1
00:00:01,000 --> 00:00:06,000
Okay, now what you should know is that when I play the video, you're going to be
muted.

2
00:00:06,000 --> 00:00:08,000
Okay, let's do it.

3
00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:13,000
And the moment when you start talking, I'm going to pause the video so you can
comment, okay?

4
00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:15,000
Okay.

5
00:00:18,000 --> 00:00:22,000
The next on the name, I've got John Carvalho to welcome to the stage.

6
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You guys know who John is as well, so please round of applause for John.

7
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Sergay is next up.

8
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Sergay, please, would you take your seat at the panel?

9
00:00:31,000 --> 00:00:36,000
And last but by no means least, my fellow countryman, Ben Ark, ladies and gentlemen.

10
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Thank you.

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Did we set the time?

12
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Hello, hello.

13
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Hi, gentlemen.

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Hi, gentlemen.

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Hello.

16
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Thank you for joining me this afternoon.

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I was just told the topic is controversial opinions.

18
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Unpopular.

19
00:01:03,000 --> 00:01:04,000
Unpopular opinions.

20
00:01:04,000 --> 00:01:08,000
So, where should we begin?

21
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May I suggest something?

22
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Please.

23
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Last year, there was Paul Sztorc here, and so one of us will rage quit Bitcoin
before a year.

24
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So, I think we should understand who, actually.

25
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Okay, Paul.

26
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So, you're going to rage quit Bitcoin by the end of the year.

27
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That's the prediction.

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Because I didn't go to Baltic Honey Badger, because I had to go to TapConf instead.

29
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No.

30
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I thought they were on the same day.

31
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Because you're going to…

32
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Yeah, but that's exactly what he said.

33
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He said he's not here, so therefore he's going to rage quit.

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Yeah.

35
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I mean…

36
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Because I didn't know that.

37
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What I didn't know is that Baltic Honey Badger is always the first weekend.

38
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I never kind of put this in my head.

39
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I never kind of put this together.

40
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It's always the first weekend in September or something.

41
00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:55,000
Anyway, let's continue watching.

42
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Musical chairs game.

43
00:01:57,000 --> 00:01:59,000
Somebody will rage quit here.

44
00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:00,000
Musical chairs.

45
00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:06,000
Is ordinals and inscriptions a dangerous place to start in an unpopular opinion
panel?

46
00:02:06,000 --> 00:02:08,000
They're dead already, right?

47
00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:10,000
Now we hate Drivechains.

48
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Drivechains to start.

49
00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,000
Okay, who would like to take that?

50
00:02:17,000 --> 00:02:20,000
I would love to hear your unpopular opinion about Drivechains.

51
00:02:21,000 --> 00:02:23,000
Drivechains are shit coins.

52
00:02:27,000 --> 00:02:29,000
But that's popular, John.

53
00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:35,000
Do you want to comment on this?

54
00:02:35,000 --> 00:02:37,000
Well, I mean, like, I don't know.

55
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I know how big that room is.

56
00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:43,000
So, you got one guy to clap?

57
00:02:43,000 --> 00:02:44,000
It's not about the claps.

58
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It's about what he, what John Carvalho said that Drivechains.

59
00:02:48,000 --> 00:03:00,000
Yeah, but I mean, John Carvalho has this belief that the peg won't hold, which is
based on his inability to, like, he, there's an analogy of like an ATM.

60
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So the ATM will always give you, if you put $20 in, it will give you $20 credit to
your checking account.

61
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Or it will take $20 out and give you a $20 bill.

62
00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:22,000
Now sometimes it might charge fees and, you know, there's usually the way it works
is like there's a network of ATMs that you're, that don't charge you fees.

63
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But if you go outside or if you have to use the one in a foreign country or
something, it charges you more.

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And then what I also stress is that most people will not use the ATM.

65
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They will not use the BIP300 rail because it is slow and it is designed not to be
used for laypeople.

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It is a special thing that is supposed to be used by whoever is willing to be
patient for three months, which is not going to be the end user.

67
00:03:52,000 --> 00:04:00,000
And so what I'm saying is you could be out, you go out into the, you know, you go to
a, you're going to concert or something, you go to whatever, you're going to Taylor
Swift's concert.

68
00:04:00,000 --> 00:04:08,000
And you get some cash out of the ATM and then you, someone, you meet someone in the
audience who says, oh, I don't kind of, I don't have any cash.

69
00:04:10,000 --> 00:04:14,000
I'll Venmo you, but I need, I want some cash.

70
00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:21,000
And you may not, you may not charge them, you know, you might give it to them at an
even thing, but you also might charge them.

71
00:04:21,000 --> 00:04:27,000
You might say, listen, I'll give you $60 worth of cash, but I want $61.

72
00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:30,000
Venmo or whatever, but that's a good thing.

73
00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:35,000
All that just makes it so that everyone can get different, can do the conversions at
different.

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00:04:37,000 --> 00:04:43,000
They can do the conversions at different speeds and with whoever they want on their
own terms.

75
00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:56,000
I don't think, I think Jankov is unwittingly contributing to the misunderstanding of
what, you know, like the shit coins on Bitcoin thing by saying this, but I, but this
is what he said on Twitter.

76
00:04:56,000 --> 00:05:05,000
I think John also, like, it's like most of his career, similar to Peter Todd, where
it's like the career is based around being contrarian and you get attention that
way.

77
00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:10,000
And you get, you know, Peter Todd gets flown around the world and people put him up
in different hotels and stuff.

78
00:05:10,000 --> 00:05:23,000
And I don't think, but it's like, he's on this thing and you see them sort of both
laughing about this, but it's like, they, this is like before Peter Todd's tweet
saying that he may not actually understand the idea fully.

79
00:05:24,000 --> 00:05:36,000
So this is like pre him admitting that, and yet this whole time I paid him months
ago to write this, to write this explanation of what is wrong with the idea.

80
00:05:37,000 --> 00:05:40,000
And he's still, to this day, has not done that.

81
00:05:42,000 --> 00:05:43,000
So.

82
00:05:43,000 --> 00:05:44,000
I do that.

83
00:05:44,000 --> 00:05:48,000
You paid him to discredit himself because you knew he would not come.

84
00:05:48,000 --> 00:05:49,000
Okay.

85
00:05:49,000 --> 00:05:50,000
I'm being conspirational.

86
00:05:51,000 --> 00:05:52,000
Yeah.

87
00:05:52,000 --> 00:05:54,000
Well, I mean, I think it's, well, what does it say?

88
00:05:54,000 --> 00:06:00,000
If you, if someone says they believe something and I say, okay, why don't you write
down what you believe?

89
00:06:01,000 --> 00:06:02,000
And he says, I'm busy.

90
00:06:02,000 --> 00:06:05,000
And then he picked that the number he charged us.

91
00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:07,000
We didn't fight it at all.

92
00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:09,000
Okay.

93
00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:12,000
He said, I will write it if you pay me this amount.

94
00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:14,000
And we said, okay, we'll pay you half now.

95
00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:15,000
And then half after you finish.

96
00:06:15,000 --> 00:06:19,000
There's a completely standard terms for that kind of thing.

97
00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:24,000
But I mean, yeah, I mean, Drivechain, they're not, you know that they are not
though, right, Vlad?

98
00:06:24,000 --> 00:06:25,000
Right.

99
00:06:25,000 --> 00:06:26,000
We don't need to explain why.

100
00:06:26,000 --> 00:06:28,000
Do we need, do you think we should explain for the audience?

101
00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:30,000
Of course.

102
00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:31,000
Why they're not?

103
00:06:31,000 --> 00:06:33,000
Why are Drivechains not shit coins?

104
00:06:33,000 --> 00:06:36,000
But you know, will you explain it or no?

105
00:06:38,000 --> 00:06:39,000
I can explain it.

106
00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:40,000
Yes, I think you should.

107
00:06:40,000 --> 00:06:56,000
Basically the mantra or the motto of the whole movement of peg sidechains is to
have the features of shit coins without the shit coin itself and have Bitcoin that's
being locked on the base layer and this being issued on the second layer or the sidechain, call it whatever.

108
00:06:56,000 --> 00:07:01,000
And you're going to have that amount of liquidity being used on every sidechain.

109
00:07:02,000 --> 00:07:04,000
So you don't really have shit coins.

110
00:07:04,000 --> 00:07:09,000
You have Bitcoin, which is being used on a different layer, just like LBTC.

111
00:07:09,000 --> 00:07:10,000
Exactly.

112
00:07:10,000 --> 00:07:11,000
It's non-liquid.

113
00:07:12,000 --> 00:07:14,000
And I guess it's unfair to compare it to Lightning.

114
00:07:15,000 --> 00:07:16,000
I think it's exactly fair.

115
00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:17,000
I think it's exactly the same.

116
00:07:18,000 --> 00:07:28,000
You lock, you spend, you have the funding transaction on L1, which is the 202
multisignature output, and then it shows up in the L2.

117
00:07:28,000 --> 00:07:30,000
It shows up in the Lightning network.

118
00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:31,000
It's exactly the same.

119
00:07:32,000 --> 00:07:39,000
But I guess there's also the uncertainty and the assumption that people are going to
be using these sidechains to issue their own shit coins.

120
00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:43,000
You can already do that on Lightning also.

121
00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:45,000
So again, it's exactly the same.

122
00:07:45,000 --> 00:07:47,000
That's what Tero is and what RGB is.

123
00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:59,000
But in the lack of a block space limitation, because these sidechains might have a
larger block size, faster block times, and whatever, you can open the floodgates for
a lot of spam.

124
00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:03,000
But I guess it's all fair as long as they pay fees and the miners…

125
00:08:03,000 --> 00:08:04,000
Yeah, L2 also.

126
00:08:05,000 --> 00:08:08,000
Open timestamps also could have an unlimited amount of spam.

127
00:08:09,000 --> 00:08:10,000
Peter Todd's project.

128
00:08:11,000 --> 00:08:13,000
But L1 doesn't see it.

129
00:08:13,000 --> 00:08:20,000
So that's why we have to stay laser focused on cost of running an L1 node, and
everything else does not matter.

130
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Okay, Paul.

131
00:08:23,000 --> 00:08:24,000
New rule with the video.

132
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So far, I stopped it twice, and it was my own initiative.

133
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From now on, I'm going to let it play, and you tell me when to stop.

134
00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:32,000
Okay, fine.

135
00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:36,000
Now with Paul.

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00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:40,000
Drivechains, the whole point of them is to not be shit coins.

137
00:08:41,000 --> 00:08:44,000
Although if they become a shit coin, then that's probably because they failed.

138
00:08:45,000 --> 00:08:48,000
Can we define Drivechain for the audience members that may not know what that is?

139
00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:53,000
Well, they are paying me to go write a blog post on this, which may be a little
delayed.

140
00:08:53,000 --> 00:09:01,000
But the definition basically is that you go and have two BIPs, BIP300/301.

141
00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:07,000
BIP300 says that you go have a special type of transaction output, which miners can
vote to decide where the money goes.

142
00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:10,000
Obviously, you'd want to go put your money into that.

143
00:09:10,000 --> 00:09:25,000
And then the second BIP, BIP301, says that you have some kind of way of what
basically is like voting on the blockchain by paying this special type of output to
be spent.

144
00:09:25,000 --> 00:09:30,000
And that special type of output basically creates a thing that can only be done once
per block.

145
00:09:30,000 --> 00:09:38,000
So that if you or I try to do the same bid, but in different ways, only one of us is
going to wind up paying.

146
00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:43,000
And then as for the Drivechain thing, just fill in the details. It's really easy.

147
00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:47,000
I think I partially understood that.

148
00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:48,000
Yeah, it's a hard block to write.

149
00:09:48,000 --> 00:09:49,000
So it's a shit coin.

150
00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:54,000
So it isn't a flushed out idea. No one's written source code that actually does the
whole thing.

151
00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:58,000
Gotcha. Giacomo, you always have colorful opinions.

152
00:09:58,000 --> 00:09:59,000
Well, I...

153
00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:02,000
Okay, you raised your hand.

154
00:10:02,000 --> 00:10:05,000
Yeah, you were muted. You have muted me, so...

155
00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:08,000
No, it's what Jitsi does.

156
00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:12,000
Okay, so I'll raise the hand then next time, because I clicked that button.

157
00:10:12,000 --> 00:10:15,000
Okay, so yeah.

158
00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:21,000
So Peter's description was not that accurate, but it was okay.

159
00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:23,000
Miners don't literally vote.

160
00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:25,000
There's an SPV proof.

161
00:10:25,000 --> 00:10:28,000
So it's literally exactly like confirmations.

162
00:10:28,000 --> 00:10:36,000
So it's the same way that whether or not you are in the longest chain and whether or
not your transaction gets confirmed.

163
00:10:36,000 --> 00:10:42,000
The same sense that that is a vote is the sense in which bid 300 is a vote, miners
vote.

164
00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:45,000
It's only the work.

165
00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:49,000
It's only the 13,000 confirmations that gates whether or not the transaction goes
through or not.

166
00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:51,000
And this is, of course, slightly more different than that.

167
00:10:51,000 --> 00:10:56,000
I think it was interesting that, again, he did that joke, and you didn't really hear
anyone laugh,

168
00:10:56,000 --> 00:10:59,000
because people were genuinely very interested in what a Drivechain is,

169
00:10:59,000 --> 00:11:08,000
and they think it's probably more to it than something where miners just have all
the coins, which, of course, there is.

170
00:11:11,000 --> 00:11:13,000
So we could get into that, but I don't know how long.

171
00:11:13,000 --> 00:11:15,000
How long? About how long is this?

172
00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:20,000
32 minutes, and we are only three minutes in.

173
00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:26,000
But, yeah, I think he was describing the details, but he didn't explain what the
point of it is,

174
00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:33,000
which is that you have freedom to go to a different piece of software.

175
00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:37,000
So it's developers compete, and the end user wins.

176
00:11:38,000 --> 00:11:40,000
But that was okay.

177
00:11:40,000 --> 00:11:43,000
I mean, he didn't understand 301 really that much.

178
00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:44,000
There is a bid and stuff.

179
00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:51,000
But I think this is a kind of funny video that people will play in the future.

180
00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:57,000
I'd love to hear more.

181
00:11:58,000 --> 00:12:07,000
This is Breedlove, right, and he's moderating, and I'd love to know if he got
something out of that explanation.

182
00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:11,000
No, it's funny, because Breedlove wanted to start with ordinal inscriptions,

183
00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:15,000
and he was cut short, and then he was out of his depth, and he was like,

184
00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:18,000
so what's a Drivechain? Can anyone explain that?

185
00:12:18,000 --> 00:12:26,000
I think he seemed genuinely curious, which I think is the most we can ask of anyone
who doesn't already know something.

186
00:12:28,000 --> 00:12:29,000
You want me to keep playing?

187
00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:30,000
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

188
00:12:32,000 --> 00:12:34,000
You're going to be muted, but you know what to do.

189
00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:36,000
I agree with people.

190
00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:40,000
The original purpose was not to create shitcoins.

191
00:12:40,000 --> 00:12:46,000
So, the original idea was many shitcoins are created because people are trying to
experiment with new ideas,

192
00:12:46,000 --> 00:12:50,000
new architecture, new trade-offs between privacy, scalability, and decentralization.

193
00:12:50,000 --> 00:12:52,000
So, we want to experiment.

194
00:12:52,000 --> 00:12:56,000
Unfortunately, changing Bitcoin is hard, so we are forced to print money.

195
00:12:56,000 --> 00:13:01,000
We would like not to, but we are forced because we want to experiment with
technology.

196
00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:06,000
So, the idea of the sidechains by blockchain people originally was, actually,

197
00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:09,000
you don't need to print money in order to experiment.

198
00:13:09,000 --> 00:13:13,000
You can create another infrastructure that will just reuse the same money.

199
00:13:13,000 --> 00:13:21,000
So, we can basically go to peg Bitcoin to this other system and then back.

200
00:13:21,000 --> 00:13:26,000
So, you can bootstrap new technology without bootstrapping new money.

201
00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:28,000
The problem is that there is no way to go back.

202
00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:30,000
You can easily go one way.

203
00:13:30,000 --> 00:13:33,000
Like, for example, you burn one Bitcoin and you get a sidecoin.

204
00:13:33,000 --> 00:13:34,000
That's one way.

205
00:13:34,000 --> 00:13:36,000
But how do you go back?

206
00:13:36,000 --> 00:13:41,000
The point is that the actual Bitcoin system is not aware of the side system.

207
00:13:41,000 --> 00:13:45,000
And if it was, that would be very bad because in that case,

208
00:13:45,000 --> 00:13:49,000
everything bad that happens to the side system will directly influence Bitcoin
consensus.

209
00:13:49,000 --> 00:13:53,000
So, the idea of the original sidechain idea was,

210
00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:56,000
miners, we already trust them for canonical ordering,

211
00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:01,000
so we may as well just trust them also for going back.

212
00:14:01,000 --> 00:14:06,000
So, we put this coin in a, let's say, no, code is not really enough.

213
00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:10,000
We put them in a kind of output that miners, in a majority,

214
00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:14,000
over time, can vote to unlock to a certain direction.

215
00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:21,000
The problem is that miners are under no obligation to follow any kind of logic like
this.

216
00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:24,000
Like, for example, miners hold mine invalid transaction.

217
00:14:26,000 --> 00:14:27,000
Okay, go.

218
00:14:27,000 --> 00:14:30,000
Okay, that was pretty good.

219
00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:33,000
At the beginning, he was a little misleading there when he said,

220
00:14:33,000 --> 00:14:38,000
the original plan was not shitcoins on Bitcoin because it kind of made it seem like
I had changed it

221
00:14:38,000 --> 00:14:40,000
to a new plan that was shitcoins.

222
00:14:40,000 --> 00:14:43,000
I think I'm just following the original plan.

223
00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:49,000
It's interesting that he remembers there was a time when it was not an opcode,

224
00:14:49,000 --> 00:14:51,000
and it was instead something else.

225
00:14:51,000 --> 00:14:56,000
It was like an opcode-like thing that was, this was many years ago.

226
00:14:56,000 --> 00:15:01,000
He went on Twitter, and then he was criticized by people because in the BIP there
was no opcode.

227
00:15:01,000 --> 00:15:05,000
So, people said, yo, you haven't even read this BIP.

228
00:15:05,000 --> 00:15:15,000
Now, in a somewhat ironic way, he changed it since back to a BIP, to an opcode,

229
00:15:15,000 --> 00:15:21,000
and now he kind of wanted to avoid saying that there, which is kind of funny to me.

230
00:15:21,000 --> 00:15:22,000
Only funny to me.

231
00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:25,000
But now he's getting into the meat of it.

232
00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:29,000
He did a very good job of explaining mostly what the idea was,

233
00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:34,000
but he's saying the miners have no reason at all to process the withdrawals
honorably,

234
00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:36,000
but that's not true.

235
00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:46,000
They get the fees of the sidechain, and they get the value add of having a coin that
can do everything

236
00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:48,000
versus a coin that can do nothing.

237
00:15:48,000 --> 00:15:52,000
And every coin that is sent, you have to be enticed.

238
00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:54,000
It's kind of like a hotel.

239
00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:57,000
The hotel manager can maybe do anything.

240
00:15:57,000 --> 00:15:59,000
They could have you thrown out.

241
00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:01,000
Security could throw you out.

242
00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:06,000
Or they could call the police and have you thrown off.

243
00:16:06,000 --> 00:16:10,000
So, the hotel manager is in charge of the hotel, but they have to entice you to
come.

244
00:16:10,000 --> 00:16:12,000
They have to say, come to this hotel.

245
00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:14,000
And the user would say, really?

246
00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:15,000
I like it at my own house.

247
00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:18,000
Or they have to entice you to come to your restaurant.

248
00:16:19,000 --> 00:16:24,000
They could poison the food or whatever, but they want customers.

249
00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:32,000
So, they fight to attract people, and they're under no literal obligation,

250
00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:37,000
but the whole scheme is set up so that it's all automated if it works perfectly.

251
00:16:37,000 --> 00:16:43,000
But if something goes wrong, then it will be a nightmare for everyone involved.

252
00:16:43,000 --> 00:16:50,000
I'm sure he's going to explain now why it is that he thinks the miners will
miswithdraw the coins.

253
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:55,000
But even so, this is going to miss the point because it's the end user's decision

254
00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:59,000
what security model they want to choose.

255
00:16:59,000 --> 00:17:03,000
They choose for themselves and for their own money.

256
00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:05,000
And I have a separate argument that I think, actually,

257
00:17:05,000 --> 00:17:08,000
the Lightning Network is more vulnerable to miner theft.

258
00:17:08,000 --> 00:17:13,000
This is just having the miners basically co-sign something that the sidechain
software writes,

259
00:17:13,000 --> 00:17:17,000
which is this one hash, in return for huge amounts of money.

260
00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:18,000
So, they have to do basically nothing.

261
00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:20,000
But let's hear what he has to say.

262
00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:24,000
But we will just invalidate it, so they will lose money.

263
00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:29,000
If they vote to just move money around a different way, we cannot invalidate that

264
00:17:29,000 --> 00:17:33,000
because we are not even supposed to run the consensus of this other chain.

265
00:17:33,000 --> 00:17:38,000
So, Blockstream partially abandoned this initial idea of miner-based stuff

266
00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:41,000
and they moved to a fixed federation liquid.

267
00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:44,000
And Postdoc took the idea and said,

268
00:17:44,000 --> 00:17:48,000
since we are trusting miners already, let's just simplify it and trust them
completely.

269
00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:52,000
And I think that the original reason was not to have shitcoins.

270
00:17:52,000 --> 00:17:55,000
But then they had to do heavy marketing.

271
00:17:55,000 --> 00:17:58,000
And so now the new narrative is you have token.

272
00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:03,000
So, I think the most shitcoinist thing of dry chains is the style.

273
00:18:03,000 --> 00:18:09,000
They are using full-blown shitcoin style to promote something that is supposed to be
avoiding shitcoin.

274
00:18:09,000 --> 00:18:14,000
And if the soft fork will be attempted and fail, it will actually create a shitcoin.

275
00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:15,000
So, it may be.

276
00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:20,000
So, the Drivechain system is effectively a peg to Bitcoin, it sounds like.

277
00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:21,000
It's meant to be, yes.

278
00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:24,000
You raised your hand once.

279
00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:25,000
Yes.

280
00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:27,000
Well, I don't really know what to make of any of that.

281
00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:34,000
Like, the marketing is in the style of an altcoin.

282
00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,000
I don't really understand what that means.

283
00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:39,000
He also implied that you have a token or something.

284
00:18:39,000 --> 00:18:41,000
Yeah, I don't know what that means either.

285
00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:46,000
Are you trying to sell the Drivechain token?

286
00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:49,000
I don't know what that even is referring to.

287
00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:50,000
There is no Drivechain token.

288
00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:56,000
Do you want me to rewind that so we can listen to it?

289
00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:58,000
If you think about it, like, what would it even...

290
00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:00,000
So, yeah, I don't know.

291
00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:02,000
I don't know this about the...

292
00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:05,000
He's still saying, like, the original idea versus the new idea.

293
00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:10,000
There is no such thing.

294
00:19:13,000 --> 00:19:14,000
So, I don't know.

295
00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:16,000
But let alone multiple.

296
00:19:16,000 --> 00:19:18,000
Like, that seems to be what he's saying.

297
00:19:18,000 --> 00:19:19,000
I don't know.

298
00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:21,000
Maybe he's referring to Bitcoin Hivemind or something.

299
00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:24,000
But again, that has nothing to do with...

300
00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:26,000
That's a completely different thing.

301
00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:29,000
That would already...

302
00:19:29,000 --> 00:19:30,000
Even if it was...

303
00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:32,000
Like, that's a completely different thing.

304
00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:35,000
And that's required for the peer-to-peer oracle to work.

305
00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:38,000
That's basically like staking a variable amount of coins.

306
00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:41,000
But that's...

307
00:19:41,000 --> 00:19:42,000
I don't even know.

308
00:19:42,000 --> 00:19:44,000
I'm not sure who's listening at this point.

309
00:19:44,000 --> 00:19:46,000
And if you are, you're kind of a hero.

310
00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:49,000
Because it's been two and a half hours.

311
00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:50,000
And we're not even done yet.

312
00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:53,000
But Paul mentioned Hivemind.

313
00:19:53,000 --> 00:19:56,000
And I guess that's your prediction market sidechain?

314
00:19:58,000 --> 00:19:59,000
Yes.

315
00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:03,000
That's all?

316
00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:05,000
Yeah, but that's not like a token that is like...

317
00:20:10,000 --> 00:20:18,000
Like, even if that project didn't exist, we would still be of crucial value for
Bitcoin to do sidechains in order to survive.

318
00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:20,000
In order to have privacy, scalability, etc.

319
00:20:22,000 --> 00:20:23,000
So yeah, I don't know.

320
00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:26,000
I don't even know what he's talking about.

321
00:20:28,000 --> 00:20:29,000
Okay.

322
00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:30,000
Well, let's go on.

323
00:20:31,000 --> 00:20:36,000
And this came up in a recent conversation I had with the Twilight of Gold series,
actually.

324
00:20:36,000 --> 00:20:41,000
Luke Groman, he stated it as an economic law that all pegs break.

325
00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:47,000
And if everything is falling in price against Bitcoin over the long run, isn't it
inevitable that it would break?

326
00:20:47,000 --> 00:20:49,000
Crypto doesn't necessarily mean that all pegs...

327
00:20:49,000 --> 00:20:53,000
Like, you could hypothetically design things in crypto that are not breakable.

328
00:20:53,000 --> 00:20:56,000
But the big problem is with Drivechains is...

329
00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:58,000
So, you know, a close analogy is actually like SegWit.

330
00:20:59,000 --> 00:21:07,000
When SegWit was introduced, SegWit meant that you'd have a whole bunch of coins with
what, according to the previous rule, where anyone can spend outputs.

331
00:21:07,000 --> 00:21:10,000
Well, why wasn't that previously insecure?

332
00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:12,000
You know, why couldn't miners renege on that?

333
00:21:12,000 --> 00:21:15,000
Well, because the entire world said, hey, we like these sacred rules.

334
00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:17,000
We're going to run nodes that validate those rules.

335
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:23,000
Under that circumstance, where we're all validating these rules, SegWit's totally
secure.

336
00:21:23,000 --> 00:21:28,000
Because from the point of view of all the people in this room who run nodes, which
I'm hoping is everyone,

337
00:21:29,000 --> 00:21:32,000
they're not going to allow transactions that steal those coins.

338
00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:38,000
Drivechain skips that part and says, hey, we can just have new rules, but we don't
actually need to enforce them.

339
00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:43,000
Like, you know, if miners go steal the money, I guess maybe everyone will go stop it
or something like that.

340
00:21:44,000 --> 00:21:52,000
But, you know, when you have like 200 Drivechains, that's a total mess when you
start having thefts happen and people are, you know, advocating on Twitter.

341
00:21:52,000 --> 00:22:00,000
No, we got to go run the UASF to go prevent, you know, this $100 million theft of
Drivechain number 106 that no one really cares about.

342
00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:03,000
Go on, Paul.

343
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:08,000
Well, I don't know. Like, I think Peter Todd should know better than to say some of
those things.

344
00:22:08,000 --> 00:22:10,000
So I don't know how to do them, but I think I'll try in order.

345
00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:15,000
So SegWit, the new rules, they don't have to be enforced by the entire world and
everyone in this room.

346
00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:27,000
It's only enough, you know, enough of the people would be doing it so that breaking
the rules would be too difficult from like a coordination point of view, game theory
point of view.

347
00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:30,000
You just have some people who are going to enforce SegWit rules.

348
00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:34,000
So it has to be all the minors plus a critical mass of users, which can be very,
very small.

349
00:22:35,000 --> 00:22:40,000
It can be very small in the same way that if you have like Thanksgiving, well, maybe
I shouldn't do analogies because people don't like them.

350
00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,000
But like Thanksgiving dinner, like someone says, oh, let's have it here.

351
00:22:43,000 --> 00:22:44,000
Everyone wants to be in the same network.

352
00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:47,000
So it can be a small intransigent minority.

353
00:22:47,000 --> 00:22:49,000
It doesn't have to be in the entire world.

354
00:22:51,000 --> 00:22:53,000
Like we're all running the SegWit.

355
00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:54,000
That's not the case.

356
00:22:54,000 --> 00:23:04,000
But then at the end, it's very strange for him not to say that there is no, there is
nothing to the BIP300 rules, because of course there is.

357
00:23:04,000 --> 00:23:08,000
That's the counting the 13,000 part is there.

358
00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:10,000
And that's the whole point.

359
00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:15,000
If we didn't, if we didn't need to do that, then there would be no BIP300 and
there'd be no conversation.

360
00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:18,000
And then we would already have Drivechains.

361
00:23:18,000 --> 00:23:25,000
They would be fully trusting minor because what BIP300 does is it puts the minors
on a short leash for the deposits and withdrawals.

362
00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:33,000
So if we did, we already have, we would already have Drivechains.

363
00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,000
There'd be no BIP300 and there'd be no need for one.

364
00:23:37,000 --> 00:23:40,000
He should know better than to say a lot of that was okay.

365
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:46,000
I mean, notice that he did say that the peg, he completely ignored what John
Carvalho said about the peg not holding.

366
00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:53,000
So he's clearly just disagrees with John Carvalho, but he knows that he's on the
anti-Drivechain team.

367
00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:55,000
So he doesn't want to like bring it up.

368
00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:58,000
He's a member of Breedlove asked about it specifically.

369
00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:03,000
And he said like, well, forget about what John said and listen to what I have to
say.

370
00:24:04,000 --> 00:24:08,000
But what he said was flatly incorrect in my opinion.

371
00:24:09,000 --> 00:24:21,000
But now we're going to hear more about him saying that we're completely trusting the
minors and there is no, there is nothing gating the withdrawals, which is false.

372
00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:25,000
There's also someone in the chat.

373
00:24:26,000 --> 00:24:28,000
His name is Sanisdoker or something.

374
00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:30,000
Sanisdoker.

375
00:24:31,000 --> 00:24:36,000
And he says he was referring to the root stock Drivechains token called RBTC.

376
00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:42,000
It's technically a one-to-one peg, but I suppose it could de-peg.

377
00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:44,000
That's what he had to add.

378
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:50,000
Like, I don't know what that means though.

379
00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:52,000
Isn't that just Bitcoin on root stock?

380
00:24:53,000 --> 00:24:55,000
So how is that a token?

381
00:24:56,000 --> 00:24:59,000
You can't like sell that to other people and like use that to raise money.

382
00:25:00,889 --> 00:25:04,049
Yeah. Anyway, let's keep watching this.

383
00:25:08,449 --> 00:25:13,329
I mean, it's just created a gigantic mess for a system that really should be pretty
boring.

384
00:25:14,289 --> 00:25:21,729
I think the scary part is of the whole Drivechain debate is kind of reminded a lot
of us how

385
00:25:22,369 --> 00:25:27,889
miners can sneak stuff in. And the mining itself probably needs to be a bit more
decentralized,

386
00:25:27,889 --> 00:25:31,889
which is a good thing that they shed light on that. And then projects like Stratum
V2,

387
00:25:31,889 --> 00:25:36,849
which was Matt Crello's first initial criticism of Drivechains. And I think that's
healthy and

388
00:25:36,849 --> 00:25:43,329
good that that debate was had and it sheds light on that as an issue. Maybe to add a
little more

389
00:25:43,329 --> 00:25:47,649
nuance to my, you know, Drivechains or shit coins comment and with some context from
what

390
00:25:47,649 --> 00:25:53,489
your answers were. You raised your hand. Yeah, I know. I just want to say that
whatever, like

391
00:25:53,489 --> 00:26:01,409
everyone, Stratum V2 is just, you know, I'm happy to support Stratum V2. I think it
doesn't even go

392
00:26:01,409 --> 00:26:06,049
far enough, but I also think it's irrelevant. So it's irrelevant, but this is the
thing that this

393
00:26:06,049 --> 00:26:10,929
is what everyone's going to say. They're going to say after they realize how good
this idea is,

394
00:26:10,929 --> 00:26:15,009
they're going to be like, well, it needs Stratum V2 because everyone, you know,
success has many

395
00:26:15,009 --> 00:26:20,129
fathers, you may have heard. So they don't want to be like, okay, without me doing
Stratum V2,

396
00:26:20,129 --> 00:26:24,289
we would never have had safe Drivechains. I can explain that if you want, but we
should

397
00:26:24,289 --> 00:26:30,929
probably just keep going. I'm a bit confused because the intentions of Stratum V2 is
to empower

398
00:26:30,929 --> 00:26:38,289
every individual miner to vote and opt out from being co-opted into something that
they don't like.

399
00:26:39,089 --> 00:26:41,809
They already are, though. They absolutely are already.

400
00:26:44,689 --> 00:26:49,809
How easy is it to switch mining pools? It's a drop of a hat. It costs nothing.

401
00:26:50,769 --> 00:26:55,409
But you also had that case from, which mining pool was it? F2 pool?

402
00:26:56,689 --> 00:26:57,809
F2 pool, yes, sure.

403
00:26:57,809 --> 00:27:00,049
The one that collected a very large fee.

404
00:27:00,049 --> 00:27:01,009
20 Bitcoin.

405
00:27:01,969 --> 00:27:08,209
Exactly. And the owners of the pool decided to return it without any input from the
actual

406
00:27:08,209 --> 00:27:08,689
workers.

407
00:27:09,569 --> 00:27:17,809
Yes. Well, the owners of the pool should do whatever is in the best interest of
their

408
00:27:18,529 --> 00:27:24,129
members. They have no choice in the long run. But it's not necessarily clear that

409
00:27:26,129 --> 00:27:28,289
it's hard to say what is in the best interest because

410
00:27:28,529 --> 00:27:35,169
maybe, you don't know. It's hard to say. Maybe to behave in a dishonorable way would
discredit the

411
00:27:35,169 --> 00:27:44,289
pool in some other way. And so, it's the pool administrator's task to keep their
customers.

412
00:27:45,169 --> 00:27:54,769
And if they do that, it's their decision to make. It's their call. They do this
24-7, 365,

413
00:27:55,489 --> 00:28:01,169
and they know they have a relationship with their members and clients, and they know
the industry.

414
00:28:02,369 --> 00:28:09,009
And if they made the wrong decision, then F2 pool will be destroyed soon because
everyone will

415
00:28:09,009 --> 00:28:16,529
leave. But if they made the right decision, then it will grow or whatever. So,
that's just the

416
00:28:17,249 --> 00:28:24,929
reality. It's like, to keep it couldn't be seen as dishonorable. And that could make
it seem like

417
00:28:24,929 --> 00:28:32,609
the pool is not acting in Bitcoin's best interest because it's clearly a mistake.
And we want people

418
00:28:32,609 --> 00:28:39,569
to have a positive experience when they use Bitcoin. So, in the grand scheme of
things,

419
00:28:40,369 --> 00:28:44,929
it could have reduced the net worth of the mining machines. It's theoretically
possible.

420
00:28:46,369 --> 00:28:50,849
But keeping it would have been not in the best financial interest. But in any way,

421
00:28:50,849 --> 00:28:54,929
it's their call to make, and they suffer the consequences if they make a mistake or
if they

422
00:28:54,929 --> 00:29:02,689
do the right thing. Okay, should we continue? I don't see how Stratum v2 would have
helped at

423
00:29:02,689 --> 00:29:06,449
all. It would have been too late by the time. Stratum v2 helps with job selection,

424
00:29:07,249 --> 00:29:17,649
maybe. Like, if you still have the 100 block maturity,

425
00:29:20,849 --> 00:29:24,289
I would be interested to know if someone could write down an example with like a
technical

426
00:29:24,289 --> 00:29:29,489
example of how Stratum v2 would have changed that at all. I'd be very interested to
read that.

427
00:29:31,009 --> 00:29:34,449
What's the Stratum v2 do that just being able to leave the pool doesn't do?

428
00:29:37,409 --> 00:29:41,009
Okay, let's continue. This is going to take about 100 hours at this rate.

429
00:29:43,089 --> 00:29:49,089
Like, to break it down into like more abstract primitives, stability is not a
quality of a thing,

430
00:29:49,089 --> 00:29:54,929
it's a service. And so you can't, there's no atomic way to peg. And so when you have
two

431
00:29:54,929 --> 00:29:58,449
separate networks, like as Jaco mentioned, that are not aware of each other and
shouldn't be aware

432
00:29:58,449 --> 00:30:03,489
of each other, although I think Drivechain is not completely sound. Symmetrical, the
drive

433
00:30:03,489 --> 00:30:07,649
chain is aware of the main chain, but not the other way around. So the service of
stability

434
00:30:07,649 --> 00:30:14,449
is provided by the escrow of the miners. And so there's no real enforcement of
stability of the

435
00:30:14,449 --> 00:30:19,489
peg. And thus, you're either going to have an outcome, and they're both bad
outcomes,

436
00:30:19,489 --> 00:30:23,969
where you eventually you lose the peg, and it trend like counterparty, where it just
kind of

437
00:30:23,969 --> 00:30:30,609
trends to zero, or even worse, potentially is the sidechain. Now imagine say, let's
say Roger

438
00:30:30,689 --> 00:30:35,409
Ver was right. And we have the sidechain that is, you know, infinitely increasing
or increasing

439
00:30:35,409 --> 00:30:41,729
the demand of the users and block size, say that that becomes more popular than
Bitcoin,

440
00:30:41,729 --> 00:30:46,289
and more everybody moves their coins to the Drivechain. How does that express? What
do we do about

441
00:30:46,289 --> 00:30:51,089
that? Is that a problem? What if we had that spread over many Drivechains, and now
we have

442
00:30:51,089 --> 00:30:56,609
many Drivechains. So this stability as a service thing is a good way to look at it,
because you

443
00:30:56,609 --> 00:31:02,049
can't have an atomic peg, and you can't, nothing is stable, because you're just
implying

444
00:31:02,049 --> 00:31:07,329
countercurrencies. So thus they are shit coins, because you're converting your
Bitcoin to the

445
00:31:07,329 --> 00:31:13,089
side coin, right to the escrowed Bitcoin. And so thus, there's no peg of the value,

446
00:31:13,089 --> 00:31:20,529
there's no transfer of value. Yeah, I guess just to be contrary with the group,

447
00:31:21,489 --> 00:31:27,809
frankly, I don't have a strong... Go on, Paul. I mean, I don't know. I would love to
know if anyone

448
00:31:28,929 --> 00:31:33,249
can get anything out of that. I mean, I could give us, I think we could hire John to
give the

449
00:31:33,249 --> 00:31:40,929
same speech about ATMs and say, well, they never, you know, the stability as a
service

450
00:31:41,809 --> 00:31:47,489
of the ATM, and there's never any point where it's literally pegged. If he would use
the software,

451
00:31:47,489 --> 00:31:54,849
he would see if he deposits 13 coins or whatever, you get 13 coins come out the
other side every

452
00:31:54,849 --> 00:32:02,609
time. As Giacomo correctly said, it's aware in one direction. And then when you
withdraw,

453
00:32:02,609 --> 00:32:06,929
if you withdraw 15 coins and you have a main chain fee in there, but when you
withdraw,

454
00:32:06,929 --> 00:32:13,889
do you get exactly that many coins out? So it's not a service of the miners at all.
The miners

455
00:32:13,889 --> 00:32:22,289
bless the withdrawal transaction ID, the miners find blocks, but the protocol, just
the software

456
00:32:22,289 --> 00:32:27,409
just automatically credits you the same as when you take $20 out of an ATM, it takes
$20 out of

457
00:32:27,409 --> 00:32:32,769
your checking account. So I don't know what to say about that, but we'll see what
Sergei has to say.

458
00:32:34,929 --> 00:32:38,689
I don't have an opinion about Drivechains, but one of the things that I'm noticing
with this

459
00:32:38,689 --> 00:32:45,569
debate, and I've seen with many of the other things that we often argue over in the
Bitcoin

460
00:32:45,569 --> 00:32:55,249
spaces, there's always a fundamental debate between the trade-offs of whether or not
to keep

461
00:32:55,249 --> 00:33:01,089
Bitcoin more pure in some way in terms of decentralization or in terms of security
and so on.

462
00:33:02,289 --> 00:33:08,609
Oftentimes on the other side, the people that are arguing against the purity side
are arguing

463
00:33:08,609 --> 00:33:17,089
for some kind of benefits, some kind of use cases, some kind of people and so on.
And we should,

464
00:33:17,089 --> 00:33:26,609
I think, be aware that the idea that we should keep Bitcoin pure is a very logically
consistent

465
00:33:26,609 --> 00:33:33,249
opinion, but it is at tension with Bitcoin maximalism, because Bitcoin maximalism is
the

466
00:33:33,249 --> 00:33:39,009
idea that when it comes to internet money, Bitcoin is the be-all end-all. It's going
to be everything

467
00:33:39,009 --> 00:33:46,289
for everyone, right? And so there is tension here, because if we decide that we need
to keep Bitcoin

468
00:33:46,289 --> 00:33:51,169
pure, and for that reason we're willing to trade off the following things, that
means that these

469
00:33:51,169 --> 00:33:57,969
things can appear in other situations. Security, I think, is probably the best
example. There's

470
00:33:57,969 --> 00:34:05,649
often these trade-offs between security and utility scale, whatever, and very often
things

471
00:34:05,649 --> 00:34:11,489
require lesser amounts of security, and then we see them appear, other chains that
are less secure,

472
00:34:11,489 --> 00:34:17,409
but where that level of security is useful for certain things, certain things that
certain

473
00:34:17,409 --> 00:34:24,849
people want to do. So I think there's a certain tension there that we should be
aware of.

474
00:34:25,809 --> 00:34:31,569
I think it's fair when you think about people on Bitcoin Twitter that are, I guess,
the midwit type

475
00:34:31,569 --> 00:34:36,449
saying that argument, but you can see here, we have nuanced arguments, right? We
have rational

476
00:34:36,449 --> 00:34:42,209
arguments about what the risks are. It's not just about, oh, nothing new or nothing
complex.

477
00:34:42,209 --> 00:34:47,729
It's just, I don't need that, and what you're saying isn't true, so why are we doing
this?

478
00:34:47,729 --> 00:34:53,409
There is an inherent risk with the ideology of the maximalist in that Bitcoin is
perfect

479
00:34:53,489 --> 00:34:57,889
and then shouldn't progress, and it's not. It's a work in progress, and if we want
this thing to

480
00:34:57,889 --> 00:35:01,489
be the backbone of the future world's economy, which I do personally, I want
everything to be

481
00:35:01,489 --> 00:35:06,769
on Bitcoin. I want Bitcoin to, that's what everyone transacts value through, how are
we going to do

482
00:35:06,769 --> 00:35:10,849
that? How are we going to scale? There's a bunch of fundamental things in Lightning,
for example,

483
00:35:10,849 --> 00:35:14,769
which needs to be fixed in order to make it easy for people to run in a
self-sovereign way,

484
00:35:14,769 --> 00:35:21,089
but then how do we cater for the world? And then I suppose Drivechain, they were
trying to say that,

485
00:35:21,089 --> 00:35:28,129
look, if you have this system where we entrust miners as a federation, then you can
have these

486
00:35:28,129 --> 00:35:34,289
200 extra chains in which you can have this different type of economic commerce, and
I think

487
00:35:35,249 --> 00:35:41,649
when we had the block wars, we did decide that off-chain scaling was probably the
way to go

488
00:35:41,649 --> 00:35:46,369
rather than making the blocks bigger, and if we do need the whole world to be
transacting using

489
00:35:46,369 --> 00:35:49,329
Bitcoin, maybe that's not what you want. Maybe you're just like, no, I want just
Bitcoin just

490
00:35:49,409 --> 00:35:55,569
for us. Well, I think a problem with the idea that Drivechain scale is computers are
a lot

491
00:35:55,569 --> 00:36:02,769
cheaper than humans, and to the extent Drivechain scale, they scale in a way which
has risks of

492
00:36:04,049 --> 00:36:09,409
very ugly politics, because, you know, Drivechains will probably go fail, and in the
process of

493
00:36:09,409 --> 00:36:13,889
failing, people will go and use the backup option of arguing for things like
user-activated

494
00:36:13,889 --> 00:36:18,769
soft-forks to go fix that problem, and that's a really ugly, diverse device.

495
00:36:20,769 --> 00:36:21,969
I knew this was coming.

496
00:36:24,129 --> 00:36:29,169
Okay, so I mean, you know, the people sitting on one side seem to be a lot, you
know,

497
00:36:32,449 --> 00:36:36,529
they seem to, you know, I like them more than the people sitting in maybe the
middle.

498
00:36:39,409 --> 00:36:43,249
But yeah, I mean, of course, all that was great. Everyone was going pretty well.

499
00:36:43,249 --> 00:36:46,289
Like, you know, people are different, transactions are different, not everyone

500
00:36:46,289 --> 00:36:51,729
wants the same security model. Look, there's all this other stuff that's real, that
has real users,

501
00:36:51,729 --> 00:36:58,769
and Peter Todd is also correct that, in an ideal way, from the perspective of R&D
only,

502
00:36:59,489 --> 00:37:03,169
not from any other rational perspective, but I'm just saying, if you wanted to
maximize R&D,

503
00:37:04,689 --> 00:37:08,209
you would launch sidechains, and roughly half of them would fail, because you'd want
to figure

504
00:37:08,209 --> 00:37:14,209
out really quickly, like, how far can I push the envelope? So he's right that some
would fail,

505
00:37:15,969 --> 00:37:23,969
and now where he's wrong is he says that politics will affect L1. I mean, it may,
but again,

506
00:37:23,969 --> 00:37:29,569
my claim is that it will be much less than we're already affected by L1. In
particular, he's very

507
00:37:29,569 --> 00:37:35,009
wrong about this UASF thing. The UASF, again, if you fight the miners with the UASF,
it is a hard

508
00:37:35,009 --> 00:37:39,649
fork, because you're breaking the heaviest chain rule. So if it's users versus
miners

509
00:37:41,009 --> 00:37:44,449
in a UASF, then it is a hard fork from the user's point of view.

510
00:37:45,009 --> 00:37:51,809
The miners cast the tie-breaking vote for every soft fork, and the soft fork needs
only one of

511
00:37:51,809 --> 00:38:00,929
the two groups. The UASF was a case where users made it clear that they only wanted
to pay for

512
00:38:00,929 --> 00:38:10,049
blocks that had the segment UASF. In that case, that's a good thing. The users are
being empowered.

513
00:38:11,089 --> 00:38:17,569
So again, people don't need to do anything. They don't need to care about the
politics. They may

514
00:38:17,569 --> 00:38:24,929
care about sympathy. But yeah, Drivechain is designed in many ways to evade the UASF
style,

515
00:38:24,929 --> 00:38:29,089
neutralize it, really, because it says you have three months of hash rate already
committed to

516
00:38:29,089 --> 00:38:37,809
something. So they seem really committed. And it's also saying there's no sense in
which this

517
00:38:37,809 --> 00:38:42,369
is an accident. There's no sense in which anyone's saying they're confused about
what's going on.

518
00:38:42,369 --> 00:38:52,049
It's a very slow thing, so that they're fully... It's very transparent.

519
00:38:52,049 --> 00:39:00,449
So the security model of Drivechain is not based on UASF at all. It's based on this
economics of

520
00:39:00,449 --> 00:39:06,929
miner fees and the idea that miners want the coin to do well. You can see that with
the 20 Bitcoin

521
00:39:09,009 --> 00:39:13,729
giveaway thing, that miners sometimes say, OK, my short-term interests of this fee

522
00:39:14,609 --> 00:39:19,649
do not outweigh the whole Bitcoin brand. So maybe they would... That's just proof to
you

523
00:39:19,649 --> 00:39:27,009
that theoretically it's possible, even if there's no fees. And the UASF idea is

524
00:39:30,449 --> 00:39:38,609
it's designed to... Drivechain is designed to resist that by having the long delay
and saying

525
00:39:38,609 --> 00:39:43,569
that there's plenty of time before it would even happen. So there are these other
events in

526
00:39:43,569 --> 00:39:48,529
Bitcoin's history, the value overflow incident and this July 2015

527
00:39:53,009 --> 00:39:57,249
database lock thing that happened. And so it's actually designed to

528
00:39:58,369 --> 00:40:08,209
shed the effects of the UASF, the drama. It's designed to shed the drama as rapidly
as possible.

529
00:40:08,209 --> 00:40:12,929
But the thing is, of course, you could do UASF for any reason at any time. People
could just decide

530
00:40:12,929 --> 00:40:19,889
next Tuesday, we're going to do UASF for this. They could decide that they will do
UASF to force

531
00:40:21,729 --> 00:40:26,689
Drivechain to activate or to force it not to activate or to whatever. Force the
miners to

532
00:40:26,689 --> 00:40:31,889
steal, force the miners to be unable to steal, force nothing. So the UASF is just
the users

533
00:40:31,889 --> 00:40:35,889
getting what they want. And we should be... If they pull that off ever, we should be
happy about

534
00:40:35,889 --> 00:40:40,289
that. They will be able... Over the long run, they will always be able to pull that
off

535
00:40:41,009 --> 00:40:44,929
because they always get what they want, which is a good thing. But I think it's
clear the whole...

536
00:40:44,929 --> 00:40:54,529
The idea of separable zones is... That's the whole idea. And the idea is that if
miners mine

537
00:40:54,529 --> 00:40:59,729
on something that... See, well, I only let him finish his thought and then we'll
reply to the

538
00:40:59,729 --> 00:41:07,169
whole thing. But we'll see. Yes. The thing, whereas if you just want to go scale up,

539
00:41:07,889 --> 00:41:11,329
if you just increase the block size, it means that everyone throws relatively cheap

540
00:41:11,329 --> 00:41:15,409
computing hardware at the problem. And that's probably a much better outcome to get,
say,

541
00:41:15,409 --> 00:41:20,529
a 10X scaling than having ten more different Drivechains with different
characteristics and

542
00:41:20,529 --> 00:41:25,569
a whole ton of complexity and a whole bunch of Twitter wars. So we scale for so more
people can

543
00:41:25,569 --> 00:41:32,529
put ordinals on Bitcoin? I'd just say between the two of them, throwing computers at
the problem

544
00:41:32,529 --> 00:41:38,049
is just so much cheaper. I don't think the 10X scaling increase is something we
should do anytime

545
00:41:38,049 --> 00:41:42,929
soon. Hopefully, we figure out a way to never have to do it. But it's certainly more
desirable

546
00:41:42,929 --> 00:41:47,249
than an outcome where you've scaled by doing a whole bunch of Drivechains, which are
critically

547
00:41:47,249 --> 00:41:51,969
important to the world's commerce. So it's Peter Rage quitting. Peter is moving to
BigCache the

548
00:41:51,969 --> 00:41:56,049
next year. We'll find out. We spotted him. I was going to ask. No, but he's right in
that

549
00:41:56,689 --> 00:42:02,129
you can actually assess on-chain scaling. You can look at it and say... You can even
do studies

550
00:42:02,209 --> 00:42:06,849
and say how much it will... Okay, so first of all, I owe Giacomo a little bit of an
apology there,

551
00:42:06,849 --> 00:42:11,889
because I misunderstood. His original joke was that I had already Rage Quit, and
that someone

552
00:42:11,889 --> 00:42:17,969
on this year's stage would be next. And he's saying it's Peter. So I misunderstood
his earlier joke.

553
00:42:21,169 --> 00:42:27,409
So then Peter again... So like the way that the UASF... It's not really...

554
00:42:27,729 --> 00:42:31,169
Since it breaks the heaviest chain rule, if you fight the miners, it's really a hard
fork.

555
00:42:31,169 --> 00:42:36,209
So it's not UASF. It's just a hard fork, which again, can be done at any time. And
that's also

556
00:42:36,209 --> 00:42:47,089
disruptive. But the way it's set up, it has no downsides. So either the users ban
the miners'

557
00:42:47,089 --> 00:42:52,449
theft transaction, and the miners fold, in which case nothing happens. The miners
just lose,

558
00:42:52,529 --> 00:43:02,369
and nothing happens. There's no reorg, there's no anything. Or the miners don't
fold,

559
00:43:02,369 --> 00:43:06,289
and they succeed with the theft, and then everyone who opted in only, they're on a

560
00:43:06,929 --> 00:43:11,889
chain that has no hash rate on it. So it's also the case that nothing happens.
They're

561
00:43:11,889 --> 00:43:15,329
really on a hard fork. They've basically hard forked themselves onto a chain that
has no blocks.

562
00:43:16,289 --> 00:43:22,369
So either way, nothing happens at all. So it's actually... The idea of calling it a
UASF,

563
00:43:22,369 --> 00:43:26,769
similar to SegWit, where there's Twitter wars and there's hats, is completely 100%
false.

564
00:43:28,209 --> 00:43:34,209
It's very carefully set up so that it does not have any negative impact. And the...

565
00:43:36,529 --> 00:43:40,849
I think... Let me see if I'm going to try to explain this here.

566
00:43:41,809 --> 00:43:53,409
The... You should watch my soft fork panel with Jimmy Song and Jeremy Rubin. The
soft fork has

567
00:43:53,409 --> 00:43:58,449
had two different definitions that sometimes overlap, sometimes are irrelevant to
each other,

568
00:43:58,449 --> 00:44:03,409
and sometimes directly contradict each other. And those two definitions are
tightening the

569
00:44:03,409 --> 00:44:08,289
rules versus loosening. And then the other definition is, does everyone need to
upgrade

570
00:44:08,369 --> 00:44:18,129
or not? So those are the two. Did you change that? Have people not been able to see
me the

571
00:44:18,129 --> 00:44:24,449
whole time? Or what? I just wanted to enlarge the image so people can watch you
while you explain.

572
00:44:25,809 --> 00:44:31,569
The... So the idea of it being UASF, I already thought of that back in 2016,

573
00:44:31,569 --> 00:44:36,049
and I designed it so that it would never have that property of the drama leaking one
way.

574
00:44:39,009 --> 00:44:43,409
It's like... But even if it did, I would consider that a success. I would say, oh,
look,

575
00:44:43,969 --> 00:44:51,569
the users of L1, they felt sorry for the users of L2 and they protected them. They
chose to

576
00:44:51,569 --> 00:44:55,489
protect them. Now, if you're on L1 and you want to ignore all of that, like I said,
you either

577
00:44:55,489 --> 00:45:01,329
ignore it and nothing happens, or you either ignore it and something other happens,
or it

578
00:45:01,329 --> 00:45:05,249
doesn't happen. But either way, you just end up... This is the magic of the soft
fork, because you

579
00:45:05,249 --> 00:45:12,369
end up on the longest chain. You end up with everyone. So it really has no downsides
at all.

580
00:45:12,369 --> 00:45:16,129
I don't know if this is the easiest... I don't know if I have a good way of making
this clear,

581
00:45:16,129 --> 00:45:21,489
or if I should write some kind of diagram or something about this. But it's
designed,

582
00:45:21,489 --> 00:45:25,089
even in the case of the UASF, where you think it's like a human sympathy thing,

583
00:45:25,089 --> 00:45:27,889
where you think, of course, it can travel across chain in any direction.

584
00:45:28,849 --> 00:45:35,969
But even in that case, the users of L1 who do not want to pay attention don't. And
it's exactly for

585
00:45:35,969 --> 00:45:43,409
that reason that Peter's point is upside down. It does respect the attention of
humans on L1.

586
00:45:43,409 --> 00:45:48,449
And so if he's saying that it won't be so bad to have more hardware requirements for
nodes,

587
00:45:48,449 --> 00:45:53,729
which again, the node hardware requirements are microscopic compared to the mining
hardware,

588
00:45:54,209 --> 00:46:00,529
which are tens of millions of dollars. The node hardware requirements are not that
bad. And of

589
00:46:00,529 --> 00:46:05,409
course, as technology improves, it does get easier every year. I wrote a post called
The Thunder

590
00:46:06,209 --> 00:46:10,369
as a little joke. And in an appendix, I estimated how much it would cost to have

591
00:46:11,569 --> 00:46:15,169
one gigabyte nodes, which is, of course, absurdly...

592
00:46:16,289 --> 00:46:18,849
You mean one gigabyte blocks, not nodes.

593
00:46:18,849 --> 00:46:23,969
One gigabyte blocks, which is absurd and which we should never do. But I just
thought,

594
00:46:23,969 --> 00:46:30,929
what would that cost? On a sidechain, you can have UTXO commitments and throw out
state.

595
00:46:32,689 --> 00:46:35,089
Like as nine months go by, you can start throwing away stuff.

596
00:46:36,049 --> 00:46:45,009
So in that case, you get all the benefits of ZK. It proves to be more transparent.

597
00:46:45,969 --> 00:46:50,689
So it's actually not that much. It was like $2,000 up front and like $400 a month or
something.

598
00:46:51,089 --> 00:46:52,209
And that was a few years ago.

599
00:46:55,969 --> 00:47:01,569
But anyway, yeah, the UASF thing, it's the opposite of what he says. It's designed
so

600
00:47:01,569 --> 00:47:08,689
that the drama does not travel from L2 to L1. There is no such thing as a UASF of
this form.

601
00:47:08,769 --> 00:47:15,889
It's a hard fork, just like every UASF is actually a hard fork because breaking the

602
00:47:15,889 --> 00:47:21,489
longest chain rule is always a hard fork. The Drivechain is designed to measure the

603
00:47:21,489 --> 00:47:30,049
miner's opinion very accurately three months in advance. And it is also designed to

604
00:47:30,529 --> 00:47:39,009
deter. It's designed to rely on miners maximizing their own net worth, which is the
security model.

605
00:47:39,009 --> 00:47:44,289
So it's not. Nonetheless, it does give people, since it's so slow, it lets everyone
at least

606
00:47:44,289 --> 00:47:48,929
see what is happening and decide if they want to try to do something about it. If
they try,

607
00:47:48,929 --> 00:47:54,529
it doesn't affect the people who are paying attention. But I think he at least has
the

608
00:47:54,609 --> 00:48:01,089
But I think he at least has the criterion right that we should care only if it
affects other people on L1.

609
00:48:01,889 --> 00:48:06,209
But yeah, I would like to stress again that when he's saying this, this is before

610
00:48:06,209 --> 00:48:09,649
he has written his tweet saying that he hasn't actually looked into the idea yet.

611
00:48:11,809 --> 00:48:14,929
And you can kind of see that in that he doesn't really understand. He thinks it's
like about

612
00:48:14,929 --> 00:48:19,649
voting. He thinks it's like if 200 happen at once, that this is going to be some
kind of burden.

613
00:48:20,609 --> 00:48:24,609
But since they all take three months and each of them has to be a dispute,

614
00:48:24,609 --> 00:48:27,009
the software will do it all automatically if they match.

615
00:48:28,529 --> 00:48:33,729
So it's only it has to be 200 disputes and then you're three months. So we actually
have a long

616
00:48:33,729 --> 00:48:40,049
time. It's certainly interesting to hear you go through that thought process in real
time,

617
00:48:40,849 --> 00:48:45,649
because I realized that you were explaining a very simple concept, but it took you
like five

618
00:48:45,649 --> 00:48:53,489
minutes of running cycles. But basically, I think what they're referring to is the
fact that miners

619
00:48:55,569 --> 00:49:01,089
do they vote? Is this a correct term? They vote and they need 75% of the hash rate
for

620
00:49:01,089 --> 00:49:03,809
it's kind of like a certain Drivechain to get deployed.

621
00:49:04,369 --> 00:49:08,849
Each block can move the score up. So they're really more like confirmation.

622
00:49:09,569 --> 00:49:13,569
But I think of them as upvotes. I mean, I just think of it as like a Reddit thing
when upvotes

623
00:49:13,649 --> 00:49:18,369
because before Reddit sucked. In 2015, I was making this.

624
00:49:19,009 --> 00:49:26,129
Okay. So 25% is the right proportion that I'm describing?

625
00:49:26,129 --> 00:49:35,489
If 25% are against, they can veto. So it's like you downvote. So you need to get
halfway to 26,000.

626
00:49:35,489 --> 00:49:42,129
You need to get to 13,000. So you can upvote and downvote. So if you have 25% who
are downvoting,

627
00:49:42,129 --> 00:49:45,009
you need 75% upvoting to just barely make it in time.

628
00:49:46,769 --> 00:49:53,969
Okay. So 25% of the hash rate can unlock the funds that some miners don't want to

629
00:49:53,969 --> 00:49:59,329
release from a Drivechain. Is that correct? No, no. If they're 25, then they are
blocking it.

630
00:49:59,329 --> 00:50:01,809
They're trying to just stall.

631
00:50:01,920 --> 00:50:11,440
So basically, if someone, let's say that I want to release the Vlad scammy
sidechain,

632
00:50:11,440 --> 00:50:18,600
and I want to do hex on the sidechain and scam the entire planet, 25% of miners can

633
00:50:18,600 --> 00:50:23,800
decide to not let that happen, to not let the Drivechain get launched.

634
00:50:23,800 --> 00:50:26,380
Is that correct?

635
00:50:26,380 --> 00:50:30,260
The activation is slightly different, but let's just assume that we'll sweep that
detail

636
00:50:30,260 --> 00:50:35,540
away for the moment. We'll just say there's deposits and withdrawals. The coin, the
BTC,

637
00:50:35,540 --> 00:50:44,300
will travel slowly from sidechain to layer one mainchain. But the sidechain is going

638
00:50:44,300 --> 00:50:49,660
to procedurally generate. It generates exactly what this hash should be. And then
the miner's

639
00:50:49,660 --> 00:50:54,540
job is to just copy that over. Their job is never to just make up some new thing,
which

640
00:50:54,580 --> 00:51:00,420
is what they would have to do. They'd make up some new hash that pays someone else.
And

641
00:51:00,420 --> 00:51:04,860
you can see why that would be very difficult, because they would have to then decide
how

642
00:51:04,860 --> 00:51:09,860
they came up with that, whereas the sidechain software is doing it all
automatically.

643
00:51:09,860 --> 00:51:15,780
So that's why it's always sort of indefensible to do anything other than that,
because it's

644
00:51:15,780 --> 00:51:18,260
like, where did that come from?

645
00:51:19,260 --> 00:51:24,780
OK, well, you sip some water. I got to play another ad because I forgot about this.
I'm

646
00:51:24,780 --> 00:51:31,380
supposed to play ads. How am I going to make a donation if you're listening to this?
If

647
00:51:31,380 --> 00:51:35,180
they drop me or whatever. Anyway, I'm going to play this ad and then we go back.
We're

648
00:51:35,180 --> 00:51:40,780
at 14.26 in the video. So that's almost halfway into it.

649
00:51:40,780 --> 00:51:47,180
Remember the paper wallet? Ah, yes. The good old days when you printed your Bitcoin
private

650
00:51:47,220 --> 00:51:53,220
key on an offline computer. It was so fun, but not really easy and totally not
secure.

651
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Today we have SadoDyme, a chip card that acts just like your good old paper wallet,
but

652
00:51:58,300 --> 00:52:03,140
with all the modern security features and top notch functionality. It turns your
Bitcoin

653
00:52:03,140 --> 00:52:07,740
into a bearer asset, which you can easily trade in person. Thanks to NFC, you can
use

654
00:52:07,740 --> 00:52:12,580
the SadoDyme card with your smartphone. Creating a new pair of Bitcoin keys takes
just two

655
00:52:12,580 --> 00:52:17,340
swipes. Check your balance in real time. Create multiple key pairs. Whenever you
want,

656
00:52:17,340 --> 00:52:22,100
you can reveal your Bitcoin wallet's private key with just a single click. The
simple uncluttered

657
00:52:22,100 --> 00:52:27,180
interface lets you quickly see if a key pair has been unsealed. Finally, the cold
storage

658
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you've been looking for. Available now on SadoDyme.io.

659
00:52:36,420 --> 00:52:42,420
One prediction, Paul, I think all of this debate, all this discussion about scaling

660
00:52:42,420 --> 00:52:47,420
Bitcoin is going to end up basically increasing the block size. I think that's going
to be

661
00:52:47,420 --> 00:52:52,100
the compromise that everyone makes. I'm not sure who's going to be happy with this,
but

662
00:52:52,100 --> 00:52:59,140
it seems like nobody wants to inflate the 21 million supply. It seems like people
don't

663
00:52:59,140 --> 00:53:02,900
want to wrap their heads around Drivechains. They think they're too complicated and
they're

664
00:53:02,980 --> 00:53:08,100
going to be like, oh, let's just turn one into two or four or whatever and move on.

665
00:53:10,340 --> 00:53:12,740
I mean, you might be right about that. I don't know, because people will.

666
00:53:13,620 --> 00:53:18,740
Yeah, that would be funny. You know, that would be very funny if people pivoted from

667
00:53:20,740 --> 00:53:24,500
like they take the Peter Todd view and they say it's going to be

668
00:53:26,980 --> 00:53:32,500
like something we understand, bigger blocks. Then now they'll say now the bandwidth
speeds

669
00:53:32,500 --> 00:53:39,380
and the hard drive costs are there. And that would be consistent with the whole like
people

670
00:53:39,380 --> 00:53:44,980
maintaining their control over. There's like a conspiracy theory about who controls
the code.

671
00:53:46,500 --> 00:53:49,540
So I guess I'd be kind of consistent with that conspiracy theory.

672
00:53:52,100 --> 00:53:55,780
Yep. I mean, we've got a lot of video. We've got to get through the whole video.

673
00:53:56,020 --> 00:53:56,340
Yeah.

674
00:54:00,420 --> 00:54:02,740
The next on the name, I've got John Carvalho.

675
00:54:03,860 --> 00:54:08,820
More importantly, look at it and say you can even do studies and say how much it
will cost

676
00:54:08,820 --> 00:54:13,460
the average person per year. You can actually assess it. You can't do that with
Drivechains.

677
00:54:13,460 --> 00:54:18,100
And more importantly, we need to like have a better understanding of what we mean
when we

678
00:54:18,100 --> 00:54:22,660
say scaling. Like there's scaling, like just making number go up of any concept that
you

679
00:54:22,660 --> 00:54:27,540
care about. And there's scaling of networks. Drivechains do not scale Bitcoin. They
scale

680
00:54:27,540 --> 00:54:32,660
the concept of blockchains. You know what I mean? Blockchains don't scale in
themselves.

681
00:54:32,660 --> 00:54:37,220
The end user needs to scale in the end in order to do network scaling. You need to
increase the

682
00:54:37,220 --> 00:54:41,780
capacity of the Bitcoin network. So it's not actually a form of scaling if you
aren't increasing

683
00:54:41,780 --> 00:54:46,660
the capacity for Bitcoin. Lightning network kind of is like a nice little hack
because

684
00:54:46,660 --> 00:54:51,460
it's like an alternative network, but it still uses Bitcoin transactions.

685
00:54:51,460 --> 00:54:55,700
So there is a little bit of a compromise and say that it affects the intensive
structure

686
00:54:55,700 --> 00:55:01,460
of miners, for example, but it's still Bitcoin transactions. And so it still scales
transactions.

687
00:55:02,740 --> 00:55:07,300
Let me try to address Serge's point about maximalism and tension. I think it's a
very

688
00:55:07,300 --> 00:55:15,620
popular opinion that maximalists are asking to put every use cases on Bitcoin. And
so the tensions

689
00:55:15,620 --> 00:55:20,580
seems to emerge because, wait, you don't like shitcoins. But when we try to do
shitcoin on

690
00:55:20,580 --> 00:55:25,620
Bitcoin, you get defensive. You don't like changing Bitcoin as well. So you have to
pick one, right?

691
00:55:25,620 --> 00:55:32,500
You cannot say everything on Bitcoin, but not this on Bitcoin. But I think one
fundamental

692
00:55:32,500 --> 00:55:37,060
misunderstanding is that the original maximalist position was not really,

693
00:55:37,060 --> 00:55:42,740
this should all go on Bitcoin or everything should go on Bitcoin. It was originally
either

694
00:55:42,740 --> 00:55:46,980
this use case that you're proposing, David, doesn't even make sense. So it's not
necessary

695
00:55:46,980 --> 00:55:51,700
that I want NFT on Bitcoin. Maybe I just think they're stupid and not interested in
running

696
00:55:51,700 --> 00:55:57,220
on my node. Or this thing, it's great, it's perfect, it's beautiful, but it should
just run

697
00:55:57,220 --> 00:56:02,900
on a database. So I remember one of the things I used to shield in 2017 was a great
website.

698
00:56:02,900 --> 00:56:09,780
It's still around. It's myblockchain.xyz. And it's a website where you can download
software.

699
00:56:09,780 --> 00:56:15,940
Your software is a blockchain. It's actually a fork of MySQL, but the tables are
renamed into

700
00:56:15,940 --> 00:56:21,700
blocks and records are renamed into transactions. And now you can run a blockchain.
So sometimes

701
00:56:21,700 --> 00:56:27,220
when people say, I want to do this, which doesn't require this decentralization or
security,

702
00:56:27,220 --> 00:56:32,820
my answer is usually not, do it on Bitcoin. But it's usually, that's OK, let's just
open a

703
00:56:32,820 --> 00:56:37,220
spreadsheet. Unless you have a specific reason not to do that. For example, do you
want to do

704
00:56:37,220 --> 00:56:42,580
something legal or partially or likely legal, as somebody would say, then maybe you
have to

705
00:56:42,580 --> 00:56:46,820
pretend you use a blockchain just as a shield against regulators. But if you're just
doing

706
00:56:46,820 --> 00:56:54,820
something like, I don't know, frogs, autographers of artists, just open up a
spreadsheet. It's

707
00:56:54,820 --> 00:56:59,380
enough. We don't want to change Bitcoin because we think your use case, not yours
specifically,

708
00:56:59,380 --> 00:57:05,220
is not even worth the effort to decentralize it because it's centralized anyway.
Like

709
00:57:05,780 --> 00:57:12,900
ICO projects where there is a marketing team, a network, a website with faces, just
open it

710
00:57:13,460 --> 00:57:19,700
in MySQL. Or compromise and use client-side validation techniques which scale
indefinitely

711
00:57:19,700 --> 00:57:25,220
and let you still have your database. So basically, unless you... But that's not
like, it's not like...

712
00:57:27,620 --> 00:57:31,140
No, actually, let's let Sergey, well, let's see what Sergey has to say.

713
00:57:32,100 --> 00:57:38,180
But that's the case for every other cryptocurrency. Like there are things that are

714
00:57:38,180 --> 00:57:43,060
reasonably decentralized, reasonably secure. Things like Litecoin, for example, that
like

715
00:57:43,060 --> 00:57:48,100
have been around since forever, live and thrive, work similarly like Bitcoin but
make some

716
00:57:48,100 --> 00:57:53,860
different trade-offs. And it seems that that seems to suit certain people and it's
not

717
00:57:53,860 --> 00:57:58,900
sort of declining or dying off or anything. It's sort of just doing its own thing.
And

718
00:57:58,900 --> 00:58:04,500
there are projects that matter where you know that you don't need a blockchain for
that.

719
00:58:05,140 --> 00:58:11,540
The answer does not really necessarily apply. But even Litecoin, you have assumed
that you

720
00:58:11,540 --> 00:58:18,020
have Bitcoin as a store of value because... Yeah, Litecoin wasn't great. I think the
smarter

721
00:58:18,020 --> 00:58:23,380
thing would be to say Zcash for privacy or you just say the scalability thing which
links all the

722
00:58:24,020 --> 00:58:29,140
wrongness of all the different answers. So like John Carvalho was saying,

723
00:58:29,140 --> 00:58:34,100
well, we don't want... He said the USF thing because he thinks that it's USF. But
again,

724
00:58:34,100 --> 00:58:40,260
as I've already explained, that's not true and that's not possible. And then he's
saying that

725
00:58:40,820 --> 00:58:46,100
Lightning can scale Bitcoin because it uses Bitcoin transactions.

726
00:58:48,340 --> 00:58:52,660
The reality though is that Lightning is probably not going to scale anything because
it's probably

727
00:58:52,980 --> 00:58:59,220
just going to be abandoned. Probably, I don't know, in five years we'll see. I'm not
sure,

728
00:58:59,220 --> 00:59:05,300
but at this rate, I don't think it will. The technical elite jumped ship last year,

729
00:59:05,300 --> 00:59:09,700
partially on John's podcast. So he did Lightning limitations, synonym spaces,

730
00:59:11,140 --> 00:59:16,180
and just play it if you want. If you think that Lightning has a bright future, just
press play.

731
00:59:16,260 --> 00:59:24,580
Just press play. And then I think we had... I think Ark was saying about the
fundamental

732
00:59:24,580 --> 00:59:33,460
limitations. He mentioned it. I think... Yeah. And then we have this idea about

733
00:59:33,460 --> 00:59:40,980
Giacomo saying that he is infallible when it comes to determining if the end user's
use case is

734
00:59:41,540 --> 00:59:51,220
legit or not. And so there's no toleration of any kind of creativity or novelty. But
even if there

735
00:59:51,220 --> 01:00:01,780
was no novelty, still the scaling idea is key. It is when John Carvalho says it
doesn't scale

736
01:00:02,340 --> 01:00:11,700
Bitcoin. What I mean by that is that every single person on the planet Earth, like a
week after

737
01:00:11,700 --> 01:00:19,860
activating BIP300, could all obtain Bitcoin in a wallet that has... where the money
is controlled

738
01:00:19,860 --> 01:00:26,180
by keys, and where they sign transactions, and where they could... each of them
could settle

739
01:00:26,500 --> 01:00:33,140
to L1. I mean, they can't all settle at once. But each of them could, if everyone
else doesn't

740
01:00:33,140 --> 01:00:38,500
want to at that particular moment, or they could join forces with someone who is and
move

741
01:00:38,500 --> 01:00:44,740
interoperably among these. Now, more people could use Bitcoin in that way than could
use

742
01:00:44,740 --> 01:00:49,300
the Lightning Network. Because Lightning Network does nothing except onboarding. So

743
01:00:50,260 --> 01:00:58,340
Giacomo misses the big use cases of just scaling Bitcoin and Zcash privacy.

744
01:00:59,140 --> 01:01:03,780
There's a whole argument to be made about, like, what will human creativity invent

745
01:01:03,780 --> 01:01:10,020
when it's free of these gatekeepers? But I think that was disappointing.

746
01:01:10,900 --> 01:01:16,740
Him saying that... you know, that's what I used to believe back in 2015, 2016.

747
01:01:17,940 --> 01:01:24,020
That the use case... no one will ever invent a good use case, and that it will be...
it will all

748
01:01:24,020 --> 01:01:33,060
just be databases or just people who are hopelessly deluded. But I don't believe
that at all anymore.

749
01:01:33,700 --> 01:01:39,380
I think that, in fact, the fact that we bet everything on Lightning proves how
foolish it

750
01:01:39,380 --> 01:01:49,300
was for us to presume that we know anything about what the end user will enjoy. So I
think that...

751
01:01:50,020 --> 01:01:56,660
Also, he is in direct conflict with, for example, Bruce Fenton. You mentioned the
ICOs and, like,

752
01:01:57,540 --> 01:02:03,220
the marketing team. Bruce Fenton, who has an enormous amount of experience in this
area,

753
01:02:04,100 --> 01:02:11,940
he says that even if there would be of enormous value, even if the company is itself
centralized,

754
01:02:11,940 --> 01:02:18,740
the process for issuing the corporation's shares and transferring them, he says, is

755
01:02:19,700 --> 01:02:27,060
a terrible and would be much... and I agree with him, and it would be much improved
if there was

756
01:02:27,060 --> 01:02:32,260
just a way to transfer these bearer instruments around. It would... they would still
be... the

757
01:02:32,260 --> 01:02:35,380
redemption of them would still be centralized. But that's, again, something like...
that's

758
01:02:35,380 --> 01:02:40,500
something like Tether as an example of that, where Tether is centralized to
redemption,

759
01:02:41,460 --> 01:02:45,220
but it really doesn't seem to matter for most people. Most people don't need to
redeem.

760
01:02:46,020 --> 01:02:50,980
They still get an enormous amount of value from the service. People love USDT.

761
01:02:54,820 --> 01:03:02,900
They really like it a lot. So I don't know, like... but the whole... the premise is
that

762
01:03:04,100 --> 01:03:10,900
Giacomo knows better than the inventor of something, and that it'll always be true.

763
01:03:10,980 --> 01:03:15,620
What was true and what people thought was true in 20... just because IBM did...
tried to do

764
01:03:15,620 --> 01:03:19,940
blockchain, whatever, healthcare on the blockchain, and it was a joke in 2016,

765
01:03:20,900 --> 01:03:25,700
then nothing... nothing useful will ever be invented, and there won't be any need to
tweak

766
01:03:25,700 --> 01:03:33,380
or change anything. And they're in response to new technology, new opportunities,
new innovation,

767
01:03:33,380 --> 01:03:40,020
new problems, new culture, new use case. So he's saying that it will just... we're
going to bet

768
01:03:40,020 --> 01:03:47,620
everything that no one will invent something cool ever again. Doesn't make any sense
to me.

769
01:03:48,660 --> 01:03:49,780
I don't know, Vlad, what do you think?

770
01:03:52,100 --> 01:03:56,660
Well, I don't think it matters what I think. This is all about you watching this and
reacting.

771
01:03:57,220 --> 01:04:00,740
Okay. All right, let's keep going then.

772
01:04:02,180 --> 01:04:06,900
So having Litecoin as a store of value, I mean, everybody's free, but come on. So
you have

773
01:04:06,900 --> 01:04:11,380
Bitcoin as a store of value. Now you want to transact very free and very cheap. So
what you

774
01:04:11,380 --> 01:04:16,420
need to do is a Bitcoin transaction to a centralized exchange, likely, if you don't
swap with Litecoin,

775
01:04:16,420 --> 01:04:20,100
to change it to Litecoin, to send it to your friend that eventually, or to the
merchant,

776
01:04:20,100 --> 01:04:25,540
that will have to send it back to an exchange, to send it on-chain to Bitcoin. So
either you go

777
01:04:25,540 --> 01:04:32,020
off-chain or maybe use Cashew or Fetimint, use a Chowmian Mint, something that
doesn't even create

778
01:04:32,020 --> 01:04:37,780
an old, new blockchain with a new form of money, with a slippage in price between in
and out.

779
01:04:37,780 --> 01:04:43,780
It's like, I want to do a swap with Monero to be more private. Okay, so I will do a
Bitcoin

780
01:04:43,780 --> 01:04:48,980
transaction, which is not very private, to some kind of market that could be even
decentralized,

781
01:04:48,980 --> 01:04:54,420
but the order book will be public, which will be a bottleneck in liquidity, so also
in an

782
01:04:54,420 --> 01:04:59,940
anonymity set. And then my merchant, eventually, if it doesn't want to lose money,
will convert

783
01:04:59,940 --> 01:05:05,380
back to Bitcoin. So maybe there is value in batching things, but most of these
narratives,

784
01:05:05,380 --> 01:05:10,900
they are not fighted off like, you should do that on Bitcoin. Most of the time it's,

785
01:05:11,460 --> 01:05:16,580
you should not do that, in my opinion. Sure, in your opinion, but like, it's a big
assumption,

786
01:05:17,140 --> 01:05:22,260
what you describe, like there's plenty of people who, you know, live their life
within the Monero

787
01:05:22,260 --> 01:05:28,180
ecosystem or in the Litecoin ecosystem and don't, and there are services that serve
them and so on.

788
01:05:28,180 --> 01:05:32,900
So there are definitely, like indisputably, economies within.

789
01:05:32,900 --> 01:05:38,260
They should be free. There are people that on TikTok, they pay girls to pretend to
be

790
01:05:38,260 --> 01:05:42,660
NPC video game characters. They pay a lot of money. They should be free to do that.
I don't

791
01:05:42,660 --> 01:05:47,540
want necessarily my system to enable them to do that. And I can criticize, I can say
they're

792
01:05:47,540 --> 01:05:53,220
stupid, but I will never initiate violence against them. So people should shitcoin
and learn.

793
01:05:53,220 --> 01:05:59,060
Anyway, Monero is an interesting thing where it does have a very interesting
advantage over

794
01:05:59,060 --> 01:06:04,020
Bitcoin for things that are maybe less than legal, which is it's very difficult to
use

795
01:06:04,020 --> 01:06:09,300
Monero in such a way that your privacy is terrible. You know, the low bar on Monero

796
01:06:09,300 --> 01:06:13,940
is much higher than Bitcoin. Yeah, just due to how the software happens to go work.

797
01:06:13,940 --> 01:06:17,860
Now, obviously you could go design a new Bitcoin payment standard where that was
true too.

798
01:06:17,940 --> 01:06:22,820
And you could imagine like, you know, lightning, triple secure, and that's the only
thing like

799
01:06:22,820 --> 01:06:28,180
dark markets would support. But that's just not how the ecosystems happen. So that's
Monero's niche.

800
01:06:28,180 --> 01:06:34,340
I think censorship resistance and privacy for anyone who wants it for whatever use
case

801
01:06:34,340 --> 01:06:38,500
they're using it for. And I think it's best placed on Bitcoin. We want the
developers,

802
01:06:38,500 --> 01:06:43,780
we want the users, we want Bitcoin to be the backbone of the world's economy in the
future.

803
01:06:43,860 --> 01:06:49,140
And just because we here use Bitcoin in a certain way, it doesn't mean that the rest
of the world

804
01:06:49,140 --> 01:06:52,340
and the future users of Bitcoin won't want to use it in a different way. Like, how
do we make

805
01:06:52,340 --> 01:06:56,900
that possible? Like, what proposals exist out there to make that possible without
just suggesting

806
01:06:56,900 --> 01:07:01,140
that they use a custodial service or using a federation which may get civil
attacked?

807
01:07:01,140 --> 01:07:07,940
So what Drivetrain posited with the, but I suppose the issue is really mining
decentralization.

808
01:07:07,940 --> 01:07:11,620
Like, they're offloading the idea of running all these separate federations, which
can be

809
01:07:11,620 --> 01:07:15,060
very troublesome. Federations are hard to run. Just, you know, ask anyone who has a
federation

810
01:07:15,780 --> 01:07:22,180
for any popular Bitcoin sidechain. You would offload that onto miners. But I'm not
saying

811
01:07:22,180 --> 01:07:25,220
it's a particularly good idea to do that, because you're empowering miners. But I'm
just saying that

812
01:07:25,220 --> 01:07:30,980
I can understand why it's a proposal. They're interested in trying to cater for all
the world's

813
01:07:30,980 --> 01:07:36,500
needs. Well, I should point out that the thing with Drivechains mining
centralization is that

814
01:07:36,500 --> 01:07:39,940
it's not so much like, oh, Drivechains would be okay if we could get mining.

815
01:07:41,540 --> 01:07:48,100
Okay, I mean, I just wanted to, before whatever this is happens, all of that was
pretty good,

816
01:07:48,100 --> 01:07:54,740
wasn't it? A lot of people, like the Monero example is much better. Peter Todd
admitted

817
01:07:54,740 --> 01:08:02,660
that it was a niche. No one is even giving John the microphone, so he's not saying
anything,

818
01:08:02,660 --> 01:08:11,620
which is great. And yeah, privacy is important to people. Monero undisputably is
real,

819
01:08:11,620 --> 01:08:16,820
and there are services for that. And yeah, the idea is you shouldn't compare this to

820
01:08:17,380 --> 01:08:21,860
L1 block space. You should say, what can we do, what can we give everyone in the
world that they

821
01:08:21,860 --> 01:08:32,340
would actually like, you know, that would actually work for them. So people do seem
to

822
01:08:32,340 --> 01:08:42,180
be getting it, I think. Did you see this live? No, unfortunately, I was outside. I
was promoting

823
01:08:42,180 --> 01:08:49,300
my magazine, but I watched this on live stream. Okay, can you tell me, did as many
people attend

824
01:08:49,300 --> 01:08:56,260
this year as last year? No, it was a smaller event, and it was a different, much
smaller.

825
01:08:58,020 --> 01:09:03,620
Was it a different venue? No, it was the same venue, and it felt more like a family
reunion,

826
01:09:03,620 --> 01:09:09,220
as opposed to a conference. Yeah, you know, the Miami conference was also smaller,
so that,

827
01:09:09,220 --> 01:09:15,220
I think the whole space is shrinking, because it was the post-COVID high of just the
euphoria of

828
01:09:15,860 --> 01:09:19,860
breaking free of COVID. No, it's more than that. It was the first year

829
01:09:21,780 --> 01:09:28,420
during the bull market, and then the year after the bull market, and now it's two
years into the

830
01:09:28,420 --> 01:09:33,780
bear market, and people are tired, and they just want the number to go up for some
reason,

831
01:09:33,780 --> 01:09:41,060
and they don't want to spend too much. I did notice that the market dynamics are
different

832
01:09:41,060 --> 01:09:46,580
right now, and everyone complains that nobody's spending their Bitcoin, and all
businesses are

833
01:09:46,580 --> 01:09:54,100
downsizing. As far as I know, Bitcoin Magazine fired half of their staff last month.
Yeah,

834
01:09:54,100 --> 01:10:01,940
CoinDesk also. It's like this. I also noticed on my website that the number of
searches,

835
01:10:01,940 --> 01:10:09,780
I mean, 80% of my traffic on bitcointakeover.com is driven by search engines, and I
noticed that

836
01:10:09,780 --> 01:10:15,540
the amount of clicks is decreasing. I went from, I think during the bull market, I
had

837
01:10:15,540 --> 01:10:21,860
around 500 views a day on articles. Now I have about maybe less than 100.

838
01:10:25,300 --> 01:10:30,420
It's like that. Also, the podcast is not doing so great, but if you're listening to
this, I'm

839
01:10:30,420 --> 01:10:39,460
really grateful. Me too. This is a good one. There's so many bad Bitcoin podcasts
that are just

840
01:10:40,420 --> 01:10:43,540
unlistenable. They're making more money than me.

841
01:10:47,460 --> 01:10:50,820
Yeah, I just said, if you have something that's really, really generic and
predictable,

842
01:10:52,100 --> 01:10:56,180
that would do really well. It's kind of depressing when you think about it, and I
don't want to

843
01:10:56,180 --> 01:11:01,300
change the subject to be this about myself, but if I just did a podcast where I just
said Bitcoin is

844
01:11:01,300 --> 01:11:06,820
going to $1 million and talk about this every day and say it's invincible, it's
unstoppable,

845
01:11:06,820 --> 01:11:11,460
it's a rock, you cannot change it, you cannot move it, there's nothing you can do to
it. Everyone

846
01:11:11,460 --> 01:11:16,420
who tries to change Bitcoin is a scammer. We don't need anything. It's just perfect.

847
01:11:17,700 --> 01:11:22,500
Satoshi was an alien. He was a time traveler. He was a genius. He was this and that.

848
01:11:23,060 --> 01:11:27,220
I could make so much money if I did that. Also, if I had a British accent.

849
01:11:28,020 --> 01:11:33,300
But I don't. I choose to follow this path, and it's hard.

850
01:11:33,300 --> 01:11:36,420
No, it will pay off, Vlad. Don't worry. It's going to pay off. Trust me.

851
01:11:37,700 --> 01:11:40,340
That's what I like to think, but, you know, then you look at...

852
01:11:41,460 --> 01:11:45,780
Yeah, I know. Why are you taking advice from me? Okay, what are you looking at?

853
01:11:47,940 --> 01:11:50,340
Never mind. Let's just continue watching. Nobody wants to hear me complain.

854
01:11:50,340 --> 01:11:56,260
I was just curious, because I would have liked to know, what is the audience paying
attention?

855
01:11:56,980 --> 01:12:02,580
Do they laugh at anything? Are they really interested? Because this kicked off this
panel,

856
01:12:02,580 --> 01:12:05,940
and then there was one throwaway joke about ordinals, and then everyone felt
compelled to

857
01:12:05,940 --> 01:12:11,780
talk about this idea. Now it does seem like they got it out of their system. They're
a little,

858
01:12:12,340 --> 01:12:17,700
you know, they're whinging and complaining, and they're avenging, and now they're
kind of like,

859
01:12:17,700 --> 01:12:25,300
okay, wait a minute. On the criterion of what do we give the people who want ring
signatures?

860
01:12:25,300 --> 01:12:32,420
What do we give the people who want something to use tomorrow, or who are willing to
change

861
01:12:32,420 --> 01:12:37,860
the security trade-off? What do we give the people, the Ethereum people? They're
like, we've

862
01:12:37,860 --> 01:12:44,260
got nothing. Paul's idea is the only idea. So they're not quite saying that, but
they're sort of,

863
01:12:44,260 --> 01:12:51,460
you know, people sort of get it a little bit. So, but now we're going to hear Peter
dump cold

864
01:12:51,460 --> 01:13:00,180
water over everyone, or they'll try, I suppose. Maybe. Also, before I press play, I
just want to

865
01:13:00,180 --> 01:13:06,580
make this remark. Last year you were there on this exact panel about unpopular
opinions,

866
01:13:06,580 --> 01:13:10,740
but they did not talk about Drivechains as much as they did when you were not there.

867
01:13:11,460 --> 01:13:16,820
Well, I remember that I changed it to Drivechain at some point. We talked about it
the whole time,

868
01:13:16,820 --> 01:13:20,660
and then I said, how much time do we have, right? And then they said, just keep
going. The whole

869
01:13:20,660 --> 01:13:26,100
audience was like, keep going. So then we did talk about it for a little bit. I
don't know,

870
01:13:26,100 --> 01:13:30,340
did you actually time it out? I would be interested to know how far we got it on
last

871
01:13:30,340 --> 01:13:37,220
year. Maybe it was like 25 minutes. I don't know. No, it was longer. But the whole
panel was very

872
01:13:37,220 --> 01:13:43,780
long last year, but I don't know how much, there was like a Drivechain section. So I
don't know

873
01:13:43,780 --> 01:13:48,900
if we compared them. I honestly don't know if we made it to half an hour. I don't,
this seems like

874
01:13:48,900 --> 01:13:57,540
it was more, you're right. Yes. Anyway, let's push on. Mining to be centralized is
that having

875
01:13:57,540 --> 01:14:02,180
things like Drivechains makes mining inherently more centralized because it makes it
much more

876
01:14:02,180 --> 01:14:09,700
complex. And once you start getting these failure modes, you cannot be a P2 pool
miner in a drive

877
01:14:09,700 --> 01:14:15,940
chains world so easily. That's your real issue. But I also kind of want to say, as
much as you

878
01:14:16,020 --> 01:14:20,420
talk about, well, lightning can't support this, lightning can't support that, we're
probably 10

879
01:14:20,420 --> 01:14:26,900
years away from lightning even beginning to hit these limits in terms of actual
adoption. 10

880
01:14:26,900 --> 01:14:32,020
years is a long time. For all I know, in five years we're going to invent lightning
2.0 and

881
01:14:32,020 --> 01:14:36,100
we'll fix all these problems. I don't know, 2008 happened in the blink of an eye and
it could

882
01:14:36,100 --> 01:14:40,820
happen again. I don't want to be a scaremonger. And also for all the unbanked
regions of the

883
01:14:40,820 --> 01:14:45,780
world which want access to decent and stable money, you can laugh at that, but I
think it's

884
01:14:45,780 --> 01:14:49,300
important that they have access to it and how do we give them access to it and how
do we give them

885
01:14:49,300 --> 01:14:55,540
access to it now. I just don't see Bitcoin getting to that level of growth that
quickly.

886
01:14:57,540 --> 01:15:01,540
So if we're talking about mining, like, maybe

887
01:15:01,724 --> 01:15:13,724
the fact that these Drivechains exist and we're relying upon those miners to not
collude and then steal our money, maybe that is the thing which then adds, puts more
energy into projects like Stratum V2.

888
01:15:13,724 --> 01:15:17,724
All right guys, we ate up 23 minutes on Drivechains. Maybe we can try one more.

889
01:15:17,724 --> 01:15:22,724
Can I make a quick summary, just that, like to summarize, you said we want this.
There's no we.

890
01:15:22,724 --> 01:15:30,724
The problem is that we all want different things and that will never stop being
true. And so you only ever can expect the lowest common denominator out of Bitcoin.

891
01:15:30,724 --> 01:15:34,724
I'm just talking about all the conflicting souls inside my brain.

892
01:15:34,724 --> 01:15:50,724
And I think we need to start talking and communicating more clearly about the goal
conflicts that we have, because even within this room, we have very different goals
for Bitcoin that create these tensions.

893
01:15:50,724 --> 01:15:59,724
And oftentimes I see people just talking past each other because this guy has this
goal and this guy has that goal in their attention and then they argue.

894
01:15:59,724 --> 01:16:09,724
Whereas in reality, it's like, yeah, this is my goal. This is my goal. OK, we could
also be civil and find some kind of common ground because that's the only thing
that's going to end up happening anyway.

895
01:16:09,724 --> 01:16:14,724
This is the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, like often within that kind
of maximus ideology.

896
01:16:14,724 --> 01:16:19,724
Rhetoric is very important because it is something, it's a security mechanism for
Bitcoin.

897
01:16:19,724 --> 01:16:26,724
But we do not, the dialectic is good that we have, you know, different conflicting
ideas, which then find synthesis and that's how you progress.

898
01:16:26,724 --> 01:16:31,724
And if you just use rhetoric, you don't progress. So there's a balance to be had
where, yes, absolutely.

899
01:16:31,724 --> 01:16:37,724
I first heard the word drive chainer like a couple of days ago or yesterday on
Twitter and I was like, am I a drive chainer?

900
01:16:37,724 --> 01:16:44,724
Because I don't think it's an altogether terrible idea or parts of it aren't a
terrible idea.

901
01:16:44,724 --> 01:16:50,724
So let me go back to something you said earlier, which is probably also a source of
contention that we can all talk about.

902
01:16:50,724 --> 01:16:57,724
I think you said increasing the block size on Bitcoin would be a better idea than
Drivechains. Did I hear you correctly?

903
01:16:57,724 --> 01:17:04,724
Increasing the block size is a better idea than Drivechains for the purpose of
increasing the block size.

904
01:17:04,724 --> 01:17:09,724
OK, so does that take us into block size wars 2.0?

905
01:17:10,724 --> 01:17:12,724
You're going to pay for this later on.

906
01:17:12,724 --> 01:17:18,724
There is a version of Drivechains advocacy that says we're going to do this to go
scale Bitcoin.

907
01:17:18,724 --> 01:17:24,724
And what that advocacy really is, is we're going to do this so we can increase the
block size to increasing the block size.

908
01:17:24,724 --> 01:17:36,724
And that way of increasing the block size, allowing more transactions per second,
it's far more technically complex and in particular, much more politically complex
than just increasing the block size.

909
01:17:36,724 --> 01:17:40,724
In a way, Peter's joke is a little bit like Paul Sztorc's move.

910
01:17:40,724 --> 01:17:50,724
The Blockstream version of miner-based SPV, fraud-proof-based sidechain, was so
complex and it trusted miners anyway.

911
01:17:50,724 --> 01:17:54,724
So Paul said, let's just do something more obvious, which does the same thing,
trusting miners.

912
01:17:54,724 --> 01:17:57,724
And Peter says, OK, that will create basically a block size increase.

913
01:17:57,724 --> 01:18:00,724
At this point, you could basically just increase the blocks.

914
01:18:01,724 --> 01:18:14,724
So I think that it was Adam maybe today in another panel saying that eventually, in
some years, the long tail, social long tail of the block size war will basically
begin to evaporate.

915
01:18:14,724 --> 01:18:19,724
And we will be able maybe to discuss block size limit again a little bit.

916
01:18:19,724 --> 01:18:26,724
For example, some, most of the people disagree with the GigaMech of the block.

917
01:18:27,724 --> 01:18:32,724
OK, now we're touching on very advanced and nuanced concepts, which is very good.

918
01:18:32,724 --> 01:18:36,724
And in fact, so many went that I had to fix some notes.

919
01:18:36,724 --> 01:18:42,724
But I think, OK, so Peter Todd is seriously saying that we won't have to worry about
this for 10 years because we'll grow that slowly.

920
01:18:42,724 --> 01:18:46,724
Like that, I think, is I don't agree with that at all.

921
01:18:46,724 --> 01:18:50,724
I think that is that's a really weird thing to presume.

922
01:18:51,724 --> 01:18:55,724
I think that Bitcoin has grown so quickly.

923
01:18:55,724 --> 01:18:59,724
And I agree 2008 could happen at any moment.

924
01:18:59,724 --> 01:19:10,724
I honestly think, you know, the long run fiscal situation of the United States
government is also like, you know, we don't know where the line is, but at some
point it will be will be hit.

925
01:19:10,724 --> 01:19:14,724
And that would be a great day for Bitcoin.

926
01:19:15,724 --> 01:19:33,724
I also think it's like until we show people that we actually could scale to eight
billion people in some form, no one will take it seriously because they'll just
think like, well, that that project will grow to its maximum size and then it will
hit a wall.

927
01:19:33,724 --> 01:19:37,724
And then everyone who involved, everyone involved, you have to switch the whole.

928
01:19:37,724 --> 01:19:39,724
I think money is a lot like a language.

929
01:19:40,724 --> 01:19:45,724
Personally, everyone's going to have to switch at like basically the same time.

930
01:19:45,724 --> 01:19:48,724
That's part of why I think everyone's so preoccupied with the price.

931
01:19:48,724 --> 01:19:49,724
But so I don't know.

932
01:19:49,724 --> 01:19:51,724
I think that it's very weird.

933
01:19:51,724 --> 01:20:00,724
And then for Peter Todd to say that it is a block size increase is untrue because,
first of all, the proposal, there's a line of code that changes the block size.

934
01:20:00,724 --> 01:20:04,724
And this line, this 500 does not change that line of code.

935
01:20:04,724 --> 01:20:12,724
But also the idea of what the block size is, has nothing to do with what miners do.

936
01:20:12,724 --> 01:20:14,724
Absolutely nothing whatsoever.

937
01:20:14,724 --> 01:20:18,724
It's just the cost of running an L1 full node.

938
01:20:19,724 --> 01:20:30,724
So if the miners need to do natural gas flaring credit, so the miners need to buy
ASICs and they can't make it with FPGAs or CPU mining that they need to do.

939
01:20:30,724 --> 01:20:34,724
But what miners do has nothing to do with the block size debate.

940
01:20:34,724 --> 01:20:41,724
It was all about how difficult it would be to run a node, how difficult it would be
to measure confirmations for yourself without relying on someone else.

941
01:20:41,724 --> 01:20:43,724
The node is like the cell.

942
01:20:43,724 --> 01:20:45,724
It's like a bacterial cell.

943
01:20:45,724 --> 01:20:55,724
So if all the cells are killed, the node cell can regenerate just like the character
cell from Dragon Ball Z.

944
01:20:55,724 --> 01:20:56,724
OK.

945
01:20:56,724 --> 01:20:58,724
Maybe these analogies are not very good.

946
01:20:58,724 --> 01:21:01,724
But the point is, at one point, he goes down to one cell.

947
01:21:01,724 --> 01:21:02,724
You know what I'm talking about, Vlad?

948
01:21:02,724 --> 01:21:04,724
And then that's it.

949
01:21:04,724 --> 01:21:06,724
Because each cell has the same DNA.

950
01:21:06,724 --> 01:21:10,724
One node can regenerate the whole network if it shuts down.

951
01:21:10,724 --> 01:21:14,724
So it's the cost of starting up the new node is the cost of the cell dividing.

952
01:21:14,724 --> 01:21:16,724
That is the only thing that matters.

953
01:21:16,724 --> 01:21:21,724
And what miners need to do, if we cared about that, we would just remove the
difficulty adjustments from blocks.

954
01:21:21,724 --> 01:21:25,724
And then Peter is going to say something about, like, what about the fixed cost of
mining?

955
01:21:25,724 --> 01:21:33,724
There really is no such thing because the miners are going to minimize their costs
using whatever combination of fixed and variable costs they find appropriate for
their time horizon.

956
01:21:33,724 --> 01:21:36,724
And that's always been the case and that always will be the case.

957
01:21:37,724 --> 01:21:41,724
The fixed cost of running these nodes is also basically zero anyway.

958
01:21:41,724 --> 01:21:45,724
It costs nothing because the regular users have to run these nodes.

959
01:21:45,724 --> 01:21:50,724
If the nodes are too expensive, the miners will all use Blind Merged Mining to shirk
the cost.

960
01:21:50,724 --> 01:21:52,724
So that cost is zero.

961
01:21:52,724 --> 01:21:54,724
So the whole thing is just so gigantic.

962
01:21:54,724 --> 01:21:58,724
Anyone who says that it is a block size increase is completely and totally false.

963
01:21:58,724 --> 01:22:04,724
This is my attempt, honestly, to protect the block size limit and keep it small.

964
01:22:05,724 --> 01:22:09,724
And so I completely and totally disagree with that 100 percent.

965
01:22:09,724 --> 01:22:14,724
And then I wrote the word social, but I don't remember why.

966
01:22:14,724 --> 01:22:20,724
Oh, I think he's – oh, because Giacomo is talking about the scars of the block size
war.

967
01:22:20,724 --> 01:22:28,724
But this is – but now you start to see – now they're really talking about it because
now what they're kind of saying is – except for Peter Todd.

968
01:22:28,724 --> 01:22:30,724
And who knows what John Carvalho is saying.

969
01:22:30,724 --> 01:22:32,724
I really don't.

970
01:22:32,724 --> 01:22:39,724
I think he's getting a little bit of like a Vinnie Gupta blah, blah, blah kind of
vibe.

971
01:22:39,724 --> 01:22:41,724
Like I don't even really know what he's talking about.

972
01:22:41,724 --> 01:22:49,724
But what they're kind of saying now is we have no other good idea.

973
01:22:49,724 --> 01:22:55,724
This idea is good, but a whole set of ideas can't even be discussed for an
irrational social reason.

974
01:22:55,724 --> 01:22:59,724
And so we need to wait until we're in a better mood.

975
01:23:00,724 --> 01:23:08,724
And you see then how just irrational it is.

976
01:23:08,724 --> 01:23:14,724
The idea that we would wait is I think a risk, a very big risk.

977
01:23:14,724 --> 01:23:17,724
Why would we do that?

978
01:23:17,724 --> 01:23:23,724
Well, I guess your proposal is too complex for most people to understand.

979
01:23:23,724 --> 01:23:25,724
And they're going to be like –

980
01:23:25,724 --> 01:23:27,724
It just counts to $13,000.

981
01:23:27,724 --> 01:23:29,724
That's all it does on L1.

982
01:23:29,724 --> 01:23:33,724
Most people never count it to more than $100,000 honestly.

983
01:23:33,724 --> 01:23:36,724
Yeah.

984
01:23:36,724 --> 01:23:39,724
Oh, well.

985
01:23:39,724 --> 01:23:41,724
Maybe we can do something.

986
01:23:41,724 --> 01:23:50,724
Maybe when I go to – I'll go to Bitcoin Amsterdam and I'll have like – we'll get
like a BIP300 exhibit somehow.

987
01:23:51,724 --> 01:23:52,724
It will just be a number.

988
01:23:52,724 --> 01:23:58,724
It will be a giant wheel that spins to $13,000 and then spins back.

989
01:23:58,724 --> 01:24:01,724
I don't know.

990
01:24:01,724 --> 01:24:04,724
I mean they say this and this, but they don't even like –

991
01:24:04,724 --> 01:24:07,724
So I hate to play this card because it is mean.

992
01:24:07,724 --> 01:24:12,724
But again, Giacomo, he didn't know that it was changed back to an opcode a long time
ago.

993
01:24:12,724 --> 01:24:14,724
So he was like, well, it's not really an opcode.

994
01:24:14,724 --> 01:24:16,724
But that means he hasn't opened –

995
01:24:16,724 --> 01:24:20,724
I hate to play it because it really doesn't matter that much.

996
01:24:20,724 --> 01:24:27,724
But he has not – you could prove that he has not opened the BIP text and just
glanced at it to like refresh his memory.

997
01:24:27,724 --> 01:24:32,724
Because it says right at the beginning, OpNot5.

998
01:24:32,724 --> 01:24:38,724
So it's like –

999
01:24:38,724 --> 01:24:40,724
Like what do you want me to do?

1000
01:24:40,724 --> 01:24:45,724
Even God needed a lump of clay when he created man, right?

1001
01:24:45,724 --> 01:24:49,724
So I can't literally do everything.

1002
01:24:49,724 --> 01:24:52,724
All right, now let's see what Giacomo has to say.

1003
01:24:52,724 --> 01:24:55,724
But some more nuanced takes about –

1004
01:24:55,724 --> 01:25:01,724
I remember Rosie Manningfield proposing elastic block size based on minimum fees.

1005
01:25:01,724 --> 01:25:04,724
There were some proposals that were not completely retarded.

1006
01:25:04,724 --> 01:25:07,724
So maybe some people will start discussing them again.

1007
01:25:07,724 --> 01:25:17,724
But the principle of not creating bad precedents, of organized minorities taking
over the rules for everybody,

1008
01:25:17,724 --> 01:25:24,724
and the principle of keeping the network rules reliable, predictable, honest,
backward-compatible,

1009
01:25:24,724 --> 01:25:28,724
that's really the point of the fork wars, even more the block size.

1010
01:25:28,724 --> 01:25:32,724
I think that many participants of the block size will not be opposed to –

1011
01:25:32,724 --> 01:25:36,724
actually, most of the people agreed to go to basically four megabytes with SegWit.

1012
01:25:36,724 --> 01:25:39,724
So most of the people were not really small blockers.

1013
01:25:39,724 --> 01:25:45,724
They were like, do not change Bitcoin, especially under the false pretense of some
kind of emergency,

1014
01:25:45,724 --> 01:25:52,724
if we don't have the buy-in of all the economy for certain reasons, predictable
times,

1015
01:25:52,724 --> 01:25:57,724
and after a lot of thinking and testing and discussing.

1016
01:25:57,724 --> 01:25:58,724
Of course, also –

1017
01:25:58,724 --> 01:26:00,724
Thank you.

1018
01:26:00,724 --> 01:26:03,724
You should not apply. That means I'm popular and I'm losing here.

1019
01:26:03,724 --> 01:26:05,724
Yeah, that was not unpopular.

1020
01:26:05,724 --> 01:26:10,724
I think I remember like, SegWit was basically 4x block size increase.

1021
01:26:10,724 --> 01:26:12,724
4x is not very big.

1022
01:26:12,724 --> 01:26:17,724
I mean, in a system like Bitcoin, you would expect to have safety margins.

1023
01:26:17,724 --> 01:26:22,724
You would expect the engineering to work still if the block size was like 10x
bigger,

1024
01:26:22,724 --> 01:26:25,724
because you want to have a 10x safety margin on all this stuff.

1025
01:26:25,724 --> 01:26:29,724
I mean, this is like half a trillion dollars worth of value right now.

1026
01:26:29,724 --> 01:26:32,724
You want big safety margins on this.

1027
01:26:32,724 --> 01:26:36,724
The thing with Drivechains is you get that safety – like, look at this way.

1028
01:26:36,724 --> 01:26:40,724
Could you go and run your node with maybe a 10x bigger hard drive?

1029
01:26:40,724 --> 01:26:44,724
How much more would that really cost you versus now being distracted

1030
01:26:44,724 --> 01:26:50,724
by a whole bunch of bullshit political crap about doing new ASFs to go and save
people's funds?

1031
01:26:50,724 --> 01:26:55,724
The latter occupies much more value in terms of your time, your attention,

1032
01:26:55,724 --> 01:26:58,724
than a slightly more expensive computer.

1033
01:26:58,724 --> 01:27:00,724
That's the real issue here.

1034
01:27:00,724 --> 01:27:03,724
And it's easier to hijack politically.

1035
01:27:03,724 --> 01:27:05,724
Much easier.

1036
01:27:05,724 --> 01:27:09,724
Well, again, I mean, it's designed so that people on layer one can't ignore it.

1037
01:27:09,724 --> 01:27:14,724
So he's right, it is the issue, but he doesn't seem to agree with me that I have
solved it.

1038
01:27:14,724 --> 01:27:19,724
So if you don't want to pay attention to those new ASFs, then don't,

1039
01:27:19,724 --> 01:27:23,724
because absolutely nothing bad can happen to you as a result of ignoring them.

1040
01:27:23,724 --> 01:27:25,724
You don't have to participate in any of these.

1041
01:27:25,724 --> 01:27:33,724
The security model is based on fees, and it involves some of the sidechains
failing.

1042
01:27:33,724 --> 01:27:40,724
So if it involves some of them failing, then how can it be that I require people to
care about USFs to protect?

1043
01:27:40,724 --> 01:27:42,724
No, I'm requiring some of them to fail.

1044
01:27:42,724 --> 01:27:44,724
I give examples.

1045
01:27:44,724 --> 01:27:53,724
In the 2016 one, in the video, I give an example of how there's competing versions
of a chain,

1046
01:27:53,724 --> 01:27:56,724
and it's actually in everyone's best interest for miners to kill the chain.

1047
01:27:56,724 --> 01:27:58,724
So I want the miners to kill the chain.

1048
01:27:58,724 --> 01:28:01,724
So I do not want the USF to succeed.

1049
01:28:01,724 --> 01:28:03,724
It's completely the opposite of the case.

1050
01:28:03,724 --> 01:28:09,724
So he's right about that being the issue, but I have already fixed the issue.

1051
01:28:09,724 --> 01:28:11,724
I have preemptively fixed it.

1052
01:28:11,724 --> 01:28:15,724
So it's – I don't know.

1053
01:28:15,724 --> 01:28:17,724
It's not the issue he thinks it is.

1054
01:28:17,724 --> 01:28:26,724
Anyone who's listening, you can ignore all of the – every Drivechain USF, just like
you ignore everything else probably.

1055
01:28:26,724 --> 01:28:30,724
So – and, of course, as I said before, they're actually hard forks.

1056
01:28:30,724 --> 01:28:31,724
They're not even USF.

1057
01:28:31,724 --> 01:28:33,724
They're UHF.

1058
01:28:33,724 --> 01:28:37,724
Let me think of what else to say.

1059
01:28:37,724 --> 01:28:45,724
The – yeah, the goal is to ignore – well, let me see.

1060
01:28:45,724 --> 01:28:46,724
I wrote down some stuff.

1061
01:28:46,724 --> 01:28:57,724
So like I agree with Giacomo that the hard fork – the problem was really the hard
fork, I thought, about –

1062
01:28:57,724 --> 01:29:03,724
I disagreed with large blockism because I thought it would be like the debt ceiling

1063
01:29:03,724 --> 01:29:06,724
where it would just raise all the time, and then what's the point?

1064
01:29:06,724 --> 01:29:16,724
But the issue is they had a terrible strategy, and the hard fork is too dangerous a
tool.

1065
01:29:16,724 --> 01:29:21,724
So I just kind of thought like they didn't know what they were doing, and they did
rush it.

1066
01:29:21,724 --> 01:29:28,724
And it's – yeah, it's interesting.

1067
01:29:28,724 --> 01:29:35,724
I mean it's kind of a catch-22 because they say we have to carefully discuss
everything,

1068
01:29:35,724 --> 01:29:38,724
but then only recently have they carefully discussed it,

1069
01:29:38,724 --> 01:29:44,724
and I think it's only because certain miners said they were very interested in
activating BIP300

1070
01:29:44,724 --> 01:29:46,724
that people are talking about it now.

1071
01:29:46,724 --> 01:29:53,724
So I think it's a little bit of a – we do suffer from a lack of an actual process

1072
01:29:53,724 --> 01:30:02,724
because it just means that it is something of a mob process.

1073
01:30:02,724 --> 01:30:05,724
But yeah, it's disappointing that Peter Todd believes that –

1074
01:30:05,724 --> 01:30:10,724
but it's interesting that he's riffing here, and then he read –

1075
01:30:10,724 --> 01:30:16,724
he clearly read some of the stuff I was tweeting in the run-up to TabConf while he
was –

1076
01:30:16,724 --> 01:30:19,724
if I'm remembering correctly, there was some time in between.

1077
01:30:19,724 --> 01:30:22,724
It was a week off or something.

1078
01:30:22,724 --> 01:30:29,724
So he didn't say any of this about UASFs at all in the debate with me.

1079
01:30:29,724 --> 01:30:33,724
So I guess he – here he's saying that's the main issue here,

1080
01:30:33,724 --> 01:30:36,724
but then when the debate with me, he switched back.

1081
01:30:36,724 --> 01:30:41,724
He switched completely off of that and didn't bring it up one time,

1082
01:30:41,724 --> 01:30:45,724
and he didn't bring it up at all, and he switched to this miner fixed cost thing.

1083
01:30:45,724 --> 01:30:51,724
So he had abandoned the – what he says here is the crucial thing.

1084
01:30:52,724 --> 01:30:57,724
He – it's something he abandoned when he had the debate with me in person in Atlanta
a week later.

1085
01:30:57,724 --> 01:31:00,724
So I don't know.

1086
01:31:00,724 --> 01:31:03,724
I mean I interpret that as him saying that he looked into it more,

1087
01:31:03,724 --> 01:31:06,724
and he realized that it is not based on UASFs.

1088
01:31:06,724 --> 01:31:09,724
It's based on fees, and that actually – he realized that I do want –

1089
01:31:09,724 --> 01:31:15,724
I want some of them to fail, which makes it really impossible to argue that it
relies on UASFs

1090
01:31:15,724 --> 01:31:20,724
since it's like which UASF do I want, failure or success.

1091
01:31:20,724 --> 01:31:24,724
I say they rise or fall in their fees.

1092
01:31:24,724 --> 01:31:26,724
They're like restaurants.

1093
01:31:26,724 --> 01:31:31,724
The threat of going bankrupt is what keeps the quality high.

1094
01:31:36,724 --> 01:31:40,724
When shitcoiners debate weak subjectivity,

1095
01:31:40,724 --> 01:31:46,724
like even if your node doesn't know the right sequence of transaction,

1096
01:31:46,724 --> 01:31:50,724
if it's slow enough, it will just go on Twitter and make it out socially.

1097
01:31:50,724 --> 01:31:53,724
But that's actually the part which is easier to manipulate.

1098
01:31:53,724 --> 01:31:56,724
You can have any kind of gatekeeper of the social discussion,

1099
01:31:56,724 --> 01:32:00,724
can easily create a campaign in which you think if you read –

1100
01:32:00,724 --> 01:32:02,724
you know how the block size wars ended,

1101
01:32:02,724 --> 01:32:06,724
but if you read the Reddit during the peak of the block size wars,

1102
01:32:06,724 --> 01:32:09,724
everybody was a super giga mega big blocker.

1103
01:32:09,724 --> 01:32:11,724
It was just completely derailed.

1104
01:32:11,724 --> 01:32:14,724
So moving the consensus –

1105
01:32:16,724 --> 01:32:17,724
I disagree with that.

1106
01:32:17,724 --> 01:32:21,724
For me, it was always clear that the small blockers had it.

1107
01:32:21,724 --> 01:32:23,724
But it's interesting that he feels that way.

1108
01:32:23,724 --> 01:32:27,724
I would be interested in hearing more about –

1109
01:32:27,724 --> 01:32:28,724
I just definitely don't think of –

1110
01:32:28,724 --> 01:32:36,724
r slash bitcoin was controlled by Thamos, who was a small blocker,

1111
01:32:36,724 --> 01:32:39,724
or was very supportive.

1112
01:32:39,724 --> 01:32:41,724
So I don't know why he would even say that.

1113
01:32:41,724 --> 01:32:43,724
That's a very strange thing to say.

1114
01:32:43,724 --> 01:32:45,724
I don't think very many people would agree with him,

1115
01:32:45,724 --> 01:32:46,724
but maybe not.

1116
01:32:46,724 --> 01:32:51,724
But yeah, like discussion of block size increases and hard forks

1117
01:32:51,724 --> 01:32:54,724
was like purged from r slash bitcoin.

1118
01:32:54,724 --> 01:32:57,724
That was one of the things Roger Ver wouldn't stop complaining about.

1119
01:32:57,724 --> 01:32:59,724
He would complain about it all the time.

1120
01:32:59,724 --> 01:33:00,724
So I disagree with that.

1121
01:33:00,724 --> 01:33:04,724
And this idea that, again, it's social consensus.

1122
01:33:04,724 --> 01:33:08,724
This is only – if you're only on L1, none of this is affecting you.

1123
01:33:08,724 --> 01:33:11,724
It's only if you're on L2 that you have to worry about a hypothetical

1124
01:33:11,724 --> 01:33:15,724
persuasion of the miners to take the coins for some reason.

1125
01:33:15,724 --> 01:33:20,724
There is no sense in which the miners are convinced to send the coins

1126
01:33:20,724 --> 01:33:24,724
to a certain destination by humans.

1127
01:33:24,724 --> 01:33:28,724
If the sidechain software, which is committed to –

1128
01:33:28,724 --> 01:33:34,724
you commit to the actual software when you create.

1129
01:33:34,724 --> 01:33:39,724
When the sidechain takes slot seven or something, you commit to it.

1130
01:33:39,724 --> 01:33:44,724
That software, if you run it, it will tell you what the withdrawal hash is.

1131
01:33:44,724 --> 01:33:47,724
So there's no sense in which – I think there's this misconception

1132
01:33:47,724 --> 01:33:51,724
that the miners all meet and like they meet like in Vatican City

1133
01:33:51,724 --> 01:33:55,724
or something and they decide, okay, here's where all the coins should go.

1134
01:33:55,724 --> 01:33:57,724
But the sidechain software is what tells them.

1135
01:33:57,724 --> 01:33:59,724
It tells everyone.

1136
01:33:59,724 --> 01:34:03,724
It tells literally everyone who runs the software for free,

1137
01:34:03,724 --> 01:34:04,724
screams it.

1138
01:34:04,724 --> 01:34:05,724
It's in the header of every block.

1139
01:34:05,724 --> 01:34:07,724
It's at the ribbon in the bottom of the GUI.

1140
01:34:07,724 --> 01:34:08,724
It's everywhere.

1141
01:34:08,724 --> 01:34:10,724
They know where it should be.

1142
01:34:10,724 --> 01:34:13,724
If they want to do something else, they have to decide what that would be.

1143
01:34:13,724 --> 01:34:18,724
It has to be something that adds up to a transaction ID of a certain format

1144
01:34:18,724 --> 01:34:23,724
of something that will be withdrawn from the BIP300 UTXO.

1145
01:34:23,724 --> 01:34:30,724
So it's very weird if they – the persuaders really have a huge amount of work

1146
01:34:30,724 --> 01:34:32,724
cut out for them.

1147
01:34:32,724 --> 01:34:33,724
I don't know.

1148
01:34:33,724 --> 01:34:36,724
I think that this is, again, because Giacomo has not read the BIP.

1149
01:34:51,724 --> 01:34:54,724
Don't forget you're susceptible to legal too.

1150
01:34:54,724 --> 01:34:57,724
I mean right now I have two lawsuits against me from Craig Wright,

1151
01:34:57,724 --> 01:35:03,724
and one of them is to go recover his allegedly stolen coins.

1152
01:35:03,724 --> 01:35:06,724
And that is precisely the kind of legal action that you could expect

1153
01:35:06,724 --> 01:35:09,724
when you go have people losing coins on Drivechains that go fail

1154
01:35:09,724 --> 01:35:11,724
and you could easily have miners being sued.

1155
01:35:11,724 --> 01:35:14,724
Miners being sued.

1156
01:35:14,724 --> 01:35:20,724
You could, but, you know, like there's no sense in which –

1157
01:35:20,724 --> 01:35:21,724
like who are they going to sue?

1158
01:35:21,724 --> 01:35:22,724
Like a mining pool?

1159
01:35:22,724 --> 01:35:24,724
All of the mining pools?

1160
01:35:24,724 --> 01:35:28,724
One, you know, if you ever win, the mining pool can just dissolve.

1161
01:35:28,724 --> 01:35:34,724
This is the software we should build.

1162
01:35:34,724 --> 01:35:38,724
All the mining pools can, like, declare bankruptcy and just reform,

1163
01:35:38,724 --> 01:35:40,724
like with a click of a button.

1164
01:35:40,724 --> 01:35:46,724
But it's – I don't think, you know, you could sue,

1165
01:35:46,724 --> 01:35:50,724
but that's not how it would work because what would happen is there would be

1166
01:35:51,724 --> 01:35:55,724
a failure on the sidechain and there would be something like whatever,

1167
01:35:55,724 --> 01:35:57,724
the Dow, and there would be something over there.

1168
01:35:57,724 --> 01:36:01,724
But it would be according to Ethereum's rules, it would have the correct withdrawal.

1169
01:36:01,724 --> 01:36:07,724
And by the time you could even do this, the coins would have changed hands

1170
01:36:07,724 --> 01:36:09,724
and there would be new owners withdrawing them.

1171
01:36:09,724 --> 01:36:11,724
That's in the case where the miners are not stealing.

1172
01:36:11,724 --> 01:36:13,724
Maybe I'm not explaining this very well, but I'm saying if there's some kind of

1173
01:36:13,724 --> 01:36:17,724
hack or something confusing or something social or whatever,

1174
01:36:17,724 --> 01:36:20,724
it would be, like, too difficult.

1175
01:36:20,724 --> 01:36:24,724
It's only when – ironically, it's only because the Ethereum Dow hack

1176
01:36:24,724 --> 01:36:29,724
had this weird delay that it was even possible for them to try to stop it.

1177
01:36:29,724 --> 01:36:36,724
But if miners steal from the sidechain, in a sense, like the logic of BIP300

1178
01:36:36,724 --> 01:36:41,724
is that they should steal if the fees don't justify the chain.

1179
01:36:41,724 --> 01:36:44,724
So they are doing their job if they steal.

1180
01:36:44,724 --> 01:36:47,724
And the reason why they should not steal is because they want to maximize

1181
01:36:47,724 --> 01:36:50,724
the long-run transaction fee volume.

1182
01:36:50,724 --> 01:36:52,724
Everyone's afraid.

1183
01:36:52,724 --> 01:36:58,724
If you use Drivechain, you're afraid that your money will be stolen by miners.

1184
01:36:58,724 --> 01:37:03,724
But if you're a miner, you're afraid that no one will want to use the Drivechains

1185
01:37:03,724 --> 01:37:05,724
and you won't get the fee revenue.

1186
01:37:05,724 --> 01:37:10,724
So it's a mutual fear Mexican standoff.

1187
01:37:10,724 --> 01:37:12,724
That is how it works.

1188
01:37:12,724 --> 01:37:14,724
And, yeah, you can always be sued.

1189
01:37:14,724 --> 01:37:16,724
I mean, that would be great.

1190
01:37:16,724 --> 01:37:19,724
If lawsuits against miners would – that would decentralize mining.

1191
01:37:19,724 --> 01:37:23,724
I would be in favor of that because that's – what would be better

1192
01:37:23,724 --> 01:37:26,724
at decentralizing mining than that?

1193
01:37:26,724 --> 01:37:29,724
If we have enough of those, eventually we'll have mining pools

1194
01:37:29,724 --> 01:37:34,724
that are, like, completely open source and completely behind Tor or something.

1195
01:37:34,724 --> 01:37:36,724
That would be great, I think.

1196
01:37:37,724 --> 01:37:43,724
The fact that he uses Craig as Wright's frivolous lawsuit against him

1197
01:37:43,724 --> 01:37:48,724
as an example of why we should care about lawsuits is, I think, actually

1198
01:37:48,724 --> 01:37:51,724
180 degrees defeating the point.

1199
01:37:51,724 --> 01:37:54,724
He's just saying any idiot can sue any other idiot about anything.

1200
01:37:54,724 --> 01:37:59,724
So that's – who cares about that?

1201
01:37:59,724 --> 01:38:03,724
But it's true that – I guess it's a tiny nugget of truth in that it just

1202
01:38:03,724 --> 01:38:07,724
creates, like, salient days and salient, like, events.

1203
01:38:07,724 --> 01:38:14,724
Like this is the day of the withdrawal, kind of like the having.

1204
01:38:14,724 --> 01:38:16,724
So it creates, like, salient days.

1205
01:38:16,724 --> 01:38:21,724
And they can say on this day something else should have happened.

1206
01:38:21,724 --> 01:38:25,724
Isn't it ironic, though, that you were just telling me before that

1207
01:38:25,724 --> 01:38:29,724
Luke Dashjr. said the advantage of liquid is that you can sue

1208
01:38:29,724 --> 01:38:31,724
the people who withdraw.

1209
01:38:31,724 --> 01:38:35,724
Now it's a disadvantage because those people can be sued.

1210
01:38:35,724 --> 01:38:37,724
Blah, blah, blah.

1211
01:38:37,724 --> 01:38:39,724
You know, like, whatever, right?

1212
01:38:39,724 --> 01:38:40,724
You can't win.

1213
01:38:40,724 --> 01:38:42,724
That's the point.

1214
01:38:45,724 --> 01:38:50,724
Failed to go and mine the right side of that fork effectively.

1215
01:38:50,724 --> 01:38:52,724
You failed to prevent the theft happening.

1216
01:38:52,724 --> 01:38:57,724
You have a duty of care to go and, like, run this sidechain client

1217
01:38:57,724 --> 01:39:00,724
to go and validate those rules to make sure that forks didn't happen.

1218
01:39:00,724 --> 01:39:03,724
You know, you were being negligent by not running that code.

1219
01:39:03,724 --> 01:39:04,724
Oh, you're a small miner?

1220
01:39:04,724 --> 01:39:06,724
Oh, you just run, like, P2 pool or something?

1221
01:39:06,724 --> 01:39:08,724
Well, I mean, you're being very irresponsible here.

1222
01:39:08,724 --> 01:39:12,724
Why don't you go mine at a proper pool that can afford to go and

1223
01:39:12,724 --> 01:39:13,724
do its job?

1224
01:39:13,724 --> 01:39:14,724
Like, we don't want that.

1225
01:39:14,724 --> 01:39:18,724
So we all agree, basically, why we should have just put Peter

1226
01:39:18,724 --> 01:39:20,724
between Sergey and John.

1227
01:39:22,724 --> 01:39:25,724
Yeah, I want to address this P2 pool thing, because he brought it up

1228
01:39:25,724 --> 01:39:26,724
before and I didn't address it.

1229
01:39:26,724 --> 01:39:32,724
But Peter really wants everyone to use P2 pool, and he really doesn't

1230
01:39:32,724 --> 01:39:36,724
like the idea that there must be a loss of efficiency.

1231
01:39:40,724 --> 01:39:43,724
There are a lot of interesting ideas for changing the way people – but

1232
01:39:43,724 --> 01:39:46,724
for those of you who don't know, P2 pool was this neat idea where it

1233
01:39:46,724 --> 01:39:51,724
was a decentralized mining pool, and it had interesting properties,

1234
01:39:51,724 --> 01:39:56,724
such as when it found a block, the Coinbase paid out to, like,

1235
01:39:56,724 --> 01:40:00,724
a ton of people, because it paid everyone out, like, immediately.

1236
01:40:01,575 --> 01:40:06,575
So the Coinbase would be huge. I don't know how many outputs it had, but it was a
lot. Thousands.

1237
01:40:06,575 --> 01:40:22,575
And that, of course, made it kind of inefficient, because the right thing – you
know, the more efficient thing that involves some trust to do would be to just have
an account with the pool in mind, and then your account goes up, and then cash out.

1238
01:40:22,575 --> 01:40:44,575
But, of course, that has the downside of requiring trust. Various people have
mentioned different inventions and things over the years of trying to solve this
problem, but the problem doesn't seem to really exist, because, like I said, the way
the pool works is the miners can fire their pool, like, almost at any time.

1239
01:40:44,575 --> 01:41:01,575
They can point their hash at a completely different pool. They probably don't want
to or whatever. They like their pool, but they have a relationship with their pool.
But the pool cannot easily – you know, it's easy to start a new pool. It's not as
easy to just spin up, like, a new mining facility that has 15 percent of the hash
rate.

1240
01:41:01,575 --> 01:41:30,575
That would cost a fortune, and it's just like enormous organizational complexity, et
cetera. So for Peter, it's really important that mining not have a lot of trust, but
my point of view is that this is – you know, it's an admirable goal, but I think he
just doesn't understand Bitcoin mining, because Bitcoin mining is a relentless push
for efficiency every two weeks.

1241
01:41:31,575 --> 01:41:52,575
So every single stone that can be turned over and every single idea – the depths of
every idea that can be plumbed and – so it's not just that they'll cut a couple
corners to get a little bit of efficiency, and they'll cut – and P2Pool will be a
victim.

1242
01:41:52,575 --> 01:42:06,575
It's like everything will be a victim. It's just in the name of efficiency. And so I
don't – the P2Pool thing, just – to me, it just highlights the fact that Peter Todd
doesn't understand mining.

1243
01:42:06,575 --> 01:42:16,575
I mean I hate to say – I hate to be so dismissive, but what he's saying is like –
what he's really saying – I'm not sure if this will make sense or not, but he's
saying something like this.

1244
01:42:16,575 --> 01:42:45,575
If I declare to the world tomorrow, I say I'll give every miner $10 a year if they
join my pool. What Peter is saying is that like this will centralize mining, because
I'm – everyone will be going through me, and I will be able to deny people the $10,
and I will – but to my point of view is that it's all just like kind of missing the
point, which is that miners need to – they don't want to censor, and they want to
cut their profits.

1245
01:42:45,575 --> 01:42:55,575
And they want to cut their costs to the bare minimum, and so they will cut
everything. And the point – and the important thing is that we run our Layer 1 full
node to protect us against the miners' mistakes.

1246
01:42:55,575 --> 01:43:04,575
So it's my view that the nodes outrank the miners, but I don't think Peter Todd
realizes that his view is the reverse.

1247
01:43:05,575 --> 01:43:16,575
But I guess it's for the audience to decide if they can make any sense of any of
this. The miners may make mistakes, or they may do things that we don't like, but
our nodes will protect us.

1248
01:43:16,575 --> 01:43:31,575
Our nodes enforce the difficulty adjustments. Our nodes check every block to make
sure that it's valid, and the transactions – we don't want them to be censored, so
we attach a little bribe.

1249
01:43:32,575 --> 01:43:42,575
But yeah, Peter is trying to make all these arguments that say – basically, the
arguments are of the form if a miner is very, very inefficient, shouldn't we cut
them like miner welfare or something?

1250
01:43:43,575 --> 01:43:53,575
Miner EBT card. And maybe they – because we want them to be using a P2 pool or
something.

1251
01:43:55,575 --> 01:44:02,575
Because this problem of the concentration in powerful pools is really widespread,
but I don't have that view at all.

1252
01:44:02,575 --> 01:44:17,575
And my view is that pools have no agency, and that if a pool makes a mistake and
does something financially or economically irresponsible or even culturally
irresponsible, that the clients of the pool will just leave.

1253
01:44:17,575 --> 01:44:21,575
So they have a huge amount of leverage. They can walk out at any time.

1254
01:44:22,575 --> 01:44:31,575
It's like they live in a country where they can press a teleport button and leave.
No one really likes my analogies, but they can leave.

1255
01:44:31,575 --> 01:44:43,575
The pools are so vulnerable relative to the hashers, and they only exist because the
variance reduction makes them very important.

1256
01:44:44,575 --> 01:44:48,575
And it makes it so that they have – their brand is the only thing they have.

1257
01:44:48,575 --> 01:44:53,575
And so everyone makes these pie charts. It's these darn pie charts, I tell you.

1258
01:44:53,575 --> 01:44:59,575
And it's because – just because the data is available, they decide, I'll make a pie
chart.

1259
01:44:59,575 --> 01:45:02,575
And then everyone looks at the pie chart, and they think, oh my gosh, we don't like
that.

1260
01:45:02,575 --> 01:45:04,575
Foundry has such a big slice.

1261
01:45:05,575 --> 01:45:07,575
And they say, how can we get rid of that?

1262
01:45:08,575 --> 01:45:16,575
My view is all of that is just a giant misinterpretation of what Bitcoin mining is
and what pools do.

1263
01:45:16,575 --> 01:45:20,575
Pools make it easy for the small guy to mine because they get rid of the variance
reduction.

1264
01:45:21,575 --> 01:45:27,575
Anyway, I don't know. He's saying we should care about – we'll sacrifice anything.

1265
01:45:27,575 --> 01:45:37,575
We'll sacrifice global scale. We'll sacrifice Zcash privacy just so that P2Pool can
have an advantage that's not even real.

1266
01:45:37,575 --> 01:45:48,575
Because it's just as easily – the mining fixed costs are already zero, and they can
already switch pools at the drop of a hat.

1267
01:45:49,575 --> 01:45:55,575
I mean P2Pool was interesting, but people don't use it.

1268
01:45:55,575 --> 01:45:58,575
I think we should build some more stuff.

1269
01:45:58,575 --> 01:46:05,575
I think Ben Ark has it right where it's like if there's a – and now that – if
there's a problem, people will build the solution.

1270
01:46:06,575 --> 01:46:10,575
So what we should really do is wait for pools to start misbehaving, which currently
they don't.

1271
01:46:11,575 --> 01:46:16,575
And then we should build stuff to make it very, very easy to just switch pools.

1272
01:46:16,575 --> 01:46:21,575
But I think everyone knows that that would come, and that's why pools have always
been very well behaved.

1273
01:46:21,575 --> 01:46:23,575
It's too easy to leave the pool.

1274
01:46:23,575 --> 01:46:31,575
Anyway, this is a rambling answer now, but P2Pool is suggesting that existing pools
are doing something wrong, but they really aren't.

1275
01:46:31,575 --> 01:46:40,575
And that's why people use them, because actually they don't do – they have yet to do
anything inappropriate.

1276
01:46:43,575 --> 01:46:47,575
Jonan talked about zero confirmation and RBF. We messed up.

1277
01:46:48,575 --> 01:46:56,575
How about since we keep talking so much about the block size war, and there's been
what, six years now,

1278
01:46:56,575 --> 01:47:01,575
it would be interesting to discuss the review and sort of in hindsight to see, you
know,

1279
01:47:01,575 --> 01:47:08,575
which arguments were presented by each side and like hindsight bias.

1280
01:47:08,575 --> 01:47:12,575
Like there are a few that the big blockers got right.

1281
01:47:13,575 --> 01:47:20,575
I haven't changed my opinion on the subject, but some arguments ended up being true
in retrospect.

1282
01:47:20,575 --> 01:47:24,575
The problem is they hung everything on a hard fork. That was the problem.

1283
01:47:24,575 --> 01:47:29,575
You couldn't have a conversation where we don't have any technology or any research

1284
01:47:29,575 --> 01:47:33,575
where we can confidently do a transfer of value during a hard fork.

1285
01:47:33,575 --> 01:47:35,575
Yeah, I'm not looking to redo the debate.

1286
01:47:35,575 --> 01:47:39,575
It's a good proposal, but we'll have to do it next time, guys, because time is up.

1287
01:47:40,575 --> 01:47:46,575
We were deciding back then to scale smart rather than just make blocks bigger,

1288
01:47:46,575 --> 01:47:49,575
and it sounds to me like some people just want to make blocks bigger now.

1289
01:47:49,575 --> 01:47:53,575
Unfortunately, we're not going to make our time slot any bigger, but we could vote
for that maybe.

1290
01:47:57,575 --> 01:48:01,575
Guys, thank you so much for sharing your unpopular opinions. This was fun.

1291
01:48:04,575 --> 01:48:05,575
Thank you.

1292
01:48:09,575 --> 01:48:13,575
I don't think I would have rambled so much if I knew we were only moments from the
end.

1293
01:48:13,575 --> 01:48:18,575
Well, I mean, I hope someone got something out of this, my reaction to the panel.

1294
01:48:18,575 --> 01:48:23,575
That's interesting that it ate up the entire panel, and I don't know.

1295
01:48:26,575 --> 01:48:28,575
I don't know if anything left to be said.

1296
01:48:28,575 --> 01:48:30,575
Is anyone still listening? Probably not, right?

1297
01:48:30,575 --> 01:48:34,575
Who would make it for—I mean, Bitcoin and Sensor routinely go six hours.

1298
01:48:35,575 --> 01:48:40,575
Everyone I know in Bitcoin listens to the whole thing every time, so I think—who
knows?

1299
01:48:42,575 --> 01:48:44,575
Yeah, this was almost four hours long.

1300
01:48:45,575 --> 01:48:51,575
We're about to hit that mark, but it's certainly interesting the way that they poked
fun at voting

1301
01:48:51,575 --> 01:48:56,575
and the fact that they became so loose when it comes to the idea of increasing the
block size.

1302
01:48:56,575 --> 01:48:59,575
They're like, yeah, they see it as a compromise.

1303
01:49:05,575 --> 01:49:07,575
I mean, I wonder about that.

1304
01:49:10,575 --> 01:49:11,575
I do wonder about that.

1305
01:49:11,575 --> 01:49:17,575
So, I mean, Peter Todd, he considers it a block size increase if miners are
persuaded to do it at all,

1306
01:49:17,575 --> 01:49:19,575
even the tiniest amount.

1307
01:49:20,575 --> 01:49:27,575
So to him, buying an ASIC is a block size increase, or is it? I don't know.