1
00:00:00,522 --> 00:00:11,562
Welcome, everyone.

2
00:00:11,562 --> 00:00:29,321
Come on up and share a comment or question if you'd like.

3
00:00:29,321 --> 00:00:38,441
I have placed in the nest a recent tweet from LayerTwo Labs.

4
00:00:38,441 --> 00:00:53,161
This is a link to an article about Drivechain published by CoinMarketCap.

5
00:00:53,161 --> 00:00:56,641
The article by CoinMarketCap is quite good.

6
00:00:56,641 --> 00:01:02,242
It's a lengthy article and it discusses Drivechain and other matters.

7
00:01:02,242 --> 00:01:09,002
The main topic of the article by CoinMarketCap is the Bitcoin security budget and whether

8
00:01:09,002 --> 00:01:12,462
it is sustainable.

9
00:01:12,462 --> 00:01:19,202
One of the motivations for Drivechain today is to increase fees for Bitcoin so that the

10
00:01:19,202 --> 00:01:29,081
miners have lots of income because that is what causes Bitcoin to be secure from an economic

11
00:01:29,081 --> 00:01:32,081
security standpoint.

12
00:01:32,081 --> 00:01:40,882
And by that, I mean, what would it cost someone to try to be a hostile majority miner attacker?

13
00:01:40,882 --> 00:01:46,882
What would it cost someone to try to have so much hash rate that they can make the network

14
00:01:46,882 --> 00:01:50,581
unusable as a hostile miner?

15
00:01:50,581 --> 00:01:58,322
So if the cost of doing that is high, then we can say that Bitcoin is highly secure and

16
00:01:58,322 --> 00:02:03,282
we want fees to go up to keep Bitcoin secure.

17
00:02:03,282 --> 00:02:12,602
So that is one of the benefits of a successful adoption of Drivechain.

18
00:02:12,602 --> 00:02:20,801
The idea that it would increase fees paid to miners.

19
00:02:20,801 --> 00:02:27,361
And the article by CoinMarketCap that I have put in the nest here on the spaces addresses

20
00:02:27,361 --> 00:02:29,561
those questions.

21
00:02:29,561 --> 00:02:40,322
Will Bitcoin be secure in the future and could Drivechain increase the fees for Bitcoin?

22
00:02:40,441 --> 00:02:56,482
Moon Settler, if you'd like to come up and chat, you're welcome to.

23
00:02:56,482 --> 00:03:01,721
So this article that I'm talking about, which I put in the nest, is called The Ultimate

24
00:03:01,721 --> 00:03:05,962
Deep Dive into Bitcoin's Security Model.

25
00:03:05,962 --> 00:03:08,842
And it's by a reporter at CoinMarketCap.

26
00:03:08,842 --> 00:03:12,822
And he asks, is Bitcoin's current security model flawed?

27
00:03:12,822 --> 00:03:21,762
What could be done to the Bitcoin network to ensure it is sustainable?

28
00:03:21,762 --> 00:03:35,441
And at the end of the article, he says, is merged mining a wildcard solution?

29
00:03:35,441 --> 00:03:42,522
And he says, Bitcoin researcher Paul Sztorc suggests merged mining in his own two-part

30
00:03:42,522 --> 00:03:48,721
deep dive into the Bitcoin security budget.

31
00:03:48,721 --> 00:03:55,001
Mining these sidechains would increase miners' revenues and de facto increase the block size.

32
00:03:55,001 --> 00:03:59,281
Storz refutes the claim that merged mining is prone to centralization and inherently

33
00:03:59,281 --> 00:04:01,001
not secure enough.

34
00:04:01,001 --> 00:04:06,602
He contends that mining is already significantly centralized and that centralization through

35
00:04:06,602 --> 00:04:12,982
specialization is not a security risk as long as the decentralization of nodes is guaranteed.

36
00:04:12,982 --> 00:04:15,842
So this article is pretty great.

37
00:04:15,842 --> 00:04:24,601
It discusses many interesting things related to Bitcoin's security and touches on Drivechain.

38
00:04:24,601 --> 00:04:29,002
So I liked it.

39
00:04:29,002 --> 00:04:32,242
The article author also makes a strong claim.

40
00:04:32,242 --> 00:04:38,562
He says, to conclude, Bitcoin's security model is unsustainable as it stands today.

41
00:04:38,562 --> 00:04:44,801
In other words, Bitcoin with 2022 adoption rates and lower block rewards will be much

42
00:04:44,801 --> 00:04:48,942
more vulnerable to an attack two halvings from now.

43
00:04:48,942 --> 00:04:53,842
But luckily, the community still has time to figure things out.

44
00:04:53,842 --> 00:05:00,921
So this author at CoinMarketCap apparently is convinced that Drivechain is very worthy

45
00:05:00,921 --> 00:05:09,962
of consideration as a potential great solution to the security budget questions.

46
00:05:09,962 --> 00:05:14,201
Welcome to those who've joined the listening group.

47
00:05:14,201 --> 00:05:18,041
Everyone is welcome to raise your hand and come on up to the stage and talk about anything

48
00:05:18,041 --> 00:05:25,881
you'd like related to Drivechain, sidechains, Bitcoin economic security, any of the topics

49
00:05:25,881 --> 00:05:35,081
that we're touching on today.

50
00:05:35,081 --> 00:05:50,321
Well, we have a quiet audience.

51
00:05:50,321 --> 00:05:54,402
Nobody yet has raised their hand to come on up.

52
00:05:54,402 --> 00:06:00,442
The goal of these Twitter spaces is to just be an open forum for conversation, interviews

53
00:06:00,442 --> 00:06:03,601
and discussions about Drivechain.

54
00:06:03,601 --> 00:06:09,242
So we host them every Monday and Thursday.

55
00:06:09,242 --> 00:06:11,081
I'm Henry at LayerTwo Labs.

56
00:06:40,242 --> 00:06:46,442
Well, surely someone has a comment.

57
00:06:46,442 --> 00:06:47,442
Don't be shy.

58
00:06:47,442 --> 00:07:11,962
Come on up to the stage if you'd like.

59
00:07:11,962 --> 00:07:16,321
Moon Settler, I see your tweet that you are cooking and not able to speak.

60
00:07:16,321 --> 00:07:17,321
That's understandable.

61
00:07:17,321 --> 00:07:18,321
That's understandable.

62
00:07:18,321 --> 00:07:19,321
No problem.

63
00:07:20,321 --> 00:07:31,321
No problem.

64
00:07:31,321 --> 00:07:56,041
I have sent a note to our special invitee today.

65
00:07:56,041 --> 00:08:00,282
I was expecting a special guest to come and chat.

66
00:08:00,282 --> 00:08:01,282
Hopefully he'll join soon.

67
00:08:01,282 --> 00:08:02,282
Thank you.

68
00:08:30,282 --> 00:08:48,042
There have been a lot of great Drivechain related tweets lately.

69
00:08:48,042 --> 00:08:56,121
Various people online are sharing all kinds of interesting ideas about

70
00:08:56,121 --> 00:08:58,121
Drivechain and sidechains.

71
00:09:26,121 --> 00:09:39,881
Well, this is one of the calmest Drivechain Twitter spaces we've ever had.

72
00:09:39,881 --> 00:09:45,842
Usually people want to come on up and share their thoughts and ideas.

73
00:09:45,842 --> 00:09:49,761
Sometimes we've had many tweets to discuss.

74
00:09:49,761 --> 00:09:55,441
I can find some and put them in the nest and maybe that will prompt more conversation.

75
00:09:55,441 --> 00:10:11,321
There have been a number of tweets lately that were quite interesting.

76
00:10:11,321 --> 00:10:16,362
We might have discussed this on Monday, but five days ago Adam Back put out a tweet on

77
00:10:16,362 --> 00:10:22,641
Drivechain and I've put it in the nest now for our review.

78
00:10:22,641 --> 00:10:28,881
He wrote to Roger Veer, better still, Bitcoin adds a Drivechain as I suggested to you in

79
00:10:28,881 --> 00:10:34,241
person a few times pre-forks.

80
00:10:34,241 --> 00:10:40,681
So this is a great tweet from Adam talking about how Roger and he had discussed Drivechain

81
00:10:40,681 --> 00:10:52,001
in the past and he goes on in the tweets to describe Drivechain as a win-win large

82
00:10:52,001 --> 00:10:56,321
block Drivechain.

83
00:10:56,321 --> 00:10:58,321
So that's a great idea.

84
00:10:58,321 --> 00:11:04,641
The idea of having a large block version of Bitcoin as a sidechain enabling everyone who

85
00:11:04,641 --> 00:11:13,482
likes large blocks to use a sidechain of Bitcoin and pay fees to Bitcoin miners and

86
00:11:13,482 --> 00:11:22,362
maintain exposure to Bitcoin as a unit of account and when they're done return to holding

87
00:11:22,362 --> 00:11:26,162
actual layer one Bitcoin.

88
00:11:26,162 --> 00:11:34,321
So this arrangement would avoid the creation of a speculative altcoin.

89
00:11:34,321 --> 00:11:35,681
That's the beauty of Drivechain.

90
00:11:35,681 --> 00:11:44,162
It enables people to have the software of an altcoin while having the economics of Bitcoin.

91
00:11:44,162 --> 00:11:56,282
So ah, our special guest has arrived, delightful, Post Capone.

92
00:11:56,282 --> 00:12:03,441
I've invited you to speak.

93
00:12:03,441 --> 00:12:09,681
Come on up to the stage if you'd like.

94
00:12:09,681 --> 00:12:16,561
Hey, I'm glad you're here.

95
00:12:16,561 --> 00:12:24,681
All right, so you're our special guest today.

96
00:12:24,681 --> 00:12:26,561
I look forward to this chat.

97
00:12:26,561 --> 00:12:29,321
I've heard you speak just a couple of times on Twitter.

98
00:12:29,321 --> 00:12:34,282
I know nothing about you and I found your Twitter bio kind of confusing.

99
00:12:34,282 --> 00:12:37,302
You mentioned Ethereum and Bitcoin in there, if I recall.

100
00:12:37,302 --> 00:12:42,081
So you are an interesting person as far as I'm concerned.

101
00:12:42,081 --> 00:12:46,862
I have no idea what you do for a living or what your background is in Bitcoin, except

102
00:12:46,862 --> 00:12:52,441
that I heard you talking about ordinals this week and you sounded pretty informed, pretty

103
00:12:52,441 --> 00:12:53,482
technically savvy.

104
00:12:53,482 --> 00:12:57,422
So I'm curious to hear what are your thoughts on Drivechain?

105
00:12:57,422 --> 00:13:00,302
How do you feel about sidechains for Bitcoin?

106
00:13:00,302 --> 00:13:07,741
Are you optimistic that this project of Drivechain, if it becomes adopted by the community, could

107
00:13:07,741 --> 00:13:11,302
be transformative and great for Bitcoin?

108
00:13:11,302 --> 00:13:12,621
What are your thoughts on these things?

109
00:13:12,621 --> 00:13:20,282
Yeah, I mean, I think that additional layers are, you know, like an inescapable necessity.

110
00:13:20,282 --> 00:13:30,282
And I also think that if you can preserve simplicity in the L1, then, you know, keeping

111
00:13:30,282 --> 00:13:35,102
that simplicity as far as you can into the future is good.

112
00:13:35,102 --> 00:13:42,081
Like offloading computational throughput to some other layer is like great.

113
00:13:42,081 --> 00:13:47,081
To those ends, like BIP300, 301 makes a tremendous amount of sense.

114
00:13:47,081 --> 00:13:54,922
I'd say that as far as like sort of like packaged implementable schemes for doing other

115
00:13:54,922 --> 00:14:00,482
layers to Bitcoin or improving the general notion of like what a quote-unquote sidechain

116
00:14:00,482 --> 00:14:05,162
or merge line chain or what have you might should be, it's the one that probably makes

117
00:14:05,162 --> 00:14:10,241
the most sense, yeah.

118
00:14:10,241 --> 00:14:18,121
So you mentioned preserving simplicity on L1, meaning keeping L1 not complex.

119
00:14:18,121 --> 00:14:26,201
How do you feel about the fact that Ethereum has a complex L1 and with Drivechain, Bitcoin

120
00:14:26,201 --> 00:14:29,201
would aim to avoid complexity on the L1?

121
00:14:29,201 --> 00:14:36,121
Do you feel like there is like a future problem that could arise as a result of the complexity

122
00:14:36,121 --> 00:14:42,282
on Ethereum's L1 and when do you think that'll play out?

123
00:14:42,282 --> 00:14:44,042
And how would you, what would you call that problem?

124
00:14:44,042 --> 00:14:45,922
Does it have a name as a category?

125
00:14:45,922 --> 00:14:53,922
Oh, well, there's an inherent scaling limitation that you run into where the thing that, so

126
00:14:53,922 --> 00:14:59,482
if you, for those people that have been paying attention to the Orgles discussion, this is

127
00:14:59,482 --> 00:15:03,001
probably going to have a little bit more context, but maybe, you know, maybe we can circle back

128
00:15:03,001 --> 00:15:07,441
and talk about some things for the sake of, you know, the comparative case.

129
00:15:07,441 --> 00:15:13,761
But PSBTs, the mechanism by which we handle like trustless swaps of inscriptions would

130
00:15:13,761 --> 00:15:20,362
be like a very, very good example of, maybe it's like a 101 in this idea of offloading

131
00:15:20,362 --> 00:15:27,162
computation to some other sort of arbitrary or nebulously defined layer.

132
00:15:27,162 --> 00:15:31,941
A partially signed Bitcoin transaction that, you know, has to be fulfilled by your counterparty

133
00:15:31,941 --> 00:15:34,581
can be passed around off-chain.

134
00:15:34,581 --> 00:15:36,821
The state there can be updated and modified.

135
00:15:36,821 --> 00:15:39,741
You can increase the price, decrease the price.

136
00:15:39,741 --> 00:15:43,141
I guess, you know, if you're decreasing the price, there's really nothing to do but just

137
00:15:43,141 --> 00:15:46,941
simply create a new PSBT, right, because a rational actor is going to take whatever the

138
00:15:46,941 --> 00:15:47,941
lowest one is.

139
00:15:47,941 --> 00:15:53,621
So you can even do like Dutch auction formats where you like, you publish one, nobody buys

140
00:15:53,621 --> 00:15:56,621
it, and then you lower it by a little bit, publish another one, nobody buys it, and you

141
00:15:56,621 --> 00:15:59,662
lower it for a little bit, you know, nobody buys it, and you lower a bit, and then somebody

142
00:15:59,662 --> 00:16:00,662
buys it.

143
00:16:00,662 --> 00:16:05,222
So there's these steps, these iterative processes, this computation, this distribution of some

144
00:16:05,222 --> 00:16:09,422
data that can all happen off-chain, and it could, you know, it could be people text messaging

145
00:16:09,422 --> 00:16:13,982
each other, it could be posting it to a Discord, it could be stored to a database, it doesn't

146
00:16:13,982 --> 00:16:14,982
really matter.

147
00:16:14,982 --> 00:16:15,982
The L1 doesn't care.

148
00:16:15,982 --> 00:16:20,061
It can be a sort of, you know, we can say it can be as centralized or distributed as

149
00:16:20,061 --> 00:16:27,722
you want, and the scalability of that, like in that context, is really like the scalability

150
00:16:27,722 --> 00:16:30,261
of the web itself, right?

151
00:16:30,862 --> 00:16:33,061
So you're really not bound to much.

152
00:16:33,061 --> 00:16:38,741
And there are perhaps many other ways that you could leverage like cryptographic signatures

153
00:16:38,741 --> 00:16:42,982
and things like this to do other very neat, interesting things that fit the same sort

154
00:16:42,982 --> 00:16:45,381
of idea.

155
00:16:45,381 --> 00:16:52,102
And the L1 now, the sort of applications, extensibility, use cases of products in the

156
00:16:52,102 --> 00:16:58,941
L1 has massively opened up without you necessarily requiring additional computational throughput

157
00:16:58,941 --> 00:17:02,061
or design complexity in the L1.

158
00:17:02,061 --> 00:17:05,182
And I think that both of those matter quite a lot.

159
00:17:05,182 --> 00:17:10,902
You know, one, there's like these hard scaling limitations because the computation is like

160
00:17:10,902 --> 00:17:12,302
very, very redundant.

161
00:17:12,302 --> 00:17:18,302
The entire execution layer of Ethereum is burdened with, you know, the programmability

162
00:17:18,302 --> 00:17:20,361
of everybody's smart contract.

163
00:17:20,361 --> 00:17:25,662
If there's 10 people using the smart contract, 400,000 nodes got to, you know, they're not

164
00:17:25,662 --> 00:17:30,341
actually 400,000 nodes, but you know, like 400,000 sort of validator assignments have

165
00:17:30,341 --> 00:17:33,501
to have to attest to this computation, right?

166
00:17:34,621 --> 00:17:40,981
May I ask, do you think with the Ordinal's success, the success of that project becoming

167
00:17:40,981 --> 00:17:47,141
very popular and discussed, do you think that that is an indication that there is a growing

168
00:17:47,141 --> 00:17:52,981
interest within the Bitcoin community and within the crypto community, an interest to

169
00:17:52,981 --> 00:18:00,302
see Bitcoin be a platform for interesting applications other than simply money payments?

170
00:18:00,621 --> 00:18:01,902
Oh, sure. Yeah.

171
00:18:02,782 --> 00:18:08,782
I think that like the whole like NFTs on Bitcoin sort of meta conversation is like the head

172
00:18:08,782 --> 00:18:14,182
turner. But in reality, there's this there's this whole other kind of world of like these

173
00:18:14,182 --> 00:18:16,341
interesting things that have been going on in Bitcoin, right?

174
00:18:16,341 --> 00:18:19,902
Like whether it's whether you're looking at it from the lens like RGB or Terra or what

175
00:18:19,902 --> 00:18:24,662
have you. Like there's a lot of cool stuff that's gone on that I would imagine that kind

176
00:18:24,662 --> 00:18:27,022
of continues that thread of excitement.

177
00:18:28,182 --> 00:18:33,501
And I would think 300 301, as well as the validity rollups conversation, are also two

178
00:18:33,501 --> 00:18:38,542
like really exciting things for people to look at, like, you know, potential forward

179
00:18:38,542 --> 00:18:39,381
opportunities.

180
00:18:40,582 --> 00:18:46,542
Which of the sidechains that have been discussed within the drivechain community do you

181
00:18:46,542 --> 00:18:48,662
think is most interesting to you?

182
00:18:48,662 --> 00:18:55,302
For example, would you like to see on Bitcoin a privacy focused sidechain that uses Zcash

183
00:18:55,302 --> 00:19:00,861
technology? Or would you be interested in like a large block Thunder sidechain for

184
00:19:00,861 --> 00:19:04,381
scaling with, you know, small fees and huge throughput?

185
00:19:04,702 --> 00:19:12,461
Is that idea strike you as compelling or would it be a Ethereum clone that has smart

186
00:19:12,461 --> 00:19:18,101
contracts? And, you know, which which of those three or is there or Hivemind, for

187
00:19:18,101 --> 00:19:24,902
example, which is Paul Sztorc's own sidechain idea for a peer to peer Oracle network?

188
00:19:25,422 --> 00:19:30,101
Do you which of those three or four strikes you as the most compelling or is it all the

189
00:19:30,101 --> 00:19:36,062
above? Well, each side is just, you know, charming, you know, for a myriad of its own

190
00:19:36,062 --> 00:19:39,101
sort of even if lousy purposes.

191
00:19:39,782 --> 00:19:44,702
But also, I think the idea of like the Zcash drivechain, like a privacy focused drive

192
00:19:44,702 --> 00:19:46,261
chain is definitely very interesting.

193
00:19:47,022 --> 00:19:51,182
You like one of the ones you threw in there was like sort of the big block, right, like

194
00:19:51,182 --> 00:19:52,662
massive throughput kind of thing.

195
00:19:53,621 --> 00:20:00,422
This is like one of the only, I guess, criticisms of 301 that I can sort of like flirt

196
00:20:00,422 --> 00:20:07,341
with and sort of rationalize is the notion of like convoluted miner incentives where

197
00:20:08,902 --> 00:20:17,822
miners will some miners will participate in the verification of these drivechains and

198
00:20:17,822 --> 00:20:22,101
they'll have these ancillary revenues, which that in and of itself seems fine, right?

199
00:20:22,101 --> 00:20:28,381
Like miners can have whatever other hustle they want, but it could I could I could very

200
00:20:28,381 --> 00:20:37,582
easily see a scenario where it it starts to pour, you know, better reinvestment capital,

201
00:20:37,582 --> 00:20:42,221
more available revenues to miners with bigger and bigger infrastructures.

202
00:20:42,221 --> 00:20:48,381
And so we see further and further deepening of like centralization across the interests

203
00:20:48,381 --> 00:20:54,782
of miners, like, you know, perhaps mining pools can can sort of share resources for

204
00:20:54,782 --> 00:21:00,062
this, but you really start to deeply intermediate the roles of mining pools.

205
00:21:00,062 --> 00:21:02,662
And I can see that side of the criticism.

206
00:21:02,902 --> 00:21:08,261
So the stuff like the idea of like the big block extensible throughput kind of thing,

207
00:21:08,582 --> 00:21:12,702
those are the things where I'm like, I don't know that that might be where this gets a

208
00:21:12,702 --> 00:21:14,702
little bit more complicated of a conversation.

209
00:21:16,690 --> 00:21:26,690
Do you know how blind merged mining enables the miners to get the revenue from the sidechain without running the node of the sidechain?

210
00:21:26,690 --> 00:21:37,690
So I'm familiar in broad strokes with this, but I would actually be very curious to hear like more of an explanation of it, especially from the horse's mouth, so to speak.

211
00:21:38,690 --> 00:21:47,690
Yeah, maybe Moon Settler or others in the audience who are more technical technical than me can give like a review of it.

212
00:21:47,690 --> 00:22:00,690
That would that would be at your level, I think, just a sense of like how you your level of understanding of Bitcoin, I think, would would be that you would like to hear it from someone who's like a true engineer.

213
00:22:01,690 --> 00:22:23,690
In broad strokes, my understanding is what it enables is blind merged mining allows all Bitcoin miners to share in portions of the transaction fee revenue from the sidechains from these BIP301 sidechains without running the node of the sidechain.

214
00:22:23,690 --> 00:22:37,690
Now, the objectors and skeptics to drivechain would say, well, the the amount of revenue that the miners get would be higher slightly if they run this if they run the node.

215
00:22:37,690 --> 00:22:45,690
And of course, running the node of a large block sidechain with one gigabyte blocks every 10 minutes would be expensive.

216
00:22:46,690 --> 00:22:53,690
So maybe the the miners who can run that would would benefit.

217
00:22:53,690 --> 00:23:00,690
They get more revenue from the MEV or or other things, and then they have higher rates of profit.

218
00:23:00,690 --> 00:23:11,690
And therefore there would be centralization because or the word could be concentration in the sector of mining because of the larger, larger participants having more profit.

219
00:23:12,690 --> 00:23:20,690
And then that would lead to, you know, a diminution of of the of the decentralization of mining.

220
00:23:21,690 --> 00:23:36,690
But I think the counter argument to that, which is compelling, is that that this this argument against the centralizing effects, if any, of run of the higher profit going to those who run the nodes of the sidechain.

221
00:23:36,690 --> 00:23:38,690
The argument against that is that.

222
00:23:39,690 --> 00:23:43,690
It is an arbitrary prejudice against profitable software.

223
00:23:43,690 --> 00:24:00,690
The people who make this argument do not argue against the other centralizing effects in mining, such as large miners having a special arrangement with a power company to balance the grid at certain times.

224
00:24:01,690 --> 00:24:15,690
People don't complain about the large miners having economies of scale and erecting server farms in locations that are most efficient, that are cold, that are next to a power source, perhaps next to a stranded power source.

225
00:24:16,690 --> 00:24:26,690
So the people who object to merged mining, one of the errors they make is they have an arbitrary prejudice against profitable software.

226
00:24:27,690 --> 00:24:31,690
They do not object to forms of profit that do not take the form of software.

227
00:24:31,690 --> 00:24:45,690
And there is no rational basis for objecting to profitable software when the person is not objecting to the other many types of profitable activities that miners engage in that I just mentioned.

228
00:24:46,690 --> 00:24:55,690
So it all boils down to an aversion to merged mining, not merged mining that's blind specifically, but just merged mining in general.

229
00:24:55,690 --> 00:25:02,690
People say, oh, well, you have to run the node to make the most amount of money from the complex sidechains where there's MEV.

230
00:25:02,690 --> 00:25:05,690
So then, therefore, merged mining is not good.

231
00:25:06,690 --> 00:25:09,690
Merged mining has been in Bitcoin since the beginning of Bitcoin.

232
00:25:09,690 --> 00:25:24,690
And Satoshi himself explicitly endorsed in writing publicly the notion that merged mining could be a significant source of revenue for miners in the future, boosting Bitcoin's security.

233
00:25:24,690 --> 00:25:31,690
In other words, he explicitly acknowledged the security budget problem and said how merged mining could be a solution to it.

234
00:25:31,690 --> 00:25:33,690
That's what he wrote in the BitDNS thread.

235
00:25:33,690 --> 00:25:38,690
He said all the networks in the world would share CPU power, increasing total strength.

236
00:25:38,690 --> 00:25:51,690
So he's explicitly talking about the strength of the network in relation to the fees and how he wanted every blockchain to be merged mine with Bitcoin, which is exactly what Drivechain aspires to create.

237
00:25:51,690 --> 00:25:54,690
It will put everything on top of Bitcoin.

238
00:25:54,690 --> 00:25:56,690
Everything is merged mine with Bitcoin.

239
00:25:57,690 --> 00:26:04,690
And then we have much more fees because right now, you know, there are 15 times higher fees outside of Bitcoin than in Bitcoin.

240
00:26:04,690 --> 00:26:10,690
Bitcoin is missing out on almost all of the fees paid on blockchains.

241
00:26:10,690 --> 00:26:14,690
But if they were all merged mine with Bitcoin, we'd have a much higher rate of fees.

242
00:26:14,690 --> 00:26:21,690
And then there would be no calls for inflation and there wouldn't be this security budget criticism.

243
00:26:21,690 --> 00:26:27,690
Like every day on Twitter, I see the ETH Maxi saying Bitcoin doesn't have enough fees.

244
00:26:27,690 --> 00:26:29,690
It's going to have to do inflation.

245
00:26:29,690 --> 00:26:36,690
And what they don't know or what they don't want to say is that if Drivechain is adopted, the fees will go up.

246
00:26:36,690 --> 00:26:41,690
Just like Satoshi said, merged mining can increase the strength of the network.

247
00:26:41,690 --> 00:26:47,690
If we get more blockchains to be merged mined as Bitcoin sidechains, that would be great.

248
00:26:47,690 --> 00:26:54,690
So I feel like the critics that you're talking about, who talk about the miner incentives becoming convoluted, as you say,

249
00:26:54,690 --> 00:26:59,690
they need to, even if they're right, if we assume ad arguendo that they're correct.

250
00:26:59,690 --> 00:27:07,690
Even then, they should balance their criticism with the benefits that merged mining offers,

251
00:27:07,690 --> 00:27:10,690
which the creator of Bitcoin himself perceived.

252
00:27:10,690 --> 00:27:13,690
And Bitcoin has had merged mining for over a decade.

253
00:27:13,690 --> 00:27:16,690
And there has yet to be any problem from that.

254
00:27:16,690 --> 00:27:23,690
So I find it very puzzling that people are opposed to merged mining when it already exists.

255
00:27:23,690 --> 00:27:25,690
It's already a fine thing.

256
00:27:25,690 --> 00:27:29,690
And it solves a problem that we know we have to contend with.

257
00:27:29,690 --> 00:27:35,690
And if we don't go down the route of merged mining, then I think we'll have to eventually, you know,

258
00:27:35,690 --> 00:27:42,690
come to a fork in the road where one path is inflation and the other path is do nothing and just hope for the best.

259
00:27:42,690 --> 00:27:46,690
Do you agree with that analysis that we're going to confront that problem?

260
00:27:46,690 --> 00:27:49,690
I agree with several things in there.

261
00:27:49,690 --> 00:28:00,690
So one, I think that it's almost like a generic human tendency for us to sort of play telephone with each other's rationales.

262
00:28:00,690 --> 00:28:10,690
And that sometimes you can see this pattern where somebody understands the sort of nugget of a criticism,

263
00:28:10,690 --> 00:28:12,690
but doesn't necessarily extend the logic.

264
00:28:12,690 --> 00:28:15,690
And then you get these, you know, like, I think that's what you're describing, right?

265
00:28:15,690 --> 00:28:20,690
Like, OK, all right, I get it. So you've got this miner convolution argument, but you don't have that problem somewhere else.

266
00:28:20,690 --> 00:28:24,690
So you just haven't really, like, applied this rationale universally.

267
00:28:24,690 --> 00:28:28,690
You haven't really kind of consumed all the spaces that this affects.

268
00:28:28,690 --> 00:28:30,690
And I think I think that's totally fair.

269
00:28:30,690 --> 00:28:42,690
I do think that there are people that criticize it in that way and then would also have these other concerns and criticisms that might that might sort of like reduce down to.

270
00:28:42,690 --> 00:28:47,690
And it would be very reductive to frame it this way, but it might reduce down to something like, you know,

271
00:28:47,690 --> 00:28:59,690
Bitcoin needs to be considerate of like lowering the cost of beneficial participation in order to ensure that centralizing forces over time do not take root.

272
00:28:59,690 --> 00:29:06,690
And become sort of irreversible. But I.

273
00:29:06,690 --> 00:29:12,690
I would also agree that, like, we've seen a lot of, like, very deep similarities.

274
00:29:12,690 --> 00:29:18,690
And I would, you know, I don't think that you can really even deny that in context,

275
00:29:18,690 --> 00:29:23,690
there's sort of an implicit support from Satoshi for ideas such as this.

276
00:29:23,690 --> 00:29:41,690
And I absolutely agree that Bitcoin has sort of a decision to make that you might describe as like an existential crisis on some sort of like 40, 60, 80 year time horizon kind of thing where you either have to generate more fees or you have to consider a change to monetary policy.

277
00:29:41,690 --> 00:29:48,690
I so deeply just like so many people love to frame this under the context like Bitcoin must change its monetary policy.

278
00:29:48,690 --> 00:29:58,690
I'm sorry, it just doesn't like, you know, whether it's whether it's 300, 301 or just accelerating the general demand for block space.

279
00:29:58,690 --> 00:30:02,690
There are many ways in which it could be solved.

280
00:30:02,690 --> 00:30:14,690
Now, if it's if it's just generically accelerating the demand for block space, I think you have to get up to, like, an average fee rate of like 260 sats per byte or something like that within within like 40 years.

281
00:30:14,690 --> 00:30:21,690
So, like, really compensate on curve for the reduction in the block reward.

282
00:30:21,690 --> 00:30:27,690
So, you know, it's a steep, steep acceleration that you've got to you've got to meet.

283
00:30:27,690 --> 00:30:31,690
Yeah. Hopefully that answers that.

284
00:30:31,690 --> 00:30:34,690
Yeah. Yeah. You totally are on the same page.

285
00:30:34,690 --> 00:30:38,690
You understood everything I said completely.

286
00:30:38,690 --> 00:30:42,690
I agree with you. There's an interesting back and forth.

287
00:30:42,690 --> 00:30:45,690
Gabriel Kerman, welcome to the stage.

288
00:30:45,690 --> 00:30:47,690
Please chime in.

289
00:30:47,690 --> 00:30:51,690
Thank you very much, guys.

290
00:30:51,690 --> 00:30:59,690
First of all, I want to say I'm super excited to see that there's at least 10 Bitcoiners interested in discussing drivechains.

291
00:30:59,690 --> 00:31:04,690
So we're looking forward to see more of these discussions in the future.

292
00:31:04,690 --> 00:31:14,690
Just for some background, I'm a co-founder of Rustok, the Bitcoin sidechain that does merge mining and is compatible with Ethereum.

293
00:31:14,690 --> 00:31:18,690
So it's one of the examples that you guys were mentioning.

294
00:31:18,690 --> 00:31:29,690
So I just thought it could be good to give you some some flavor on what's going on and how we are experiencing some of the examples,

295
00:31:29,690 --> 00:31:37,690
theoretical examples that you mentioned that which are quite practical in every day for the Rustok ecosystem.

296
00:31:37,690 --> 00:31:45,690
So first of all, I think that the whole concept of drivechains and the evolution of the crypto a little bit different.

297
00:31:45,690 --> 00:31:53,690
So what I would try to focus on, what I answer when I get asked about the future of the ecosystem,

298
00:31:53,690 --> 00:32:06,690
the way I like to frame it is I believe that everything that is interesting in the blockchain space or crypto space will eventually be forked and built as a Bitcoin sidechain.

299
00:32:06,690 --> 00:32:15,690
So I believe that before these 40 years that we were mentioning before, we're going to see in the next decade a lot of censorship,

300
00:32:15,690 --> 00:32:27,690
a lot of backlash from governments trying to block everything that can compete with the failing fiat currencies and everything else that Bitcoin will fail.

301
00:32:27,690 --> 00:32:38,690
So if there is a good technology out there that's needed in the world, I believe eventually will be built as a Bitcoin sidechain.

302
00:32:38,690 --> 00:32:48,690
And even Bitcoin sidechains will be challenged in their decentralization and censorship resistance.

303
00:32:48,690 --> 00:32:58,690
And I believe the drivechain, it's the ultimate censorship resistance way to build the drivechain, to build a sidechain.

304
00:32:58,690 --> 00:33:03,690
So I think they're absolutely a must.

305
00:33:03,690 --> 00:33:16,690
That is something that we need to talk Bitcoiners and the ecosystem over the next couple of years to make sure that this is hopefully implemented because we will need it.

306
00:33:16,690 --> 00:33:26,690
I'm from Latin America, assume my guess by my accent, and we need a full financial system.

307
00:33:26,690 --> 00:33:36,690
We cannot solve the problems that we have in Argentina and Venezuela, Sri Lanka, Africa and Lebanon just with gold 2.0.

308
00:33:36,690 --> 00:33:43,690
We need a full micro loan and financial system that is fully automated.

309
00:33:43,690 --> 00:33:48,690
We believe smart contracts will probably be the ideal tool to build that.

310
00:33:48,690 --> 00:33:59,690
And that's what took us to build Roostock, trying to get all the functionality from solidity smart contracts, but built on top of Bitcoin infrastructure.

311
00:33:59,690 --> 00:34:03,690
So I'm super excited about we discussing drivechains.

312
00:34:03,690 --> 00:34:15,690
I think there's a lot to be discussed and a lot of collaboration needed among the different layer two projects that are building technology on top of Bitcoin.

313
00:34:15,690 --> 00:34:18,690
So we're very close to lightning, to liquid.

314
00:34:18,690 --> 00:34:24,690
We love Paul's push on drivechain.

315
00:34:25,690 --> 00:34:35,690
Regarding the centralization issue that you guys were mentioning in the case of RSK, the merchant mining is done through the mining pools.

316
00:34:35,690 --> 00:34:42,690
So the actual extra node or the RSK Roostock node that is being run is run by the mining pool.

317
00:34:42,690 --> 00:34:50,690
So it does not create any additional burden or hardware requirements for the miners.

318
00:34:50,690 --> 00:34:58,690
So in that sense, it doesn't centralize the mining, the Bitcoin mining more than it is today.

319
00:34:58,690 --> 00:35:07,690
So just to keep in mind, as of today, I think half of the Bitcoin hashing power is merchant mining RSK.

320
00:35:07,690 --> 00:35:18,690
So it's an incredible high number that makes Roostock many times more secure than Ethereum before moving to proof of stake.

321
00:35:18,690 --> 00:35:23,690
So now I think they cannot be compared, but it's quite exciting.

322
00:35:23,690 --> 00:35:34,690
And not many people know that we already have a Bitcoin sidechain that is secured through merchant mining by around 50% of the total Bitcoin hash rate.

323
00:35:34,690 --> 00:35:44,690
So this is around, I think today, around three Bitcoins per month that are being generated in extra fees because Roostock does not have a coin base.

324
00:35:44,690 --> 00:35:48,690
This is all fees based, small still.

325
00:35:48,690 --> 00:35:59,690
But if we fast forward a couple of decades with all the growth that we expect to see in DeFi on top of Bitcoin and the reduction in the coin base,

326
00:35:59,690 --> 00:36:08,690
it's going to be interesting and definitely can add sustainability to Bitcoin mining and the security budget overall.

327
00:36:08,690 --> 00:36:23,690
And just one final comment, the only argument that I've heard so far, which I know criticism that I think is compelling to the current drivechain proposal,

328
00:36:23,690 --> 00:36:32,690
especially talking about the BIP300 and 301, is that the code is too complex.

329
00:36:32,690 --> 00:36:36,690
I think it has around 6000 lines of code.

330
00:36:36,690 --> 00:36:40,690
I might be wrong. I don't know. But this is the number that comes to my mind right now.

331
00:36:40,690 --> 00:36:54,690
And I think after what we're seeing with SegWit, with Taproot, now with Ordinance and all the backlash, even for Softforks that we've seen recently in Bitcoin,

332
00:36:54,690 --> 00:37:06,690
I understand that probably it's impossible to get consensus in implementing something with this kind of complexity in the code.

333
00:37:07,690 --> 00:37:30,690
Even if all the core developers love the idea of drivechains, I find compelling the argument that the amount of code and changes required to implement this would open so many potential risks and backs and unexpected outcomes

334
00:37:30,690 --> 00:37:36,690
that probably that makes the whole thing impossible to move forward.

335
00:37:36,690 --> 00:37:48,690
Even like I'm a super drivechain fan and I think we have arguments that over time could be made to convince many Bitcoiners to support drivechains.

336
00:37:48,690 --> 00:37:53,690
But in that sense, I believe we need a minimalistic approach.

337
00:37:54,690 --> 00:38:09,690
And for those of you in the room who want to deep dive, Sergio Lerner, chief scientist of the Roostock project, has put together a proposal for a drivechain implementation.

338
00:38:09,690 --> 00:38:15,690
It doesn't have a VIP number yet, something that we are working on and we would love to work with the community.

339
00:38:15,690 --> 00:38:35,690
It's called R11. So if you Google and check R11 drivechain implementation by Sergio Lerner, you will see an approach that it's minimalistic in the number of lines of code that should be added to Bitcoin.

340
00:38:35,690 --> 00:38:39,690
So I don't know, probably you guys can come up with a better idea.

341
00:38:40,690 --> 00:38:42,690
But I think this is something that we should keep in mind.

342
00:38:42,690 --> 00:39:00,690
We need to understand how Bitcoin ecosystem was seven years ago when Paul came up with these beeps, how the ecosystem looks like now and how the politics and governance of Bitcoin work.

343
00:39:00,690 --> 00:39:03,690
You might like it, you might not.

344
00:39:03,690 --> 00:39:07,690
I think the governance of Bitcoin is one of its strengths.

345
00:39:10,690 --> 00:39:12,690
But it doesn't matter what I think.

346
00:39:13,690 --> 00:39:35,690
I believe that it's an interesting conversation to discuss whether if we ever see a drivechain implemented on Bitcoin, it will probably be a minimalistic code that has the least amount of complexity possible, just adding that functionality and enabling fully decentralized sidechains or drivechains.

347
00:39:36,690 --> 00:39:39,690
So overall, thank you very much for the invite.

348
00:39:39,690 --> 00:39:42,690
I'm really excited to see Bitcoiners discussing drivechain.

349
00:39:44,690 --> 00:39:55,690
And if anyone wants to learn more about what we're doing on Roostalk or if there's any way we can collaborate somehow to take drivechains forward, happy to help and participate.

350
00:39:55,690 --> 00:39:56,690
Thanks.

351
00:39:57,690 --> 00:39:58,690
Thank you.

352
00:39:59,690 --> 00:40:00,690
That was very interesting.

353
00:40:03,690 --> 00:40:10,690
So Roostalk is generating three Bitcoin per month in fees for Bitcoin miners.

354
00:40:10,690 --> 00:40:11,690
That's great.

355
00:40:11,690 --> 00:40:12,690
Yes.

356
00:40:13,690 --> 00:40:17,690
So you can see all the statistics of the Roostalk blockchain in that website.

357
00:40:17,690 --> 00:40:27,690
I saw Sergio's tweet where he said about a few weeks ago that it is the intention of the Roostalk community to develop into a drivechain.

358
00:40:28,690 --> 00:40:30,690
Once drivechains are possible on Bitcoin.

359
00:40:30,690 --> 00:40:41,690
And do you feel that Roostalk would benefit greatly because the peg would become peer-to-peer instead of federal?

360
00:40:42,690 --> 00:40:51,690
Would you use those terms to describe what the drivechain version of Roostalk would be in distinction from its current approach?

361
00:40:51,690 --> 00:40:56,690
Would you say that today it's federated and with a drivechain, it would be peer-to-peer?

362
00:40:56,690 --> 00:40:59,690
And that that is the main difference between a drivechain and a peer-to-peer?

363
00:40:59,690 --> 00:41:00,690
Yes.

364
00:41:00,690 --> 00:41:01,690
That's a good question.

365
00:41:01,690 --> 00:41:07,510
the Drivechain version of Rootstock would be in distinction from its current

366
00:41:07,510 --> 00:41:12,150
approach. you say that today it's federated and with a Drivechain, it would be peer -to

367
00:41:12,150 --> 00:41:17,270
-peer? And that that is the main difference between a sidechain today and a

368
00:41:17,346 --> 00:41:21,646
drivechain in the future is that it goes from federated - different.

369
00:41:21,926 --> 00:41:22,806
Peer to peer.

370
00:41:23,666 --> 00:41:26,186
A bit different and let me explain why.

371
00:41:27,026 --> 00:41:32,826
we as Bitcoiners, we want to be as decentralized as possible.

372
00:41:32,826 --> 00:41:33,001
We

373
00:41:33,001 --> 00:41:44,001
We believe that decentralization is the ultimate goal because we are building stuff that is so important that unless it's fully decentralized, it's going to get attacked by governments and organizations.

374
00:41:44,001 --> 00:41:58,001
The things that are at stake are so important. The world leaders and the G20 do not want Africa to be free, do not want freedom in the exchange of value across the world.

375
00:41:58,001 --> 00:42:15,001
So we need decentralization. There is a reason why we do not call the current version of Rustok federated because we need to make a distinction, for instance, between Rustok and Liquid.

376
00:42:15,001 --> 00:42:32,001
So Liquid is a federation. You have parties that hold their private keys in a secure environment, in a computer. They create the transactions and they signed those transactions in a multi-sig.

377
00:42:32,001 --> 00:42:45,001
So this is a federated sidechain. In the case of Liquid, they also create the blocks. So they do not have merge mining. So that's another difference from the Rustok architecture.

378
00:42:45,001 --> 00:43:10,001
In the Rustok architecture, the security and the immutability of the blocks is done through merge mining. And the pegnatories, as we call those members that participate in the multi-sig on Rustok, only participate in the way Bitcoins move from Bitcoin to Rustok back and forth.

379
00:43:10,001 --> 00:43:27,001
In the case of Rustok, when you move Bitcoins from Bitcoin to Rustok, that process is completely decentralized. So it's a smart contract on the Rustok side that reads what's happening on the Bitcoin side.

380
00:43:27,001 --> 00:43:42,001
When the Bitcoins get locked in a specific address, the smart contract releases the same amount of Satoshis or Bitcoins on the Rustok side. So that part on the way in to Rustok is fully decentralized.

381
00:43:42,001 --> 00:44:00,001
The challenge in sidechains is when you go back. Because Bitcoin is not smart and Bitcoins can only be held in multi-sig. So you need someone to sign that multi-sig. So what has the Rustok ecosystem developed?

382
00:44:00,001 --> 00:44:23,001
We tried to be the most trust-minimized possible option before the drivechain. So we developed something called the Proof-of-Work peg. Because as opposed to Liquid, where the federation members create the transactions and sign them and have access to the private keys.

383
00:44:23,001 --> 00:44:52,001
In the case of Rustok, the transactions to release the funds in Bitcoin are created by the bridge smart contract. So the pegnatories, as opposed to the federation members, are not the ones creating the transactions. They cannot make or include an illegal transaction into the way out of the sidechain.

384
00:44:53,001 --> 00:45:13,001
So the transactions to release the funds are created by the smart contract and the bridge only follows those transactions with the longest proof-of-work. That's why it's called a Proof-of-Work peg. Because it's secured by the proof-of-work of the smart contract in the longest chain.

385
00:45:13,001 --> 00:45:31,001
And the private keys of the pegnatories are held in tamper-proof physical devices. And the private keys cannot be accessed by the pegnatories. So pegnatories cannot collude to steal the funds.

386
00:45:31,001 --> 00:45:57,001
The only possible attack that these pegnatories could do is unplug the devices. And if that happens, and enough pegnatories unplug the devices, there is a very long period of time where the funds cannot move. And then a new backup federation comes into place to replace the original Proof-of-Work peg and replace with new physical devices.

387
00:45:58,001 --> 00:46:13,001
So it's not ideal, but the incentives to attack the pope are extremely low because these are well-known organizations. The whole ecosystem would know about the attack. And again, the only thing that that can do is unplug the devices.

388
00:46:13,001 --> 00:46:40,001
With the drivechain, what would be added to this is that you would have miners or mining pools signing the release of the funds every time they build a new block. So this could go 100% pure drivechain. So you eliminate the pegnatories and now only miners decide what to do with the funds.

389
00:46:41,001 --> 00:47:04,001
Or you could have a hybrid solution where you have separation of balance of powers, like in Western democracy, where you want to make sure that the miners make sure that the pope peg or pegnatories do not attack and the pegnatories make sure that the miners do not steal the funds.

390
00:47:05,001 --> 00:47:27,001
If I may try to see if I understand fully because I've enjoyed reading on the website and I enjoy the RSK Block Explorer. I've learned a little bit about it. If I understand correctly, RSK has succeeded in developing something which is an attempt to replicate drivechain as much as possible without a soft fork.

391
00:47:28,001 --> 00:47:43,001
So the peg in is not gated by parties. It's automatic. But the peg out, which is the essence of drivechain, the peg out, how do we get that to be as trustless as possible?

392
00:47:44,001 --> 00:47:58,001
So the RSK model is involving hash rate to some extent, but it is not as optimal as if it were a true complete drivechain. Is that a fair, very simple, very simplistic summary of what's going on?

393
00:47:59,001 --> 00:48:16,001
Yes, yes. And then we could discuss as an ecosystem the different alternatives, because I'm not convinced that a pure drivechain is the most secure. There are multiple attacks that mining pools could do. They could steal the funds.

394
00:48:17,001 --> 00:48:37,001
So then you also have a whole new area to discuss with hybrid drivechains. But the good thing is once the opcode is implemented in Bitcoin, each drivechain, each sidechain could decide, each community could decide what's the best security solution for the use case.

395
00:48:37,001 --> 00:48:55,001
But this would enable all kinds of drivechains, the pure drivechains only given the power to the miners, something hybrid, multiple options. But this would enable every single innovative technology built in the crypto space to be copied and built on top of Bitcoin.

396
00:48:56,001 --> 00:49:07,001
I'd like to welcome Moon Settler to the stage, one of our favorite speakers. Thanks for coming back. Please chime in in the conversation, Moon Settler.

397
00:49:08,001 --> 00:49:29,001
Hi, guys. I can't stay for long, but I would like to have a question to Gabriel. What do you think about implementing drivechain rules explicitly with this RSK like both peg mechanism?

398
00:49:29,001 --> 00:49:56,001
So basically, you would have these HSM signers that follow, implement inside the trusted enclave these drivechain rules basically for the escrow and approximate and prove the concept of drivechains that way without a fork.

399
00:49:59,001 --> 00:50:06,001
I'm not sure if I understood the question. I don't know if someone can explain it a bit better. I'm a bit confused.

400
00:50:07,001 --> 00:50:19,001
So the idea is that you don't have an anyone can spend script like in the drivechains proper, but you have, say, a multisig or a single sig. It doesn't matter much for the concept.

401
00:50:20,001 --> 00:50:37,001
And basically, you would have a similar construct like now in RSK that if the signers are disabled, then there is a fallback mechanism that can even fall back to a legal layer.

402
00:50:38,001 --> 00:50:54,001
So the coins probably don't get lost forever. But in normal operation, you basically have a sign that can only sign withdrawals if the BIP300 rule set is being followed.

403
00:50:54,001 --> 00:51:20,001
So like I said, instead of an anyone can spend, it's a signature, but you implement a HSM device similar to RSK both peg where it only signs if the required amount of miners included in the OP_RETURN, the proper way that withdrawal hash basically.

404
00:51:25,001 --> 00:51:40,001
The idea to present to Sergio to discuss is I think this is the kind of ideas that we need. So we start testing and proving concepts.

405
00:51:40,001 --> 00:51:53,001
We could also implement the drivechain on other forks of Bitcoin in the same way that Litecoin implemented SegWit before we had it in Bitcoin.

406
00:51:54,001 --> 00:52:04,001
I kind of understand the logic of Bitcoin Core, where you need to prove the value before getting the subject discussing in depth.

407
00:52:05,001 --> 00:52:25,001
And I think these kind of forums are extremely useful so we can experiment with drivechain. But I think we need to experiment on a code that we believe is simple enough to be able to be approved and implemented in Bitcoin eventually in the future.

408
00:52:26,001 --> 00:52:50,001
And as far as I understand, I think there is a compelling argument that the BIP300 and 301 are too complex. So even if everyone loves it, the amount of years of peer review and the potential bugs and liabilities that could arise from such a long and complex code make it impossible to be implemented.

409
00:52:50,001 --> 00:53:05,001
So I think if we put a lot of effort and we push to implement that or experiment that on a controlled environment, we'll probably be wasting our time because then what could be implemented to Bitcoin will be completely different.

410
00:53:06,001 --> 00:53:10,001
So I think less is more sometimes and I think this might be one of those cases.

411
00:53:11,001 --> 00:53:19,001
I've read over the last year everything I could find in criticism of drivechain and I've never heard that criticism.

412
00:53:20,001 --> 00:53:29,001
The criticisms that I hear and read are always economic in nature and they generally take one of two forms.

413
00:53:29,001 --> 00:53:36,001
One is an argument that the drivechains will never be large because the miners will always steal from them.

414
00:53:37,001 --> 00:53:49,001
And the other criticism is that the drivechains could be very large, but that they will result in an unacceptable centralizing effect on miners.

415
00:53:50,001 --> 00:53:52,001
Those are the two criticisms.

416
00:53:52,001 --> 00:54:08,001
I've never heard someone say that the code is too long and I heard one expert tell me recently that it would take about one year from today if the community were very motivated to adopt drivechain as soon as possible.

417
00:54:08,001 --> 00:54:19,001
It would take about one year to review the code in full and engage in rebasing and vetting to tune it up to implement it.

418
00:54:19,001 --> 00:54:21,001
Not many years.

419
00:54:21,001 --> 00:54:36,001
And also I think one of the strengths of drivechain that's pretty much undisputed is that the sophistication mathematically, the complexity of the overall design is relatively low compared to, for example, roll ups.

420
00:54:36,001 --> 00:54:46,001
So drivechain is a seven year old idea that uses technology that is not extraordinarily complicated in nature.

421
00:54:46,001 --> 00:54:53,001
So I feel like it's really the opposite of what you're saying as far as I can tell from the discourse in the community.

422
00:54:54,001 --> 00:55:04,001
Yeah. So just one final comment is maybe the reason why we are having these concerns is because we already bought on drivechain.

423
00:55:04,001 --> 00:55:09,001
So the first criticisms that you hear is when people are against drivechains.

424
00:55:09,001 --> 00:55:12,001
We are fooled for drivechains.

425
00:55:12,001 --> 00:55:14,001
So we believe in the value that it would bring to Bitcoin.

426
00:55:14,001 --> 00:55:20,001
We want Bitcoin to be the base cornerstone of the whole financial system of the future.

427
00:55:20,001 --> 00:55:30,001
So all of the what the others are criticizing are those who haven't understood for me the value that drivechains will bring to Bitcoin.

428
00:55:30,001 --> 00:55:44,001
Now, when you pass that threshold and you get into the code and you get pragmatic into how to get this implemented in Bitcoin, I think that's when you start having these kind of concerns.

429
00:55:45,001 --> 00:55:56,001
I hope you agree that, let's say, the drivechain, the BIP300 has 6,000 lines of code.

430
00:55:56,001 --> 00:56:00,001
If it could have 500, it would be much better.

431
00:56:00,001 --> 00:56:03,001
Right. So simplicity is better.

432
00:56:03,001 --> 00:56:08,001
And I think we need to understand the drivechain as a concept and not as a VIP.

433
00:56:09,001 --> 00:56:19,001
The conversation is finished in terms of what's the best code to get the drivechain functionality working.

434
00:56:19,001 --> 00:56:28,001
And in that sense, I really like Sergio, but I don't care whether he's VIP or you're VIP or whoever's VIP gets implemented.

435
00:56:28,001 --> 00:56:48,001
I think. And I invite everyone to check the R11 code, because I think it's an interesting new approach to make this work in a minimalistic way and simplified version.

436
00:56:48,001 --> 00:56:50,001
But if it is 300, I'm happy.

437
00:56:51,001 --> 00:56:54,001
Gabriel, I think we're losing your audio a little bit.

438
00:56:57,001 --> 00:57:01,001
Yeah, sorry. I got a problem with my internet. It's not working very well.

439
00:57:01,001 --> 00:57:05,001
But what I'm saying is if 300 works, I'm happy to support it.

440
00:57:05,001 --> 00:57:12,001
If something more simple and easier to discuss and present to the community, it's available.

441
00:57:12,001 --> 00:57:14,001
More than happy to see that as well.

442
00:57:15,001 --> 00:57:18,001
Yes. Well said. I agree. You make a very good point.

443
00:57:19,001 --> 00:57:22,001
And I appreciate the way you explained it.

444
00:57:26,001 --> 00:57:31,001
Thank you so much, guys. And we should keep having these conversations more often.

445
00:57:31,001 --> 00:57:33,001
Oh, yeah, absolutely.

446
00:57:33,001 --> 00:57:37,001
Please come back every time if you'd like. We welcome you to return every time.

447
00:57:37,001 --> 00:57:39,001
We have these conversations.

448
00:57:40,001 --> 00:57:44,001
So we're here to stay. And we believe in drivechain.

449
00:57:44,001 --> 00:57:52,001
We believe that sidechains are a very important part of Bitcoin's future for multiple reasons.

450
00:57:52,001 --> 00:57:59,001
In terms of increasing Bitcoin's market cap and value and increasing the return to holders.

451
00:58:00,001 --> 00:58:05,001
And then also increasing the flow of fees to the miners to secure the network.

452
00:58:05,001 --> 00:58:10,001
So there are multiple ways to understand the value proposition of drivechain.

453
00:58:10,001 --> 00:58:18,001
And even if drivechain is adopted and then not used a whole lot, there still would be a need for it.

454
00:58:18,001 --> 00:58:22,001
There are multiple ways to understand the value proposition of drivechain.

455
00:58:22,001 --> 00:58:30,001
And even if drivechain is adopted and then not used a whole lot, there still would be a narrative gain,

456
00:58:30,001 --> 00:58:41,001
a psychological gain to Bitcoin and its community, where the idea of building on Bitcoin will be stronger.

457
00:58:41,001 --> 00:58:48,001
And I think that is an important part of understanding the value proposition of drivechain.

458
00:58:48,001 --> 00:58:54,001
It's not simply a technology, it's also a narrative that people can build trustless sidechains on Bitcoin.

459
00:58:54,001 --> 00:59:01,001
That blockchains other than Bitcoin can be attached to Bitcoin and strengthen Bitcoin's narratives.

460
00:59:01,001 --> 00:59:08,001
So in this hypothetical that I'm exploring, imagine if drivechain is adopted and there are only a few drivechains

461
00:59:08,001 --> 00:59:15,001
that become significant and they are of a market cap that's only maybe $100 million.

462
00:59:15,001 --> 00:59:22,001
For example, suppose we get HiveMind, which is an Oracle network, and it has a market cap of $100 million.

463
00:59:22,001 --> 00:59:30,001
Well, it would be a very interesting feature that is attached to Bitcoin and that would strengthen Bitcoin's narratives.

464
00:59:31,001 --> 00:59:38,001
That there is a high tech, innovative project, a permissionless prediction market attached to Bitcoin.

465
00:59:38,001 --> 00:59:45,001
Even though $100 million isn't an extraordinary effect on Bitcoin's market cap

466
00:59:45,001 --> 00:59:49,001
and the fees wouldn't have an extraordinary effect on Bitcoin's fees,

467
00:59:49,001 --> 00:59:56,001
still that little interesting project attached to Bitcoin would increase Bitcoin's narrative.

468
00:59:56,001 --> 01:00:06,001
And that way people wouldn't be able to say anymore that there's nothing interesting and different and high tech going on in the Bitcoin space.

469
01:00:06,001 --> 01:00:13,001
So I think it's great if Bitcoin can have these cool projects attached to it inside chains, even if they don't become large.

470
01:00:13,001 --> 01:00:20,001
But I do think they will become large. But in that pessimistic case that they're small, still it would be like an interesting thing.

471
01:00:20,001 --> 01:00:31,001
The analogy I enjoy is it's like a car company. A car company might sell millions of cars that are boring and only a few cars that are supercars.

472
01:00:31,001 --> 01:00:40,001
Like Ford. Ford makes ordinary cars like the Taurus, but they also sell the GT40, which is a supercar that costs a lot of money.

473
01:00:40,001 --> 01:00:43,001
It costs like half a million dollars or something.

474
01:00:44,001 --> 01:00:52,001
So they sell this very cool car and that improves the whole brand, even though most people aren't buying that very cool car.

475
01:00:52,001 --> 01:00:56,001
The existence of the cool car makes the brand sexier.

476
01:00:56,001 --> 01:01:05,001
So, for example, if Bitcoin had a sidechain like Hivemind, that would make the entire Bitcoin project sexier and more interesting.

477
01:01:05,001 --> 01:01:15,001
Even though the ordinary user might just use Bitcoin Layer 1 and Lightning, still the existence of this very interesting sidechain.

478
01:01:15,892 --> 01:01:21,892
Even though it's economically small, it could have a very large psychological impact that's positive.

479
01:01:21,892 --> 01:01:24,892
So that's one way of understanding drivechain.

480
01:01:26,892 --> 01:01:40,892
You had previously compared complexity or maybe the considered complexity versus, say, a roll-up scheme.

481
01:01:41,892 --> 01:01:49,892
Do you have thoughts in regards to John Light and Dugan and Abdel's research on that stuff?

482
01:01:51,892 --> 01:01:57,892
I'm not trying to derail the 300-301 space, but I'm just curious if you have any thoughts on it.

483
01:01:58,892 --> 01:02:05,892
Yeah, we've had John Light here two times in these spaces, and his contributions have been excellent.

484
01:02:06,892 --> 01:02:12,892
So John Light is an employee of Sovereign, which is built on Rootstock, as I understand.

485
01:02:13,892 --> 01:02:24,892
And he is also the author of BitcoinRollups.com, and he also is the recipient of a grant of Bitcoin to do research.

486
01:02:25,892 --> 01:02:43,892
And that grant was funded by the Human Rights Foundation and Starkware, the company that is currently most famous in the Ethereum community for funding academic research on zero-knowledge proofs, roll-ups, and related technology.

487
01:02:44,892 --> 01:03:05,892
So John said in these spaces a few weeks ago to me, when asked about his thoughts on the comparative merits of drivechain and roll-ups, he said that he would like to see both come to Bitcoin and that probably it makes sense to do drivechain first.

488
01:03:06,892 --> 01:03:17,892
And I can find the tweet and put it in the nest where he said that just to give you his exact words, and also that tweet would include a link to the audio so you can hear the full context of the conversation.

489
01:03:18,892 --> 01:03:25,892
But I think I'm giving a fair summary of it that he said, you know, it probably makes sense to do drivechain first because it's lower technology.

490
01:03:26,892 --> 01:03:37,892
And also because drivechain can, in theory, accelerate other technologies coming to Bitcoin Layer 1 because drivechain would enable them to be tested on a drivechain.

491
01:03:38,892 --> 01:03:57,892
So there could be a roll-ups drivechain, and then if that roll-ups drivechain becomes very large and successful, that would expedite the community's interest in bringing roll-ups down to Layer 1 where they would have the most potential to improve Bitcoin's value proposition.

492
01:03:58,892 --> 01:04:06,892
But it's amazing how drivechain is actually like an incubation laboratory for excellent ideas.

493
01:04:07,892 --> 01:04:20,892
And if they grow large and prove to be stable and valuable to their users, then that is a signal to the Bitcoin community that, hey, so many Bitcoiners love using this sidechain.

494
01:04:21,892 --> 01:04:25,892
Maybe we should make this sidechain technology come down to Layer 1.

495
01:04:26,892 --> 01:04:36,892
And so, in fact, Paul Sztorc has said that Taproot might have come faster to Bitcoin if it had been first tested in a drivechain.

496
01:04:37,892 --> 01:04:40,892
So instead of taking five years, that upgrade might have taken less time.

497
01:04:41,892 --> 01:04:42,892
So the same could be true of roll-ups.

498
01:04:43,892 --> 01:04:52,892
People who love roll-ups might do well to support drivechain because right now it might take maybe a decade for roll-ups to come to Bitcoin.

499
01:04:53,892 --> 01:05:06,892
And if we get drivechain, then it could be much faster if the sidechain that uses roll-ups is very successful in terms of having a lot of value and being stable in operation.

500
01:05:07,892 --> 01:05:10,892
I haven't heard that perspective from John.

501
01:05:11,892 --> 01:05:12,892
That's interesting.

502
01:05:13,892 --> 01:05:16,892
It definitely seems like an argument John would make, for sure.

503
01:05:17,892 --> 01:05:20,892
And in a lot of ways, it makes sense.

504
01:05:21,892 --> 01:05:47,892
But one of the things that is very appealing to me about the scope for the idea of a validity roll-up is that the capacity exists for the L1 to very strictly guide the extensibility or the functionality that exists within the roll-up.

505
01:05:48,892 --> 01:05:52,892
So very pragmatic limitations can be placed.

506
01:05:53,892 --> 01:05:56,892
You could say, okay, we're just going to do a P2PKH roll-up.

507
01:05:57,892 --> 01:06:00,892
And that's the only thing you can do in the roll-up is P2PKH.

508
01:06:01,892 --> 01:06:07,892
All we want to do is we just want to scale P2PKH and we just want to see how that goes.

509
01:06:08,892 --> 01:06:15,892
And then you can, over time, extend the tolerance from the L1 on what goes on there.

510
01:06:16,892 --> 01:06:23,892
And I think that there's a lot of value to that that follows the same vein of logic in my mind.

511
01:06:24,892 --> 01:06:27,892
You want to test everything first, right?

512
01:06:29,892 --> 01:06:38,892
I kind of miss the public when it was more generally considered that, quote-unquote, everything is a Bitcoin testnet.

513
01:06:39,892 --> 01:06:40,892
I think that that was a healthy view.

514
01:06:41,892 --> 01:06:47,892
And I think that John's argument, as you describe it there, is very reminiscent of that same idea.

515
01:06:48,892 --> 01:06:49,892
And I like that to that end.

516
01:06:50,892 --> 01:06:56,892
But I also like the notion of this workflow where you say, okay, we're going to do roll-ups.

517
01:06:57,892 --> 01:06:59,892
And we're going to do very, very limited functionality in the roll-ups.

518
01:07:00,892 --> 01:07:01,892
And then over time, we're going to extend them.

519
01:07:01,892 --> 01:07:11,892
And I honestly have had this sort of, what probably would have sounded a year, year and a half ago,

520
01:07:12,892 --> 01:07:21,892
is a bit of a harebrained conspiracy theory about a projected coordinated development track, if you want to call it that way,

521
01:07:22,892 --> 01:07:23,892
that lands in validity roll-ups.

522
01:07:24,892 --> 01:07:26,892
And I think that a lot of what we're seeing right now is part of that.

523
01:07:27,892 --> 01:07:30,892
And to be honest with you, every day that passes, I'm like, yep, you were right about that.

524
01:07:31,892 --> 01:07:33,892
Your harebrained conspiracy theory was right.

525
01:07:34,892 --> 01:07:41,892
You know, like Eric Wall, who is a board member for Starkware, he posted today,

526
01:07:42,892 --> 01:07:52,892
noting that after sharding and constant state in the L1, that the recursive proofs for Starks

527
01:07:53,892 --> 01:07:57,892
aren't even really considered a scaling upgrade for Ethereum.

528
01:07:57,892 --> 01:07:58,892
And I was kind of joking with him.

529
01:07:59,892 --> 01:08:03,892
And I was like, does this mean that they liked your presentation on Blobspace?

530
01:08:04,892 --> 01:08:07,892
Because he, I guess fairly recently, gave a presentation to the Stark guys.

531
01:08:08,892 --> 01:08:15,892
Basically, his argument to them was, you know, Starkware relies on this concept of Blobspace in Ethereum.

532
01:08:16,892 --> 01:08:19,892
And it's like the same Blobspace exists in Bitcoin.

533
01:08:20,892 --> 01:08:23,892
And it's like one-eighth the cost to write to it.

534
01:08:23,892 --> 01:08:28,892
And he was just kind of like trying to encourage developers in that ecosystem

535
01:08:29,892 --> 01:08:33,892
to like take the idea of exploring options within Bitcoin very seriously.

536
01:08:34,892 --> 01:08:37,892
And he responded back and his answer was literally like, you will see soon.

537
01:08:38,892 --> 01:08:41,892
So I think we're going to see a lot of acceleration on that conversation.

538
01:08:42,892 --> 01:08:45,892
I think we are already seeing the acceleration on the conversation.

539
01:08:46,892 --> 01:08:51,892
Like this is a non-technical kind of opinionated or observational take.

540
01:08:51,892 --> 01:08:56,892
But I think that Inscriptions is really like this head-turner event

541
01:08:57,892 --> 01:09:01,892
that sort of like whiplashes everybody into paying attention to grandpa again.

542
01:09:02,892 --> 01:09:09,892
And then there's a very clear path to a very well-constructed sort of rollout

543
01:09:10,892 --> 01:09:12,892
of feature sets that I anticipate to see.

544
01:09:13,892 --> 01:09:16,892
And it sort of culminates in validity roll-ups.

545
01:09:17,892 --> 01:09:18,892
So I think that's sort of imminent.

546
01:09:18,892 --> 01:09:21,892
Do you mean a validity roll-up soft fork on Bitcoin?

547
01:09:22,892 --> 01:09:24,892
That's what you're saying would be the culmination of this movement?

548
01:09:25,892 --> 01:09:27,892
It's going to be a culmination into a very real debate

549
01:09:28,892 --> 01:09:30,892
about the bit that would be necessary for it. Correct.

550
01:09:31,892 --> 01:09:34,892
So you said you were interested to see the John Light tweet.

551
01:09:35,892 --> 01:09:36,892
I put it in the nest. Do you see that tweet?

552
01:09:37,892 --> 01:09:39,892
Where it's my tweet. I transcribed what he wrote.

553
01:09:40,892 --> 01:09:41,892
But there's an audio link there. You can go hear it.

554
01:09:42,892 --> 01:09:46,892
So he said that I think it would make sense to do drivechains first

555
01:09:46,892 --> 01:09:49,892
rather than wait until validity roll-ups are ready.

556
01:09:50,892 --> 01:09:54,892
So I think he would be I think he was probably in that conversation.

557
01:09:55,892 --> 01:09:59,892
We also talked about the idea that drivechain could accelerate roll-ups

558
01:10:00,892 --> 01:10:03,892
by enabling live testing rather than just some validity roll-ups test net.

559
01:10:04,892 --> 01:10:06,892
Like right now for drivechain, there's a test net.

560
01:10:07,892 --> 01:10:09,892
People can go in there who are interested in test nets.

561
01:10:10,892 --> 01:10:11,892
It's kind of a technical topic.

562
01:10:12,892 --> 01:10:14,892
Most Bitcoiners aren't dabbling in test nets.

563
01:10:14,892 --> 01:10:19,892
But if there were a live venue to really experience with real money

564
01:10:20,892 --> 01:10:23,892
a sidechain that has drivechains, that would be neat.

565
01:10:24,892 --> 01:10:25,892
I agree.

566
01:10:26,892 --> 01:10:29,892
So if we get drivechains, then we get that live testing ground for roll-ups.

567
01:10:30,892 --> 01:10:32,892
The roll-up sidechain maybe would be so successful

568
01:10:33,892 --> 01:10:36,892
it would really accelerate because people respect the market signals.

569
01:10:37,892 --> 01:10:44,892
So help me walk through the pragmatic differences here.

570
01:10:45,892 --> 01:10:48,892
So if we go the route of saying like,

571
01:10:49,892 --> 01:10:55,892
all right, we've got Dugan's Capri and it's doing P2PKH validations.

572
01:10:56,892 --> 01:10:58,892
And we just want to do a validity roll-up.

573
01:10:59,892 --> 01:11:00,892
Like we'll slap it straight into the L1.

574
01:11:01,892 --> 01:11:03,892
We'll do these very strict definitions for the roll-up.

575
01:11:03,892 --> 01:11:08,892
And really all it's going to do is it's going to scale

576
01:11:09,892 --> 01:11:10,892
very like vanilla peer-to-peer payments.

577
01:11:11,892 --> 01:11:13,892
And that's sort of all we want it to do.

578
01:11:14,892 --> 01:11:18,892
That gives me this sort of like, I don't know,

579
01:11:19,892 --> 01:11:20,892
maybe it's an ideological comfort,

580
01:11:21,892 --> 01:11:24,892
but I think it is also a technical sense of comfort and confidence

581
01:11:25,892 --> 01:11:29,892
that you can define this protocol very strictly and expand it over time.

582
01:11:29,892 --> 01:11:32,892
Help me walk through the pragmatic differences there.

583
01:11:33,892 --> 01:11:37,892
If we do this, the same idea, but we instead,

584
01:11:38,892 --> 01:11:42,892
we sort of like open free range for the validity roll-ups

585
01:11:43,892 --> 01:11:44,892
in the context of a drivechain.

586
01:11:45,892 --> 01:11:49,892
To me, like intuitively there's not any limitation

587
01:11:50,892 --> 01:11:52,892
for what the roll-up might or might not do in the drivechain.

588
01:11:54,892 --> 01:12:02,892
So what would be the ideal way to target in that workflow,

589
01:12:03,892 --> 01:12:05,892
in that context, how do we target the feature sets

590
01:12:06,892 --> 01:12:11,892
that we want to focus on and prioritize them

591
01:12:12,892 --> 01:12:16,892
without necessarily going the route of,

592
01:12:17,892 --> 01:12:18,892
I'm going to call it whims of the market.

593
01:12:19,892 --> 01:12:20,892
I mean, we're developing financial products,

594
01:12:20,892 --> 01:12:21,892
so it's always the whims of the market.

595
01:12:22,892 --> 01:12:23,892
It's like hard to deny that stuff,

596
01:12:24,892 --> 01:12:26,892
but it's also hard to deny that the whims of the market

597
01:12:27,892 --> 01:12:29,892
sometimes leads you down pretty dangerous rabbit holes.

598
01:12:30,892 --> 01:12:34,892
Like I'll use Ethereum's current validator assignment regime

599
01:12:35,892 --> 01:12:36,892
as like an example to that.

600
01:12:37,892 --> 01:12:38,892
So yeah, help me walk through that.

601
01:12:39,892 --> 01:12:42,892
So that question was pretty sophisticated

602
01:12:43,892 --> 01:12:45,892
and I don't have an answer for it at your level.

603
01:12:46,892 --> 01:12:49,892
But if you want to see what Paul Sztorc thinks about roll-ups generally,

604
01:12:50,892 --> 01:12:54,892
you can go to drivechain.info forward slash FAQ.

605
01:12:55,892 --> 01:12:58,892
That's drivechain.info forward slash FAQ.

606
01:12:59,892 --> 01:13:02,892
If you scroll halfway down the page, it's a pretty long FAQ.

607
01:13:03,892 --> 01:13:06,892
If you scroll halfway down a little bit further than that,

608
01:13:07,892 --> 01:13:08,892
you get to a section called

609
01:13:09,892 --> 01:13:11,892
What About Zero-Knowledge Validity Roll-Ups?

610
01:13:12,892 --> 01:13:16,892
And he writes a compare and contrast short essay there

611
01:13:17,892 --> 01:13:19,892
on the differences between roll-ups and drivechain.

612
01:13:20,892 --> 01:13:22,892
So I think that would interest you.

613
01:13:23,892 --> 01:13:25,892
That's the best I can do on that topic.

614
01:13:28,892 --> 01:13:30,892
I wish I had a better answer.

615
01:13:34,892 --> 01:13:35,892
That's all I got.

616
01:13:36,892 --> 01:13:37,892
Oh, you mentioned Eric Wall.

617
01:13:38,892 --> 01:13:41,892
So I just wanted to mention in case you or others are interested to know,

618
01:13:42,892 --> 01:13:43,892
he's a fan of drivechain.

619
01:13:44,892 --> 01:13:48,892
So I can tell you a tweet to go to.

620
01:13:48,892 --> 01:13:51,892
I'm going to share it in the nest in case anyone's interested.

621
01:13:54,892 --> 01:14:00,892
So here's what Eric Wall tweeted a few months ago in November.

622
01:14:01,892 --> 01:14:02,892
He wrote,

623
01:14:03,892 --> 01:14:07,892
It has been seven years since Truthcoin wrote the original drivechain blog post.

624
01:14:08,892 --> 01:14:12,892
If you went back in time and told me that seven years later,

625
01:14:13,892 --> 01:14:15,892
no effort has been made towards merge mine sidechains,

626
01:14:15,892 --> 01:14:20,892
but that the same people who opposed them were upset Ethereum existed,

627
01:14:21,892 --> 01:14:22,892
I'd laugh in your face.

628
01:14:23,892 --> 01:14:26,892
So there he is in classic form being a little bit jocular.

629
01:14:27,892 --> 01:14:30,892
His point, in my view, is that drivechain was proposed.

630
01:14:31,892 --> 01:14:34,892
The Bitcoin community didn't fully embrace it.

631
01:14:35,892 --> 01:14:39,892
And then the people who are opposed to drivechain today

632
01:14:40,892 --> 01:14:44,892
are complaining about Ethereum being large

633
01:14:45,892 --> 01:14:46,892
and bad in their view.

634
01:14:47,892 --> 01:14:49,892
But what drivechain was trying to do

635
01:14:50,892 --> 01:14:51,892
was bring all those users and community and technology

636
01:14:52,892 --> 01:14:53,892
and development over to Bitcoin

637
01:14:54,892 --> 01:14:58,892
rather than it growing in this competitive dynamic

638
01:14:59,892 --> 01:15:01,892
where it's on an altcoin that competes for,

639
01:15:02,892 --> 01:15:04,892
existentially competes with Bitcoin for monetary premium.

640
01:15:05,892 --> 01:15:07,892
That's why there's so much adversarial rhetoric

641
01:15:08,892 --> 01:15:09,892
between Bitcoin and altcoins,

642
01:15:10,892 --> 01:15:11,892
people calling altcoins shitcoin,

643
01:15:11,892 --> 01:15:13,892
altcoiners calling Bitcoin, you know,

644
01:15:14,892 --> 01:15:15,892
orange coin and whatnot.

645
01:15:16,892 --> 01:15:19,892
So that's why there's this adversarial rhetoric

646
01:15:20,892 --> 01:15:21,892
that's so unproductive.

647
01:15:22,892 --> 01:15:24,892
It's because protocols compete for monetary premium.

648
01:15:25,892 --> 01:15:28,892
And if we had done drivechain seven years ago,

649
01:15:29,892 --> 01:15:30,892
as Eric Wall was saying,

650
01:15:31,892 --> 01:15:34,892
then perhaps there would be much more development on Bitcoin

651
01:15:35,892 --> 01:15:36,892
and people wouldn't have to spend their time

652
01:15:37,892 --> 01:15:39,892
complaining about the growth of altcoins.

653
01:15:40,892 --> 01:15:41,892
So that's his view on that.

654
01:15:42,892 --> 01:15:43,892
I think he completely understands

655
01:15:44,892 --> 01:15:45,892
what drivechain is all about and likes it.

656
01:15:46,892 --> 01:15:48,892
Yeah, one of the things that,

657
01:15:49,892 --> 01:15:51,892
like the very first time I ever saw

658
01:15:52,892 --> 01:15:55,892
like sort of an example of Paul ranting about drivechains,

659
01:15:56,892 --> 01:15:59,892
one of the immediate things that he and I definitely agree on

660
01:16:00,892 --> 01:16:03,892
is that, well, so one, I'll say as an aside,

661
01:16:04,892 --> 01:16:07,892
even beyond protocols competing for fee markets,

662
01:16:08,892 --> 01:16:11,892
also, I think, you know, we're, as humans,

663
01:16:12,892 --> 01:16:13,892
we're just sort of suckers for tribalism.

664
01:16:14,892 --> 01:16:16,892
And I think that that plays like a really,

665
01:16:17,892 --> 01:16:18,892
really substantial role in it.

666
01:16:19,892 --> 01:16:22,892
But Paul and I like so very deeply agree

667
01:16:23,892 --> 01:16:25,892
on this idea that like Bitcoin

668
01:16:26,892 --> 01:16:28,892
is already effectively securing the entire industry

669
01:16:29,892 --> 01:16:31,892
as the largest market cap network.

670
01:16:31,892 --> 01:16:35,892
It is sort of, it would be trivial

671
01:16:36,892 --> 01:16:38,892
if somebody, if like a nation state actor

672
01:16:39,892 --> 01:16:41,892
were to actively attack Ethereum,

673
01:16:42,892 --> 01:16:43,892
it would be like this very, very,

674
01:16:44,892 --> 01:16:46,892
not even half step to doing anything about the industry.

675
01:16:47,892 --> 01:16:49,892
And I've actually, I've got quite,

676
01:16:50,892 --> 01:16:53,892
I've got quite a passionate sort of turbo-doomer rant

677
01:16:54,892 --> 01:16:57,892
that I could go on about how the idea

678
01:16:58,892 --> 01:16:59,892
of Ethereum flipping Bitcoin

679
01:16:59,892 --> 01:17:01,892
is like one of the most dangerous things

680
01:17:02,892 --> 01:17:03,892
that could possibly happen to this industry right now,

681
01:17:04,892 --> 01:17:06,892
because Ethereum's exposure to the US jurisdiction

682
01:17:07,892 --> 01:17:08,892
is really, really significant.

683
01:17:09,892 --> 01:17:10,892
And if Ethereum were to flip Bitcoin

684
01:17:11,892 --> 01:17:12,892
and then it were to be forced

685
01:17:13,892 --> 01:17:14,892
into a user-activated soft fork,

686
01:17:15,892 --> 01:17:16,892
the general interpretation of like,

687
01:17:17,892 --> 01:17:18,892
quote unquote, crypto dead

688
01:17:19,892 --> 01:17:20,892
would be a lot more easy to rationalize.

689
01:17:21,892 --> 01:17:22,892
And I don't like that outcome.

690
01:17:23,892 --> 01:17:26,892
But if Bitcoin is already, by default,

691
01:17:27,892 --> 01:17:28,892
securing the entire industry,

692
01:17:29,892 --> 01:17:30,892
like shouldn't they get paid for it, right?

693
01:17:31,892 --> 01:17:33,892
And so that's really like the nugget

694
01:17:34,892 --> 01:17:35,892
that I really do love about drivechains.

695
01:17:36,892 --> 01:17:37,892
And I think the element that really shifts me

696
01:17:38,892 --> 01:17:40,892
to like a net positive interpretation

697
01:17:41,892 --> 01:17:43,892
of 300301 is this idea of,

698
01:17:44,892 --> 01:17:45,892
all right, let's get grandpa paid

699
01:17:46,892 --> 01:17:47,892
for doing the job that it's already doing.

700
01:17:48,892 --> 01:17:50,892
I understand what you're saying.

701
01:17:51,892 --> 01:17:52,892
You're talking about security,

702
01:17:53,892 --> 01:17:56,892
on the one hand, technologically involving fees.

703
01:17:57,892 --> 01:17:58,892
And on the other hand,

704
01:17:59,892 --> 01:18:00,892
you're talking about the narrative

705
01:18:01,892 --> 01:18:02,892
and how Bitcoin secures the whole community,

706
01:18:03,892 --> 01:18:04,892
the whole crypto community,

707
01:18:05,892 --> 01:18:06,892
in a narrative sense.

708
01:18:07,892 --> 01:18:08,892
And you're saying there's some linkage there.

709
01:18:09,892 --> 01:18:10,892
I see what you're saying.

710
01:18:11,892 --> 01:18:12,892
I followed your reasoning about

711
01:18:13,892 --> 01:18:14,892
if Ethereum were to flip Bitcoin

712
01:18:15,892 --> 01:18:16,892
and then be attacked by regulators,

713
01:18:17,892 --> 01:18:18,892
it would have an interesting,

714
01:18:19,892 --> 01:18:20,892
potentially bad effect on the whole space.

715
01:18:21,892 --> 01:18:23,892
However, I do think that the cypherpunk attitude

716
01:18:24,892 --> 01:18:26,892
is not what you just said.

717
01:18:27,892 --> 01:18:28,892
Because, you know,

718
01:18:29,892 --> 01:18:30,892
I think some Bitcoiners,

719
01:18:31,892 --> 01:18:32,892
perhaps rightly so,

720
01:18:33,892 --> 01:18:34,892
will say that doesn't have any

721
01:18:35,892 --> 01:18:36,892
necessary effect on Bitcoin.

722
01:18:37,892 --> 01:18:38,892
These are people who don't care so much

723
01:18:39,892 --> 01:18:40,892
about Bitcoin's number going up.

724
01:18:41,892 --> 01:18:42,892
They want Bitcoin to be developed

725
01:18:43,892 --> 01:18:44,892
in a way which is true to its roots,

726
01:18:45,892 --> 01:18:47,892
you know, and simplicity, anonymity,

727
01:18:48,892 --> 01:18:49,892
things like that.

728
01:18:50,892 --> 01:18:51,892
So they're not so interested

729
01:18:52,892 --> 01:18:53,892
in these narratives about what's going on

730
01:18:54,892 --> 01:18:55,892
on the altcoins.

731
01:18:56,892 --> 01:18:57,892
But I would agree with you.

732
01:18:57,892 --> 01:18:58,892
Not everyone thinks exactly like that.

733
01:18:59,892 --> 01:19:01,892
And the worst case scenario could be bad.

734
01:19:02,892 --> 01:19:03,892
I think, yeah,

735
01:19:04,892 --> 01:19:05,892
to clarify,

736
01:19:06,892 --> 01:19:07,892
I do think that

737
01:19:08,892 --> 01:19:09,892
the most passionately emboldened

738
01:19:10,892 --> 01:19:11,892
amongst us

739
01:19:12,892 --> 01:19:13,892
would stick around even if the shit

740
01:19:14,892 --> 01:19:15,892
went to near zero.

741
01:19:16,892 --> 01:19:17,892
I think there's enough

742
01:19:18,892 --> 01:19:19,892
philosophical or ideological love

743
01:19:20,892 --> 01:19:21,892
for the intentions

744
01:19:22,892 --> 01:19:23,892
that you would see continued work

745
01:19:24,892 --> 01:19:25,892
no matter what.

746
01:19:25,892 --> 01:19:26,892
But we are very

747
01:19:27,892 --> 01:19:28,892
far past the point where,

748
01:19:29,892 --> 01:19:30,892
in the context of the larger market,

749
01:19:31,892 --> 01:19:32,892
the cypherpunks are at the wheel.

750
01:19:33,892 --> 01:19:34,892
There are a lot of great

751
01:19:35,892 --> 01:19:36,892
sort of cyberpunk-minded people

752
01:19:37,892 --> 01:19:38,892
in Ethereum, a lot of people that,

753
01:19:39,892 --> 01:19:40,892
you know,

754
01:19:41,892 --> 01:19:42,892
would be excellent people

755
01:19:43,892 --> 01:19:44,892
to have conversations about

756
01:19:45,892 --> 01:19:46,892
the same sort of

757
01:19:47,892 --> 01:19:48,892
maybe philosophical notions

758
01:19:49,892 --> 01:19:50,892
of the most hardcore

759
01:19:51,892 --> 01:19:52,892
cypherpunk Bitcoiners you can find.

760
01:19:53,892 --> 01:19:54,892
And they're just wildly

761
01:19:55,892 --> 01:19:56,892
out of control.

762
01:19:57,892 --> 01:19:58,892
They can't get the reins back.

763
01:19:59,892 --> 01:20:00,892
Ethereum onboarded

764
01:20:01,892 --> 01:20:02,892
too many market participants

765
01:20:03,892 --> 01:20:04,892
too quickly and too few network

766
01:20:05,892 --> 01:20:06,892
participants in general.

767
01:20:07,892 --> 01:20:09,892
And the ratio is just outrageous now.

768
01:20:12,892 --> 01:20:13,892
It's not that crypto

769
01:20:14,892 --> 01:20:15,892
would actually die.

770
01:20:16,892 --> 01:20:17,892
It's that the general notion

771
01:20:18,892 --> 01:20:19,892
from the market perspective

772
01:20:20,892 --> 01:20:21,892
that crypto is dead

773
01:20:22,892 --> 01:20:23,892
would be much easier to rationalize.

774
01:20:23,892 --> 01:20:24,892
You don't see it turning into

775
01:20:25,892 --> 01:20:26,892
like a 20-year winner kind of thing.

776
01:20:27,892 --> 01:20:28,892
Could you explain again

777
01:20:29,892 --> 01:20:30,892
what we're just saying about a ratio

778
01:20:31,892 --> 01:20:32,892
in Ethereum?

779
01:20:32,892 --> 01:20:33,892
What was the ratio between?

780
01:20:34,892 --> 01:20:35,892
It's this.

781
01:20:36,892 --> 01:20:37,892
So there is some,

782
01:20:38,892 --> 01:20:39,892
we'll say we don't know exactly

783
01:20:40,892 --> 01:20:41,892
what it is,

784
01:20:41,892 --> 01:20:42,892
but there is some ratio

785
01:20:43,892 --> 01:20:44,892
of market participants

786
01:20:45,892 --> 01:20:46,892
to network participants

787
01:20:46,892 --> 01:20:47,892
that you really need to maintain

788
01:20:48,892 --> 01:20:49,892
to have like

789
01:20:50,892 --> 01:20:51,892
a robust network.

790
01:20:51,892 --> 01:20:52,892
And it's,

791
01:20:53,892 --> 01:20:54,892
you know,

792
01:20:55,892 --> 01:20:56,892
you probably can tolerate

793
01:20:57,892 --> 01:20:58,892
a really rapid expansion

794
01:20:58,892 --> 01:20:59,892
of market participants

795
01:20:59,892 --> 01:21:00,892
without necessarily seeing

796
01:21:01,892 --> 01:21:02,892
a rapid expansion

797
01:21:02,892 --> 01:21:03,892
of network participants.

798
01:21:04,892 --> 01:21:05,892
But whatever that sort of

799
01:21:06,892 --> 01:21:07,892
optimal threshold is,

800
01:21:08,892 --> 01:21:09,892
Ethereum blew right past it

801
01:21:09,892 --> 01:21:10,892
this last cycle.

802
01:21:10,892 --> 01:21:11,892
Are you talking about

803
01:21:11,892 --> 01:21:12,892
the ratio between

804
01:21:13,892 --> 01:21:14,892
people who have a full node

805
01:21:15,892 --> 01:21:16,892
and people who don't?

806
01:21:18,140 --> 01:21:19,160
the block somewhere?

807
01:21:19,200 --> 01:21:24,380
Yeah, that's where I would define it, but even perhaps more than that, even perhaps

808
01:21:24,380 --> 01:21:29,800
less constrictive than that, people that engage with the network rather than just

809
01:21:29,800 --> 01:21:33,020
like, you know, trade some stuff on a centralized exchange.

810
01:21:33,380 --> 01:21:37,060
Like the number of people that are actually engaging with the protocol, even from a

811
01:21:37,060 --> 01:21:37,120
light

812
01:21:37,160 --> 01:21:42,560
client versus the number of who have financial exposure to the asset.

813
01:21:43,100 --> 01:21:44,260
It's insane.

814
01:21:47,300 --> 01:21:49,780
Ethereum also has a crisis of infrastructure for sure.

815
01:21:51,180 --> 01:21:56,140
the US Treasury banned Iran, Infuro was compelled by law.

816
01:21:56,380 --> 01:21:58,300
like they have to operate in legal ways.

817
01:21:58,580 --> 01:22:02,420
So they were compelled by law to block Iranian IPs and like, you know, two and a half

818
01:22:02,420 --> 01:22:04,580
million Iranian kids lost access to Ethereum.

819
01:22:05,220 --> 01:22:09,620
And it took, you know, independent sort of quote unquote road node operators going off

820
01:22:09,620 --> 01:22:13,620
to Hungary or whatever and setting up nodes and then literally like foot soldiering

821
01:22:13,620 --> 01:22:15,140
Iran and being like, yo, use this

822
01:22:15,140 --> 01:22:17,100
RPC to get people back on board.

823
01:22:17,220 --> 01:22:18,120
took months.

824
01:22:19,580 --> 01:22:20,580
Those are problems.

825
01:22:21,140 --> 01:22:22,580
Like, those are very real problems.

826
01:22:22,860 --> 01:22:27,200
When you were talking about, you know, what if Ethereum got large and then and then was

827
01:22:27,200 --> 01:22:30,700
attacked by regulators and how that could lead to a crypto winter for a long time.

828
01:22:31,860 --> 01:22:34,080
I think another way of saying that idea

829
01:22:34,140 --> 01:22:39,960
is to say that it would be great if the entire crypto community were in Bitcoin.

830
01:22:40,660 --> 01:22:46,620
Because then the number of people who support Bitcoin politically would be very large.

831
01:22:47,120 --> 01:22:52,400
And to the extent that there are cypherpunk people in Ethereum, if they were in Bitcoin

832
01:22:52,400 --> 01:22:52,960
instead,

833
01:22:53,340 --> 01:22:58,100
then the community of those cypherpunk people, along with all of the users who aren't

834
01:22:58,100 --> 01:23:02,160
so ideological but still support Bitcoin because they're using it to some extent,

835
01:23:02,500 --> 01:23:04,020
everyone would be aligned.

836
01:23:04,140 --> 01:23:09,440
The whole crypto community with its values of liberty

837
01:23:09,440 --> 01:23:12,140
and property and

838
01:23:12,140 --> 01:23:33,140
Those values that are shared, to some extent, largely throughout the crypto community, that would be, everyone would be working in the same political party, as it were. This analogy to political parties is something Paul sometimes makes, where, you know, imagine how powerful a political party would be if everyone combines rather than being in different factions.

839
01:23:33,140 --> 01:23:54,140
Like one thing that puzzles me, when I'm learning about like the history of Bitcoin, is how the large blockers split up at one point between Bitcoin Cash and BSV. So it's like, it's like people not getting along with their cousins. It's unproductive, because if you want to get something done, it's very valuable to have a large network of people helping you.

840
01:23:54,140 --> 01:24:23,140
So if a group splits in half, then the notion that either part of that group will be successful is much lower. And that's one of the inspirations for Drivechain, is that it is fundamentally and originally inspired to lower the rate of these harmful forks within the Bitcoin community by enabling differences of opinion and development to express themselves in the creation of sidechains, instead of in the completion of the chain.

841
01:24:24,140 --> 01:24:45,140
It's a complete separation of the community into the original blockchain and a new altcoin that competes with the blockchain for monetary premium, competes with the original one. So it's not good when Bitcoin splits. It wasn't good to have the hard fork. Some people like it, though. And I think they're mistaken, but they say, oh, these forks are great.

842
01:24:46,140 --> 01:24:56,140
It gets rid of the people who don't have the right ideas. But that's not productive when you're trying to win politically. It's great to have a very large community that is unified rather than split up.

843
01:24:57,140 --> 01:25:10,140
I agree with you. I would like to phrase it as like you can undermine the human psyche sense of tribalism by unifying the networks.

844
01:25:11,140 --> 01:25:33,140
However, I think that the pragmatic reality is that Ethereum would have a very substantial identity crisis if it were really linked to the proof of work mechanism that is Bitcoin.

845
01:25:33,140 --> 01:25:50,140
I think they've held themselves so far deep into anti-proof of work that I don't know if there's a pragmatic undoing of that without some sort of very significant event that compels them to make some other argument for themselves.

846
01:25:51,140 --> 01:26:06,140
Let's talk about the difference between proof of work and proof of stake, since that is a topic closely related to drivechain, because it was Paul Sztorc who wrote an important essay on the difference between proof of work and proof of stake.

847
01:26:07,140 --> 01:26:14,140
Are you familiar with that? His essay called Nothing is Cheaper Than Proof of Work, which was written in 2015 on Truthcoin.com?

848
01:26:15,140 --> 01:26:26,140
I am, and I actually would really love to go down this rabbit hole. I am going to have to shelve that, and I want to circle back with you on that. I'll come back, and I'll hang out again.

849
01:26:27,140 --> 01:26:37,140
I've got a code review that I have to do for some of the LiteClient software that's coming out, so I'm going to bounce. I'm going to go do that. This has been lovely, though. This conversation has been excellent, and I'll come back.

850
01:26:38,140 --> 01:26:40,140
Thank you, Post. Thank you for being here. See you again soon.

851
01:26:41,140 --> 01:26:42,140
Yeah, absolutely. Thanks, guys.

852
01:26:45,140 --> 01:26:59,140
What I was going to talk about in terms of proof of work and proof of stake in brief is Paul Sztorc's view, which was an essay in 2015 on Truthcoin.info titled Nothing is Cheaper Than Proof of Work.

853
01:27:00,140 --> 01:27:19,140
In that essay, he says that the value consumed in proof of work in the form of electricity and other inputs to miners is equal to the value consumed in proof of stake in the form of liquidity being consumed.

854
01:27:20,140 --> 01:27:34,140
Therefore, economically, for a system to be proof of stake isn't cheaper to the participants as a collective than the cost of doing proof of work.

855
01:27:34,140 --> 01:27:47,140
In other words, if society's monetary system is proof of work, there is a cost that society is paying for that monetary system, and that is all of the revenue to the miners.

856
01:27:48,140 --> 01:27:56,140
That's the cost that society collectively is paying to have that institution in society, the proof of work monetary system.

857
01:27:57,140 --> 01:28:06,140
If there's a shift to proof of stake, the proof of stakers back in 2015 were thinking, oh, this is going to be much cheaper because we get a monetary system.

858
01:28:07,140 --> 01:28:11,140
That's a blockchain, but it doesn't have all this electricity being burned up, so it's actually cheaper for us.

859
01:28:12,140 --> 01:28:16,140
Therefore, it's more efficient, and therefore, it'll be better.

860
01:28:17,140 --> 01:28:18,140
But actually, it's not cheaper.

861
01:28:19,140 --> 01:28:26,140
There is a cost, and the value of that cost is identical to the value of the cost in proof of work.

862
01:28:27,140 --> 01:28:29,140
The difference is that the form of the cost is different.

863
01:28:30,140 --> 01:28:40,140
In proof of work, the cost takes the form of energy and machines and the labor involved in running them, but primarily energy.

864
01:28:41,140 --> 01:28:42,140
That's the thing being consumed in proof of work.

865
01:28:43,140 --> 01:28:46,140
In proof of stake, liquidity is the thing being consumed.

866
01:28:47,140 --> 01:28:58,140
This is a complex proposition that takes people sometimes a long time to wrap their heads around, but the essence of this argument is an argument against shifting to proof of stake.

867
01:28:59,140 --> 01:29:04,140
The reason why it's not good to shift to proof of stake is that it's not any cheaper.

868
01:29:05,140 --> 01:29:09,140
The main reason people were arguing for proof of stake at the time was that it's cheaper.

869
01:29:10,140 --> 01:29:11,140
It's economically superior.

870
01:29:12,140 --> 01:29:29,140
Now that that argument has been shown to not be true, the argument that's mainly relied on is the environmental one, that society is better off burning less energy, which I don't find compelling.

871
01:29:30,140 --> 01:29:32,140
But there you go. That's the argument.

872
01:29:33,140 --> 01:29:35,140
I encourage others to read it.

873
01:29:36,140 --> 01:29:45,140
You can go find it at truthcoin.info, which is the blog of Paul Sztorc, one of the two authors of the drivechain Bips.

874
01:29:46,140 --> 01:29:47,140
It's a great blog.

875
01:29:48,140 --> 01:29:51,140
It's a blog that is primarily on economics of blockchain.

876
01:29:52,140 --> 01:29:55,140
The comments on these posts are great.

877
01:29:56,140 --> 01:30:06,140
For the post on nothing is cheaper than proof of work, Vitalik Buterin and other leading thinkers in Ethereum commented on that post at the time.

878
01:30:07,140 --> 01:30:13,140
You can read the comments and watch them become convinced and then admit that the argument is correct.

879
01:30:14,140 --> 01:30:16,140
It's quite extraordinary.

880
01:30:17,140 --> 01:30:21,140
Vitalik wrote a lengthy blog post in response to that blog post.

881
01:30:22,140 --> 01:30:28,140
After Paul wrote nothing is cheaper than proof of work, Vitalik commented and they went back and forth in the comments.

882
01:30:29,140 --> 01:30:33,140
Then Vitalik wrote a whole post called why proof of stake?

883
01:30:34,140 --> 01:30:37,140
Then Paul responds to that post.

884
01:30:38,140 --> 01:30:39,140
They're going back and forth in blog posts.

885
01:30:40,140 --> 01:30:48,140
Paul's response goes line by line showing how Vitalik's blog post includes some errors that are important.

886
01:30:49,140 --> 01:30:59,140
If you're really interested in the crypto economic discussion on proof of stake versus proof of work, then these blog posts I've mentioned are essential reading.

887
01:31:05,140 --> 01:31:08,140
Well, we've reached 11 o'clock Pacific time.

888
01:31:09,140 --> 01:31:10,140
We've been going for an hour and a half.

889
01:31:11,140 --> 01:31:12,140
We can continue for a while, though.

890
01:31:12,140 --> 01:31:18,140
If anyone has any questions or comments, you can raise your hand and come up to the stage.

891
01:31:19,140 --> 01:31:23,140
We are doing Drivechain Twitter spaces here at LayerTwo Labs every Monday and Thursday.

892
01:31:24,140 --> 01:31:25,140
I'm your host, Henry.

893
01:31:26,140 --> 01:31:41,140
I'm an employee of LayerTwo Labs, and the purpose of these conversations is to promote education on the topic of Drivechain so that the Bitcoin community can make a very informed decision about whether it would be great to have Drivechains.

894
01:31:42,140 --> 01:32:02,140
Some of the people who think Drivechains are cool include Dr. Adam Back of Blockstream, Fiatjaf, the creator of Nostr, and many other people who have very technical backgrounds, as well as some of the most well-known Bitcoin investors and a lot of other people.

895
01:32:03,140 --> 01:32:06,140
So it's interesting if you want to see Bitcoin's number go up.

896
01:32:07,140 --> 01:32:08,140
That's one reason to be interested in Drivechain.

897
01:32:08,140 --> 01:32:15,140
If you want to see Bitcoin have a bunch of very cool protocols attached to it, that's another reason to do Drivechain.

898
01:32:16,140 --> 01:32:22,140
And if you want to have the world see less altcoin creation, that's another reason to do Drivechain.

899
01:32:23,140 --> 01:32:29,140
Because every time a project moves to a Drivechain from an altcoin, then there's less altcoins out there.

900
01:32:30,140 --> 01:32:41,140
So if a person doesn't like the proliferation of speculative tokens that have been created outside of the Bitcoin blockchain, then Drivechain should be of interest.

901
01:32:42,140 --> 01:32:46,140
Because, of course, Drivechain would not eliminate entirely all speculative tokens, right?

902
01:32:47,140 --> 01:32:53,140
There's always going to be speculation in life, and some of that speculation will occur in the context of blockchain-based assets.

903
01:32:54,140 --> 01:33:09,140
However, if Drivechain is adopted, then no altcoin founder will be able to rationalize the creation of an altcoin by citing a limited extensibility of Bitcoin.

904
01:33:10,140 --> 01:33:25,140
In other words, when you read the Ethereum white paper, one of the things that they wrote there at the very beginning on the first page was they did a long multi-paragraph essay on the limits of trying to build on Bitcoin and how it's hard or impossible to build on Bitcoin.

905
01:33:26,140 --> 01:33:32,140
But if Drivechain were adopted, no longer would altcoin founders be able to make that argument as well.

906
01:33:33,140 --> 01:33:42,140
They wouldn't be able to say it's hard or impossible to build a protocol on Bitcoin because people will be able to build Drivechains, which are advanced sidechains.

907
01:33:43,140 --> 01:33:55,140
So there will be fewer altcoins, I believe, if Drivechain is adopted because the founders won't be able to say credibly that it is difficult or impossible to build on Bitcoin.

908
01:33:55,140 --> 01:34:07,140
Well, since we have no questions or comments remaining, I guess we'll wrap and we'll circle back on Monday.

909
01:34:07,140 --> 01:34:10,140
Please, if you've enjoyed this, follow LayerTwo Labs.

910
01:34:10,140 --> 01:34:13,140
Please bring your questions and comments.

911
01:34:13,140 --> 01:34:19,140
Everyone who listens to these is encouraged to speak and participate in these spaces.

912
01:34:19,140 --> 01:34:22,140
And it's been really great.

913
01:34:22,140 --> 01:34:25,140
We had a lot of great speakers today.

914
01:34:25,140 --> 01:34:29,140
And I look forward to the next one.

915
01:34:29,140 --> 01:34:33,140
So on Monday, you know, feel free to come with your questions and comments.

916
01:34:33,140 --> 01:34:37,140
The places you can go to learn more about Drivechain include YouTube.

917
01:34:37,140 --> 01:34:41,140
There is the LayerTwo Labs YouTube channel.

918
01:34:41,140 --> 01:34:45,140
And there's also Paul Sztorc's YouTube channel.

919
01:34:46,140 --> 01:34:55,140
And there is also the Drivechain Talk Telegram group, where 700 Bitcoiners hang out and talk about Drivechain.

920
01:34:55,140 --> 01:34:58,140
At least that's how many members the group has.

921
01:34:58,140 --> 01:35:07,140
And there is also the Drivechain Project GitHub, where you can see the code, which was discussed today.

922
01:35:08,140 --> 01:35:19,140
And there is also other websites, like if you go to John Light, his website, I recommend it.

923
01:35:19,140 --> 01:35:21,140
He has a blog called Lightcoin.

924
01:35:21,140 --> 01:35:24,140
And he has two posts on Drivechain.

925
01:35:24,140 --> 01:35:28,140
And they're both favorable towards Drivechain.

926
01:35:28,140 --> 01:35:33,140
The posts deal with the question of whether miners will steal from the Drivechain.

927
01:35:33,140 --> 01:35:39,140
And he argues in those posts that it is unlikely that the miners will steal from the Drivechain.

928
01:35:39,140 --> 01:35:50,140
And he cites the fact that miners or validators haven't been stealing in a roughly equivalent situation on Ethereum.

929
01:35:50,140 --> 01:35:55,140
So that's a very informed and interesting read.

930
01:35:55,140 --> 01:36:03,140
Another great read is fiatjaf.com, where the creator of Nostr has written an essay on Drivechain.

931
01:36:03,140 --> 01:36:05,140
I recommend it. It's a great place to start.

932
01:36:05,140 --> 01:36:12,140
If you're interested in just starting to learn about Drivechain, go to fiatjaf.com, F-I-A-T-J-A-F.com.

933
01:36:12,140 --> 01:36:15,140
And then click on Bitcoin and then click on Drivechain.

934
01:36:15,140 --> 01:36:17,140
Read his essay. It only takes five minutes.

935
01:36:17,140 --> 01:36:23,140
And then you will be up to speed on what the creator of Nostr thinks about Drivechain.

936
01:36:25,140 --> 01:36:29,140
Well, that's all we have for today, folks. Thanks for being here.

937
01:36:29,140 --> 01:36:34,140
And I'll catch you on Monday. Ciao.