whether or not we should have SegWit2x or regular.

494
00:25:41,798 --> 00:25:44,798
And they were split like 85 15 in favor of small blockers.

495
00:25:44,798 --> 00:25:53,798
So even in my own paradigm where I'm saying they must maximize the value of the chain, that's kind of objectively what happened.

496
00:25:54,798 --> 00:26:01,798
Through one reading of the situation, it may have been I may be I may be reading too much into it.

497
00:26:01,798 --> 00:26:12,798
But the cold, hard facts of the case are that there was only ever one alternative that was actually proposed that had some kind of futures markets or some kind of expectation.

498
00:26:12,798 --> 00:26:16,798
And the expectation was that the large block version would be worth about 15 percent.

499
00:26:17,798 --> 00:26:22,798
Or rather, 15 over 0.85 or whatever that is percent, it would be split 85 15.

500
00:26:22,798 --> 00:26:37,798
And then when SegWit and when Bitcoin Cash sort of took over from SegWit2x, it ended up being split about 85 15 for a little while before the large block version ultimately proved to be less valuable.

501
00:26:39,798 --> 00:26:42,798
Yeah, but this was like two years into the argument.

502
00:26:42,798 --> 00:26:46,798
Right. And so like if somebody wants to propose a sidechain and.

503
00:26:48,798 --> 00:27:03,798
You know, if they propose it, like I guess I guess we're talking there's a whole political process leading up to them proposing the sidechain so that the miners will they will get at least 90 percent support in the two weeks following the time that it gets proposed.

504
00:27:04,798 --> 00:27:09,798
And so this requires I mean, it's just like I mean, it's almost like drivechain.

505
00:27:09,798 --> 00:27:12,798
Like it's taken you like, I don't know, seven years or something.

506
00:27:13,798 --> 00:27:16,798
And I don't know how long, how old, but like you're right.

507
00:27:17,798 --> 00:27:19,798
It seems like this is the political process.

508
00:27:19,798 --> 00:27:23,798
There's some political process. However, this has been the case with Bitcoin since the beginning.

509
00:27:24,798 --> 00:27:25,798
Satoshi made it clear that.

510
00:27:26,798 --> 00:27:41,798
What I would rather say, actually, that is that the the way BIP300 is designed is to actually insulate layer one from all of the politics of the situation, which is to say that the politics only it may affect.

511
00:27:41,798 --> 00:27:48,798
It's sort of like something the miners do completely separate from what happens on L1.

512
00:27:49,798 --> 00:27:54,798
And so your L1, your layer one Bitcoin Core node is only going to do the BIP300 rules.

513
00:27:54,798 --> 00:28:01,798
It's the BIP300. It's going to watch as the slots are added or removed and people deposit to them and withdraw.

514
00:28:01,798 --> 00:28:06,798
But it doesn't really care about what's happening on the sidechains and whether or not one slot is added.

515
00:28:06,798 --> 00:28:08,798
One sidechain is added versus another.

516
00:28:09,798 --> 00:28:10,798
It really makes no difference.

517
00:28:11,798 --> 00:28:20,798
So the BIP300 angle is to sanitize that actually and thus greatly reduce all the politics.

518
00:28:20,798 --> 00:28:35,798
The only reason we had SegWit2x in the first place, the only reason we had Bitcoin Cash, the only reason we had these hard fork campaigns, the only reason we have altcoins is because there is no other way for people to get what they want.

519
00:28:36,798 --> 00:28:37,798
Out of Bitcoin.

520
00:28:38,798 --> 00:28:49,798
And in fact, those things, the hard forks and the altcoins, those are all actually existential threats to Bitcoin, because even though it's very unlikely, most of them aren't very good right now.

521
00:28:50,798 --> 00:28:57,798
But it's always possible that if one would succeed and then if it's just the way the network effects work.

522
00:28:58,798 --> 00:29:04,798
Could you describe for us in further interest of his question, could you describe to us?

523
00:29:04,798 --> 00:29:06,798
Henry, I'd rather just listen to what he has to say.

524
00:29:09,798 --> 00:29:24,798
Yeah, I understand that it insulates L1 from the transactions, but it doesn't seem to insulate the miners from the politics because now there's 256 slots.

525
00:29:24,798 --> 00:29:27,798
And if this is successful, these are going to be very coveted.

526
00:29:28,798 --> 00:29:32,798
Well, I mean, I don't know how many sidechains there will be.

527
00:29:32,798 --> 00:29:35,798
I think it probably won't be anywhere near 256, but it could.

528
00:29:35,798 --> 00:29:48,798
But I think this is another key thing, which is that this is an intentional design choice of a drivechain, which is that the list of things that the miners are in inferior to like the full node network.

529
00:29:48,798 --> 00:29:53,798
So miners are people who use Bitcoin, but we are protected.

530
00:29:53,798 --> 00:30:00,798
It's ironic that the people who who were the small blockers don't understand this about drivechain.

531
00:30:00,798 --> 00:30:06,798
This is sort of an irony that many the small blockers think we don't want to be affected by that.

532
00:30:07,798 --> 00:30:19,798
But the same people said when Brian Armstrong wanted to just have when they had 83 percent of the network for SegWit2x, they had a lot of people said, well, that doesn't matter.

533
00:30:19,798 --> 00:30:21,798
It doesn't matter how much hash rate you have.

534
00:30:21,798 --> 00:30:24,798
The layer one node is going to trump that.

535
00:30:24,798 --> 00:30:27,798
And they're right. That is the point.

536
00:30:27,798 --> 00:30:33,798
And it's because of that true fact that the miners can have any politics they want about any subject.

537
00:30:33,798 --> 00:30:37,798
They can have politics about electrical power.

538
00:30:37,798 --> 00:30:43,798
They can have politics about ASICs. They can have politics about literally anything.

539
00:30:43,798 --> 00:30:50,798
And again, that's something that is kind of between them, you know, and it doesn't really affect.

540
00:30:50,798 --> 00:30:55,798
The only thing that could possibly affect you on layer one is whether or not your transaction is censored.

541
00:30:55,798 --> 00:31:05,798
And that is that's actually a completely separate question involving mostly involving privacy, which just the mere existence of Zcash sidechain would actually probably improve.

542
00:31:06,798 --> 00:31:13,798
But but that's the whole point is the only thing that the layer one people should care about when it comes to mining is getting their transaction censored.

543
00:31:13,798 --> 00:31:21,798
As long as they pay a transaction fee and as long as they have privacy, that none of them will be censored because it's just irrational.

544
00:31:22,798 --> 00:31:28,798
OK, well, my concern is now the miners do like you.

545
00:31:28,798 --> 00:31:39,798
I think you're giving them power because now I mean, in the past, like in the block wars, it was like the threat the miners had was they could like completely nuke the whole thing.

546
00:31:39,798 --> 00:31:45,798
Like there was either there's either they keep mining according to the rules or they nuke the whole thing.

547
00:31:45,798 --> 00:31:48,798
And there's really like no in between.

548
00:31:49,798 --> 00:31:50,798
So now with this.

549
00:31:51,798 --> 00:32:03,798
Drivechain where they they can vote on different proposals, they can maybe disallow certain withdrawals, they can allow certain things to happen or not.

550
00:32:04,798 --> 00:32:06,798
They can overwrite sidechains if they get upset with them.

551
00:32:07,798 --> 00:32:23,798
There does seem to be a lot of middle ground now where they can do political things and they can form coalitions and they can say something like, hey, you know, we over here don't believe that Bitcoin should be used for ransomware.

552
00:32:23,798 --> 00:32:25,798
And so we're going to, you know.

553
00:32:26,798 --> 00:32:30,798
Destroy, we're going to wipe out any sidechain which is being used for ransomware.

554
00:32:30,798 --> 00:32:32,798
And this might be 40 percent or something.

555
00:32:33,798 --> 00:32:36,798
Every time is wiped out, including ones for ransomware.

556
00:32:36,798 --> 00:32:40,798
We don't have any. It's really when you say give power to the miners.

557
00:32:40,798 --> 00:32:49,798
This implies that there's like some kind of pie chart or something that someone is losing power and and miners are gaining that power from someone.

558
00:32:50,798 --> 00:32:53,798
But that's not the case because right now there's no sidechains at all.

559
00:32:53,798 --> 00:32:57,798
So what's really happening is it's creating a whole new opportunity.

560
00:32:57,798 --> 00:33:04,798
And if miners play ball, then they can make a ton of money using this system.

561
00:33:04,798 --> 00:33:08,798
And if they don't, then we'll just go back to the way it is now where none of this exists.

562
00:33:09,798 --> 00:33:14,798
And so it's not really like powers being given to the miners that they didn't have before.

563
00:33:15,798 --> 00:33:17,798
They still if you have coins on layer one, they still are.

564
00:33:17,798 --> 00:33:19,798
They're unaffected by BIP300.

565
00:33:19,798 --> 00:33:21,798
Your coins are only affected by BIP300.

566
00:33:21,798 --> 00:33:26,798
If you spend money into BIP300 script, if you deposit them to a sidechain.

567
00:33:26,798 --> 00:33:31,798
So if you don't deposit them and you're exactly where you were before.

568
00:33:32,798 --> 00:33:37,798
So there's no sense in which anyone is like losing powers of any kind.

569
00:33:37,798 --> 00:33:39,798
It's true that they may.

570
00:33:39,798 --> 00:33:43,798
Miners may have different ecology afterwards.

571
00:33:43,798 --> 00:33:44,798
That's absolutely the case.

572
00:33:44,798 --> 00:33:48,798
But, you know, in 2015, they already all knew each other's phone number and had a shared mempool.

573
00:33:48,798 --> 00:33:50,798
In fact, more than half of the.

574
00:33:50,798 --> 00:33:52,798
I'm not saying that that's a good.

575
00:33:52,798 --> 00:33:53,798
What I'm saying is it's unrelated.

576
00:33:53,798 --> 00:33:58,798
It's a it's not has nothing to do with drivechain per se.

577
00:33:58,798 --> 00:34:06,798
So the point you're giving, you're explicitly giving miners with a 90 percent threshold to allow new projects.

578
00:34:06,798 --> 00:34:09,798
I mean, so I mean, if this is successful.

579
00:34:09,798 --> 00:34:11,798
Right. But right now there are no new projects.

580
00:34:12,798 --> 00:34:17,798
OK, but the whole point is that this would be I mean, you're doing this believing that it would be successful.

581
00:34:17,798 --> 00:34:20,798
Right. That that sidechains will be attractive.

582
00:34:20,798 --> 00:34:24,798
That these other sidechains will come in and they'll bring lots of fees.

583
00:34:24,798 --> 00:34:25,798
Right. So that's what I think.

584
00:34:25,798 --> 00:34:28,798
People like alt coins and people see people seem to like alt chains.

585
00:34:28,798 --> 00:34:31,798
They like alternative designs.

586
00:34:31,798 --> 00:34:34,798
Zcash seems like better privacy than we could get in Bitcoin.

587
00:34:34,798 --> 00:34:39,798
Doesn't seem like there's any good scaling other than optional large block sidechains.

588
00:34:40,798 --> 00:34:45,798
So it seems like everything needs the same level of decentralization.

589
00:34:45,798 --> 00:34:51,798
I think there's a lot of ideas that are good that could be done Namecoin in prediction markets.

590
00:34:51,798 --> 00:34:54,798
So that's what I think. Yes.

591
00:34:54,798 --> 00:35:03,798
Right. But and now you're giving the Bitcoin miners the power to approve or disapprove of these things happening on the side.

592
00:35:04,798 --> 00:35:06,798
They should have that power, though.

593
00:35:06,798 --> 00:35:08,798
I mean, because they're the ones who benefit.

594
00:35:08,798 --> 00:35:14,798
They benefit from a higher Bitcoin price since they're always paid in Bitcoin and they benefit from more transaction fees.

595
00:35:14,798 --> 00:35:17,798
So they benefit if they get it right and they suffer if they get it wrong.

596
00:35:17,798 --> 00:35:19,798
So who should instead have that power?

597
00:35:19,798 --> 00:35:25,798
Like, you know, whoever is maintaining it on GitHub or who in your view should have that power?

598
00:35:25,798 --> 00:35:31,798
Because right now it's all of the sidechain slots are censored effectively,

599
00:35:31,798 --> 00:35:37,798
which to me is no different than censoring someone's Bitcoin transaction.

600
00:35:37,798 --> 00:35:40,798
But but still, I mean, they do have that power, right?

601
00:35:40,798 --> 00:35:42,798
Like you're saying, well, they should have that power.

602
00:35:42,798 --> 00:35:46,798
And I'm saying, well, yes, they do. They should have that power.

603
00:35:46,798 --> 00:35:50,798
I mean, you're saying they're going to use this power like somewhat benevolently.

604
00:35:50,798 --> 00:35:53,798
Or I'm going to give them an opportunity to.

605
00:35:53,798 --> 00:35:57,798
There's an opportunity if it doesn't work, if the sidechain idea doesn't work,

606
00:35:57,798 --> 00:36:00,798
then I would say that we would probably live in a multi-coin world.

607
00:36:00,798 --> 00:36:06,798
And then all the altcoins, people should probably invest in altcoins because we're just going to have competition.

608
00:36:06,798 --> 00:36:11,798
We'll have like a Hayekian currency competition world.

609
00:36:11,798 --> 00:36:16,798
Right. I mean, best case scenario from a drivechain perspective.

610
00:36:16,798 --> 00:36:21,798
All the sidechains, every new sidechain idea wants to plug into Bitcoin.

611
00:36:21,798 --> 00:36:24,798
They want to have this two way peg where they can peg in and out.

612
00:36:24,798 --> 00:36:29,798
Right. Or they're just so dismayed at the idea of doing anything else that they feel like they just have no choice.

613
00:36:29,798 --> 00:36:32,798
Same reason as, you know, everyone uses USB, right?

614
00:36:32,798 --> 00:36:39,798
Everyone uses a QWERTY keyboard. Most people use English as a language.

615
00:36:39,798 --> 00:36:45,798
And so now you've given you've given the miners the power to approve this or disapprove this.

616
00:36:45,798 --> 00:36:50,798
I know, but it's created. Right now.

617
00:36:50,798 --> 00:36:53,798
Well, I mean, sure. But I don't know where you're going with the question.

618
00:36:53,798 --> 00:36:57,798
Well, I'm going with what I'm going is now the miners have power that they didn't have.

619
00:36:57,798 --> 00:37:04,798
Like right now, miners, Bitcoin miners cannot say anything about any other sidechain that doesn't have anything to do with Bitcoin.

620
00:37:04,798 --> 00:37:07,798
Right. Unless they want to like redirect their hash.

621
00:37:07,798 --> 00:37:09,798
Right. I think that's fair.

622
00:37:09,798 --> 00:37:13,798
But you understand that my point of view is that right now.

623
00:37:13,798 --> 00:37:17,798
We don't have any. So it's like the.

624
00:37:18,798 --> 00:37:24,798
It's like it's not like power is being taken from someone else.

625
00:37:24,798 --> 00:37:31,798
It's like a successful situation in which this new thing has been created and this new thing is functioning.

626
00:37:31,798 --> 00:37:35,798
And now the miners in this new.

627
00:37:35,798 --> 00:37:44,798
I guess what I'm saying is if they misuse their power, we'll just be back to where we are now.

628
00:37:44,798 --> 00:37:48,798
And if they use the power, great, then everyone is happy.

629
00:37:48,798 --> 00:37:52,798
OK, but that's but then this becomes sort of like a political statement.

630
00:37:52,798 --> 00:38:01,798
Like, I mean, I think it's political, though, because it's just, again, it's about maximizing fees and the exchange rate.

631
00:38:01,798 --> 00:38:11,798
But I mean, this is a little bit of human creativity, like it involves a little bit of like the miners would have to take a kind of.

632
00:38:11,798 --> 00:38:16,798
You have to guess as to what would maximize the value of Bitcoin and do that thing.

633
00:38:16,798 --> 00:38:18,798
But that's a good thing, I think.

634
00:38:18,798 --> 00:38:20,798
But I think it's ultimately political.

635
00:38:20,798 --> 00:38:26,798
I mean, guessing like when we guess whether we should be like going to war with Ukraine or something,

636
00:38:26,798 --> 00:38:31,798
we're making some sort of guess that like in the future, the world would be a better place.

637
00:38:31,798 --> 00:38:36,798
And we're maximizing each of our own like, you know, functionals.

638
00:38:36,798 --> 00:38:42,798
I think it's political if your decisions affect a lot of a large group of people.

639
00:38:42,798 --> 00:38:46,798
Maybe because like otherwise you're saying like if any anyone who comes up with a new microchip design,

640
00:38:46,798 --> 00:38:50,798
they're they're guessing that that chip will be. But that's not very political.

641
00:38:50,798 --> 00:38:55,798
You know, someone's doing video game speed running alone in their house.

642
00:38:55,798 --> 00:38:59,798
They guess, oh, maybe if I did this, I would get a faster time.

643
00:38:59,798 --> 00:39:05,798
But that's not. But just merely having a conjecture and doing more now.

644
00:39:05,798 --> 00:39:08,798
Knowledge is not. But you see that this is a very different world.

645
00:39:08,798 --> 00:39:15,798
We have 256 slots that are all optional for the layer one user and that you can pull the plug on later and read.

646
00:39:15,798 --> 00:39:20,798
You can say, well, we added this slot, but we don't like it anymore.

647
00:39:20,798 --> 00:39:24,798
We're pulling it. Right. I mean, that would be a controversial thing.

648
00:39:24,798 --> 00:39:29,798
We didn't do this. We didn't add this slot and we should have.

649
00:39:29,798 --> 00:39:33,798
So it can it has an endless ability to just correct the error.

650
00:39:33,798 --> 00:39:39,798
Whereas what we write, what we have right now is just a one size fits all blockchain where we haven't.

651
00:39:39,798 --> 00:39:43,798
I mean, Taproot, it's much more political now.

652
00:39:43,798 --> 00:39:47,798
The politics will fall by like five or six orders of magnitude.

653
00:39:47,798 --> 00:39:50,798
Do you agree with that or no? Because right now. No, no.

654
00:39:51,798 --> 00:40:02,798
Taproot. We have like it's like if you work on whether or not something is approved in Bitcoin Core or even gets the attention from reviewers is enormously political.

655
00:40:02,798 --> 00:40:05,798
Yeah, I think this would expand the politics.

656
00:40:05,798 --> 00:40:12,798
Like, I mean, the Bitcoin Core stuff, there's like a very small handful of people that can even understand that.

657
00:40:12,928 --> 00:40:30,928
But. Say Mark Zuckerberg proposes a sidechain where he's just going to import a bunch of Bitcoin and have like a private, like it's all privately transferred around and then he says when it transfers out, but it's going to be used on threads and Facebook and everything.

658
00:40:30,928 --> 00:40:37,928
Yeah, but isn't that less political because he's on his own chain? It doesn't affect L1 and doesn't affect any of the other two chains.

659
00:40:38,928 --> 00:40:58,928
The decision to let him do this is now up to the miners and some miners will say, no, this is this is great. We're going to get a lot of fee revenue for this. And then other miners will say, no, he's just going to pull it in and then he's going to rug pull us at some time in the future.

660
00:40:59,928 --> 00:41:11,928
And then people start arguing whether, you know, depending on whether you like Mark Zuckerberg or you trust him and it seems like a solution to the problem of people disagreeing. People always disagree.

661
00:41:12,928 --> 00:41:31,928
Right. But the effect of the disagreement on other people is worse without the sidechains. Because now what if instead of doing the Mark Zuckerberg doing a sidechain, he does it as a hard fork of Bitcoin. That's enormously more political.

662
00:41:32,928 --> 00:41:41,928
People would probably I mean, I think that would be a no go. I mean, that's me guessing.

663
00:41:42,928 --> 00:42:02,928
Ironically, though, it would be a no go because it's so political because people would say, well, his coalition doesn't include the real Bitcoiners. So so his idea, which could be a good idea, will never even see the light of day in that situation, which is like many sidechain ideas that have yet to see the light of day, even though they have been.

664
00:42:03,928 --> 00:42:19,928
Many of them are probably good. Many of them are probably bad. But the point is that the miners would have a slightly different but the miners already have an enormous number of extremely creative tasks that they have to do, like, for example, the invention of the natural gas flaring credit strategy.

665
00:42:19,928 --> 00:42:44,928
So like miners are already they already live in a world where the difficulty adjusts every two weeks, the bottom half of the performers are fired, they lose out. And so they're already trying to compete as as hard as they can. And they have to do everything they can think of to do a good job.

666
00:42:44,928 --> 00:43:10,928
So this is a situation where they they have an incentive to get it right. I mean, what, what cost? What cost does like, you know, someone like Vladimir, the lead maintainer on github.com, who was now no longer, but what cost does he pay if he makes the wrong decision on what feature to merge into Bitcoin Core?

667
00:43:11,928 --> 00:43:26,928
Or if people on Twitter say we should focus on taproot, or we should not focus on CTV, even though now it's, I think, overwhelmingly clear that CTV would have been better to focus on than taproot by like, orders of magnitude.

668
00:43:26,928 --> 00:43:50,928
But what cost to does Twitter pay? Or does the lead maintainer pay? How do they fall on the totem pole relative to other Bitcoiners by screwing up? Whereas the miners, if they screw up, they take in less money than their friend who works in advertising or whatever. So they have an incentive to get it right.

669
00:43:51,928 --> 00:43:55,928
But when you say get it right, like, we don't, I mean, we don't know today.

670
00:43:55,928 --> 00:44:02,928
We do know it. You just keep ignoring this point for some reason, which is that it's about the market exchange rate and the transaction fees.

671
00:44:02,928 --> 00:44:15,928
But you're saying this like it's deterministic. Like, if Mark Zuckerberg proposes a sidechain, we don't know if this is going to bring lots of profits, or if it will destroy Bitcoin.

672
00:44:15,928 --> 00:44:24,928
We don't know anything about anything with certainty. But this is at least something where there is a result that has a number. And we want the number to be as high as possible.

673
00:44:24,928 --> 00:44:25,928
Could I?

674
00:44:25,928 --> 00:44:29,928
No, there's no result. There's no number. There's just, I don't know.

675
00:44:30,928 --> 00:44:40,928
At the end of the day, after they add the sidechain, there is a number that is whatever the market exchange rate is, $30,000 per coin, like today, it'd be some other number.

676
00:44:40,928 --> 00:44:47,928
And the total amount of fees coming in will be a number. You could, if you want, you could have conditional future markets.

677
00:44:47,928 --> 00:44:55,928
And you would even know in advance before adding the sidechain, which decision would objectively, according to the best knowledge at the time.

678
00:44:56,928 --> 00:45:04,928
No one knows anything with certainty. Like, you can have a conditional prediction market, or you can have a prediction market about a coin flip or something.

679
00:45:04,928 --> 00:45:16,928
And it's just going to say that it's 50% likelihood to be heads, 50% likelihood to be tails. You flip the coin, and if it lands heads, then it will sort of look like the market.

680
00:45:16,928 --> 00:45:22,928
Why didn't the market give heads 100%? Well, that's because no one knew. There was no knowledge.

681
00:45:23,928 --> 00:45:28,928
This isn't a purely random problem of knowledge, but you see that's not a real criticism.

682
00:45:28,928 --> 00:45:39,928
This isn't a problem about, this isn't randomness. It's people have these ideas, and they think, like a lot of people are very certain that Twitter is going to go bankrupt in the next year.

683
00:45:39,928 --> 00:45:46,928
A lot of people are very, they're convinced that that's not true. And these people are very confident, and you could put them in a prediction market.

684
00:45:47,928 --> 00:46:07,928
And maybe, what's the percentage, 20%, 23%. This doesn't translate to an automatic functional that miners can decide, we better all vote yes on this meta coin, or we better all vote no.

685
00:46:08,928 --> 00:46:19,928
It is a political discussion because it involves so many factors. It's not like you're just throwing some Poisson distributions in the computer.

686
00:46:19,928 --> 00:46:29,928
I think what Paul is saying, if I may interject just one point, is that your word, Professor, your word benevolence, is actually the opposite of the correct view.

687
00:46:29,928 --> 00:46:51,928
Because drivechain leverages profit motive more than the current process for Bitcoin development, which is exclusively deliberative, not a competitive system where sidechains can accrue value and demonstrate their potential benefit as a change, hypothetically, for main chain.

688
00:46:51,928 --> 00:47:07,928
So this enables a test bed of live, real money, opt-in uses that can then show, like, let's say all of the current BIPs, other than drivechain, are tested in sidechains, that would show which ones accrue value and are stable, which ones aren't.

689
00:47:07,928 --> 00:47:21,928
And during the test, all of the value of the test is accruing value to Bitcoin through the two-way peg. So it's more capitalistic and profit motivated than our current system. So there's no benevolence involved. It's really the opposite.

690
00:47:21,928 --> 00:47:36,928
But, I mean, we couldn't, I mean, can we do this with BIP300? And, like, I mean, can we run a futures market? Like, this is what I don't understand. It's that you're not just comparing a coin's value to, like, another coin's value.

691
00:47:36,928 --> 00:47:57,928
You're saying, like, I think that over the next indefinite amount of time, we don't, I don't know what my time frame is. Maybe I'm a miner that's going to be in the business for two years. Maybe I'm an investor that's going to be here for 20 years. We all have these different functions that we're looking at. And we're all trying to maximize our own thing. And we're talking about, like, this is deterministic and the market's just going to automatically.

692
00:47:57,928 --> 00:48:25,848
No, we're not. We're not saying the markets are always right. Right. People can make mistakes and people are the market. However, however, do you agree that miners in Bitcoin today, from the very beginning of Bitcoin, it has been assumed that miners are, and all Bitcoin users are, presumably and potentially, anonymous, self-interested and profit motivated. However, they, no, self-interested, anonymous and mutually distrusting.

693
00:48:26,648 --> 00:48:36,968
Drivechain makes the exact same assumptions. And it posits, it's a hypothesis that miners will act to maximize the value of their ASICs and their fee revenue.

694
00:48:36,968 --> 00:49:04,967
No, that's not quite correct. The net present value is what matters.

695
00:49:04,967 --> 00:49:18,328
So we assume the time preference will vary among miners. And we assume, just like Bitcoin does, that the miners aren't going to attack the value of Bitcoin for any kind of selfish reason, but instead just promote the value of Bitcoin.

696
00:49:18,727 --> 00:49:33,047
And as Fiatjaf argues in his excellent essay on Drivechain in favor of it, if the 51 percent of miners can't be trusted to maximize their own profit and the long term benefit of Bitcoin, then probably Bitcoin is at risk already.

697
00:49:35,688 --> 00:49:56,888
I don't agree with that dichotomy. Because I think that you're saying that, you know, 51 percent, there's a huge difference between like 51 percent of miners like attacking the whole thing and tearing it down and 51 percent like disagreeing with the other 49 percent.

698
00:49:57,847 --> 00:50:13,368
Even if they do steal, it's only harming those who opt in. And the same thing is true with Lightning. And it's the same thing that's true with sidechains today that are federated. If there's a theft or coercion or accident where the Bitcoin's lost, if you didn't opt into liquid or Rootstock, you aren't harmed at all.

699
00:50:14,328 --> 00:50:28,328
It's strictly better to have Drivechain. Strictly better to have Drivechain, which can possibly provide an enormous amount of the necessary fee revenue and value accrual and network effect Bitcoin must maintain to be successful in the future.

700
00:50:28,328 --> 00:50:57,527
I mean, really, what it's about is just giving people an option. So it's like, you know, freedom is a choice or whatever, that type of a thing. So it's like you have the option to go to Subway sandwiches, or you have the option to go to McDonald's, you have the option to go to a nice restaurant. That's the idea, basically.

701
00:50:59,287 --> 00:51:10,328
You could say, oh, isn't it political whether or not the bank allows you to borrow money to start a Subway sandwiches? But it's kind of missing the point, I think.

702
00:51:10,328 --> 00:51:17,287
But it is. I mean, like, if I want a strip club on my block, like this is a political discussion.

703
00:51:17,287 --> 00:51:29,287
Again, if the miner, if it affects, if the sidechains negatively affect each other, it has to bring down the price of Bitcoin, and then it's just a math problem.

704
00:51:29,287 --> 00:51:33,287
No, that's it. It's not a math problem.

705
00:51:33,287 --> 00:51:41,287
Sir, I need you to understand that this is a math problem.

706
00:51:41,287 --> 00:51:43,287
It is not a math problem.

707
00:51:43,287 --> 00:51:55,287
It's just the value of the land next year, whether or not we build the strip club or not. And it's the land value. It's just a number.

708
00:51:55,287 --> 00:52:09,287
Okay, but I mean, if I go to the city council, I say I want to do a strip club here. And there's going to be people on all sides, they're going to say, well, it's, this is going to go up, you know, we're going to destroy the business.

709
00:52:09,287 --> 00:52:15,287
People are going to say we're going to get tax revenue. We're going to get families leaving, we're going to get families staying.

710
00:52:15,287 --> 00:52:25,287
Yeah, well, people can say X, Y, and Z. They may be right, they may be wrong. But they can, like, if you say, well, if I change this kind of engine in my car, then it will use less fuel.

711
00:52:25,287 --> 00:52:42,287
And then someone could say, yes, it will or no, it won't. And they could say, maybe it will, maybe it won't. People would disagree. People would disagree about everything. Disagreement is very important. But this is a thing. At the end of the day, they're disagreeing about one, a number.

712
00:52:42,287 --> 00:52:54,287
So, professor, we're saying that Bitcoin should aim towards maximum value accrual. And you're introducing the possibility of like a normative discussion that's separate from profit motive and value accrual.

713
00:52:55,287 --> 00:53:13,287
Well, no, no, no, no. I'm saying, like, we can have this discussion. Like, my wife and I, we're talking about direction. She says take I5. I say take I205. Like, we're both talking about the same objective, which is to get from here to there with the lowest possible time.

714
00:53:14,287 --> 00:53:35,287
She starts talking about how Google Maps sucks. And I start talking about how Apple Maps sucks. And last time, and it's, we're still maximizing the same thing. It's a very specific thing, but we're still having this argument, right? That's the point. We have different things in our, we have different priors. We have different reasons why we're arguing these things. It's the same mathematical.

715
00:53:35,287 --> 00:53:53,287
Well, I can disagree with you then if you're saying that miners will have a conversation and they will be, some of them will be saying, this sidechain is like a strip club if we added the market price of Bitcoin. But that's what I'm saying. I'm saying people, some people will say we shouldn't add this sidechain. Other people will say we should.

716
00:53:53,287 --> 00:53:55,287
Yes, exactly.

717
00:54:01,466 --> 00:54:05,206
whereas the system we have now does not do that at all.

718
00:54:05,286 --> 00:54:06,346
It's a very perverse incentive.

719
00:54:06,526 --> 00:54:11,406
Let's explore what he's asking even further to make sure we fully respect it.

720
00:54:11,646 --> 00:54:14,786
He's asking, if the miners and the whole Bitcoin community

721
00:54:14,953 --> 00:54:20,453
are torn between should a certain sidechain, let's take HiveMine for example Paul,

722
00:54:20,893 --> 00:54:23,273
which is my favorite sidechain idea by far.

723
00:54:24,033 --> 00:54:28,613
there could be a discussion, BIP300 is activated, we get a sidechain, we get a scaling

724
00:54:28,620 --> 00:54:32,340
sidechain. But then there is great disagreement about Hivemind.

725
00:54:32,720 --> 00:54:33,940
Should it be on Bitcoin or not?

726
00:54:34,120 --> 00:54:36,640
Would it be good for Bitcoin's price and fees or not?

727
00:54:37,140 --> 00:54:39,840
How would that discussion look?

728
00:54:40,160 --> 00:54:42,020
that the question, Professor?

729
00:54:43,287 --> 00:55:10,287
Yeah, but you understand that too. Well, I mean, I suppose it's possible that, but if people could disagree about anything, they could say, you know, because the issue with the block size war is that everyone had to use the same block size. So it's kind of a night and day difference in this situation.

730
00:55:10,287 --> 00:55:29,287
Assigning the slot in BIP300 is like 34 bytes or something. It's like nothing. And you're just like people's wallets, people's nodes are like basically just tracking all the money that is in this one ETXO.

731
00:55:30,287 --> 00:55:44,287
Yeah, the reason why it's different, Professor, is that if people are debating whether or not HiveMind should be a Bitcoin sidechain, that is a vastly less controversial matter than whether or not there should be a Bitcoin layer one software.

732
00:55:44,287 --> 00:56:09,287
It's kind of like if you're saying everyone in this town eats, they must eat prison food every day. They have no choice. And then I'm saying, well, we should open a food court where we have different restaurants. And then if people want to eat the prison food, they still can. No one's stopping them. But now I have a bunch of choices.

733
00:56:10,287 --> 00:56:31,287
And then like people come along and they say, well, you know, won't people disagree about whether or not we should have a Subway sandwiches or a, you know, Pizzeria Uno here? And isn't that the same as just what the prison food chef would make? So it's the same thing.

734
00:56:32,287 --> 00:56:42,287
Well, if your goal was to remove people who are saying something like that, it's hard for me to figure out, you know, what thoughts they have in their head.

735
00:56:43,287 --> 00:56:54,287
Well, if your goal is to remove politics, then like completely take politics out of the whole situation, then, you know, the prison food is the safest bet. It's kind of like school uniforms.

736
00:56:55,287 --> 00:57:05,287
Well, I mean, that would be the case if Bitcoin were indestructible, but that's not the case at all. If someone builds something that's really bad or it is more popular, will eventually flip Bitcoin and then Bitcoin will go to zero and be destroyed.

737
00:57:06,287 --> 00:57:26,287
Yeah. So, Professor, like if everyone is required to always be happy with mainchain Bitcoin without any optional peer-to-peer sidechains, you know, available to them, then they might just continue to leave Bitcoin to go to places that offer more privacy or more scaling or more interesting projects like Hivemind.

738
00:57:27,287 --> 00:57:44,287
So instead, what Drivechain is all about is enabling optional experimentation and innovation. So if you're happy with Bitcoin mainchain, you stay there. But if you're happy with alternatives, you can opt into those on Bitcoin in a way that brings value and fees to Bitcoin rather than leaving the Bitcoin community.

739
00:57:44,287 --> 00:58:00,287
So what we're talking about here is the difference between, as you say, politics. It's the difference between the contentious nature of changing Bitcoin and mainchain versus the less contentious, less momentous nature of introducing.

740
00:58:01,287 --> 00:58:16,287
No, I'm not using the block size war as like a direct comparison. I'm saying the block size war is an example of people with the same basic objective, but with completely different arguments and completely different calculations. The large blockers thought that large blockers were better.

741
00:58:17,287 --> 00:58:30,287
Yes, you're making our point, because if – let me just say one – I'll be quiet after this, Paul. If the large blockers had had the option to use a large block sidechain on Bitcoin, they never would have left.

742
00:58:31,287 --> 00:58:42,287
And I'm saying it might not have been an option, because there might have been 12% of the buyers who just said, fuck the large blockers. We just want to watch.

743
00:58:42,287 --> 00:58:49,287
Yeah, but if they do that and they're mistaken to offer this alternative, then they at least suffer a financial penalty.

744
00:58:50,287 --> 00:58:55,287
But they don't believe they're going to suffer a financial penalty. They believe that they're making it.

745
00:58:55,287 --> 00:58:58,287
Yeah, they may be wrong about anything they believe.

746
00:58:59,287 --> 00:59:16,287
One thing that the miners – anyone can be mistaken about what they believe, but one thing is that the – I guess what I'm trying to say is there's an actual process now.

747
00:59:16,287 --> 00:59:26,287
There's like a process for an idea. So if people actually want to try an idea, and then they say they at least know, okay, this idea is good enough.

748
00:59:26,287 --> 00:59:40,287
We're at 88, and we just need a little bit more. So that would at least give someone some kind of idea of what they should do next, like try to persuade the last 4% or whatever it is.

749
00:59:41,287 --> 00:59:47,287
Again, I want to keep drawing that contrast to what happens without sidechains, which is that you have to launch the hard fork.

750
00:59:47,287 --> 00:59:52,287
The hard fork doesn't immediately get half of the market cap of the coin.

751
00:59:52,287 --> 00:59:56,287
So it's not like a pristine laboratory experiment with all these variables controlled for.

752
00:59:56,287 --> 01:00:04,287
You need a new name. You need a new ticker. It's not a pristine experiment at all.

753
01:00:05,287 --> 01:00:10,287
So again, it's the difference between launching a coin and having the optional L2 chain is big.

754
01:00:10,287 --> 01:00:16,287
But you are correct that miners would have conversations amongst themselves.

755
01:00:16,959 --> 01:00:31,959
In various ways about which sidechains will – they will develop theories about which sidechains will maximize their profit, and they will act on those theories.

756
01:00:31,959 --> 01:00:39,959
And those theories will not be infallible, so they will have mistakes. So you're right about all those things.

757
01:00:40,959 --> 01:00:52,959
Yeah, but this is what I think is going to be political, because this is just how people behave. They have different theories, and then they argue about the theories, and then they form camps and tribes.

758
01:00:53,959 --> 01:01:07,959
But again, we already have that with stuff like taproot activation and just block size wars. Again, a perfect example of that where people thought if they could just persuade the miners to join their side, the miners didn't know what to do.

759
01:01:07,959 --> 01:01:14,959
They eventually sort of became large blockers temporarily, but not really. So we already have a much worse version of it.

760
01:01:14,959 --> 01:01:28,959
This is a version where it's sanitized from L1, and it's at least about opt-in optional things. But yeah, I think people always disagree. I mean, people could disagree about what movies they like also. It doesn't affect the L1 Bitcoin.

761
01:01:29,959 --> 01:01:56,959
But yeah, I guess my concern is this. It introduces politics in a way which is not there. I mean, on the miners actually voting level. I mean, people are political, right? I get that people are going to argue about taproot or whatever, but people being political and actually having the ability to vote down a project or vote up a project or vote down a withdrawal.

762
01:01:57,959 --> 01:02:17,959
We have the world of altcoins. All the toxicity is political. Everything Ethereum does versus Bitcoin is political. So people would prefer to live in a world – I get why. Part of me understands why drivechain is not as popular as you think it would be since it enables basically everything at zero risk.

763
01:02:18,959 --> 01:02:32,959
And the reason is that it's just culturally it just landed at a bad place. It's in the wrong place at the wrong time, which is because the popular Bitcoin belief is just to say that Bitcoin is completely indestructible.

764
01:02:32,959 --> 01:02:48,959
Bitcoin Core is the best. Blockchain has the best development team. It has the best whatever, smart contracting, scripting. Everything that happens in Ethereum is a scam. Everything else is – it's all lies from the altcoins, Monero, etc.

765
01:02:48,959 --> 01:03:03,959
It's all just a government psyop to trick us all and that Bitcoin is going to go to $300 trillion and all you need to do is own this coin and then close your mouth and then we will just make it there as long as we silence the critics of Bitcoin who are spreading FUD.

766
01:03:03,959 --> 01:03:19,959
That is like the mainstream political view. That's a lot of wishful thinking in that. No matter what mistakes Bitcoin makes, we don't have to care about whether or not anything said is technically accurate.

767
01:03:19,959 --> 01:03:33,959
We don't need to care about whether or not we are missing easy opportunities. We don't need to care about whether or not – we don't need to care about growth. We don't need to care about convincing people to join Bitcoin because eventually they'll just come crawling back.

768
01:03:34,959 --> 01:03:47,959
These are all the cultural ideas that make people just think, well, what's the point of having sidechains at all? It's a point of drivechain because there is just – Bitcoin is already perfect.

769
01:03:48,959 --> 01:04:03,959
People who believe that don't know anything about Bitcoin, but the more people who work in Bitcoin every day up close and who work with Lightning Network every day up close and who have been in Bitcoin a long time, we know it's not perfect.

770
01:04:04,959 --> 01:04:15,959
The best thing to do is to try and give everyone – give the customer what they want in a way that doesn't affect the other customers who don't want that.

771
01:04:16,959 --> 01:04:22,959
We have different food court with different restaurants and anyone can get whatever they want.

772
01:04:23,959 --> 01:04:30,959
But a lot of people out there, they just say this prison food is the best and we love prison food and why would anyone want to leave?

773
01:04:31,959 --> 01:04:41,959
Especially some people who do try to leave are viciously – it's literally like people who try to get out, whatever, Roger Veritalik, even someone like Jeremy Rubin who complains.

774
01:04:42,959 --> 01:04:49,959
They just get beaten to death and then they say, see, everyone is really happy here.

775
01:04:52,959 --> 01:05:05,959
Have you done – how much have you done any Bitcoin development yourself?

776
01:05:06,959 --> 01:05:08,959
I haven't done any development myself, no.

777
01:05:09,959 --> 01:05:13,959
Do you go to BitDevs? Do you live in a city that has BitDevs?

778
01:05:14,959 --> 01:05:15,959
Not that I'm aware of.

779
01:05:15,959 --> 01:05:18,959
Well, this is why he has an open mind on drivechain. He brings a fresh perspective.

780
01:05:19,959 --> 01:05:23,959
So what are your thoughts about the discussion we've had so far, professor?

781
01:05:24,959 --> 01:05:34,959
Are you getting how we feel that right now there's only deliberation, there's not enough competition and profit motive in the process for building on Bitcoin?

782
01:05:34,959 --> 01:05:45,959
This would enable a more efficient, less controversial, less political type of development on Bitcoin that builds Bitcoin's value and fee revenue.

783
01:05:46,959 --> 01:06:03,959
So it's very harmonious with the kinds of things you've been developing over the last year, which is a very detailed and comprehensive look at things like miner revenue and the need for a stable and strong fee revenue for the future of Bitcoin.

784
01:06:04,959 --> 01:06:10,959
This is very harmonious with your writings on Bitcoin so far.

785
01:06:11,959 --> 01:06:21,959
So I think you're a great candidate for working through these questions you've had, which I think drivechain ultimately answers completely, which is this is less political.

786
01:06:22,959 --> 01:06:29,959
Once it's adopted, Bitcoin has a less political, more seamless, more optional type of development process.

787
01:06:29,959 --> 01:06:41,959
Yeah, I'm not convinced that putting miners in a position to approve or disapprove projects makes it less political.

788
01:06:42,959 --> 01:06:49,959
I mean, if you go to the restaurant analogy, you have a town, you serve everybody prison food, but then you say we're going to open up a block of restaurants.

789
01:06:49,959 --> 01:07:01,959
Then Subway wants to come in, McDonald's wants to come in, whatever, Dave's Spicy Chicken, they all want to come in and then people are going to argue about what should be coming in and what's healthy.

790
01:07:02,959 --> 01:07:08,959
And then whoever gets to make the decision now has power that they did not have.

791
01:07:09,959 --> 01:07:20,959
Well, I think you're right about that. But I mean, again, it's like in that case, maybe the politics has transformed into something better.

792
01:07:21,959 --> 01:07:28,959
I mean, I think in that case, the important thing to focus on is just how much better it is, how much better life in the town is, how much better it is for the Bitcoin end user.

793
01:07:29,959 --> 01:07:48,959
But would someone really say, like who's living in the town, someone who's not a miner, they're not a developer, but they're just an end user, are they really going to say, wow, the biggest mistake we ever made was opening this block of…

794
01:07:49,959 --> 01:08:02,959
It's kind of like someone who gets a Netflix subscription and they're like, oh, my life is so difficult. There's too many choices. I don't know. Out of all this great entertainment, I don't know what to watch. It's like a first world problem kind of.

795
01:08:03,959 --> 01:08:07,959
I think I might have a great question for you, Professor, that maybe will answer this whole discussion.

796
01:08:08,959 --> 01:08:19,959
The question is, which do you feel is going to be a more controversial political matter? Which of the following two things?

797
01:08:20,959 --> 01:08:28,959
One, a block size increase on Bitcoin mainchain. Two, the introduction of a large block BIP300 sidechain.

798
01:08:29,959 --> 01:08:42,959
Which of those is more political in your view? Assuming Drivechain exists on Bitcoin today and there are some people who want to increase the Bitcoin mainchain block size and other people who want to just introduce an optional sidechain with large blocks.

799
01:08:43,959 --> 01:08:46,959
Which of those is more political and controversial in your view?

800
01:08:47,959 --> 01:08:59,959
I don't know how to measure it. I mean, the first one is like it's definitely, I mean, they're both political, but like it's not going to happen. So it's not really, nobody's arguing it.

801
01:09:00,959 --> 01:09:02,959
Yes, they are. Every day they're arguing it.

802
01:09:03,959 --> 01:09:09,959
Well, I mean, are people seriously still thinking the large block hard fork is going to happen?

803
01:09:09,959 --> 01:09:26,959
I read Bitcoin Twitter all the time every day. And some of the members of the technical community who are active on Twitter and in this audience who are significant in the discourse on Bitcoin are saying a block size increase at some point in the future, preferably sooner rather than later, is an important part of scaling Bitcoin.

804
01:09:26,959 --> 01:09:40,959
And Drivechain fundamentally says let's enable those who like Bitcoin as it is to keep mainchain Bitcoin small block and that way larger blocks are optional. Let's make everything optional so everybody gets what they want.

805
01:09:41,959 --> 01:09:47,959
Well, I do agree that probably the large block layer one is probably dead after so many humiliating failures.

806
01:09:48,959 --> 01:09:59,959
But I think in the case of the sidechain, it's like people are disagreeing on like this one thing, which is the exchange rate of Bitcoin and the total fees collected by miners.

807
01:10:00,959 --> 01:10:06,959
So at least they have, they're all watching the same thing. Whereas in the hard fork case, they are arguing about many other things.

808
01:10:07,959 --> 01:10:15,959
Like, you know, like how, when should, how should we, what should we hard fork to and when, how should we deploy that? And what do we do if someone proposes two hard forks at the same time?

809
01:10:16,959 --> 01:10:22,959
It's about the, is it about the block size? Okay, yes. Do we do anything else? Do we do anything from the hard fork wishlist while we're at it?

810
01:10:22,959 --> 01:10:33,959
Um, there, you know, it's like, it's, it's about a lot more than just the block size. It's like the full node costs versus the fees, the interaction between the two.

811
01:10:34,959 --> 01:10:47,959
If something else is going to be invented later that, um, like if lightning is going to be invented later and then we would never need, we would need this block space less versus more.

812
01:10:48,959 --> 01:10:54,959
So they're actually disagreeing on a lot of stuff, but I don't know. We've been talking for a while. Should we hear from anyone else who wants to speak?

813
01:10:55,959 --> 01:11:02,959
We have one of our friends, Jay Berg. Welcome to the stage, Jay. Thank you for joining. Welcome back. Share your thoughts.

814
01:11:03,959 --> 01:11:10,959
Hey, Jay, I don't, I still to this day don't understand how it is that you can support BIP300 and not…

815
01:11:10,959 --> 01:11:20,959
Yeah, the worst part is I agree with 90% of, you know, what Paul's saying, but, or maybe even 98%, but the last 2% is, um, you know, what I argue about.

816
01:11:21,959 --> 01:11:33,959
But, um, I just want to say regarding the block size increase, um, you know, SegWit was a block size increase. Um, before the Civil War, there was consensus for a block size increase.

817
01:11:34,959 --> 01:11:40,959
Even after the Civil War, consensus was we're going to try to scale on-chain before we increase the block size again.

818
01:11:41,959 --> 01:11:49,959
But of course, we want to, we want to get as much scaling as possible on-chain. That's what we've been doing for 10 years is trying to find ways to scale on-chain.

819
01:11:50,959 --> 01:11:59,959
And one of those ways is a block size increase. So, I mean, how could anyone say block size increase is outside consensus? Anyway, that's just one point.

820
01:11:59,959 --> 01:12:08,959
Yeah, we weren't saying it was outside consensus. We were just saying that a future increase, again, any further increase would be controversial.

821
01:12:09,959 --> 01:12:18,959
And what I'm trying to ask, and you can answer, why don't we ask you the same question that I asked the professor is, you know, which is less, which is more controversial?

822
01:12:18,959 --> 01:12:34,959
Changing main-chain Bitcoin or introducing a sidechain? Drive-chainers would argue it's absolutely, inherently, necessarily less controversial to add or subtract a sidechain than change the main-chain, which everyone must use to be a Bitcoiner.

823
01:12:35,959 --> 01:12:45,959
Right. So what you do is you're trying to cheat and say we're going to get consensus on all possible things out of the way. Then there won't be any more drama.

824
01:12:45,959 --> 01:12:54,959
So that's what drivechain is doing. It's saying, hey, we're going to reach consensus on every single possible sidechain. It's okay to put it on the sidechain.

825
01:12:55,959 --> 01:13:06,959
And we're going to have a hash that represents that. And that takes away all future debates. I agree, but the problem is something that could do anything, everything, could basically do nothing.

826
01:13:07,959 --> 01:13:24,959
So I think the better approach is very simple. Block size increase or big block sidechain. Just forget about 301. Forget about miners voting. Just choose one. Choose one that has consensus because you still have the fight of the 300.

827
01:13:25,959 --> 01:13:36,959
What did you mean when you said – and by the way, I always appreciate your tweets and comments – but what did you mean when you said that if we can do everything, then we can do nothing? I didn't understand what that meant.

828
01:13:37,959 --> 01:13:52,959
So basically everything is nothing. A framework that can do everything can do nothing. That's the point. Everyone's trying to get Turing completeness in Bitcoin, but the reason why Bitcoin works is because it's not.

829
01:13:52,959 --> 01:14:14,959
It's because it solves double spends with Nash equilibriums or game theory that the miners have nothing else to do but build blocks. And that has to do with the protocol itself, which is – to put it very simply, a double spend is a mutually exclusive transaction.

830
01:14:14,959 --> 01:14:29,959
Only one of them is valid. That's all the miner could do is decide which one is valid, and he has nothing to do with that process in the limit because it's random. Some random miner doesn't know that you're making a deal somewhere in Mexico.

831
01:14:29,959 --> 01:14:49,959
But when you add something else, you change that. And the extreme is the Turing completeness that you can do anything. Once you can do anything, you're asking us to come to consensus on all possible sidechains, even though the ones that we don't want. So instead, let's just pick the one that we do want and talk about that.

832
01:14:49,959 --> 01:15:10,959
But I don't quite follow when you say that we get every sidechain that's possible. We only get the ones that people want. If people don't want an Ethereum sidechain, then they won't get that. They'll only get the privacy and the scaling and the hive mind. So why are you assuming that every possible sidechain that anyone might desire would necessarily get activated?

833
01:15:11,959 --> 01:15:35,959
Because that's what's the process of the process because we're, you're skipping the hardest. The hardest part of getting these things activated is going to get consensus, right? Imagine we had to do a soft fork for every single one. That's my point. I'd rather that. And you're right. I'd rather have it. That's my point. I'd rather have a soft fork for each individual sidechain than to have a soft fork for all possible sidechains.

834
01:15:36,959 --> 01:15:38,959
But Henry, can you just like...

835
01:15:38,959 --> 01:15:39,959
Sure.

836
01:15:43,959 --> 01:15:53,959
The process for adding the sidechain is basically, it's very much like BIP9. So it's kind of like a soft fork, but there's no code changes. So isn't that better?

837
01:15:53,959 --> 01:15:56,959
So BIP9 as far as like signaling?

838
01:15:57,959 --> 01:16:06,959
Right. It's basically 90% over two weeks, which is used to be how soft forks were activated for a time.

839
01:16:07,959 --> 01:16:18,959
Okay. So can you see a situation where we just gave miners, like we used to be able to UASF. Now it's, well, I guess we could UASF, right?

840
01:16:18,959 --> 01:16:27,959
Can always UASF. You can UASF to add. You can UASF to force the miners to add or to force them to remove. But the UASF...

841
01:16:27,959 --> 01:16:30,959
I mean, there's only what? There's only 256 of these, right?

842
01:16:31,959 --> 01:16:39,959
256 slots. You could just add it again and add 256 more, or you could have sidechains of sidechains. So it's really kind of unlimited.

843
01:16:39,959 --> 01:16:54,959
So at least one way to do that, the way UASF works is where everyone knows what's allowed. Like we know from socially, we understand what the purpose of Bitcoin is in the first place. That's why UASF works.

844
01:16:54,959 --> 01:16:55,959
I agree.

845
01:16:55,959 --> 01:17:02,959
So if we could just say what these 256 are supposed to represent, they're supposed to represent scaling on-chain, pay-to-pay electronic cash.

846
01:17:02,959 --> 01:17:09,959
Like we just explicitly say what they're supposed to represent and what they're not supposed to represent. That goes a long way.

847
01:17:09,959 --> 01:17:19,959
But just saying we could do anything and everything's good is kind of cheating because we're trying to, it's hard enough to get consensus on one thing.

848
01:17:20,959 --> 01:17:30,959
Like even the simplest, most conservative thing like Bit119. But you're saying, no, we want to get consensus on everything at once. So it's a bigger ask. And on top of that, you have the hashrate escrow.

849
01:17:30,959 --> 01:17:42,959
Well, not really, because when we say everything, I just mean that there's a universality to the idea. Like you buy a computer that has USB ports on it, and you say, well, you can plug anything into this.

850
01:17:42,959 --> 01:17:56,959
But they don't literally mean like, that's not what people mean when they say plug anything into it. They mean there's like a standard for emulating any altcoin.

851
01:17:56,959 --> 01:18:05,959
I mean, I'm just going back to the fact that we know that Turing Complete smart chains are an anti-pattern, and we're kind of bringing that into Bitcoin.

852
01:18:06,959 --> 01:18:18,959
Yeah, I'm not in favor of a Turing Complete. And I actually think that this is superior because you have the sidechains, they have categories, like the privacy sidechain or the Oracle sidechain or whatever.

853
01:18:18,959 --> 01:18:34,959
And I think, yeah, if you have Turing Complete, then people will write weird contracts in there that will actually attack other chains or just do weird stuff like pay for reorganization or stuff that maybe you wouldn't want, like the strip club type of a thing.

854
01:18:34,959 --> 01:18:45,959
And I think they would eventually just get... I also think they're inefficient because when you do something like Ethereum, you need something like gas to account for the fact that everything is using different resources.

855
01:18:45,959 --> 01:18:54,959
When you have a sidechain, you really don't need that. They can all have their own global state or the state that's local to the sidechain, so it can do a lot of heavy lifting.

856
01:18:54,959 --> 01:19:05,959
If you have something like Thunder that could scale Bitcoin infinitely, scale the peer-to-peer UTXO set infinitely on a sidechain, why do we need another sidechain? I don't understand.

857
01:19:05,959 --> 01:19:09,959
Well, you're referring to Zcash, like the Zcash smart privacy sidechain.

858
01:19:09,959 --> 01:19:19,959
Yeah, but there's only like a handful of those, like there's five of them, so we could just list them out. Like, this is what's expected, this, this, this, and this. And if we come up with something in 10...

859
01:19:19,959 --> 01:19:29,959
Well, I mean, I have done that. I mean, I have already made a little list on drivechain.info on what I think we would have. But why is it important to you that our knowledge today of what sidechains are good...

860
01:19:29,959 --> 01:19:30,959
It's consensus.

861
01:19:30,959 --> 01:19:31,959
... to be permanent.

862
01:19:31,959 --> 01:19:33,959
It's consensus. It just needs to be explicit.

863
01:19:33,959 --> 01:19:46,959
But the thing is, this is a list of things that I think we should try to give people an optional version of, but even that is something that people might disagree with. And so in the future, they might say, well, we didn't write that.

864
01:19:46,959 --> 01:19:58,959
Yeah, right. So don't you see it's a little difficult to get someone to agree with all possible ones, even though... So that includes all the ones they disagree with, when we can't even come up with a list of five that we agree with today.

865
01:19:58,959 --> 01:20:10,959
We could come up with a list of five. I think, again, it's like you buy a computer with a USB port versus one with like special ports for each thing. And they say, well, let's list them out, a keyboard, a webcam.

866
01:20:12,425 --> 01:20:20,785
But maybe they didn't realize, before COVID, you wouldn't realize that everyone will probably want to buy a nice microphone or maybe like a ring light or something.

867
01:20:20,785 --> 01:20:27,105
So 10 years from now, we do this again and we say we want to do another five.

868
01:20:27,105 --> 01:20:31,425
And that's why we're going to add AI and quantum computing and aliens.

869
01:20:31,825 --> 01:20:35,384
Well, sure. But that has the obvious downside that we have to go through this whole process again.

870
01:20:36,384 --> 01:20:42,384
Yeah, but the upside of going through the process is... What's the upside of going through the process?

871
01:20:42,384 --> 01:20:46,384
It's UASF. It's the only way this thing works.

872
01:20:47,384 --> 01:20:58,384
I think that I actually don't really believe in... Like, for a while, I thought that informed consent was a really good thing.

873
01:20:58,384 --> 01:21:08,384
I mean, I still think that. But now I just think the idea that the regular layperson on Twitter would know anything about these issues is basically 0% likelihood.

874
01:21:08,384 --> 01:21:09,384
Yeah, I agree.

875
01:21:09,384 --> 01:21:13,384
They're never going to actually know. So they're not going to know anything about Zcash sidechain or whatever.

876
01:21:13,384 --> 01:21:22,384
Yeah, so that's marketing. That's a marketing problem. I agree. I mean, back in the day, it was all about the devs and science and stuff.

877
01:21:22,384 --> 01:21:28,384
People didn't know at the time. A few people did, but most people didn't know it was a block size increase.

878
01:21:28,384 --> 01:21:33,384
I didn't either. I didn't until after the Civil War, which is insane.

879
01:21:33,384 --> 01:21:40,384
A lot of people still, to this day, people think that somehow it achieves more transactions by, like, efficiently shrinking...

880
01:21:40,384 --> 01:21:43,384
People think it's backwards compatible, too. People think it's not a hard fork.

881
01:21:43,384 --> 01:21:44,384
Right.

882
01:21:44,384 --> 01:21:45,384
I mean...

883
01:21:45,384 --> 01:21:49,384
It's a completely different block, completely different TXID, completely different local roots.

884
01:21:49,384 --> 01:21:56,384
But we had nuance back then. Back then we had, okay, so Luke and everyone's saying, okay, listen, we're going to sell this thing because it is good.

885
01:21:56,384 --> 01:22:03,384
But we're going to sell it in a way that we don't have to put thousands of plebs in computer science 101.

886
01:22:03,384 --> 01:22:07,384
So we're going to say things like, oh, it's backwards compatible, you know, blah, blah, blah.

887
01:22:07,384 --> 01:22:11,384
It's conservative. It's not really a block size increase because it's backwards compatible.

888
01:22:11,384 --> 01:22:14,384
This is the most we could squeeze out of it. Blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

889
01:22:14,384 --> 01:22:19,384
And that's kind of like what we're, you know, what we're hoping we could do next for the next nuance.

890
01:22:19,384 --> 01:22:22,385
But all nuance got lost at the Civil War.

891
01:22:22,385 --> 01:22:29,385
And then with Taproot, that's kind of like people just threw up their hands and it was like, you know, we spent all this time.

892
01:22:29,385 --> 01:22:30,385
I think it's getting worse.

893
01:22:30,385 --> 01:22:31,385
Oh.

894
01:22:31,385 --> 01:22:33,385
I certainly think it's getting worse over time.

895
01:22:33,385 --> 01:22:38,385
I think it's because the community is growing and it constantly includes a huge proportion of new people.

896
01:22:39,385 --> 01:22:46,385
Those people that you described earlier, the maxis that think Bitcoin is great, it's going to do awesome on its own.

897
01:22:46,385 --> 01:22:50,385
That's dwindling really fast.

898
01:22:50,385 --> 01:22:53,385
You know, like there's not that many of those.

899
01:22:53,385 --> 01:22:56,385
There's loud ones at the USD conferences.

900
01:22:56,385 --> 01:23:10,385
But, you know, there's really not those maxis anymore that really believe Bitcoin is just going to go hyper on its own without any dev help.

901
01:23:10,385 --> 01:23:11,385
I mean, that's just insane.

902
01:23:11,385 --> 01:23:12,385
Right.

903
01:23:12,385 --> 01:23:15,385
But I think for a while there was a lot.

904
01:23:15,385 --> 01:23:18,385
I mean, I think probably, don't you think, like Michael said?

905
01:23:18,385 --> 01:23:20,385
Yeah, Michael said, I was saying there's a couple, there's like four, right?

906
01:23:20,385 --> 01:23:28,385
There's four big loud people, you know, like if you go to a conference for three days and there's not one mention of a bit the whole time on stage, you know you're in the wrong place, right?

907
01:23:28,385 --> 01:23:30,385
Things like that.

908
01:23:30,385 --> 01:23:36,385
But it used to be the pubs would be like, listen, eventually the devs are going to figure it out.

909
01:23:36,385 --> 01:23:38,385
The devs are going to figure something out.

910
01:23:38,385 --> 01:23:40,385
We know there's some way of working on it.

911
01:23:40,385 --> 01:23:52,385
But one by one, the devs started leaving because, you know, they just, after the Civil War, everybody just wanted to keep fighting.

912
01:23:52,385 --> 01:24:06,385
Yeah, I think the Civil War did raise an issue that like either something has to be built that is either like lightning network shaped or is like some kind of like solution to a large block layer one.

913
01:24:06,385 --> 01:24:10,385
Like something needs to, something new needs to be created.

914
01:24:10,385 --> 01:24:20,385
And that created this, like the idea of like a roadmap or the idea of like future expectations of, I mean, it took a large group of people.

915
01:24:20,385 --> 01:24:26,385
It took a while for us to actually figure out that two-way pegs are impossible.

916
01:24:26,385 --> 01:24:28,384
It took a long time, a lot of research.

917
01:24:28,384 --> 01:24:34,384
And each, as each researcher figured that out, they kind of was like, oh shit.

918
01:24:34,384 --> 01:24:40,384
You know, what we kind of implied, we promised, you know, during the Civil War is we can't really come through with it.

919
01:24:40,384 --> 01:24:46,384
You think a two-way peg is impossible? It's of course possible like at some level of security.

920
01:24:46,384 --> 01:24:47,384
Two-way peg?

921
01:24:49,384 --> 01:24:53,384
Well, you have, you have Liquid Federation and then you have BIP300.

922
01:24:53,384 --> 01:24:57,384
I mean, you have to choose a group to trust.

923
01:24:59,384 --> 01:25:00,384
Well, I don't think that's the case.

924
01:25:00,384 --> 01:25:03,384
I mean, BIP300 is a decentralized mining process.

925
01:25:03,384 --> 01:25:06,384
You don't like pick a group of people, pick the miners.

926
01:25:06,384 --> 01:25:08,384
Well, we're picking this SHA-256 hashrate.

927
01:25:09,384 --> 01:25:10,384
Yeah.

928
01:25:10,384 --> 01:25:13,384
Well, you, but it's a, it's an ongoing process.

929
01:25:13,384 --> 01:25:20,384
Like the people who, they stand to gain or lose if the withdrawals are going through correctly or not.

930
01:25:20,384 --> 01:25:26,384
They, there's like, it's so slow and transparent.

931
01:25:26,384 --> 01:25:32,384
There's things that would happen if the kind of error corrects the process.

932
01:25:32,384 --> 01:25:33,384
There's no fixed.

933
01:25:33,384 --> 01:25:37,384
I mean, like if you say like a lot of people like to FPV security.

934
01:25:39,384 --> 01:25:45,384
The large blockers, they were like pro SPV level security and they still are.

935
01:25:46,384 --> 01:25:55,384
If you say that that SPV sidechain is custodial or like requires trust,

936
01:25:55,384 --> 01:26:01,384
then you're saying that, you know, Electrum wallet requires trust or something where it's sort of like not really what it originally meant.

937
01:26:01,384 --> 01:26:04,384
These words are changing their definition an awful lot.

938
01:26:04,384 --> 01:26:05,384
I think.

939
01:26:05,384 --> 01:26:15,384
I mean, in the limit, someone, someone wrote a paper once that says any two ways peg sidechain is in essence a block size increase.

940
01:26:15,384 --> 01:26:16,384
Like we.

941
01:26:16,384 --> 01:26:17,384
I don't agree with that.

942
01:26:17,384 --> 01:26:18,384
Whoever said that.

943
01:26:18,384 --> 01:26:22,384
Well, because the miners at the end of the day, someone has to go look at the sidechain.

944
01:26:23,384 --> 01:26:25,384
And that never gets a little later.

945
01:26:25,384 --> 01:26:26,384
One there.

946
01:26:26,384 --> 01:26:30,384
It doesn't enforce the actual peg in the other reverse direction.

947
01:26:31,384 --> 01:26:32,384
So they can.

948
01:26:35,384 --> 01:26:36,384
Oh, my God.

949
01:26:36,384 --> 01:26:37,384
Whatever that is.

950
01:26:39,384 --> 01:26:51,384
Whatever the whatever happens, like the miners could theoretically mine a bunch of L1 blocks, mine a bunch of L2 blocks, ignore what was happening on the L2, collect all the L2 sidechain block fees.

951
01:26:51,384 --> 01:26:58,384
And then steal all the coins or withdraw them to someone where they don't even know if the recipient is the real recipient or not.

952
01:26:58,384 --> 01:26:59,384
They do all that.

953
01:27:00,384 --> 01:27:01,384
And.

954
01:27:03,384 --> 01:27:07,384
They could do all that without ever looking at without there even being sidechain node software.

955
01:27:14,384 --> 01:27:16,384
So they can't do the whole thing blind if they want.

956
01:27:17,384 --> 01:27:19,384
I mean, now we get into the other problem is.

957
01:27:20,384 --> 01:27:21,384
If that's the way.

958
01:27:22,384 --> 01:27:23,384
Because you like.

959
01:27:23,384 --> 01:27:24,384
So here's the problem.

960
01:27:25,384 --> 01:27:28,384
On the one hand, you're the only person in the entire world, I think.

961
01:27:28,384 --> 01:27:29,384
Right.

962
01:27:29,384 --> 01:27:30,384
Not that that makes you wrong.

963
01:27:30,384 --> 01:27:31,384
I'm just saying it's very interesting.

964
01:27:32,384 --> 01:27:33,384
OK, so the problem is this.

965
01:27:33,384 --> 01:27:37,384
If you say BMM somehow secures the sidechain.

966
01:27:38,384 --> 01:27:40,384
How how could it secure the sidechain?

967
01:27:40,384 --> 01:27:46,384
There's only one way it could secure about the sidechain is because of the proof of work and the distribution of shops.

968
01:27:46,384 --> 01:27:54,384
It's a hash rate that somehow that immutable hash has says something about decentralization.

969
01:27:55,384 --> 01:28:02,384
But if that's the case, if it secures the sidechain, then it also creates MEV, because that means that the miners do, in fact.

970
01:28:04,384 --> 01:28:05,384
Have a say.

971
01:28:06,384 --> 01:28:09,384
In what happens in the section, they can't have it both ways.

972
01:28:10,384 --> 01:28:11,384
Yeah.

973
01:28:11,384 --> 01:28:13,384
The miners have a say in what happens on the side.

974
01:28:13,384 --> 01:28:14,384
But they do not.

975
01:28:14,384 --> 01:28:16,384
They get all of the value.

976
01:28:16,384 --> 01:28:18,384
What you might call the MEV.

977
01:28:18,384 --> 01:28:20,384
The MEV is twelve dollars.

978
01:28:20,384 --> 01:28:25,384
The layer one miner gets the twelve dollars, but they don't have to run the sidechain node.

979
01:28:28,384 --> 01:28:30,384
So they don't actually have to do anything.

980
01:28:30,384 --> 01:28:33,384
Someone is doing the MEV, but it's not the layer one miner.

981
01:28:34,384 --> 01:28:35,384
No, they could do it.

982
01:28:35,384 --> 01:28:36,384
They don't have to.

983
01:28:36,384 --> 01:28:37,384
They could.

984
01:28:37,384 --> 01:28:38,384
Well, they could do it.

985
01:28:38,384 --> 01:28:39,384
Right.

986
01:28:39,384 --> 01:28:41,384
But by having the hash, not anyone only.

987
01:28:41,384 --> 01:28:42,384
Right.

988
01:28:42,384 --> 01:28:44,385
But in the limit, you need the hash rate to do it.

989
01:28:45,385 --> 01:28:46,385
Yeah, but they don't.

990
01:28:46,385 --> 01:28:47,385
Nothing hinges on.

991
01:28:47,385 --> 01:28:49,385
They get the twelve dollars whether they do it or not.

992
01:28:49,385 --> 01:28:51,385
So they probably won't do it.

993
01:28:53,385 --> 01:29:00,385
I mean, it usually it usually doesn't work like that because it's a very expensive build to actually get the MEV.

994
01:29:00,385 --> 01:29:01,385
And they're not.

995
01:29:01,385 --> 01:29:06,385
So the theory is that they won't even invest in building it if they know it.

996
01:29:07,385 --> 01:29:10,385
Sidechain block constructor is a sidechain full node.

997
01:29:11,385 --> 01:29:13,385
It is not a layer one miner.

998
01:29:13,385 --> 01:29:14,385
Yeah.

999
01:29:14,385 --> 01:29:17,385
The block is normally worth six dollars of transaction fees.

1000
01:29:18,385 --> 01:29:22,385
But there's an additional six dollars of MEV that if they pay two dollars.

1001
01:29:23,385 --> 01:29:30,385
They can get they can pull another six dollars out of this on the sidechain, which has nothing to do with layer one whatsoever.

1002
01:29:31,385 --> 01:29:33,385
They they will run their node.

1003
01:29:33,385 --> 01:29:34,385
They collect the transactions.

1004
01:29:34,385 --> 01:29:35,385
They say, oh, this is this.

1005
01:29:35,385 --> 01:29:36,385
I'm getting six dollars.

1006
01:29:37,385 --> 01:29:38,385
That's great.

1007
01:29:38,385 --> 01:29:39,385
I like that.

1008
01:29:39,385 --> 01:29:43,385
And then the then they'll say, oh, wait, I can pay two dollars to get another six.

1009
01:29:44,385 --> 01:29:48,385
Now the block is worth ten dollars to them since they've done the MEV.

1010
01:29:48,385 --> 01:29:50,385
They've invested the two dollars in.

1011
01:29:50,385 --> 01:29:52,385
And now the sidechain block is worth ten dollars.

1012
01:29:53,385 --> 01:29:54,385
They go over to L1.

1013
01:29:54,385 --> 01:29:56,385
This is a prospective block.

1014
01:29:57,385 --> 01:30:08,385
They go over to L1 and then they say, someone out there saying, I'll pay six dollars if you if you blessed this sidechain block, sidechain block 43 for me.

1015
01:30:08,385 --> 01:30:09,385
And then they say, I'll pay.

1016
01:30:11,385 --> 01:30:14,385
Seven dollars, and then they get into a bidding war with someone else who did the MEV.

1017
01:30:16,385 --> 01:30:17,385
It goes for nine ninety nine.

1018
01:30:18,385 --> 01:30:19,385
So they get ten dollars in the sidechain.

1019
01:30:19,385 --> 01:30:21,385
They pay nine ninety nine on L1.

1020
01:30:22,385 --> 01:30:25,385
The miner gets paid on L1 and they don't even see the sidechain node.

1021
01:30:26,385 --> 01:30:33,385
So even though there is whether or not the MEV is a decision made by the sidechain developer and it does not affect L1.

1022
01:30:33,385 --> 01:30:34,385
Yeah.

1023
01:30:34,385 --> 01:30:39,385
I mean, it's yeah, it's obfuscation.

1024
01:30:39,385 --> 01:30:41,385
I mean, it's a separation of obfuscation.

1025
01:30:41,385 --> 01:30:53,385
But I mean, there's there's there's theories about if you're willing to do something against social consensus, if nobody could nobody could find out.

1026
01:30:53,385 --> 01:30:55,385
There's a lot of different things here.

1027
01:30:55,385 --> 01:31:05,385
It's not always easy to figure out how much you want to bid for this particular MEV when if you actually have the hash rate, you're just saying, I'll take it for free if I could get it.

1028
01:31:05,385 --> 01:31:06,385
If not, I won't.

1029
01:31:06,385 --> 01:31:07,385
All right.

1030
01:31:07,385 --> 01:31:10,385
I'm not going to go pay some some external miner.

1031
01:31:10,385 --> 01:31:11,385
I already know.

1032
01:31:11,385 --> 01:31:12,385
I'll try to do it myself.

1033
01:31:13,385 --> 01:31:15,385
Well, the sidechain nodes have no hash rate.

1034
01:31:15,385 --> 01:31:16,385
They just bid.

1035
01:31:17,385 --> 01:31:18,385
I know.

1036
01:31:18,385 --> 01:31:21,385
But the thing is that sidechain nodes are secured by Bith 301.

1037
01:31:21,385 --> 01:31:22,385
Right.

1038
01:31:22,385 --> 01:31:23,385
Yes or no.

1039
01:31:24,385 --> 01:31:30,385
In Bith 301, the sidechain node, whether or not the block meets the proof of work requirement.

1040
01:31:31,385 --> 01:31:39,385
So that's like if the header meets the proof of work requirement on L1, that's like whether or not they are included in the L1 coinbase.

1041
01:31:39,385 --> 01:31:40,385
That is the same thing.

1042
01:31:40,385 --> 01:31:48,385
So like in Bitcoin L1, you firstly get the 80 byte header and you say, does this meet the proof of work?

1043
01:31:48,385 --> 01:31:52,385
Then if it does, you download the block and you check it against all the rules.

1044
01:31:52,385 --> 01:32:00,385
So on the sidechain, you first see if the sidechain header, if that hash made it into L1 coinbase.

1045
01:32:00,385 --> 01:32:03,385
And if it does make it into L1 coinbase.

1046
01:32:05,385 --> 01:32:10,385
Then you say, OK, this sidechain block met the proof of work requirement, and then you download the sidechain block.

1047
01:32:10,385 --> 01:32:12,385
And what does that mean?

1048
01:32:12,385 --> 01:32:14,385
What is the assumption when you say met the proof of work?

1049
01:32:14,385 --> 01:32:20,385
The assumption is that it's secure because of proof of work.

1050
01:32:20,385 --> 01:32:23,385
SHA-256 mining is decentralized.

1051
01:32:23,385 --> 01:32:31,385
So now we're looking at Bitcoin mainchain to decide the state of the sidechain.

1052
01:32:32,385 --> 01:32:34,385
Because it goes in that direction.

1053
01:32:34,385 --> 01:32:36,385
That's the good direction.

1054
01:32:36,385 --> 01:32:44,385
The thing is, you have no way to tell if this miner actually is a sidechain miner that made the mainchain block.

1055
01:32:44,385 --> 01:32:46,385
And he actually did a bunch of frontrunning.

1056
01:32:46,385 --> 01:32:48,385
And it just, oh, it just happened.

1057
01:32:48,385 --> 01:32:49,385
Everyone's like on the sidechains.

1058
01:32:49,385 --> 01:32:52,385
Oh, it just happens to be that that one got in before this one.

1059
01:32:52,385 --> 01:32:53,385
That's weird.

1060
01:32:53,385 --> 01:32:56,385
And they don't even notice that it's being actively manipulated.

1061
01:32:56,385 --> 01:32:57,385
Right.

1062
01:32:57,385 --> 01:33:00,385
So that's the that's the story I'm getting at is that.

1063
01:33:00,385 --> 01:33:02,385
I mean, you say security.

1064
01:33:02,385 --> 01:33:04,385
I don't know exactly what you mean by that.

1065
01:33:05,385 --> 01:33:10,385
I mean, maybe this will help to point out that the hash of the sidechain header is in L1.

1066
01:33:10,385 --> 01:33:12,385
So it is protected by it.

1067
01:33:12,385 --> 01:33:15,385
It's no different than any other L1 transaction in that way.

1068
01:33:15,385 --> 01:33:16,385
Right.

1069
01:33:16,385 --> 01:33:18,385
OK, so so now we can talk about that.

1070
01:33:18,385 --> 01:33:20,385
You can do the same thing in an OP_RETURN.

1071
01:33:20,385 --> 01:33:21,385
You just say, hey, like ordinal.

1072
01:33:21,385 --> 01:33:23,385
So just pick an OP_RETURN.

1073
01:33:23,385 --> 01:33:24,385
And it's the same immutability.

1074
01:33:24,385 --> 01:33:25,385
Right.

1075
01:33:25,385 --> 01:33:27,385
So and here's the critical part.

1076
01:33:27,385 --> 01:33:32,385
What what's what changes when you go from an OP_RETURN into the coinbase?

1077
01:33:33,385 --> 01:33:36,385
And this is a very nuanced.

1078
01:33:36,385 --> 01:33:37,385
Sorry.

1079
01:33:37,385 --> 01:33:38,385
This is the very nuanced question.

1080
01:33:38,385 --> 01:33:39,385
Like, what changes?

1081
01:33:39,385 --> 01:33:40,385
And that's the problem.

1082
01:33:40,385 --> 01:33:41,385
Very little.

1083
01:33:41,385 --> 01:33:44,385
But the whole point of this is why BIP301 is not even really that required.

1084
01:33:44,385 --> 01:33:55,385
But what it does do is BIP301 allows it to make it so that when you bid on the block, the miner will only take the highest bid.

1085
01:33:55,385 --> 01:33:57,385
They won't just take everyone's bid.

1086
01:33:57,385 --> 01:33:58,385
Like everyone says, I'll pay $4.

1087
01:33:58,385 --> 01:34:00,385
I'll pay $4.10.

1088
01:34:00,385 --> 01:34:01,385
I'll pay $4.12.

1089
01:34:01,385 --> 01:34:03,385
They can only take the highest bid.

1090
01:34:03,385 --> 01:34:16,385
They have to include the moving into the coinbase means that you know that it was the Bitcoin miners that someone with the proof of work who who blessed the message with the proof of work.

1091
01:34:16,385 --> 01:34:21,385
So BIP301 is just about having the two people be able to coordinate without trusting each other.

1092
01:34:21,385 --> 01:34:22,385
So it's the right.

1093
01:34:22,385 --> 01:34:23,385
And exactly.

1094
01:34:23,385 --> 01:34:24,385
What are they trusting?

1095
01:34:24,385 --> 01:34:29,385
They're trusting the distribution of SHA-236 hash rate is not centralized.

1096
01:34:29,385 --> 01:34:30,385
That's right.

1097
01:34:30,385 --> 01:34:34,385
I don't really think so because I think you just said you just said they don't have to trust each other.

1098
01:34:34,385 --> 01:34:36,385
So what are they trusting?

1099
01:34:36,385 --> 01:34:37,385
How do you see?

1100
01:34:37,385 --> 01:34:43,385
How are you solving them not trusting each other by having some random miner and trying to put it in the coinbase?

1101
01:34:43,385 --> 01:34:55,385
What do you gain from it would be like someone says, listen, what they would do instead if they couldn't use BIP301 is they would just have a relationship with the mining pool.

1102
01:34:55,385 --> 01:34:59,385
And they would say, I will make your sidechain blocks for you.

1103
01:34:59,385 --> 01:35:01,385
I will pay myself a transaction fee.

1104
01:35:01,385 --> 01:35:07,385
And then after in the next block, after you include my hash.

1105
01:35:07,385 --> 01:35:10,385
I will pay you in one or I'll pay you up front.

1106
01:35:10,385 --> 01:35:11,385
Either way, it doesn't make any difference.

1107
01:35:11,385 --> 01:35:12,385
There's another way to do this.

1108
01:35:12,385 --> 01:35:13,385
You could do APL.

1109
01:35:13,385 --> 01:35:15,385
APL could do this.

1110
01:35:15,385 --> 01:35:16,385
You just need a bidding.

1111
01:35:16,385 --> 01:35:21,385
If you just need a fee bidding system that could be done without itself for right.

1112
01:35:21,385 --> 01:35:23,385
Like a double spend system like any previous.

1113
01:35:24,385 --> 01:35:30,385
I don't really think that 301 is like, I just thought it will ride along with the 300 top part.

1114
01:35:30,385 --> 01:35:35,385
Because again, when I proposed all this, it was November 2015 and soft forks were actually not a big deal.

1115
01:35:35,385 --> 01:35:39,385
And there were in fact three done the very next month, I think, if I remember correctly.

1116
01:35:39,385 --> 01:35:42,385
So I was just like, whatever.

1117
01:35:42,385 --> 01:35:45,385
And I broke it into two bits to make it easier to read.

1118
01:35:45,385 --> 01:35:47,385
So they're not like mutual.

1119
01:35:47,385 --> 01:35:49,385
Because you could always have a sidechain that doesn't.

1120
01:35:49,385 --> 01:35:54,385
This is what Professor War, or whatever.

1121
01:35:54,385 --> 01:35:56,385
I only see the first part of his name.

1122
01:35:56,385 --> 01:35:57,385
But he was asking about that earlier.

1123
01:35:57,385 --> 01:35:59,385
You don't really need to.

1124
01:35:59,385 --> 01:36:00,385
It doesn't really need to even be a blockchain.

1125
01:36:00,385 --> 01:36:02,385
It could be like some weird nebulous thing.

1126
01:36:02,385 --> 01:36:05,385
So it doesn't necessarily need to be blind merge mine.

1127
01:36:05,385 --> 01:36:07,385
Although I think there's a big mistake.

1128
01:36:07,385 --> 01:36:09,385
Because you see the benefits of blind merge mining, right?

1129
01:36:09,385 --> 01:36:10,385
Yeah, I know.

1130
01:36:10,385 --> 01:36:13,385
The benefits is the UASF risk.

1131
01:36:13,385 --> 01:36:20,385
The only reason why miners, the miners are going to make a very quick decision when they're building their mining operation.

1132
01:36:20,385 --> 01:36:25,385
They're going to say, are we going to hire people to research how to manipulate this thing or not?

1133
01:36:25,385 --> 01:36:28,385
And that's the instant.

1134
01:36:28,385 --> 01:36:32,385
And we just want them to say every time that they're not going, they're just going to run the fucking software and not do anything.

1135
01:36:32,385 --> 01:36:34,385
That's why it works.

1136
01:36:34,385 --> 01:36:35,385
They don't even try.

1137
01:36:35,385 --> 01:36:36,385
No, they won't.

1138
01:36:36,385 --> 01:36:37,385
BIP301 tries to do.

1139
01:36:37,385 --> 01:36:42,385
BIP301 says you don't even have to run the software at all.

1140
01:36:42,385 --> 01:36:45,385
Someone else does that and they just bid up the block.

1141
01:36:45,385 --> 01:36:50,385
And if they if they get eight Bitcoin worth of value out of this block, there's a big seven point nine nine nine.

1142
01:36:50,385 --> 01:36:53,385
It's a question of the question of do they want to?

1143
01:36:53,385 --> 01:36:54,385
Not if they could.

1144
01:36:54,385 --> 01:36:55,385
Do they want to do it?

1145
01:36:55,385 --> 01:36:56,385
Right.

1146
01:36:56,385 --> 01:37:03,385
But anyway, if they want to, I don't really see a problem with that either, because they'll they'll build the block and they'll get a Bitcoin on the sidechain.

1147
01:37:04,385 --> 01:37:17,384
And maybe a Bitcoin on the sidechain is worth seven point nine nine nine on the main chain, especially after you account for the fact that running the node will have some costs, even though it'll be almost certainly very, very small compared to every other.

1148
01:37:17,384 --> 01:37:18,384
Right. So now.

1149
01:37:18,384 --> 01:37:21,384
So now all of a sudden you have a what's it called?

1150
01:37:21,384 --> 01:37:27,384
You have like a unit swap sidechain, something, some massive FTX monstrosity.

1151
01:37:28,384 --> 01:37:33,384
And it's very nuanced and abstract, but it's it's pure manipulation.

1152
01:37:33,384 --> 01:37:35,384
If you get enough retail flow.

1153
01:37:35,384 --> 01:37:36,384
Yes.

1154
01:37:36,384 --> 01:37:37,384
Right.

1155
01:37:37,384 --> 01:37:40,384
So at that point.

1156
01:37:40,384 --> 01:37:41,384
Right.

1157
01:37:41,384 --> 01:37:44,384
When the miners are building, they're doing their cash flow analysis.

1158
01:37:44,384 --> 01:37:46,384
I mean, a lot of them are capitulating right now.

1159
01:37:46,384 --> 01:37:48,384
They're going to say, oh, wow.

1160
01:37:48,384 --> 01:37:53,384
OK, let's get Wall Street in and let's build this this thing and actually let's centralize it.

1161
01:37:54,384 --> 01:37:59,384
So the point is, the point is, you don't want protocols that open that up.

1162
01:37:59,384 --> 01:38:01,384
And we know what it is that opens that up.

1163
01:38:01,384 --> 01:38:19,384
And and so I think that it is a good thing, because think about it like you have to look at it from my point of view, which is the sidechain point of view, is that if they build the unit swap sidechain, it doesn't affect like the large block sidechain or the prediction market sidechain or the main chain.

1164
01:38:20,384 --> 01:38:22,384
It's just its own thing, its own restaurant.

1165
01:38:22,384 --> 01:38:24,384
And it has soundproof walls.

1166
01:38:24,384 --> 01:38:25,384
So.

1167
01:38:25,384 --> 01:38:29,384
So this is like opening like a weird like a weird store.

1168
01:38:29,384 --> 01:38:30,384
It's an end club.

1169
01:38:30,384 --> 01:38:33,384
But they are going to be collecting the transaction fees from that.

1170
01:38:33,384 --> 01:38:35,384
So as far as I'm concerned, this is a good thing.

1171
01:38:35,384 --> 01:38:36,384
It's just a miner thing.

1172
01:38:36,384 --> 01:38:38,384
We want Bitcoin to grow, to have more users.

1173
01:38:38,384 --> 01:38:40,384
We want more transaction fees.

1174
01:38:40,384 --> 01:38:42,384
So I'm just going to tell you how this is.

1175
01:38:43,384 --> 01:38:54,384
The way it ends is after 50 million dollars of of research and building and programmers and quants and everything, they're going to come to a point where, hey, we're mining this block.

1176
01:38:54,384 --> 01:38:56,384
We really want we really want this.

1177
01:38:56,384 --> 01:38:58,384
I mean, we lost it.

1178
01:38:58,384 --> 01:39:00,384
So let's not switch the head.

1179
01:39:00,384 --> 01:39:01,384
I'm not going to switch the head.

1180
01:39:01,384 --> 01:39:02,384
I'm going to keep going.

1181
01:39:02,384 --> 01:39:10,384
Because to me, it's worth it more the next one minute, 60 seconds to keep trying to reorg.

1182
01:39:10,384 --> 01:39:12,384
And we saw this happen.

1183
01:39:12,384 --> 01:39:16,384
And right. So that's the only thing I'm saying, that it could affect the main money.

1184
01:39:16,384 --> 01:39:18,384
OK, I totally agree with that.

1185
01:39:18,384 --> 01:39:26,384
So let me just unpack that a little bit more, which is that that that also applies to any situation where the blockchain has lots of fees, where it doesn't have a block company.

1186
01:39:27,384 --> 01:39:29,384
And again, the sidechain can reorg.

1187
01:39:29,384 --> 01:39:30,384
Right.

1188
01:39:33,384 --> 01:39:43,384
The difference is, is that this protocol is actually broken, manipulating retail on a massive scale versus one that's just the fees that we all know about.

1189
01:39:43,384 --> 01:39:45,384
That's the difference. That's the only difference.

1190
01:39:45,384 --> 01:39:47,384
It's like these protocols don't belong.

1191
01:39:47,384 --> 01:39:50,384
They don't get not only don't they get secured by blockchain.

1192
01:39:50,384 --> 01:39:52,384
They don't get secured by miner.

1193
01:39:52,384 --> 01:39:54,384
The miner is a centralization.

1194
01:39:54,384 --> 01:40:03,384
It's like we're going to choose one random miner in Sri Lanka every 10 minutes and let him front run everyone.

1195
01:40:05,254 --> 01:40:07,574
Why would we choose him? There's no reason to choose him.

1196
01:40:08,014 --> 01:40:11,254
The choice that we're choosing him only works for double spend prevention.

1197
01:40:11,854 --> 01:40:16,574
When the again, when the UTXO, it's a mutually exclusive transaction.

1198
01:40:16,614 --> 01:40:19,174
All he could do is choose between one double spend and the other.

1199
01:40:19,814 --> 01:40:22,614
He doesn't know anything about my transaction in Chicago.

1200
01:40:23,133 --> 01:40:25,294
So he doesn't care which one goes in.

1201
01:40:26,574 --> 01:40:27,574
That's the point.

1202
01:40:28,774 --> 01:40:31,813
Well, it's funny you say that because I think it's kind of a separate point.

1203
01:40:31,813 --> 01:40:41,494
But but even going on this point, I think I'm very curious as to why do you treat MEV differently than just a transaction that pays a very high fee?

1204
01:40:42,173 --> 01:40:44,893
Oh, because MEV is a terrible terminology.

1205
01:40:44,934 --> 01:40:47,334
I mean, it's OK.

1206
01:40:47,373 --> 01:40:51,094
Let's say we have a game of rock, paper, scissors on the blockchain.

1207
01:40:52,853 --> 01:40:54,654
And people are just as dumb as they are.

1208
01:40:55,373 --> 01:41:07,094
And people are going to start putting money down to bet on rock and assuming it's somehow secure because blockchain secure when obviously anyone who's dumb enough to make the first move loses every time.

1209
01:41:07,213 --> 01:41:08,974
And in the limit, the miner wins every time.

1210
01:41:09,893 --> 01:41:12,853
Right. That's broken. It's a broken game of rock, paper, scissors.

1211
01:41:12,893 --> 01:41:14,654
It doesn't work. It's bad science.

1212
01:41:14,694 --> 01:41:15,734
It's bad for everyone.

1213
01:41:16,374 --> 01:41:17,374
And it shouldn't exist.

1214
01:41:18,294 --> 01:41:20,374
And it shouldn't affect Bitcoin.

1215
01:41:21,014 --> 01:41:27,414
It's just a bad protocol because it's a multiplayer game, an open multiplayer game.

1216
01:41:27,453 --> 01:41:31,294
And we give the miner the ultimate way to win every time.

1217
01:41:31,493 --> 01:41:34,813
It's just not something you would use if you were trying to design the system.

1218
01:41:35,773 --> 01:41:37,173
Right. So that's what I'm saying.

1219
01:41:37,654 --> 01:41:39,694
I mean, not really. I mean, I don't understand.

1220
01:41:39,734 --> 01:41:42,414
I mean, some of my friends want to go to the casino sometimes.

1221
01:41:42,414 --> 01:41:47,133
And as a former professional statistician, I find this absurd.

1222
01:41:47,173 --> 01:41:50,614
But I still go and I play blackjack.

1223
01:41:50,974 --> 01:41:54,773
Okay. MEV to exchange is a double spend to money.

1224
01:41:54,813 --> 01:42:01,734
If we said we're going to create electronic cash, but double spends happen every once in a while, we're like, no, let's not have double spends happening because that's what we're trying to do.

1225
01:42:01,893 --> 01:42:04,374
Again, it only happens on the weird Uniswap chain.

1226
01:42:04,614 --> 01:42:07,173
This is like the restaurant with soundproof walls or whatever.

1227
01:42:07,294 --> 01:42:08,893
It's like they're doing something weird over there.

1228
01:42:08,934 --> 01:42:09,493
They're losing money.

1229
01:42:09,493 --> 01:42:12,494
It's like having a little casino in the food court.

1230
01:42:12,813 --> 01:42:15,974
And, you know, I don't really get it, but people seem to enjoy it.

1231
01:42:16,533 --> 01:42:18,653
And, you know, they pay they pay rent.

1232
01:42:18,694 --> 01:42:27,893
They pay whatever the equivalent of what we have to say is the same type of protocols, the same type of protocols that make Bitcoin work.

1233
01:42:28,974 --> 01:42:37,373
Is what we should put on sidechains, and that means anything where the miners are only looking at fees and it's it's mutually exclusive transactions, right?

1234
01:42:37,733 --> 01:42:44,694
Well, it does go a little bit against the whole point of sidechains is that a lot of people disagree over what what types of things should be on them.

1235
01:42:44,733 --> 01:42:50,254
And that's that's kind of the whole point, which is that some people say, I really want the Zcash sidechain.

1236
01:42:50,254 --> 01:42:57,733
And other people say, we can't have too much privacy because it makes it harder to tell if we have inflated past 21 million coins.

1237
01:42:58,054 --> 01:42:59,653
And some people love assets.

1238
01:42:59,694 --> 01:43:05,013
They love, yeah, so counterparty while issuing stuff on the blockchain and other people.

1239
01:43:05,733 --> 01:43:08,574
I get it. So now you're getting into the fact that people are clueless.

1240
01:43:08,574 --> 01:43:12,533
I get it. So that's that's a different argument than I have nothing to agree.

1241
01:43:12,533 --> 01:43:17,414
And I think that people make, you know, people trial and error is a good.

1242
01:43:17,494 --> 01:43:19,173
But we saw I don't know.

1243
01:43:19,173 --> 01:43:20,453
We have 10 years of Ethereum.

1244
01:43:20,614 --> 01:43:21,373
I still don't.

1245
01:43:21,774 --> 01:43:30,334
May I take a stab at trying to crystallize what's being discussed just for the benefit of our audience who might be less technical than you two?

1246
01:43:30,974 --> 01:43:32,974
It sounds to me like what Jay is saying.

1247
01:43:32,974 --> 01:43:34,373
And Jay, please correct me if I'm wrong.

1248
01:43:34,373 --> 01:44:02,653
But it sounds to me like what you're saying is if we had a 200 billion dollar sidechain today that was the same as Ethereum, then you believe that the negative effects that some Ethereum users experience would be suffered by the not only the users on the sidechain, but in your view, there would be trickle down of those negative effects to main chain Bitcoin users in some form of

1249
01:44:02,653 --> 01:44:03,893
negative consequence.

1250
01:44:03,893 --> 01:44:13,533
Whereas what Paul is saying is the sidechain users opt in and then they benefit or don't benefit from the sidechains, features and and patterns.

1251
01:44:13,933 --> 01:44:18,494
And that main chain is is only benefiting from higher fees and value of Bitcoin.

1252
01:44:19,013 --> 01:44:25,694
There's no experience on this Ethereum sidechain that trickles down in any negative way to the main thing.

1253
01:44:25,734 --> 01:44:26,493
Is that your view?

1254
01:44:26,933 --> 01:44:28,093
Yeah, exactly.

1255
01:44:28,093 --> 01:44:28,854
So exactly.

1256
01:44:28,854 --> 01:44:30,093
And it's very specific.

1257
01:44:30,093 --> 01:44:32,613
There's a specific thing that does trickle down.

1258
01:44:33,053 --> 01:44:35,254
And we saw this in Ethereum.

1259
01:44:36,174 --> 01:44:37,294
And Paul even agrees.

1260
01:44:37,294 --> 01:44:41,213
And that specific thing is an instantaneous reorg attempt.

1261
01:44:41,574 --> 01:44:49,333
So instead of everyone's going to change their mining algorithm to not follow it ahead, but try to make a mathematical economic.

1262
01:44:49,373 --> 01:44:53,134
That's the that's not a layer two on Ethereum.

1263
01:44:53,134 --> 01:44:54,613
That's Ethereum main chain.

1264
01:44:54,613 --> 01:44:57,093
Whereas in drivechain, it would be on a sidechain.

1265
01:44:57,533 --> 01:44:58,294
No, no, no, no.

1266
01:44:58,294 --> 01:45:05,414
It's layer two smart contracts affecting the main chain miners to reorg.

1267
01:45:06,014 --> 01:45:07,174
This was a big deal.

1268
01:45:07,254 --> 01:45:09,373
It was no one ever thought it would happen.

1269
01:45:09,373 --> 01:45:11,894
It didn't actually happen, but it almost did.

1270
01:45:12,294 --> 01:45:14,134
There was an emergency thing with Vitalik.

1271
01:45:14,813 --> 01:45:16,053
People are writing software.

1272
01:45:16,053 --> 01:45:20,254
They're going to try to reorg, reorg the chain for MEV.

1273
01:45:20,933 --> 01:45:32,053
It did happen in some sense that happened in Bitcoin history also, at least once with the value overflow or underflow bug.

1274
01:45:33,613 --> 01:45:39,894
Yeah, but I'm talking about a systematic, systematic change in the sense of structure of the mine.

1275
01:45:40,894 --> 01:45:51,653
Well, I think the but again, the the goal is to have these things be like connected in some way, but also as separated as possible.

1276
01:45:51,653 --> 01:46:07,333
So it's a little strange because, you know, we seem to be mostly on the same page where it's like if even if they decide that their best shot at reorging L2 is to also reorg L1, which is like that would cost them.

1277
01:46:07,933 --> 01:46:12,014
That would cost them a lot because they'd actually have to find blocks, whereas to reorg L2, they do not.

1278
01:46:12,734 --> 01:46:13,254
Yeah, I know.

1279
01:46:13,254 --> 01:46:14,333
That's a pretty big difference.

1280
01:46:14,333 --> 01:46:22,333
But if they decide, OK, we want to just we want to reorg L1, like do they have to reorg L1?

1281
01:46:22,333 --> 01:46:26,373
And then while they're at it, they're going to try to do a bunch of double spending, you know, like.

1282
01:46:26,854 --> 01:46:28,333
No, no, they're not double spending.

1283
01:46:28,493 --> 01:46:29,974
They're just saying I'm not going to switch.

1284
01:46:30,213 --> 01:46:31,533
I'm in the middle of trying to mine.

1285
01:46:31,533 --> 01:46:35,454
I know what I get if I find if I find an ounce and it's worth more.

1286
01:46:35,773 --> 01:46:38,894
And I'm going to put in the risk of not working on this new head.

1287
01:46:39,694 --> 01:46:40,894
I mean, it's pure math.

1288
01:46:41,014 --> 01:46:41,933
It's a pure formula.

1289
01:46:41,933 --> 01:46:43,093
I mean, I could write it down.

1290
01:46:43,373 --> 01:46:48,414
There will be a formula that says I'm no longer going to just switch every time someone else finds a block.

1291
01:46:48,694 --> 01:46:51,533
I'm going to wait until it's in my best interest to.

1292
01:46:52,414 --> 01:46:53,894
So I guess they call it selfish mining.

1293
01:46:53,894 --> 01:46:57,174
I'm just saying it is a little thing that could happen.

1294
01:46:57,613 --> 01:46:58,454
And you admitted that.

1295
01:46:58,454 --> 01:46:59,174
So that's fine.

1296
01:46:59,174 --> 01:47:01,773
I think the most important thing is just to say that it's possible.

1297
01:47:02,373 --> 01:47:04,134
And then the question is, why?

1298
01:47:04,373 --> 01:47:10,254
Why do we want to enable all possible sidechains, even the ones that we don't like, even the ones that you don't like?

1299
01:47:10,613 --> 01:47:15,773
Like, that's what the answer is, is because the clubs are clueless and is the only way we can get in.

1300
01:47:16,533 --> 01:47:17,294
That's the answer.

1301
01:47:17,454 --> 01:47:26,373
But that's a but it's an easy question, Jay, is because what some people like, you know, one man's trash is another man's treasure, so to speak.

1302
01:47:26,373 --> 01:47:33,373
If someone likes something, the thing that you what if someone said we can do any sidechain we want, as long as it's not the large chain, large block sidechain.

1303
01:47:34,174 --> 01:47:44,333
Remember, the thing is, this is we have to admit that mass manipulation of retail through obfuscation is bad and we see it happening.

1304
01:47:44,613 --> 01:47:52,533
I mean, as a first principle, I mean, I take it as a matter of principle that if some user wants to pay a transaction fee for something.

1305
01:47:53,533 --> 01:48:03,294
And if a miner wants to mine that and some developer wants to write the software for that, and some investor wants to hold that coin, like if these people all want something.

1306
01:48:03,773 --> 01:48:05,053
Yeah, but the retail doesn't know it.

1307
01:48:05,053 --> 01:48:05,694
They get it first.

1308
01:48:05,694 --> 01:48:07,093
First thing, they're getting manipulated.

1309
01:48:07,093 --> 01:48:10,773
First of all, we have to say that that should be allowed.

1310
01:48:12,093 --> 01:48:13,933
If they really don't want it, they'll learn eventually.

1311
01:48:13,974 --> 01:48:15,773
Well, then, I mean, how did how did we all learn?

1312
01:48:16,533 --> 01:48:17,454
You know, everyone's got to learn.

1313
01:48:17,454 --> 01:48:18,093
We didn't.

1314
01:48:18,974 --> 01:48:20,974
Well, Satoshi understood it, right?

1315
01:48:22,533 --> 01:48:26,174
I mean, you're saying that there's something that they voluntarily do that's bad for them.

1316
01:48:26,454 --> 01:48:27,734
But that's just no, no, no.

1317
01:48:27,734 --> 01:48:30,813
By adding, they're going to look to Bitcoin consensus.

1318
01:48:30,813 --> 01:48:35,694
They'd be like, huh, these guys that are smartest people in the world, that must be it secures the network somehow.

1319
01:48:36,493 --> 01:48:37,973
I'm my game of rock, paper, scissors.

1320
01:48:37,973 --> 01:48:39,574
I just I end up losing every time.

1321
01:48:39,574 --> 01:48:43,413
But that's just my bad luck, because obviously it's on Bitcoin.

1322
01:48:43,413 --> 01:48:44,094
It's secure.

1323
01:48:45,134 --> 01:48:46,894
Right. That's what I'm saying.

1324
01:48:46,894 --> 01:48:53,293
Instead, we just say, no, just the only things that we can secure are the things that we can secure.

1325
01:48:54,214 --> 01:48:56,733
Right. Otherwise, I don't really think that's that likely.

1326
01:48:56,733 --> 01:49:02,134
I don't think people really say, well, rock, paper, scissors on blockchain on Bitcoin is probably more secure.

1327
01:49:02,134 --> 01:49:04,534
I think probably just most people just don't really know.

1328
01:49:04,733 --> 01:49:07,894
I met a lot of like lay people, you know, at like parties.

1329
01:49:07,894 --> 01:49:10,694
And they're just like, oh, should I invest in whatever coin or whatever coin?

1330
01:49:10,694 --> 01:49:11,574
Things I've never heard of.

1331
01:49:12,134 --> 01:49:14,813
Like they really don't know about these nuances.

1332
01:49:15,334 --> 01:49:18,694
Most people like they heard about Ethereum and Bitcoin at the same time.

1333
01:49:18,694 --> 01:49:19,853
They don't even really see.

1334
01:49:20,774 --> 01:49:26,094
They vaguely notice the difference between ordinales, ordinales before BRC 20 and ordinales after BRC 20.

1335
01:49:26,094 --> 01:49:31,413
So ordinales has no effect on fee until the front running shit started.

1336
01:49:32,094 --> 01:49:33,694
I mean, it's you see it everywhere.

1337
01:49:33,694 --> 01:49:43,493
When when something is just Bitcoin or just UTXO like Chia or even Cardano, like, you know, anything that that doesn't have

1338
01:49:43,694 --> 01:49:45,574
completeness is different than ones that do.

1339
01:49:46,334 --> 01:49:47,894
And it just brings the wrong element.

1340
01:49:47,894 --> 01:49:49,454
But I'll shut up now.

1341
01:49:52,173 --> 01:49:54,293
I'd like to ask a terminology question.

1342
01:49:54,613 --> 01:50:00,413
OK, so when we talk about MEV, there seems to be two very distinct types of MEV.

1343
01:50:00,694 --> 01:50:04,894
One is this like really easy front running, which happens in a block.

1344
01:50:04,894 --> 01:50:09,014
Like if we play rock, paper, scissors and then this is basically over the next block.

1345
01:50:09,933 --> 01:50:14,293
And this is what happens and this is what Paul is saying, it does not pass through.

1346
01:50:14,293 --> 01:50:16,373
I mean, it doesn't go through the blood brain barrier.

1347
01:50:16,534 --> 01:50:26,214
It doesn't get to Bitcoin because once some block is mined, you know, that difference has already been arbitraged between the miner and the the sidechain miner.

1348
01:50:26,654 --> 01:50:32,334
But there's this different type of MEV, which involves reorging maybe a block or two blocks.

1349
01:50:32,334 --> 01:50:33,733
Do we have a different word for that?

1350
01:50:34,694 --> 01:50:36,493
Why is it? I don't think it's any different.

1351
01:50:36,894 --> 01:50:40,774
I think MEV. So I see MEV as reordering transactions.

1352
01:50:41,334 --> 01:50:42,454
So today in Bitcoin.

1353
01:50:42,454 --> 01:50:44,413
But that can be that can be within a block.

1354
01:50:44,454 --> 01:50:45,373
I mean, within a block.

1355
01:50:45,613 --> 01:50:48,654
Yeah, within an order, within a block, within a block.

1356
01:50:48,654 --> 01:50:49,813
It's all about within a block.

1357
01:50:49,813 --> 01:50:53,293
Right. Yeah. But but I'm saying like the block has not been formed yet.

1358
01:50:54,214 --> 01:50:56,733
Right. So you're making the block or you're making the block.

1359
01:50:57,574 --> 01:50:59,574
You're making the block and you put a value on it.

1360
01:50:59,933 --> 01:51:02,173
Right. So why are you going to reorg?

1361
01:51:02,173 --> 01:51:06,254
So when you're looking for the non-reorg yet, you're looking for the nonce.

1362
01:51:06,254 --> 01:51:07,694
Right. You're looking, you're looking, you're looking.

1363
01:51:08,134 --> 01:51:09,894
You didn't find it. Somebody else found it.

1364
01:51:10,334 --> 01:51:11,973
And you're like, no, no, no, that's not good enough.

1365
01:51:11,973 --> 01:51:13,574
I know I really want to find this one.

1366
01:51:13,574 --> 01:51:16,894
It's worth a lot more than the risk of losing the next block.

1367
01:51:16,933 --> 01:51:18,894
So I'm going to keep mining. That's all I mean by reorg.

1368
01:51:18,894 --> 01:51:20,493
I just mean, oh, yeah, I'm going to change.

1369
01:51:21,094 --> 01:51:23,373
Yeah. Yeah. But I'm saying there's a different type of MEV.

1370
01:51:23,373 --> 01:51:25,774
And I think this is what Paul was describing first.

1371
01:51:25,813 --> 01:51:28,733
Yeah. And that's a shame because the order.

1372
01:51:28,973 --> 01:51:30,574
Well, that's what I'm saying. We need new terminology.

1373
01:51:30,574 --> 01:51:35,894
We need to talk about. Well, that's what Ethereum did when they found, you know, the problem was brought up to them in 2014, whatever.

1374
01:51:36,373 --> 01:51:44,733
You know, what you do is, you know, I guess what you do is you say you try to make it sound better than manipulation, front running, like scam, fraud.

1375
01:51:44,894 --> 01:51:46,094
Right. You call it MEV.

1376
01:51:46,654 --> 01:51:49,574
And then all of a sudden, next thing you know, there's some good MEV and some bad MEV.

1377
01:51:49,973 --> 01:51:55,534
Like when I say MEV, I mean manipulation of retail fraud, like tech, like bad, bad, bad.

1378
01:51:55,894 --> 01:52:02,413
That cost the miner no marginal cost because the block has not been formed yet and they could fill wet concrete.

1379
01:52:02,654 --> 01:52:07,813
And then he's saying there's a different kind of MEV would cost money if you if you wanted to reorg.

1380
01:52:07,813 --> 01:52:14,173
And that would that has the potential of inconveniencing other people who's in the block there in the block.

1381
01:52:14,173 --> 01:52:22,014
And they think now this block might reorg because this confirmation isn't real because it would happen.

1382
01:52:22,014 --> 01:52:23,173
It could happen in Bitcoin also.

1383
01:52:23,173 --> 01:52:32,254
Like if you fast forward to the future where there's no block subsidy and then someone puts like a transaction in a block that pays like an unbelievably transaction fee of like ten million dollars.

1384
01:52:32,613 --> 01:52:41,694
Then you might think like, well, I have one confirmation now, but you think isn't someone going to just chase this fee and try again?

1385
01:52:42,094 --> 01:52:45,334
And there have been a different different theories about that.

1386
01:52:45,334 --> 01:52:52,053
I kind of think that the theory never really unwinds, because if you go for that, you need to find two blocks in a row.

1387
01:52:52,053 --> 01:52:56,413
But then the first person is losing their giant fee that they just got.

1388
01:52:56,413 --> 01:52:58,853
So they have an incentive to keep fighting on their chain.

1389
01:52:58,853 --> 01:53:00,454
So I actually think it wouldn't be an issue.

1390
01:53:00,454 --> 01:53:03,293
But I think you need an outlier.

1391
01:53:03,293 --> 01:53:05,654
So I think the big miner eventually takes it.

1392
01:53:07,014 --> 01:53:08,454
You need an outlier fee.

1393
01:53:09,413 --> 01:53:13,373
I think the first whoever found it first just takes it because it's too difficult to coordinate.

1394
01:53:13,613 --> 01:53:22,933
If you have a split, if someone finds we have block three million and then three hundred and three million one has a block that pays like a 40 billion dollar transaction fee.

1395
01:53:23,293 --> 01:53:24,574
That's a transaction in there.

1396
01:53:24,574 --> 01:53:32,014
But for some reason, that's because the mining company didn't didn't hire a team of quants to build this for them.

1397
01:53:32,214 --> 01:53:33,214
And that's the difference.

1398
01:53:33,293 --> 01:53:35,173
They're just going to forget about it's not worth it.

1399
01:53:35,173 --> 01:53:36,454
It happens once every 10 years.

1400
01:53:37,293 --> 01:53:39,134
I'm saying that's what I'm saying is the problem.

1401
01:53:39,134 --> 01:53:46,094
They do it and then someone says, well, I want to find that block because that block has that block has a 40 billion dollars.

1402
01:53:46,454 --> 01:53:47,733
So they might go for it.

1403
01:53:47,733 --> 01:53:51,853
But the thing is, the first person who found it, they already have it.

1404
01:53:51,853 --> 01:53:55,813
And they're going to think, wait a minute, I want to double down on having it.

1405
01:53:55,813 --> 01:53:59,733
And now it kind of there's no real way of resolving it.

1406
01:53:59,733 --> 01:54:02,173
So I think that maybe they would try.

1407
01:54:02,173 --> 01:54:09,454
But I think but yeah, this is an interesting case where the just someone paying a fee would deconfirm the blocks.

1408
01:54:09,454 --> 01:54:13,214
And we want we always want the confirmations to mean something.

1409
01:54:13,214 --> 01:54:14,813
So that is very different.

1410
01:54:15,173 --> 01:54:24,214
And the way that three hundred and one tries to address this, Jay, apparently still sheds a tear of sadness.

1411
01:54:24,214 --> 01:54:26,293
But no, I just wanted you to admit this.

1412
01:54:26,293 --> 01:54:27,613
Once you admitted it, I'm fine.

1413
01:54:27,613 --> 01:54:36,094
I admit that this is a non-zero real one sidechain to reorg, even as the main chain blockchain is not real.

1414
01:54:36,413 --> 01:54:44,413
And so that's the idea is that they would just reorg inside and they would not because when you reorg outside, you have to actually find new blocks with proof of work.

1415
01:54:44,413 --> 01:54:47,373
But inside, you only have to pay.

1416
01:54:47,373 --> 01:54:50,733
You have to use your Coinbase space and move back.

1417
01:54:52,053 --> 01:54:54,493
You is one main chain block per sidechain block.

1418
01:54:54,894 --> 01:54:56,973
So this is it can reorg independently.

1419
01:54:58,613 --> 01:55:01,214
There's like no reason or.

1420
01:55:02,413 --> 01:55:09,413
I mean, you could as we were talking, you could say someone could say, listen, I think our best shot at getting the sidechain.

1421
01:55:10,134 --> 01:55:17,973
Block is to reorg the main chain block and every single sidechain block above it in some kind of surprise attack super.

1422
01:55:17,973 --> 01:55:20,694
But in order to do that, you have to find multiple main chain blocks.

1423
01:55:20,694 --> 01:55:23,493
So that's like where it works.

1424
01:55:23,493 --> 01:55:31,094
And in the limit, it works best when I mean, when there's a single control, someone single centralized control shot.

1425
01:55:31,094 --> 01:55:32,094
This is just exaggerate.

1426
01:55:32,613 --> 01:55:34,894
Yeah, it's kind of like implausible, I think.

1427
01:55:34,894 --> 01:55:36,733
But it's all theoretically possible.

1428
01:55:36,813 --> 01:55:46,973
The whole thing about confirmations is about there's an intriguing thing about confirmations, which is that if you are worried about them, you always have the option as like a merchant to say.

1429
01:55:47,894 --> 01:55:53,774
This is sort of a passing the buck to some extent, but it's like you can always say, well, we require six confirmations.

1430
01:55:53,774 --> 01:55:55,534
We require 10 confirmations.

1431
01:55:55,534 --> 01:56:00,853
We require you can change how many confirmations you require based on like your own level of paranoia.

1432
01:56:01,493 --> 01:56:03,493
I mean, Bitcoin, you need zero confirmation.

1433
01:56:03,493 --> 01:56:08,173
The merchant has less risk with zero confirmation than any other means of payment that exists.

1434
01:56:08,173 --> 01:56:09,173
I agree with that.

1435
01:56:09,173 --> 01:56:10,173
It's retarded.

1436
01:56:10,173 --> 01:56:20,613
But also this whole idea that the plebs have and all the software is built with this binary confirmed, binary confirmed, RBF, full RBF is an assumption that binary confirmed means something.

1437
01:56:21,134 --> 01:56:29,094
When one day there will be a confirmation that gets reorg and all the software is going to break.

1438
01:56:29,334 --> 01:56:31,654
Well, everyone has this obsession.

1439
01:56:32,053 --> 01:56:33,493
You got to wait for a confirmation.

1440
01:56:33,493 --> 01:56:35,053
I have to wait. It's not confirmed yet.

1441
01:56:35,053 --> 01:56:36,694
It's not legit until it's confirmed.

1442
01:56:37,014 --> 01:56:39,454
And one day it's going to be confirmed and then not confirmed.

1443
01:56:39,454 --> 01:56:40,534
Then everything's going to break.

1444
01:56:40,534 --> 01:56:43,094
And then people are going to realize, oh, there's no such thing as confirmed.

1445
01:56:43,454 --> 01:56:44,293
It's a finality.

1446
01:56:44,293 --> 01:56:45,574
I would agree with that.

1447
01:56:45,574 --> 01:56:48,894
I mean, obviously, there is a difference between zero confirmations and one.

1448
01:56:49,094 --> 01:56:50,654
That's kind of a little bit of a difference.

1449
01:56:50,694 --> 01:56:52,613
I'm sure you would agree to some extent.

1450
01:56:52,694 --> 01:56:57,933
But I think also your bigger point was more correct, which is that the credit card company can charge you back like.

1451
01:56:59,134 --> 01:57:01,214
A lot. So Bitcoin.

1452
01:57:01,254 --> 01:57:04,214
Right. So that's a big fun.

1453
01:57:04,413 --> 01:57:07,853
There should be no merchants that have to wait for confirmation.

1454
01:57:08,173 --> 01:57:11,774
And the only problem is it's very rare.

1455
01:57:12,054 --> 01:57:22,054
There's very rare situations where like Amazon can do zero conf because if you if you cancel the transaction, they can just cancel the order.

1456
01:57:22,333 --> 01:57:23,333
They just don't ship it to you.

1457
01:57:23,774 --> 01:57:24,453
Exactly.

1458
01:57:24,814 --> 01:57:33,134
In a real world, you're often on like security cameras, you're buying coffee or something like they'll know they'll be able to know exactly what it's going to rest of a shoplifting or something.

1459
01:57:33,254 --> 01:57:44,573
And the risk is that the user is going to make a mistake and double spend by mistake because his wallet doesn't understand zero correctly or he goes home with a second wallet with the same key.

1460
01:57:45,093 --> 01:57:45,934
And they just.

1461
01:57:45,934 --> 01:57:50,774
Right. So I agree with you that zero conf is a outlier in terms of how final it is.

1462
01:57:50,894 --> 01:57:51,493
It's a very fun.

1463
01:57:52,054 --> 01:58:00,213
We could fix the wallets and then the wallets basically say, I want to be you could just say, I want to be honest, I want to pay my Starbucks.

1464
01:58:00,254 --> 01:58:01,414
I don't want to double spend them.

1465
01:58:01,894 --> 01:58:04,654
And then you could be a wallets could help you not double spend them.

1466
01:58:05,573 --> 01:58:09,774
I mean, there's like a simple thing that we just decided not to look into.

1467
01:58:10,134 --> 01:58:16,134
And of course, again, this is what I was trying to say before is each merchant has their own life situation.

1468
01:58:16,134 --> 01:58:20,134
Like if you're selling a boat or something, I mean, this is your only thing that you own.

1469
01:58:21,493 --> 01:58:23,373
And you really need this. Make sure you have this money.

1470
01:58:23,373 --> 01:58:25,054
You would wait for many confirmations.

1471
01:58:25,093 --> 01:58:26,093
Of course, you stand there.

1472
01:58:26,814 --> 01:58:37,934
If you're like someone like Wal-Mart, maybe you you know that you're going to eat whatever, four percent of the inventory from, you know, shoplifting or whatever you want to call it, breakage.

1473
01:58:38,613 --> 01:58:41,254
So maybe they just do zero conf and they just have numbers.

1474
01:58:41,254 --> 01:58:45,973
They have boardroom meetings every quarter about how much money they lose, which is not very much.

1475
01:58:46,254 --> 01:58:49,733
So if people are people, but there are people have been taking zero conf for eight years.

1476
01:58:49,733 --> 01:58:50,654
Zero, zero.

1477
01:58:51,654 --> 01:58:59,774
So that's what I'm saying, though, about the whole that's how we got onto this, which is we were just asked about the reorg version.

1478
01:58:59,774 --> 01:59:06,373
And so the reorg thing is bad, but it's kind of like it's actually it's bad relative to a perfect world.

1479
01:59:06,373 --> 01:59:10,853
But actually, it's still very, very good relative to the existing world of payments.

1480
01:59:11,853 --> 01:59:17,333
And the three or one tries to completely neutralize that, but.

1481
01:59:19,294 --> 01:59:19,894
There you go.

1482
01:59:20,613 --> 01:59:28,894
And that phenomenon also applies to layer one, if someone pays a huge one random Bitcoin transaction with a huge, huge transaction fee.

1483
01:59:30,093 --> 01:59:31,414
So that's all that is.

1484
01:59:31,414 --> 01:59:36,613
Why are you so against just limiting sidechains to UTXO Bitcoin script?

1485
01:59:37,134 --> 01:59:41,294
I think that there's a lot of cool stuff that's being invented, I believe in innovation, really.

1486
01:59:41,294 --> 01:59:44,333
I think that it's wrong for me to say that I know.

1487
01:59:45,254 --> 01:59:52,254
What everyone will invent in the future, but we know what Bitcoin secure proof of work as it only secures.

1488
01:59:52,414 --> 01:59:58,774
We should only allow sidechains that are secured by the proof of work, but by Merck, like like that's the point.

1489
01:59:59,093 --> 02:00:02,373
Why why else are we doing it if it actually makes it worse?

1490
02:00:04,302 --> 02:00:05,302
Makes what worse?

1491
02:00:05,302 --> 02:00:06,302
The sidechain protocol.

1492
02:00:08,102 --> 02:00:10,062
Well, I think there's lots of things a sidechain could do.

1493
02:00:10,062 --> 02:00:13,382
Like you don't see any value in Zcash at all or Namecoin.

1494
02:00:15,302 --> 02:00:17,382
Namecoin, I mean, Namecoin, I don't know.

1495
02:00:17,422 --> 02:00:19,102
Namecoin works. Yeah, Namecoin's fine.

1496
02:00:19,142 --> 02:00:20,861
Works with Bitcoin UTXO.

1497
02:00:21,021 --> 02:00:26,021
Now you want Namecoin, you know, you just said that only the world's worst sidechain.

1498
02:00:26,021 --> 02:00:27,021
Now you're like.

1499
02:00:27,302 --> 02:00:32,222
No, no, no, no, no, no. Only only blockchain, only sidechains that we could just say

1500
02:00:33,422 --> 02:00:37,342
have no reordering of transactions, doesn't change the state.

1501
02:00:37,941 --> 02:00:38,941
Something like that, right?

1502
02:00:41,421 --> 02:00:46,782
Well, again, I guess I already explained it and you already agreed that this can already happen with Bitcoin UTXO.

1503
02:00:46,782 --> 02:00:49,142
Just one large fee that could change the state.

1504
02:00:50,542 --> 02:00:51,542
Across blocks.

1505
02:00:52,022 --> 02:00:53,221
No, across blocks, right?

1506
02:00:53,741 --> 02:00:55,502
Saying it's the same thing.

1507
02:00:56,502 --> 02:01:05,502
Right, but the distribution of SHA-256 hashrate makes it, yeah, we're giving, yeah, we're giving, that's, that's good MEV.

1508
02:01:05,502 --> 02:01:06,901
That's where the good MEV comes in.

1509
02:01:06,901 --> 02:01:08,581
We want, we want that MEV.

1510
02:01:11,982 --> 02:01:20,501
I think just take it as a first principle that we should not censor something if everyone wants to do it.

1511
02:01:20,982 --> 02:01:25,261
If everyone wants to do it, if a bunch of people want to do it, a miner, a user.

1512
02:01:27,141 --> 02:01:32,702
Right, but the way you're getting there is by saying we're going to let everyone, we're going to allow anyone to do anything,

1513
02:01:32,702 --> 02:01:38,901
even though nobody wants to do it and nobody agrees with any of it, just so we could find those couple of things that we agree with.

1514
02:01:38,901 --> 02:01:43,422
I'm just saying we should just find a couple of things we agree with and start there.

1515
02:01:43,422 --> 02:01:44,821
Can I ask a clarifying question?

1516
02:01:46,302 --> 02:01:51,261
Jay, some people who are concerned with merged mining are worried.

1517
02:01:51,861 --> 02:01:59,221
They have to go, unfortunately, for now, but I don't know if there's anyone who's absolutely dying to ask a question.

1518
02:02:00,302 --> 02:02:03,501
Then maybe I have another 300 seconds.

1519
02:02:04,462 --> 02:02:05,861
Yeah, Paul has to go to a podcast.

1520
02:02:05,861 --> 02:02:07,501
He has to go to a podcast.

1521
02:02:07,501 --> 02:02:08,941
You want to ask him a final question, Jay?

1522
02:02:08,941 --> 02:02:16,941
Yeah, just, I think, you know, are you open to thinking about limiting the sidechain?

1523
02:02:16,941 --> 02:02:23,941
Well, I'm open to anything if there's a good reason, but when you say limiting the sidechain to stuff that's only UTXO,

1524
02:02:23,941 --> 02:02:30,941
so there would be no Ethereum sidechain, I think copying the Ethereum sidechain is clever because it lets you, because no one is bafe.

1525
02:02:30,941 --> 02:02:33,941
The kernel will copy everything in its path.

1526
02:02:34,941 --> 02:02:36,941
The kernel will copy everything in its path.

1527
02:02:36,941 --> 02:02:46,941
And the software is already Turing-complete, like any piece of software, like the C++ compiler that made Bitcoin Core, that is Turing-complete or whatever you want to call it.

1528
02:02:46,941 --> 02:02:50,941
So, like, people can do stuff.

1529
02:02:50,941 --> 02:02:52,941
They're going to do whatever they want to do.

1530
02:02:54,941 --> 02:03:00,941
And how would we, why is it layer one's business whether or not something is, so I don't really understand the question.

1531
02:03:04,941 --> 02:03:16,941
The process of double spend prevention works with a set of incentives that the miner can't really do anything but look at the fees.

1532
02:03:16,941 --> 02:03:23,941
And the incentive is that all he could do is decide between two double spends.

1533
02:03:23,941 --> 02:03:29,941
And since he has no connection to that transaction, there's nothing that's secure.

1534
02:03:29,941 --> 02:03:33,941
So we're basically saying this is how we get decentralization.

1535
02:03:33,941 --> 02:03:35,941
Every 10 minutes we centralize.

1536
02:03:35,941 --> 02:03:38,941
We pick some random scam artist in the world.

1537
02:03:38,941 --> 02:03:40,941
We say you get to pick this block.

1538
02:03:40,941 --> 02:03:44,941
But we know you can't do anything because of the protocol.

1539
02:03:44,941 --> 02:03:46,941
There's nothing you could do to us.

1540
02:03:46,941 --> 02:03:48,941
So you're just going to help us and get paid.

1541
02:03:48,941 --> 02:03:49,941
We just don't want to break that.

1542
02:03:49,941 --> 02:03:51,941
That's all I'm just trying to say.

1543
02:03:51,941 --> 02:03:52,941
But anyway.

1544
02:03:53,941 --> 02:04:03,941
I think that is a good perspective.

1545
02:04:03,941 --> 02:04:10,941
But the idea is that only the people who opt in to this chain will be affected.

1546
02:04:10,941 --> 02:04:12,941
So the people want to do it.

1547
02:04:12,941 --> 02:04:13,941
So I don't know.

1548
02:04:13,941 --> 02:04:18,941
I don't really buy the fact that we should stop people from doing something that they want to do.

1549
02:04:18,941 --> 02:04:25,942
I think that's more what I want to be about is more about helping everyone get what they want to do.

1550
02:04:25,942 --> 02:04:29,942
And that was part of the whole why sidechains were a response to the block size war.

1551
02:04:29,942 --> 02:04:32,942
Because I thought, well, why can't we just let everyone – people want different things.

1552
02:04:32,942 --> 02:04:34,942
But why can't we just let everyone get what they want?

1553
02:04:34,942 --> 02:04:38,942
And that's kind of what I want to let people do what they want to do.

1554
02:04:38,942 --> 02:04:47,942
And if they want to make these trades that leave them open to being scammed by miners,

1555
02:04:47,942 --> 02:04:51,942
if they want to do that, then they want to do that, I think.

1556
02:04:51,942 --> 02:04:53,942
As long as it doesn't affect anyone else.

1557
02:04:53,942 --> 02:04:54,942
Anyway, this is fun.

1558
02:04:54,942 --> 02:04:55,942
I have to go.

1559
02:04:55,942 --> 02:04:56,942
So hang out.

1560
02:04:56,942 --> 02:04:57,942
Have fun hanging out.

1561
02:04:57,942 --> 02:04:58,942
Thanks, everyone.

1562
02:04:58,942 --> 02:04:59,942
Thank you, Paul.

1563
02:04:59,942 --> 02:05:00,942
And thank you to our speakers.

1564
02:05:00,942 --> 02:05:01,942
We'll hang out for a bit more.

1565
02:05:01,942 --> 02:05:04,942
Everyone's free to remain.

1566
02:05:04,942 --> 02:05:05,942
Of course.

1567
02:05:05,942 --> 02:05:11,942
I don't have Paul's technical knowledge level, but we can continue chatting for maybe half an hour.

1568
02:05:11,942 --> 02:05:14,942
Yeah, maybe we can collect questions if there's anything.

1569
02:05:14,942 --> 02:05:16,942
Anyway, see everyone later.

1570
02:05:17,942 --> 02:05:22,942
And thank you for those who've spoken so far, Jay and Professor Warren.

1571
02:05:22,942 --> 02:05:24,942
It was really awesome to hear your questions.

1572
02:05:24,942 --> 02:05:33,942
And, Jay, I think you very perfectly articulated, like, some of the most sophisticated ideas that, you know,

1573
02:05:33,942 --> 02:05:38,942
people have presented regarding the way that blind merge mining works.

1574
02:05:38,942 --> 02:05:46,942
And I think your analysis and your technical, you know, expression of them is so helpful because, you know,

1575
02:05:46,942 --> 02:05:53,942
the only way this project ever moves forward is if people think critically and carefully about it as you are.

1576
02:05:53,942 --> 02:05:55,942
So it's great.

1577
02:05:55,942 --> 02:06:00,942
I mean, to my less technical ears, it kind of sounds like the question is as follows.

1578
02:06:00,942 --> 02:06:04,942
Suppose we had Ethereum as a sidechain on Bitcoin today.

1579
02:06:04,942 --> 02:06:07,942
Suppose it's the largest sidechain.

1580
02:06:07,942 --> 02:06:14,942
Suppose we have all this Wall Street type activity on a sidechain, a BIP300 sidechain.

1581
02:06:14,942 --> 02:06:22,942
Would that in any way harm main chain Bitcoin and harm people who haven't opted in?

1582
02:06:22,942 --> 02:06:31,942
Or would all of the effects be exclusively positive as drive chainers, you know, generally say, where, you know,

1583
02:06:32,942 --> 02:06:39,942
because, of course, it would be Bitcoin on this on the sidechain as the primary unit of account, not Ethereum.

1584
02:06:39,942 --> 02:06:45,942
So we get Bitcoin number going up higher fees, higher value.

1585
02:06:45,942 --> 02:06:47,942
You know, that's the drivechain vision.

1586
02:06:47,942 --> 02:06:54,942
But your objection, if I understand it correctly, is there could be complicated, complicated consequences that are negative.

1587
02:06:54,942 --> 02:06:59,942
And then it becomes a question of is do we have are we comfortable with those negatives?

1588
02:06:59,942 --> 02:07:03,942
You know, if we believe they're much smaller than the positives.

1589
02:07:03,942 --> 02:07:06,942
Is that fair?

1590
02:07:06,942 --> 02:07:12,942
Yes. It's just it's just the extra 60 second reorg attempt by miners.

1591
02:07:12,942 --> 02:07:16,942
And Paul agrees that that could happen if that's OK.

1592
02:07:16,942 --> 02:07:19,942
That's fine. Just put it out there that that could happen.

1593
02:07:19,942 --> 02:07:23,942
So miners will change their way of mining.

1594
02:07:23,942 --> 02:07:34,942
OK, then my question is, do you agree that this this line of criticism or this line of concern is not a line of concern about drivechain specifically?

1595
02:07:34,942 --> 02:07:42,942
It is rather if drivechain is adopted, then this line of concern is appropriate to be voiced.

1596
02:07:42,942 --> 02:07:48,942
When the question becomes, should there be a Ethereum type sidechain?

1597
02:07:48,942 --> 02:07:52,942
You know, because if we do drivechain, we don't necessarily get every sidechain imaginable.

1598
02:07:52,942 --> 02:07:57,942
There has to be miners, you know, acting the creation of the sidechain.

1599
02:07:57,942 --> 02:08:00,942
So there has to be community will.

1600
02:08:00,942 --> 02:08:06,942
So we would first get a large block sidechain and a privacy sidechain, because who's going to object to that after a drivechain has been adopted?

1601
02:08:06,942 --> 02:08:09,942
Right. Everyone would be like, yeah, right. Yeah. So.

1602
02:08:09,942 --> 02:08:13,942
So all you have to do is explicitly say that. I'm not saying you have to change the code.

1603
02:08:13,942 --> 02:08:18,942
I'm saying you have to explicitly say that behind 301 is meant for things that we agree to.

1604
02:08:19,942 --> 02:08:22,942
That's just it's not meant for. Yeah.

1605
02:08:22,942 --> 02:08:27,942
So the debate over. So your object, your your concern isn't about every possible sidechain.

1606
02:08:27,942 --> 02:08:32,942
It's about financialized sidechains. So I think that's a good question.

1607
02:08:32,942 --> 02:08:37,942
And maybe maybe your your view will be accepted in a strong way.

1608
02:08:38,942 --> 02:08:48,942
And then maybe the community would hesitate or decline to ever have a sidechain like Ethereum, but still would be OK with the large block and the privacy sidechain.

1609
02:08:48,942 --> 02:08:54,942
What if we could actually make a sidechain that solves the problem better than Ethereum?

1610
02:08:54,942 --> 02:09:02,942
Isn't that shouldn't that be the goal to actually have sidechains that don't that are good and do work?

1611
02:09:02,942 --> 02:09:11,942
Of course. So, yeah, I mean, the Ethereum clone that's on the drivechain test net right now, we have to Ethereum and Zcash.

1612
02:09:11,942 --> 02:09:16,942
Some changes are made like the Zcash sidechain. We the coders.

1613
02:09:16,942 --> 02:09:24,942
I had nothing to do with it, of course. The coders strip out stripped out the developer tax that the Zcash altcoin has.

1614
02:09:24,942 --> 02:09:31,942
So there are some changes, but basically the core technology of Ethereum and Zcash is preserved.

1615
02:09:31,942 --> 02:09:36,942
Of course. Yeah. The problem isn't the Ethereum sidechain. The problem is the rock, paper, scissors sidechain.

1616
02:09:36,942 --> 02:09:41,942
Right. And your view is that it wouldn't just harm those playing rock, paper, scissors.

1617
02:09:41,942 --> 02:09:47,942
It would it would harm the main chain. If it's big enough, if it's big enough, it will centralize hash rate.

1618
02:09:47,942 --> 02:09:51,942
All right. So there's two separate concerns then.

1619
02:09:51,942 --> 02:09:56,942
One is, does hash rate centralize as a result of the financialized sidechain?

1620
02:09:56,942 --> 02:10:05,942
And the other is, does the reorg activity harm users on main chain?

1621
02:10:05,942 --> 02:10:08,942
It harms the users on the sidechain.

1622
02:10:08,942 --> 02:10:14,942
But in the process, the profit derived leads to centralization of the miners on main chain.

1623
02:10:14,942 --> 02:10:20,942
Is that right? Is that what you're saying?

1624
02:10:20,942 --> 02:10:28,942
Yeah. I mean, just when every time Paul says there's zero risk and there's zero effect on main chain, I'm saying, no, there's not zero effect.

1625
02:10:28,942 --> 02:10:33,942
There's a 60 second effect for miner. He has an incentive not to switch.

1626
02:10:33,942 --> 02:10:38,942
That's all. And we know this because we saw it happen over 10 years in Ethereum.

1627
02:10:38,942 --> 02:10:40,942
That's the limit.

1628
02:10:40,942 --> 02:10:47,942
I'm curious. Did you follow? I didn't follow. He says that you can reorg a sidechain without reorging the main chain.

1629
02:10:47,942 --> 02:10:53,942
But if that's the case, I don't understand what's the point of reorg.

1630
02:10:53,942 --> 02:11:01,942
So that's hard to write. So you could actually, in the sidechain, all you have to do is pay more than the previous fee.

1631
02:11:01,942 --> 02:11:03,942
To who?

1632
02:11:03,942 --> 02:11:08,942
Back to the main chain miners. So the next block.

1633
02:11:09,942 --> 02:11:15,942
The next block. Basically, if you think of a linear reorg, a linear fork, let's say a linear hard fork.

1634
02:11:15,942 --> 02:11:19,942
If you keep the old fork, then you say, hey, this is the point of the reorg.

1635
02:11:19,942 --> 02:11:25,942
But you still have a linear events. So the event in the Bitcoin main chain is linear.

1636
02:11:25,942 --> 02:11:29,942
But on the sidechain, it actually reorgs. Does that make sense?

1637
02:11:30,942 --> 02:11:38,942
OK. So block 1000 in the sidechain gets mined. Block 1001. Right.

1638
02:11:38,942 --> 02:11:45,942
And then somebody goes back and then the subsequent block on Bitcoin pays a miner to re-mine block 1001.

1639
02:11:45,942 --> 02:11:52,942
And that's not a problem. There's no issues with that as far as the validity of the blockchain blocks.

1640
02:11:52,942 --> 02:11:58,942
Right. And then that begs the question, why do we need the miners? Why do we need Bitcoin?

1641
02:11:58,942 --> 02:12:04,942
So you can just like go back 20 blocks and just put like a heavy bid.

1642
02:12:04,942 --> 02:12:09,942
And then, yeah, because the blockchain might have paid either way. Right.

1643
02:12:09,942 --> 02:12:12,942
Yeah. Yeah. But who's going to do that? Who's going to do that? Right.

1644
02:12:12,942 --> 02:12:17,942
The thing is, there's no zero. You've taken the whole probability out of it. Right.

1645
02:12:17,942 --> 02:12:21,942
If I just tell you I'm going to pay for the next 20 blocks, I can go.

1646
02:12:21,942 --> 02:12:26,942
Then I can just do it. Right. And there's no I don't have to win 20 lotteries.

1647
02:12:26,942 --> 02:12:32,942
I mean, that's that's why proof of work works is if you have you know, you can't just buy 10 blocks in a row.

1648
02:12:32,942 --> 02:12:40,942
You have to get super lucky. But if the way you're describing this, you can buy old forks of the sidechain.

1649
02:12:40,942 --> 02:12:45,942
Then you can just pay to like arbitrarily. I mean, you got to pay a little bit of money.

1650
02:12:45,942 --> 02:12:51,942
You know, you pay the price of 30 blocks to do a 30 block reorg, which is linear, which is seems really problematic.

1651
02:12:51,942 --> 02:12:59,942
And that's how it works. I mean, yeah, it's it's an old concept, but it kind of.

1652
02:12:59,942 --> 02:13:04,942
Yeah. Also, why would you spend that money unless your sidechain peers agree?

1653
02:13:04,942 --> 02:13:07,942
Like you also have to get consensual consensus or else you're just wasting money.

1654
02:13:07,942 --> 02:13:13,942
So. But it's the it's the it's the block is the blind merge mine problem.

1655
02:13:13,942 --> 02:13:17,942
It's ordinals. It's anyone who says that you get security like stacks.

1656
02:13:17,942 --> 02:13:21,942
Anyone who says you get security, Bitcoin security on a layer two, it has the same problem.

1657
02:13:21,942 --> 02:13:25,942
You need some sort of finality on layer two to solve that problem.

1658
02:13:30,942 --> 02:13:33,942
OK, yeah, I didn't realize it was that bad. I thought I thought you had.

1659
02:13:33,942 --> 02:13:41,942
I thought that this this hash had to like point to the previous latest hash or something.

1660
02:13:42,942 --> 02:13:43,942
But you're saying that it doesn't.

1661
02:13:47,942 --> 02:13:51,942
I mean, the sidechain hash that gets mined, it has to it can be a fork.

1662
02:13:51,942 --> 02:13:53,942
I didn't realize it could be a fork.

1663
02:13:53,942 --> 02:13:58,942
I think within the Bitcoin block is I know the original merge mining spec.

1664
02:13:58,942 --> 02:14:09,942
I'm not sure about the drivechain one, but I know that like if you're in between block 1000 and 1001 of Bitcoin and there's 10 blocks of the sidechain, you could definitely reorg those.

1665
02:14:10,942 --> 02:14:17,942
Right, because it's just the same hash power in between the two blocks that that can affect the state of the secondary blocks.

1666
02:14:17,942 --> 02:14:31,942
But once you have the state transition on Bitcoin, then the sidechain is kind of locked to that unless you have a layer one reorg, which would be a Bitcoin reorg, which would cost a lot more like seven to ten million dollars or whatever it is.

1667
02:14:32,942 --> 02:14:35,942
OK, yeah, I guess I'm still confused.

1668
02:14:35,942 --> 02:14:42,942
So you're saying suppose on the sidechain I send a transaction to a Bitcoin miner which says I'm mining block 1001.

1669
02:14:42,942 --> 02:14:45,942
The Bitcoin miner mines that right.

1670
02:14:46,942 --> 02:14:52,942
Can the next Bitcoin miner of the next block mine block 994?

1671
02:14:54,942 --> 02:14:58,942
Yeah, I mean, if he's selfishly mining, he could be doing that kind of.

1672
02:14:59,942 --> 02:15:04,942
I mean, it's subsequential to the block which mine 1001 on the sidechain.

1673
02:15:05,942 --> 02:15:06,942
Oh, I don't think so.

1674
02:15:06,942 --> 02:15:08,942
I mean, maybe Paul can answer that.

1675
02:15:08,942 --> 02:15:16,942
I don't I think that wouldn't be possible because that's not the canonical chain that's building off of 99999.

1676
02:15:17,942 --> 02:15:24,942
So you wouldn't be able to go backwards, but you'd be able to selfishly mine and reorganize that if you have enough power.

1677
02:15:25,942 --> 02:15:27,942
Not not on the Bitcoin level.

1678
02:15:27,942 --> 02:15:29,942
I mean, because I was hearing one thing.

1679
02:15:29,942 --> 02:15:30,942
I was hearing different things like.

1680
02:15:33,942 --> 02:15:37,942
So just say we're block 800,000 Bitcoin, we're block 1000 sidechain.

1681
02:15:38,942 --> 02:15:40,942
I mine block 1001.

1682
02:15:40,942 --> 02:15:44,942
This gets written on block 800,001 of the Bitcoin blockchain.

1683
02:15:45,942 --> 02:15:53,942
I can't go back and rewrite the sidechain from a previous block on block 800,002 in Bitcoin, correct?

1684
02:15:54,942 --> 02:15:59,942
OK, hey, someone is late from the podcast I was going to, so I thought I'd just hang out here until they.

1685
02:16:00,942 --> 02:16:05,942
Yeah, Paul, why don't you why don't you tell them about reorganizing the sidechain?

1686
02:16:05,942 --> 02:16:08,942
There's a diagram in a linear fashion.

1687
02:16:08,942 --> 02:16:12,942
Yeah, the blind merge mining post has an image that kind of explains this.

1688
02:16:13,942 --> 02:16:17,942
But yeah, and it has similar to the number is he was using where it's like.

1689
02:16:17,942 --> 02:16:23,942
So, yeah, if you're finding one main chain block every 10 minutes and you never reorg, then each sidechain block.

1690
02:16:25,942 --> 02:16:31,942
It's kind of like a tiny little thing in there that it refers to its previous sidechain block.

1691
02:16:32,942 --> 02:16:37,942
So what you can do is you can have like if maybe you had block a main chain block ABCDF.

1692
02:16:38,942 --> 02:16:42,942
And you're on main chain block D, you'll find sidechain block 37.

1693
02:16:43,942 --> 02:16:55,942
Then in main chain block E, the next one, you can say I am finding a new sidechain block that is not it doesn't extend the tip, does not extend the tip of the sidechain.

1694
02:16:55,942 --> 02:16:58,942
It instead goes back to sidechain block 18 or something.

1695
02:16:59,942 --> 02:17:01,942
And I'm going to find a new 19, 19B.

1696
02:17:02,942 --> 02:17:04,942
And then in the next block, you can do 20B.

1697
02:17:04,942 --> 02:17:07,942
And then eventually, you'll overtake it.

1698
02:17:08,942 --> 02:17:12,942
And then the sidechain nodes will consider that the canonical thing.

1699
02:17:12,942 --> 02:17:19,942
And the reason why you must do that, by the way, just in case anyone's wondering, is that someone can find a block.

1700
02:17:19,942 --> 02:17:23,942
This happens in any blockchain, Bitcoin, sidechain, mainchain, whatever.

1701
02:17:23,942 --> 02:17:26,942
You can find a block and then not disclose it.

1702
02:17:27,942 --> 02:17:32,942
And then no one will know if it's valid or if it's invalid.

1703
02:17:32,942 --> 02:17:33,942
And so they won't know what to do with it.

1704
02:17:33,942 --> 02:17:37,942
So they have to treat it as though it's invalid until it's fully disclosed.

1705
02:17:37,942 --> 02:17:44,942
Because they can never have you just say, keep it a secret for 10 years and then reveal it as invalid.

1706
02:17:44,942 --> 02:17:46,942
And then that will destroy the chain.

1707
02:17:47,942 --> 02:17:49,942
Is that the blind aspect?

1708
02:17:49,942 --> 02:17:52,942
No, that just happens to be something else that is true.

1709
02:17:53,942 --> 02:17:59,942
That's true of all things, is that you can never withhold the contents of the block that must be treated as invalid.

1710
02:18:04,942 --> 02:18:06,942
And yeah, I don't know if you could find it.

1711
02:18:07,942 --> 02:18:08,942
I'll let Jack.

1712
02:18:08,942 --> 02:18:12,942
Jack probably knows more than anyone else about this stuff.

1713
02:18:12,942 --> 02:18:14,942
He's the inventor of Ciscoin.

1714
02:18:15,942 --> 02:18:17,942
So I put my faith in him.

1715
02:18:18,942 --> 02:18:22,942
I saw you and Paul on here, so I'd love to…

1716
02:18:22,942 --> 02:18:23,942
It's good to see you, man.

1717
02:18:25,942 --> 02:18:28,942
I was wondering about the blind aspect of it.

1718
02:18:28,942 --> 02:18:31,942
Does that help in selfish mining at all?

1719
02:18:33,942 --> 02:18:37,942
I have an unorthodox view of selfish mining, which is that it doesn't converge the strategy.

1720
02:18:37,942 --> 02:18:42,942
Because if you selfish mine, then you have an edge with…

1721
02:18:42,942 --> 02:18:48,942
With selfish mining, instead of having an edge at 51%, you have an edge at 34% or whatever the number is.

1722
02:18:49,942 --> 02:18:58,942
But I don't think that's really the case because someone can always form a different group that has 37% and they selfish mine, and then they'll be beating you.

1723
02:18:59,942 --> 02:19:05,942
And then the way it works is they'll just keep being bid up until 51%, so it's the same thing.

1724
02:19:05,942 --> 02:19:12,942
And then from the upper direction, if you have 60% and you selfish mine, you'll always win.

1725
02:19:13,942 --> 02:19:20,942
But the 40% who are always losing, they can kind of deal with 11% of the 60% because they're always getting nothing.

1726
02:19:20,942 --> 02:19:24,942
So my view is that none of it actually converges and that it's just 50%.

1727
02:19:25,942 --> 02:19:30,942
It's always just 51% attacking, so I don't think selfish mining ended up making too big of a difference.

1728
02:19:30,942 --> 02:19:34,942
Sorry, guys. I actually found out that the person is on time now, so I have to leave again for real.

1729
02:19:35,942 --> 02:19:37,942
Anyways, have fun. See you guys later.

1730
02:19:38,942 --> 02:19:46,942
I think that makes a lot of sense. I mean, that's why we call it 51%. It always converges towards that, right?

1731
02:19:47,942 --> 02:19:56,942
Yeah, that selfish mining aspect was why Luke Dashjr. showed… He was bearish on the aspects of merge mining as well.

1732
02:19:56,942 --> 02:20:14,942
And with CoiledCoin, he actually physically attacked using his pool by creating empty blocks and trying to prove out that OxPow doesn't actually work in practice because he can selfishly mine the blocks of CoiledCoin.

1733
02:20:15,935 --> 02:20:19,175
You know, by not affecting Bitcoin and only affecting CoiledCoin.

1734
02:20:19,575 --> 02:20:25,455
And it kind of… I think that was a really big setback for merge mining

1735
02:20:25,615 --> 02:20:30,295
because people lost faith in it a little bit just because of that attack.

1736
02:20:30,415 --> 02:20:36,695
But then I think what Stacks and what Risk was trying to do is get around that.

1737
02:20:36,695 --> 02:20:41,775
I think maybe Paul's drivechain gets around some of that as well.

1738
02:20:42,174 --> 02:20:48,135
There's always a risk of someone selfishly mining just because they want to screw around with the sidechain somehow.

1739
02:20:48,135 --> 02:20:50,015
So you need to solve for that somehow.

1740
02:20:52,175 --> 02:20:55,455
Yeah, I mean, the fact that you can do it linearly seems really bad.

1741
02:20:56,095 --> 02:20:57,214
I mean, I didn't realize this.

1742
02:20:57,214 --> 02:21:02,175
Like, I mean, proof of work works because it's like statistically impossible to take,

1743
02:21:02,775 --> 02:21:05,775
you know, 12% of the hash rate and get, you know, six blocks in a row.

1744
02:21:06,775 --> 02:21:13,935
But if you can just put up enough money and say, I'm going to destroy this chain for the next…

1745
02:21:13,935 --> 02:21:17,574
I'm going to re-erg this chain, you know, 600 blocks.

1746
02:21:17,574 --> 02:21:20,695
And it's just sort of like a fixed number that you can just throw out there.

1747
02:21:21,854 --> 02:21:27,134
Anybody with a little bit of cash can just sort of do whatever they want with any chain.

1748
02:21:27,695 --> 02:21:31,134
Yeah, especially if you're a government and you want to try to…

1749
02:21:31,174 --> 02:21:36,214
Just like what Luke Dash did with CoiledCoin, he controlled a pool.

1750
02:21:36,214 --> 02:21:45,174
If you throw up enough money, you do an MEV attack on this thing and say, I want to roll this thing back a thousand blocks to try to make people lose confidence on it.

1751
02:21:45,655 --> 02:21:45,854
Right.

1752
02:21:45,854 --> 02:21:46,814
You have to work…

1753
02:21:46,814 --> 02:21:51,775
Yeah, I mean, that's something as merge mining people we have to worry about.

1754
02:21:52,254 --> 02:21:57,574
So my take there is you have to have a finality event for multiple reasons.

1755
02:21:57,814 --> 02:22:01,574
There's one reason is to avoid selfish mining if you had a finality event.

1756
02:22:01,574 --> 02:22:05,415
But you do have the problem of, OK, well, if you're adding finality, how are you doing that?

1757
02:22:05,454 --> 02:22:09,134
How are you not relegating to proof of stake or some sort of subset of super nodes?

1758
02:22:09,574 --> 02:22:11,454
And that is a bigger challenge.

1759
02:22:11,454 --> 02:22:13,574
So risks try to do it in different ways.

1760
02:22:13,854 --> 02:22:18,534
Stacks try to do it in different ways to try to keep that problem at bay.

1761
02:22:18,534 --> 02:22:26,775
And that to me, like when Satoshi came up with a merge mining proposal, to me, that was the biggest thing was how do you avoid situations where

1762
02:22:27,374 --> 02:22:35,094
you can either MEV or pay for a tax and it's disproportionate to the value of the value sitting on layer two.

1763
02:22:35,294 --> 02:22:45,575
Yet secondary part is to Jay's concern that a lot of if you financialize the sidechains and they're also deflationary instruments just like Bitcoin,

1764
02:22:45,935 --> 02:22:56,335
you have a parasitic behavior that if that situation and the TVL of the layer two ends up surpassing or catching up to Bitcoin to the point

1765
02:22:57,094 --> 02:23:07,294
like how Dogecoin surpassed Litecoin in a way, then you have situations where it's parasitic to the parent, where people will want to just go to the side

1766
02:23:07,294 --> 02:23:09,254
chain. Right. And that's not what we want.

1767
02:23:09,335 --> 02:23:13,294
You want Bitcoin as a gold base, as a core system that doesn't change.

1768
02:23:13,534 --> 02:23:15,014
It's there. It's secure.

1769
02:23:15,215 --> 02:23:20,575
And you want to create that financial backing for the secondary layer.

1770
02:23:20,615 --> 02:23:22,615
But you don't want parasitic behavior as well.

1771
02:23:22,894 --> 02:23:25,935
So I think you need to solve those two things.

1772
02:23:26,215 --> 02:23:32,415
Once you can add the financiality, then you do have decentralized sequencing and all these free things you start to get.

1773
02:23:33,055 --> 02:23:40,575
But without financializing it, it's really hard to get network effects and to create a secure system on layer two.

1774
02:23:40,935 --> 02:23:45,855
Some of the guys like what Celestia is working on with Rollkit is to try to create a Bitcoin layer two.

1775
02:23:46,215 --> 02:23:53,374
But they are doing it in a way where the data is stored off chain and they're trying to store the state on Bitcoin.

1776
02:23:53,415 --> 02:23:59,055
There's one proposal to store the actual data also, as well as the state on Bitcoin.

1777
02:23:59,094 --> 02:24:03,454
But you don't have the flexibility to bridge in and out as nicely.

1778
02:24:03,495 --> 02:24:05,415
Maybe with Taproot and Mast, you could do that.

1779
02:24:06,294 --> 02:24:09,615
So if you have financialization, it makes it better.

1780
02:24:09,775 --> 02:24:13,294
But you have to worry about parasitic behavior there.

1781
02:24:13,454 --> 02:24:14,254
That's what I worry about.

1782
02:24:15,534 --> 02:24:16,894
That was very interesting, by the way.

1783
02:24:16,935 --> 02:24:18,294
Thank you for those thoughts.

1784
02:24:19,294 --> 02:24:24,654
You made a point about Litecoin and how Dogecoin is merged mined with it.

1785
02:24:25,294 --> 02:24:35,734
But isn't there an important difference where that's a merged mined altcoin, whereas Drivechain is focused on merged mined sidechains?

1786
02:24:35,734 --> 02:25:05,694
If one of the sidechains were so successful and popular that its value began to rival the value of the Bitcoin on mainchain that isn't in hashrate escrow, then that would be a signal, a market signal that the value of this sidechain and its stability and the user's demand for it is such that perhaps that technology should be brought down to mainchain Bitcoin.

1787
02:25:05,935 --> 02:25:21,215
So in a sense, it's unreasonable to expect that a sidechain would grow bigger than Bitcoin in terms of the Bitcoin not in hashrate escrow, because we would just we would say, OK, this is a very popular sidechain.

1788
02:25:21,775 --> 02:25:42,894
That's a market signal that Bitcoiners want that technology, and if it's existing in a stable, positive way, then it could just be a way for the community to understand that we should bring the technology down to the mainchain potentially, unless, for example, there would be a reason not to do that.

1789
02:25:42,894 --> 02:25:46,095
But but what about that line of reasoning?

1790
02:25:46,095 --> 02:25:52,655
Like, yeah, Dogecoin dwarfs altcoin, dwarfs Litecoin, but that's because it's on a sidechain.

1791
02:25:52,655 --> 02:25:55,615
You can't bring the Doge tech down to the Litecoin.

1792
02:25:55,734 --> 02:25:58,014
Yeah, well, there is no Doge tech.

1793
02:25:58,615 --> 02:25:59,574
I think that makes sense.

1794
02:25:59,574 --> 02:26:05,375
There's a misnomer that we because Dogecoin is not focusing on any extra utility that Litecoin doesn't present.

1795
02:26:05,694 --> 02:26:13,335
So I would say the TVL of the sidechain can actually surpass the TVL of the base chain in some certain ways, like active utility.

1796
02:26:13,495 --> 02:26:19,215
And that goes back to, again, the parasitic behavior of the financialization of the asset of the sidechain.

1797
02:26:19,215 --> 02:26:24,974
So if you have the sidechain focusing on utility, it's a total different ballgame than what Bitcoin is.

1798
02:26:24,974 --> 02:26:26,134
Bitcoin is a store of value.

1799
02:26:26,134 --> 02:26:35,734
It's a court system. It's a settlement system where it's like the money aspect of Bitcoin is probably the biggest thing you can have across the ecosystem.

1800
02:26:35,734 --> 02:26:49,134
And then you have the utility on top, almost like the sidechains would be commodity instruments and commodity instruments are like gas to serve for running my car or doing smart contract calls, not store of value.

1801
02:26:49,694 --> 02:26:59,375
And that's Ethereum had an interesting proposal, EIP 1559, around creating tokenomics for utility only.

1802
02:27:00,495 --> 02:27:13,775
You know, I was I came kind of bearish on the concept, but it grew on me that it creates sort of like a inflation based growth metric on the tokenomic growth.

1803
02:27:14,255 --> 02:27:18,854
So, like, for example, if if a lot of people are using the system, it becomes deflationary.

1804
02:27:19,335 --> 02:27:22,174
If not a lot of people are, it becomes inflationary.

1805
02:27:22,694 --> 02:27:26,854
And so you have this supply demand equilibrium built into that system.

1806
02:27:27,255 --> 02:27:40,255
You don't want to take away from the fact that the ultimate store value would be Bitcoin, but the utility could be unlocked by driving that value back to Bitcoin, not in a parasitic parasitic way.

1807
02:27:40,495 --> 02:27:51,535
Dogecoin and Litecoin are different because they're both competing for I think Dogecoin has unlimited inflation, but the utility of Dogecoin is pretty much the same as Litecoin.

1808
02:27:51,574 --> 02:27:55,055
There is no extra opcodes or something like that.

1809
02:27:55,095 --> 02:28:01,375
I know they have a they have this EVM thing going on thinking about, but it's not native to the base.

1810
02:28:01,375 --> 02:28:04,495
Right. So do you like the idea?

1811
02:28:04,574 --> 02:28:08,535
I mean, I just want to hear your thoughts because I've never spoken to you before and you're much more technical than I am.

1812
02:28:08,854 --> 02:28:32,095
Do you like the idea in general that it would be cool for people to have an opt in sidechain to get more privacy or more scaling where the cash token on the sidechain shares Bitcoin's monetary policy, meaning that and you were just saying this in different words that, you know, Dogecoin and Litecoin as tokens compete existentially for monetary premium.

1813
02:28:32,134 --> 02:28:35,215
And that's where the parasitic dimension exists.

1814
02:28:35,255 --> 02:28:47,895
But there is no competition for monetary premium between a synthetic Bitcoin on a two way peg sidechain and the Bitcoin on main chain because they share the exact same monetary policy.

1815
02:28:47,895 --> 02:29:12,695
There can never be more than 21 million Bitcoin across every Bitcoin sidechain and main chain in total if we consider the hash rate escrowed Bitcoin to be not circulating and therefore, you know, when you're finished on the sidechain and you're pegging back into main chain, you're burning units on the sidechain and, you know, returning those units into circulating supply on main chain.

1816
02:29:13,094 --> 02:29:15,815
So does that does that scheme appeal to you?

1817
02:29:15,815 --> 02:29:26,375
Like it's, you know, as some say, drivechain is like we're adding utility and therefore increasing the total addressable market of Bitcoin without adding any inflation.

1818
02:29:28,255 --> 02:29:36,414
Yeah, I mean, I think that's what risk or one of the one of the risk or stacks was also attempting to actually use actual Bitcoin.

1819
02:29:37,294 --> 02:29:39,375
That I think it gets philosophical here.

1820
02:29:39,534 --> 02:29:43,935
And my take is, yeah, privacy.

1821
02:29:43,935 --> 02:29:44,774
Privacy makes sense.

1822
02:29:44,774 --> 02:29:48,854
But general Turing complete layers can offer privacy.

1823
02:29:50,094 --> 02:30:00,055
Besides on a tangent, UTXO provides better privacy because especially with ZK proofs, you can prove client side validation of transactions.

1824
02:30:00,414 --> 02:30:08,094
And you could I think what Cardano was going after was client side ZK proofs, but they didn't get to the layer two aspect yet.

1825
02:30:08,774 --> 02:30:15,174
But having client side UTXO proofs can open the doors to ZK privacy and also smart contracts and all that.

1826
02:30:15,174 --> 02:30:18,895
So you can get privacy and win at the same time as create economies of scale.

1827
02:30:19,455 --> 02:30:29,495
But that's on a tangent that the whole aspect of having the same coin serve as utility, I deviate away from that.

1828
02:30:29,495 --> 02:30:42,974
I think I think something like EIP 1559 with utility based tokenomics, that's not parasitic, but it's more like gas consuming, would open doors to more utility because people are holding Bitcoin.

1829
02:30:43,055 --> 02:30:45,055
They're not they're stacking it.

1830
02:30:45,094 --> 02:30:47,455
They're not spending it as gas.

1831
02:30:48,214 --> 02:30:49,575
I don't want to spend my Bitcoin.

1832
02:30:49,695 --> 02:30:59,455
You know, I want to hold it because I know the game of Bitcoin is much different than the game of driving a car and spend spending it buying oil.

1833
02:30:59,534 --> 02:31:07,695
Right. It's different. So I find the smart contracts generally the utility behind that needs to be a little bit different because it's very utility focused.

1834
02:31:08,214 --> 02:31:13,015
So having a tokenomic paradigm that buys into that utility focus is critical.

1835
02:31:13,015 --> 02:31:19,895
That's the philosophical shift that I have compared to using actual Bitcoin because there's only 21 million.

1836
02:31:19,895 --> 02:31:23,734
And how are you going to serve utility framework with A.I.

1837
02:31:23,734 --> 02:31:32,094
coming with bots that are going to be using this stuff, doing thousands of transactions a second just for themselves before even humans get into the picture?

1838
02:31:33,055 --> 02:31:37,854
You can be driving up costs, especially the monetary premium Bitcoin.

1839
02:31:38,255 --> 02:31:43,575
You would driving out all the regular people who work less than the minimum wage.

1840
02:31:44,375 --> 02:31:45,534
That's the problem I have.

1841
02:31:45,534 --> 02:31:53,414
If you have a utility based utility based monetary system, you don't have a situation where that there's such a high premium on the instrument.

1842
02:31:53,654 --> 02:31:55,854
Could you explain further what you meant there?

1843
02:31:55,974 --> 02:31:57,174
You were kind of over my head.

1844
02:31:57,495 --> 02:31:58,495
This is Henry speaking.

1845
02:31:59,015 --> 02:32:00,734
I work for Paul at LayerTwo Labs.

1846
02:32:02,015 --> 02:32:04,695
The I didn't understand how A.I.

1847
02:32:05,135 --> 02:32:11,334
has anything to do with the problem arising in the context of sidechains.

1848
02:32:11,534 --> 02:32:22,495
And also, I didn't understand how the increase in the monetary premium, meaning the increase in the purchasing power of Bitcoin, somehow disempowers poor people.

1849
02:32:23,414 --> 02:32:40,895
I don't understand that you're sort of describing, in very interesting words, a conflict of interest between those who want to hold Bitcoin as a savings vehicle and those who want to monetize, see Bitcoin monetize in a economy of peer to peer applications on sidechains.

1850
02:32:41,094 --> 02:32:42,774
I don't think there's a conflict there.

1851
02:32:43,015 --> 02:32:49,214
I mean, anytime someone holds Bitcoin, they are engaging in the store of value utility of Bitcoin.

1852
02:32:49,255 --> 02:32:56,615
And anytime they hold it, there is logically necessarily the expectation eventually of spending it at some point in the future.

1853
02:32:56,895 --> 02:33:00,414
So store of value and medium of exchange are inextricably linked.

1854
02:33:00,615 --> 02:33:04,414
There's no competition between those who want to store and those who want to spend.

1855
02:33:04,774 --> 02:33:06,055
It's all the same thing.

1856
02:33:07,015 --> 02:33:12,455
So I'm not sure what that like higher value for Bitcoin is strictly good for everyone involved in Bitcoin.

1857
02:33:12,895 --> 02:33:14,455
You know, why is it a bad thing?

1858
02:33:14,495 --> 02:33:16,895
It's infinitely divisible in theory.

1859
02:33:17,055 --> 02:33:18,695
So can you explain?

1860
02:33:18,895 --> 02:33:21,414
Well, up to up to the maximum amount of satoshis, right?

1861
02:33:22,094 --> 02:33:29,015
And at some point you have people other than humans entering the system, bidding up the fee market to use the resources.

1862
02:33:29,015 --> 02:33:33,294
And there's a set resource cost for every state that you're every state.

1863
02:33:33,575 --> 02:33:41,375
Everything that's adding state bloat is adding the exponential costs and anything you're adding for the data and on the ZK side is adding costs.

1864
02:33:41,414 --> 02:33:42,294
You got to pay for that.

1865
02:33:43,294 --> 02:33:51,294
If everything's priced in Bitcoin, there's a very high premium you're paying to get your transaction through in the fee market.

1866
02:33:51,654 --> 02:34:08,575
Now, I can see maybe if drivechain with and I didn't understand the blind aspect is adding a way for you to use that Bitcoin in a way where the sequencing is taken care of because there's no need for decentralized sequencing.

1867
02:34:08,895 --> 02:34:10,455
That's with merge mining.

1868
02:34:10,534 --> 02:34:12,815
You don't get that with maybe drivechains.

1869
02:34:12,815 --> 02:34:13,334
You get that.

1870
02:34:13,895 --> 02:34:29,015
And in my mind, if you have to pay for sequencing that you have a network cost, you have to you have to generate revenue as a network to beat out the to create a security environment for your for your network to survive.

1871
02:34:29,414 --> 02:34:32,135
That sequencing has set costs.

1872
02:34:32,495 --> 02:34:47,055
That's where you have a utility based tokenomic system that can secure that system much better than if it was relying on the miners taking Bitcoin and then charging higher premium, which would drive up the fee market for users on that system.

1873
02:34:47,294 --> 02:34:59,695
So imagine if one Satoshi was priced, you know, out of reach and each transaction might cost two or three Satoshis in the scenario where Bitcoin is ten million dollars.

1874
02:35:00,495 --> 02:35:06,334
That's where I was thinking you'd be potentially priced out, can't get lower than one Satoshi.

1875
02:35:06,334 --> 02:35:09,654
That's the minimum amount you can send on a payment channel or on Bitcoin.

1876
02:35:09,654 --> 02:35:09,895
Right.

1877
02:35:10,534 --> 02:35:26,414
OK, so if I understand you correctly, which I don't claim to don't claim to the your idea is that there might be a problem for Bitcoin, whether drivechain exists or not in the form of one Satoshi being worth, you know, fifty dollars.

1878
02:35:26,974 --> 02:35:31,534
So therefore, Bitcoin has a problem with divisibility in your view.

1879
02:35:31,854 --> 02:35:33,815
Is that correct in the long term?

1880
02:35:36,015 --> 02:35:49,414
It could be. It depends on the fee market and and the sequencing mechanisms of these layer twos, because if they're tied directly to the sequencing of Bitcoin, which is through miners, then potentially you can solve some of that.

1881
02:35:50,174 --> 02:35:59,214
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt, but are you talking about the value of Bitcoin going up too high or the value of the block space?

1882
02:35:59,214 --> 02:36:05,135
Because those are totally separate things, you know, one can go up and the other can go down sometimes.

1883
02:36:06,695 --> 02:36:17,815
Yeah, I mean, the the block space you can try to solve for differently, like what we did in CIS was we had a separate block space just for roll up data availability.

1884
02:36:18,135 --> 02:36:29,375
But if if you're tying the instrument, so if you didn't have CIS, you just have Bitcoin and through sidechains, you're you're saying you have to pay gas with the Satoshis.

1885
02:36:29,815 --> 02:36:44,174
And if Bitcoin goes up too high compared to everything else around it, especially if you're paying server costs, ZK and all that stuff, then is there a situation where each Satoshi is going to start pricing out people?

1886
02:36:44,695 --> 02:36:51,695
So given the fact that these sidechains are focused very much on utility, less on the storage aspect.

1887
02:36:51,695 --> 02:37:00,455
Can you just tell me, just for my simple understanding, are you talking about the price of Bitcoin being high and that being a problem or the price of the block space being high and that being a problem?

1888
02:37:00,455 --> 02:37:01,214
Which one?

1889
02:37:02,214 --> 02:37:04,495
The block space is already set, right?

1890
02:37:04,495 --> 02:37:16,654
So we're saying in the sidechain proposal, you're storing blocks in probably somewhere else and then you're uploading the state route to Bitcoin or however sidechains works.

1891
02:37:16,654 --> 02:37:19,694
And merge mining, it's just the block header.

1892
02:37:19,694 --> 02:37:37,574
But what happens if, let's just walk through this and potentially you guys have solutions here, but let's walk through this, like if Bitcoin is at $10 or $15 million each, what happens in that scenario if there's a sidechain that's using that, like a privacy ZCash?

1893
02:37:37,574 --> 02:37:49,574
Can you just, for my understanding, because I'm not that technical, can you tell me, are you talking about a problem where Bitcoin is very valuable and that creates a problem or where Bitcoin block space is very valuable and that creates a problem?

1894
02:37:49,854 --> 02:37:50,375
Which one?

1895
02:37:50,694 --> 02:37:52,135
Well, let's walk through both.

1896
02:37:52,135 --> 02:37:58,375
Let's just Bitcoin, the price, and then the block space we can deal with separately.

1897
02:37:58,934 --> 02:38:09,094
OK, so you're saying there could be a problem if Bitcoin becomes extremely valuable and that Bitcoin becoming extremely valuable, is it your view that drivechain would lead to that problem?

1898
02:38:09,094 --> 02:38:19,334
I feel like a lot of people in Bitcoin want it to become the world's money, and that would mean it has a market capitalization in the trillions between like 100 and 200 trillion dollars.

1899
02:38:19,854 --> 02:38:25,255
So if that is our shared goal, of course, many things will change between now and then.

1900
02:38:25,694 --> 02:38:36,775
Perhaps the protocol will evolve to, you know, to overcome any growing pains of the nature that you're describing, where there's like a technical issue with divisibility, as you seem to describe and perceive.

1901
02:38:37,375 --> 02:38:45,974
But I feel like, you know, on the other hand, you're talking about we should also discuss, like, would there be problems with the block space being valuable?

1902
02:38:45,974 --> 02:39:04,814
But I feel like it's a it's a majority view in the Bitcoin community, as far as I can tell, that the block space on main chain becoming more valuable or rather the total transaction fee rate increasing on main chain as the subsidy diminishes is an important sign of the success of Bitcoin, you know, fee driven security.

1903
02:39:05,535 --> 02:39:15,615
And this is something that people who oppose drivechain agree with, to some extent, I think that we need high fees in the future for miners as the subsidy declines.

1904
02:39:16,094 --> 02:39:27,214
So I feel like if either of the concerns you're describing of higher token price or higher block space value, either of those are actually things that are signs of Bitcoin's success.

1905
02:39:27,214 --> 02:39:32,214
But of course, you might be right that there are interesting technical questions about how those would pan out.

1906
02:39:33,705 --> 02:39:47,705
Yeah, I mean, success for someone on the speculation of Bitcoin as a store value is different than the success of utility of serving the masses for someone who doesn't have a job in Africa or in India to get involved in the global economy.

1907
02:39:47,705 --> 02:39:49,664
To me, those are two separate problems.

1908
02:39:49,945 --> 02:39:51,545
One is a utility focused problem.

1909
02:39:51,865 --> 02:39:57,705
One is empowering you through digital wealth and retaining your purchasing power.

1910
02:39:57,705 --> 02:40:01,865
Right. So if your block space gets more expensive, the price of Bitcoin is getting more expensive.

1911
02:40:01,905 --> 02:40:05,945
That's an exponential problem to the cost of trying to do utility transaction.

1912
02:40:06,504 --> 02:40:13,385
And that philosophically led us to a fundamentally different design where we don't rely on the consensus of Bitcoin.

1913
02:40:13,425 --> 02:40:18,425
We rely on the mining of Bitcoin and the mining of Bitcoin is the treasure chest.

1914
02:40:18,464 --> 02:40:31,504
Basically, the difficulty in hashrate applied in separate sidechains makes a lot more sense, at least to me for now, than tying actual Satoshi usage because of that utility aspect.

1915
02:40:31,545 --> 02:40:42,505
Now, it's not a let's create a new token and pump that thing, but it's more of let's create a utility focused tokenomic system that is not geared towards just store value.

1916
02:40:42,904 --> 02:40:50,224
It probably even doesn't even want that high of store value, probably more focused on utility based on usage.

1917
02:40:50,264 --> 02:40:54,664
So if it's not being used, that thing shouldn't be creating revenue because it's not secure.

1918
02:40:54,944 --> 02:40:57,185
But if it is being used, it's creating revenue and being secure.

1919
02:40:57,304 --> 02:41:03,825
But it shouldn't affect the security should be still borrowed in a way from the difficulty of Bitcoin.

1920
02:41:04,185 --> 02:41:08,425
That was our kind of takeaway from all of our thinking and research.

1921
02:41:09,185 --> 02:41:17,344
So the Cisco and system, which I'm not that familiar with, like if I understand correctly, there is a token that's involved, like as you say, tokenomics.

1922
02:41:17,865 --> 02:41:31,865
And I think that the reason why drivechain is compelling to some people is like me, is that there is no alternative token necessarily involved in a drivechain sidechain.

1923
02:41:32,224 --> 02:41:40,105
Unlike Stacks and Syscoin, in my understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, there is another token involved with its own monetary policy.

1924
02:41:40,624 --> 02:41:54,505
And as Gavin Andresen said, you know, a decade ago, like every time we have a new token with a new monetary policy, we are arguably violating the monetary policy of Bitcoin.

1925
02:41:54,544 --> 02:41:57,145
We're arguably doing like inflation.

1926
02:41:57,665 --> 02:42:11,904
So the best possible long term future for the world would be to have one monetary policy, the one we already have, Bitcoin, and to have all all use of money be using that monetary policy.

1927
02:42:12,344 --> 02:42:25,585
Whether you're long term savers, wanting digital gold on main chain with high decentralization, or whether you want to opt into a scaling layer for your coffee purchases, such as a large block sidechain that shares Bitcoin's monetary policy.

1928
02:42:26,065 --> 02:42:39,225
So no one's getting, as you say, priced out, you know, from the token or the block space because people can opt into the layer that appeals to them based on their values and preferences and spending power.

1929
02:42:39,264 --> 02:42:45,025
So if you're someone who's poor in Africa, like you mentioned, like that person probably will be using Thunder.

1930
02:42:45,264 --> 02:42:57,065
Thunder is the large block Bitcoin sidechain that if it ever exists, will have very low fees because it's going to have a block size that's many times larger than the main chain.

1931
02:42:57,464 --> 02:43:10,904
So they're not going to get priced out of using a layer on Bitcoin in the same way that if you're an ordinary person, you don't need to like charge up your iPhone by plugging into a power plant.

1932
02:43:11,104 --> 02:43:16,865
You don't have to go to layer one of the energy infrastructure, which is a nuclear power plant to charge your iPhone.

1933
02:43:17,104 --> 02:43:28,264
You're going to plug in your iPhone on a layer that is more efficient and cheaper and simpler for you, which is like plugging into the socket in your wall, in your apartment or house.

1934
02:43:28,585 --> 02:43:34,665
You don't have to go to the base layer of the entire energy infrastructure and plug directly into a power plant.

1935
02:43:34,705 --> 02:43:46,585
Now, if you're a huge energy user, like an institution that's going to run a data center, maybe you'll want to be co-located with the power center as like a quote unquote layer one energy user.

1936
02:43:47,025 --> 02:43:53,025
So I think Bitcoin will become layered in the future if it is to succeed, which I think it will.

1937
02:43:53,425 --> 02:43:58,905
And people will go into the layer that they want, whether it's for privacy or for low fees.

1938
02:43:59,465 --> 02:44:02,425
And then all those layers will share the same monetary policy.

1939
02:44:02,664 --> 02:44:07,305
That way, there's no inflation because inflation is just a tax on people who are saving.

1940
02:44:07,544 --> 02:44:09,264
So we don't need to have any new tokens.

1941
02:44:09,504 --> 02:44:18,465
We just infinitely scale Bitcoin with infinite divisibility, even if the protocol right now doesn't allow for true, literal, infinite divisibility.

1942
02:44:18,905 --> 02:44:26,104
I think that, you know, that's like this is like a problem of worrying about what happens when Bitcoin goes to like 15 million dollars a coin.

1943
02:44:26,425 --> 02:44:28,585
That's like a problem you want to have.

1944
02:44:29,585 --> 02:44:31,064
And it's in the far future.

1945
02:44:32,264 --> 02:44:33,544
Is that a fair description?

1946
02:44:35,145 --> 02:44:48,145
Yeah, I mean, I think the solution you're describing is you open up the block space and through blind merge mining, you can apply the same instrument and policy.

1947
02:44:48,425 --> 02:44:53,824
But because of the larger block space, the fee market is depressed for the same Satoshis.

1948
02:44:54,264 --> 02:45:06,585
So even if it's 15 million dollars a coin, the Satoshi can give you more purchasing power on the bigger block space because there's more supply available for to do your utility based transaction.

1949
02:45:06,585 --> 02:45:07,544
Is that how you're describing it?

1950
02:45:07,705 --> 02:45:08,865
Can I ask you another question?

1951
02:45:08,944 --> 02:45:12,544
And then I want others to like jump in because this is just a free form chat.

1952
02:45:12,544 --> 02:45:16,984
I know we have others in the stage who've been waiting a little while to chat and we don't have Paul here anymore.

1953
02:45:16,984 --> 02:45:21,425
So if you ask a highly technical question, I won't know the answer probably.

1954
02:45:21,824 --> 02:45:44,865
But like one thing I wonder about with this coin is like if this is I know almost nothing about it, but if it's a project that intends to provide more functionality and that kind of leverages Bitcoin in some way, why not use RSK where the native token, the main native token, in my understanding, is a synthetic Bitcoin, right?

1955
02:45:44,865 --> 02:45:49,345
And RBTC, it's redeemable for Bitcoin through a two way peg.

1956
02:45:49,784 --> 02:46:01,585
There isn't this altcoin, whereas with this coin, like the whole thing is like if I understand correctly, like stacks where there's like another token that competes existentially for monetary premium against Bitcoin.

1957
02:46:01,585 --> 02:46:04,784
Like, isn't it great not to have that other token involved?

1958
02:46:05,025 --> 02:46:15,145
And Rootstock, as I understand in its current form, doesn't leverage like a separate token that goes up if people use Rootstock more.

1959
02:46:15,145 --> 02:46:19,384
It's not like all about like, you know, like Stacks has a token, right?

1960
02:46:19,384 --> 02:46:22,384
Like Syscoin has a token, but Rootstock doesn't.

1961
02:46:22,384 --> 02:46:30,224
It's more like Liquid where it's a little bit more economically aligned with the accrual of value to Bitcoin, not some other token.

1962
02:46:30,664 --> 02:46:33,145
Is that a fair observation?

1963
02:46:35,145 --> 02:46:41,224
Yeah, I mean, I can see, I mean, that's most of the Bitcoiners would come at it from that angle.

1964
02:46:42,224 --> 02:46:48,865
But from my perspective, the securing of that secondary system, which has its own, obviously has its own blocks.

1965
02:46:49,865 --> 02:47:00,865
And in our example, we have Finality, which is neither what Risk or Stacks are trying to do, which requires its own setup and system with what we call masternodes.

1966
02:47:00,865 --> 02:47:08,865
Those guys are just voting on the chain tip and fall back to longest chain rule in case there's a dispute.

1967
02:47:08,865 --> 02:47:16,865
So it's almost like what Ethereum is trying to do with their system, but falling back to Bitcoin's longest chain rule.

1968
02:47:16,865 --> 02:47:25,865
So to do that, you know, we've opted for the EIP 1559 sort of solution.

1969
02:47:25,865 --> 02:47:33,865
On top of that, we view that critical Finality aspect, which is required for a few reasons.

1970
02:47:33,865 --> 02:47:40,865
One, the selfish mining concern we were talking about, but second, pruning of the data availability, which is used on the rollups.

1971
02:47:40,865 --> 02:47:52,865
And that data availability is very, very, a very specific problem when you're scaling up sidechains to the layer of Syscoin in this case, which is what Ethereum is also solving.

1972
02:47:52,865 --> 02:48:05,864
You get into the need to solve for that in a way where you don't want that token to be store value only, you need that to be utility focused.

1973
02:48:05,864 --> 02:48:10,864
And there's a couple like one example I'll give is the block reward.

1974
02:48:10,864 --> 02:48:19,864
The block reward of on the on the Syscoin UTXO side is always inflating a minimum amount no matter what.

1975
02:48:19,864 --> 02:48:27,864
Even when the thing deflates towards zero, there's a minimum amount that's paid to the validators to always keep them around.

1976
02:48:27,864 --> 02:48:31,864
So a hundred years down the road, they're not relying only on fees.

1977
02:48:31,864 --> 02:48:35,864
They're still getting a block premium.

1978
02:48:35,864 --> 02:48:42,864
And then on the EVM side, there is a static inflated reward always paid to miners.

1979
02:48:42,864 --> 02:48:48,864
It never deflates. And that's what the EIP 1559 keeps around the incentives.

1980
02:48:48,864 --> 02:48:55,864
And to give back, to not be parasitic to Bitcoin, those rewards are not up only store value.

1981
02:48:55,864 --> 02:49:01,864
It's it's based on inflating when needed and deflating when needed.

1982
02:49:01,864 --> 02:49:03,864
We always merge mine with Bitcoin.

1983
02:49:03,864 --> 02:49:07,864
So you cannot mine a Syscoin block on its own.

1984
02:49:07,864 --> 02:49:09,864
You have to mine Bitcoin.

1985
02:49:10,864 --> 02:49:20,864
So in some ways, when Bitcoin fee market is the only thing that is paying the miners, there's these sidechains or merge mine chains that will guarantee subsidy.

1986
02:49:20,864 --> 02:49:22,864
But the only way to get them is to mine Bitcoin.

1987
02:49:22,864 --> 02:49:25,864
Yeah, that's kind of how we tie that narrative.

1988
02:49:25,864 --> 02:49:26,864
I get what you're saying.

1989
02:49:26,864 --> 02:49:28,864
That was very interesting.

1990
02:49:28,864 --> 02:49:36,864
I mean, I agree, like to the extent I understand, of course, merge mine altcoins like Syscoin are paying fees to Bitcoin miners.

1991
02:49:36,864 --> 02:49:38,864
And Satoshi invented that.

1992
02:49:38,864 --> 02:49:41,864
And it's never been a problem in Bitcoin so far.

1993
02:49:41,864 --> 02:49:52,864
I mean, I haven't heard anyone say that Rootstock is, you know, the three Bitcoin per month that Rootstock is paying to Bitcoin miners isn't like, you know, creating a disaster on Bitcoin.

1994
02:49:52,864 --> 02:50:02,864
How much fees currently is Syscoin paying per month to the Bitcoin mining community that chooses to merge mine Syscoin?

1995
02:50:02,864 --> 02:50:04,864
Do you know?

1996
02:50:05,864 --> 02:50:14,864
It's fairly like the way it was structured was a smaller percent is paid to the Bitcoin miners because they get this for free.

1997
02:50:14,864 --> 02:50:17,864
They're effectively mining without doing any extra work.

1998
02:50:17,864 --> 02:50:24,864
They're taking the existing work and they're taking that nonce and they're able to solve a secondary chain.

1999
02:50:24,864 --> 02:50:27,864
And you can depress the amount that you have to give to them.

2000
02:50:28,864 --> 02:50:34,864
15% of the block reward is given out to the Bitcoin miners, including the EVM, which is a static reward.

2001
02:50:34,864 --> 02:50:41,864
And then there's a larger percent given to the validators because those are the guys that are doing actual work for the blockchain.

2002
02:50:41,864 --> 02:50:43,864
Yeah, I was just curious, like, what's the amount?

2003
02:50:43,864 --> 02:50:52,864
In terms of fiat, it's probably fairly low because the market cap of Sys is like 80 or 90 million only.

2004
02:50:52,864 --> 02:50:54,864
So it's a very small amount.

2005
02:50:54,864 --> 02:51:04,864
It's probably three to five, three to five million dollars a year, probably just to the to the miners.

2006
02:51:04,864 --> 02:51:10,864
Because recently I was we were talking in this space a couple of months ago with Gabriel Kerman of Rootstock.

2007
02:51:10,864 --> 02:51:23,864
And he said, if I recall correctly, that about three about three Bitcoin per month is the amount of fee income that Bitcoin miners receive from merged mining Rootstock.

2008
02:51:23,864 --> 02:51:34,864
Rootstock is like, if last time I checked, like roughly 100 million dollar sidechain on Bitcoin, the largest source of merged mine revenue for Bitcoin miners.

2009
02:51:34,864 --> 02:51:40,864
And roughly about half of all Bitcoin hash rate is merged mining Rootstock.

2010
02:51:40,864 --> 02:51:46,864
So it sounds like Syscoin might be roughly similar to those figures.

2011
02:51:46,864 --> 02:51:48,864
Yeah, it's a market rate.

2012
02:51:48,864 --> 02:51:54,864
It's I mean, once if Rootstock went up, obviously the revenue would go up if it's used.

2013
02:51:54,864 --> 02:51:56,864
It's the same thing.

2014
02:51:56,864 --> 02:52:12,864
Right. But the main takeaway we have is when the fees go to zero, we don't we try not to be parasitic because we are focused more on the way that the structure is set up is to create these validators, which require for civil protection.

2015
02:52:12,864 --> 02:52:15,864
It requires some sort of amount of Syscoin to start these up.

2016
02:52:15,864 --> 02:52:21,864
They are directly tied to the health of Syscoin because they're creating finality for the Syscoin blockchain.

2017
02:52:21,864 --> 02:52:23,864
They're not earning Bitcoin.

2018
02:52:23,864 --> 02:52:35,864
So they don't have this ancillary kind of side effect of I don't really care about Syscoin because I'm caring only about Bitcoin and therefore I will not create finality events on Syscoin because I don't care about it.

2019
02:52:35,864 --> 02:52:44,864
They own the base instrument asset of Sys and the merge mining takes care of, OK, I have enough difficulty in hash rate coming from Bitcoin.

2020
02:52:44,864 --> 02:52:50,864
And then the protocol itself ensures to give back to Bitcoin because you cannot mine Syscoin on its own.

2021
02:52:50,864 --> 02:52:54,864
There has to be a parent merge mining chain to mine it.

2022
02:52:54,864 --> 02:53:00,864
So even if the TVL of Sys goes to 10 billion or 100 billion, you still have to mine Bitcoin.

2023
02:53:00,864 --> 02:53:07,864
And when the fee market goes to zero, you have a guaranteed source of income coming in every block, not just fees.

2024
02:53:07,864 --> 02:53:11,864
That's I mean, that's the philosophical difference that I think we know.

2025
02:53:11,864 --> 02:53:17,864
A lot of people are wondering whether fee reliant economic security in the long term is viable.

2026
02:53:18,864 --> 02:53:30,864
I think that it's an exciting thing to have Bitcoin with no inflation and or more precisely just Bitcoin with 21 million hard cap.

2027
02:53:30,864 --> 02:53:32,864
That's an exciting, important feature.

2028
02:53:32,864 --> 02:53:36,864
And it would be awesome to see that succeed.

2029
02:53:37,864 --> 02:53:43,864
Every blockchain in the world being merged mine with Bitcoin is one way to aspire.

2030
02:53:43,864 --> 02:53:51,864
That's one aspiration which might be sufficient to make Bitcoin successfully secured from fees alone.

2031
02:53:51,864 --> 02:53:55,864
So that's that's a cool thing.

2032
02:53:55,864 --> 02:54:04,864
If you have no inflation and because inflation tends towards zero, it goes towards like one Satoshi per block or something, right?

2033
02:54:04,864 --> 02:54:12,864
In the long run, how would you ensure crypto economic security of the larger block space of a sidechain?

2034
02:54:12,864 --> 02:54:14,864
Say it's 100 megabytes.

2035
02:54:14,864 --> 02:54:23,864
The security of each BIP300/301 sidechain is a function of the fees paid on that specific sidechain.

2036
02:54:24,864 --> 02:54:36,864
So in that sense, there is an interesting open question to which drivechain has the optimistic hypothesis that there would be bootstrapping.

2037
02:54:36,864 --> 02:54:45,864
Similar to similar to the way Bitcoin, when it on the first instant it existed, it didn't have like the powerful security it has today.

2038
02:54:46,864 --> 02:54:48,864
You know, there's a bootstrapping mechanism.

2039
02:54:48,864 --> 02:54:55,864
Of course, the inflation subsidy in Bitcoin played an important role in that bootstrapping.

2040
02:54:55,864 --> 02:55:01,864
But there's something that also helps these sidechains happen, even though they have no no subsidy.

2041
02:55:01,864 --> 02:55:04,864
All they have is fees for economic security.

2042
02:55:04,864 --> 02:55:07,864
The sidechains do have an important thing.

2043
02:55:07,864 --> 02:55:13,864
They share something with the largest cryptocurrency in the world.

2044
02:55:13,864 --> 02:55:16,864
They share Bitcoin's monetary policy.

2045
02:55:16,864 --> 02:55:19,864
They share Bitcoin's unit of account.

2046
02:55:19,864 --> 02:55:22,864
And they share Bitcoin's miners.

2047
02:55:22,864 --> 02:55:30,864
So when you're using a sidechain, you're you're opting into something which is different than Bitcoin in terms of features.

2048
02:55:30,864 --> 02:55:37,864
But it's the same as Bitcoin in terms of monetary policy and miner and hash rate.

2049
02:55:37,864 --> 02:55:40,864
So the economic security, you're right.

2050
02:55:40,864 --> 02:55:43,864
It's tiny when a sidechain is starting out.

2051
02:55:43,864 --> 02:55:52,864
And then it'll it's logically a necessity that every drivechain sidechain will never be as economically secure as the main chain.

2052
02:55:52,864 --> 02:55:56,864
Because the main chain's economic security has three things.

2053
02:55:56,864 --> 02:55:59,864
It's got the inflation of Bitcoin for the next hundred years.

2054
02:56:00,864 --> 02:56:09,864
And it's also got the fees on the main chain, plus the fees on every sidechain, which are, we expect, almost entirely delivered to main chain miners.

2055
02:56:09,864 --> 02:56:25,864
So like the main chain, economic security will be massive because it'll be the sum of the security on every merged mine sidechain, plus the plus the inflation on the main chain, which is right now the majority of security most days.

2056
02:56:26,864 --> 02:56:34,864
That would be like if the sidechain ends up creating a whole bunch of utility, the fee market, the fee paid out would be much higher than the base fees on Bitcoin.

2057
02:56:34,864 --> 02:56:36,865
But that's OK because it's a sum.

2058
02:56:36,865 --> 02:56:45,865
So, yeah, I mean, that now I understand why, yeah, why Paul's been so bullish on drivechain.

2059
02:56:45,865 --> 02:56:47,865
I guess there's always a trade off to this.

2060
02:56:47,865 --> 02:56:49,865
Right. And I always look for that.

2061
02:56:49,865 --> 02:56:55,865
The first trade off I found was probably the price out of pricing out people at some point.

2062
02:56:55,865 --> 02:56:58,865
But like you said, that's a problem for the future.

2063
02:56:58,865 --> 02:57:08,865
And for me, I'm more of a stickler trying to, if I see a problem that I'm not OK with, it will be a blocker for me.

2064
02:57:08,865 --> 02:57:18,865
And to me, the blocker for looking at that long term vision of are you pricing out people if everyone's tending towards using this?

2065
02:57:18,865 --> 02:57:24,865
Can you devise something that might not might not have that is where the philosophical design differences are.

2066
02:57:25,865 --> 02:57:29,865
But I totally get the proposal now, even technically.

2067
02:57:29,865 --> 02:57:42,865
Bitcoinization in the most powerful, like, you know, hypothetical future where like the whole world Bitcoinizes, the effect on the poorest people will be astronomically positive.

2068
02:57:42,865 --> 02:57:51,865
Like if you're a poor person in a developing country right now, you're you're like the last person in the global economy to receive new dollars.

2069
02:57:51,865 --> 02:58:04,865
So it's actually the poor outside of America who are bearing the burden of the senior age profits accrued by those close to the money printer in America,

2070
02:58:04,865 --> 02:58:14,865
which is the financial institutions and the recipients of the government's payments for, you know, the military industrial complex, et cetera.

2071
02:58:15,865 --> 02:58:19,865
But what about people that haven't been born yet, like, say, the fifth generation from now?

2072
02:58:19,865 --> 02:58:23,865
And those people are may or may not be priced out, right?

2073
02:58:23,865 --> 02:58:26,865
No one is priced out from money that is divisible.

2074
02:58:26,865 --> 02:58:30,865
There's no such thing as being priced out from Bitcoin.

2075
02:58:30,865 --> 02:58:40,865
I mean, currently, let's compare like right now, the current the status quo is if you're a poor person, you're bearing the burden of inflation because you're not close to the money printer.

2076
02:58:40,865 --> 02:58:47,865
You're the last to receive new money and others who received it earlier used it to bid up the prices of goods and services.

2077
02:58:47,865 --> 02:58:55,865
So the Cantillon effect burdens the poor, especially outside of America, literally far from the money printer.

2078
02:58:55,865 --> 02:58:58,865
So that's the Cantillon effect.

2079
02:58:58,865 --> 02:59:08,865
Now, with Bitcoin, there is no Cantillon effect, I would argue, because everyone already knows how much money there's going to be ever in Bitcoin.

2080
02:59:08,865 --> 02:59:10,865
And it's only 21 million.

2081
02:59:10,865 --> 02:59:17,865
And those who want to speculate on its adoption are doing a service and they could be wrong or they could be drawdowns.

2082
02:59:17,865 --> 02:59:19,865
So they're they're bearing risk.

2083
02:59:19,865 --> 02:59:24,865
So there's no like Cantillon effect in Bitcoin, I would say.

2084
02:59:24,865 --> 02:59:29,865
And in the current system, there's like a terrible Cantillon effect of endless money printing forever.

2085
02:59:30,571 --> 02:59:46,291
So, I mean, I just feel like the poor are those that you're talking about being like harmed, but they're actually benefited entirely and the most by the eradication of that Cantillon effect that arises from the senior age of fiat money.

2086
02:59:47,290 --> 02:59:51,011
Oh, you know, I guess I get the fiat side for sure.

2087
02:59:51,011 --> 03:00:05,850
Yeah, it's more of in the scenario of Satoshi's being priced, pricing people out in the future, like the fifth generation now, their families never owned a Satoshi or they have to work more to earn that one Satoshi.

2088
03:00:05,850 --> 03:00:17,170
So the cost around them in relation to all other public goods is much higher than another design, which is what I'm saying.

2089
03:00:17,170 --> 03:00:19,251
But, I mean, that's a problem for the future.

2090
03:00:19,690 --> 03:00:28,931
So I get the design decisions and what is about that's why I came on, because I wanted to know the design decisions and what drove it.

2091
03:00:28,971 --> 03:00:29,811
So that makes sense.

2092
03:00:29,931 --> 03:00:31,731
Awesome. Well, those are all great questions.

2093
03:00:31,731 --> 03:00:33,771
And a lot of what you said was above my head.

2094
03:00:34,170 --> 03:00:37,011
So I appreciate you saying it for those who understood it.

2095
03:00:37,011 --> 03:00:39,770
And no, dude, you nailed it.

2096
03:00:39,770 --> 03:00:42,331
Like you really described what it's doing.

2097
03:00:42,331 --> 03:00:47,130
So I think you're definitely on the ball with the tech as well.

2098
03:00:47,850 --> 03:00:50,170
Crypto Voyager, why don't you jump in?

2099
03:00:50,170 --> 03:00:52,571
You've been waiting patiently to say something.

2100
03:00:52,770 --> 03:00:53,651
What's on your mind?

2101
03:00:53,810 --> 03:00:54,731
Do you like drive change?

2102
03:00:54,731 --> 03:00:55,810
Do you hate it? What do you think?

2103
03:00:56,731 --> 03:01:00,571
Hi, Jack Thiep, it's a very nice conversation.

2104
03:01:00,571 --> 03:01:02,450
Very, very technical.

2105
03:01:02,450 --> 03:01:09,130
Definitely. I have one question, Jack Thiep, you were saying something about increasing block size.

2106
03:01:10,170 --> 03:01:11,331
What was that about?

2107
03:01:11,371 --> 03:01:12,450
That's one question.

2108
03:01:12,450 --> 03:01:24,011
And then I actually have a question on the whole layer two, layer three and all the other layers and I assume they have to finalize on the main chain.

2109
03:01:24,571 --> 03:01:28,691
How is that supposed to work then afterwards?

2110
03:01:28,691 --> 03:01:32,051
Is it just a hash that gets implemented on that?

2111
03:01:32,051 --> 03:01:43,210
And not only that, since the fear of increasing block size is the fear of the loss of decentralization.

2112
03:01:43,651 --> 03:01:53,291
Would that not mean that there is then the decentralization just moves up a layer and then that layer two, whatever that will be, is then completely centralized?

2113
03:01:54,291 --> 03:01:55,690
It's not completely centralized.

2114
03:01:55,731 --> 03:01:56,850
It looks like he departed.

2115
03:01:56,850 --> 03:01:59,690
Maybe he had to go to listening to handle something.

2116
03:02:00,130 --> 03:02:12,690
But the drivechain view is that centralization or decentralization in Bitcoin is a function of the cost to validate.

2117
03:02:13,250 --> 03:02:16,931
So it's not the number of nodes.

2118
03:02:18,091 --> 03:02:21,850
It's not how much the fees are.

2119
03:02:22,410 --> 03:02:28,250
It's. How much does it cost to validate that you were paid Bitcoin?

2120
03:02:28,731 --> 03:02:39,091
So this translates to how much does it cost a person to buy a laptop and pay for the Internet and how long do they have to wait?

2121
03:02:39,891 --> 03:02:45,451
What are all the costs associated with validating Bitcoin transactions that they receive?

2122
03:02:45,970 --> 03:02:56,091
So in the view of the small blockers, which drive chainers emphatically are in favor of small blocks on the base layer of Bitcoin.

2123
03:02:56,651 --> 03:03:06,410
In fact, some of the leading drive chainers agree with those who have suggested that a block size decrease would be favorable for Bitcoin main chain.

2124
03:03:07,171 --> 03:03:14,931
So drive chainers think that Bitcoin is decentralized when the cost of a main chain full node is low.

2125
03:03:15,970 --> 03:03:18,330
Not thousands of dollars, but hundreds of dollars.

2126
03:03:18,731 --> 03:03:23,011
And ideally, something that people could do on their smartphones with ease.

2127
03:03:23,330 --> 03:03:30,811
So it would be great if an ordinary smartphone was able to easily have a full node for layer one.

2128
03:03:31,291 --> 03:03:34,970
And that would be decentralization in the drivechain view.

2129
03:03:35,011 --> 03:03:44,410
So you're perfectly right to point out that if the large block sidechain is more expensive to validate, then it'll be less decentralized.

2130
03:03:45,970 --> 03:03:48,051
But it'll be optional.

2131
03:03:48,090 --> 03:03:48,891
You don't have to.

2132
03:03:49,451 --> 03:03:54,530
You can opt into the layer of these to the to the degree of decentralization you desire.

2133
03:03:54,810 --> 03:03:57,970
Do you want digital gold or do you want really low fees?

2134
03:03:58,370 --> 03:03:59,250
There's a choice.

2135
03:03:59,250 --> 03:04:00,090
There's a tradeoff.

2136
03:04:00,370 --> 03:04:12,970
And drivechain aspires to give different users who have different values and preferences options that do not mean that they have to leave Bitcoin to use an altcoin.

2137
03:04:12,970 --> 03:04:28,810
Instead, they can stay in Bitcoin and keep on paying fees to Bitcoin miners and keep on participating in Bitcoin's monetary policy while opting in to a lower decentralization, higher scalability sidechain.

2138
03:04:32,731 --> 03:04:33,891
Go ahead with your rebuttal.

2139
03:04:36,011 --> 03:04:38,171
No, it's not a rebuttal.

2140
03:04:38,171 --> 03:04:38,771
That's not it.

2141
03:04:39,690 --> 03:04:45,611
OK, so my question is, I have been using Bitcoin for a while now and I've never had a note.

2142
03:04:46,930 --> 03:05:08,530
Not only that, in the white paper, it basically states that for me as a user that is not producing blocks, the way that I should kind of like validate that the money I receive is correct is by me just looking up the Merkle roots and the hash of that transaction that I receive.

2143
03:05:09,130 --> 03:05:16,530
And doing that, I just ask the miner or a group of miners that is that valid?

2144
03:05:16,810 --> 03:05:18,930
And they say, well, this is the longest chain.

2145
03:05:18,930 --> 03:05:19,930
That thing is correct.

2146
03:05:19,930 --> 03:05:22,611
And that's it. And that's that's just basically 40 kilobytes.

2147
03:05:22,611 --> 03:05:23,810
I can do that on my phone.

2148
03:05:24,370 --> 03:05:25,291
I don't have to have.

2149
03:05:25,291 --> 03:05:26,530
Yes. Yes.

2150
03:05:26,611 --> 03:05:28,771
And that's what Satoshi talked about.

2151
03:05:29,051 --> 03:05:30,690
He talked about SPV.

2152
03:05:31,130 --> 03:05:43,690
He talked about ordinary users not being network nodes and how in the future there would be a certain number, he said, probably not more than one hundred thousand, if I recall, network nodes.

2153
03:05:43,690 --> 03:05:51,051
And by network nodes, he meant people producing blocks and collecting fees and and whatnot.

2154
03:05:51,451 --> 03:06:11,130
So the thing is, crypto lover, crypto voyager, the thing is, a lot of people don't share that view that you described, which is that, you know, we should have you seem to be suggesting large blocks on main chain and then reliance in the way that you just articulated.

2155
03:06:11,650 --> 03:06:22,331
Many people, including Paul Sztorc and others who favor Bitcoin, who favor drivechain or don't, many people believe that small blocks on main chain is important and necessary.

2156
03:06:22,571 --> 03:06:24,771
And I tend to agree with them entirely.

2157
03:06:24,771 --> 03:06:42,491
So what drivechain wants to do is give you and people like you who have your view a way to participate in Bitcoin's monetary policy and miners without giving up on what you desire, which is the benefits of larger blocks.

2158
03:06:42,491 --> 03:06:59,211
So with drivechain, big blockers get the big block version of Bitcoin they want and the small blockers get the small block version of Bitcoin that they want and they coexist like the bumper sticker with the, you know, the sickle and crescent and the different cross.

2159
03:06:59,211 --> 03:07:03,051
And like we all coexist as a big, happy family.

2160
03:07:03,410 --> 03:07:07,130
We sing Kumbaya and we smoke the peace pipe.

2161
03:07:07,690 --> 03:07:11,530
And that's because you get large blocks, I get small blocks.

2162
03:07:11,810 --> 03:07:19,370
And, you know, Mary over here wants a privacy protocol that uses Bitcoin's monetary policy.

2163
03:07:19,370 --> 03:07:25,891
And and Tommy over there wants Ethereum sidechain to do his whatever.

2164
03:07:26,171 --> 03:07:32,130
So everyone gets what they want, but we're all going to share Bitcoin unit of account and Bitcoin hash rate.

2165
03:07:32,370 --> 03:07:35,051
We're all going to pay fees to the same set of miners.

2166
03:07:35,491 --> 03:07:51,370
And that is like the that's the most powerful idea to me, because when everybody gets what they want, then the synergistic collaborative system is going to be really big and very successful.

2167
03:07:52,370 --> 03:07:58,130
Whereas if we have this balkanized multichain world of everyone having different altcoins.

2168
03:07:59,090 --> 03:08:12,170
Instead of all the chains sharing monetary policy and miners like drivechain has, like if we do this other thing where there's like a thousand different coins, then like each system is weak and they're all competing.

2169
03:08:12,571 --> 03:08:18,490
And then like the movement for peer to peer cash is weaker than if we all combine forces.

2170
03:08:18,490 --> 03:08:24,370
So what drivechain wants to do is have everyone get into the same the same bus.

2171
03:08:24,851 --> 03:08:34,851
And this bus is going to be powered by the same like the same miners, everyone sharing, pooling together transaction fees, using everyone using the same unit of account.

2172
03:08:35,130 --> 03:08:44,411
It's much more powerful because then we have like the powerful network effect where BTC is the only unit of account on every single blockchain.

2173
03:08:44,771 --> 03:08:45,810
That is the goal.

2174
03:08:46,091 --> 03:08:47,370
That's a very powerful thing.

2175
03:08:47,930 --> 03:08:53,930
Network effects are more powerful in the market for money than in any other economic market.

2176
03:08:54,651 --> 03:08:57,571
Network effects are very important in the market for money.

2177
03:08:57,930 --> 03:09:02,851
You're the money that will survive in the far future is the one that has the most adoption.

2178
03:09:03,370 --> 03:09:08,211
So what drivechain wants to do is give everybody what they want as much as possible.

2179
03:09:09,531 --> 03:09:16,170
As long as they're still using BTC as the unit of account and paying into the same miner set.

2180
03:09:16,290 --> 03:09:18,690
So does that resonate?

2181
03:09:21,490 --> 03:09:23,250
Oh, it resonates completely with me.

2182
03:09:23,290 --> 03:09:25,490
I'm I'm definitely a Bitcoin maxi.

2183
03:09:25,531 --> 03:09:35,490
Any other chain that that is not Bitcoin is is takes away from the market cap of what actually we we want in the world.

2184
03:09:35,571 --> 03:09:40,571
And not only that, we should be using just just one single protocol.

2185
03:09:40,651 --> 03:09:42,891
So so I agree with you on that one completely.

2186
03:09:43,891 --> 03:10:00,571
My question is, again, the so how does it finalize on the on the layer one one and second, isn't there then the the fear of of the of the small

2187
03:10:00,571 --> 03:10:06,290
blockers is that if you have big blocks, you cannot you cannot verify all the movements.

2188
03:10:07,531 --> 03:10:09,891
Wouldn't that just be moved to layer two?

2189
03:10:09,891 --> 03:10:19,810
So let's say let's say the drivechain works and you have a billion people using using drivechain, you have 80 billion IOT devices using

2190
03:10:19,810 --> 03:10:21,290
drivechain and all that.

2191
03:10:21,331 --> 03:10:26,690
And yes, definitely on the 21 million Bitcoin stuff, they are all using the same unit of account.

2192
03:10:27,011 --> 03:10:35,810
But all that data is then processed and stored in one single lump sum network.

2193
03:10:36,531 --> 03:10:46,771
Well, in the case of a drivechain layer two, isn't that isn't that just moving the centralization part of all those of all those

2194
03:10:46,891 --> 03:10:48,971
transactions, just moving it one layer up?

2195
03:10:49,411 --> 03:10:56,851
So so if you look at it from a like a pyramid, like a triangle, it's just an inverted triangle.

2196
03:10:56,891 --> 03:11:03,130
So so the big blockers say everything on layer one, you can have some sidechains for some other funky stuff.

2197
03:11:03,130 --> 03:11:07,370
But the base is where where everything gets kind of like moved.

2198
03:11:07,411 --> 03:11:18,250
So so you have a very broad base or you have the small block way of thinking that the that the triangle is then on its head, like the like

2199
03:11:18,250 --> 03:11:20,411
the pointy end on the bottom.

2200
03:11:20,451 --> 03:11:25,730
So everybody has just a small, a small verifying node.

2201
03:11:25,971 --> 03:11:33,930
But that big, big data storage of all the transactions that have happened, because I presume that those transactions still have to be

2202
03:11:33,930 --> 03:11:40,130
stored somewhere, be it on layer two, wherever that that also has to be stored in in in server farms.

2203
03:11:41,091 --> 03:11:42,531
What's the difference?

2204
03:11:43,810 --> 03:11:49,050
So. We've been going for three hours now, you ask a very good question.

2205
03:11:49,050 --> 03:11:57,451
Your question is basically the question that is the at the root of the large blocker view on protocol design.

2206
03:11:59,011 --> 03:12:05,091
I welcome anyone in the audience who wants to answer that, you know, on behalf of small blockers, myself included.

2207
03:12:05,690 --> 03:12:10,170
I'm getting a little bit tired, not from your questions, but from the duration of this space.

2208
03:12:10,690 --> 03:12:20,490
But I'm happy to continue going, but like I basically don't have like what I would describe as the comprehensive, like theoretical and

2209
03:12:20,490 --> 03:12:27,490
historical knowledge to provide the best possible small blocker arguments that you're requesting.

2210
03:12:27,851 --> 03:12:29,810
And some people do have that knowledge.

2211
03:12:30,091 --> 03:12:39,130
Some people like Paul and others here lived through the block size war and understand all of the potential arguments of the large

2212
03:12:39,130 --> 03:12:45,211
blockers. And the question you're asking about, which is the inverted pyramid and and that sort of thing.

2213
03:12:45,250 --> 03:12:52,250
But what I understand is more on the human level, which is that some people want large blocks, others want small blocks.

2214
03:12:52,290 --> 03:12:53,851
That's just the fact of reality.

2215
03:12:54,170 --> 03:12:55,531
It doesn't matter who's right.

2216
03:12:55,891 --> 03:13:01,331
Drivechain lets both the large blockers and the small blockers get what they want, arguably.

2217
03:13:01,851 --> 03:13:05,451
And that alone is a powerful solution.

2218
03:13:06,050 --> 03:13:13,571
It is an alternative to there being competing altcoins, one with large blocks, one with small blocks.

2219
03:13:13,690 --> 03:13:20,490
And then we see who wins the monetary premium battle, who accrues value and who doesn't.

2220
03:13:20,690 --> 03:13:27,971
Instead, with Drivechain, we give the small blockers the layer they want and the large blockers the layer they want.

2221
03:13:28,290 --> 03:13:36,971
And it must be that layer one is small because of the nature of cumulative decentralization.

2222
03:13:37,011 --> 03:13:48,050
In other words, if you're using layer two, if you're using a large block sidechain, you are experiencing the combination of layer one

2223
03:13:48,050 --> 03:13:52,211
block size plus the layer two block size that you've opted into.

2224
03:13:52,771 --> 03:13:57,451
So therefore, we must have the large blocks on a second layer, not the first layer.

2225
03:13:57,891 --> 03:14:00,050
This is a core idea of Drivechain.

2226
03:14:00,690 --> 03:14:05,531
Everyone is experiencing necessarily all of the cumulative layers they've opted into.

2227
03:14:05,571 --> 03:14:11,891
So if you buy Bitcoin, you're participating in the decentralization of main chain Bitcoin.

2228
03:14:12,250 --> 03:14:22,170
If you then opt in to a BIP300 large block sidechain, now the decentralization that you're experiencing is the combination of the

2229
03:14:22,170 --> 03:14:24,851
small block main chain plus the large block sidechain.

2230
03:14:25,290 --> 03:14:34,610
If we were to invert that and have the main chain be large block, that would effectively be a mandatory block size increase on everyone.

2231
03:14:34,891 --> 03:14:43,250
And it would eliminate the ability for people to experience small block Bitcoin, because if they opt in to some sidechain that has small

2232
03:14:43,250 --> 03:14:54,370
blocks, they have already, they are already experiencing the large block hypothetical main chain Bitcoin that you would prefer.

2233
03:14:54,610 --> 03:15:04,610
So I feel that we have to give people what they want and we can't deprive small blockers of their preferred experience.

2234
03:15:04,771 --> 03:15:08,610
So we have to make large blocks optional, not mandatory.

2235
03:15:08,891 --> 03:15:10,211
And that's what Drivechain does.

2236
03:15:10,211 --> 03:15:19,531
And if Drivechain had existed from day one on Bitcoin in 2008, if it had existed when Bitcoin was first announced, maybe there never would have

2237
03:15:19,531 --> 03:15:20,531
been a block size war.

2238
03:15:20,851 --> 03:15:29,451
Maybe people would just happily have used a large block sidechain without any objections or grievances.

2239
03:15:30,891 --> 03:15:34,531
So that's that's the Drivechain view as best as I can give it.

2240
03:15:40,091 --> 03:15:49,610
I don't, if you're tired, you can close the space and I would just ask to keep that question open and when Paul comes back, maybe maybe talk

2241
03:15:49,610 --> 03:15:57,930
about it. That's one. On the opt in question that you were saying, I'm not really sure about that.

2242
03:15:57,930 --> 03:16:09,050
So so so in small block theory, since since the fee market ever gets higher, the more demand there is on on on chain one, well on layer

2243
03:16:09,050 --> 03:16:17,290
one, I'm I kind of like see how you say, yes, the small blockers get what they want and the big blockers get what they want.

2244
03:16:17,451 --> 03:16:30,531
But the big blockers in that regard would be forced economically to use option two, to use layer two, unless unless you have enough

2245
03:16:30,531 --> 03:16:41,971
capital, enough economic resources to to use layer one to to actually say, I, I have the ability to to to take that opt in option to use

2246
03:16:41,971 --> 03:16:44,131
layer one. That's that's my point.

2247
03:16:44,131 --> 03:16:46,611
No, layer one is not optional.

2248
03:16:46,650 --> 03:16:48,770
Layer one is mandatory.

2249
03:16:49,170 --> 03:16:50,890
I understand. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

2250
03:16:50,930 --> 03:16:52,050
Layer one is mandatory.

2251
03:16:52,050 --> 03:16:55,170
Yeah, definitely. That's that I agree with you on that one.

2252
03:16:55,211 --> 03:16:56,451
That's that's not what I mean.

2253
03:16:56,611 --> 03:17:05,491
What I mean is if I'm, for example, a poor person in the world and the world is already hyper Bitcoinized and everybody's using Bitcoin, be it

2254
03:17:05,491 --> 03:17:07,251
layer one, layer two, layer whatever.

2255
03:17:08,251 --> 03:17:16,611
If I don't have enough money to pay the transaction fees on layer one, I'm I am actually forced to use layer two.

2256
03:17:18,170 --> 03:17:19,331
That's what I'm saying.

2257
03:17:19,530 --> 03:17:21,410
And Jack Deep is a speaker again.

2258
03:17:21,410 --> 03:17:27,491
So if Jack Deep could could answer my first question on increasing block size, that would be amazing.

2259
03:17:27,491 --> 03:17:29,530
And that's basically all from me.

2260
03:17:29,571 --> 03:17:31,611
Yeah, those are awesome questions.

2261
03:17:31,611 --> 03:17:38,530
I think the host kind of nailed it a little bit, but I think, you know, I'm a small booker as well.

2262
03:17:38,690 --> 03:17:47,050
I view I view blocks like you're saying that the tip at the bottom at the extra pyramid, the extra pyramid of value is everything is a

2263
03:17:47,050 --> 03:17:50,930
derivative down to the base, which would be something like Bitcoin, right?

2264
03:17:50,930 --> 03:17:52,211
The ultimate store of value.

2265
03:17:52,810 --> 03:18:00,331
Everything else would be trading at a discount, especially when you have when you have Malthusian scares, right?

2266
03:18:00,331 --> 03:18:04,170
When Malthusian scares and you drive, everything drives back down to the base.

2267
03:18:04,170 --> 03:18:07,211
So I view that from an economic perspective, it makes sense.

2268
03:18:07,410 --> 03:18:14,690
But if you look at Bitcoin and you're trying to scale through bigger blocks, the function of a blockchain is twofold.

2269
03:18:14,690 --> 03:18:17,251
It's executions and it's data availability.

2270
03:18:17,251 --> 03:18:20,410
You have to take the data to reproduce the state.

2271
03:18:20,650 --> 03:18:24,851
So there is an inherent execution to calculate the state through the data.

2272
03:18:24,851 --> 03:18:32,890
So if you break the blockchain into two parts, then you have a data availability problem, which is what we've been trying to solve for.

2273
03:18:33,131 --> 03:18:36,410
And any settlement layer will have that data availability problem.

2274
03:18:36,690 --> 03:18:42,451
It's an abundance when you have a big state and you want to have censorship resistance to your sidechain.

2275
03:18:42,451 --> 03:18:43,971
You need that data availability solved.

2276
03:18:44,131 --> 03:18:46,731
And then the execution in order for us to scale.

2277
03:18:46,731 --> 03:18:50,371
First and foremost, the biggest bottleneck was execution, right?

2278
03:18:50,410 --> 03:18:52,571
It's how many transactions you could do.

2279
03:18:52,571 --> 03:18:53,851
That's based on the block size.

2280
03:18:53,851 --> 03:19:05,211
If you remove the transactions off of the base and you have a more decentralized base, more full nodes can run in a lighter way, then you have executions moved off to the sidechain.

2281
03:19:05,775 --> 03:19:09,575
But then you still need censorship resistance in some ways.

2282
03:19:10,455 --> 03:19:13,735
And in terms of sidechains, it doesn't matter too much because it's just Bitcoin.

2283
03:19:14,175 --> 03:19:23,094
What I mean by censorship resistance is when you start to create a base layer and you have all these sorts of tokens, like say IBM and stock tokens start to come in and USDC and USDT.

2284
03:19:23,455 --> 03:19:28,975
You can say in a hyper Bitcoinization world, there's no other tokens, but in my world, there's going to be a whole bunch of tokens.

2285
03:19:28,975 --> 03:19:45,494
So when you're trying to move those tokens into your scalable execution layers, even if one sidechain is just a base and it's not meant to be where all the retailers transact, it's another base towards another sidechain where the execution is actually, say, 10,000 TPS.

2286
03:19:45,974 --> 03:19:48,895
You have this data availability problem and that is inherited.

2287
03:19:50,055 --> 03:19:57,895
If you go down the scalability far enough, you will always end up at that problem and you need to solve for that a little bit differently.

2288
03:19:58,215 --> 03:20:12,855
And what Ethereum is doing in their next update is something called protodank sharding, and that is trying to create a sidecar of data not to inflate the block base for size, but put it in a separate fee market.

2289
03:20:13,255 --> 03:20:18,695
And because that data gets pruned after some amount of time, that fee market becomes much cheaper.

2290
03:20:19,734 --> 03:20:27,535
So your overall systemically, it becomes a much more efficient system if you can separate the execution from the data.

2291
03:20:28,054 --> 03:20:36,414
Some purists might say that the data must live next to the execution, otherwise you start taking tradeoffs, and that's true.

2292
03:20:37,454 --> 03:20:51,575
But I would say the best way to get everyone involved to use this thing, the claim of the Leiden Network white paper of everyone should be able to do one or two transactions, everyone in the world, the 7 billion people should be able to do one or two transactions a day.

2293
03:20:52,335 --> 03:20:58,734
That claim cannot really come alive unless you start to break up the data layers and execution layers.

2294
03:20:59,535 --> 03:21:02,454
Yeah, just increasing the block size doesn't solve that problem.

2295
03:21:02,975 --> 03:21:07,855
Well said. Yeah, Ethereum is grappling with these different questions.

2296
03:21:08,414 --> 03:21:19,775
You know, some have suggested that what they're doing is trying to pursue very roughly a drivechain like design, albeit in a way that's kind of misguided and and confused.

2297
03:21:21,814 --> 03:21:28,975
If you have only Ethereum and only Ethereum was moving to sidechains, then it's drivechain.

2298
03:21:29,374 --> 03:21:33,174
But Ethereum is playing around with a whole bunch of other random tokens.

2299
03:21:33,535 --> 03:21:36,294
And so those random tokens need to go in and out of these sidechains.

2300
03:21:36,374 --> 03:21:38,814
And that is something that drivechain wasn't solving.

2301
03:21:38,855 --> 03:21:44,094
So if it's just Bitcoin in the world, then drivechain's fine because you have smart contracts there.

2302
03:21:44,654 --> 03:22:00,255
The drive chainers, we do want that like all of the large block Bitcoiners who left Bitcoin in the block size war, we want all of them to come back to Bitcoin and use the large block sidechain and the other sidechains.

2303
03:22:00,495 --> 03:22:06,495
We want to completely reunite everyone who's ever used Bitcoin and eliminate all of the altcoin communities.

2304
03:22:07,214 --> 03:22:11,975
We want to make it that no one has any hope to compete with Bitcoin.

2305
03:22:12,495 --> 03:22:21,615
We want to make it that everyone believes that any new idea that's at all of any potential value will become on Bitcoin.

2306
03:22:22,135 --> 03:22:24,695
So we think sidechains have a very big part in that future.

2307
03:22:24,734 --> 03:22:37,055
So Crypto Voyager, I would encourage you to DM me on this account, LayerTwo Labs, with like your availability to have a debate if you're interested with Paul.

2308
03:22:37,495 --> 03:22:48,535
Because I think what we need to do is stamp out the incorrect understanding that is persisting among some people that large blocks on mainchain Bitcoin would be a good idea.

2309
03:22:48,895 --> 03:23:01,255
So we need to have a debate where whoever has the most comprehensive understanding of the alleged benefits of large block mainchain Bitcoin debate that with Paul.

2310
03:23:01,695 --> 03:23:13,975
And we'll make sure that we get down to the brass tacks, get down to the fundamental question of which is better, mainchain being large block or small block, because this debate has to end.

2311
03:23:14,294 --> 03:23:21,055
We have to get to the bottom of this so that people aren't still confused and unsure about the topic.

2312
03:23:21,695 --> 03:23:33,415
So let me know if you want to debate, because I recently had some tweets that I saw where some large blockers were saying the things you're saying about the inverted pyramid and whatnot.

2313
03:23:33,855 --> 03:23:39,295
But then I invited them today to come and I messaged three well-known large blockers.

2314
03:23:39,654 --> 03:23:41,695
They didn't come here and debate with us today.

2315
03:23:42,334 --> 03:23:47,654
So, you know, they're friends of mine, they're friendly people, they're smart people, but I believe they're wrong.

2316
03:23:48,015 --> 03:23:58,054
I believe Paul can beat them in a civil debate on the question of should we have drivechain or should we have large block mainchain?

2317
03:23:58,494 --> 03:23:59,894
Like the answer is drivechain.

2318
03:23:59,894 --> 03:24:06,054
And we need to, like, get everyone on the same page as soon as possible for the sake of sound money and freedom.

2319
03:24:06,535 --> 03:24:07,894
We need to have everyone agreeing.

2320
03:24:08,255 --> 03:24:15,054
We can't have this, like, endless debate going on eight years about whether we should, you know, multiply the mainchain block size.

2321
03:24:15,614 --> 03:24:18,135
So the monolithic versus modular debate, right?

2322
03:24:18,135 --> 03:24:25,735
Yeah. You or someone else, Crypto Voyager, should DM me and say that, like, you want to have a block size debate with Paul.

2323
03:24:25,975 --> 03:24:28,094
We can do it at the next week's space.

2324
03:24:28,135 --> 03:24:30,415
This space meets every week on Friday.

2325
03:24:30,934 --> 03:24:32,175
So we can do it next Friday.

2326
03:24:32,175 --> 03:24:35,654
If someone will step forward, is it going to be you or is it going to be someone else?

2327
03:24:35,654 --> 03:24:38,975
Like, let me know. We're happy to have the discussion.

2328
03:24:39,614 --> 03:24:47,575
And I promise you that if I'm hosting it in this Twitter space, you'll get completely good treatment.

2329
03:24:48,175 --> 03:24:50,415
There'll be no interrupting or name calling.

2330
03:24:50,934 --> 03:24:59,334
You'll have every opportunity to make the case to Paul or whoever, you know, we bring to represent the small block view.

2331
03:25:00,334 --> 03:25:02,054
Does that sound good to you, Crypto Voyager?

2332
03:25:03,054 --> 03:25:11,494
I'm not so sure that I'm qualified enough to debate that one and to settle the block size.

2333
03:25:11,494 --> 03:25:15,175
That's a little bit too much for me.

2334
03:25:15,175 --> 03:25:16,894
But definitely, yes.

2335
03:25:16,894 --> 03:25:17,695
Thanks very much.

2336
03:25:17,695 --> 03:25:18,455
I gave you a follow.

2337
03:25:18,455 --> 03:25:18,855
My pleasure.

2338
03:25:18,855 --> 03:25:19,575
I'll send you a DM.

2339
03:25:19,575 --> 03:25:26,535
I'll send you a DM and I'll find my champion to put in the ring.

2340
03:25:26,535 --> 03:25:29,814
I would not say that Paul is the leader of the small blockers.

2341
03:25:30,695 --> 03:25:41,934
He's just one of the key voices that all the way back in 2015, he wrote that post called Measuring Decentralization on Truthcoin.info, his blog.

2342
03:25:42,654 --> 03:25:48,094
And that Measuring Decentralization post articulated what others have believed for years.

2343
03:25:48,295 --> 03:25:49,654
So I'm not saying he invented it.

2344
03:25:50,255 --> 03:25:51,295
I'm saying the opposite.

2345
03:25:51,415 --> 03:25:54,334
He subscribes to the small blocker view.

2346
03:25:55,334 --> 03:26:07,535
But that post crystallized, in the view of some, the argument, which is that Bitcoin decentralization increases when the cost to validate decreases.

2347
03:26:08,094 --> 03:26:24,295
So if you think differently and that we could have large blocks and everyone could be pruning and on SPV, etc., and that that'd be just as good, strictly just as good, without any detriment or tradeoff, then have someone come forward and debate Paul on that.

2348
03:26:24,334 --> 03:26:27,894
And we'll get to the bottom of it because we have to settle this.

2349
03:26:28,295 --> 03:26:29,614
It can't just go on forever.

2350
03:26:31,175 --> 03:26:34,374
And then I invited these large blockers to come here and they declined.

2351
03:26:35,654 --> 03:26:37,135
So it's disappointing.

2352
03:26:38,855 --> 03:26:46,575
So you let me know, you talk to your large block contacts and see if one of them will step forward to have a debate on this matter.

2353
03:26:47,575 --> 03:27:08,535
Because then it'd be great for Drivechain, that way we can we can move forward and those people might then become supporters of Drivechain and rejoin the Bitcoin community and help Drivechain become adopted rather than continue with their, you know, Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin SV experiments, which compete with Bitcoin for monetary premium.

2354
03:27:08,535 --> 03:27:19,455
OK, fine, I'll try my best to get to get somebody to to do that.

2355
03:27:21,094 --> 03:27:22,415
Yeah, OK, fine.

2356
03:27:23,415 --> 03:27:32,135
Jackthief, apparently the way that you're thinking with Ethereum, me and LayerTwo Labs are kind of in agreement.

2357
03:27:32,735 --> 03:27:36,094
There can only be one and it's not going to be Ethereum.

2358
03:27:36,094 --> 03:27:39,375
So choose between small block or big block.

2359
03:27:40,454 --> 03:27:42,214
Yeah, I mean, I agree.

2360
03:27:42,214 --> 03:27:45,935
Like, I think it's small blocks and I think blockchains are court systems.

2361
03:27:45,975 --> 03:27:49,735
So you need to treat them as a court system, not as a transaction processor.

2362
03:27:50,134 --> 03:27:53,334
So you need to break things down into parts, into modularity.

2363
03:27:53,694 --> 03:27:55,415
And that's what Drivechains are trying to do.

2364
03:27:55,415 --> 03:28:01,295
And, you know, even with Drivechains, I think Paul's going to hit the data availability problem when he goes down to it.

2365
03:28:01,334 --> 03:28:07,375
Like you're thinking about layers on top of Drivechains to create composable experiences.

2366
03:28:07,735 --> 03:28:09,654
You're going to have the data availability problem.

2367
03:28:09,654 --> 03:28:14,134
So we've already thought ahead with a lot of this and solved some of these problems.

2368
03:28:14,134 --> 03:28:18,574
And I think some of these problems could be transferred back into concepts such as Drivechain.

2369
03:28:19,495 --> 03:28:24,615
You know, as they encounter these issues and I know RISK has hit those issues, they're trying to solve it.

2370
03:28:24,615 --> 03:28:26,495
Ethereum is solving with protodank charting.

2371
03:28:26,495 --> 03:28:28,495
We've solved it with proof of data availability.

2372
03:28:29,254 --> 03:28:36,975
You always will end up at that data availability problem if you're trying to scale this stuff, regardless if you're a monolithic or a modular blockchain.

2373
03:28:40,055 --> 03:28:42,694
Well, this has been a really great conversation.

2374
03:28:42,694 --> 03:28:46,375
Thank you, Professor Micah Warren, who spoke earlier.

2375
03:28:46,855 --> 03:28:50,014
And that was the main part of our conversation today.

2376
03:28:50,574 --> 03:28:53,815
And thank you also, Jay Berg, who spoke also very well.

2377
03:28:54,134 --> 03:28:57,975
And thank you, Jagdeep and as well as Crypto Voyager.

2378
03:28:57,975 --> 03:28:58,975
You spoke very well.

2379
03:28:59,535 --> 03:29:00,615
Thank you for being here.

2380
03:29:00,615 --> 03:29:06,094
Thank you to our listeners, those who listen live right now, as well as those who listen on demand.

2381
03:29:06,094 --> 03:29:10,334
These are recorded spaces hosted by LayerTwo Labs every week on Friday.

2382
03:29:10,894 --> 03:29:18,694
Everyone is welcome to be here, whether you're a Drivechain critic, a skeptic, a newcomer or an enthusiastic supporter.

2383
03:29:19,214 --> 03:29:20,535
We appreciate you listening.

2384
03:29:21,774 --> 03:29:25,495
And if you want to learn more, like let's say you're a Drivechain critic.

2385
03:29:26,094 --> 03:29:28,894
Let's say you want to stop this project.

2386
03:29:29,295 --> 03:29:35,735
I would encourage you to read Paul's blog, find out what he thinks in detail.

2387
03:29:35,735 --> 03:29:44,415
He's written many long essays on there, all about block size, you know, the privacy sidechain, the scaling sidechain and an enormous amount of writing.

2388
03:29:44,415 --> 03:29:47,654
It's like a textbook, how much he's put on his blog.

2389
03:29:48,175 --> 03:29:52,415
So you can find out what he thinks, get really into the details and then DM me.

2390
03:29:52,735 --> 03:29:53,935
We'll schedule a debate.

2391
03:29:54,175 --> 03:29:56,014
It'll be just you and Paul.

2392
03:29:56,774 --> 03:30:05,694
So if you're an important listener in this space right now, who is a critic of this project, I encourage you to do your research and then come prepared to debate

2393
03:30:05,694 --> 03:30:08,454
things and you'll have extremely fair treatment from me.

2394
03:30:08,935 --> 03:30:13,815
You'll have every opportunity to find out for you and the audience who has the stronger argument.

2395
03:30:14,295 --> 03:30:31,334
We'll get down to the fundamental questions about whatever it is that's concerning you about Drivechain, whether it's MEV, whether it's miners stealing, whether it's decentralization, whether it's that you prefer large blocks or whether the whatever is the concern.

2396
03:30:32,014 --> 03:30:37,134
We'll get down to the most fundamental question and that's how we'll move forward.

2397
03:30:38,694 --> 03:30:41,055
So thanks, everyone, for listening.

2398
03:30:41,574 --> 03:30:50,574
If you want to engage in the coming days before our next space, the ways you can do it are we have the Drivechain Telegram group.

2399
03:30:50,694 --> 03:30:52,134
Everyone's welcome to be there.

2400
03:30:52,815 --> 03:31:04,134
You can find a link to that on the Drivechain.info website, or you can also find a link to our Telegram group on the layer2labs.com website.

2401
03:31:04,735 --> 03:31:07,735
We also have other ways you can interact.

2402
03:31:07,975 --> 03:31:14,615
In addition to the Telegram group, you can download our software at layer2labs.com and participate in the Drivechain testnet.

2403
03:31:15,214 --> 03:31:27,175
So that means you download the software and you can actually run the software of the sidechains, which is one of them for privacy, which is based on Zcash and the other ones for smart contracts based on Ethereum.

2404
03:31:28,535 --> 03:31:31,535
So you can get involved in a technical way or just by reading.

2405
03:31:33,375 --> 03:31:35,415
And everyone's welcome to do all of that.

2406
03:31:35,454 --> 03:31:37,295
So, yeah, go to layer2labs.com.

2407
03:31:37,334 --> 03:31:41,334
Also, make sure if you're interested in this topic that you have actually read the BIPs.

2408
03:31:41,855 --> 03:31:47,495
So make sure you're familiar with those BIPs, because that's really the core, the BIP, as well as the code.

2409
03:31:47,495 --> 03:31:49,815
It's all available for review.

2410
03:31:50,415 --> 03:31:55,935
So thanks for everyone who's like exploring that content and getting involved.

2411
03:31:57,014 --> 03:32:00,454
So I guess we'll wrap up now and reconvene in one week from now.

2412
03:32:01,535 --> 03:32:04,214
And it was great to have everyone chatting and listening.

2413
03:32:04,855 --> 03:32:05,935
These are recorded spaces.

2414
03:32:05,935 --> 03:32:07,694
You can listen to our prior recorded spaces.

2415
03:32:07,694 --> 03:32:14,535
We've had excellent interviews with some in the audience, like Moonsettler and Hampus and many others have come.

2416
03:32:14,535 --> 03:32:17,935
And those conversations are great and they're available.

2417
03:32:18,134 --> 03:32:27,014
If you just look through the LayerTwo Labs Twitter timeline, you'll find those recordings of those spaces where we've been privileged to have those guests speak.

2418
03:32:29,774 --> 03:32:31,254
So thanks, everyone.

2419
03:32:31,295 --> 03:32:32,855
I guess I'll see you in one week from now.

2420
03:32:34,735 --> 03:32:35,574
Thanks for listening.

2421
03:32:36,134 --> 03:32:37,014
Have a great Friday.