1
00:00:02,327 --> 00:00:05,127
Hey everybody, welcome to the space.

2
00:00:08,927 --> 00:00:10,927
Come on up if you'd like to chat.

3
00:00:14,207 --> 00:00:16,207
Happy Friday.

4
00:00:22,167 --> 00:00:24,167
Hey Moon Settler, how's it going?

5
00:00:31,327 --> 00:00:33,327
What's up Moon Settler? Happy Friday.

6
00:01:02,327 --> 00:01:04,327
Moon Settler, are you there?

7
00:01:14,327 --> 00:01:16,327
Hello, can you hear me?

8
00:01:16,327 --> 00:01:18,327
Yes, I can hear you.

9
00:01:18,327 --> 00:01:20,327
Happy Friday.

10
00:01:20,327 --> 00:01:22,327
Happy Friday.

11
00:01:22,327 --> 00:01:24,327
What's up?

12
00:01:24,327 --> 00:01:26,327
I just had a little bit of headset trouble.

13
00:01:26,327 --> 00:01:31,327
Every time I get speaker, the headset disconnects from the phone.

14
00:01:31,327 --> 00:01:33,327
Yeah.

15
00:01:35,327 --> 00:01:37,327
Well, welcome to the stage.

16
00:01:39,327 --> 00:01:41,327
Feel free to just chat.

17
00:01:41,327 --> 00:01:43,327
Say whatever's on your mind.

18
00:01:43,327 --> 00:01:45,327
Drivechain related or otherwise.

19
00:01:48,327 --> 00:01:50,327
What do you think about the PR?

20
00:01:50,327 --> 00:01:52,327
You saw what Luke did on GitHub.

21
00:01:55,327 --> 00:01:57,327
Hi everybody.

22
00:01:57,327 --> 00:01:59,327
Hi Moon Settler.

23
00:01:59,327 --> 00:02:01,327
Hi Henry.

24
00:02:05,327 --> 00:02:07,327
I actually have a question for Moon Settler.

25
00:02:07,327 --> 00:02:15,327
I see that you take the opinion that if there was drivechains, then the base layer transaction fees would be lower.

26
00:02:15,327 --> 00:02:19,327
Would you care to elaborate that or maybe I understood it wrong?

27
00:02:25,327 --> 00:02:27,327
One second.

28
00:02:27,327 --> 00:02:30,327
I have to take care of something and then I will answer.

29
00:02:30,327 --> 00:02:32,327
One second.

30
00:02:32,327 --> 00:02:34,327
Sure, sure.

31
00:02:34,327 --> 00:02:38,327
I just found an interesting opinion that I saw you making.

32
00:02:41,327 --> 00:02:46,327
Yeah, so we don't actually really know.

33
00:02:46,327 --> 00:02:49,327
Because this thing depends on a lot of things.

34
00:02:50,327 --> 00:02:55,327
How desirable actually will be the main chain box space?

35
00:02:55,327 --> 00:02:57,327
What will be the one for it?

36
00:02:57,327 --> 00:03:01,327
And in compulsion, how desirable could be drivechain box space?

37
00:03:01,327 --> 00:03:04,327
A lot of assumptions can go into that.

38
00:03:04,327 --> 00:03:11,327
And people can arrive to different conclusions from different base assumptions.

39
00:03:11,327 --> 00:03:17,327
Just on that, what they imagine people would want and value.

40
00:03:19,327 --> 00:03:21,327
Right, right.

41
00:03:23,327 --> 00:03:26,327
How about this question?

42
00:03:26,327 --> 00:03:33,327
Do you think that there is a non-zero chance where if drivechains was not implemented or anything like it,

43
00:03:33,327 --> 00:03:42,327
do you think that it would be possible that there might actually be enough demand for block space as Bitcoin currently works?

44
00:03:42,327 --> 00:03:46,327
Where the fees would be enough for security?

45
00:03:46,327 --> 00:03:48,327
What do you think, Moon Settler?

46
00:03:50,327 --> 00:03:58,327
Yeah, I'm actually in the camp that thinks that most people on this planet will be priced out from using Elvan

47
00:03:58,327 --> 00:04:00,327
and the fees will be high eventually.

48
00:04:00,327 --> 00:04:07,327
If there is actually really demand for Bitcoin and the utility of Bitcoin and the utility of self-custody,

49
00:04:07,327 --> 00:04:15,327
then I pretty much expect that almost everyone will be forced into custody of solutions and it will be a rich man's hobby.

50
00:04:15,327 --> 00:04:24,327
And that fees can actually be high enough to secure the network for a while.

51
00:04:24,327 --> 00:04:27,327
But on the other hand, it all depends.

52
00:04:27,327 --> 00:04:36,327
Because if you keep increasing the viable size of transactions that make economic sense on Bitcoin,

53
00:04:36,327 --> 00:04:42,327
then in relation, the fees mean less and less.

54
00:04:42,327 --> 00:04:49,327
So that's a big problem that I see with the entire small block concept that Bitcoin went towards.

55
00:04:49,327 --> 00:04:56,327
I kind of think that Satoshi, when he invented Bitcoin and thought of the monetary policy,

56
00:04:56,327 --> 00:05:02,327
when he had an ever increasing number of transactions, exponentially increasing number of transactions

57
00:05:02,327 --> 00:05:08,327
and exponentially decreasing volume of transactions in mind when he set this whole thing up.

58
00:05:09,327 --> 00:05:13,327
And he himself diverted from that much later.

59
00:05:13,327 --> 00:05:21,327
But then the system parameters were already set in stone and he couldn't change the emission schedule.

60
00:05:21,327 --> 00:05:31,327
And I think while small blocks make engineering sense absolutely from network engineering perspective and stuff,

61
00:05:31,327 --> 00:05:35,327
I think small blocks and layouts can make sense.

62
00:05:35,327 --> 00:05:41,327
In this regard, in the security aspect, they totally don't make sense.

63
00:05:41,327 --> 00:05:43,327
I have another view to look at it.

64
00:05:43,327 --> 00:05:44,327
I don't know.

65
00:05:44,327 --> 00:05:46,327
I'm wondering if you can see it like this.

66
00:05:46,327 --> 00:05:54,327
So if we are on a track to more custodial solutions for scaling, kind of like what Hal Finney talked about of Bitcoin banks,

67
00:05:54,327 --> 00:06:04,327
and it could be different layers like Lightning or ARK or similar things or maybe even other things that we don't know that might be introduced in the future,

68
00:06:04,327 --> 00:06:10,327
then the price of on-chain transactions could potentially go up.

69
00:06:10,327 --> 00:06:20,327
If an on-chain transaction is going to be an economic dense transaction and it's representing a lot more that's going on another chain or on another layer,

70
00:06:20,327 --> 00:06:25,327
then it would make sense for people that are transacting on the base layer to pay high amounts.

71
00:06:26,327 --> 00:06:34,327
But with the block space being limited, then there's going to be a fee market for it and potentially it would be very high fees.

72
00:06:34,327 --> 00:06:43,327
But when you limit the block space even more with smaller blocks, wouldn't it make sense for actually the fees to continue to go up with smaller blocks?

73
00:06:43,327 --> 00:06:48,327
I think that's where I don't really fully understand why you think smaller blocks might make lower fees.

74
00:06:51,327 --> 00:06:54,327
I think there is a huge problem with this whole thing.

75
00:06:54,327 --> 00:06:55,327
There is a huge timing issue.

76
00:06:55,327 --> 00:06:58,327
These things would need time to develop.

77
00:06:58,327 --> 00:07:09,327
So, you know, these cooperative solutions and whatever that we can try to dream up to solve this problem, this takes time to develop and adopt.

78
00:07:09,327 --> 00:07:16,327
And the demand for block space comes in these huge spikes during bull markets.

79
00:07:17,327 --> 00:07:27,327
And if we expect, because of whatever political or economic reasons, we expect a larger batch of newcomers trying to come into Bitcoin,

80
00:07:27,327 --> 00:07:37,327
then I expect these newcomers will simply capitulate at the first time of high fees and it's not going to be sustained.

81
00:07:37,327 --> 00:07:44,327
They are going to go either into custody or into altcoins or whatever else.

82
00:07:45,327 --> 00:07:47,327
And so this is a complex topic.

83
00:07:47,327 --> 00:07:52,327
Like I said, you have to assume certain things to even arrive to any conclusion.

84
00:07:52,327 --> 00:08:04,327
And I kind of assume that probably this fixed block size limit will not yield a stable, a metastable market at all.

85
00:08:04,327 --> 00:08:16,327
It will be very fluctuating and high fees and too low fees are going to interchangeably, following each other.

86
00:08:16,327 --> 00:08:19,327
These periods are going to follow each other.

87
00:08:19,327 --> 00:08:26,327
And that's pretty bad for the miners too and pretty bad for the users because when they actually want to transit,

88
00:08:26,327 --> 00:08:36,327
they are going to have high fees and then they will not have proper security eventually when the subsidy runs out in the low fee period.

89
00:08:36,327 --> 00:08:43,327
So the whole thing seems like a really bad system to me.

90
00:08:43,327 --> 00:08:47,327
But don't you think a smaller block size might help a little bit?

91
00:08:47,327 --> 00:08:49,327
Because now it's more...

92
00:08:49,327 --> 00:08:54,327
No, I think if you do that now, then everyone will just capitulate.

93
00:08:54,327 --> 00:08:55,327
That's what I think.

94
00:08:55,327 --> 00:08:56,327
Literally you can.

95
00:08:56,327 --> 00:08:58,327
You have to solve the problem first.

96
00:08:58,327 --> 00:09:00,327
You have to solve the problem of scaling first.

97
00:09:00,327 --> 00:09:08,327
And when that is adopted, and when you see that the block space is largely filled with stuff like, you know, JPEGs,

98
00:09:08,327 --> 00:09:11,327
then you can try to constrict the block size.

99
00:09:11,327 --> 00:09:20,327
But maybe at that point the technology will progress so much that it doesn't even make sense to reduce the block size.

100
00:09:20,327 --> 00:09:29,327
And again, if we expect, like right now Bitcoin block space can accommodate like 10-20 million active users in my estimation.

101
00:09:29,327 --> 00:09:35,327
100 million tops with very heavy centralizing, centrally coordinated optimizations.

102
00:09:35,327 --> 00:09:41,327
100 million active users are not unimaginable, but probably the 20 million is a better...

103
00:09:41,327 --> 00:09:44,327
That's a large city, so that's not the world.

104
00:09:44,327 --> 00:09:45,327
That's nothing.

105
00:09:45,327 --> 00:09:52,327
And we don't actually have any control over when people will have a need, when people will have a demand for Bitcoin.

106
00:09:52,327 --> 00:09:56,327
And the properties of Bitcoin that we cherish so much, right?

107
00:09:56,327 --> 00:10:01,327
So this whole thing about this intermediating authorization.

108
00:10:01,327 --> 00:10:07,327
So the way you're looking at it, because the block fee is too volatile, right?

109
00:10:07,327 --> 00:10:12,327
During bull markets it can be extremely high, and during bear markets it can be extremely low.

110
00:10:12,327 --> 00:10:19,327
That because of the volatility, it can cause security to be very, very low during low fee markets.

111
00:10:19,327 --> 00:10:29,327
But if the block size is smaller, wouldn't it incentivize people to build out these other layers, even if they're custodial layers?

112
00:10:29,327 --> 00:10:32,327
Yeah, but that's not a good idea.

113
00:10:32,327 --> 00:10:37,327
So if you start scaling custodially, you know, Hoa's vision, let's call it.

114
00:10:38,327 --> 00:10:43,327
It's not possible for the base layer anyways to scale, right?

115
00:10:43,327 --> 00:10:47,327
It doesn't matter if it's a one megabyte limit, or a four megabyte limit, or a ten megabyte limit.

116
00:10:47,327 --> 00:10:49,327
Either way, it can't scale.

117
00:10:49,327 --> 00:10:50,327
But there is a difference.

118
00:10:50,327 --> 00:11:00,327
There's a huge difference between custodial scaling and other types of scaling, in my view.

119
00:11:01,327 --> 00:11:05,327
Because we see where the world is going.

120
00:11:05,327 --> 00:11:10,327
They are going to tighter and tighter financial and digital control.

121
00:11:10,327 --> 00:11:25,327
And it's just not plausible that they will let people free, and not enforce the exact same key CML, financial regulation bullshit, or even worse, on these custodians.

122
00:11:25,327 --> 00:11:27,327
That's just not plausible.

123
00:11:27,327 --> 00:11:34,327
So we are going to end up with the same system, again, as we have with banks, where you have no privacy and you have no sovereignty.

124
00:11:34,327 --> 00:11:36,327
And then what the fuck is Bitcoin doing, right?

125
00:11:36,327 --> 00:11:44,327
You're thinking if you're prematurely lowering the block size, you're pricing out people way too early to even give it a chance to learn about it, to use the base layer, basically.

126
00:11:44,327 --> 00:11:49,327
And you would rather people learn how the base layer works, even if in the future they won't be able to use it.

127
00:11:50,327 --> 00:11:55,327
Yeah, so we need time.

128
00:11:55,327 --> 00:12:03,327
We need time to migrate to newer solutions and develop them and test them and try them out and even scrap them if they are not good enough, right?

129
00:12:03,327 --> 00:12:13,327
We need this process of invention and trial by fire and adoption or adoption of something else.

130
00:12:13,327 --> 00:12:15,327
We need these things.

131
00:12:15,327 --> 00:12:29,327
And we kind of need to keep up with the new adopters to keep them from defecting, again, from Bitcoin, the asset overall, or just from self-custody.

132
00:12:29,327 --> 00:12:37,327
And I think it's a very, very bad idea to prematurely lower the block size.

133
00:12:38,327 --> 00:12:49,327
Because that would mean that the current users, who are actually right now happy with self-custody and using Bitcoin, are going to start to be priced out.

134
00:12:49,327 --> 00:12:51,327
And...

135
00:12:54,327 --> 00:12:55,327
Sorry about that.

136
00:12:55,327 --> 00:13:00,327
And that actually is making things worse for the users.

137
00:13:00,327 --> 00:13:03,327
That's not a great idea in my book.

138
00:13:04,327 --> 00:13:11,327
And I don't really see how this system can be stable again.

139
00:13:11,327 --> 00:13:33,327
But I find some plausibility of, you know, collecting fees from sidechains and other layer tools like ORC, you know, and trying to funnel that to the miners to solve this issue.

140
00:13:33,327 --> 00:13:47,327
But if I'm being completely honest, I don't actually think that it is possible to really secure Bitcoin just from transaction fees.

141
00:13:47,327 --> 00:13:50,327
The model doesn't really work out in my head.

142
00:13:50,327 --> 00:14:04,327
So if you are adding, you know, cheaper block space that is less replicated and less desired and less valuable, that is not going to impact very much.

143
00:14:04,327 --> 00:14:13,327
And like I said, the defection rate is going to be very high, in my estimation, if you are trying to squeeze more fees.

144
00:14:13,327 --> 00:14:16,327
Do you think it's going to hurt adoption of the asset in general?

145
00:14:16,327 --> 00:14:26,327
Because people have alternatives where, you know, if they can't use the base layer of Bitcoin, then they would just use a different layer or even a different asset, potentially.

146
00:14:26,327 --> 00:14:36,327
Yes. So the problem is there is not really an option to be self-sovereign in Bitcoin without ever touching the base layer.

147
00:14:36,327 --> 00:14:43,327
Right. But don't you think it's still an inevitability where even if like, let's say, you know, the block size was whatever, four megabytes, it doesn't matter.

148
00:14:43,327 --> 00:14:49,327
It's whatever the arbitrary limit is. It's inevitable that people are going to be priced out.

149
00:14:49,327 --> 00:14:56,327
Where I always saw it as like the base layer settlement of, you know, either like large institutions or nation states or banks.

150
00:14:56,327 --> 00:15:01,327
You know, they're going to be the ones using the base layer because everybody else can be priced out anyways.

151
00:15:01,327 --> 00:15:08,327
But your argument is if you if you try to do that earlier, then it doesn't give a chance for Bitcoin to adopt.

152
00:15:08,327 --> 00:15:19,327
No, no. My argument, if you go down that path, then you are not going to have better results than what we have with the financial system we have right now.

153
00:15:19,327 --> 00:15:29,327
Yeah, I can see that. But I think that at least there's some kind of I think I think that there is still a benefit because the auditability is there.

154
00:15:30,327 --> 00:15:36,327
And the ability to, what's it called, go back to the base layer, even if it's too expensive.

155
00:15:36,327 --> 00:15:46,327
Like, you know, for example, if I was selling something for a few hundred, a few million dollars, I might be able to afford the base layer transaction for that.

156
00:15:46,327 --> 00:15:52,327
So just having that availability, I think, is still beneficial versus, you know.

157
00:15:52,327 --> 00:15:59,327
I don't think I don't think that is don't think that is any more beneficial or plausible than what we have with gold.

158
00:15:59,327 --> 00:16:01,327
Like, I really don't think that.

159
00:16:01,327 --> 00:16:03,327
And I don't.

160
00:16:03,327 --> 00:16:07,327
With gold, it takes too long to get it. It takes it's too expensive to transfer it.

161
00:16:07,327 --> 00:16:12,327
Like if you want to transfer, you know, hundreds of pounds of gold across across the world, that's too much.

162
00:16:12,327 --> 00:16:15,327
And then the verifiability there is also very expensive.

163
00:16:15,327 --> 00:16:16,327
And because of that.

164
00:16:16,327 --> 00:16:23,327
But no, no normal person is going to have the problem of transferring hundreds of pounds of gold across the world.

165
00:16:23,327 --> 00:16:25,327
So they're forced to use the base layer.

166
00:16:25,327 --> 00:16:31,327
But where in Bitcoin, they might be incentivized to use the other layer, but they're not forced because they can still use the base layer.

167
00:16:31,327 --> 00:16:33,327
It's just more expensive.

168
00:16:34,327 --> 00:16:36,327
But I'm trying to say that.

169
00:16:36,327 --> 00:16:43,327
Basically, like 99% of the world's population is not not going to have that problem.

170
00:16:43,327 --> 00:16:49,327
Like they put a single gold coin in their pocket and that's pretty much the life saving for normal people.

171
00:16:49,327 --> 00:16:52,327
That's the case. And then you have rich people, right.

172
00:16:52,327 --> 00:17:00,327
And rich people with rich people problems and they might actually be held up on the airports and they might actually be, you know,

173
00:17:00,327 --> 00:17:02,327
Covid is searched for gold.

174
00:17:02,327 --> 00:17:07,327
They are trying to do something if they are working funny or something.

175
00:17:07,327 --> 00:17:16,327
But and these people are going to love Bitcoin probably if they can even use it, because there is a big question.

176
00:17:16,327 --> 00:17:20,327
So if you go down this, this is absolutely permissioned part.

177
00:17:20,327 --> 00:17:24,327
And, you know, SMTP started out as a completely open protocol.

178
00:17:24,327 --> 00:17:27,327
Everyone was free to run the servers and whatnot.

179
00:17:27,327 --> 00:17:34,327
And right now the state is that you basically can't send an email to anyone on this planet.

180
00:17:34,327 --> 00:17:49,327
If you are not sending it from like the six email providers that actually, you know, or their minions or let's call it serves.

181
00:17:50,327 --> 00:17:58,327
So basically, it's very easy to capture open protocols, especially if almost all the supplies held in custody.

182
00:17:58,327 --> 00:18:02,327
It's very easy to go into a paper Bitcoin direction.

183
00:18:02,327 --> 00:18:08,327
You can't actually audit the liabilities on top of the on top of the assets.

184
00:18:08,327 --> 00:18:14,327
So you can't actually prove if someone is providing your signature on a challenge text that you are asked for it.

185
00:18:14,327 --> 00:18:20,327
You can't actually prove that it was them that signed and they did not just forward your request and made someone else sign it.

186
00:18:20,327 --> 00:18:26,327
You can't actually know if legally they are beholden to someone else first with that Bitcoin.

187
00:18:26,327 --> 00:18:28,327
You don't know any of this.

188
00:18:28,327 --> 00:18:34,327
So I don't see why we would have better results with that part, with that half in his vision.

189
00:18:34,327 --> 00:18:39,327
But then what we had with gold, I see the same problem.

190
00:18:39,327 --> 00:18:43,327
You know, if Bitcoin is expensive to hold and transact, then it's the same as gold.

191
00:18:43,327 --> 00:18:50,327
It is going to share the fate of gold just much quicker, probably because it's, you know, it's digital and people already know what to do.

192
00:18:50,327 --> 00:18:57,327
So I see that as a path that leads to capture and Bitcoin stops working as freedom money and stops serving any function.

193
00:18:57,327 --> 00:19:01,327
And also it's a scarcity properties.

194
00:19:01,327 --> 00:19:04,327
I'm not going to step in a custodial scaling solution.

195
00:19:04,327 --> 00:19:15,327
I really, really believe that we are going to have a huge super dilution in the scenario where the liquidity is where people have access to Bitcoin, which will not be the main chain.

196
00:19:15,327 --> 00:19:22,327
And I see block size decrease as something that just reinforces this, that just makes it more likely and more stronger.

197
00:19:22,327 --> 00:19:28,327
And right. So I really don't like talking about that stuff.

198
00:19:28,327 --> 00:19:43,327
I got into an argument with Stuart McKenzie and I told him that in the event, if we had, you know, sidechains that are comparably secure, not the same, but comparably secure,

199
00:19:43,327 --> 00:19:49,327
let's say you have like 10 or 100 block finality assumptions, it doesn't really matter.

200
00:19:52,316 --> 00:19:57,316
So 10 or 100 block finality assumptions instead of one, two blocks, that's fine.

201
00:19:57,316 --> 00:20:12,316
It doesn't have to be exactly the same security as Bitcoin. If you have like short term volatility exposure, but it's not serious, like it's not like you will lose everything, get rough with it or whatever, but you do have some exposure, that's fine.

202
00:20:13,316 --> 00:20:24,316
That could still be livable to people, but it has to be comparable to Bitcoin mainchain. And then it probably makes a lot of sense to decrease the Bitcoin mainchain block size.

203
00:20:24,316 --> 00:20:37,316
If you have that option, if you have block size, block space that can be utilized by the people, you have an abundance of block space that is comparably secure to Bitcoin mainchain, then absolutely.

204
00:20:37,316 --> 00:20:48,316
I think then we should seriously consider reducing the block size, but aside from that, it will literally just cause problems and make everything worse, in my opinion.

205
00:20:48,316 --> 00:20:54,316
Yeah, thanks for clarifying with the questions I asked. I think I have a better understanding of your view.

206
00:20:54,316 --> 00:21:04,316
If I was just to like simplify it, it's basically the issues that you see would be expedited if you decrease it.

207
00:21:04,316 --> 00:21:19,316
Yeah, absolutely. I think if you decrease the block size prematurely before the conditions for that actually are met, then you are going to actually make things worse and the worst outcome will be more pronounced.

208
00:21:19,316 --> 00:21:46,316
I wanted to say one more thing, and this is probably absolutely not going to be popular with Connex, but I kind of think that there is a chance that we are only going to be able to have a significant enough security budget that allows us to secure these increasingly valuable on-chain transactions

209
00:21:47,316 --> 00:21:52,316
if the miners can collect revenue beyond the fees.

210
00:21:52,316 --> 00:22:12,316
So basically, if we can somehow tame MEV, Miner Extractable Value, and it is a significant multiple of the fee, like let's say 50x, 100x or something like that, so miner revenue is 100x from fees, but people are willing to pay for fees.

211
00:22:12,316 --> 00:22:15,316
We kind of know the maximum of that, so whatever.

212
00:22:15,316 --> 00:22:36,316
And if we can do that, and we can do that without fully centralizing mining, like it can remain decentralized enough, and its adverse effects do not really transfer to mainchain, if we could somehow anyhow do that, then I believe that would solve the security budget.

213
00:22:37,316 --> 00:22:42,316
The inherent security budget unsolvable, I don't know how many lemma.

214
00:22:43,316 --> 00:23:02,316
So that was one thing that made me very interested in drivechains, because drivechains enable MEV, and if we can somehow tame that, if we can somehow put that in the service of securing Bitcoin for everyone, and we could somehow make sidechains benefit that mainchain security,

215
00:23:03,316 --> 00:23:22,316
and this increased mainchain security somehow dribbles down on these layers, and the users actually benefit from it, then that's a future that I can imagine where Bitcoin could be a great success and really eat everything, as people like to say.

216
00:23:22,316 --> 00:23:28,316
Otherwise, I think it will be marginalized, and it will die.

217
00:23:28,316 --> 00:23:31,316
Do you think that this comes from 301?

218
00:23:32,316 --> 00:23:36,316
Yeah, that's one possibility.

219
00:23:36,316 --> 00:23:40,316
So, blind merge mining is not really special.

220
00:23:40,316 --> 00:23:47,316
It doesn't require a single way to do it.

221
00:23:47,316 --> 00:23:49,316
You can do it many ways.

222
00:23:49,316 --> 00:23:54,316
We could come up with at least five different ways to do it.

223
00:23:54,316 --> 00:24:08,316
And, of course, 301 and 300, they are aiming to be the maximally block-size, byte-efficient ways to do it.

224
00:24:09,316 --> 00:24:19,316
But people might say that's not the only perspective that we need to consider.

225
00:24:19,316 --> 00:24:35,316
So, being byte-size efficient may not be the most important thing, but I think 300 and 301 are the most efficient, most specialized tools for these jobs.

226
00:24:36,316 --> 00:24:55,316
You can probably use them to bring MEV to Bitcoin and 100x the miner revenue, which would mean that, let's say, if you had like a 0.5 BTC fee revenue,

227
00:24:55,316 --> 00:25:02,316
that is absolutely bollocks if people are going to transact larger and larger amounts on the Bitcoin mainchain,

228
00:25:02,316 --> 00:25:12,316
because the world is coming in, and everyone is condensing everything, and they are using custodians and custodians, and book, and whatever.

229
00:25:12,316 --> 00:25:16,316
There are issues there.

230
00:25:17,316 --> 00:25:23,316
But you are trying to secure tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of Bitcoins with 0.5 BTC per block.

231
00:25:23,316 --> 00:25:27,316
That doesn't make sense. It doesn't make any sense to me.

232
00:25:27,316 --> 00:25:33,316
0.5 BTC per block secures like 0.5 to 1 BTC transaction values.

233
00:25:33,316 --> 00:25:40,316
That's what it secures perfectly, and it does not secure 10,000 BTC settlements.

234
00:25:40,316 --> 00:25:44,316
And if the proof-of-work does not secure them, then what secures them?

235
00:25:44,316 --> 00:25:55,316
And will that thing tolerate proof-of-work miners trying to take a cut from them when they are not even doing a fucking thing to secure their transactions?

236
00:25:55,316 --> 00:26:00,316
And will the world tolerate proof-of-work if it does not actually solve any problem?

237
00:26:00,316 --> 00:26:06,316
So these are the thoughts that bother me when I think about this.

238
00:26:06,316 --> 00:26:12,316
And I try to come up with a way that actually makes proof-of-work useful, proof-of-work security useful,

239
00:26:12,316 --> 00:26:22,316
that actually makes people being able to transact smaller amounts, and those make economic sense, and stuff like that.

240
00:26:22,316 --> 00:26:32,316
So it's a very complex topic to answer your question, and I'm pretty pessimistic on the fees and the security.

241
00:26:33,316 --> 00:26:45,316
I see. I just, the way I look at it is a little bit like, if you're transferring 0.5, if the fee is 0.5 per block for miner revenue,

242
00:26:45,316 --> 00:26:54,316
then there's, from my understanding, there will be a lot more space for people to transact, you know, larger amounts.

243
00:26:54,316 --> 00:27:01,316
And then the fee market would go high, it would actually be more than 0.5, because if it's 0.5, then there's more space.

244
00:27:01,316 --> 00:27:06,316
There's not enough economic dense transactions ready to pay for it, you know, that much.

245
00:27:06,316 --> 00:27:11,316
Yeah, I mean, it all depends on how fast it's centralizing again.

246
00:27:11,316 --> 00:27:16,316
Because if people rush ahead, because it becomes inconvenient and expensive to use mainchain,

247
00:27:16,316 --> 00:27:26,316
and they just rush ahead and everyone adopts custodians first, then we can get into a situation where custodians are only paying once per bite for space,

248
00:27:27,316 --> 00:27:29,316
and nobody's using mainchain.

249
00:27:29,316 --> 00:27:37,316
Yeah, I think that these custodians need to have the optionality, where it's like, if everybody's just onboarded to the custodial, whatever,

250
00:27:37,316 --> 00:27:40,316
then yeah, then the fees can be extremely low, because that's just what everybody's using.

251
00:27:40,316 --> 00:27:49,316
But if the custodial has, like, whatever the wallets are, they have the optionality, you could use the base layer right now, fees are low, would you like to?

252
00:27:49,316 --> 00:27:52,316
If not, then you can continue on the custodial option.

253
00:27:52,316 --> 00:27:56,316
Yeah, I think custodial scaling will come with off-chain settlement books.

254
00:27:56,316 --> 00:28:01,316
So pretty fast people will reinvent the whole banking thing.

255
00:28:01,316 --> 00:28:17,316
And I kind of expect that these large entities will find ways to secure their transactions by forming federations and settling on off-chain books and off-chain transactions.

256
00:28:18,316 --> 00:28:28,316
Like, you have five or six or seven large financial entities, and they have an NFN, USIG, whatever.

257
00:28:28,316 --> 00:28:36,316
Then nobody can screw anyone, they can maintain an always-online node, because it's not a problem at those levels.

258
00:28:36,316 --> 00:28:42,316
So basically you're saying you can incentivize people to use these other layers enough that the base layer is very low?

259
00:28:42,316 --> 00:28:44,316
Absolutely. Absolutely, they will defect.

260
00:28:44,316 --> 00:28:56,316
So the moment fees go, like, without high, people are going to adopt these things, and they will work for them, and their friends will immediately start using them instead of mentioning them.

261
00:28:56,316 --> 00:29:05,316
I think the whole thing will marginalize proof-of-work until people are starting asking the question, why are we even doing this bullshit, it does not secure anything.

262
00:29:05,316 --> 00:29:15,316
So that's my main fear with all this, you know, all this dance that we are playing with the fees and turning away people.

263
00:29:15,316 --> 00:29:24,316
I think everyone from the third world needs to be able to run a Bitcoin full node on their phone or whatever.

264
00:29:25,316 --> 00:29:34,316
But it's not a problem if transactions are $100 or $1,000, because, you know, people will use custodians anyhow.

265
00:29:34,316 --> 00:29:38,316
So this whole thing doesn't really make sense to me, to be honest.

266
00:29:38,316 --> 00:29:45,316
So transaction costs are a bigger pain point than node costs, in my opinion.

267
00:29:46,316 --> 00:29:53,316
At least at higher adoption, this is going to be more pronounced, because right now the fanatics are already in Bitcoin, I believe.

268
00:29:53,316 --> 00:30:07,316
So the people who will insist at all times, absolutely from their mountain bunkers, to run a Bitcoin node, if they have to use it, then they will use a subprime or whatever, and they will just buy hard drives if they have to.

269
00:30:07,316 --> 00:30:11,316
Those people are already in Bitcoin, probably. They are already running the nodes.

270
00:30:11,316 --> 00:30:20,316
And like everyone else in the world that doesn't give a flying fuck about any of this, they are just going to use what works and what is cheap.

271
00:30:21,316 --> 00:30:35,316
And also we are seeing that sadly not only just what works and what is cheap, but also they are very sensitive to exchange rate risk in the sense to the US dollar, basically.

272
00:30:35,316 --> 00:30:42,316
So to their fiat currency, the exchange rate and the downwards volatility is very painful for them.

273
00:30:42,316 --> 00:30:47,316
So that's also a form of cost, right?

274
00:30:47,316 --> 00:30:52,316
It's also a form of cost if they are forced to hold Bitcoin, nobody likes that.

275
00:30:52,316 --> 00:30:54,316
That's a shitty thing.

276
00:30:54,316 --> 00:31:00,316
And if you add all of these things together, it paints a pretty bleak picture.

277
00:31:00,316 --> 00:31:10,316
And I think we could try to make everything as good, as secure and as self-sovereign to the users as we physically can.

278
00:31:11,316 --> 00:31:19,316
And even then, it's a really long road for the world to actually adopt Bitcoin in such a way.

279
00:31:19,316 --> 00:31:28,316
It's already a fairytale at that point if we do everything that we can for these new users, the next 1 billion people.

280
00:31:28,316 --> 00:31:31,316
But if we actually say, fuck them, right?

281
00:31:31,316 --> 00:31:38,316
So Mr. Horl style, I don't give a fuck, I just want my cheap node and I don't give a flying fuck about those people.

282
00:31:38,316 --> 00:31:47,316
If that narrative wins, if that is the prevailing attitude, then these people are not even going to try adopting Bitcoin.

283
00:31:47,316 --> 00:31:54,316
Or if they do, they will use it as a stock and they will use it in a custodial manner.

284
00:31:54,316 --> 00:31:59,316
And so that's kind of how I see all this playing out.

285
00:32:00,316 --> 00:32:04,316
Okay, I actually have a question.

286
00:32:04,316 --> 00:32:16,316
Previously, when you said they would defect on the main chain, you mean by they're just going to use the other custodial solutions like Lightning or ARK or even a different chain, completely a different asset.

287
00:32:16,316 --> 00:32:18,316
That's what you mean by defect, right?

288
00:32:18,316 --> 00:32:21,316
Yeah, I mean, ARK is a funny thing.

289
00:32:21,316 --> 00:32:30,316
You don't mean defect like in a drivechain world where they're using a sidechain that's actually two-way pegged through hash rate or something like that.

290
00:32:30,316 --> 00:32:32,316
You don't mean defect in that scenario?

291
00:32:32,316 --> 00:32:36,316
I think most of them will defect Bitcoin as the asset.

292
00:32:36,316 --> 00:32:39,316
Like that's kind of how I expected playing out.

293
00:32:39,316 --> 00:32:43,316
Right, so you mean in a non-drivechain world though, right?

294
00:32:44,316 --> 00:32:45,316
Doesn't matter.

295
00:32:45,316 --> 00:33:01,316
I'm not sure I have a very hard time imagining that someone who is new to this is going to look at these things like all the altcoins that he can pick from and see that they have a much larger upside to Bitcoin.

296
00:33:01,316 --> 00:33:04,316
That's how they advertise like that.

297
00:33:04,316 --> 00:33:10,316
Okay, Bitcoin may do a 20x maybe in 10-15 years, we don't know.

298
00:33:10,316 --> 00:33:13,316
But these things, they can do a 1000x if you're lucky.

299
00:33:13,316 --> 00:33:17,316
So there is that utility that people want to be early.

300
00:33:17,316 --> 00:33:21,316
And from that point of view, Bitcoin is probably losing.

301
00:33:21,316 --> 00:33:25,316
It does not exhibit the number go up properties anymore.

302
00:33:25,316 --> 00:33:30,316
If someone looks at the price chart, they start drawing lines and they are just looking at it.

303
00:33:30,316 --> 00:33:35,316
The potent recognition in their brain is going to see that it is topping out.

304
00:33:35,316 --> 00:33:38,316
That's what new people see when they look at the price chart.

305
00:33:38,316 --> 00:33:39,316
There's diminishing returns, right?

306
00:33:39,316 --> 00:33:41,316
Yes, yes, yes.

307
00:33:41,316 --> 00:33:47,316
If you're speculating on a new asset that you really fully don't understand, you might as well speculate on something that's going to give you way higher potential returns.

308
00:33:47,316 --> 00:33:50,316
I mean, it depends who wants what.

309
00:33:50,316 --> 00:34:00,316
But I can absolutely see that a lot of people are going to be drawn to the same properties that early Bitcoiners were drawn to when Bitcoin was super volatile.

310
00:34:00,316 --> 00:34:06,316
But what they won't have is the network effect and liquidity, right?

311
00:34:06,316 --> 00:34:10,316
Yeah, I'm not an expert on that.

312
00:34:10,316 --> 00:34:15,316
But I think a lot of temptation will go towards that.

313
00:34:15,316 --> 00:34:17,316
And they will also have the cheap fees.

314
00:34:17,316 --> 00:34:19,316
So that's another thing.

315
00:34:19,316 --> 00:34:30,316
I mean, there were times where I looked at the transaction fees on Bitcoin, you know, going from one exchange to the other.

316
00:34:30,316 --> 00:34:31,316
And I said, fuck it.

317
00:34:31,316 --> 00:34:33,316
I'm not going to transact in Bitcoin.

318
00:34:33,316 --> 00:34:36,316
I'm going to exchange.

319
00:34:36,316 --> 00:34:43,316
I will use a shitcoin because that's like a tiny fraction of the transaction fee.

320
00:34:43,316 --> 00:34:48,316
And that attitude is, I think, going to be perfectly natural to new people.

321
00:34:48,316 --> 00:35:02,316
And it all trends towards that, you know, that Bitcoin as a medium of exchange and settlement layer is going to get marginalized as well.

322
00:35:02,316 --> 00:35:07,316
As Bitcoin, the asset, might actually be marginalized, especially in bull markets.

323
00:35:07,316 --> 00:35:09,316
I can totally see that in bull markets.

324
00:35:09,316 --> 00:35:15,316
You know, when all the shitcoins are falling, it will see consolidations as we usually see that.

325
00:35:15,316 --> 00:35:20,316
But when the bull market starts, everyone is starting to look at altcoins.

326
00:35:20,316 --> 00:35:29,316
I can kind of see that in the posts and the behavior of people and the price actions of these various shitcoins.

327
00:35:29,316 --> 00:35:34,316
You can see that people can't wait for the bull market to go into shitcoins.

328
00:35:34,316 --> 00:35:39,316
And then that all is going to also limit Bitcoin's upside potential.

329
00:35:39,316 --> 00:35:44,316
I still think that the more sophisticated players are only looking for a bull market to make more Bitcoin.

330
00:35:44,316 --> 00:35:49,316
I think that the Harvard fact and the Metcalfe's law of hard money eventually winning in the future,

331
00:35:49,316 --> 00:35:54,316
they don't mind to speculate on other alternate currencies.

332
00:35:54,316 --> 00:35:59,316
But I think that they're still basing their long-term value in Bitcoin.

333
00:35:59,316 --> 00:36:02,316
New players would not because they don't really understand that, I think.

334
00:36:02,316 --> 00:36:06,316
Possibly, but we are talking about a very, very small fraction of humanity.

335
00:36:06,316 --> 00:36:10,316
So I think if you are looking at the investors as a group, then...

336
00:36:10,316 --> 00:36:21,316
Yeah, the fraction would be very small, but I think that if the actual amount of the total value there is going to be more than, you know, I don't know.

337
00:36:21,316 --> 00:36:25,316
Yeah, I just look at these charts, right?

338
00:36:26,316 --> 00:36:35,316
So I look at Bitcoin and think if I was a pension fund and I saw that it has 80-90% drawdown still,

339
00:36:35,316 --> 00:36:49,316
but actually has diminishing returns and I'm looking at like best case, I'm looking at like a plus 80% and then after plus 20% in the next cycle.

340
00:36:49,316 --> 00:36:52,316
But I have a huge amount of risk going with that.

341
00:36:52,316 --> 00:36:56,316
And it's not like before that I only have to risk like 1 or 5%.

342
00:36:56,316 --> 00:36:57,316
I have to go all in.

343
00:36:57,316 --> 00:37:07,316
Not only, but let's say I have to go in a significant portion of my funds and that actually can affect my ability to pay out.

344
00:37:07,316 --> 00:37:11,316
And really, I have all sorts of regulatory risk.

345
00:37:11,316 --> 00:37:14,316
I'm just going to say nah, right?

346
00:37:14,316 --> 00:37:18,316
So it's 1-2% exposure doesn't work anymore.

347
00:37:19,316 --> 00:37:25,316
I can't risk more on these 80-90% drawdowns because, you know, banks have failed on less.

348
00:37:25,316 --> 00:37:32,316
Like 30% on bonds can kill these institutions when they do these things.

349
00:37:32,316 --> 00:37:38,316
So I kind of see that, you know, traditional finance is not going to be ultra-interested.

350
00:37:38,316 --> 00:37:49,316
There is a population of investors that is very much interested in growing their value in Bitcoin.

351
00:37:49,316 --> 00:37:50,316
But that can also change, right?

352
00:37:50,316 --> 00:37:57,316
If they see that it has diminishing returns, if they see that it struggles to keep up with inflation, their interest will immediately go away.

353
00:37:57,316 --> 00:38:02,316
And I think that's kind of the biggest problem that Bitcoin has right now.

354
00:38:03,316 --> 00:38:09,316
It is out of sync with inflation and it does not even act as a good inflation hedge anymore.

355
00:38:09,316 --> 00:38:14,316
That's probably the biggest issue that Bitcoin has overall.

356
00:38:14,316 --> 00:38:21,316
And again, this whole thing in my head, everything just connects to each other.

357
00:38:21,316 --> 00:38:24,316
Everything goes back to the demand for Bitcoin.

358
00:38:24,316 --> 00:38:26,316
Demand for Bitcoin's basic properties.

359
00:38:26,316 --> 00:38:37,316
Because as limited the supply is, if there is a really serious demand coming in for what Bitcoin actually does on the main chain, on the base layer,

360
00:38:37,316 --> 00:38:43,316
it's very hard to see that we could not resume some serious NGO.

361
00:38:43,316 --> 00:38:57,316
And that would, in this early phase, you know, still bring back this protection that people start seeing Bitcoin as something that you can hold long term and don't have to trade.

362
00:38:57,316 --> 00:39:09,316
So, shifting into that point of view, if you're looking at Bitcoin eventually becoming the base layer, like the asset that's everything denominated in Bitcoin,

363
00:39:09,316 --> 00:39:14,316
then people might not look at Bitcoin as the speculative asset to make gains,

364
00:39:14,316 --> 00:39:19,316
but they're going to look at Bitcoin as the denominated asset for anything that they want to make gains on.

365
00:39:19,316 --> 00:39:23,316
I'm not even really considering that in all seriousness.

366
00:39:23,316 --> 00:39:28,316
And that's a good meme that I don't think that will ever happen at this rate.

367
00:39:28,316 --> 00:39:34,316
I don't know. I think there's a considerable amount of altcoin traders or whatever.

368
00:39:34,316 --> 00:39:37,316
They're basically denominated as Bitcoin.

369
00:39:37,316 --> 00:39:41,316
How many of these people are there? Seriously, look at the world.

370
00:39:41,316 --> 00:39:48,316
This is like a single detention camp in China or something like that.

371
00:39:48,316 --> 00:39:51,316
That's what we are talking about. It's nothing.

372
00:39:51,316 --> 00:40:00,316
I just recently read an article a few days ago that made some interesting things that I've been thinking about that I'm wondering other people's point of view.

373
00:40:00,316 --> 00:40:10,316
So he was saying in a drivechain world where like big companies might be incentivized to create drivechains, maybe like a Twitter drivechain, a Facebook drivechain.

374
00:40:10,316 --> 00:40:17,316
And he was talking about how because you need 90 percent approval rate from hashrate to add a new slot.

375
00:40:17,316 --> 00:40:25,316
He was thinking maybe Facebook would have an incentive to control at least 10 percent of the hashrate to make sure no competitors would get a slot.

376
00:40:25,743 --> 00:40:39,343
And I was thinking about this. Is this a positive or negative? Is this good for Bitcoin where it would incentivize companies like Facebook to have 10 percent hashrate to make sure their competitor doesn't get a slot? Or is this like bad?

377
00:40:39,343 --> 00:40:41,343
What do you have to say about this?

378
00:40:41,343 --> 00:41:04,342
I don't know. I honestly I did not. So I was thinking more when I posted that companies might actually sponsor and lobby for sidechains that they would actually use it for themselves. I did not necessarily think about stuff like Facebook. I was thinking more like stuff like Moon Wallet and Phoenix and stuff like that.

379
00:41:05,342 --> 00:41:24,342
It doesn't matter what the company is, but the point is like you would incentivize a company, a large company to have at least 10 percent hashrate to make sure that no other competitor would get an active slot. Is this a positive for hashrate though? I think it could be a positive, but I haven't really thought enough about it to have a really good opinion.

380
00:41:24,342 --> 00:41:31,342
I think we are a few cycles too early for this. Like seriously, like 10 years from now.

381
00:41:31,342 --> 00:41:40,342
You would need a drivechain world and then you would need really, really high adoption of drivechain world and then you would have really successful drivechains, right? Like it's so far down.

382
00:41:40,342 --> 00:41:57,342
Yeah, and even then controlling the hashrate can mean a lot of different things, right? In a corporate legal world, you can actually just contract a large mining pool and agree with them that they will not sponsor competitors.

383
00:41:57,342 --> 00:42:03,342
You also don't really even need to have it at all times. You could just like rent out 10 percent whenever you want.

384
00:42:03,342 --> 00:42:24,342
Yes, exactly. You can rent out or you can just sign contracts with mutual benefits, with pools. So I'm not sure I would go that deep into a lot and I absolutely don't want to even entertain whatever stupidity Jason and Larry comes up with.

385
00:42:24,342 --> 00:42:37,343
I don't know, I think it's good. If you're incentivizing people to have hashrate, no matter how you think about it, I think it's a potential good thing. I'm not fully convinced yet, but I think incentivizing people to have hashrate is not necessarily bad.

386
00:42:37,343 --> 00:43:02,343
It was very funny because I remember he was posting about this thing about somehow using hashrate for security and all this bullshit and I was just making a point that if Russia wanted to obliterate the power grid of Ukraine and Ukraine was trying to protect them with hash power instead of military,

387
00:43:02,343 --> 00:43:16,343
it would cost Russia absolutely nothing, they could do it in a matter of hours or minutes and it would just be a missile salvo, a kinetic strike salvo and the power grid would be gone and Ukraine's hashrate would be gone if that would even make sense.

388
00:43:16,343 --> 00:43:34,343
You know, a funny thing is right about, I don't know, like 15 minutes later people started posting graphs about internet blackouts in Ukraine because the Russians actually did zero their power grid with a single missile salvo.

389
00:43:34,343 --> 00:43:42,343
What I got out of that article is that drivechains can actually be a lot bigger than I thought about because I really wasn't thinking that far out.

390
00:43:43,343 --> 00:43:59,343
My point is power infrastructure is very vulnerable, so this entire notion that you can use hashrate as protection from kinetic threats or it would be superior to kinetic threats is absolute bollocks and we should not even speak about it at all.

391
00:43:59,343 --> 00:44:03,343
Well, like Jason Lowery's point of view of the power projection.

392
00:44:03,343 --> 00:44:06,343
Yeah, that's what I was talking about.

393
00:44:06,343 --> 00:44:09,343
You're not going to use kinetic power, you're going to use hashrate power.

394
00:44:09,343 --> 00:44:18,343
Yeah, I already talked too much if you were not arguing for that and let's forget it because I think that's complete bollocks but forget it.

395
00:44:18,343 --> 00:44:29,343
And people are saying drivechain world but I don't know what the fuck that means because there are so many ways this could go.

396
00:44:30,343 --> 00:44:45,343
So just people having base assumptions and the basic understanding, sort of social contract, shared morality, whatever, having an agreement on something completely changes the Schelling point.

397
00:44:45,343 --> 00:44:53,343
The probabilities and the expected payouts for miners in their games that they can play with drivechains, it completely changes the Schelling point.

398
00:44:53,343 --> 00:45:10,343
So I don't know what the drivechain world means because people are talking all over the place on how they see this working and what can main chain users, if they even exist because we can just reduce the block size and force everyone to drivechain.

399
00:45:10,343 --> 00:45:13,343
I don't know what a drivechain world means, seriously.

400
00:45:13,343 --> 00:45:16,343
It can be so many things.

401
00:45:16,343 --> 00:45:24,343
Mun Sedla, can I ask you, sorry I'm a bit under the weather, I'd participate a bit more but my voice here is weak.

402
00:45:24,343 --> 00:45:39,343
But can I ask you if you had to lay out a plan, very high level, and you had dictatorial control over the network and obviously that's antithesis to the value proposition to begin with but let's just say that no one cared.

403
00:45:40,343 --> 00:45:49,343
What would you do, what dials would you tweak to try to assure that Bitcoin's success?

404
00:45:49,343 --> 00:45:54,343
Yeah, that's a very interesting question.

405
00:45:54,343 --> 00:46:07,343
So, to be honest, yeah, many times during my career, so to speak, I thought I had the answer.

406
00:46:07,343 --> 00:46:10,343
I thought I knew exactly what we have to do.

407
00:46:11,343 --> 00:46:16,343
And kind of got rug pulled each and every time on them.

408
00:46:16,343 --> 00:46:34,343
I was really, really convinced that we need to create, like, to avoid regulatory culture, to avoid this fucking centralized nightmare that, you know, custodians are holding Bitcoin, they are telling us what Bitcoin is, and people are not even able to have access to the Bitcoin network.

409
00:46:34,343 --> 00:46:39,343
And those that have not even access to the Bitcoin network, they are excluded from traditional financial systems.

410
00:46:39,343 --> 00:46:47,343
So those coins can't actually interact with, you know, the vast majority of the coins that don't interact with anyone and stuff like that.

411
00:46:48,343 --> 00:47:05,343
So I see the world going in that direction and I thought what we need to do is make Bitcoin, you know, function as electronic cash, peer-to-peer, you know, medium of exchange.

412
00:47:05,343 --> 00:47:21,343
And it would fix the valuation because the scarcity properties, if people insist on final settlement for Bitcoin with a large enough circular economy, then it would fix the valuation, it would fix the value of money problem if people actually used it for real goods and services.

413
00:47:21,343 --> 00:47:34,343
It would not be as manipulable as it is right now when it's traded as a stock on centralized exchanges and it's all beholden to the, you know, the legal regulatory system.

414
00:47:34,343 --> 00:47:45,343
So I thought that was what we needed to do, but again, people don't really have an appetite for Bitcoin for this use case right now.

415
00:47:45,343 --> 00:47:58,343
It's just too volatile, especially to the downside for them to want to use it as money, like a month-to-month spending budget to be in Bitcoin.

416
00:47:58,343 --> 00:48:01,343
For most people that is just way too risky.

417
00:48:01,343 --> 00:48:12,343
And since Bitcoin can't really function in this aspect, it's probably never going to be, you know, resilient enough against this sort of capture.

418
00:48:12,343 --> 00:48:27,343
So that's where I am kind of in the depression train that even if you somehow manage to make Bitcoin, you know, usable for billions of people as a medium of exchange,

419
00:48:28,343 --> 00:48:31,343
it wouldn't mean that they actually want that and they would adopt it.

420
00:48:31,343 --> 00:48:37,343
Like, there is a chance, of course, but I see that as very, very low right now.

421
00:48:37,343 --> 00:48:45,343
And I think Alex Kravets said that what people actually want from Bitcoin right now is to be smart collateral.

422
00:48:45,343 --> 00:48:53,343
Smart as in being able to use in a non-custodial manner that is not beholden to the regulators, right?

423
00:48:53,343 --> 00:49:04,342
So that's what people actually want. They want to gamble with shit and they want to use Bitcoin as collateral because it may actually be good for collateral that is super legal.

424
00:49:04,342 --> 00:49:15,342
That's kind of the end goal of this whole crypto thing that Satoshi started is that we have a system that is not beholden to the legal system, to the judicial system,

425
00:49:15,342 --> 00:49:21,342
that it works without, you know, central authority and these boomers that control the world right now.

426
00:49:22,342 --> 00:49:27,342
So that was the original purpose of Bitcoin and that's kind of what people want from it.

427
00:49:27,342 --> 00:49:30,342
They just don't want to use it as money.

428
00:49:30,342 --> 00:49:38,342
And Bitcoin is so limited in its contractual capabilities that it does not really function very well as smart collateral even.

429
00:49:38,342 --> 00:49:47,342
So not only it does not function as peer-to-peer money at scale in a large circular economy, that's absolutely out of question for Bitcoin,

430
00:49:47,342 --> 00:49:50,342
but it does not even function as smart collateral.

431
00:49:50,342 --> 00:49:57,342
And that was a pretty big blow to me when he said that because I felt that he is not just making this shit up.

432
00:49:57,342 --> 00:50:06,342
He has thought about it deeply and I kind of have a feeling from what I've seen in the world and where things are developing

433
00:50:06,342 --> 00:50:10,342
and what people are excited about it that there might actually be something in this.

434
00:50:11,342 --> 00:50:20,342
And so, to be honest, I don't know what I would do if I could dictate the course for Bitcoin,

435
00:50:20,342 --> 00:50:24,342
but I would really like to explore what we can do with governance.

436
00:50:24,342 --> 00:50:32,342
I really would like to see how far we can push things, how far we can push scaling, how far we can push smarter contracts.

437
00:50:33,342 --> 00:50:42,342
And they seem to be the least disruptive change that we can do with Bitcoin that can have a huge potential payout.

438
00:50:43,342 --> 00:50:49,342
So that's something, but I don't think that we'll solve all the problems of Bitcoin, to be honest.

439
00:50:49,342 --> 00:50:54,342
I just think we should really explore them and see how far we can go.

440
00:50:59,342 --> 00:51:00,342
Hey, I made it.

441
00:51:01,342 --> 00:51:16,342
I think, you know, as I think everyone here knows, there is like a cultural idea that Bitcoin doesn't have any problems at all and it's already perfect.

442
00:51:16,342 --> 00:51:24,342
And I don't know if anyone has any ideas on how exactly to push back against that in a way that actually works,

443
00:51:24,342 --> 00:51:28,342
like to just stop people from saying that.

444
00:51:28,342 --> 00:51:34,342
Or maybe I just wanted to raise that idea because, you know, this is a wide idea.

445
00:51:35,342 --> 00:51:38,342
I think it's a very strong idea because currently it works.

446
00:51:38,342 --> 00:51:43,342
And at least currently from their observation, they can use it for whatever use cases they use it for.

447
00:51:43,342 --> 00:51:48,342
So it works for them for what they're doing or what they're intending to do with it today, currently.

448
00:51:49,342 --> 00:51:52,342
So I think it's very hard to push back on it because it's like a hypothetical future.

449
00:51:52,342 --> 00:52:00,342
Even if this future is, you know, very likely, I don't think that they might see the future because they just they see it as how it is right now.

450
00:52:00,342 --> 00:52:01,342
It's working.

451
00:52:02,342 --> 00:52:04,342
So I would say it's very hard to push back on it.

452
00:52:05,342 --> 00:52:08,342
Absolutely. And very easy to guess like people with, you know, what?

453
00:52:09,342 --> 00:52:11,342
It's working. I can transact to pay nothing.

454
00:52:11,342 --> 00:52:15,342
Lightning working. I buy bananas every day on the market with lightning.

455
00:52:15,342 --> 00:52:16,342
What's your problem?

456
00:52:16,342 --> 00:52:18,342
So very easy to guess like people.

457
00:52:18,342 --> 00:52:23,342
But the truth is a real problem I see is that development is very slow.

458
00:52:23,342 --> 00:52:24,342
Adoption, testing, whatever.

459
00:52:25,342 --> 00:52:27,342
We are talking always in multi years.

460
00:52:27,342 --> 00:52:31,342
Then when we want to actually improve on something, we want to add new capability.

461
00:52:31,342 --> 00:52:35,342
Multi years to 10 years right now and can actually get slower later on.

462
00:52:36,342 --> 00:52:39,342
And like I said, defection is lightning fast.

463
00:52:40,342 --> 00:52:41,342
So that that is really, really fast.

464
00:52:41,342 --> 00:52:51,342
Like if you make Bitcoin like a too expensive, too clunky, too unwieldy system for new people, then they will defect without within a heartbeat.

465
00:52:52,342 --> 00:52:53,342
And that won't take years.

466
00:52:54,342 --> 00:53:02,342
So that's kind of the problem I see with this attitude that that people are asking that what's the rush and it's all working for me.

467
00:53:03,342 --> 00:53:23,342
Right. That I would like them to think like a little bit in terms of of how the development actually goes and how these capabilities can be deployed and how other people behave when they are met with a system that is just completely fucking unusable for them and too expensive.

468
00:53:24,342 --> 00:53:36,342
I try to I try to look at it from a perspective of like, even if it's currently working, how much better it can be, because like there's there's obviously, I don't know, to me, it seems like there's more users on Ethereum.

469
00:53:37,342 --> 00:53:39,342
And and Bitcoiners might be like, well, who cares? Right.

470
00:53:40,342 --> 00:53:45,342
But to me, it's like, well, you can actually you know, you can you can get some of those users so it can actually be better.

471
00:53:46,342 --> 00:53:47,342
So I think it's not I don't know.

472
00:53:48,342 --> 00:53:50,342
I think it's just very hard to push back on it.

473
00:53:51,342 --> 00:54:11,342
I completely agree that people will do like Fiatjaf and I were talking on Twitter and we were talking about how the Lightning Network actually it sort of has this problem that, you know, Moon Settler is very aware of about the L1 fee rate goes up and then the HTLCs become unenforceable.

474
00:54:12,342 --> 00:54:21,342
And then Peter Todd replied with like a screenshot of him doing several different Lightning transactions for one set.

475
00:54:22,342 --> 00:54:28,342
And that's an example, I think, of what you're talking about, where it's like they just say, well, it is working for me.

476
00:54:29,342 --> 00:54:40,342
But we know like Fiatjaf and I know that those aren't that's not really HTLCs or it's not really the Lightning Network or that something else is going on or that even if that is something confusing.

477
00:54:41,342 --> 00:54:43,342
And so I certainly agree that that type of thing happens.

478
00:54:44,342 --> 00:55:07,342
And I have this very different I think I don't know why this view is so different, because the view that I'm about to explain, which is this network effect maximalist view, which is to me, I see this whole thing is like the biggest one is just going to win and everything else will go to zero, which I thought was the whole maximalism idea.

479
00:55:07,342 --> 00:55:16,342
Like, it's like the spread of the English language into Canada, or something, you know, where it was like half French, half English.

480
00:55:17,342 --> 00:55:30,342
But as the years go on, I mean, you're a fool if you think in 100 years, there's going to be like equal number of French and English speakers in Canada, like 0% chance of that happening.

481
00:55:31,342 --> 00:55:32,342
Everyone will speak English.

482
00:55:32,342 --> 00:55:34,342
And maybe no one will speak.

483
00:55:34,342 --> 00:55:35,342
I don't know French.

484
00:55:35,342 --> 00:55:39,342
You know, I'm not like, I don't know how that will work exactly.

485
00:55:39,342 --> 00:55:50,342
But I do know that, like when people in Europe make different business contracts, like if someone in France and someone in Germany writes a contract, they write it in English.

486
00:55:51,342 --> 00:56:04,342
And when people negotiate, like someone from Vietnam and someone from China, even something like China, I mean, especially not to mention India, where like everyone could speak English.

487
00:56:04,342 --> 00:56:12,342
So, like, my view is, you're big, you are a threat to everything else.

488
00:56:12,342 --> 00:56:14,342
It's a rivalrous contest.

489
00:56:14,342 --> 00:56:17,342
So, Satoshi and Joy are mentioning Ethereum.

490
00:56:17,342 --> 00:56:22,342
You know, if we have the Ethereum users, it's not just like some people who are having fun over there.

491
00:56:22,342 --> 00:56:35,342
It's like you could, there could be like a two week period where ETH gets something really big and really positive, you know, like the FanDuel DraftKings on ETH or something that is just really popular.

492
00:56:36,342 --> 00:56:39,342
And then you just have a flippening, you have one day.

493
00:56:39,342 --> 00:56:44,342
Bitcoin has one day where it's down 50% and then the next day it's down 90%.

494
00:56:44,342 --> 00:56:47,342
And then that's like completely game over.

495
00:56:47,342 --> 00:56:49,342
Like, you know, like that's impossible.

496
00:56:50,342 --> 00:56:57,342
Of course, the price is the most important metric, but you can kind of go back in time and think of an analogy where that basically has already happened.

497
00:56:57,342 --> 00:57:10,342
If you were to go in 2015 and tell somebody in eight years, Ethereum is going to have 10 times, and that's, you know, that's at today's kind of bear market bottom.

498
00:57:10,342 --> 00:57:17,342
So Ethereum will have 10 times the fees, 10 times the paying users of Bitcoin.

499
00:57:17,342 --> 00:57:21,342
People would have denigrated you to no end.

500
00:57:21,342 --> 00:57:30,342
You would have been called all sorts of, there'd been, Safe Team would have had a hilarious quip about how stupid you were, how you were a troglodyte.

501
00:57:31,342 --> 00:57:47,342
At the peak of the bear market, Ethereum for a period of, you know, over a month had 100 times, 100x the, or I think it was average 80, but a few days, 100 times the amount of fees collected.

502
00:57:47,342 --> 00:57:55,342
So in that metric where kind of a moonsetter was saying like, okay, the price, the market cap is higher on Bitcoin.

503
00:57:55,342 --> 00:57:56,342
That's the most important thing.

504
00:57:57,342 --> 00:58:03,342
But as far as people who are actually using it, and you know, you can say holding Bitcoin is using it.

505
00:58:03,342 --> 00:58:04,342
That's true, of course.

506
00:58:04,342 --> 00:58:08,342
But the people who are actually like, you know, doing their degenerate bullshit every day.

507
00:58:08,342 --> 00:58:19,342
Ethereum has 10 times the amount of degenerate bullshit payment flow, not payment flow, but a fee collection as Bitcoin does.

508
00:58:19,342 --> 00:58:21,342
And that's value, right?

509
00:58:21,342 --> 00:58:24,342
So that is value to those people.

510
00:58:24,342 --> 00:58:26,342
You can call it bullshit, of course.

511
00:58:26,342 --> 00:58:29,342
I will also call it bullshit because I personally think it's bullshit.

512
00:58:29,342 --> 00:58:34,342
But for those people that is value, value that Bitcoin is not providing.

513
00:58:34,342 --> 00:58:35,342
Clearly somebody's valuing it.

514
00:58:35,342 --> 00:58:44,342
Look at Las Vegas and Macau and all the other stuff that I would say is bullshit.

515
00:58:44,342 --> 00:58:52,342
But humans in aggregate are valuing degenerate gambling to the tune of trillions of dollars.

516
00:58:55,342 --> 00:59:03,342
Well, let me just say that Satoshi Dice was kind of Bitcoin's big break and that was degenerate gambling.

517
00:59:03,342 --> 00:59:05,342
It's Eric Voorhees project.

518
00:59:05,342 --> 00:59:07,342
So I just want to throw that in there.

519
00:59:07,342 --> 00:59:20,342
Yeah, I would just say that it's still not the best pushback because we're in the event of like Ethereum creating like an amazing Ponzi that has like really, really good whatever Ponzinomics and it becomes like mainstream, right?

520
00:59:20,342 --> 00:59:25,342
Like for one reason or another, like a fan fuel, dual, whatever that you gave that example.

521
00:59:25,342 --> 00:59:35,342
But you can give any other example of, you know, some kind of mass media attention to some kind of contract that locks up a lot of Ethereum and is extremely successful for whatever reason.

522
00:59:35,342 --> 00:59:37,342
And, you know, and Ethereum's price goes up.

523
00:59:37,342 --> 00:59:42,342
I don't think that necessarily makes Bitcoin's price go down 50 percent or 90 percent.

524
00:59:42,342 --> 00:59:48,342
I think that Ethereum's price, I mean, Bitcoin's price versus Ethereum can go down definitely because Ethereum's price can go up a lot.

525
00:59:48,342 --> 00:59:56,342
But I think that's not a good enough pushback to Bitcoiners because to them, they care about whatever fundamental properties Bitcoin has, where they just they value that.

526
00:59:56,342 --> 01:00:01,342
And they think that even if Ethereum's price goes up, it has other properties that they're just not interested in.

527
01:00:01,342 --> 01:00:04,342
So I don't think it's still a good enough pushback.

528
01:00:07,342 --> 01:00:12,342
Well, I mean, I think people do think that to some extent, but I think they are kidding themselves.

529
01:00:12,342 --> 01:00:16,342
People, I think this is a situation where people are kind of lying to themselves about how much they believe something.

530
01:00:16,342 --> 01:00:22,342
Because people say it doesn't matter what Ethereum's price is as long as Bitcoin's price is also where it is.

531
01:00:22,342 --> 01:00:24,342
But what if there's the flipping?

532
01:00:24,342 --> 01:00:27,342
What if Ethereum is 10 times the price of Bitcoin?

533
01:00:27,342 --> 01:00:30,342
So what if Ethereum is 100 times?

534
01:00:31,160 --> 01:00:33,480
The market cap of Ethereum, you know what I mean?

535
01:00:33,480 --> 01:00:42,400
Like there comes a point where actually everyone kind of admits to themselves that it actually would be an existential threat to the project, I think.

536
01:00:42,400 --> 01:00:44,720
But maybe there's a type of people there.

537
01:00:44,720 --> 01:00:52,559
I think that like a lot of people that are just following Bitcoiners, they might start, you know, double guessing, double doubles, you know, whatever the other opinions now.

538
01:00:52,559 --> 01:00:55,639
And they might start moving over to Ethereum for, you know, those reasons.

539
01:00:55,920 --> 01:01:05,360
But I think like diehard Bitcoiners might think of it as a temporary thing that maybe it's, you know, maybe a few years of Ethereum being high or maybe a decade of Ethereum being, you know, flippant.

540
01:01:05,639 --> 01:01:13,200
But I think that they believe that in the long term, the properties of Ethereum don't make sense to them where and it might be a smaller amount.

541
01:01:13,200 --> 01:01:15,520
And then maybe their Bitcoins will lose a lot of users to that.

542
01:01:16,000 --> 01:01:24,119
But I still think that there's going to be those diehard Bitcoiners that really care about Bitcoin's properties over Ethereum's, that it's just very hard for them to see those kind of things.

543
01:01:24,759 --> 01:01:27,920
Yeah, but it's very interesting that they think it is a given, right?

544
01:01:27,920 --> 01:01:35,439
So if we do nothing and Bitcoin will retain these properties that we enjoy, enjoyed to this point and enjoy today.

545
01:01:36,079 --> 01:01:39,560
And that's not actually how the whole thing is set up.

546
01:01:39,960 --> 01:01:47,280
So we know the subsidy is going away and we might actually actually want that hundred times fee revenue or maybe more.

547
01:01:47,719 --> 01:01:52,799
Yeah, I think that the best approach is to show that the potential benefits can be extremely big.

548
01:01:53,200 --> 01:02:06,320
And I think that that's the best approach, because like if it can have a potential enormous positive gain, then you need to start, even if you start weighing out the whatever hypothetical negatives to it,

549
01:02:06,600 --> 01:02:11,039
then you've got to be fair and you also have to look at the potential, you know, benefits to it.

550
01:02:11,359 --> 01:02:20,439
And then if you're looking at it, then you might be like, oh, if you start to see that there is potential huge, enormous gain from it, you might start thinking about being more open minded to it.

551
01:02:21,000 --> 01:02:28,679
I think we also need to understand, like better understand where this confidence is coming from.

552
01:02:28,920 --> 01:02:40,000
I kind of think that the early evangelists of Bitcoin who have, you know, orange peeled these people basically technically lied to them.

553
01:02:40,239 --> 01:02:56,720
So what happened is they oversimplified things, they removed all nuance because these arguments and the way that people have been orange peeled and the things that they have been fed just got simpler and simpler and simpler because that worked better and better and better.

554
01:02:56,720 --> 01:03:03,119
Right. So so the goal was always for the evangelists to actually believe that Bitcoin is going to be a huge success.

555
01:03:03,119 --> 01:03:10,800
But of course, it's going to need more people because network effect is important and whatever, and maybe even wanted to pump drawbacks, who knows.

556
01:03:11,239 --> 01:03:16,319
But the point is, these evangelists actually started to simplify the message to the point where it became a lie.

557
01:03:16,319 --> 01:03:18,200
And these lies became very, very popular.

558
01:03:18,200 --> 01:03:29,479
And these lies have been retold so many times and have been perfected so many times that it's very hard to approach them with any any common sense of technical nuance.

559
01:03:29,920 --> 01:03:32,599
And that's kind of the situation we are in.

560
01:03:32,959 --> 01:03:39,000
The majority of the Bitcoin and Bitcoin have been sold a lie or many lies, basically.

561
01:03:39,000 --> 01:03:41,560
And it's not necessarily with the intention of lying.

562
01:03:41,560 --> 01:03:45,519
It's just the simple message hit harder and spread better.

563
01:03:45,519 --> 01:03:48,879
And people thought they understood Bitcoin.

564
01:03:48,920 --> 01:03:50,160
They actually think they are.

565
01:03:50,160 --> 01:03:55,599
But of course, the people, you know, that you say are lying, they don't think themselves to be lying.

566
01:03:55,599 --> 01:04:01,679
Nobody knows what this is or what's going to happen for sure.

567
01:04:01,679 --> 01:04:07,440
Or even like, you know, the best people are those that have some humility.

568
01:04:07,560 --> 01:04:16,720
People are saying things like Bitcoin is unconfiscated, Bitcoin is immutable, Bitcoin is the ultimate universal source of truth.

569
01:04:16,920 --> 01:04:21,280
And you need to get these ideas, you know, try to distill these ideas.

570
01:04:21,280 --> 01:04:25,640
So it's very it's something very different than anything that's been before.

571
01:04:25,640 --> 01:04:27,200
And it has analogies.

572
01:04:27,679 --> 01:04:44,239
But when you have something that's like kind of invented that has only, you know, broad ties to previous to anything that existed prior, it's not easy to relay what it is.

573
01:04:44,239 --> 01:04:47,320
So, I mean, I don't want these people to do that.

574
01:04:47,679 --> 01:04:50,160
And of course, a lot of these people, they believe it wholeheartedly.

575
01:04:50,480 --> 01:04:53,840
And now it's their business.

576
01:04:54,079 --> 01:05:01,399
And many of them, not all of actually a lot, all of them, I'm sure a lot of the, you know, some of the loudest people actually aren't holding all that much coin.

577
01:05:01,399 --> 01:05:03,600
And they are definitely still got to work for a living.

578
01:05:03,600 --> 01:05:12,160
But some of the people, of course, of your Paul Storch's and the like have done very well and are now sitting pretty.

579
01:05:12,560 --> 01:05:19,000
And of course, that further validates, you know, to them how intelligent and clairvoyant they are.

580
01:05:20,000 --> 01:05:21,560
Yes, that is all true.

581
01:05:21,560 --> 01:05:22,840
I agree with all that.

582
01:05:22,840 --> 01:05:33,320
But what I wanted to say in the end, and of course, they don't necessarily do this on purpose, but they are saying increasingly insane things that are just technically not true.

583
01:05:33,880 --> 01:05:46,480
And you can see that if Saylor posts something complete bollocks, that just completely mental, that he's raking in the likes.

584
01:05:46,480 --> 01:05:52,399
If anyone with actual understanding to Bitcoin makes a smart technical observation, he gets two likes.

585
01:05:52,799 --> 01:05:55,079
So that's kind of how the whole system works.

586
01:05:55,079 --> 01:06:02,359
Right. So we are kind of set up to go towards idiocracy in the end.

587
01:06:02,919 --> 01:06:04,720
But of course, it's a lot broader than that.

588
01:06:04,720 --> 01:06:23,679
I mean, it's sadly the I think the whole Twitter discussion is much more important than it used to be, I guess, because, you know, the whole world was forced to kind of go with all the Corona lockdown bullshit.

589
01:06:24,679 --> 01:06:28,119
Everybody had was forced to become like hyper Internet or whatever.

590
01:06:28,119 --> 01:06:40,480
But, you know, I spent a long time at Kraken working as like kind of the front, like the top level kind of customer facing person for many years.

591
01:06:40,959 --> 01:06:53,560
And I can tell you for sure that some of the most important people that are affecting this market, influencing the market and the like are not on Twitter at all.

592
01:06:53,600 --> 01:06:57,280
Still to this day and are actually like extremely serious people.

593
01:06:58,840 --> 01:07:02,720
Some of them don't even speak English or, you know, hardly do.

594
01:07:02,720 --> 01:07:11,440
And sometimes I was just quite surprised how little they pay attention to the kind of technical discussions surrounding it.

595
01:07:11,440 --> 01:07:15,720
So there is a much broader picture out there.

596
01:07:15,720 --> 01:07:34,199
Like if tomorrow the some central bank or, you know, the Russian central bank or something comes and says, oh, yeah, we just bought, you know, we just bought 20,000 Bitcoin and we have plans to or they announce some giant investment or deployment of hash rate.

597
01:07:34,199 --> 01:07:38,840
And in fact, I can say something that I do know for sure that not many people do.

598
01:07:38,880 --> 01:07:54,760
I won't say like what it is exactly, but there is this all this discussion the last day because I guess Oman has announced this like one and a half billion or 1.1 billion investment in this mining facility, which I had been aware of that some time ago.

599
01:07:54,760 --> 01:07:59,959
And it was like an idle, like an idle power plant.

600
01:07:59,959 --> 01:08:04,160
And they had been like entertaining bids and stuff for some time now.

601
01:08:04,160 --> 01:08:15,880
But there's also other sovereigns that are doing Bitcoin mining right now today that are not public about it, that I have like kind of a I was in a position to be involved with.

602
01:08:15,919 --> 01:08:28,280
So, so, you know, these sovereigns are not on Twitter trying to see what the what to ask, what fucking spanky monkey 507 thinks about whatever bullshit they have.

603
01:08:28,480 --> 01:08:31,679
This is a very different game, but it's always been like that.

604
01:08:31,679 --> 01:08:39,480
It's not whenever even when it was on when it was on on Reddit and all the discussion, all the like pleb discussion was here and there.

605
01:08:40,119 --> 01:08:52,199
There's a lot of stuff happening that's that's much more impactful than these people's retarded opinion and their 50 dollar a week dollar cost average on Swan or whatever.

606
01:08:53,720 --> 01:08:56,239
Yeah, I just I just want to make the point.

607
01:08:56,840 --> 01:09:00,440
Well, can OK, well, let Moon Settler say his thing first.

608
01:09:00,440 --> 01:09:02,560
I'm just going to say, like, what can we actually do about it, though?

609
01:09:02,560 --> 01:09:08,120
Like, like, I wanted I wanted to wanted to answer to Paul's question, where is this coming from?

610
01:09:08,120 --> 01:09:11,120
Right. How did we get here and what we could do about it?

611
01:09:11,120 --> 01:09:16,120
And I wanted to say that we need to understand where it is coming from.

612
01:09:16,360 --> 01:09:41,720
I think it's coming from Bitcoin evangelists oversimplifying the message and that being very popular and very catchy and and and having basically 90 something percent of Bitcoiners not really understanding Bitcoin, but thinking they understand Bitcoin because they understand these oversimplified messages which are factually untruths.

613
01:09:42,160 --> 01:09:59,280
And so I think that's that's where you start, that that you you try to try to discover how how we got here and what were the messages and what context that they, you know, given out and how they were simplified.

614
01:10:00,280 --> 01:10:08,600
And one potential strategy could be to to to show that reality is more complex.

615
01:10:08,600 --> 01:10:09,800
It's not that simple.

616
01:10:09,840 --> 01:10:13,319
This has been oversimplified and it's technically objectively false.

617
01:10:13,360 --> 01:10:19,680
I think that could work on some people, but I kind of have my doubt that it would work on the vast majority.

618
01:10:20,079 --> 01:10:22,680
And it would be an extremely sad thing.

619
01:10:22,680 --> 01:10:26,720
And I really don't want to participate and don't even want to know it exists.

620
01:10:26,720 --> 01:10:31,720
But you can basically probably do the same bullshit like you can oversimplify your message.

621
01:10:31,720 --> 01:10:35,480
You can you can sell lies that, you know, deep down are not true.

622
01:10:35,480 --> 01:10:40,879
But but at least people would understand and you could sell your your thing that way.

623
01:10:40,879 --> 01:10:43,519
That is probably the more successful strategy.

624
01:10:43,519 --> 01:10:52,280
But if we if we, you know, start going into that direction, then probably the bigger marketing projects will win.

625
01:10:52,519 --> 01:11:04,720
And eventually this whole thing will be taken over by the likes of Facebook and Microsoft and Google and whatnot and or the respective governments that put them on a leash or whatever.

626
01:11:04,720 --> 01:11:07,999
So I'm not sure I'm comfortable with the direction.

627
01:11:08,120 --> 01:11:09,120
Just wanted to say.

628
01:11:09,120 --> 01:11:10,120
I have an idea.

629
01:11:10,840 --> 01:11:11,840
I have an idea.

630
01:11:11,840 --> 01:11:13,519
The question of what can we do?

631
01:11:14,680 --> 01:11:17,519
Well, what speaks to me is is like the reward mechanism.

632
01:11:17,720 --> 01:11:21,439
Like why does somebody buy an altcoin or shitcoin or whatever?

633
01:11:21,600 --> 01:11:28,280
I think that they they think that there's a potential of them becoming a millionaire and the potential of them becoming a millionaire makes it interesting to them.

634
01:11:28,280 --> 01:11:30,240
So so what's what's going on there?

635
01:11:30,240 --> 01:11:34,519
Like you give them the potential reward and then they're interested.

636
01:11:34,639 --> 01:11:44,199
So I think that the best way or I don't know, I just think it's an approach that if we can get people to be honest, that there is actually a potential benefit to be gained here.

637
01:11:44,439 --> 01:11:49,759
I think that if they're being honest, they will realize that the game can be huge.

638
01:11:50,079 --> 01:11:57,120
And I think that that's that's that's an approach that can be effective, because if they say, oh, well, I don't care about anything on an Ethereum style chain.

639
01:11:57,360 --> 01:12:03,319
Sure. You might not care about anything, but there's obviously users there and there's obviously more users there that do care.

640
01:12:03,559 --> 01:12:05,360
Right. So they'll be like, well, let them go over there.

641
01:12:05,559 --> 01:12:09,720
Fine. But you could be like, yeah, but is there a benefit to them using Bitcoin asset?

642
01:12:09,840 --> 01:12:16,120
And I think if they're just being honest, they will see that the network effect that Bitcoin will gain from that is is potentially tremendous.

643
01:12:16,319 --> 01:12:23,999
And if you show them that reward that actually helps them and their Bitcoin, I think that that's that's like a more if they're being like, I don't know.

644
01:12:23,999 --> 01:12:32,680
I think that that's that that's a way to give them more open mindedness to it where they can see a direct benefit to it like themselves, obviously, and also the Bitcoin network.

645
01:12:33,840 --> 01:12:43,879
Yeah, I think like we could do something like we could form a new group that is like realist Bitcoiners.

646
01:12:43,879 --> 01:12:58,559
And it's something like you can still become a Bitcoin millionaire while also not believing a bunch of simplistic garbage that, you know, we feed to the we feed to the masses.

647
01:12:58,959 --> 01:13:06,160
We could do something like that where it's like we still think that Bitcoin is the most important thing in the world and you probably make a ton of money.

648
01:13:06,720 --> 01:13:17,160
But we don't believe that if there's an HTLC below the set per byte ratio, then that's using the lightning network or something.

649
01:13:17,160 --> 01:13:25,519
You know, we could make like a list of like, I don't know if that's good either, because you're going to lose the majority of people because the majority of people don't understand the technical parts.

650
01:13:25,519 --> 01:13:31,040
The majority of people understand, all right, this has user demand, and if it has user demand, it's positive for Bitcoin.

651
01:13:31,319 --> 01:13:32,959
If you bring it over to Bitcoin, I don't know.

652
01:13:33,600 --> 01:13:37,120
I think that once you start going technical, you're just going to lose 99 percent of people.

653
01:13:37,319 --> 01:13:43,480
And like most of the people, you're sure there's technical people that understand and they're just going to double down and argue with you.

654
01:13:43,639 --> 01:13:47,079
But then most people that just follow them are going to also double down and argue with you.

655
01:13:47,319 --> 01:13:49,120
So I don't know if that's effective.

656
01:13:49,360 --> 01:13:55,920
Yes, the laypeople will never know, they'll never be specialists, so they always need to dumb down in some way or another.

657
01:13:56,160 --> 01:14:07,680
But maybe if we just take your idea that we still say we stay positive about Bitcoin, we say, well, Bitcoin almost certainly will succeed.

658
01:14:07,680 --> 01:14:10,720
But it's not like it's not just on autopilot to succeed.

659
01:14:10,720 --> 01:14:14,720
It will succeed because of what all of its supporters do.

660
01:14:14,720 --> 01:14:21,519
I think that's a better approach where not like it most certainly will succeed.

661
01:14:21,519 --> 01:14:25,079
Like there's definitely a good chance it could continue to succeed, right?

662
01:14:25,079 --> 01:14:28,399
Like there's a non-zero chance that it's fine and it will continue to succeed.

663
01:14:28,600 --> 01:14:31,840
But how much better it can be is more the approach.

664
01:14:31,840 --> 01:14:35,680
It could be like obviously it could also not work, right?

665
01:14:35,680 --> 01:14:36,759
That's a reality.

666
01:14:37,639 --> 01:14:41,120
But if it does work, can it actually be extremely better?

667
01:14:41,399 --> 01:14:49,399
And I think most people will have to start to concede to that if they really start to think about that it actually can be better if they start thinking about this.

668
01:14:51,040 --> 01:15:01,920
I'm sure Austin can remember a time when, I remember when Gavin Andresen would always insist year after year after year, like 2012, 2013, 2014, he would say Bitcoin is an experiment.

669
01:15:01,920 --> 01:15:03,240
Bitcoin could go to zero.

670
01:15:03,759 --> 01:15:16,319
It's just kind of amusing how now it's kind of ironic that instead, you know, you have people saying, we know the names, people saying like, oh, this is a $100 trillion asset.

671
01:15:16,319 --> 01:15:20,160
You know, it's just a matter of when, not if, you know, stuff like that.

672
01:15:20,160 --> 01:15:22,280
It's kind of flipped 180 degrees.

673
01:15:22,280 --> 01:15:25,439
But I think it's important that they can be right, right?

674
01:15:25,439 --> 01:15:29,519
Like there's a possibility that they can be right, which should be like, oh, all right.

675
01:15:29,519 --> 01:15:30,840
Well, yeah, you could be right.

676
01:15:30,840 --> 01:15:31,319
Fine.

677
01:15:32,120 --> 01:15:34,920
It could be, but it could just be a million times better.

678
01:15:34,920 --> 01:15:36,720
And it's not just like a little bit better.

679
01:15:36,720 --> 01:15:38,079
It could be a million times better.

680
01:15:38,079 --> 01:15:46,720
So I think that that's an approach that might get them to think about it because they're not going to admit that that's wrong, right?

681
01:15:46,720 --> 01:15:52,360
That's their belief that, you know, it's a trillion, a hundred trillion dollar asset and it's going to be there inevitably.

682
01:15:52,360 --> 01:15:53,680
That's their belief. Right.

683
01:15:53,680 --> 01:15:55,160
And it could be right.

684
01:15:55,160 --> 01:15:56,120
Like they could be right.

685
01:15:56,480 --> 01:15:58,160
Who knows? We don't know the future.

686
01:15:58,399 --> 01:16:00,639
And they obviously have strong reasons to believe that.

687
01:16:00,879 --> 01:16:05,399
But if they can start thinking about that can be sped up, that could be so much better and not just a little better.

688
01:16:05,399 --> 01:16:06,720
That could be so much better.

689
01:16:06,840 --> 01:16:14,480
And start to think about how it can be so much better through proposals like, you know, 300, 301 or any other proposal, whatever they might think about.

690
01:16:14,639 --> 01:16:19,759
Then they could start being more open minded to, all right, well, let's make this a billion times better, not just a little better.

691
01:16:20,559 --> 01:16:26,160
Or just something that it was like, I mean, it used to be an idea that if you liked Bitcoin, you would like.

692
01:16:27,160 --> 01:16:39,639
Tell people about Bitcoin, maybe, or you would, you know, you'd like you get like a Bitcoin shirt, you'd wear it, you know, like you would you do, you try to get your favorite restaurant to take Bitcoin or something like that.

693
01:16:39,639 --> 01:16:41,999
There used to be this more of like an activist.

694
01:16:42,920 --> 01:16:54,199
Kind of thing that I never really participated in, but it used to exist like the Bitcoin people would go around and they would say they would try to work for BitPay either literally or some kind of referral thing.

695
01:16:54,920 --> 01:17:08,920
I think a different tactic that might work would be to, this is something that I think has a little bit of success where you could try to convince people that Bitcoin is a great project.

696
01:17:10,759 --> 01:17:20,280
Things are going great in Bitcoin, but these people who take its success for granted are not helping the situation.

697
01:17:21,079 --> 01:17:25,639
They're mostly irrelevant, but they're kind of making the situation worse or they're just not helping.

698
01:17:26,120 --> 01:17:31,040
So you could say they have their own little thing that they do and they make a lot of noise.

699
01:17:31,879 --> 01:17:46,480
But even though you kind of try to separate Bitcoin, the project, and even Bitcoin, the community from like, you know, like someone who is whatever, laser eye Twitter.

700
01:17:46,480 --> 01:17:53,640
I don't think this is acceptable either, because once you start creating separations or you create this unity, that's not a positive.

701
01:17:53,959 --> 01:18:01,199
I think it's better to find commonality in them and like point out positive things, point out commonality, completely ignore any negative things.

702
01:18:01,439 --> 01:18:04,880
Because even if they are negative to you, they might not be negative to them.

703
01:18:05,279 --> 01:18:07,600
And if you're pointing it out, it's just being divisive.

704
01:18:07,840 --> 01:18:09,199
And I don't think that there's a gain from that.

705
01:18:09,240 --> 01:18:15,000
I think the gain is from finding commonalities, finding similarities, finding like we all want Bitcoin to succeed.

706
01:18:15,039 --> 01:18:17,159
Obviously, we all want a lot of users on Bitcoin.

707
01:18:17,199 --> 01:18:20,279
Obviously, we all we all want the network effect of Bitcoin to grow.

708
01:18:20,400 --> 01:18:31,799
Obviously, these kind of things that we all share will be a lot easier for people, for everybody to be under the same umbrella, because we want to find the most amount of common similarities and the things that we all agree on.

709
01:18:32,079 --> 01:18:38,400
And like strengthen those, because then you'll have people in completely different camps that have completely different beliefs.

710
01:18:38,439 --> 01:18:40,959
They'll also join because they share those things.

711
01:18:41,120 --> 01:18:49,000
But once you start pointing out the things they don't like, they don't agree with, it automatically like separates them, even if there is commonalities, right?

712
01:18:49,000 --> 01:18:50,880
Like the negative starts to become bigger.

713
01:18:51,039 --> 01:19:01,120
I think it's the better approach is make the positive bigger, make the common bigger, make that like the, you know, the big thing in the room where it's like.

714
01:19:01,240 --> 01:19:21,199
But that's the like the foundational value out of drivechain is that then despite different willingness to have different trade offs and, you know, different attributes that they're looking to utilize or whatever, everybody's holding the same asset.

715
01:19:21,880 --> 01:19:30,319
And so, you know, that speaks to me, like, for example, you know, the idea of why do people have to create a different asset protocol?

716
01:19:30,360 --> 01:19:43,480
Right. If they really like, there's no reason for for people to like, of course, the only answer to that is that only one person can win any technical debate.

717
01:19:43,679 --> 01:19:53,319
Like Paula said a hundred times, you can only have in the current architecture, either big blocks or small blocks.

718
01:19:54,240 --> 01:20:02,720
And so we're lucky that we didn't get, you know, a big block takeover, but the collateral damage has been immense.

719
01:20:04,480 --> 01:20:10,679
And with the drivechain architecture, you can have, everyone can have what they want.

720
01:20:11,600 --> 01:20:16,720
Yeah, this is this is very important because big blockers too, because we can be like, all right, well, what do big blockers want?

721
01:20:16,720 --> 01:20:20,480
They want a lot of users of Bitcoin asset, right?

722
01:20:20,480 --> 01:20:21,760
That's that's really what they want.

723
01:20:21,959 --> 01:20:33,079
They want it all to be on one chain, but it can be a big block sidechain, like, you know, and then you can start talking about, like, you know, the technical differences of of a big block blockchain that could be there.

724
01:20:33,400 --> 01:20:36,480
That's their base layer. Like they don't have to think about anything, you know, before that.

725
01:20:36,862 --> 01:20:41,862
Yeah, I wanted to say, can you hear me, guys?

726
01:20:41,862 --> 01:20:43,862
Yeah, we hear you. Yes.

727
01:20:43,862 --> 01:20:46,862
All right. I was not sure because. All right.

728
01:20:46,862 --> 01:21:02,862
So so what I wanted to say is that it is actually very, very, very important that we can disagree on things, because I think the group is not too big on having it being possible that we are going to agree on everything.

729
01:21:02,862 --> 01:21:11,862
When it comes to the rule set that we want to be, you know, subjected to on the chain that we use.

730
01:21:11,862 --> 01:21:16,862
I think Bitcoin is just too big for everyone to to agree on everything.

731
01:21:16,862 --> 01:21:23,862
And basically the only thing that we can agree on is that we don't agree on anything and we don't change anything.

732
01:21:23,862 --> 01:21:30,862
And that kind of means like ossification in my opinion.

733
01:21:30,862 --> 01:21:35,862
But if we had a way to to like disagree in a way that we do not create shit coins with.

734
01:21:35,862 --> 01:21:51,862
Right. So in a way that preserves the monetary unity of Bitcoin and people use the common language, the common asset, that that would be a huge thing, because I can tell you there are a lot of people on Bitcoin Twitter that I don't want to be on the same chain with.

735
01:21:51,862 --> 01:21:58,862
Like literally, I disagree with them so fucking much that I don't even want to be on the same chain with.

736
01:21:58,862 --> 01:22:02,862
Yeah, I think a lot of people feel that.

737
01:22:02,862 --> 01:22:09,862
Could we. But I think that's kind of like a little bit what I was saying about saying that some people aren't helping.

738
01:22:09,862 --> 01:22:16,862
So I want to defend this idea just a little before giving up on it, because I'm not sure it's the best idea.

739
01:22:16,862 --> 01:22:28,862
But I think it's like, could you reframe it as like some people on Twitter are like literally like harassing developers or something like you could say something like that?

740
01:22:28,862 --> 01:22:33,862
Like in a way, Luke was trying not Luke, sorry, Vitalik.

741
01:22:33,862 --> 01:22:36,862
He was trying to do Ethereum on Bitcoin.

742
01:22:36,862 --> 01:22:38,862
This is like a well-known story trope.

743
01:22:38,862 --> 01:22:40,862
And it's not it's not really important.

744
01:22:40,862 --> 01:22:42,862
The point is just the archetype of the story.

745
01:22:42,862 --> 01:22:50,862
It's not important how literally true or false it is, although certainly part of it is literally true that, you know, Roger Ver tried to do a large blocks on BTC.

746
01:22:50,862 --> 01:22:55,862
Vitalik tried to do Ethereum EVM thing on BTC, but then they couldn't.

747
01:22:55,862 --> 01:23:04,862
So you could you could almost say on one sense, the toxicity is preserving the the L1 characteristics, which is a good thing.

748
01:23:04,862 --> 01:23:09,862
But you can also say that it is actually closing down innovation.

749
01:23:09,862 --> 01:23:15,862
And like you could say, it's literally harassing developers in some way would be a way of framing it.

750
01:23:15,862 --> 01:23:26,862
And so it's interesting that BIP300 does a similar thing where it protects L1 like completely because there is no no one would change L1 at all.

751
01:23:26,862 --> 01:23:32,862
In that in that paradigm, and yet the person could still make their own optional thing.

752
01:23:32,862 --> 01:23:42,862
So maybe you could reframe all the negativity that comes from Twitter or that even comes from a technical debates.

753
01:23:42,862 --> 01:23:48,862
You could try to reframe that as just quote harassing developers, unquote.

754
01:23:48,862 --> 01:23:51,862
So now it's not the case that you are protecting Bitcoin.

755
01:23:51,862 --> 01:24:01,862
It's the case that you are like if you're you're against whatever you want to call it, like you're against ZK snarks.

756
01:24:01,862 --> 01:24:14,862
If you're against if you're against a developer who wants that or if you're if you're against someone who wants ARK, you know, you're you're like sort of harassing Barack or something.

757
01:24:14,862 --> 01:24:30,862
If you are or Jeremy Rubin more directly, you know, if you're against 119 or if you're it's now it's now personal uncalled for harassing of the technical community by by random other people, you know.

758
01:24:31,862 --> 01:24:33,862
I have a little idea.

759
01:24:33,862 --> 01:24:39,862
Let's say you have like let's say you have whatever you have X amount of time in your day.

760
01:24:39,862 --> 01:24:48,862
Right. And X amount of energy. One one or one use case of that energy is to point out the people that are harassing or like blocking innovation or whatever it is.

761
01:24:48,862 --> 01:24:57,862
You want one one point of view. You can you can spend that energy on that or you can spend energy on showing the potential benefits of CTV or whatever it is.

762
01:24:57,862 --> 01:25:08,862
Like I think that there's much better or like I think it is a better approach to spend your energy on showing what's positive from it than to show who are not right.

763
01:25:08,862 --> 01:25:16,862
Because once you show who are not right, you're just spending you're spending your energy on toxicity. You're spending your energy on people that are dirty and you're getting dirty.

764
01:25:16,862 --> 01:25:27,862
Otherwise, it's like the negative people will get to like Jeremy Rubin or whatever. And I think like one or two negative people can easily cancel out like a couple encouraging tweets.

765
01:25:27,862 --> 01:25:35,862
I think if there was enough like people be more more talking about good things about, you know, the CTV, then Jeremy Rubin might have completely ignored.

766
01:25:35,862 --> 01:25:42,862
Jeremy Rubin might have been more around. And I think a better approach to negativity is to ignore it.

767
01:25:42,862 --> 01:25:48,862
Can I tell you what, you know, what I took from the CTV story?

768
01:25:48,862 --> 01:25:56,862
But I don't know how to say it. So what conclusions I got from observing that very closely.

769
01:25:56,862 --> 01:26:08,862
So it basically, when you have a Bitcoin change proposal, by default, nobody gives a flying fuck about it.

770
01:26:08,862 --> 01:26:14,862
Like six people will care about it, they will maybe read the bit, maybe they will just skim the bit.

771
01:26:14,862 --> 01:26:18,862
And these six people will talk about it among themselves.

772
01:26:18,862 --> 01:26:26,862
Up until the point that you actually start talking about activation, then a whole bunch of people will get really, really upset.

773
01:26:26,862 --> 01:26:30,862
But then people will actually look at it.

774
01:26:30,862 --> 01:26:42,862
So the first point where people will actually start looking at the bit and start seriously discussing maybe the technical trade-offs is when actually talks about activation start.

775
01:26:42,862 --> 01:26:45,862
That's when this becomes more widespread.

776
01:26:45,862 --> 01:26:56,862
Despite whatever anyone says, earlier it just doesn't happen because people have, especially developers are very busy people, and everyone is very busy, and time and energy is scarce.

777
01:26:56,862 --> 01:27:03,862
So people are not reviewing 600 bits and not keeping up to date with them and not discussing them day and night.

778
01:27:03,862 --> 01:27:12,862
And developers are not going to build tools and stuff on features that may not even get activated or very likely not getting activated.

779
01:27:12,862 --> 01:27:22,862
So the whole idea that you would have a finished product that you can demo is a bit bonkers because these things cost time and money and stuff.

780
01:27:22,862 --> 01:27:26,862
So nobody cares about the bit that does not push for activation.

781
01:27:26,862 --> 01:27:28,862
That was one interesting thing.

782
01:27:28,862 --> 01:27:31,862
When you push for activation, people actually start caring.

783
01:27:31,862 --> 01:27:37,862
The very interesting thing was the whole shitstorm about bit 8 versus bit 9.

784
01:27:37,862 --> 01:27:41,862
So that was a very, I did not expect that to happen.

785
01:27:41,862 --> 01:27:50,862
I did not expect that to completely derail all discussion from the technical merits, benefits, and possibilities of Bitcoin completely.

786
01:27:50,862 --> 01:27:57,862
And just take it into partly personal attacks and harassment, as Paul said.

787
01:27:57,862 --> 01:28:02,862
That is very prevalent. People who are not so technical will find a way to convince them.

788
01:28:02,862 --> 01:28:11,862
They will find a way to, you know, try to dig up shit, try to imply shit, try to see shit where there isn't any, or maybe there is, whatever.

789
01:28:11,862 --> 01:28:20,862
But they are going to start calling you a Mossad agent or whatever that is on the menu, or the special thing.

790
01:28:21,862 --> 01:28:33,862
And the point is, that was a bit surprising to me that just bit 8 versus bit 9 created such a huge split and controversy alone.

791
01:28:33,862 --> 01:28:38,862
And really, from what I observed, this whole thing, Jeremy just suggested it.

792
01:28:38,862 --> 01:28:40,862
Like, he did not even release the software.

793
01:28:40,862 --> 01:28:49,862
He just suggested that we may actually use the same, the exact same activation method that Taproot used, and it worked fine, and everyone was generally happy with it.

794
01:28:49,862 --> 01:28:54,862
And all hell broke loose. From where I stood, this is what it took to me.

795
01:28:54,862 --> 01:29:04,862
And basically, that was interesting, because after that, somehow, CTV was branded, tries to hand power over to the miners,

796
01:29:04,862 --> 01:29:17,862
and completely screw everyone, and undo the big Bitcoin freedom fight of, you know, the SegWit USF that was not a USF, but whatever, it was still a USF,

797
01:29:17,862 --> 01:29:19,862
because people wore the hats.

798
01:29:19,862 --> 01:29:28,862
So these things that unfolded was a complete shitstorm, and then Jeremy backed off, and suddenly the whole thing died down.

799
01:29:28,862 --> 01:29:39,862
And still, a lot of people, you know, FUD was very popular, so non-technical, non-well-thought-out FUD about CTV was very, very popular,

800
01:29:39,862 --> 01:29:42,862
and very high-flying at the time.

801
01:29:42,862 --> 01:29:48,862
It was very well replicated and propagated when that went on.

802
01:29:48,862 --> 01:29:53,862
And then later, people slowly get the message that those are not actually true, right?

803
01:29:54,862 --> 01:30:03,862
So somehow, I think, not completely, but some understanding saturated some part of the Bitcoin community,

804
01:30:03,862 --> 01:30:13,862
that these things about permanent encumbrance are not really a viable threat, and it's absolutely not a question with CTV.

805
01:30:13,862 --> 01:30:20,862
And then, what happened is, everyone chilled out, and then the pain came.

806
01:30:20,862 --> 01:30:30,862
So, two things happened, you know, with ordinals and high fees, people suddenly got hit by the winds of the future.

807
01:30:30,862 --> 01:30:38,862
They finally got a taste of, even some new people, that how it could be when the fees are permanently high,

808
01:30:38,862 --> 01:30:43,862
and the mempool is permanently closed, in a higher adoption, higher demand future.

809
01:30:43,862 --> 01:30:51,862
That pain, actually, coupled with some new inventions and new ways of thinking about CTV and this high building,

810
01:30:51,862 --> 01:30:58,862
for a very short moment, gave the whole thing a very good back wind.

811
01:30:58,862 --> 01:31:06,862
And basically, for a little while, it looked like that CTV is getting popular among the plebs.

812
01:31:07,862 --> 01:31:14,862
And that, to me, looks like it was directly tied to the pain that people actually felt.

813
01:31:14,862 --> 01:31:21,862
That's what I wanted to tell about all this long story, that pain seemed to have been the biggest factor.

814
01:31:21,862 --> 01:31:26,862
Of course, there were other factors, but the pain that people actually feel, and this is my problem with the whole dynamic,

815
01:31:26,862 --> 01:31:33,862
that I understand that pain and necessity will bring innovation, but I also know that it takes many, many, many years,

816
01:31:33,862 --> 01:31:39,862
from the point that something like CTV is activated, to the point where it actually does something for the pain.

817
01:31:39,862 --> 01:31:45,862
That can be an entire cycle, or maybe more than an entire cycle.

818
01:31:45,862 --> 01:31:50,862
And the moment the pain is gone, the moment the interest has been largely subsiding,

819
01:31:50,862 --> 01:31:55,862
and now people are again, suddenly asking, what's the hurry?

820
01:31:55,862 --> 01:31:59,862
So when there is no pain, people are asking, what's the hurry? Why are you rushing things?

821
01:31:59,862 --> 01:32:04,862
Why don't we think for 10 more years about which Covenant proposals to activate?

822
01:32:04,862 --> 01:32:15,862
So this is how I saw it, and I think there are some interesting conclusions.

823
01:32:15,862 --> 01:32:18,862
No, I think those are very, very good points.

824
01:32:18,862 --> 01:32:26,862
I think I was taking some notes with my pen, and I think that actually all the points you made are, I think, all related,

825
01:32:26,862 --> 01:32:33,862
which is that no one actually seems to care about whether or not the idea is good.

826
01:32:33,862 --> 01:32:39,862
Instead, they care about activation, or they care about the timeline, or they care about how does it make them look,

827
01:32:39,862 --> 01:32:42,862
if it's BIP-8 or BIP-9.

828
01:32:42,862 --> 01:32:47,862
You would think if the idea is good, it wouldn't actually matter if it activated in a bad way,

829
01:32:48,862 --> 01:32:56,862
because it would be like, you know, it's kind of like if you found a $100 bill in an envelope on your front door,

830
01:32:56,862 --> 01:33:02,862
or if the wind blew it into your face or something, or if it just showed up in your checking account.

831
01:33:02,862 --> 01:33:06,862
It's kind of like it's a good thing. You have $100.

832
01:33:06,862 --> 01:33:11,862
It's like it doesn't sort of really matter that much kind of how it happened,

833
01:33:11,862 --> 01:33:19,862
and I completely agree with you that the pain feedback loop doesn't operate the right way.

834
01:33:19,862 --> 01:33:26,862
I think all those observations are right, but I think just in general to hone in on that idea of like these people,

835
01:33:26,862 --> 01:33:34,862
I think it's just easier to comment on activation rather than to comment on –

836
01:33:34,862 --> 01:33:38,862
because if you want to say something about CTV, you actually have to know something.

837
01:33:38,862 --> 01:33:48,862
Yeah, but that's very rational because there is no prescribed political process.

838
01:33:48,862 --> 01:33:57,862
So you have this system that's trustless, supposedly leaderless, but yet there is, of course, politics inherent in it.

839
01:33:57,862 --> 01:34:05,862
So the debates and conversations around activation are essentially like debates and conversations

840
01:34:05,862 --> 01:34:14,862
around what the political structure should be and what the technical parameters –

841
01:34:14,862 --> 01:34:22,862
what kind of political structure like the technical parameters anchor it to versus how much wiggle room is there actually.

842
01:34:22,862 --> 01:34:30,862
It's very similar to like the debate between – or the debate surrounding is it the miners or the node operators

843
01:34:30,862 --> 01:34:38,862
that have the power when it comes to SegWit activation, which I don't think is settled either.

844
01:34:38,862 --> 01:34:47,862
Yeah, I think that was a big loss in a way because I think people don't understand that even to change something in Bitcoin

845
01:34:47,862 --> 01:34:49,862
doesn't really mean that it changes.

846
01:34:49,862 --> 01:34:59,862
It's kind of like it's like you – because of the way the soft fork works, the change is like opt-in

847
01:34:59,862 --> 01:35:02,862
and only affects the people who are interested in the change.

848
01:35:02,862 --> 01:35:03,862
You know what I mean?

849
01:35:03,862 --> 01:35:08,862
Like it's like you have a magic – I don't know how to describe this,

850
01:35:08,862 --> 01:35:13,862
but it's like something like you have a magic basketball court that has a referee or something,

851
01:35:13,862 --> 01:35:15,862
and then you have a different game.

852
01:35:15,862 --> 01:35:24,862
The soft fork is like you have a different game where you say if someone makes three basketball shots –

853
01:35:24,862 --> 01:35:31,862
one team makes three shots in a row, then during the next timeout we play a game of blitz chess or something,

854
01:35:31,862 --> 01:35:38,862
where it's like if you don't know what's going on, you're just in the break not playing the blitz chess or something.

855
01:35:38,862 --> 01:35:40,862
This is like a weird – it's a hard thing to describe,

856
01:35:40,862 --> 01:35:50,862
but the soft fork is already pushing the envelope on like – it's not really even really a change so to speak.

857
01:35:50,862 --> 01:35:53,862
Although, of course, Luke famously disagrees with this.

858
01:35:53,862 --> 01:35:55,862
Luke has a very interesting – it's very interesting.

859
01:35:55,862 --> 01:35:56,862
I mean I love Luke.

860
01:35:56,862 --> 01:35:58,862
Luke does not agree with this.

861
01:35:58,862 --> 01:36:05,862
He really thinks that it is the case that everyone must upgrade to the latest version

862
01:36:05,862 --> 01:36:08,862
or else they have like completely – they're on a completely different network,

863
01:36:08,862 --> 01:36:13,862
and they don't – nothing's enforced, and it's all – you've been fully degraded to SPV mode.

864
01:36:13,862 --> 01:36:18,862
And sort of Adam Beck also who was on our space, on the recording of our space,

865
01:36:18,862 --> 01:36:25,862
whatever that was two or three weeks ago, he also endorses this view I think,

866
01:36:25,862 --> 01:36:29,862
although I thought we may have partially brought him around.

867
01:36:29,862 --> 01:36:37,862
But this is another thing that I think is a kind of a sad – like a path not taken.

868
01:36:37,862 --> 01:36:44,862
If people could have been convinced that actually you should just ignore most soft forks because they don't affect you.

869
01:36:44,862 --> 01:36:48,862
But this is an intriguing thing that – let me raise – this is a completely different –

870
01:36:48,862 --> 01:36:51,862
this is a totally related topic, but it's in a completely different dimension,

871
01:36:51,862 --> 01:36:59,862
which is when you support a piece of software, you have lots of challenges.

872
01:36:59,862 --> 01:37:04,862
Like there's dependencies, and there is code review, and then there's code complexity.

873
01:37:04,862 --> 01:37:06,862
Then there's like CVE.

874
01:37:06,862 --> 01:37:10,862
There's like critical bugs that certain people get notified about first

875
01:37:10,862 --> 01:37:14,862
because you don't want the secret to get out because you don't want the bug to be exploited.

876
01:37:14,862 --> 01:37:18,862
But you have to tell someone that, hey, you have to change this code.

877
01:37:18,862 --> 01:37:25,862
So a CVE situation is – all this stuff is inherently what you might call centralizing

878
01:37:25,862 --> 01:37:31,862
because it's better if there's a situation where there's like one person in charge of the bitcoin,

879
01:37:31,862 --> 01:37:36,862
github.com, bitcoin slash bitcoin, that you can send a PGP email to and say,

880
01:37:36,862 --> 01:37:40,862
by the way, there's a horrible bug in the software.

881
01:37:40,862 --> 01:37:45,862
Change it secretly, and then push the change out so that everyone upgrades.

882
01:37:45,862 --> 01:37:49,862
And then months after everyone has upgraded, we'll tell everyone.

883
01:37:49,862 --> 01:37:56,862
And these types of things – it's very weird in a way that my view is that actually it's –

884
01:37:56,862 --> 01:38:00,862
ossification is death, which many people believe,

885
01:38:00,862 --> 01:38:08,862
but also frequent changes make it so that you are beholden to –

886
01:38:09,862 --> 01:38:16,862
Frequent changes make it so that you are beholden to the lead developer or something.

887
01:38:16,862 --> 01:38:20,862
I'm trying to articulate this point here, which is that the reality of software –

888
01:38:20,862 --> 01:38:26,862
And the centralizing attributes of the repository, right?

889
01:38:26,862 --> 01:38:32,862
So the GitHub repository is a huge centralizing factor in itself,

890
01:38:33,862 --> 01:38:37,862
and kind of not even under the control of the developers technically.

891
01:38:37,862 --> 01:38:45,862
So it's interesting that if you update too frequently, then that's very centralizing.

892
01:38:45,862 --> 01:38:53,862
If you update too infrequently, then you are basically probably making everyone miserable.

893
01:38:54,862 --> 01:39:00,862
Or if you update too infrequently, you may also miss out on the –

894
01:39:00,862 --> 01:39:04,862
It may take too much time to fix the CVE.

895
01:39:04,862 --> 01:39:08,862
And so in a very bizarre way, you can think of it as like –

896
01:39:08,862 --> 01:39:12,862
There's like large blocks on layer one, like large blockism is bad,

897
01:39:12,862 --> 01:39:15,862
but actually just because of the way –

898
01:39:15,862 --> 01:39:21,862
Like not having a viable plan to ossify L1, possibly because it can't exist.

899
01:39:21,862 --> 01:39:23,862
Such a plan possibly can't exist.

900
01:39:23,862 --> 01:39:34,862
But there is also a parallel version of that in the dev world of like too much reliance on GitHub,

901
01:39:34,862 --> 01:39:42,862
too frequently modifying the code, the problem of CVEs, the problem of dependencies.

902
01:39:42,862 --> 01:39:48,862
That is like its own block size increase in a way.

903
01:39:49,862 --> 01:39:55,862
Very hard to articulate that, but if someone has a great way of naming that or something,

904
01:39:55,862 --> 01:39:57,862
that would be a winning –

905
01:39:57,862 --> 01:40:03,862
That's like an enlightening concept that everyone, I think, should discuss more.

906
01:40:03,862 --> 01:40:09,862
Yes. So one more thing I want to talk about, Luke, is today, even today,

907
01:40:09,862 --> 01:40:12,862
he said something that completely baffled me.

908
01:40:12,862 --> 01:40:17,862
He said, there should be no such thing.

909
01:40:17,862 --> 01:40:19,862
There should be no such thing.

910
01:40:19,862 --> 01:40:22,862
People should not use any node-less wallets.

911
01:40:22,862 --> 01:40:28,862
And we should, if we can make it impossible for people to use node-less wallets.

912
01:40:28,862 --> 01:40:30,862
And I was like, wait a minute.

913
01:40:30,862 --> 01:40:32,862
That's just insanely coercive.

914
01:40:33,681 --> 01:40:46,681
I think I was being a snarky ass and I responded something like, yeah, we should round up everyone that doesn't run a node and just shoot them, put them out of their misery, something like that.

915
01:40:47,681 --> 01:41:03,681
So it's really coercive. And if someone is letting you use the node as a service, that's kind of like something like an anarcho-capitalist free market, voluntarist thing between two, right?

916
01:41:03,681 --> 01:41:15,681
So why can't you two cooperate if you want to cooperate? Why would someone come in and tell you that you can't do that if you both want to do that?

917
01:41:15,681 --> 01:41:22,681
So it was very weird to me. It was very kind of alien from how I look at this.

918
01:41:22,681 --> 01:41:35,681
And I kind of think that people are going to go for cheaper resource use, more convenience, faster UX direction anyhow.

919
01:41:36,681 --> 01:41:51,681
And this does not actually require a fork, so there is not really a way to stop this. So the whole idea that you want to control people's relationship with nodes is kind of weird on the dead end.

920
01:41:52,681 --> 01:42:06,681
I think we can take an example of how previous softworks happened, like the more previous ones, not like before that, for example, SegWit or Tappert, and the potential that Jeremy could have taken with CTV.

921
01:42:07,681 --> 01:42:17,681
And I think Pali is over here in the listeners. He takes a similar approach where getting people excited about a change before proposing it.

922
01:42:17,681 --> 01:42:25,681
It seems like SegWit people were excited about that for maybe because of the block size wars or Tappert because they got sold, whatever.

923
01:42:25,681 --> 01:42:40,681
So I think that getting community excited, even if it's a private community or whatever community, growing a community of people excited about something, a potential software, then proposing it would actually be, and might be just very, very hard or might be just near impossible.

924
01:42:40,681 --> 01:42:47,681
Because I know, Paul, you've been trying to get people excited about drivechains forever, and only recently people are starting to grow in that idea.

925
01:42:47,681 --> 01:42:57,681
And it might be impossible. It might be where doing that activation where it's going to fail is kind of putting it in the spotlight where after time people might start to realize.

926
01:42:57,681 --> 01:43:05,681
So what if Jeremy started to give really good examples of what you can do with CTV and making it dumbed down so people could understand?

927
01:43:05,681 --> 01:43:11,681
You could do a lot of that, though. I think that in the future no one will attempt a soft or hard fork of any kind.

928
01:43:11,681 --> 01:43:27,681
I think just no one will do it. It's already basically reached the edge of just being something that's just not practical. I think no one will actually want to do it. And I think people regret having done it. Let's hear from Isaiah.

929
01:43:28,681 --> 01:43:42,681
Hey, guys. I just kind of want to build off of what Paul was talking about earlier. Because I know it's a little hard to explain. Are soft forks voluntary or are they forced?

930
01:43:42,681 --> 01:44:01,681
Because I know, Paul, you were saying you don't have to run the latest version, which that's kind of what I agree with. But when it comes to soft forks like SegWit and stuff, if you want to run a legacy node, you're basically saying the rest of the network is not valid.

931
01:44:01,681 --> 01:44:23,681
Which that's the part where it gets complicated. Because if the majority of transactions are SegWit and Taproot transactions, you're pretty much just going to ignore a lot of the market. But there are some legacy Bitcoin maxis that still only recognize the original Bitcoin, which is kind of funny.

932
01:44:23,681 --> 01:44:41,681
But yeah, that's why it's kind of a weird mix. It's not forced, but at the same time, you'll be in your own pre-fork group, I guess. You're forced to be in the older version if you don't think the new ones are valid.

933
01:44:41,681 --> 01:45:01,681
Well, believe it or not, I think you're completely right. And those are very good. Those comments are all accurate. But I've actually been meditating on this for a long time. And I think it's actually SegWit is the odd man out. It's actually SegWit that is... let me try to explain it.

934
01:45:01,681 --> 01:45:20,681
SegWit is like a mandatory extension block for signatures. And so it's sort of like SegWit is something that happens to be... the SegWit fork was actually kind of an evil fork. It was a mandatory hard fork.

935
01:45:20,681 --> 01:45:37,681
And it also happened to be one that was so... it was like bespoke and custom that there was a one-to-one correspondence with the old network that it kind of like there's two parallel synchronized networks that are different.

936
01:45:37,681 --> 01:45:57,681
But actually, the SegWit one is the mandatory block size increase. It's a mandatory extension block for signatures. And since it was enforced by the miners, ironically, before the UASF happened, it is in fact the first Luke Tash Jr. 51% attack evil fork in a weird way.

937
01:45:57,681 --> 01:46:11,681
But that sounds kind of crazy. But I actually think that that is the only consistent... because if you go back and you look at other things that were soft forks like the, you know, whatever, CheckLockTimeVerify or something, they don't have any of these weird philosophical questions or problems.

938
01:46:11,681 --> 01:46:29,681
So Satoshi changing the counting rule, and I'll put... let me put a link and you can read about some of my thoughts on this from this article that I wrote. But Satoshi changed the counting rule from the longest chain to the heaviest proof-of-work chain, and then SegWit and the evil fork and the mandatory extension block.

939
01:46:30,681 --> 01:46:50,681
I think those are actually all... it depends, but the terminology is all screwed up. But I think it's actually SegWit that was unique. And since Tapper uses a different SegWit like script versioning, I don't know if it also falls under that category, which would be kind of strange if it does.

940
01:46:50,681 --> 01:47:05,681
But I think the old idea of the soft fork was, we'll take this op that never throws the script interpreter error, and then we'll make it throw an error if new rules are broken. And so that way we tighten the rules, old nodes are unaffected.

941
01:47:05,681 --> 01:47:19,681
So I actually think maybe you have to go... it's probably the case, and this is another link that I'll try to put it in the nest, which is that when I did two Miami conferences ago, I was on the soft fork panel.

942
01:47:19,681 --> 01:47:33,681
And I was saying the soft fork has grown so powerful, it can do so many things with the evil fork and with script versioning history and just all the things that were learned, mandatory extension blocks and things, evil forks.

943
01:47:34,681 --> 01:47:49,681
The soft fork has grown so powerful that there kind of no longer is, and no one tries the hard fork anymore. So probably the whole terminology should just be thrown in the dumpster. Because what are we really saying when we say something's a soft fork?

944
01:47:49,681 --> 01:48:13,681
You know what I mean? It's not like we're contrasting it. It's not like we're saying hard versus soft fork, because no one advocates for a hard fork anymore. And the soft fork isn't what it used to be. And so I'm going to look this up, and I'll put these in the nest, and anyone who's interested in this mysterious philosophical topic, you can read and watch, and I'll try to do this thing. How do I do it?

945
01:48:14,681 --> 01:48:15,681
Can I post this here?

946
01:48:19,681 --> 01:48:26,681
I'll do this reply. I'll put this link, and then I'll put this other link. I'll try to look it up.

947
01:48:27,681 --> 01:48:50,681
In the meantime, I just want to say that when Zaya came up to speak, I totally lost the sound, and I was dying. The app was dying, and I got disconnected. So up to the point I came back, I really heard nothing from what was said. So if anyone has a question or there was something interesting, someone could just sum it up, please.

948
01:48:51,681 --> 01:49:18,681
Yeah, no, I was kind of just going off how, like, in my opinion, at least, SegWit, or any soft fork in general, was kind of optional. But people who didn't want to run SegWit, they couldn't really, you can't recognize SegWit transactions as being valid. So you kind of have to ignore a lot of the network and just live in your own bubble.

949
01:49:21,961 --> 01:49:25,981
This was just going back to, know, like, are soft forks mandatory or not?

950
01:49:29,141 --> 01:49:33,021
And before Isaiah, was saying how, like,

951
01:49:33,181 --> 01:49:39,001
from a pleb point of view CTV and 119 of Jeremy,

952
01:49:39,461 --> 01:49:43,201
a pleb just sees out of nowhere somebody's just trying to do some kind of activation

953
01:49:43,201 --> 01:49:44,301
for some kind of change.

954
01:49:44,621 --> 01:49:46,681
They have no idea who Jeremy is, have no idea what

955
01:49:46,681 --> 01:49:50,541
CTV is they have no idea of potential benefits of it or whatever.

956
01:49:50,541 --> 01:49:54,241
It's as a defense mechanism They're be like what the fuck right away and like wait wait

957
01:49:54,241 --> 01:49:54,921
wait wait wait.

958
01:49:54,921 --> 01:49:56,341
Let's learn about it, right?

959
01:49:56,921 --> 01:50:02,381
As opposed to if you were instead trying to teach people about What it is and like get

960
01:50:02,381 --> 01:50:06,621
people excited actually wanted show them the use case Show them the you know, like get

961
01:50:06,621 --> 01:50:11,781
user demand for it before trying to activate it and maybe the activation That will fail

962
01:50:11,781 --> 01:50:14,361
is a way to get people interested in it.

963
01:50:14,361 --> 01:50:20,061
Maybe that is but but Like I said, years can pass without

964
01:50:20,061 --> 01:50:22,381
any real interest in anything.

965
01:50:22,801 --> 01:50:24,561
is not actually pushing the correct decision.

966
01:50:25,781 --> 01:50:27,041
That's what makes it difficult.

967
01:50:27,501 --> 01:50:28,721
That's what makes it very, very difficult.

968
01:50:28,841 --> 01:50:32,841
To get people excited about something or to get people to able to pay for hard.

969
01:50:33,661 --> 01:50:39,281
And the rejection is so harsh and so abusive if you look at it it probably

970
01:50:40,294 --> 01:50:46,034
you can't even play that game that you are proposing activation to get

971
01:50:46,034 --> 01:50:50,234
people's attention because you really think your idea is good and is ready for

972
01:50:50,234 --> 01:50:52,134
activation or merging or something.

973
01:50:53,114 --> 01:50:57,348
you are just proposing that, not even completely serious,

974
01:50:57,568 --> 01:51:01,448
Let's say you think you actually want to activate it two years from now, that it's more

975
01:51:01,448 --> 01:51:05,868
realistic, but you are saying, hey, let's activate this to get people look at it like

976
01:51:05,868 --> 01:51:07,608
seriously, because now it's ready.

977
01:51:07,868 --> 01:51:11,008
We looked at serious and discuss it and stuff like that.

978
01:51:11,008 --> 01:51:14,681
But the the lashback is so severe, so

979
01:51:14,701 --> 01:51:20,201
abusive that it will probably take the life out of anyone who tries to do that.

980
01:51:21,341 --> 01:51:26,081
And I'm not really surprised that Jeremy said, for this, why I'm out.

981
01:51:27,881 --> 01:51:31,481
Yeah, it's a defensive mechanism and you can say that there's a benefit to that too,

982
01:51:31,501 --> 01:51:32,014
because then it's

983
01:51:32,054 --> 01:51:34,234
going to be very hard for anybody to do a malicious change.

984
01:51:34,834 --> 01:51:38,214
know, if the whole community just instantly rejected any kind of change right away,

985
01:51:38,374 --> 01:51:43,494
that's good. I think that getting people excited, getting majority of Bitcoiners

986
01:51:43,494 --> 01:51:46,614
excited about something, letting them see a potential use case that they're excited

987
01:51:46,614 --> 01:51:49,294
about is... don't think it's

988
01:51:49,348 --> 01:51:52,548
actually good. think people should actually discuss the BIPs.

989
01:51:52,788 --> 01:51:58,448
However, we can get into a situation where basically someone is

990
01:51:58,448 --> 01:52:02,608
running a DDoS attack on us with

991
01:52:02,608 --> 01:52:06,681
ideas that come up

992
01:52:06,681 --> 01:52:08,161
up for activation,

993
01:52:09,441 --> 01:52:14,881
So someone could actually spam beeps and could actually start pushing them like with a

994
01:52:14,881 --> 01:52:16,781
serious marketing budget.

995
01:52:17,221 --> 01:52:22,181
And in a situation like that, I can kind of see that it would be a natural defense

996
01:52:22,181 --> 01:52:27,841
mechanism to people just say, fuck no, and start talking

997
01:52:27,841 --> 01:52:30,861
about who is pushing this immediately, right?

998
01:52:30,941 --> 01:52:32,521
But that's not the word we live in.

999
01:52:32,521 --> 01:52:38,321
But so we are having like some software proposed by

1000
01:52:38,321 --> 01:52:42,161
someone outside of the core.

1001
01:52:42,681 --> 01:52:45,521
establishment, so to speak, every like six years.

1002
01:52:45,721 --> 01:52:47,301
it's not really a DDoS attack.

1003
01:52:47,741 --> 01:52:51,661
In this circumstances, people could actually take that time and look at stuff and

1004
01:52:51,661 --> 01:52:56,321
discuss it. Or let people who they delegate the technical

1005
01:52:56,321 --> 01:52:59,421
signal giving or whatever,

1006
01:53:00,394 --> 01:53:06,334
bearing that they choose to follow in these things because they void their opinions.

1007
01:53:06,854 --> 01:53:09,994
Let those people discuss it and take a look at it.

1008
01:53:10,334 --> 01:53:15,614
I think we could afford this until things get so bad that literally a new proposal

1009
01:53:15,614 --> 01:53:17,348
comes up for activation every month.

1010
01:53:18,368 --> 01:53:20,468
And that's not where we are.

1011
01:53:21,428 --> 01:53:27,188
So like, Paulie has this, you know, own, and excuse me if I'm wrong, I've seen

1012
01:53:27,188 --> 01:53:32,428
Paulie had some articles about a really more, a different type of protocol for scaling

1013
01:53:32,428 --> 01:53:34,328
and he needs some certain upcodes

1014
01:53:35,581 --> 01:53:44,221
think

1015
01:53:44,221 --> 01:53:50,081
a idea. idea.

1016
01:53:50,081 --> 01:53:51,181
idea. idea. I that's idea.

1017
01:53:51,801 --> 01:53:51,981
I good

1018
01:53:52,014 --> 01:53:56,214
kind of proposal comes up for it, you know, for the opcodes that Polly wants, you're to

1019
01:53:56,214 --> 01:53:59,534
just have a whole bunch of people that are like, oh yeah, we want this because it can

1020
01:53:59,534 --> 01:54:00,654
do what Polly wants to do.

1021
01:54:00,654 --> 01:54:02,754
Or, you know, it can do this protocol, right?

1022
01:54:03,134 --> 01:54:06,954
As opposed to where just CTV comes out of nowhere and nobody knows anything about it

1023
01:54:06,954 --> 01:54:08,154
because they haven't talked about it.

1024
01:54:08,454 --> 01:54:09,294
know, it's just I

1025
01:54:09,588 --> 01:54:14,448
think that having community to be excited about something, wanting something, finding

1026
01:54:14,448 --> 01:54:18,288
an actual use case for themselves first before the

1027
01:54:18,288 --> 01:54:22,308
activation. We'll make the activation a lot more successful.

1028
01:54:22,308 --> 01:54:26,488
As you can see that the community is not released, crowning the

1029
01:54:26,681 --> 01:54:31,881
going the mailing list and the GitHub reports and the pull requests and Oh yeah,

1030
01:54:31,881 --> 01:54:35,761
it's out there for 99 % of people.

1031
01:54:35,881 --> 01:54:38,901
They're not, you know, not Yeah, they are looking.

1032
01:54:39,341 --> 01:54:40,821
No matter how they try.

1033
01:54:41,421 --> 01:54:46,901
They have people that they are attuned to, that they are looking for signals,

1034
01:54:47,741 --> 01:54:50,301
and a lot of people follow them back.

1035
01:54:50,861 --> 01:54:56,301
saw that all of them has to do is just like phrase a

1036
01:54:56,301 --> 01:55:02,261
concern in a very vague mannerism, So he can just be

1037
01:55:02,261 --> 01:55:02,661
very vague.

1038
01:55:02,681 --> 01:55:02,901
vague

1039
01:55:02,920 --> 01:55:09,881
that this could be dangerous and all hell will break loose. So many people are following him,

1040
01:55:11,321 --> 01:55:18,600
are tuned into his signals, right, that if he says something about your proposal that it is

1041
01:55:18,600 --> 01:55:26,360
like rushing things and it's too soon and we should like really think about things because

1042
01:55:26,360 --> 01:55:31,961
Bitcoin is not a play thing now, it's serious money and stuff, so he doesn't really need to

1043
01:55:31,961 --> 01:55:40,121
say anything concretely bad. People will immediately amplify that and like even go

1044
01:55:40,121 --> 01:55:46,280
for it. And that's kind of how this thing works. The thing that, like he's basically saying the

1045
01:55:46,280 --> 01:55:51,400
same thing as I am, that get people excited about something first. Yeah, but you can't,

1046
01:55:51,400 --> 01:55:57,160
that's what I'm saying, that everyone is kind of following signals and if those people who are at

1047
01:55:57,160 --> 01:56:04,201
the top of the chain, so to speak, are signal givers and torchbearers, if those people don't

1048
01:56:04,201 --> 01:56:10,040
look at something, then you are shit out of luck. Yeah, because it's so hard to find anything,

1049
01:56:10,040 --> 01:56:16,521
like this is why I say I don't think I could see, or for a soft fork to happen quickly,

1050
01:56:16,521 --> 01:56:21,081
I would expect it to be activated just like sometime in the 2020s because it just seems

1051
01:56:21,800 --> 01:56:28,521
like the process for this to be activated, it's just so absurd that, or I mean, I guess it could

1052
01:56:28,521 --> 01:56:35,961
be good, but I do think for a fast activation, I would be expecting as long as it's in the 2020s

1053
01:56:35,961 --> 01:56:41,081
for any soft fork, I would consider that fast looking at the way things are going.

1054
01:56:41,961 --> 01:56:48,681
You mean that you predict that there would be one soft fork activated in the next decade?

1055
01:56:48,681 --> 01:56:51,160
Well, yeah, but yeah. Or maybe I don't understand what you're saying.

1056
01:56:51,160 --> 01:56:54,121
I would consider that quick the way things are going.

1057
01:56:55,081 --> 01:57:02,040
I really hope that by 2024 we can activate some of the Covenant proposals. I really hope that

1058
01:57:02,441 --> 01:57:08,600
that is not going to take a decade, because really time is not working for us. But I wanted

1059
01:57:08,600 --> 01:57:13,800
to make another point regarding this that you said, that we need to make the community excited,

1060
01:57:13,800 --> 01:57:26,681
and there was a funny conversation I had today with someone and he actually did not like that

1061
01:57:26,681 --> 01:57:37,400
Burak tried to raise hype for his ARK idea without even releasing a white paper or having

1062
01:57:37,400 --> 01:57:44,361
any serious discussion among the developers. So you got the exact opposite argument, whatever you

1063
01:57:44,361 --> 01:57:50,760
come up with. You're still going to get that, but I like Burak's approach where he wants to explain

1064
01:57:50,760 --> 01:57:55,241
what this is and get people interested in it and then understand, oh, you need these op codes for

1065
01:57:55,321 --> 01:58:01,481
it. Yeah, I'm just saying a lot of people will find this suspicious. If you are trying to raise

1066
01:58:01,481 --> 01:58:08,040
hype, they will find it suspicious. If you are not raising hype, they will find it suspicious of

1067
01:58:08,040 --> 01:58:14,040
other people. So something will be suspicious to some people and they will be very loud about it.

1068
01:58:14,040 --> 01:58:21,561
And the way this rough consensus works in people's head is people seem to think that everyone has to

1069
01:58:21,561 --> 01:58:27,721
be on board with a change for it to happen. And if a group is, for whatever reason, whether it's

1070
01:58:27,721 --> 01:58:33,880
valid or not valid or really just hurting their business interest or whatever. So if a group is

1071
01:58:33,880 --> 01:58:39,880
loud enough, they are making enough noise and they can very easily create the appearance of

1072
01:58:39,880 --> 01:58:46,280
disagreement and controversy. So that's a very cheap thing to do. And basically the way I see it,

1073
01:58:47,160 --> 01:58:54,841
this could very easily result in a situation where maybe people who are invested in Bitcoin's

1074
01:58:54,841 --> 01:59:02,280
failure for various reasons can actually use this and basically block everything by making

1075
01:59:02,280 --> 01:59:09,000
everything appear controversial. And I don't think it will take a lot of money to organize this. And

1076
01:59:09,000 --> 01:59:14,280
I'm a little bit afraid that it may already be going on. But of course, the simplest explanation

1077
01:59:14,361 --> 01:59:21,721
is as you guys said, people are retarded. Everyone in their own way, even me in my own way. So people

1078
01:59:21,721 --> 01:59:34,361
are retarded and people like to shout about these things. And of course, people can go full crazy

1079
01:59:34,361 --> 01:59:41,880
with their own paranoia if they entertain their own thoughts in their head. I just want to say

1080
01:59:41,880 --> 01:59:47,081
something. I want to propose something. And I see Pierre Richard is in the audience and I know he

1081
01:59:47,081 --> 01:59:55,160
has some views on BIP300, 301. So I was wondering if Pierre wants to come up and share maybe his

1082
01:59:55,800 --> 02:00:01,721
ideas of maybe it's a bad idea. And then, of course, all with love. We all love each other

1083
02:00:01,721 --> 02:00:07,481
here. We're all Bitcoiners. We just want to talk about Bitcoin. So I think it's good to hear about

1084
02:00:08,120 --> 02:00:14,040
people that have opinions. And maybe we can share our opinions and understand each other better

1085
02:00:14,681 --> 02:00:18,201
if possible. Sounds good.

1086
02:00:20,120 --> 02:00:24,441
While we wait for him, from just what Moonsetter was saying, I think from an

1087
02:00:25,400 --> 02:00:33,880
investment thesis perspective, it probably only makes sense to believe that Bitcoin has

1088
02:00:33,880 --> 02:00:39,880
already ossified. You definitely should not be thinking that there's any changes ahead,

1089
02:00:39,880 --> 02:00:48,361
because it does seem like the possibility is at least strong enough that there likely will not be.

1090
02:00:48,521 --> 02:00:57,281
Yeah, I don't think Bitcoin will ever ossify. You know, when I think about what drives upgrades

1091
02:00:57,281 --> 02:01:04,001
in Bitcoin, it really is about, OK, do we have something here that has an interesting

1092
02:01:04,001 --> 02:01:11,441
set of tradeoffs? And when we look at the history of Bitcoin upgrades, what we see is

1093
02:01:11,521 --> 02:01:14,681
really the opposite of ossification.

1094
02:01:14,961 --> 02:01:23,480
We see upgrades that are increasingly significant in how they change the way that we can

1095
02:01:23,480 --> 02:01:24,761
interact with Bitcoin.

1096
02:01:24,761 --> 02:01:28,041
So I think ossification is a myth.

1097
02:01:28,881 --> 02:01:33,561
But the hard part with ossification is that we don't know what we don't know.

1098
02:01:33,841 --> 02:01:43,640
So we could go 15 years without a particularly compelling idea, and then it's 2040 and then

1099
02:01:43,640 --> 02:01:51,480
some computer scientist comes up with some new theorem that unlocks some efficiency gain

1100
02:01:51,721 --> 02:01:55,641
that is so significant that there's an upgrade, a soft fork at that point.

1101
02:01:55,641 --> 02:02:02,400
So, you know, we don't know when there's going to be good ideas, right, because there's

1102
02:02:02,400 --> 02:02:04,440
lots of bad ideas all the time, right?

1103
02:02:04,440 --> 02:02:09,881
I mean, coming up with bad ideas for how to change Bitcoin is probably the easiest thing

1104
02:02:09,881 --> 02:02:11,281
that one could imagine.

1105
02:02:11,281 --> 02:02:16,921
There's just a super abundance of bad ideas about how to change Bitcoin.

1106
02:02:17,201 --> 02:02:21,040
But good ideas on how to change Bitcoin, those are incredibly scarce.

1107
02:02:21,040 --> 02:02:23,040
I'd argue they're scarcer than Bitcoin itself.

1108
02:02:23,800 --> 02:02:29,241
So I think that, you know, ossification, the rhetoric, the narratives around it, I think

1109
02:02:29,241 --> 02:02:31,720
those are not based on the software engineering reality.

1110
02:02:32,001 --> 02:02:33,841
I think they're based on memes, right?

1111
02:02:33,841 --> 02:02:40,241
And and then they, you know, obviously, but the thing is, in order to achieve a particular

1112
02:02:40,241 --> 02:02:45,440
end, all of that is is is naturally it's subjective.

1113
02:02:45,841 --> 02:02:52,681
So as we reach, right, we can look at the, hey, look, Tacroot was a bigger upgrade than

1114
02:02:52,681 --> 02:02:54,281
SegWit. That's objective, right?

1115
02:02:54,480 --> 02:02:59,000
Do you think that SegWit was a bigger upgrade than CLTV or CSP?

1116
02:02:59,000 --> 02:03:03,961
No, I'm talking about the, I'm asking, I'm saying that in that just the idea of what

1117
02:03:03,961 --> 02:03:06,401
tradeoff is worth it is subjective.

1118
02:03:06,481 --> 02:03:12,321
That something has fundamentally changed in the incentive structures where now there will

1119
02:03:12,321 --> 02:03:16,961
not be any upgrades in the future, regardless of how good the tradeoffs are.

1120
02:03:17,961 --> 02:03:23,280
I agree with you, Peter, that it's that any kind of changes, we need to weigh the

1121
02:03:23,280 --> 02:03:28,601
tradeoffs well. And, you know, and if there is a demand for those specific tradeoffs,

1122
02:03:28,601 --> 02:03:30,560
then it might it might actually happen.

1123
02:03:30,841 --> 02:03:35,881
And with that tune, do you think that there is actually potential beneficial tradeoffs

1124
02:03:35,881 --> 02:03:38,481
to 300 and 301?

1125
02:03:38,681 --> 02:03:42,200
I don't know if you had a chance to really look into it deeply, but do you think that

1126
02:03:42,200 --> 02:03:47,041
Yeah, so I think that whenever we're looking at a BIP, what we have to first start is

1127
02:03:47,041 --> 02:03:51,241
really with with the beginning of the BIP, right, which is the rationale.

1128
02:03:51,241 --> 02:03:52,360
What's the reasoning?

1129
02:03:53,321 --> 02:03:59,241
What's motivating this BIP, this change to Bitcoin?

1130
02:04:00,280 --> 02:04:05,881
Presumably, you know, it's a real problem that is being solved and that that problem

1131
02:04:06,080 --> 02:04:13,681
can be explained, you know, in plain English in a couple of paragraphs of, OK, here's,

1132
02:04:13,800 --> 02:04:17,241
you know, how this is negatively affecting the users of Bitcoin.

1133
02:04:17,881 --> 02:04:19,720
I didn't see that in BIP300.

1134
02:04:19,720 --> 02:04:25,881
What I saw was kind of just economic illiteracy for several paragraphs and just kind of a

1135
02:04:25,881 --> 02:04:27,920
very disjointed thought process.

1136
02:04:28,080 --> 02:04:29,800
It wasn't particularly coherent.

1137
02:04:29,961 --> 02:04:33,961
And so at that point, I think that it's safe to say that if the problem can't be

1138
02:04:33,961 --> 02:04:40,241
described in, you know, a compelling manner, then it doesn't really matter how good the

1139
02:04:40,241 --> 02:04:42,041
solution is from a technical perspective.

1140
02:04:42,041 --> 02:04:44,601
Do you think that there always has to be a problem that a BIP solves?

1141
02:04:44,601 --> 02:04:46,280
Or can it also be that it's soft, like it has so much...

1142
02:04:46,280 --> 02:04:49,961
Yeah, there does. Otherwise, because there's an infinite number of BIPs that we could write

1143
02:04:49,961 --> 02:04:51,401
that don't solve problems, right?

1144
02:04:51,401 --> 02:04:57,961
So, for example, I could say, hey, look, the way that we can improve Bitcoin is by

1145
02:04:57,961 --> 02:05:01,401
changing this consensus variable name.

1146
02:05:01,640 --> 02:05:04,920
And then they're like, OK, what problem does that solve?

1147
02:05:04,920 --> 02:05:09,401
Do you think there's a huge problem that Taproot necessarily solved or even a specific

1148
02:05:09,401 --> 02:05:13,480
problem that like it necessarily solved or just added a potential other use case?

1149
02:05:14,200 --> 02:05:19,080
Sure. I mean, I think that, you know, there's a lot of problems that Taproot solved.

1150
02:05:19,721 --> 02:05:26,040
You know, one is, I think, one that is getting a lot of attention currently with different

1151
02:05:26,040 --> 02:05:31,721
protocol developments has to do with, you know, when you're doing a multisig, how much

1152
02:05:31,721 --> 02:05:33,401
data do you have to put on chain?

1153
02:05:33,401 --> 02:05:39,561
So before, back in the day, you know, with traditional multisig, you have to put, you

1154
02:05:39,561 --> 02:05:43,320
know, maybe five signatures on chain, right?

1155
02:05:43,320 --> 02:05:50,040
Now, with Taproot and with MuSig2 and other, you know, protocol improvements that are

1156
02:05:50,040 --> 02:05:54,600
happening, eventually it could be as efficient as a single signature.

1157
02:05:54,681 --> 02:06:01,561
So, you know, the problem of putting too much data on chain, that's a problem that I can

1158
02:06:01,561 --> 02:06:02,521
wrap my head around.

1159
02:06:02,521 --> 02:06:04,121
You know, that makes a lot of sense.

1160
02:06:04,121 --> 02:06:04,760
Wow. Yeah.

1161
02:06:04,760 --> 02:06:08,681
Bitcoin, in order to be decentralized, we want to do that, right?

1162
02:06:08,681 --> 02:06:14,920
So, you know, it's an efficiency game that's just based on the underlying computer science

1163
02:06:14,920 --> 02:06:16,040
and software engineering.

1164
02:06:16,681 --> 02:06:24,441
I don't have to make, like, crazy economic speculative arguments of, hey, we should

1165
02:06:24,441 --> 02:06:31,561
merge Taproot so that the relative value of Ethereum to Bitcoin, you know, like, that is

1166
02:06:31,561 --> 02:06:32,441
not a problem.

1167
02:06:32,441 --> 02:06:34,441
You want to see an actual problem being solved.

1168
02:06:34,441 --> 02:06:38,760
The motivation or rationale for a bit, because fundamentally, I mean, you're just making

1169
02:06:38,760 --> 02:06:46,920
like a, it's, you know, it's not, it's the tail wagging the dog, right?

1170
02:06:46,920 --> 02:06:51,721
I mean, it's like as a product manager, if I came to the executive team and I was like,

1171
02:06:51,721 --> 02:06:57,480
well, the problem we should solve is that we don't make enough money, you know, like

1172
02:06:57,480 --> 02:07:02,521
you would get fired as a product manager if that was like, okay, you know, that's your

1173
02:07:02,521 --> 02:07:05,080
contribution to the conversation here.

1174
02:07:05,080 --> 02:07:08,360
Because really what you have to think about is, is the users, right?

1175
02:07:08,360 --> 02:07:11,401
The customers and solving their problems.

1176
02:07:11,401 --> 02:07:12,920
That's, that's the role you have.

1177
02:07:13,721 --> 02:07:19,320
And so, you know, I don't think that it's a problem that Ethereum exists, right?

1178
02:07:19,320 --> 02:07:25,080
That like, you know, writing a BIP that claims that Ethereum will no longer exist after this

1179
02:07:25,080 --> 02:07:26,281
BIP gets adopted.

1180
02:07:26,281 --> 02:07:28,920
That to me, it's just, it's not compelling on its own.

1181
02:07:28,920 --> 02:07:36,600
Now, if that's just kind of sub-argument 3A, you know, like it's just, okay, yeah,

1182
02:07:36,600 --> 02:07:39,640
something that people throw out there occasionally, I get it, right?

1183
02:07:39,640 --> 02:07:40,281
Okay.

1184
02:07:40,281 --> 02:07:45,161
You know, lots, every cause has bad arguments that are, you know, thrown around by its

1185
02:07:45,161 --> 02:07:45,721
proponents.

1186
02:07:45,721 --> 02:07:46,841
I'm very familiar with that.

1187
02:07:47,880 --> 02:07:55,640
But I also just haven't heard any particularly interesting rationales or motivations, you

1188
02:07:55,640 --> 02:07:57,001
know, beyond that.

1189
02:07:57,080 --> 02:08:04,521
So, you know, when I've been trying to engage on Twitter with, sorry, on X, you know, I

1190
02:08:04,521 --> 02:08:06,121
guess that's a bit of a hard fork.

1191
02:08:06,920 --> 02:08:14,920
So, you know, the motivation to me is, at the very least, what needs to happen is that

1192
02:08:14,920 --> 02:08:16,521
it needs to be revised, right?

1193
02:08:16,521 --> 02:08:22,281
There should be a pull request on BIP300 that rewrites the motivation in a way that

1194
02:08:22,281 --> 02:08:30,760
is kind of just more in line with what one would expect for a BIP, or at least is logical,

1195
02:08:30,760 --> 02:08:31,001
right?

1196
02:08:31,001 --> 02:08:37,080
I mean, I think that's table six, that one could read through it and follow each logical

1197
02:08:37,080 --> 02:08:43,161
step in each sentence rather than kind of having a disjointed hodgepodge of economic

1198
02:08:43,161 --> 02:08:43,721
fallacies.

1199
02:08:44,441 --> 02:08:44,920
Okay.

1200
02:08:44,920 --> 02:08:48,360
Pierre, first, I want to say thanks for definitely coming in here and hanging out with

1201
02:08:48,360 --> 02:08:52,600
everybody, but also sharing your view where how you're looking at, you know, any kind

1202
02:08:52,600 --> 02:08:56,760
of changes where, well, what is it actually solving?

1203
02:08:56,760 --> 02:09:01,401
What is the actual definitive problem that it's solving to see that if it's even worth

1204
02:09:01,401 --> 02:09:02,040
even looking at?

1205
02:09:03,161 --> 02:09:08,040
I think that it's fair and it's good to see that that's, you know, that's how you're looking

1206
02:09:08,040 --> 02:09:12,681
at it, because then maybe potentially people can start to show, you know, for example,

1207
02:09:12,681 --> 02:09:14,760
maybe it solves this problem or that problem.

1208
02:09:14,760 --> 02:09:19,480
And then you can on your own to see if that's an actual problem, first of all.

1209
02:09:19,480 --> 02:09:21,481
And second of all, if this solves the problem or not.

1210
02:09:21,481 --> 02:09:22,921
And then you can think of the tradeoffs.

1211
02:09:22,921 --> 02:09:24,281
Does it actually have negatives?

1212
02:09:24,281 --> 02:09:29,000
So I think that everybody can think of different problems that it can or can't solve.

1213
02:09:29,000 --> 02:09:33,481
But some might like just a random one that I'm thinking of right now.

1214
02:09:33,481 --> 02:09:38,841
If the base layer becomes too expensive to use, like how can you send me $100 on Bitcoin

1215
02:09:38,841 --> 02:09:39,880
or something like that?

1216
02:09:39,880 --> 02:09:44,921
Do you think that drivechains can potentially solve a problem of actual scalability?

1217
02:09:47,961 --> 02:09:51,640
So is that in the BIP300 motivation?

1218
02:09:51,640 --> 02:09:53,401
Is that in there that I missed it?

1219
02:09:53,961 --> 02:09:54,760
I hear what you're saying.

1220
02:09:55,560 --> 02:09:58,921
You want the potential problems actually to be in the BIP, and I don't know if they are,

1221
02:09:58,921 --> 02:10:01,481
but I'm just trying to think of problems that it can solve.

1222
02:10:02,841 --> 02:10:07,640
Yeah, I mean, I think that, you know, I could come up on stage and say, hey, look,

1223
02:10:07,880 --> 02:10:15,401
if I buy a horse, you know, a pony, that will solve Bitcoin scalability problem.

1224
02:10:15,961 --> 02:10:17,000
What do you think about that?

1225
02:10:17,000 --> 02:10:21,161
It's like, okay, well, all right, let's talk about that, I guess.

1226
02:10:22,281 --> 02:10:23,961
I'm going to give Paul a chance to speak.

1227
02:10:23,961 --> 02:10:28,921
But I see your point is you want personally the BIP to show the actual problems that it's

1228
02:10:28,921 --> 02:10:32,200
solving, and then you would at least take it more seriously.

1229
02:10:32,200 --> 02:10:34,841
I think traditionally that's the way it works.

1230
02:10:34,841 --> 02:10:39,961
Well, I think just before I answer that question, I'd just like to know if you have any other

1231
02:10:39,961 --> 02:10:43,721
problems with the BIP other than the wording of the motivation section.

1232
02:10:45,721 --> 02:10:49,560
Well, so the BIP is ordered in a particular way, right?

1233
02:10:49,560 --> 02:10:54,521
It's not, did you randomize the order of the sections, or is there a logical projection

1234
02:10:54,521 --> 02:10:55,560
of the directions of the sections?

1235
02:10:55,560 --> 02:10:57,000
I'm just asking you a simple question.

1236
02:10:57,000 --> 02:11:02,200
I'm just asking if you have any problem with the BIP that's not the wording of the text

1237
02:11:02,200 --> 02:11:03,560
of the motivation section.

1238
02:11:03,640 --> 02:11:09,080
Paul, when I read English, left to right, top to bottom.

1239
02:11:09,080 --> 02:11:13,961
I don't start at the bottom, I don't start in the middle, I start at the top.

1240
02:11:15,161 --> 02:11:19,560
Yeah, but surely a reasonable person would read through the BIP and then they would say,

1241
02:11:19,560 --> 02:11:20,601
well, maybe I didn't understand that part.

1242
02:11:20,601 --> 02:11:23,161
Paul, do you know how much content there is on the internet?

1243
02:11:23,721 --> 02:11:28,841
How could one possibly read through, even just if you limited it to Bitcoin content,

1244
02:11:28,841 --> 02:11:30,760
it would be impossible to read through all of it.

1245
02:11:30,760 --> 02:11:35,721
So at some point when you're reading something and it's of terribly low quality, you kind

1246
02:11:35,721 --> 02:11:37,481
of just like throw an error, right?

1247
02:11:37,481 --> 02:11:43,080
I don't think, you know, I don't think, I think it's the case many times when I've read

1248
02:11:43,080 --> 02:11:46,601
something where I think, well, I don't really understand that paragraph right now.

1249
02:11:46,601 --> 02:11:51,000
No, it's not that I didn't understand it, it was just that it was illogical, right?

1250
02:11:51,000 --> 02:11:52,041
It was wrong.

1251
02:11:53,320 --> 02:11:58,760
Well, okay, well, let me answer, I mean, one way of answering your question is that Adam

1252
02:11:59,320 --> 02:12:06,200
Beck has said that one of the problems that it would solve would be a way of giving billions

1253
02:12:06,200 --> 02:12:07,640
of people their own UTXO.

1254
02:12:09,000 --> 02:12:10,760
So I don't know if you think that that's...

1255
02:12:10,760 --> 02:12:17,000
Yeah, so after you guys put in that pull request and it gets merged, I'll reread the motivation

1256
02:12:17,000 --> 02:12:19,481
and I'll think about the UTXO situation.

1257
02:12:21,240 --> 02:12:22,281
That sounds good.

1258
02:12:22,281 --> 02:12:26,521
Pierre, I think it's fair that if you have a specific way of looking at, you know, BIPs

1259
02:12:26,521 --> 02:12:30,521
and you think that that's the previous way all BIPs were and, you know, you want to see

1260
02:12:30,521 --> 02:12:35,401
that in a future BIP, you know, that that's your own, you know, and that might be, that's

1261
02:12:35,401 --> 02:12:36,120
the way you look at it.

1262
02:12:36,120 --> 02:12:38,361
And if that's the way you look at it, then, you know, that's fair.

1263
02:12:38,921 --> 02:12:43,880
And if you start to read a BIP and it doesn't have, you know, what you're looking for in

1264
02:12:43,880 --> 02:12:47,240
the beginning, then you might not even want to read the rest of it or it doesn't make

1265
02:12:47,240 --> 02:12:48,521
sense to read the rest of it.

1266
02:12:48,521 --> 02:12:53,000
The thing is that there's an infinite number of solutions that we could build, right?

1267
02:12:53,000 --> 02:12:54,601
The design space is infinite.

1268
02:12:55,161 --> 02:13:00,200
What constrains it is what's the problem and what's the value of the problem?

1269
02:13:00,200 --> 02:13:07,481
If the problem is one that its proponents won't even stand by for five minutes and,

1270
02:13:07,481 --> 02:13:13,080
you know, then they start throwing out other ideas that they just came up with, then, you

1271
02:13:13,080 --> 02:13:15,401
know, that destroys their credibility.

1272
02:13:15,401 --> 02:13:18,760
I think that the BIP allows the two-way peg.

1273
02:13:18,760 --> 02:13:24,440
And I think that that is such a, like, you know, out there idea that there's so many

1274
02:13:24,440 --> 02:13:28,361
ideas that can come from it that it's very hard to put that in, like, a specific problem

1275
02:13:28,361 --> 02:13:32,841
that it's solving because there's just too many potential problems that it can be solving.

1276
02:13:32,841 --> 02:13:34,921
You could just boil it down to a two-way peg.

1277
02:13:34,921 --> 02:13:44,521
I wanted to say that if BIP-119-CTV would start with, like, an essay about whatever

1278
02:13:44,521 --> 02:13:52,281
Burak is, you know, giving people the speech how Ellen Lightning Network fails at this

1279
02:13:52,281 --> 02:13:59,320
or that and how we could, you know, go around it and stuff like that.

1280
02:14:00,601 --> 02:14:07,640
The BIPs are technical descriptions of mechanisms, basically.

1281
02:14:07,640 --> 02:14:11,401
And I don't think we should go too far with that.

1282
02:14:11,721 --> 02:14:18,760
I would somewhat agree in a simpler case where something like, you know, like,

1283
02:14:21,000 --> 02:14:27,560
check-sequence-verify and check-log-time-verify that really just solve a straightforward problem.

1284
02:14:28,601 --> 02:14:33,401
And, of course, they did not contain in the motivation probably everything that we can

1285
02:14:33,401 --> 02:14:36,120
do with them, like, that would be insane.

1286
02:14:36,841 --> 02:14:42,760
I would guess, like, I can say not in front of me, but I would guess they probably did

1287
02:14:42,760 --> 02:14:48,921
not even have the most important things that we are using them for in the motivation.

1288
02:14:48,921 --> 02:14:50,200
I will check it out later.

1289
02:14:50,921 --> 02:14:53,640
Yeah, that would be a good thing to fact-check, for sure.

1290
02:14:53,640 --> 02:14:57,080
Yeah, there should be a limit to this.

1291
02:14:57,801 --> 02:15:07,880
So, in certain cases where, you know, where you can do so much with the change because

1292
02:15:07,880 --> 02:15:13,080
these changes are often really building blocks that we can combine in nearly infinite ways

1293
02:15:13,080 --> 02:15:16,760
and new use cases can be came up with.

1294
02:15:16,760 --> 02:15:20,921
Yeah, I mean, I think that we're not asking for 5,000 use cases.

1295
02:15:20,921 --> 02:15:26,041
We're just asking for one, you know, just like, okay, put the most compelling one there

1296
02:15:26,041 --> 02:15:30,361
and then, you know, that way people can get motivated and excited about it.

1297
02:15:31,401 --> 02:15:33,481
I think it can boil down to just a two-way peg.

1298
02:15:34,120 --> 02:15:39,880
I think that there's no current way to make a two-way peg, like, in a really well way.

1299
02:15:39,880 --> 02:15:44,440
There could be, like, you know, some kind of non-efficient ways to do two-way peg.

1300
02:15:44,440 --> 02:15:50,601
And I think that BIP300 with 301 together can solve the issue and make it a very more

1301
02:15:50,601 --> 02:15:52,601
efficient way of doing a two-way peg.

1302
02:15:53,000 --> 02:15:57,880
Yeah, I think Paul should sponsor you, you know, so that you can rewrite that and put

1303
02:15:57,880 --> 02:15:58,680
it in the pull request.

1304
02:16:00,120 --> 02:16:00,760
I'm not a dev.

1305
02:16:01,401 --> 02:16:02,281
I'm just like a regular person.

1306
02:16:02,281 --> 02:16:04,120
No, no, I mean, this is the dev, right?

1307
02:16:04,120 --> 02:16:05,000
I try to find...

1308
02:16:05,000 --> 02:16:06,041
We're writing in English.

1309
02:16:06,601 --> 02:16:09,320
Yeah, but I think, Pierre, I don't think that you're being...

1310
02:16:09,320 --> 02:16:11,080
I try to find the good in people.

1311
02:16:11,080 --> 02:16:14,921
I try to, like, see the good in their ideas and I try to bring people together personally,

1312
02:16:14,921 --> 02:16:16,200
you know, but yeah.

1313
02:16:16,200 --> 02:16:21,401
I don't think that Pierre is being serious when he says that he stopped reading at the

1314
02:16:21,401 --> 02:16:22,521
motivation section.

1315
02:16:22,521 --> 02:16:27,721
And I don't think that anyone who collided with the idea, if they say Luke Dashjr.

1316
02:16:27,721 --> 02:16:33,161
doing a pull request for it and you have Fiatjaf saying this idea is crucial for Bitcoin's

1317
02:16:33,801 --> 02:16:34,440
survival.

1318
02:16:35,000 --> 02:16:39,801
I think we all know that any reasonable person would read past the motivation section and

1319
02:16:39,801 --> 02:16:44,440
try to decide for themselves what it's for after learning about what it is.

1320
02:16:44,440 --> 02:16:45,320
I don't know.

1321
02:16:45,320 --> 02:16:47,481
So I think we all know that it's not the case.

1322
02:16:48,200 --> 02:16:52,120
I don't know because sometimes I could be unreasonable, right?

1323
02:16:52,120 --> 02:16:52,841
Anybody can be.

1324
02:16:52,841 --> 02:16:54,680
So I don't think it's like...

1325
02:16:54,680 --> 02:16:55,240
It doesn't matter.

1326
02:16:55,240 --> 02:16:55,640
I'm sorry.

1327
02:16:55,640 --> 02:17:00,281
Why is it unreasonable to expect the BIP to explain the problem that it's solving?

1328
02:17:00,841 --> 02:17:01,721
Well, it doesn't.

1329
02:17:01,721 --> 02:17:05,801
That's the most reasonable expectation I could possibly imagine.

1330
02:17:05,801 --> 02:17:08,200
I mean, I'm not being OCD here.

1331
02:17:08,841 --> 02:17:13,721
I'm just asking for, like, table stakes stuff and you guys, like, presumably you want a

1332
02:17:13,721 --> 02:17:14,601
soft fork, right?

1333
02:17:14,601 --> 02:17:17,000
So, like, let's find a way to work together here.

1334
02:17:17,481 --> 02:17:23,880
Because I think you don't have an honest interest in the BIP.

1335
02:17:23,880 --> 02:17:26,521
And your reading of it is not honest.

1336
02:17:27,961 --> 02:17:29,880
I think I'm making people...

1337
02:17:32,200 --> 02:17:33,240
Here's the thing.

1338
02:17:33,240 --> 02:17:40,440
Like, this is a way of avoiding, you know, having to do the work of saying, hey, look,

1339
02:17:41,481 --> 02:17:43,240
my critics are dishonest.

1340
02:17:43,240 --> 02:17:44,521
No, it's your way of avoiding...

1341
02:17:44,601 --> 02:17:47,721
I don't really need to, you know, justify my work.

1342
02:17:47,721 --> 02:17:48,041
All right.

1343
02:17:48,041 --> 02:17:48,921
That's fine.

1344
02:17:48,921 --> 02:17:54,840
But then, you know, the follow up to that is, no, I don't think drivechains is a path

1345
02:17:54,840 --> 02:17:58,360
forward and it doesn't seem to solve a problem.

1346
02:17:58,360 --> 02:18:00,360
And then, you know, that's where we're at.

1347
02:18:02,041 --> 02:18:06,281
Well, I think it's your way of avoiding having to do the work, because as you say, you just

1348
02:18:06,281 --> 02:18:10,041
read maybe two or three sentences and then decided to...

1349
02:18:10,521 --> 02:18:15,081
No, it's an extensive set of paragraphs, Paul.

1350
02:18:15,081 --> 02:18:17,081
Go back and read The Motivation.

1351
02:18:17,081 --> 02:18:21,000
I mean, maybe you read it so long ago that you forgot what you were working on.

1352
02:18:21,720 --> 02:18:25,640
The thing is that it was not just two or three sentences.

1353
02:18:25,640 --> 02:18:30,521
I read through those paragraphs and it's just economic nonsense.

1354
02:18:30,521 --> 02:18:37,880
And so when I look at that, then I think, OK, well, if this is just solving a non-problem,

1355
02:18:37,880 --> 02:18:38,441
then...

1356
02:18:38,441 --> 02:18:41,240
Well, why don't you give me an example of the economic nonsense?

1357
02:18:42,521 --> 02:18:44,360
An example of the economic nonsense?

1358
02:18:44,360 --> 02:18:44,600
All right.

1359
02:18:44,600 --> 02:18:49,480
Well, I mean, I think that there's the security budget, you know, part.

1360
02:18:49,480 --> 02:18:49,801
Yes.

1361
02:18:49,801 --> 02:18:50,840
That we can put aside.

1362
02:18:50,840 --> 02:18:52,360
We've already fleshed that out.

1363
02:18:52,360 --> 02:18:52,921
I think that we...

1364
02:18:52,921 --> 02:18:54,201
Well, have we fleshed that out?

1365
02:18:54,840 --> 02:18:55,081
Yes.

1366
02:18:56,120 --> 02:18:57,561
Would you like to talk about that or not?

1367
02:18:59,480 --> 02:19:00,441
We could talk about that.

1368
02:19:00,441 --> 02:19:02,041
We talked about the market cap.

1369
02:19:02,041 --> 02:19:04,041
I think that's an interesting one, too.

1370
02:19:04,120 --> 02:19:08,041
You know, the idea that there's a bunch of S-coins that break the scam.

1371
02:19:08,041 --> 02:19:10,600
Pick your favorite one and we'll talk about it.

1372
02:19:10,600 --> 02:19:18,120
I think my favorite one is this idea that, you know, that there's a demand for this.

1373
02:19:18,120 --> 02:19:18,600
Right.

1374
02:19:18,600 --> 02:19:22,041
And I think this is something that you touched on as well in that tweet of,

1375
02:19:22,600 --> 02:19:24,120
hey, yeah, it's probably too late.

1376
02:19:24,120 --> 02:19:25,240
It might be too late.

1377
02:19:25,240 --> 02:19:25,640
Right.

1378
02:19:25,640 --> 02:19:30,921
So that's where, you know, this is and this is from working at Kraken for three years.

1379
02:19:30,921 --> 02:19:38,600
The whole purpose for the cryptocurrency ecosystem is not really about the technology.

1380
02:19:38,600 --> 02:19:38,921
Right.

1381
02:19:38,921 --> 02:19:44,600
It's about the illiquidity, the pump and dumping, you know, the trading of the tokens.

1382
02:19:44,600 --> 02:19:48,600
And the idea that that's something that technology can fix.

1383
02:19:49,401 --> 02:19:50,600
I'm very skeptical about it.

1384
02:19:50,600 --> 02:19:52,921
I think, you know, technology can make it worse.

1385
02:19:52,921 --> 02:19:54,681
That's certainly the case.

1386
02:19:55,801 --> 02:20:00,600
But also, it's a problem that should be solved by the Bitcoin developers.

1387
02:20:00,921 --> 02:20:06,760
I don't think that, you know, looking at, oh, hey, we've got these token casinos,

1388
02:20:06,760 --> 02:20:11,801
you know, it's the responsibility of the Bitcoin Core developers to solve this problem.

1389
02:20:11,801 --> 02:20:13,880
Are you going to pick your favorite thing or not?

1390
02:20:13,880 --> 02:20:18,441
Your favorite thing is that there's an argument about the market cap of other currencies exist.

1391
02:20:19,480 --> 02:20:20,360
That's your favorite thing.

1392
02:20:21,161 --> 02:20:21,960
Yes or no?

1393
02:20:23,081 --> 02:20:28,201
Well, you know, it's this narrative that you've been pushing of, hey, this is going to kill S-coins.

1394
02:20:28,441 --> 02:20:36,600
Well, I think the reason why the market cap is in the motivation section of the BIP is because

1395
02:20:36,600 --> 02:20:42,521
it points to the fact that there are other people who are paying customers who put down

1396
02:20:42,521 --> 02:20:44,120
their money for this type of thing.

1397
02:20:45,161 --> 02:20:50,201
So it's saying this is a way of meeting customer demand for this.

1398
02:20:51,329 --> 02:20:52,329
This idea.

1399
02:20:53,329 --> 02:20:57,329
Well, the demand is already being met, right? I mean, I think that's what the BIP is establishing.

1400
02:20:59,329 --> 02:21:14,329
Well, no, I don't think so. Like, just to you, something like Monero or Zcash, the fact that it adds a privacy feature, that is completely irrelevant to the fact that people pay money for it.

1401
02:21:15,329 --> 02:21:28,329
Right. I think that people, you know, they're into the narrative, right? Like, they'll KYC on Kraken and buy Monero or Zcash, right? But, you know, in actual fact, they just...

1402
02:21:29,329 --> 02:21:43,329
When they spend Monero on a dark net market, that's a case where someone's buying a product with Monero and someone's selling their product for Monero.

1403
02:21:44,329 --> 02:21:54,329
There's a buyer and a seller, so there's not even a pump and dump possibility. And to you, that is like some kind of... I mean, how do you explain that, for example?

1404
02:21:55,329 --> 02:22:09,329
Yeah, so this is the classic AppCoin fallacy. And this has been around for a very long time, which is this idea that, hey, if we have this little gimmicky use case for our token, then that's going to drive demand for it and that's going to cause the price to pump.

1405
02:22:09,329 --> 02:22:25,329
And I think the problem with that is really a question of velocity, right? So obviously, the drug dealer who is receiving the currency is not going to pay his upstream supplier with that dark net currency.

1406
02:22:26,329 --> 02:22:36,329
And at some point, somebody is going to be demanding fiat. And I think that the conversion cycle there happens rather quickly. There's very little reservation demand that comes from dark net markets.

1407
02:22:37,329 --> 02:22:49,329
But that's not the point, though, Pierre. The point is, at first, there was no place to use Bitcoin. But then Dread Pirate Roberts created Silk Road.

1408
02:22:50,329 --> 02:22:51,329
Wasn't the pizza before that?

1409
02:22:52,329 --> 02:22:53,329
Yeah, the pizza, sure.

1410
02:22:54,329 --> 02:23:17,329
Yeah, I mean, so it's just like, there's all these little small details that get missed that make that, you accuse me of dishonesty, but I look at everything that you write. I've listened to you on podcasts. You're almost right, but then you get one little detail wrong. And it's like, wait, hold on. There's this obvious counterexample right here that blows up this argument.

1411
02:23:18,329 --> 02:23:43,329
And so that's really what drives my interest in having the BIP revised, right? That, hey, let's have an iterative process where, okay, you messed up. You didn't mean to make that argument about killing S coins. Let's go back to the BIP. Let's fix that motivation so that when people read this, they have a better idea of what this BIP is actually going to accomplish, right?

1412
02:23:44,329 --> 02:23:54,329
Not the opium, not the nonsense, but what tangible improvement this is making for the users of Bitcoin. I think that's something I can get behind.

1413
02:23:55,329 --> 02:24:11,329
Do you actually believe that someone buying two pizzas is a legitimate counterexample to my claim that it was Silk Road that showed, demonstrated what using Bitcoin as money would look like?

1414
02:24:11,329 --> 02:24:28,329
Like something with no names, no KYC, no social security number, no mailing address, this big marketplace operating in defiance of local laws and just operating behind Tor, very cypherpunky.

1415
02:24:29,329 --> 02:24:47,329
You're saying that two people, enthusiasts on a Bitcoin forum, who one guy ordered someone else two pizzas for 10,000 Bitcoin. You're saying that that is a counterexample to the fact that Silk Road…

1416
02:24:47,329 --> 02:24:49,329
I don't think that it's… I think it's more about…

1417
02:24:49,329 --> 02:24:53,329
No, I'm only asking you, Satoshi Enjoyer. I'm only asking him. Thanks.

1418
02:24:54,329 --> 02:25:12,329
So, yeah. I mean, I think that when I first got that magical internet money feeling, that's when I sent my first Bitcoin transaction to a third party, which was to pay for a ticket at BitPay, and that opened my eyes to what you're describing.

1419
02:25:13,329 --> 02:25:39,329
I didn't have to go buy drugs to get that realization. It's like, hey, look, I'm not saying that I'm a big supporter of pardoning Ross Ulbricht, I think he got railroaded by the judicial system, but I don't think that he played a role where without his creation of the Silk Road, the Bitcoin would have not grown to where it is today.

1420
02:25:40,329 --> 02:25:41,329
I think that…

1421
02:25:41,329 --> 02:25:42,329
I might agree with that.

1422
02:25:43,329 --> 02:25:59,329
… and we got to recognize that, hey, look, there's a lot of different ways this can play out. So, sometimes when people say, oh, Coinbase deserves so much credit for onboarding people onto Bitcoin, it's like, yeah, they were in the right place at the right time, but look, somebody else would have onboarded them.

1423
02:25:59,329 --> 02:26:24,329
And so, I think that there's a lot of like… I think it's like a mental fallacy, right, of, okay, it happened this way, therefore, it couldn't have happened any other way. And yeah, I do think that, hey, a transaction to buy pizzas is eye-opening, and that I could easily argue that, hey, a transaction to buy drugs is actually bad for the person.

1424
02:26:25,329 --> 02:26:38,329
You know perfectly well that what actually happened was, since I'm sure you know this Bitcoin history, is someone said, I want some pizzas. The other person made the telephone call and paid with fiat. It was a 100%…

1425
02:26:38,329 --> 02:26:47,329
Yeah, but how do you know that's not what happened with the drugs, Paul? I mean, like, you're really good at making irrelevant points that are just like nonsensical.

1426
02:26:47,329 --> 02:27:13,329
So, here's like a little thing that completely defunds your point of view, but really, it's just a nonsensical point that, yeah, the pizza transaction was not a direct, okay, Bitcoin 4 pizza in real life, you know, with a point-of-sale system using ATC Pacer. I get that, but it was, you know, not dissimilar, all that dissimilar to this idea of buying drugs on the Silk Road.

1427
02:27:14,329 --> 02:27:17,329
I would say Bitcoin would be better off if there wasn't a Silk Road.

1428
02:27:17,329 --> 02:27:20,329
Yeah, but it's directly related because I was talking about…

1429
02:27:20,329 --> 02:27:25,329
Luke makes a valid point, but I don't think that we want to have that debate today.

1430
02:27:25,329 --> 02:27:32,329
No, I was just making a simple point about darknet markets were a use case for Bitcoin in the early days.

1431
02:27:32,329 --> 02:27:34,329
Yeah, there's a lot of use cases for Bitcoin, right?

1432
02:27:35,329 --> 02:27:53,329
And the problem is that we refer to them as use cases. I mean, it's like, hey, I went to, you know, Target and I bought some pair of bathing shorts. Isn't that a great dollar use case? It's like, what are you talking about? Okay, it's just money, like, we get it. Yeah, you can buy stuff with it.

1433
02:27:53,329 --> 02:27:55,329
Would you like to listen to what I have to say or not?

1434
02:27:55,329 --> 02:28:02,329
Oh, I've listened to you so much, you don't even know. I've listened to you for hours, Paul.

1435
02:28:02,329 --> 02:28:05,329
Would you like to listen to my answer to your question or not?

1436
02:28:05,329 --> 02:28:07,329
What was the question? I'm sorry.

1437
02:28:07,329 --> 02:28:10,329
You asked a question about use case for Bitcoin.

1438
02:28:10,329 --> 02:28:12,329
It might have been rhetorical.

1439
02:28:12,329 --> 02:28:27,329
Yes. Well, I don't even know at this point if anyone in the audience but me can remember the thread of questioning because you have this mysterious trend to just start talking and talking. I don't understand it personally. But I think, I don't know.

1440
02:28:27,329 --> 02:28:34,329
It's because you're so slow. It's like, just spit it out, man. Like, get your ideas out. Okay, let's do it.

1441
02:28:34,329 --> 02:28:38,329
Scalability for Bitcoin, giving people lots of UTXOs. Is that a use case?

1442
02:28:38,329 --> 02:28:46,329
I did reply to that, Paul. I explained to you. Put in a pull request on the BIP. Update the language. That way we can all look at it.

1443
02:28:46,329 --> 02:29:00,329
If we just get into it on the spaces, okay, how are people going to, like, see the exchange of ideas, right? We need to have lots of eyeballs on it. Update the BIP. I don't know why the reluctance of updating the BIP.

1444
02:29:00,329 --> 02:29:09,329
I see. Yes. Well, I didn't know that anyone had any problem with the BIP text at all. But, of course, you can submit your own pull request to the BIP if you like.

1445
02:29:10,329 --> 02:29:18,329
Oh, you want me to update your rationale? You want me to update your motivation? You want me to work on your project for free?

1446
02:29:18,329 --> 02:29:20,329
No, I don't want you to work on it at all.

1447
02:29:20,329 --> 02:29:25,329
Okay. Well, you know, let me know when you've updated that BIP and I'll get back to you. All right?

1448
02:29:25,329 --> 02:29:30,329
But do you really think that that is reasonable to just say that you're not going to do it?

1449
02:29:31,329 --> 02:29:41,329
Of course it's reasonable to expect a change to Bitcoin to be motivated by a specific problem. It has some logic behind it.

1450
02:29:41,329 --> 02:29:48,329
Multiple people in this space have given you real motivation.

1451
02:29:48,329 --> 02:29:58,329
And I've asked them, why don't you put it in the BIP? And it's just like, well, we don't have to. We don't answer to you, Pierre. And that's fine, right? Like, I get that you don't report to me.

1452
02:29:58,329 --> 02:30:26,329
But in terms of actually garnering public support for a BIP, I think it's critical to make sure that, beyond just having great marketing on a website, by the way, so congrats on that, that the BIP, the 300 in this case, starts with a motivation that is written in a way that is compelling rather than a hodgepodge of economic fallacies.

1453
02:30:27,329 --> 02:30:36,329
Because a reasonable person will decide. They'll say, okay, maybe I don't agree with how the motivation was worded, but there is in the real world.

1454
02:30:36,329 --> 02:30:46,329
The real world is an idea. There is a real world motivation for the idea that many people agree is very serious, such as scalability, privacy, etc.

1455
02:30:46,329 --> 02:30:57,329
So since this real motivation exists, I'll just ignore the BIP text for now and then get into the ideas of the BIP. Or I'll say something like, well, I haven't read the BIP yet, so I don't know anything about it.

1456
02:30:57,329 --> 02:31:01,329
And so everything I've ever said about the BIP is laughably irrelevant.

1457
02:31:01,329 --> 02:31:04,329
So you're not going to update the motivation?

1458
02:31:04,329 --> 02:31:06,329
No, I'm just asking you if you are—

1459
02:31:06,329 --> 02:31:08,329
You're not going to change it?

1460
02:31:08,329 --> 02:31:12,329
Well, I don't see any reason to change it right now, especially because—

1461
02:31:13,329 --> 02:31:18,329
Rather than defending it, it seems like you're just kind of focused on changing it.

1462
02:31:18,329 --> 02:31:28,329
Well, I have a question here. How do you know that the motivation section is inaccurate, it doesn't match the idea of the BIP, if you haven't actually read the BIP part?

1463
02:31:28,329 --> 02:31:34,329
Yeah, so I don't know if the solution, the technical solution actually solves the problem that you described.

1464
02:31:34,329 --> 02:31:44,329
My argument is that the problem does not exist. So it's a very—whether a solution solves a problem that does not exist or not.

1465
02:31:44,329 --> 02:31:53,329
Well, now we're getting into degrees of creativity that is beyond me. I mean, I'm a simpleton. You know that.

1466
02:31:53,329 --> 02:32:09,329
So your position is that if there were an altcoin that were very similar to Bitcoin in many ways—coins controlled by keys, it had proof of work, blockchain, it had headers, it had Merkle trees.

1467
02:32:09,329 --> 02:32:29,329
Your position is that if we had something similar in the future whose market cap was 100 or 200 times that of Bitcoin, BTC, your position is that that would be—according to you, that's a totally irrelevant consideration, and that does not affect Bitcoin.

1468
02:32:29,329 --> 02:32:39,329
If we woke up and that had happened, that happens two weeks from now or something, your position is that that would be completely irrelevant to Bitcoin.

1469
02:32:40,329 --> 02:33:00,329
So let's explain this, because here's what I would do. I'd go on, go on GitHub, open that BIP, and in my BIP I would start the motivation with, hey, look, there's another coin that's very, very similar to Bitcoin, except for the fact that it solves this user problem.

1470
02:33:01,329 --> 02:33:16,329
And if we were to solve this user problem, then these people would come to Bitcoin. And so I think it would be the same kind of describing a user problem as Taproot, for that matter, or CSV or CLTV or SegWit.

1471
02:33:17,329 --> 02:33:36,329
Is it an unfair question? The question I asked you, is it an unfair question that somehow next year we find ourselves in a situation where there's a different proof-of-work coin and the market cap is 200 times that of BTC?

1472
02:33:37,329 --> 02:33:49,329
I'm asking you, you are complete, complete neutrality. You have complete neutrality on that thing. Is that, I'm asking you, you say that you're completely neutral on how good that is for Bitcoin?

1473
02:33:50,329 --> 02:34:07,329
No, Paul. I would be so motivated to identify the problem that that competitor is solving and seeing, OK, can we solve that problem in Bitcoin, too? Or would solving that problem actually create more problems, right? Or, you know, etc., etc., etc.

1474
02:34:08,329 --> 02:34:19,329
I mean, at the end of the day, the reason why somebody is able to outcompete Bitcoin is because they're solving a problem better than Bitcoin is. And that, I think, merits a close look.

1475
02:34:21,329 --> 02:34:27,329
So you think it is relevant, though, the relative proportions of the market cap?

1476
02:34:27,349 --> 02:34:28,109
market cap.

1477
02:34:29,369 --> 02:34:35,229
[Overlapping speakers] you can measure things like, okay, the

1478
02:34:35,229 --> 02:34:38,949
thing is that, you know, somebody can put in a trade and, you know, pump up their

1479
02:34:38,949 --> 02:34:41,209
market cap or things like that.

1480
02:34:42,209 --> 02:34:47,909
it's not the perfect measure, it's a proxy measure, and that comes with its risks.

1481
02:34:48,429 --> 02:34:53,149
There are other proxy measures to look at as well, but at the end of the day, I think

1482
02:34:53,149 --> 02:34:55,329
that the reason why, you

1483
02:34:55,329 --> 02:35:01,089
Bitcoin is not able to solve

1484
02:35:01,089 --> 02:35:06,449
some problems for folks is because there are trade -offs associated with the solutions

1485
02:35:06,449 --> 02:35:09,169
that are being solved.

1486
02:35:10,329 --> 02:35:11,329
I just want to point out here.

1487
02:35:12,329 --> 02:35:15,329
The answer is, yeah, fuck it, hello, yes, say something.

1488
02:35:16,329 --> 02:35:24,329
I just want to point out here that altcoins are not the competition of drivechains because they already could be doing a sidechain if they wanted to do that.

1489
02:35:24,329 --> 02:35:30,329
There are existing sidechains that are possible that are just basically the same as drivechains.

1490
02:35:31,329 --> 02:35:38,329
You could have a 999 out of 999 functionary situation, and that's going to be better than the current Bitcoin mining situation.

1491
02:35:39,329 --> 02:35:42,329
So the reason these things are altcoins is because they don't want to use Bitcoin.

1492
02:35:43,329 --> 02:35:45,329
So the fact that drivechains are available, they still won't use it.

1493
02:35:46,329 --> 02:35:47,329
They're still going to do an altcoin.

1494
02:35:48,329 --> 02:35:51,329
Yeah, I agree with that. I think that is actually irrelevant, but I think…

1495
02:35:51,329 --> 02:35:53,329
Yeah, that's why the motivation needs to be updated.

1496
02:35:54,329 --> 02:36:02,329
I mean, the motivation seems to have that as a central point of focus, and that you're not going to stand by that argument.

1497
02:36:03,329 --> 02:36:10,329
Well, I'm sorry, but you're going to continue to face pushback because it's a bad argument, and it's right there at the beginning of the document.

1498
02:36:11,329 --> 02:36:13,329
You disagree with it, but you don't want to update the bit.

1499
02:36:14,329 --> 02:36:20,329
I agree with everything I wrote, and first of all, the beginning of the motivation section is a quote from Reid Hoffman.

1500
02:36:21,329 --> 02:36:22,329
It's two paragraphs of quotation.

1501
02:36:23,329 --> 02:36:24,329
He invented LinkedIn.

1502
02:36:25,329 --> 02:36:27,329
Talk about guilt by association.

1503
02:36:28,329 --> 02:36:34,329
It's him why he invested in Blockstream, so it's of direct relevance to the two-way peg.

1504
02:36:34,329 --> 02:36:43,329
And I just asked you for your favorite thing, and you said the part about the market cap ratio, which is irrelevant and economic fallacy.

1505
02:36:44,329 --> 02:36:49,329
And then I asked you, well, what if the ratio were something 200 to 1, and then you said, well, that would be relevant.

1506
02:36:50,329 --> 02:36:52,329
So it's really you who doesn't stand behind your argument.

1507
02:36:53,329 --> 02:37:00,329
Yeah, I mean, I think that it comes down to, you know, we can play back the audio, but I think that it's a proxy measure.

1508
02:37:00,329 --> 02:37:14,329
I mean, I think it's a totally legitimate proxy measure that, hey, look, in this wide crypto ecosystem, if SHIB is skyrocketing, we should look at, does SHIB solve a problem that Bitcoin should be solving, right?

1509
02:37:15,329 --> 02:37:16,329
Yes, I agree.

1510
02:37:17,329 --> 02:37:19,329
And, you know, okay, the problem that SHIB is solving is about divisibility, right?

1511
02:37:20,329 --> 02:37:23,329
People want to buy a tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny fraction of the coin.

1512
02:37:24,329 --> 02:37:25,329
Is that something that Bitcoin should solve?

1513
02:37:25,329 --> 02:37:40,329
And then we can think through the engineering implications of that and come to the conclusion that, hey, despite SHIB's popularity right now, it might not be a good idea to soft or hard fork Bitcoin in order to increase the divisibility of Satoshis.

1514
02:37:41,329 --> 02:37:42,329
I think that's a totally valid perspective.

1515
02:37:43,329 --> 02:37:46,329
Well, I think one issue with that, though, is that I don't…

1516
02:37:47,329 --> 02:37:49,329
And so it really gets to the question of what you mean by relevance, right?

1517
02:37:50,329 --> 02:37:56,329
So if market cap relevance is like, oh, should we constantly be changing Bitcoin depending on what's pumping?

1518
02:37:57,329 --> 02:37:58,329
I'd say no, that's not a good idea.

1519
02:37:59,329 --> 02:38:05,329
But if we think about it as just a signal, right, a flag that, hey, look, maybe we should look at this technology.

1520
02:38:06,329 --> 02:38:08,329
Maybe, you know, it's something that Bitcoin should adopt.

1521
02:38:09,329 --> 02:38:13,329
With that, I think market cap is a valid, you know, way of kind of triaging things.

1522
02:38:13,329 --> 02:38:15,329
Yes, but isn't that the way I use it in the BIP?

1523
02:38:16,329 --> 02:38:31,329
But also, I think the idea that one person will know everything that's going on and everyone who's ever working in crypto or whatever you want to call it is basically impossible at this point.

1524
02:38:32,329 --> 02:38:33,329
There's too many people working on too many different things.

1525
02:38:34,329 --> 02:38:35,329
And there's no way…

1526
02:38:36,329 --> 02:38:37,329
We can't read all their BIPs.

1527
02:38:38,329 --> 02:38:40,329
Yeah, that's for sure. I agree. Right.

1528
02:38:41,329 --> 02:38:49,329
So how would you even begin to work on the task of looking into what is being done in Zcash or Ethereum or whatever?

1529
02:38:50,329 --> 02:38:52,329
Storage, Filecoin, et cetera, Namecoin.

1530
02:38:53,329 --> 02:38:56,329
Yeah, I mean, I think Wikipedia is a good place to start.

1531
02:38:57,329 --> 02:38:59,329
Maybe go have a beer with Zucco.

1532
02:39:00,329 --> 02:39:01,329
Yeah, right.

1533
02:39:02,329 --> 02:39:05,329
Are you in favor of like Zk-SNARK level privacy for Bitcoin?

1534
02:39:06,329 --> 02:39:10,329
If the trade-offs are good, then yeah, I think that would be fantastic.

1535
02:39:11,329 --> 02:39:13,329
If you would be for that, you'd be motivated, one could say.

1536
02:39:14,329 --> 02:39:27,329
Yeah, one could say that if you submitted a BIP for that and, you know, had a really great… every paragraph kind of just flowed coherently together, right? So then it makes sense.

1537
02:39:28,329 --> 02:39:34,329
You know, but the first few paragraphs are, they're not, I'm quoting, I directly quote Reid Hoffman, so maybe…

1538
02:39:35,329 --> 02:39:45,329
I don't subscribe to a different authority. I look at Reid Hoffman and I think to myself, I don't know if I want to take his advice on this BIP.

1539
02:39:46,329 --> 02:39:52,329
I agree, but I'm saying like, if I write Reid Hoffman a note, will you co-sign it with me and we can ask him together?

1540
02:39:52,329 --> 02:40:05,329
If he will go back to his LinkedIn post in 2014 and he can change some of those paragraphs so that when I quote them in the BIP, it flows together in a better way.

1541
02:40:06,329 --> 02:40:14,329
I wish that was the only problem with the motivation section. I mean, that would be so easy to fix. But unfortunately, it's pretty flawed end to end.

1542
02:40:14,329 --> 02:40:20,329
Okay, so we went for your favorite thing, which is the market cap ratio that you later admitted is actually…

1543
02:40:20,755 --> 02:40:30,755
you actually later completely 180 degree reversed your point of view and you said actually it does indicate… so why don't we try your second favorite? What's the second favorite?

1544
02:40:30,755 --> 02:40:40,755
Well, so Paul, I mean, earlier you accused me of being dishonest, but you'd have to admit that we were talking about this market cap issue in the context of killing S coins, right?

1545
02:40:40,755 --> 02:40:55,755
And so the idea is that, hey, if Bitcoin adopted these upgrades, then this market cap would flow to Bitcoin. I think that's a markedly different point than the one we were discussing, which was around, okay, does an increasing market cap mean something, right?

1546
02:40:55,755 --> 02:41:03,755
And so if we start conflating questions like this, I think that we get into kind of the economic mumbo jumbo that you thrive in.

1547
02:41:04,755 --> 02:41:18,755
But Pierre, it's you who's conflated it though, Pierre, because I only use it in the first sense. I only use it in the sense that it's an indicator of value. It's an indicator of customer demand.

1548
02:41:18,755 --> 02:41:33,755
Did something happen?

1549
02:41:33,755 --> 02:41:36,755
Did we lose Luke today?

1550
02:41:36,755 --> 02:41:40,755
I think this app has been glitchy sometimes, but I think everyone's back.

1551
02:41:41,755 --> 02:41:43,755
It is very buggy.

1552
02:41:43,755 --> 02:41:48,755
Did a Zcash have an inflation bug?

1553
02:41:48,755 --> 02:41:58,755
I don't know. But if it did, if it did on a sidechain, it would not affect L1. So that's an advantage of Zcash sidechain.

1554
02:41:58,755 --> 02:42:12,755
You can theoretically talk about the market cap, but for some time now, Ethereum has been kind of drastically outperforming Bitcoin in terms of fees.

1555
02:42:12,755 --> 02:42:27,755
So that's probably a more pertinent metric to try to discuss around. I mean, hopefully we never see any sort of market cap flippening, but sadly, the fee flippening is now ancient history.

1556
02:42:27,755 --> 02:42:38,755
Well, I don't know if Pierre is going to come back or if this app is being weird as it has been the last few times.

1557
02:42:38,755 --> 02:42:49,755
But, you know, I did ask him about his favorite. I only use in the BIP the market cap as an indicator that people want something.

1558
02:42:49,755 --> 02:42:55,755
And I say, well, we don't know how much they want it, but we do know the market cap. And that's something.

1559
02:42:55,755 --> 02:43:07,755
And we also know that it's evidence that people don't consider it a settled question that one coin is kind of the victor, because then we would be in the world we were before 2016.

1560
02:43:07,755 --> 02:43:19,755
And I think the world before 2016, it would be like kind of a 26. It was like a 96 percent ratio on coin market cap Bitcoin versus everything else.

1561
02:43:19,755 --> 02:43:33,755
And then now it now it is sort of different. And I would have been happy to go into the market, whatever you want to call it, the security budget point or whatever else that he thought was not good.

1562
02:43:34,755 --> 02:43:44,755
But I don't know if he is. So if he comes back, we'll put him back on the stage. But we seem to have had...

1563
02:43:44,755 --> 02:43:51,755
Well, I think you might have to remove yourself as co-host in order for it to bring him back.

1564
02:43:51,755 --> 02:44:02,755
I don't even see him in the audience. I know that Paul became co-host and then some things happened.

1565
02:44:02,755 --> 02:44:14,755
But I do want to mention that just for the sake of being able to talk about topics and conversations, sometimes it's OK to be like, OK, that's your point of view.

1566
02:44:14,755 --> 02:44:24,755
And then we can continue to go on to the next point of conversation. And if somebody has an issue with, for example, the motivation part of the BIP, OK, all right, that's your opinion.

1567
02:44:24,755 --> 02:44:28,755
And now we can continue. That might be more productive because...

1568
02:44:28,755 --> 02:44:34,755
Good luck with that. We need Robert's rules of orders in here.

1569
02:44:35,755 --> 02:44:45,755
I think his point is he has an issue with how the motivation is structured. And that's his point. That's OK. At least we can hear what his point is.

1570
02:44:45,755 --> 02:44:55,755
Now we can talk about other parts of it that he might agree or might not agree with. But if that's his point of view on that part, we can just start to dissect that.

1571
02:44:55,755 --> 02:45:00,755
But that's not going to give us opportunity to talk about other parts that he might agree with.

1572
02:45:01,755 --> 02:45:14,755
I don't know why, but I was made the co-host. And since I think, I don't know if it kicked Pierre since I think I blocked him on Twitter. So someone has to invite him back.

1573
02:45:17,755 --> 02:45:19,755
Did you also block Luke because it kicked him?

1574
02:45:19,755 --> 02:45:21,755
No, of course I haven't blocked Luke. Luke is the best.

1575
02:45:21,755 --> 02:45:26,755
Oh, I love hearing Luke. I'm so happy that he's back on Twitter.

1576
02:45:31,755 --> 02:45:43,755
What I heard is constructive criticism. If it's a constructive criticism of the way the motivation is written in the BIP. Now, it doesn't mean it has to change or it doesn't mean you have to change it.

1577
02:45:43,755 --> 02:45:54,755
You could just be like, oh, OK, fine. Let's talk about other parts of it. At least we understand his opinion of that specific part. Whether there's going to be a change or not is irrelevant.

1578
02:45:54,755 --> 02:46:01,755
It's more about understanding the other person's idea and maybe getting them to understand other ideas that we might share.

1579
02:46:01,755 --> 02:46:08,755
And then we can be like, OK, well, here's our differences of opinions. Fine. But at least we understand each other. I don't know.

1580
02:46:09,755 --> 02:46:20,755
By the way, I just want to say, I think I mentioned to Paul way back that I think it's kind of badly structured. It's a bit random.

1581
02:46:20,755 --> 02:46:34,755
And then he said he made a lot of improvements. And it looked to me that it actually did improve. Maybe I will read these BIPs again to have a fresher recollection.

1582
02:46:34,755 --> 02:46:41,755
But from what Pierre said, it sounded like there might be some...

1583
02:46:41,755 --> 02:46:52,755
Yeah, I never even looked at it from that point of view of a BIP having a specific problem that it's trying to solve and written nicely in a motivation. I never looked at it that way.

1584
02:46:52,755 --> 02:47:04,755
No, no, no. Just the overall structure. So, how logically things come for a reader. That's what I meant. So, there was, when I first read the BIP, there was a bit of randomness to it.

1585
02:47:04,755 --> 02:47:16,755
Like that critique that they did. So, from how I remember that was true. And then Paul said he fixed it up. He made a lot of improvements.

1586
02:47:16,755 --> 02:47:22,755
But it just occurred to me that maybe I should read it again and maybe suggest improvements.

1587
02:47:22,755 --> 02:47:35,755
I just felt like if we gave him the, okay, what if the BIP said it's trying to solve the two-way peg? Are you going to be okay with that? And would you be open to maybe looking at it more or discussing more parts about it?

1588
02:47:35,755 --> 02:47:42,755
Do you think that that's a better direction to put in the BIP, for example? And if he says yes or no, then we can continue.

1589
02:47:42,755 --> 02:47:55,755
I just looked at the other BIPs that were mentioned and really their core motivation, their core benefit they bring was literally like one sentence each time.

1590
02:47:55,755 --> 02:48:07,755
Maybe that's a good criticism. What if the motivation just said potentially solve the two-way peg? If it opens the door for more people to look into it, then maybe there's a benefit.

1591
02:48:08,755 --> 02:48:13,755
I don't actually agree though, Satoshi and Joy. I mean, how can you fall for that?

1592
02:48:13,755 --> 02:48:16,755
You might not agree, but you want more people to be interested.

1593
02:48:16,755 --> 02:48:23,755
But I don't think his actual disinterest is motivated by the motivation section at all.

1594
02:48:23,755 --> 02:48:33,755
Okay, sure. But at the end of the day, if that's what he's saying, then you could be like, okay, then continue, right? And then maybe he might come up with another reason.

1595
02:48:33,755 --> 02:48:42,755
He could have like a separate version of the BIP with a different motivation section for him.

1596
02:48:42,755 --> 02:48:49,755
It would be a lot of people with hands up. And tell him to come back though. He can come back into the space.

1597
02:48:50,755 --> 02:49:01,755
We can talk about all the problems with the motivation section, starting with the market cap ratio that he later admitted was actually something that he also cared about.

1598
02:49:01,755 --> 02:49:08,755
And he also looked at as an indicator of meeting consumer value, which is the exact sense in which I used it.

1599
02:49:12,755 --> 02:49:16,755
But yeah, we have lots of hands. Who should we do first? I think we had CBS hand first.

1600
02:49:17,755 --> 02:49:25,755
Hey, I actually forgot that I was on stage until Pierre came up and I tabbed back over.

1601
02:49:25,755 --> 02:49:32,755
I was like, oh shit, I've been here for a while. I don't actually know why I was out as a speaker, but I'm happy to be here.

1602
02:49:32,755 --> 02:49:40,755
I followed the drivechain thing since it kind of resurged. And obviously my focus has been on Ordinal's side of the space.

1603
02:49:40,755 --> 02:49:47,755
So now that that's cooled off, I finally have some extra brain cells to allocate to other things.

1604
02:49:47,755 --> 02:49:55,755
And my buddy here, Satoshi Enjoyer, is a good signal for things I find interesting and a good voice I like to listen to.

1605
02:49:55,755 --> 02:50:06,755
But Paul, I actually remember I was at Mining Disrupt in Miami and I remember you came by the Luxor booth and we chatted briefly.

1606
02:50:07,755 --> 02:50:15,755
Yeah, it was good to meet you. I have said that I'm undecided and neutral about drivechains.

1607
02:50:15,755 --> 02:50:19,755
I just find it really curious and interesting and find this conversation pretty interesting.

1608
02:50:19,755 --> 02:50:34,755
But I tweeted this morning and I've kind of been thinking about this a lot, which is there's a lot of discussion here about what would miners do in miner incentive.

1609
02:50:34,755 --> 02:50:37,755
And I think that makes a ton of sense to talk about.

1610
02:50:37,755 --> 02:50:51,755
But, you know, as a miner myself and I do work for a mining pool, I kind of look out across the landscape and I see this was very, very obviously displayed with Ordinal's.

1611
02:50:51,755 --> 02:51:08,755
And I got to see this kind of firsthand with Ordinal's in that Bitcoin miners, obviously they're not a monolith, but Bitcoin miners do not really generally pay attention to these types of discussions, which is kind of an interesting observation.

1612
02:51:08,755 --> 02:51:22,755
In fact, like, you know, as as me and my business partner Cypher here in the audience, we've kind of discovered firsthand, like the world of Bitcoin mining is just I knew this beforehand, but it's like a very different side of the brain.

1613
02:51:22,755 --> 02:51:32,755
Like largely miners do not pay attention to discussions over protocol governance or like what I call Bitcoin under the hood.

1614
02:51:32,755 --> 02:51:41,755
And I'm kind of interested because I saw you at Mining Disrupt and I saw you kind of walk in the floor and I see you beating the ground or, you know, boots on the ground talking about this.

1615
02:51:41,755 --> 02:51:43,755
Like, have you talked to other miners?

1616
02:51:43,755 --> 02:51:56,755
I think it is kind of ironic that Pierre was just up here because he would be like the one exception, not the one exception, you know, one of the few exceptions of people who is highly engaging and representing a Bitcoin mining company about like protocol discussion.

1617
02:51:57,755 --> 02:52:14,755
But like what have you talked to other Bitcoin miners pools have like what kind of sense are you seeing from these folks, you know, in my side of the industry just from, you know, since since kind of drivechain have come have come back in the conversation.

1618
02:52:14,755 --> 02:52:16,755
Like, what are you seeing?

1619
02:52:17,755 --> 02:52:33,755
Yes, well, because of what happened with SegWit2x and that history, I really did not I really avoided talking with miners for a while because it's kind of like what Moon Settler was saying, where there's a paradox where if you do something, people will get offended.

1620
02:52:33,755 --> 02:52:37,755
And if you if you try to hype it up, it's suspicious.

1621
02:52:37,755 --> 02:52:41,755
And then if you try to push something that there's no hype for, then it seems pointless.

1622
02:52:41,755 --> 02:52:44,755
And so there's a lot of chicken and egg type things.

1623
02:52:44,755 --> 02:52:51,755
And so I didn't want to talk to the miners sort of at first.

1624
02:52:51,755 --> 02:52:59,755
But then recently, over the last few months, maybe last six months, I have started just kind of barely started to do that.

1625
02:52:59,755 --> 02:53:02,755
And the miners are very supportive, I think.

1626
02:53:02,755 --> 02:53:12,755
So like the Luxor CEO has tweeted that he would signal for BIP300 activation publicly.

1627
02:53:12,755 --> 02:53:14,755
So that was pretty supportive.

1628
02:53:14,755 --> 02:53:22,755
I think a lot of the people at Mining Disrupt, they were like, one person actually said, I don't even know why you're here, because obviously all the miners will support you.

1629
02:53:22,755 --> 02:53:23,755
So they said that.

1630
02:53:23,755 --> 02:53:26,755
I don't know what that translates to.

1631
02:53:26,755 --> 02:53:33,755
I think that you're right that miners are like a race and breed apart and they're on a completely different planet.

1632
02:53:33,755 --> 02:53:37,755
And they have their own.

1633
02:53:37,755 --> 02:53:48,755
I think I think a new split that will probably appear actually in Bitcoin will be like practical miners who have costs, revenues.

1634
02:53:48,755 --> 02:53:58,755
I think there will be something like like the miners have like a fiduciary duty to maximize profits.

1635
02:53:58,755 --> 02:54:00,755
The miners are practical.

1636
02:54:00,755 --> 02:54:02,755
The miners are they have real numbers.

1637
02:54:02,755 --> 02:54:04,755
You know, they have like a business plan.

1638
02:54:04,755 --> 02:54:12,755
They have a time horizon versus the kind of like I think the kind of like the cult, like the Twitter cult.

1639
02:54:12,755 --> 02:54:19,755
I think that will be a new split in Bitcoin that will probably is probably on the way.

1640
02:54:19,755 --> 02:54:21,755
That's my guess.

1641
02:54:21,755 --> 02:54:28,755
But I think miners are very supportive in general, and I think most people are like, as you say, most people don't miners don't look into it at all.

1642
02:54:28,755 --> 02:54:32,755
They just think, oh, when something's ready, then we'll just activate it.

1643
02:54:32,755 --> 02:54:38,755
Yeah, that's kind of my that's kind of been my read, too, is like miners are just going to say, oh, this is this is what we're doing now.

1644
02:54:38,755 --> 02:54:40,755
But, you know, I could be wrong.

1645
02:54:41,755 --> 02:54:51,755
My career as a miner has only been post SegWit, so I haven't like firsthand participated in this discussion before.

1646
02:54:51,755 --> 02:55:02,755
You know, one thing I do kind of observe is that so in a in a in a drivechain world or drivechain system, it requires we talk about miners broadly.

1647
02:55:02,755 --> 02:55:12,755
And it's important to distinguish between like the miners and then the like the block producers or the producers of hash and the producers of blocks, which you could distinguish between.

1648
02:55:12,755 --> 02:55:27,755
And in such a case, it would kind of require the miner business model to change or evolve a little bit to being highly participatory in sidechains, which, again, is like a very different type of, you know, this is this is the eternal recurring story of Bitcoin mining.

1649
02:55:27,755 --> 02:55:55,755
Is it your it's this all of this constant, you know, walk uphill and and adding different types of business competency that going from like having heavy Chinese footprint to acquire a six and bit main relationships to being able to acquire energy and specific like like infrastructure specialty and access to capital to now, you know, in a drivechain world that would require

1650
02:55:55,755 --> 02:56:09,755
miners to have like more like technical, you would say almost like conventional like crypto expertise in-house, which is kind of interesting scenario to imagine.

1651
02:56:09,755 --> 02:56:14,755
That's I don't really have a question, but that's just kind of a thought that I've been having.

1652
02:56:14,755 --> 02:56:29,755
Yes, I see it as, as you say, like at first mining was just like in 2009, mining was just running the software and running generate, you know, generate coins on your home PC.

1653
02:56:29,755 --> 02:56:49,755
So I see it as the ongoing professionalization of mining as a trend.

1654
02:56:49,755 --> 02:56:53,755
And I do think this does add a new dimension to that.

1655
02:56:53,755 --> 02:57:03,755
The dimension is which sidechains like maximize our transaction fees or maximize the Bitcoin exchange rate.

1656
02:57:03,755 --> 02:57:07,755
And I think that is a different type of expertise.

1657
02:57:07,755 --> 02:57:14,755
I actually don't think the expert they don't really need to know anything about crypto or even about software necessarily.

1658
02:57:14,755 --> 02:57:25,755
They're they are kind of like a they're kind of like someone who is there like a I don't know, like a casino manager putting together a show or something.

1659
02:57:25,755 --> 02:57:36,755
They're going to try to put together events. So they're like, you know, they're going to manage, you know, like some kind of they're having some kind of like party or something.

1660
02:57:36,755 --> 02:57:43,755
And they're like, OK, we want the Zcash band and we want to whatever the Ethereum catering or whatever it is, you know.

1661
02:57:43,755 --> 02:57:53,755
Yeah, I make the analogy that we're that, you know, you have people who run mining companies and we're like like, you know, ringleaders or like conductors at a circus or something.

1662
02:57:53,755 --> 02:57:58,755
That's it's more like that in a business sometimes.

1663
02:57:58,755 --> 02:58:11,755
And this is sometimes leads to the whole like changing miner incentives train of thought, which it does in the same sense that anyone broadcasting a layer one transaction is with a fee.

1664
02:58:11,755 --> 02:58:22,755
Anyone who does that or anyone who says I'm going to broadcast this, I'm going to pay five dollars worth of fee every day or I'm going to open one lightning channel every every year forever.

1665
02:58:22,755 --> 02:58:28,755
Those people are also, quote, changing miner incentives, unquote.

1666
02:58:28,755 --> 02:58:36,755
But, you know, of course, the bigger the bigger picture is the point you made about mining is always evolving.

1667
02:58:37,755 --> 02:58:52,755
And this is part of the evolution to not only cut costs or hash as quickly and efficiently as possible, but also to maximize the fees, to try to maximize the fees, sort of pick the portfolio of.

1668
02:58:52,755 --> 02:58:58,755
So willingly support the sub modules that maximize the fees.

1669
02:58:58,755 --> 02:59:02,755
And, yeah, this idea has not been tried, so it may not even work.

1670
02:59:02,755 --> 02:59:10,755
But that is the idea is that you have these.

1671
02:59:10,755 --> 02:59:15,755
You have the sidechains that generate fees, like an apple tree for a farmer.

1672
02:59:15,755 --> 02:59:20,755
You know, they're generating fees and that's why the miners want to keep them around.

1673
02:59:20,755 --> 02:59:22,755
And so that's our works.

1674
02:59:22,755 --> 02:59:25,755
I'll say briefly that this is not anything new whatsoever.

1675
02:59:25,755 --> 02:59:43,755
If you go to the Foundry website, which is probably at the moment the most important entity in Bitcoin mining, you'll find a very well labeled section on Ethereum staking, of which I think they are one of the biggest participants in the Ethereum staking network.

1676
02:59:44,755 --> 02:59:50,755
And, of course, throughout the years, Bitmain has been producing Litecoin ASICs and Zcash ASICs.

1677
02:59:50,755 --> 03:00:04,755
And many of the pools and miners have, prior to the transfer to proof of stake, were doing Ethereum proof of work and on and on.

1678
03:00:04,755 --> 03:00:07,755
It's a long term trend.

1679
03:00:08,755 --> 03:00:15,755
One thing I was surprised to learn from my conversations with miners is that actually very few miners only mine Bitcoin.

1680
03:00:15,755 --> 03:00:17,755
I was very surprised to learn that.

1681
03:00:17,755 --> 03:00:21,755
Anyway, I think we should go to – I think it was Zender who had his hand up next.

1682
03:00:23,641 --> 03:00:25,641
I know it was Polly, but yeah, I can take it.

1683
03:00:25,641 --> 03:00:29,641
Oh, really? Well then, I guess we should go then.

1684
03:00:33,641 --> 03:00:43,641
Hey, I'm just going to continue off where Pierre left off with all the issues that he might have found with the motivation section.

1685
03:00:44,641 --> 03:00:59,641
I think it would do you a great service to take all of your – from your PDF, where you got a bold claim of seven statements of heterogeneity, scalability, privacy, scams, security budget, decentralization, fundamental value.

1686
03:00:59,641 --> 03:01:09,641
Take all that and stick it in your motivation section. I shouldn't have to dig through your website, dig through your PDFs, dig through all your videos to find all that stuff.

1687
03:01:09,641 --> 03:01:12,641
You've already labeled it out. Take it there and –

1688
03:01:12,641 --> 03:01:25,641
Well, yeah, I certainly could. I actually thought I liked that slide, and I always thought that I should actually link to that slide from Drivechain.info at the top, and then I never got around to it.

1689
03:01:25,641 --> 03:01:31,641
I agree, I like that slide. You like that one, right, with the little list there, the heterogeneity?

1690
03:01:32,641 --> 03:01:38,641
Yeah, I got a few problems with it, but I think it would be a good start.

1691
03:01:39,641 --> 03:01:47,641
Something I'd like to say that I just think is funny is that people always say something, and they're like, well, I really want the DisneyCast slideshow, but I don't really want any of those other ones.

1692
03:01:47,641 --> 03:01:55,641
And then you talk to the next person, and they're like, oh, we really need to have deep lighting panels, but we don't need any of those other ones.

1693
03:01:57,641 --> 03:01:59,641
Everyone has their own thing that they think is the same.

1694
03:01:59,641 --> 03:02:07,641
I hear that every day with CTV. Every day, it's like, oh, I don't need that feature. What else do you got? I'm like, well, we got 40 other features.

1695
03:02:09,641 --> 03:02:17,641
But yeah, if you just focus on the two-way pegs aspect of it and kind of go through it, it'll help connect with people.

1696
03:02:21,641 --> 03:02:29,641
A few questions for heterogeneity. I had Henry make a claim. I want to see your opinion on it.

1697
03:02:30,641 --> 03:02:37,641
Let's say we got 10 sidechains, and we have a big breakthrough, and sidechain 11 is coming out.

1698
03:02:38,641 --> 03:02:45,641
And everyone just shifts over to sidechain 11, and all the feeds die for the first 10 sidechains.

1699
03:02:47,641 --> 03:02:55,641
Would a miner try and take some of those withdrawals from those now-dead sidechains?

1700
03:02:55,641 --> 03:03:05,641
Or would they support the whole ecosystem as a whole and don't rock the basket sort of thing?

1701
03:03:06,641 --> 03:03:23,641
Well, I mean, I gave you my guess. My guess is that the miners would say, well, if we rug pull these 10 obsolete sidechains now that are obsolete, if we rug pull them, then maybe people will feel very nervous about using sidechain 11 at all.

1702
03:03:23,641 --> 03:03:28,641
So they say, we don't want to do that. So they tell everyone, listen, withdraw your coins.

1703
03:03:28,641 --> 03:03:39,641
They say you have, like, whatever, six months to withdrawal period or something, to withdraw the coins from 1 through 10, because we don't see them as active anymore.

1704
03:03:39,641 --> 03:03:43,641
We're going to stop standing by them eventually.

1705
03:03:43,641 --> 03:03:50,641
I can also see them continuing to support them, because remember, what do the miners really lose by continuing to support those 10?

1706
03:03:51,641 --> 03:03:57,641
They don't really lose anything, because it's not like the swaps are scarce and someone still might be paying fees over there.

1707
03:03:59,641 --> 03:04:08,641
It could go so many ways. They could instead decide to attack the number 11 chain because it's giving them less fees, and they like the original 10 more.

1708
03:04:08,641 --> 03:04:10,641
There's so many different ways.

1709
03:04:10,641 --> 03:04:24,641
If it's the case that sidechain 11 decreases the total amount of fees paid across all sidechains, and it decreases the – like, let's say the market exchange rate is totally unaffected by this sidechain.

1710
03:04:24,641 --> 03:04:34,641
But let's say this is a sidechain that decreases the fees, then I would expect the miners not to activate it, which is rational, and that's what I would expect.

1711
03:04:35,641 --> 03:04:48,641
It may interfere with the transaction fees being paid in a way that it stops people from using sidechain 7, because it attacks sidechain 7.

1712
03:04:48,641 --> 03:04:53,641
I think all the transaction fee rates will be very low on all the chains.

1713
03:04:55,641 --> 03:04:58,641
It could be. It could go some different ways.

1714
03:04:58,641 --> 03:05:09,641
The miners have an incentive to maximize the total amount of fee revenue, which I think will be very low per transaction.

1715
03:05:09,641 --> 03:05:13,641
They basically want to maximize the total number of transactions across all chains.

1716
03:05:13,641 --> 03:05:19,641
Yeah, which mines say that they won't go for chain 11. They'll say, we only get one more chain.

1717
03:05:19,641 --> 03:05:26,641
In fact, we want to disable chains 2 through 10, and you only get chain 1, because that will maximize our fees altogether.

1718
03:05:27,641 --> 03:05:37,641
Yeah, but I don't think that it actually will, because the reason why I don't is because I don't actually believe this story about the transaction fees going up because of constrained block space.

1719
03:05:37,641 --> 03:05:50,641
I think when the fees go up, the users get very, very unhappy, and they do other things, like they stop using the chain as much or they try to batch their own transactions or whatever.

1720
03:05:50,641 --> 03:05:55,641
So I don't actually believe that, so I don't actually think that that does increase the long-run revenue.

1721
03:05:55,641 --> 03:06:02,641
I don't think anyone's going to want to pay a $50 transaction fee for Bitcoin, like 24-7, 365.

1722
03:06:02,641 --> 03:06:07,641
I just think people won't want to do it, and I think as time goes on, they'll want to do it less and less and less and less.

1723
03:06:07,641 --> 03:06:17,641
There'll be free stuff. There'll be WeChat Pay. There'll be Venmo or whatever, and there'll be altcoins and stuff that have a similar thing.

1724
03:06:17,641 --> 03:06:24,641
It'll be like a Litecoin. It's going to be almost the same as Bitcoin, except the fees will be near zero.

1725
03:06:24,641 --> 03:06:28,641
So I don't think that any of that actually adds up to fee pressure.

1726
03:06:28,641 --> 03:06:35,641
So I think that the way the miners will try to maximize their fee revenue is by maximizing the block space available.

1727
03:06:35,641 --> 03:06:47,641
For the sidechains, they can make their own fork changes. If they want to increase their internal block size, they can do that.

1728
03:06:47,641 --> 03:06:51,641
They can do all sorts of things once you create them, right?

1729
03:06:51,641 --> 03:06:56,641
Yes, they can make sidechain 12 or something.

1730
03:06:56,641 --> 03:07:03,641
Well, to make sidechain 12, they've got to talk to the miners. They don't get to do that on their own.

1731
03:07:03,641 --> 03:07:07,641
Yeah, I'm saying the miners can make sidechain 12 is what I meant to say there.

1732
03:07:07,641 --> 03:07:17,641
Yes, but miners also aren't developers. They're not going to go build chain 12 until someone says, hey, we've got this chain 12 we can make.

1733
03:07:17,641 --> 03:07:22,641
Indeed, yes. But I think the miners could also just hire developers or pay them off or whatever.

1734
03:07:23,641 --> 03:07:34,641
So I got a question about privacy sidechain. We have Litecoin. We have MemoWimble on Litecoin, and it got banned.

1735
03:07:34,641 --> 03:07:42,641
A lot of places delisted that extension. What is going to prevent a Bitcoin sidechain from having the same fate?

1736
03:07:42,641 --> 03:07:47,641
I think what would happen would be it would be banned, but only the sidechain would be banned.

1737
03:07:47,641 --> 03:07:56,641
And that's actually not a problem at all, because going from L1 to the sidechain is something you can do unilaterally using just the software.

1738
03:07:56,641 --> 03:08:00,641
And there's no cap on that. So I think actually that would work out just fine.

1739
03:08:00,641 --> 03:08:03,641
But I think that this privacy sidechain would probably be banned.

1740
03:08:03,641 --> 03:08:06,641
But probably because the ban is so ineffective, maybe the ban would be lifted soon.

1741
03:08:06,641 --> 03:08:14,641
But I think the idea would be it would be banned and then it would not matter because you just buy L1 coins.

1742
03:08:14,641 --> 03:08:19,641
Or you buy coins that aren't banned and then you just move them through. You use the swap thing.

1743
03:08:19,641 --> 03:08:22,641
Does that answer your question?

1744
03:08:22,641 --> 03:08:26,641
Yeah, I mean, that's kind of how it would go anyways.

1745
03:08:26,641 --> 03:08:32,641
Do you think we should... We have three hands up. Do you think we should rotate and come back?

1746
03:08:32,641 --> 03:08:37,641
Yeah, because I could go for another hour. Let's take five and move on to Zender.

1747
03:08:37,641 --> 03:08:40,641
Let's do Zender, and then Terence, and then Moonsettler.

1748
03:08:41,641 --> 03:08:46,641
Hello, hello. So we spoke a little bit in private and on Twitter.

1749
03:08:46,641 --> 03:08:52,641
My issue with the drivechain is that it changes a bit the nature of the security assumptions.

1750
03:08:52,641 --> 03:08:57,641
So that it's not only proof of work. I told you that. I know you don't agree with it.

1751
03:08:57,641 --> 03:09:03,641
But it also has some aspects of proof of stake when people have to vote.

1752
03:09:04,641 --> 03:09:12,641
People voting for me, I don't like voting. It reminds me of democracy and all the shenanigans that can happen in a democracy.

1753
03:09:12,641 --> 03:09:18,641
And voting can be bribed, can do lots of bad stuff, as you know.

1754
03:09:18,641 --> 03:09:27,641
And more specifically with the drivechain, because I read the BIP, I don't know how many people know actually how it works.

1755
03:09:27,641 --> 03:09:37,641
Miners vote, but whenever you vote on a certain proposal, you actually downvote on the others.

1756
03:09:37,641 --> 03:09:42,641
But you can also do alarm, if I understand correctly, which is downvote on all.

1757
03:09:42,641 --> 03:09:57,641
Which means that a minority of miners could on purpose downvote on a proposal or sidechain to peg out with just 26% of the votes.

1758
03:09:57,641 --> 03:10:05,641
If all the miners are actually voting, if all would be voting, there would be a need of 75% of upvotes.

1759
03:10:06,641 --> 03:10:14,641
But if there's a 26% of downvotes, it would not get to 50%. I don't know if it's very clear, but Paul, I know this is how it works.

1760
03:10:14,641 --> 03:10:18,641
But this can be even worse.

1761
03:10:18,641 --> 03:10:26,641
This can be even worse that if, let's say, 20% of the miners don't vote at all, because they don't care, they get paid the fees no matter what.

1762
03:10:27,641 --> 03:10:39,641
They can just abstain. That means 80% of the miners are left to vote and with a minority even of 16%, you cannot get to 50% needed.

1763
03:10:39,641 --> 03:10:50,641
So I think there's an issue there, because it's clear that miners could do stuff on purpose or maybe governments can force them to do stupid shit like that.

1764
03:10:50,641 --> 03:11:02,641
For example, let's say in USA, Foundry has so much percentage of the hash rate, they can be forced by the government to never peg out again from a privacy sidechain.

1765
03:11:02,641 --> 03:11:05,641
So then people cannot use it.

1766
03:11:05,641 --> 03:11:17,641
Okay, great. But before I answer those two questions, just remind everyone to invite Pierre back and that it was actually Henry's fault that he got kicked probably.

1767
03:11:17,641 --> 03:11:23,641
I don't know. So if he wants to come back, he can come back.

1768
03:11:23,641 --> 03:11:29,641
Or it was a glitch because Luke also got kicked, which is mysterious.

1769
03:11:29,641 --> 03:11:32,641
Actually, it has been glitching a lot.

1770
03:11:32,641 --> 03:11:36,641
But the first question was about democracy and voting.

1771
03:11:37,641 --> 03:11:51,641
The problem with democracy is that when you have more than maybe – I think it's literally something like more than – I think it's actually something like 15 or 16 people.

1772
03:11:51,641 --> 03:11:58,641
There's so much ambiguity as to whether or not your vote will even affect the outcome that you might as well not even look into it.

1773
03:11:58,641 --> 03:12:05,641
You have like a 0% chance of affecting the outcome, let alone when you have like 100 million people vote.

1774
03:12:06,641 --> 03:12:12,641
So I agree with you that that's a flaw in democracy that is fixed with prediction markets, I think, is my guess.

1775
03:12:12,641 --> 03:12:15,641
It's an unrelated topic that we can talk about if you want.

1776
03:12:15,641 --> 03:12:23,641
But in the BIP300 concept, it's just under the hood since you're one of the few people who have read the BIP, which I appreciate.

1777
03:12:23,641 --> 03:12:26,641
That's always encouraged.

1778
03:12:26,641 --> 03:12:34,641
You know that it's basically just this counter that's counting up to 13,000-ish, and people would think, well, what's the use of that?

1779
03:12:34,641 --> 03:12:45,641
But if you build a kind of prison where it's easy to walk in through like a turnstile – and this is answering your question eventually, I promise.

1780
03:12:45,641 --> 03:12:53,641
You can easily go in one way, so you can just walk into the prison, but in order to get out, you have to like get on this weird train, this weird capsule.

1781
03:12:54,641 --> 03:13:04,641
And it can only move forward like along its train track, like one unit at a time, one unit per 10 minutes, and it's going to take three months to get to the other side.

1782
03:13:04,641 --> 03:13:10,641
This makes it – this is a very slow and transparent process.

1783
03:13:10,641 --> 03:13:16,641
So you say this is a prison, and you say the warden can only get people out on this slow little string.

1784
03:13:16,641 --> 03:13:21,641
And you say, well, what difference does that make? So what? I'm still going to escape.

1785
03:13:21,641 --> 03:13:24,641
The string is just really slow.

1786
03:13:24,641 --> 03:13:36,641
But now we have what are you voting on in BIP300, which is the question of is the prison warden operating the prison well?

1787
03:13:36,641 --> 03:13:47,641
And that is something that would ordinarily be a very complicated question, but thanks to the magic of hashes and Merkle roots and things, with the BIP300 sidechain, it's actually very easy.

1788
03:13:47,641 --> 03:14:03,641
Because the sidechain knows exactly – it will publish this hash that is – everything is 100% correct hash, including the exact little capsule that's supposed to leave the prison.

1789
03:14:03,641 --> 03:14:18,641
So it's kind of like that's the hash that is – the real hash is broadcast by the L2 blockchain, which is – it's only going to change once every three to six months.

1790
03:14:18,641 --> 03:14:23,641
So it's the hash of everything being okay, and that is equal to the hash that is embedded on L1.

1791
03:14:24,641 --> 03:14:31,641
So all that the miners are doing is they're saying, does this hash match the other hash?

1792
03:14:31,641 --> 03:14:37,641
And that is answering the question of is the prison warden doing their job right?

1793
03:14:37,641 --> 03:14:43,641
And that is equal to the question of are the right people leaving this prison?

1794
03:14:43,641 --> 03:14:47,641
Because of course people are coming and going from the prison at various times.

1795
03:14:47,641 --> 03:14:57,641
And so we've shrunken what is normally an enormously complicated task into just does one hash match another hash?

1796
03:14:58,641 --> 03:15:20,641
And that is why it's not as big of a deal to vote on that as it is when you have 115 million people each trying to figure out which leader would better represent them for innumerable tasks like national defense, healthcare, infrastructure, energy, what is our policy on education, culture war, etc.

1797
03:15:20,641 --> 03:15:24,641
So it's a very different type of thing.

1798
03:15:24,641 --> 03:15:28,641
Now, why is it so much easier to delay?

1799
03:15:28,641 --> 03:15:38,641
So first of all, you're correct. There is a risk that you won't get – your coins will get stolen or that they will be tied up in this process.

1800
03:15:38,641 --> 03:15:45,641
And they will fail to withdraw, in which case they haven't been stolen from you yet. They're still on the L2 sidechain.

1801
03:15:45,641 --> 03:15:49,641
But it's going to take another three months at best, or maybe it will take forever.

1802
03:15:50,641 --> 03:16:00,641
Now, the reason why that's a good thing is because what you don't want is – if they're stolen, then you have minus 100% of your wealth.

1803
03:16:00,641 --> 03:16:09,641
But if they are only delayed, then you only lose the time value of money to whoever is the most patient because you can sell them to someone else who is willing to wait.

1804
03:16:09,641 --> 03:16:15,641
You sell them for $0.99 on the dollar or $0.98 on the dollar, whatever the interest rate is for three months.

1805
03:16:15,641 --> 03:16:20,641
Sell them to other people, and then those people will take your place.

1806
03:16:20,641 --> 03:16:25,641
When you sell, you kind of like switch brains. It's like when Rick and Morty has the brain gun.

1807
03:16:25,641 --> 03:16:36,641
You switch brains with someone who's outside the prison, and they go in the prison, and then they get in the capsule.

1808
03:16:36,641 --> 03:16:39,641
They get in the little train car, and they're trying to leave.

1809
03:16:40,641 --> 03:16:47,641
So let me actually say one more – I forgot to say the most important thing, of course, which is that yes, this is a risk, but this is the whole point.

1810
03:16:47,641 --> 03:16:52,641
The whole point is the people on L1, they don't want to care about the L2s.

1811
03:16:52,641 --> 03:16:54,641
That's their priority.

1812
03:16:54,641 --> 03:16:56,641
It's the L2 people that want something.

1813
03:16:56,641 --> 03:16:58,641
They want larger blocks.

1814
03:16:58,641 --> 03:16:59,641
They want zk-SNARKs.

1815
03:16:59,641 --> 03:17:00,641
They want something.

1816
03:17:01,641 --> 03:17:09,641
So it's the L2 people that want something, and they should bear some risk.

1817
03:17:09,641 --> 03:17:20,641
So it's very appropriate for them to bear this risk of either losing all their coins, having the miners steal from them, or having to wait another three months,

1818
03:17:20,641 --> 03:17:25,641
eventually getting their coins back but having to wait three months longer than they thought they would have to wait.

1819
03:17:25,641 --> 03:17:30,641
So because they're the ones who want the new feature, it's appropriate that they have to wait.

1820
03:17:33,641 --> 03:17:43,641
Right, but my point is that it's possible that, for example, the U.S. government says you will never release those coins to Foundry.

1821
03:17:43,641 --> 03:17:48,641
Foundry has more than 26% of the hash rate, so they could be blocked there.

1822
03:17:48,641 --> 03:17:50,641
They could be locked there indefinitely.

1823
03:17:50,641 --> 03:17:54,641
And my bigger worry than this one is that – because I don't care.

1824
03:17:54,641 --> 03:18:01,641
If those people lose their coins, it's their business because they put their coins in the drivechain willingly.

1825
03:18:01,641 --> 03:18:10,641
My bigger issue is that many times I heard you say that many problems could be solved with user-activated soft forks when it comes to drivechains.

1826
03:18:10,641 --> 03:18:19,641
When we add complexity to Bitcoin, I don't think we want to incentivize creating more and more USFs.

1827
03:18:19,641 --> 03:18:28,641
Because maybe even this issue where the miners at Foundry would not break any of the BIP300 rules, they would just stall indefinitely.

1828
03:18:28,641 --> 03:18:34,641
Maybe at one point the drivechain people might say it's a very big Monero sidechain.

1829
03:18:34,641 --> 03:18:40,641
They say, okay, but we want our coins, let's do another USF or bring another rule inside BIP300.

1830
03:18:40,641 --> 03:18:46,641
So this is my worry, that eventually, because of added complexity, it happens what happens in Ethereum,

1831
03:18:46,641 --> 03:18:54,641
where they have to change again and again and again the protocol in order to solve some problems that were not foreseen or cannot be solved.

1832
03:18:55,641 --> 03:19:02,641
Well, I don't really see why it gives an incentive for more USFs.

1833
03:19:02,641 --> 03:19:06,641
Because people could decide that they want to do a USF for anything.

1834
03:19:06,641 --> 03:19:14,641
But even if they did do the USF, it doesn't actually – you try the USF and if it doesn't work, then it's clear that it won't work.

1835
03:19:14,641 --> 03:19:17,641
Because the other side has a huge hash rate majority.

1836
03:19:17,641 --> 03:19:21,641
And so it's like you would try it and it would not work.

1837
03:19:22,641 --> 03:19:26,641
I mean, you would say that the USF would be to force the withdrawal of the coins?

1838
03:19:26,641 --> 03:19:29,641
Is that what you would say the USF would be or am I misunderstanding?

1839
03:19:29,641 --> 03:19:35,641
A change of rules, like you're not allowed to use Alarm anymore or you don't downvote anymore.

1840
03:19:35,641 --> 03:19:36,641
Or BIP300.

1841
03:19:36,641 --> 03:19:38,641
Yeah, yeah, exactly, exactly.

1842
03:19:42,641 --> 03:19:48,641
I don't think you could solve – you'd have to do like BIP-300B or something, some new thing.

1843
03:19:48,641 --> 03:19:55,641
But I think the idea is that you would – imagine there's a popular feature.

1844
03:19:55,641 --> 03:20:00,641
It's like we want to make the coupling as loose as possible.

1845
03:20:00,641 --> 03:20:04,641
And so we have this L2 where the feature is.

1846
03:20:09,641 --> 03:20:11,641
We have this feature where the L2 is.

1847
03:20:12,641 --> 03:20:16,641
And if it were popular in a world where there were no sidechains,

1848
03:20:16,641 --> 03:20:21,641
it would be like some kind of like altcoin gaining popularity for the feature or something like that.

1849
03:20:23,159 --> 03:20:25,159
I don't know if I'm making sense with what I'm trying to say here.

1850
03:20:25,159 --> 03:20:31,159
See, what I'm trying to say is the risk should be borne by the L2 coin users.

1851
03:20:33,159 --> 03:20:38,159
And so they may try other things to get their coins back, but I don't think – when push comes to shove,

1852
03:20:38,159 --> 03:20:44,159
I think it actually will be understood that that is the risk that they chose to take.

1853
03:20:46,159 --> 03:20:51,159
I guess I wasn't very articulate on my part, but does that make sense what I'm saying?

1854
03:20:51,159 --> 03:20:56,159
See, what I'm saying is the prison warden in that example I gave, those are the miners.

1855
03:20:56,159 --> 03:20:58,159
So the miners are making money from all of this.

1856
03:20:58,159 --> 03:21:03,159
And it's kind of like the question of are they doing a good enough job is just if one hash matches another hash.

1857
03:21:03,159 --> 03:21:10,159
Maybe the case where Foundry is told by the U.S. government to – let me give you this story.

1858
03:21:10,159 --> 03:21:13,159
Foundry is told by the U.S. government never to withdraw the coins.

1859
03:21:13,159 --> 03:21:23,159
As a result, the coins on the privacy sidechain, they no longer trade on a market basis from $0.99 on the dollar to –

1860
03:21:23,159 --> 03:21:27,159
they tank to $0.95 or something on the dollar.

1861
03:21:27,159 --> 03:21:29,159
And who's buying up these coins?

1862
03:21:29,159 --> 03:21:32,159
The individual miners could do that.

1863
03:21:32,159 --> 03:21:35,159
They would buy these coins, and they would buy the coins,

1864
03:21:35,159 --> 03:21:39,159
and then they would all temporarily point their hash rate at somewhere other than Foundry.

1865
03:21:40,159 --> 03:21:43,159
Foundry would just evaporate overnight temporarily.

1866
03:21:43,159 --> 03:21:45,159
There would be no Foundry.

1867
03:21:45,159 --> 03:21:48,159
Miners bought all these coins for $0.95 on the dollar.

1868
03:21:48,159 --> 03:21:51,159
Foundry doesn't exist anymore.

1869
03:21:51,159 --> 03:21:55,159
They withdraw their own coins since they're miners' coins now on the L2.

1870
03:21:55,159 --> 03:21:59,159
They withdraw them to L1, and then they just reform Foundry later.

1871
03:22:02,159 --> 03:22:03,159
How's that for a story?

1872
03:22:03,159 --> 03:22:08,159
But I think it's kind of like whatever – I mean do you like that story or no?

1873
03:22:09,159 --> 03:22:10,159
It's going to be fun.

1874
03:22:12,159 --> 03:22:16,159
The mining pools, I think, they lead an existence that is very –

1875
03:22:18,159 --> 03:22:24,159
think about how much easier it is for a hasher to point their hash rate at a different pool

1876
03:22:24,159 --> 03:22:31,159
versus how difficult it is for someone – like you start –

1877
03:22:31,159 --> 03:22:34,159
point your hash at a different pool or start up a new pool.

1878
03:22:39,159 --> 03:22:47,159
Versus the situation of how easy is it for someone who's running a pool to buy a bunch of ASICs and start hashing.

1879
03:22:47,159 --> 03:22:49,159
So what's that ratio?

1880
03:22:50,159 --> 03:22:56,159
I think you know perfectly well that the ratio is like literally something like $10 million to one or something.

1881
03:22:56,159 --> 03:22:57,159
Would you agree with that?

1882
03:22:57,159 --> 03:22:59,159
Yeah, okay.

1883
03:22:59,159 --> 03:23:02,159
Who's more vulnerable in that relationship?

1884
03:23:02,159 --> 03:23:03,159
Obviously.

1885
03:23:04,159 --> 03:23:12,159
When I look at the pools, I almost always see someone who is trying their best to serve the interests of their customers

1886
03:23:12,159 --> 03:23:17,159
and someone who is hanging by a thread and could just be killed from existence.

1887
03:23:18,159 --> 03:23:21,159
Yeah, my problem is that it introduces a bit of politics.

1888
03:23:21,159 --> 03:23:25,159
Like the state can interfere with how the protocol works.

1889
03:23:25,159 --> 03:23:29,159
Even if you're saying it doesn't matter because the site changes.

1890
03:23:29,159 --> 03:23:31,159
You see it's a separable thing.

1891
03:23:31,159 --> 03:23:40,159
Not to interrupt you, but it's a separable thing, which is that it's the miners who steal the coins or who fail to withdraw the coins.

1892
03:23:40,159 --> 03:23:43,159
And then the state is interfering with mining.

1893
03:23:43,159 --> 03:23:46,159
But again – well, not again because I didn't say it.

1894
03:23:52,159 --> 03:23:58,159
What I'm saying is the state can always try to interfere with mining, but basically won't succeed.

1895
03:23:59,159 --> 03:24:04,159
It's true that this – I guess you could say that BIP300 introduces salient events.

1896
03:24:04,159 --> 03:24:06,159
Like this is an event, the withdrawal.

1897
03:24:07,159 --> 03:24:09,159
So I think that part is true.

1898
03:24:10,159 --> 03:24:17,159
But it's a situation where everyone who is undertaking the withdrawal, they all know that it's not as secure as L1.

1899
03:24:17,159 --> 03:24:20,159
It is miner-related.

1900
03:24:21,159 --> 03:24:22,159
Hmm.

1901
03:24:23,159 --> 03:24:27,159
Yeah, I just don't like the politics of it.

1902
03:24:28,159 --> 03:24:38,159
But do you understand what I was saying about there's no vote on value of like 115 million people with nothing at stake in the outcome.

1903
03:24:38,159 --> 03:24:41,159
It's like does one hash match the other hash or not?

1904
03:24:41,159 --> 03:24:46,159
And they're earning fees from all this, so they have an incentive to get it right.

1905
03:24:46,159 --> 03:24:48,159
Everyone knows what the right answer is.

1906
03:24:48,159 --> 03:24:56,159
Anyone who runs a sidechain node or even a sidechain node in SPV mode, all those people know what the right answer is.

1907
03:24:57,159 --> 03:25:00,159
Right, that's why they do it on purpose.

1908
03:25:00,159 --> 03:25:02,159
It's not really a democracy-type vote.

1909
03:25:02,159 --> 03:25:06,159
It's a kind of like a – it's a kind of functionary-type vote.

1910
03:25:06,159 --> 03:25:11,159
It's kind of like – it's a kind of ceremonial vote in a way.

1911
03:25:11,159 --> 03:25:18,159
Given they can be influenced like voting, that's my issue because voting can be influenced as well.

1912
03:25:18,159 --> 03:25:20,159
In this case, it can be influenced as well.

1913
03:25:20,159 --> 03:25:32,159
Let's say maybe if China says, okay, all the Chinese pools have to not let a Tether sidechain withdraw because it uses dollars or something like that.

1914
03:25:32,159 --> 03:25:33,159
It doesn't matter.

1915
03:25:33,159 --> 03:25:38,159
But again, the pools can always say – the pools can always tell the Chinese officials.

1916
03:25:38,159 --> 03:25:41,159
They can say, listen, if we do that, everyone will be gone.

1917
03:25:41,159 --> 03:25:45,159
All the hash rate will leave our pool tomorrow, this week.

1918
03:25:45,159 --> 03:25:48,159
It will be the end of Ant Pool if we do that.

1919
03:25:48,159 --> 03:25:50,159
So don't make us do that.

1920
03:25:50,159 --> 03:25:52,159
But because it's not – whatever it is.

1921
03:25:52,159 --> 03:26:00,159
Because BIP300 assumes that the portfolio of sidechains is maximizing the transaction volume and the market exchange rate of the coins.

1922
03:26:03,159 --> 03:26:06,159
But they still get the fees no matter how they vote.

1923
03:26:06,159 --> 03:26:07,159
Why would they lose –

1924
03:26:07,159 --> 03:26:08,159
No, they won't get the fees.

1925
03:26:08,159 --> 03:26:13,159
No, they will lose the whole future stream of fees if the withdrawal system stops working.

1926
03:26:13,159 --> 03:26:18,159
Because the only reason the fees are there is because people assume that the deposits and withdrawal rail is working.

1927
03:26:18,159 --> 03:26:21,159
So they would – all of the miners would lose all the fees.

1928
03:26:21,159 --> 03:26:26,159
Yeah, well, we'll see.

1929
03:26:27,159 --> 03:26:29,159
I don't agree with that.

1930
03:26:29,159 --> 03:26:34,159
It's not like a vote on everyone's favorite color or something.

1931
03:26:34,159 --> 03:26:36,159
You know what I mean?

1932
03:26:36,159 --> 03:26:39,159
It's nothing like that at all.

1933
03:26:39,159 --> 03:26:44,159
I mean if the withdrawal fails, then people are stuck on the sidechains.

1934
03:26:44,159 --> 03:26:51,159
And a lot of people are going to just stay there because the mainchain still doesn't work because we didn't do anything to upgrade it.

1935
03:26:51,159 --> 03:26:58,159
So I don't really say that the withdrawal thing forfeited would affect the sidechain value necessarily.

1936
03:26:58,159 --> 03:27:02,159
Maybe it might dip and break the peg momentarily.

1937
03:27:02,159 --> 03:27:04,159
But long term, no.

1938
03:27:04,159 --> 03:27:06,159
People are stuck there.

1939
03:27:06,159 --> 03:27:07,159
Where are they going to go?

1940
03:27:10,159 --> 03:27:13,159
Well, I suppose at that point it becomes like a space chain or something.

1941
03:27:13,159 --> 03:27:26,159
But I think it's like the one reason why – I'm saying is if the withdrawal process is permanently broken because that was the example I thought that Zender – Zender was giving me some kind of thing that says you will never withdraw.

1942
03:27:26,159 --> 03:27:33,159
You must never withdraw, and you must always sabotage the Zcash sidechain thing.

1943
03:27:34,159 --> 03:27:41,159
And so I was saying in that situation, there's not going to be any Zcash fees because no one will accept Zcash anymore.

1944
03:27:41,159 --> 03:27:49,159
No merchant is going to take Zcash because they think, I can never get – Zcash becomes kind of like an unpegged – it could be anywhere between zero and one.

1945
03:27:49,159 --> 03:27:51,159
It kind of becomes like a Minero.

1946
03:27:51,159 --> 03:27:53,159
It becomes a whole new Zcash again.

1947
03:27:53,159 --> 03:27:55,159
It becomes Zcash.

1948
03:27:55,159 --> 03:27:56,159
It kind of alternates.

1949
03:27:56,159 --> 03:28:00,159
Yeah, it becomes – its value is based upon its utility now.

1950
03:28:00,159 --> 03:28:06,159
So if the privacy chain is depegged, it will hold value based upon its utility.

1951
03:28:06,159 --> 03:28:09,159
So it could forever keep on going.

1952
03:28:09,159 --> 03:28:18,159
But I really think what happened would be the value would dip, and new people would be buying it over there for maybe 90 cents, 95 cents on the dollar.

1953
03:28:21,159 --> 03:28:23,159
Yeah, so I got a question.

1954
03:28:23,159 --> 03:28:25,159
Why are we doing a vote?

1955
03:28:25,159 --> 03:28:27,159
Why are we making a huge down?

1956
03:28:28,159 --> 03:28:29,159
Because that's what it feels like.

1957
03:28:29,159 --> 03:28:32,159
It feels like $300 is a huge down of voting.

1958
03:28:32,159 --> 03:28:33,159
Like, why are we –

1959
03:28:33,159 --> 03:28:42,159
Well, because the L1 node has to track something, and we do not want the L1 node to have to download the sidechain software or any of the sidechain blocks.

1960
03:28:42,159 --> 03:28:45,159
Well, what about SoftChain?

1961
03:28:45,159 --> 03:28:47,159
SoftChain uses proof-of-fraud.

1962
03:28:47,159 --> 03:28:55,159
It adds a little bit of extra overhead for the mainchain nodes, but there's no voting, and we get perfect two-way pegs.

1963
03:28:55,159 --> 03:29:04,159
No, I think that SoftChain doesn't have – I don't remember exactly the details, but these things all – they have some kind of like –

1964
03:29:04,159 --> 03:29:15,159
I think SoftChain has the requirement that every sidechain that is added is a soft fork where everyone must run the sidechain node.

1965
03:29:15,159 --> 03:29:16,159
No, no, no, no.

1966
03:29:16,159 --> 03:29:26,159
The way it works is each new SoftChain is a soft fork, which makes it explicit instead of implicit, unlike drivechains, because that's a soft fork, too.

1967
03:29:26,159 --> 03:29:28,159
Let's not pretend that's not.

1968
03:29:28,159 --> 03:29:33,159
But also, the sidechain cannot fork itself.

1969
03:29:33,159 --> 03:29:38,159
The mainchain can fork it, so if they wanted to increase the block size, the mainchain would have to do that.

1970
03:29:38,159 --> 03:29:45,159
But each new SoftChain has a slight overhead of roughly 100 megabytes a year.

1971
03:29:45,159 --> 03:29:53,159
That's the only requirement of the mainchain is 100 megabytes per SoftChain, which is quite reasonable.

1972
03:29:53,159 --> 03:29:59,159
And we get away from this voting, which is insane.

1973
03:29:59,159 --> 03:30:15,159
Well, I think SoftChain is like one markdown file, and it's like – I don't think it's an actual idea, so I think maybe we should wait until someone codes the software or something.

1974
03:30:15,159 --> 03:30:21,159
I mean, are we trying to activate in 2023? Are we in a rush?

1975
03:30:21,159 --> 03:30:23,159
Why are we in such a rush?

1976
03:30:24,159 --> 03:30:26,159
Why are we not surveying everything?

1977
03:30:26,159 --> 03:30:30,159
We have multiple proposals. We have covenants. We have two-way pegs.

1978
03:30:30,159 --> 03:30:33,159
There's so many things that we've not even discussed on.

1979
03:30:33,159 --> 03:30:39,159
Why are we focusing on this one specific proposal that's been around for almost a decade now?

1980
03:30:39,159 --> 03:30:44,159
Why are we so hyper-focused on this one little thing?

1981
03:30:44,159 --> 03:30:49,159
We keep calling it the Holy Grail, but if it was the Holy Grail, we would have done it seven years ago.

1982
03:30:50,159 --> 03:30:53,159
There was no software seven years ago. It was just a blog post.

1983
03:30:53,159 --> 03:31:01,159
And I don't think – so a lot of people are focusing on this idea, but I don't think everyone is hyper-focused on it, per se.

1984
03:31:01,159 --> 03:31:20,159
I really think that – I really think SoftChainz is just one markdown file, and I don't know if that – I don't think that's – I think that's very, very wet.

1985
03:31:23,159 --> 03:31:27,159
I mean, it could be, but why not look at it more?

1986
03:31:27,159 --> 03:31:30,159
Why not look at it more? Why not add it to the list of things?

1987
03:31:37,159 --> 03:31:43,159
I've had a lot of DriveChainz guys telling me that they are pro-CTD, but I never see them talking about it.

1988
03:31:43,159 --> 03:31:51,159
All the time, I'll catch them correcting people on DriveChainz, but they never actually talk about anything else.

1989
03:31:51,159 --> 03:31:56,159
They only talk about it if we put them in a corner and saying, why aren't you talking about this other stuff?

1990
03:31:56,159 --> 03:32:00,159
Like, oh, we're pro-CTD. Like, why don't – only when we put you on the spot.

1991
03:32:00,159 --> 03:32:05,159
Like, I – you know, I just don't get it.

1992
03:32:07,159 --> 03:32:14,159
Well, I mean, one reason is that you could use CTV. We already have a – we have a sidechain, 300 sidechain that has CTV on it.

1993
03:32:14,159 --> 03:32:20,159
So why – from my point of view, you just get – you get 119 with 300.

1994
03:32:21,159 --> 03:32:28,159
No, you don't. No, you don't. That is an absolute lie. I hate that lie.

1995
03:32:28,159 --> 03:32:35,159
You do not get CTV on a sidechain. Like, the miners get benefits. Lightning gets benefits.

1996
03:32:35,159 --> 03:32:41,159
They chains get benefits. RGB gets benefits. Everyone benefits – DriveChainz benefits from CTV.

1997
03:32:41,159 --> 03:32:45,159
We do not get CTV on a sidechain. It is not the same.

1998
03:32:46,159 --> 03:32:54,159
I don't even want to use CTV on a sidechain because I would have to hold my own data, and the whole point of sidechains is to have data availability.

1999
03:32:54,159 --> 03:33:02,159
And now I'm removing that with CTV. Like, it is not the same. And that narrative needs to die.

2000
03:33:02,159 --> 03:33:11,159
Well, I think it's true that you get – well, I mean, it's true that something being on a BIP300 sidechain is not the same as having it on L1.

2001
03:33:11,159 --> 03:33:16,159
So what I am saying is you can actually – like, right now, CTV doesn't exist at all.

2002
03:33:16,159 --> 03:33:24,159
But if you had – we already have coded and we're testing it, and actually anyone can download it and try it out.

2003
03:33:30,159 --> 03:33:38,159
I'm just saying that if you activated BIP300, you would be able to use CTV on the sidechain, and that's not the same – you're right.

2004
03:33:38,159 --> 03:33:45,159
It's not the same as having it on L1, but that's also, I think, why – I don't think – you should make – you know what you should do?

2005
03:33:45,159 --> 03:33:57,159
You should make a site that has all the different – like, a table with everything, and get signatures and see, like, who supports which bit.

2006
03:33:57,159 --> 03:33:59,159
That would be neat. Why don't you do that? That would be fun.

2007
03:34:00,159 --> 03:34:09,159
It's a community effort. If you want to do that, that would be wonderful. We all each have to focus on what we're focusing on, though, right?

2008
03:34:09,159 --> 03:34:16,159
Just like you were telling Pierre, if he wanted to make a fix to your bit, that, you know, he could do it.

2009
03:34:17,159 --> 03:34:23,159
I think there seems to be you who is interested in, like, who you want to round up all the names for.

2010
03:34:23,159 --> 03:34:33,159
I think, actually, Jeremy already had a thing on one of his sites, and he asked me to endorse CTV, and I think that I did.

2011
03:34:33,159 --> 03:34:39,159
I don't know. It's been a little while. Maybe I'm not remembering it, but I think Jeremy already has, like, a big table for 119.

2012
03:34:40,159 --> 03:34:44,159
You're worried about people hiding the fact that they are supporting 119.

2013
03:34:47,159 --> 03:34:55,159
He has a signals table. It's got, like, 50 or 60 people on it. It hasn't been updated in a couple years now.

2014
03:34:56,159 --> 03:35:03,159
But it doesn't do what you're asking, which is a simple comparison between everything and what features people are asking for.

2015
03:35:04,159 --> 03:35:12,159
And, you know, that is something that we can do, but at the same time, you know, Drivechain doesn't have that.

2016
03:35:12,159 --> 03:35:20,159
We don't have a Drivechain table that says, okay, on two-way peg, we can do this sidechain with that, and this other sidechain can do this,

2017
03:35:20,159 --> 03:35:25,159
and we can make this big, long sidechain of 32 megabytes or whatever.

2018
03:35:26,159 --> 03:35:36,159
You haven't flushed out all the different scenarios, which are infinite, but you haven't flushed out a few set of them of what sidechains you see happening.

2019
03:35:36,159 --> 03:35:44,159
Because I know that you said before on one of your videos, like, there's, like, 12 different unique things that you can do with, you know, crypto,

2020
03:35:44,159 --> 03:35:50,159
and so you don't see that many sidechains actually occurring, but you don't have that table made up, you know?

2021
03:35:51,159 --> 03:35:53,159
And I've been trying to flush out everything.

2022
03:35:54,159 --> 03:35:58,159
I have some lists, I think, somewhere, but let's go to MoonSettler, I think.

2023
03:36:02,159 --> 03:36:04,159
All right, I got to get going.

2024
03:36:08,159 --> 03:36:09,159
Cool, thanks for stopping by.

2025
03:36:10,159 --> 03:36:22,159
All right, so I just had, like, one question that keeps coming back to my head, and I did not really hear it discussed a lot.

2026
03:36:22,159 --> 03:36:32,159
I watched a lot of your videos and listening on the talks, but maybe it came up, I just wasn't there, but I'm curious.

2027
03:36:33,159 --> 03:36:43,159
What do you think happens with drivechains if, you know, a sidechain has a civil war and they decide to fork?

2028
03:36:43,159 --> 03:36:45,159
So what's the idea there?

2029
03:36:45,159 --> 03:36:54,159
Because, of course, normally if some of the users are not satisfied with the way a sidechain is,

2030
03:36:54,159 --> 03:36:57,159
if we discount the network effects and all the other factors,

2031
03:36:57,159 --> 03:37:03,159
then they could just try to get the miners to activate a new chain with their preferred features,

2032
03:37:03,159 --> 03:37:06,159
and then people would naturally migrate over.

2033
03:37:06,159 --> 03:37:15,159
But stuff like, you know, in certain cases, like, established ecosystems and network effects, I think.

2034
03:37:15,159 --> 03:37:20,159
So people might actually disagree on who gets to carry on with that legacy,

2035
03:37:21,159 --> 03:37:24,159
and they might actually do a consensus fork.

2036
03:37:24,159 --> 03:37:27,159
So how would that look like, do you think?

2037
03:37:30,159 --> 03:37:31,159
Sorry, could you repeat it?

2038
03:37:35,159 --> 03:37:43,159
So how do you think it would look like if the sidechain had a civil war and a consensus fork?

2039
03:37:43,159 --> 03:37:50,159
What would happen with the drivechain as a rule, and how the miners or anyone could handle that?

2040
03:37:51,159 --> 03:37:52,159
Yes.

2041
03:37:52,159 --> 03:37:58,159
So the cool thing is the sidechains actually inherit the protections of the soft fork.

2042
03:37:58,159 --> 03:38:05,159
So as long as there's two different, if you release a new version, or if you have a different history,

2043
03:38:06,159 --> 03:38:11,159
so, like, if you run the oldest, like, the original version of the software,

2044
03:38:11,159 --> 03:38:15,159
it should report on which withdrawals are real, like, which hash is real,

2045
03:38:15,159 --> 03:38:23,159
like, which thing should be leaving the, like, the prison or whatever you want to call it.

2046
03:38:23,159 --> 03:38:25,159
So which withdrawal capsule.

2047
03:38:26,159 --> 03:38:33,159
And if the sidechain upgrades via soft fork, all of the different versions will report the same withdrawal hash.

2048
03:38:33,159 --> 03:38:39,159
And if the sidechain has some kind of, like, reorg thing,

2049
03:38:39,159 --> 03:38:46,159
it will go with whatever is the longest valid chain, according to the first version of the software's rules.

2050
03:38:46,159 --> 03:38:49,159
That would be, like, the authoritative withdrawal.

2051
03:38:49,159 --> 03:38:54,159
And if it does anything else, that would be, like, kind of hard forking the sidechain.

2052
03:38:54,159 --> 03:39:01,159
So at that point, it's kind of like, by default, you can only do soft forks to upgrade or tamper with the sidechain,

2053
03:39:01,159 --> 03:39:06,159
which is a good thing, because it means that everyone is protected by the original property rights.

2054
03:39:09,159 --> 03:39:18,159
And so in that way, there's never any problem, because maybe some people aren't happy about what happens,

2055
03:39:18,159 --> 03:39:24,159
but it's like a sorry for your loss situation where one side is just clearly losing and the other side is clearly winning.

2056
03:39:25,159 --> 03:39:33,159
And then the other thing that you could do is maybe what you would do would be conceptually the same as hard forking the sidechain,

2057
03:39:33,159 --> 03:39:42,159
which is when you make a change that's so big that the original software no longer works.

2058
03:39:42,159 --> 03:39:49,159
And I don't know if I'm explaining this in the right order, but when you first activate the software,

2059
03:39:49,159 --> 03:39:57,159
you're allowed to add, like, the hash of the software and the hash of, like, the tarball and, like, the release hash, the commit hash.

2060
03:39:57,159 --> 03:40:07,159
So you can, like, you could flag a certain bit of software as, like, the software for that sidechain so that everyone can agree what it is.

2061
03:40:08,159 --> 03:40:10,159
And then when you…

2062
03:40:16,159 --> 03:40:18,159
Sorry, I was distracted by something.

2063
03:40:19,159 --> 03:40:23,159
When the idea of hard forking the sidechain is kind of like replacing…

2064
03:40:24,059 --> 03:40:29,339
that software with new software. And so by default, everything is a soft fork,

2065
03:40:29,339 --> 03:40:35,179
and this is clear winning, losing side. But then I suppose if there was some compelling reason

2066
03:40:35,179 --> 03:40:42,298
that would somehow maximize miners about, like, the transaction fee revenues or the exchange rate

2067
03:40:43,099 --> 03:40:48,458
somehow, then you could hard fork the sidechain. But I don't actually think that will happen,

2068
03:40:48,458 --> 03:40:52,059
because what I think is anyone who's using a sidechain, they already have, like, a tenuous

2069
03:40:52,059 --> 03:40:57,338
connection. You know what I mean? Like, their best case scenario is, like, they can deposit

2070
03:40:57,338 --> 03:41:02,059
and withdraw to this sidechain according to its declared rules. Like, maybe someone on sidechain

2071
03:41:02,059 --> 03:41:07,899
5 is going to be watching this drama, and they're going to think, you know what, maybe sidechain 3

2072
03:41:07,899 --> 03:41:13,979
screwed up, but it should just… it should only affect the users of sidechain 3.

2073
03:41:15,338 --> 03:41:18,619
But, of course, it's theoretically possible for them to have some kind of, like, complicated

2074
03:41:22,059 --> 03:41:27,739
other relationship with everything. Like, it could… people could decide to do whatever for

2075
03:41:27,739 --> 03:41:33,018
any reason, you know? I don't know. So, basically…

2076
03:41:33,018 --> 03:41:35,338
I don't know if I'm answering that question, but does that make sense?

2077
03:41:39,578 --> 03:41:45,179
The way I would like to make a distinction is you can have BIP300, right, with an alternative

2078
03:41:45,179 --> 03:41:51,658
consensus mechanism for the sidechain, which can be anything. And at that point, the ways

2079
03:41:51,658 --> 03:41:58,059
it can fork, the ways the community could disagree there, and the ways they could fork it,

2080
03:41:58,059 --> 03:42:03,258
even with mutually exclusive soft forks or whatever, you know, they are both UTXO forks

2081
03:42:03,258 --> 03:42:14,219
of the sidechain. And the issue is that they lay claims both to the same escrow, basically,

2082
03:42:14,539 --> 03:42:20,219
and the system does not seem to be equipped to handle that, like, elegantly.

2083
03:42:21,338 --> 03:42:27,499
And the other possibility is that it is a blind-merge-mind chain, and as you said,

2084
03:42:28,459 --> 03:42:34,218
one of them would have to overpower the other economically via fees and bribes, and there

2085
03:42:34,218 --> 03:42:41,819
would be a clear winner in that case. But in case it's not a blind-merge-mind sidechain,

2086
03:42:41,819 --> 03:42:47,099
it is an alternative consensus mechanism, it can actually have a proper split. And

2087
03:42:48,138 --> 03:42:55,018
do we kind of expect this, or do we think that people are really, like, motivated to solve this

2088
03:42:55,018 --> 03:43:06,298
in a civil manner, or what's the expectation? I can answer this how I think it would happen.

2089
03:43:07,099 --> 03:43:12,778
I think as far as the base layer is concerned, the blocks with the heaviest proof of work are

2090
03:43:12,778 --> 03:43:17,739
just going to rule, and then behind that is just going to be whatever economic incentive it is to

2091
03:43:18,699 --> 03:43:24,138
include any withdrawal proposals or not. And if there's drama going on on the sidechain,

2092
03:43:24,138 --> 03:43:29,179
if there is a fork of consensus failure or whatever it is, as a base layer, you're just

2093
03:43:29,179 --> 03:43:33,819
looking at, you know, whatever blocks are coming in, they're valid, they're the heaviest blocks,

2094
03:43:33,819 --> 03:43:39,739
the most proof of work, and that's it. And it's up to the drivechain to figure out if they're,

2095
03:43:39,739 --> 03:43:44,459
you know, whatever their drama is, and they might have to convince the miners that this is the best

2096
03:43:44,459 --> 03:43:50,059
one, or that is the best one, but the base layer doesn't really have to care. I don't know, that's

2097
03:43:50,059 --> 03:43:56,298
kind of how I look at and boil that down to. I mean, I would say, like, from zooming way out,

2098
03:43:57,259 --> 03:44:06,619
it's like a thousand foot view or something. I kind of think it's a situation where everyone

2099
03:44:06,619 --> 03:44:14,619
wants there to be consensus in the long run, like in the abstract. So by default, this is what

2100
03:44:14,619 --> 03:44:19,418
people want, you know what I mean? Like, in a particular case, they may really hope that they

2101
03:44:19,418 --> 03:44:24,699
can bend the rules for themselves in the short term, but I think this is just kind of Satoshi's

2102
03:44:24,699 --> 03:44:32,059
design, is my guess, is that people want to buy into a system where they can do whatever,

2103
03:44:32,858 --> 03:44:41,739
where they play by a fixed set of rules. And I think they don't want, like, any rule breaking.

2104
03:44:41,739 --> 03:44:47,418
So as long as the tools are there for them to sort it out, like, they want to keep the party going,

2105
03:44:47,418 --> 03:44:53,018
is what I would say. So if there's some problem on the sidechain, most of the people there will

2106
03:44:53,018 --> 03:44:58,698
want to figure out, you know, how can we keep this network going? How can we continue to generate

2107
03:44:58,698 --> 03:45:07,258
fees? How can we continue to enjoy the future? Yeah, but I was just thinking maybe they are

2108
03:45:07,258 --> 03:45:12,298
going to have their own block size war. Like, that's the simplest thing to imagine. We already

2109
03:45:12,298 --> 03:45:21,179
had one with Bitcoin. And so you can't really make sometimes a moral judgment on who is right,

2110
03:45:21,179 --> 03:45:29,818
because the group just simply split in two, and they both think they are right. And maybe they are

2111
03:45:29,818 --> 03:45:35,659
widely of different size, maybe they are roughly of equal size. We can't really tell how it will

2112
03:45:35,659 --> 03:45:43,179
play out. I was just wondering if there is a mechanism where, you know, this could be solved

2113
03:45:43,179 --> 03:45:51,098
in a somewhat cooperative and, like, orderly manner, right? So let's say the group split,

2114
03:45:51,098 --> 03:45:58,059
they agree on splitting somewhat after, let's say, they realize they can't really, you know,

2115
03:45:58,059 --> 03:46:07,739
solve it with brute force or just trolling or whatever. Then I guess it's very easy to create

2116
03:46:07,739 --> 03:46:14,858
a withdrawal transaction that will simply split the escrow, I guess, and the miners could vote in

2117
03:46:14,858 --> 03:46:21,659
a new sidechain, right? So that would be, like, the best case, civil resolution. Can you just

2118
03:46:21,659 --> 03:46:25,818
explain what you mean about split the chain? I didn't really understand what you had in mind.

2119
03:46:26,779 --> 03:46:32,298
Yeah, like, they just want to continue with two separate sidechains.

2120
03:46:32,779 --> 03:46:40,298
But it's like a sidechain in slot 5, and then there's, like, 60 coins there, and then...

2121
03:46:41,339 --> 03:46:48,219
Yeah, that's the interesting issue, like, how if they, like, split the UTXO set or

2122
03:46:48,219 --> 03:46:52,379
they just try to continue, both of them try to continue with the whole UTXO set,

2123
03:46:52,379 --> 03:46:56,939
that would be the worst case, because then you really can't resolve that with the escrow.

2124
03:46:56,939 --> 03:47:03,018
Like, I don't know how to do that. There's always the authoritative

2125
03:47:03,018 --> 03:47:08,779
source of truth is the the original software. That's what I tried to say. I don't think I

2126
03:47:08,779 --> 03:47:14,619
explained it very well, but when you claim slot 5, you tag a certain piece of software.

2127
03:47:14,619 --> 03:47:19,739
You don't actually literally put the entire piece of software, of course, that would be ridiculous

2128
03:47:19,739 --> 03:47:24,619
on the blockchain, but you tag it with the hash, so you say, this is the software that is

2129
03:47:24,619 --> 03:47:32,219
supposed to be the sidechain full node software, and whatever, that's going to just return one

2130
03:47:32,219 --> 03:47:36,538
chain state, or it will just freeze or something, and if it freezes, you can always...

2131
03:47:37,578 --> 03:47:40,298
See, what you can always do is you can always release a soft fork,

2132
03:47:41,739 --> 03:47:47,418
and you can always release a chain that, like, it says manually invalidates sidechain block number,

2133
03:47:47,418 --> 03:47:52,698
like, 612 or something, with a block with certain hash, you know what I mean? You manually

2134
03:47:52,698 --> 03:47:58,698
invalidate this block, and then proceed with this new soft fork tightened rules, so that could be

2135
03:47:58,698 --> 03:48:07,339
like sidechain software version 4.0 upgrading to, like, 4.1. That can be, like, an upgrade,

2136
03:48:07,978 --> 03:48:13,339
and now the sidechain goes from being frozen and stuck, it just orphans the stuck block,

2137
03:48:13,339 --> 03:48:16,779
and then it has a new block, and then it has the problem fixed.

2138
03:48:17,499 --> 03:48:22,138
So, then they kind of got around it there, in that worst-case scenario.

2139
03:48:23,978 --> 03:48:28,459
Merely with a soft fork, because the... Well, actually, maybe that wouldn't, because if you

2140
03:48:28,459 --> 03:48:34,059
ran the really old version, it would still maybe freeze there, but I think... So, maybe, actually,

2141
03:48:34,059 --> 03:48:40,459
I said something mistaken there. Oh, no, actually, no, I wouldn't, because the old version will

2142
03:48:40,459 --> 03:48:47,339
naturally orphan the problematic block. Oh, luckily, I said it right there. So, you run version 1.0

2143
03:48:47,339 --> 03:48:52,939
of the software, it would freeze if it got to that block, but that block will be orphaned,

2144
03:48:52,939 --> 03:48:58,379
because it will see that as just merely an orphaned block, and it will just ignore that block.

2145
03:48:58,379 --> 03:49:03,179
So, it will never reach the conditions that causes it to freeze or crash or whatever.

2146
03:49:03,658 --> 03:49:08,298
So, then, basically, we don't expect anyone to try to follow the sidechain,

2147
03:49:09,739 --> 03:49:14,778
and what happens if, say, MainChain experiences another chain split fork?

2148
03:49:16,778 --> 03:49:22,379
What is the idea? Where would the sidechains go? They fall into the sidechains,

2149
03:49:22,379 --> 03:49:24,778
and what happens if they fall into the sidechains?

2150
03:49:25,338 --> 03:49:39,019
Yeah, they're all riding on top. All of them are riding on top,

2151
03:49:41,338 --> 03:49:50,619
and so, if the sidechain, if your MainChain has blocked 9,001, 9,002, 900,001, 900,002,

2152
03:49:50,619 --> 03:50:04,858
900,003, 900,004, and whatever, and then, so, 900,004 has sidechain block. It has two

2153
03:50:04,858 --> 03:50:14,538
sidechains in slots 2 and 7, and sidechain 2 has block G, and then sidechain 7 has block whatever,

2154
03:50:15,098 --> 03:50:24,939
900,004, 900,005, or whatever it is, and then it goes from G to H, it's slot 2, and it goes from

2155
03:50:26,939 --> 03:50:33,499
gamma to delta, I think, is how the Greek alphabet works. So, you would do that, and then,

2156
03:50:33,499 --> 03:50:42,218
if you re-org'd out 900,005, it's just as if it just goes back to G and gamma.

2157
03:50:42,538 --> 03:50:47,819
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I understand that. That's not what I meant. I mean,

2158
03:50:47,819 --> 03:50:52,858
if we experience another chain split, like with BCH, right?

2159
03:50:54,458 --> 03:50:58,218
Oh, yeah, but then something really funny happens. I think you can guess what happens in that

2160
03:50:58,218 --> 03:51:01,978
situation, though, which is it doubles everyone's coins everywhere, and it doubles the sidechains

2161
03:51:01,978 --> 03:51:07,418
also, which is kind of funny, I think. I think, why not? Why not do that?

2162
03:51:07,418 --> 03:51:16,218
Yeah, I just think there is a tiny little bit of identity issue. I think people would be confused,

2163
03:51:16,218 --> 03:51:26,218
or maybe even competitive about claiming the brands, you know? Who is actually the Bitcoin

2164
03:51:26,218 --> 03:51:29,098
monero sidechain, or whatever? Bitcoin monero sidechain.

2165
03:51:29,098 --> 03:51:34,778
Exactly what happened with Bitcoin, with Bitcoin Cash, and etc. They tried to fight over the ticker

2166
03:51:34,778 --> 03:51:41,579
and everything, but of course, what I would say, of course, in my defense, is that the whole reason

2167
03:51:41,579 --> 03:51:47,338
we had a hard fork was because there were no sidechains. That's like my propaganda, you know,

2168
03:51:48,059 --> 03:51:48,778
for that line.

2169
03:51:48,778 --> 03:51:52,298
Yeah, right. I would like to have one last question, and then I'm done.

2170
03:51:52,939 --> 03:52:02,059
So, one thing that has been bugging me lately is people keep, when they talk about who decides

2171
03:52:02,059 --> 03:52:08,139
what Bitcoin is, this is a huge ongoing debate, and every time soft forks come up, this gets

2172
03:52:08,139 --> 03:52:14,778
amplified, and so people keep talking about the economically significant nodes, like those are

2173
03:52:14,778 --> 03:52:20,218
the ones that truly enforce the rules. Of course, miners enforce the rules on the block-to-block

2174
03:52:20,218 --> 03:52:27,739
basis, because they are motivated to economically, right? The whole game theory, but everyone

2175
03:52:27,819 --> 03:52:34,298
assumes that the economically significant nodes are the ones that kind of set the rules of the

2176
03:52:34,298 --> 03:52:42,139
chain, and if they do a soft fork, then the miners, we assume, have to follow them. Of course, it's

2177
03:52:42,139 --> 03:52:49,019
always better if the actual fork is coordinated by the miners. That's way smoother than any

2178
03:52:49,658 --> 03:52:55,658
stupid deadline activation or whatever. That's kind of a rational rule, but the point is,

2179
03:52:56,538 --> 03:53:01,819
who are the economically significant nodes? Because it sounds a bit hand-wavy, right? So,

2180
03:53:01,819 --> 03:53:06,858
when people say, oh, well, the economically significant nodes matter, who are these?

2181
03:53:06,858 --> 03:53:10,858
These are the centralized exchanges, basically, or what are we talking about?

2182
03:53:14,059 --> 03:53:20,778
Well, I think it has no clear definition. It's not a crystal clear thing. I think, probably,

2183
03:53:20,778 --> 03:53:26,858
it's ironic, the exchanges went through a long period where they were not relevant,

2184
03:53:26,858 --> 03:53:32,699
but now they're some of the most relevant people. Anyway, like big exchange, big payment

2185
03:53:32,699 --> 03:53:37,338
process or someone with a lot of coin, maybe. I don't know. I don't think it has a clear definition.

2186
03:53:39,259 --> 03:53:44,619
Yeah, I also think it's not clear, but to give some examples of how that, I don't know,

2187
03:53:44,619 --> 03:53:47,978
like how you can define that, you really can't define it, but if you had to,

2188
03:53:48,858 --> 03:53:54,778
if I had like 1,000 coins and maybe Paul had 10,000 coins and there was a split on the main

2189
03:53:54,778 --> 03:54:01,819
chain, if you value Paul's coins, you would value whatever node software he's running,

2190
03:54:01,819 --> 03:54:07,259
and then you can say that Paul's node is the economic, it's an economic node because you're

2191
03:54:07,259 --> 03:54:13,418
valuing the Bitcoin from that software. So, I think it's very hard to know what people value,

2192
03:54:13,418 --> 03:54:18,939
but that's how people are ascribing economic full nodes is which software nodes of Bitcoin

2193
03:54:18,939 --> 03:54:22,298
are people valuing over another, if that makes any sense.

2194
03:54:23,819 --> 03:54:28,139
You're right. I was just wondering if we are talking about basically Coinbase and

2195
03:54:28,139 --> 03:54:30,379
Krokan and Binance when we are talking about-

2196
03:54:30,379 --> 03:54:34,218
Yeah, I don't know if it's necessarily specifically like the biggest exchanges,

2197
03:54:34,218 --> 03:54:37,978
because we saw in New York agreement where they all signed and that wasn't good enough.

2198
03:54:37,978 --> 03:54:43,098
So, I don't know if the exchanges is good enough, but they probably have an effect,

2199
03:54:43,098 --> 03:54:45,179
especially if they have coins that people want.

2200
03:54:45,978 --> 03:54:52,218
I think maybe a way to phrase the question is to say, if there was a miner activated soft fork,

2201
03:54:52,778 --> 03:55:00,298
what coalition could reverse it or prevent it or what would it take to

2202
03:55:00,858 --> 03:55:03,978
have a resistance to that miner activated soft fork?

2203
03:55:03,978 --> 03:55:11,179
Yeah, I have not even thought about necessarily reversing, but

2204
03:55:13,418 --> 03:55:17,499
there is this idea that is thrown around that the economically significant nodes

2205
03:55:18,059 --> 03:55:21,418
enforce the rules and the miners have to adopt if they want to,

2206
03:55:21,418 --> 03:55:25,019
you know, sell their coins that they are mining, basically.

2207
03:55:25,579 --> 03:55:31,819
And probably we can kind of suspect that the exchanges are beholden to their users,

2208
03:55:31,819 --> 03:55:40,059
like a large exchange can't just decide independently of everyone that they are

2209
03:55:40,059 --> 03:55:49,259
only going to honor, you know, Bitcoin withdrawals on a chain that the users generally don't want,

2210
03:55:49,259 --> 03:55:52,538
because that would probably put them out of business.

2211
03:55:52,538 --> 03:55:54,939
So, there is something like that going on.

2212
03:55:55,499 --> 03:56:00,458
I'm just wondering if, like really, we are just talking about basically a loose

2213
03:56:00,458 --> 03:56:07,098
federation of the largest exchanges at times like this and probably neither the users nor

2214
03:56:07,098 --> 03:56:13,098
the miners would really, you know, want to go against that, unless they have a very,

2215
03:56:13,098 --> 03:56:14,379
very good reason.

2216
03:56:14,379 --> 03:56:19,739
So, I can imagine scenarios where the users would say, fuck this, although I'm not sure

2217
03:56:19,739 --> 03:56:21,098
if they can actually do that.

2218
03:56:21,098 --> 03:56:28,699
Like, so the ratio of the custodially held coins and self-custodied coins becomes pretty

2219
03:56:28,699 --> 03:56:30,139
important at times like that.

2220
03:56:30,139 --> 03:56:37,819
And also, again, if the economically significant nodes can influence how the hashrate is deployed,

2221
03:56:37,819 --> 03:56:45,019
then basically any fork that the users might actually prefer might actually become non-viable

2222
03:56:45,019 --> 03:56:46,059
under proof-of-work.

2223
03:56:46,699 --> 03:56:49,019
We have all sorts of problems like that.

2224
03:56:49,019 --> 03:56:52,939
So, it's not really a clear picture and that's bothering me, because people are throwing

2225
03:56:52,939 --> 03:56:55,739
it around like it's an absolute alternative.

2226
03:56:55,739 --> 03:57:00,059
End of the debate statement and I don't even know what they are talking about, really.

2227
03:57:04,619 --> 03:57:06,778
We have someone who has a hand up for a while.

2228
03:57:08,139 --> 03:57:09,499
Hey, thanks for having me.

2229
03:57:09,499 --> 03:57:13,658
I was just curious, are we actually utilizing drivechains and sidechains now?

2230
03:57:13,658 --> 03:57:15,259
And is this a bull case for ordinals?

2231
03:57:15,259 --> 03:57:17,978
And is this layer 2, like better than stacks?

2232
03:57:17,978 --> 03:57:18,858
Because stack sucks.

2233
03:57:20,298 --> 03:57:21,499
Oh, it's Tandy.

2234
03:57:21,499 --> 03:57:22,538
What's up, Tandy?

2235
03:57:22,538 --> 03:57:24,699
Welcome to the drivechain.

2236
03:57:24,699 --> 03:57:25,658
Yo, Chuck!

2237
03:57:28,938 --> 03:57:30,539
I think it's way better than stacks.

2238
03:57:30,539 --> 03:57:35,818
Stacks is like the opposite of this in many ways, because stacks has its own token that's

2239
03:57:35,818 --> 03:57:36,458
required.

2240
03:57:37,019 --> 03:57:40,379
Whereas with this, there is no new token at all.

2241
03:57:40,379 --> 03:57:41,419
It's only BTC.

2242
03:57:45,178 --> 03:57:49,419
So, this is like an actual layer 2 and not just some Ponzi that claims to be a layer 2.

2243
03:57:50,058 --> 03:57:50,299
Right.

2244
03:57:51,259 --> 03:57:51,978
Beautiful.

2245
03:57:51,978 --> 03:57:53,499
Is this a bull case for ordinals?

2246
03:57:54,058 --> 03:57:55,019
Well, I don't know.

2247
03:57:56,458 --> 03:57:57,178
It's hard to say.

2248
03:57:58,299 --> 03:57:58,938
But maybe.

2249
03:57:59,578 --> 03:58:02,058
I mean, it may draw more attention to Bitcoin and it may make...

2250
03:58:02,058 --> 03:58:04,619
I just need a firm yes so I can pump my bags.

2251
03:58:04,619 --> 03:58:04,858
Yeah.

2252
03:58:09,899 --> 03:58:14,299
Can I chime in for a healthy context here?

2253
03:58:14,299 --> 03:58:20,938
Tandy, could you give like a 15-second primer to Paul, like where you come from here?

2254
03:58:21,338 --> 03:58:24,379
Because otherwise, we could go off the rails.

2255
03:58:25,899 --> 03:58:26,938
Let this go off the rails.

2256
03:58:26,938 --> 03:58:34,458
Now, I'm Tandy, the ordinal maxi or once ordinal maximalist and soapy booba developer and enjoyer.

2257
03:58:34,458 --> 03:58:37,978
I pump my wife's tits on the Bitcoin blockchain and the witness data of UTXO.

2258
03:58:37,978 --> 03:58:41,659
And I really like a major bull case for ordinals for the future so I can pump my bags.

2259
03:58:42,858 --> 03:58:46,698
Also, I'm a guy who doesn't enjoy stacks because that Ponzi kind of sucks.

2260
03:58:47,178 --> 03:58:52,539
I can give you my opinion on how it might or might not affect specifically ordinals and

2261
03:58:52,539 --> 03:58:53,419
inscriptions.

2262
03:58:53,419 --> 03:58:59,338
If you think drivechains can make the base layer fees a lot more expensive, then you

2263
03:58:59,338 --> 03:59:04,858
can value the block space that inscriptions are put on for like much more expensive.

2264
03:59:04,858 --> 03:59:09,338
And then you can, I don't know if you want, then you can also say that previous inscriptions

2265
03:59:09,338 --> 03:59:12,218
might have a higher value because it costs more to put them on chain.

2266
03:59:13,338 --> 03:59:15,178
But you would have to jump through all those steps.

2267
03:59:15,739 --> 03:59:19,259
So this is multiple hoops to jump through to pump my early inscription bags.

2268
03:59:19,259 --> 03:59:20,058
I'm bullish on it.

2269
03:59:20,058 --> 03:59:20,379
Thank you.

2270
03:59:21,899 --> 03:59:23,818
Yeah, like it makes the L2 blockchain.

2271
03:59:25,338 --> 03:59:30,218
Like it makes it so that the L1 is contrasted favorably with L2.

2272
03:59:30,218 --> 03:59:36,139
They say, well, there's lots of L2s, but there's only one L1 and there's only one whatever.

2273
03:59:36,698 --> 03:59:38,139
There's only one L1 Bitcoin.

2274
03:59:39,098 --> 03:59:44,938
Mr. Tendi, I think as you look into it, you'll find drivechain to be the pump technology

2275
03:59:44,938 --> 03:59:47,659
to end all other pump technologies.

2276
03:59:48,458 --> 03:59:51,739
The pumpanomics behind drivechain are so incredible.

2277
03:59:51,739 --> 03:59:53,178
It's almost like it took me.

2278
03:59:54,058 --> 03:59:56,139
You already sold me on pump technologies.

2279
03:59:56,139 --> 03:59:57,419
You don't even have to go any further.

2280
03:59:57,419 --> 03:59:59,019
Pumping technology is all I needed to hear.

2281
03:59:59,019 --> 04:00:00,139
You're going to pump my bags with this.

2282
04:00:00,139 --> 04:00:01,019
I'm so fucking bullish.

2283
04:00:01,019 --> 04:00:01,259
Thank you.

2284
04:00:08,779 --> 04:00:11,178
Also, I forgot Minnesota was a state.

2285
04:00:11,178 --> 04:00:13,259
Charlie, did you know that?

2286
04:00:13,964 --> 04:00:24,964
I did. Welcome to the stage, Tendi. I'm not in charge. I just happen to be here. I'm glad you're here to bring a different personality to the conversation.

2287
04:00:24,964 --> 04:00:34,964
I also like listening about the drivechain tech. And I've been kind of like listening in on alternative layer twos because Stacks is like dead and that Ponzi is kind of washed out.

2288
04:00:35,964 --> 04:00:49,964
That's why I'm here, too. I just happen to be up as a speaker just because I got here early. I know Paul likes to try to have more of like a guided, just open discussion.

2289
04:00:49,964 --> 04:01:05,964
But I mean, yeah, I don't really have a whole lot to say about drivechain. I just have more questions. And but I do like this idea that it drives more value accrual to Bitcoin.

2290
04:01:05,964 --> 04:01:25,964
I would think that you, Tendi, probably speak the language of most of the crypto market participants, much more so than the eggheads and the neckbeards and the autists and the basement dwellers and such.

2291
04:01:26,964 --> 04:01:36,964
Obviously, the key to the success of all of it, and people like to think that they're high and mighty and self-righteous because they hold Bitcoin.

2292
04:01:36,964 --> 04:01:40,964
Are you talking about Shinobi now?

2293
04:01:41,964 --> 04:01:57,964
I'm talking about many people. He's not even the worst of it. I'm talking about people who seem like they make it seem like it's sacrilegious in the literal sense of the term to discuss strategies for Bitcoin price appreciation.

2294
04:01:57,964 --> 04:02:11,964
And that somehow they're like members of this like anointed class with their own priesthood that's, you know, quote unquote, in it for the revolution.

2295
04:02:11,964 --> 04:02:26,964
Meanwhile, if you talk about price, you know, in any sort of boundary that they deem to be unseemly, then you're just a moon boy or whatever terms they use.

2296
04:02:26,964 --> 04:02:45,964
But of course, you know, some of the anointed ones that are the people that, you know, that they are willing to allow to talk about them, you know, they'll listen to like sailors price talk, and I'm sure they were all on top of stock to flow.

2297
04:02:46,964 --> 04:02:59,964
But, you know, the what seems like a very plausible explanation of how drivechain could pump Bitcoin in a very meaningful way over the long term, then that's goes against the dogma.

2298
04:02:59,964 --> 04:03:12,964
So right now it won't for long. I do think you're going to have a capitulation wave after capitulation wave, probably a nice wave before activation and then a wave or two after activation.

2299
04:03:12,964 --> 04:03:32,964
But, you know, a lot of the Bitcoin people, it's like there's this very self-righteous element to it. That is just it's it's there's a lot of cringe in the crypto world, but I think it's the cringiest of it all because it's like just so I don't know.

2300
04:03:32,964 --> 04:03:44,964
So like my favorite thing is I asked them how a commercialized quantum computing is going to affect SHA-256 and its inevitable breaking of SHA-256 encryption.

2301
04:03:44,964 --> 04:03:56,964
Did it just sends them into this fucking tirade of like, oh, my God, we're here already. Commercialized quantum computing is going to be the end. No, it's not. And in our lifetime, probably not.

2302
04:03:56,964 --> 04:04:01,964
OK, yeah, that's that's fun.

2303
04:04:01,964 --> 04:04:07,964
How do you guys feel about that commercialized quantum computing eventually breaking SHA-256 encryption?

2304
04:04:07,964 --> 04:04:14,964
Well, I don't think it's SHA-256 is a hash. So I think it may break ECDSA.

2305
04:04:15,964 --> 04:04:22,964
I think we I don't know. I actually heard a lot of people say that that would like that was long, really far away.

2306
04:04:22,964 --> 04:04:31,964
And then the qubits that people claimed have gone up and up and up. And now someone claims to have like a 200 qubit thing.

2307
04:04:31,964 --> 04:04:36,964
But so, yeah, I don't know. That's, of course, a very specialized field of computer engineering.

2308
04:04:37,964 --> 04:04:51,964
But it does seem like they're making a lot of progress. And but there are, as everyone, I think probably everyone knows, you can switch out the signature algorithm for one that is immune to quantum computing.

2309
04:04:51,964 --> 04:04:57,964
So that seems to be what everyone will do when the time comes. I mean, how could you not do that?

2310
04:04:57,964 --> 04:05:00,964
We can always swap our back to Solana, right?

2311
04:05:00,964 --> 04:05:09,964
It's not so easy to switch out to quantum resistant. As far as I know, they are all huge compared to the signatures we have right now.

2312
04:05:09,964 --> 04:05:17,964
Let's say current signatures are around 60, 80 bytes and and it would be 8 kilobytes to have Lamport signatures.

2313
04:05:17,964 --> 04:05:27,964
So that's a totally different kind of Bitcoin. And also, we can't really do anything about, you know, old UTXOs that are low.

2314
04:05:27,964 --> 04:05:33,964
We pay to pubkey like the Satoshi Trove and stuff like that, unless Satoshi shows up in time and moves his coins.

2315
04:05:33,964 --> 04:05:42,964
Then, you know, that that is going to hit the market suddenly, maybe one day when the quantum threat becomes legitimate.

2316
04:05:43,964 --> 04:05:49,964
There's also a possibility that like there will be social consensus to fork out those coins.

2317
04:05:51,964 --> 04:06:00,964
Interesting, because right now, if you ask Bitcoiners, they are going to be foaming at the mouth and saying there is no way we will ever violate anything.

2318
04:06:00,964 --> 04:06:11,964
But there is a need for like a 21, I think it's 2138 or I could be wrong, maybe 2038. There's some sort of need for a bug fix anyway.

2319
04:06:11,964 --> 04:06:16,964
So maybe in like a super long term one. Paul probably knows the details.

2320
04:06:16,964 --> 04:06:23,964
That's the difference. A bug fix and messing with people's property rights are two entirely different things.

2321
04:06:23,964 --> 04:06:35,964
So that's not the same. I think hardcore Bitcoin maximalists will react rather violently if you suggest that we fork out or evade people's coins.

2322
04:06:35,964 --> 04:06:43,964
The whole thing that BSV has going on with the confiscation that would literally send people up the wall if anyone suggested for Bitcoin.

2323
04:06:43,964 --> 04:06:51,964
So it's only one step away from that to fork out certain UTXOs and make them unspendable.

2324
04:06:51,964 --> 04:07:03,964
If they are not like very, very, very reasonably and almost probably absolutely unspendable because they have been created as such, that would maybe be a different situation.

2325
04:07:03,964 --> 04:07:08,964
But as far as we know, Satoshi's UTXOs are perfectly fine.

2326
04:07:09,964 --> 04:07:16,964
And so I see a bit of a potential civil war if anyone actually suggests.

2327
04:07:16,964 --> 04:07:33,964
But maybe the situation changes when in the future people realize what it would do to Bitcoin's valuation and their bags if those coins, 1 million something coins actually hit the market suddenly when mining revenue is like below 1 BTC.

2328
04:07:33,964 --> 04:07:38,964
So that maybe then you get different answers.

2329
04:07:38,964 --> 04:07:54,964
We had a space a few weeks back and Portland talked about this idea where paid a public key where it was like previous transactions where the Satoshi coins are just paid a public key not to the hash of the key.

2330
04:07:55,964 --> 04:07:57,964
Those would be like the lowest hanging fruit.

2331
04:07:57,964 --> 04:08:08,964
And then if somebody had like a quantum to be able to crack it, you would think that they would just try to crack one at a time or it would take them time to crack one.

2332
04:08:08,964 --> 04:08:12,964
Probably it wouldn't be the same exact amount of time that it would take to crack all of them.

2333
04:08:12,964 --> 04:08:18,964
So when they crack one, either they try to spend one or they could just secretly wait and crack them all and try to spend them all.

2334
04:08:18,964 --> 04:08:28,964
And then there's two scenarios. One scenario is either Bitcoiners just take the hit and whatever it is, keep it to very binary, true or false.

2335
04:08:28,964 --> 04:08:36,964
And if it's true, let's accept it no matter what. Or most likely human incentive is just going to want to fork it out.

2336
04:08:36,964 --> 04:08:38,964
Yeah, the funny thing is we wouldn't know.

2337
04:08:38,964 --> 04:08:58,964
So it would actually make sense from Satoshi if he waited until the quantum thread becomes legitimate and then he starts spending his UTXOs from back to forward one by one, like every week one or something like that.

2338
04:08:58,964 --> 04:09:01,964
We wouldn't even know if it's a quantum or if it's actually...

2339
04:09:01,964 --> 04:09:13,964
We wouldn't possibly know, but maybe, just maybe people might actually be calmed down by the rate that this happens and they might actually take it more chill and less panicky

2340
04:09:13,964 --> 04:09:21,964
than if like thousands or ten thousands of coins moving at once and this happens frequently and stuff like that.

2341
04:09:21,964 --> 04:09:33,964
So it all depends. A lot of assumptions can go into it, but basically if an adversary, if a quantum adversary actually wants to destroy Bitcoin for whatever reason,

2342
04:09:33,964 --> 04:09:44,964
then this is one. So he can actually on purpose try to crash the market instead of trying to maximize his revenue.

2343
04:09:44,964 --> 04:09:55,964
And again, like a quantum miner could actually lurp a Satoshi and tell everyone that chill out people, I'm just going to withdraw a little bit of coin at a time and I'm not trying to crash the market.

2344
04:09:55,964 --> 04:09:59,964
A quantum adversary would be able to sign a Satoshi.

2345
04:09:59,964 --> 04:10:15,964
I want to pivot to another topic that came up before Paul was in the space where I was thinking of the point of view from the article that I read recently

2346
04:10:15,964 --> 04:10:21,964
was about if their drivechains are going to be successful and there's going to be a huge demand for them.

2347
04:10:21,964 --> 04:10:37,964
And if we have like Facebook having their own drivechain and Twitter having their own drivechain, would they have an incentive to have at least 10% hash rate or to at least rent 10% hash rate to make sure no other competitor drivechain gets included?

2348
04:10:37,964 --> 04:10:48,964
Because you need 90% to agree. And if that's a good thing, if we're incentivizing bigger conglomerates to have hash rate just to make sure like their competitors don't get a drivechain slot.

2349
04:10:49,964 --> 04:11:00,964
Well, isn't that an arms race that we want to have happen? In a way we're in the early stages of right now with Oman and Abu Dhabi and such.

2350
04:11:00,964 --> 04:11:07,964
Yeah, that's the way I saw it because in the article, it seemed like it was a negative, but I didn't really come to that conclusion right away.

2351
04:11:08,964 --> 04:11:13,964
It seems like it's actually a positive thing to incentivize people to have hash rate.

2352
04:11:13,964 --> 04:11:18,964
If the large institutions on earth are doing Bitcoin mining, I would say that's a massive win.

2353
04:11:18,964 --> 04:11:24,964
That's how I was looking at it too. So I was like curious, why is he framing it from a negative?

2354
04:11:25,964 --> 04:11:38,964
There's this idea that permeates throughout the Bitcoin culture that mining is something that you need to be able to do from your basement or in Sub-Saharan Africa in wartime conditions.

2355
04:11:38,964 --> 04:11:49,964
And we have one CPU, one vote, and it's just nothing like that as I'm sure many people know, Mr. CBS speaker.

2356
04:11:50,964 --> 04:11:58,964
I think they don't want miners to have hash rate for any other reason than just doing regular transactions.

2357
04:11:58,964 --> 04:12:01,964
If you have any other reason to have hash rate, they don't like that.

2358
04:12:01,964 --> 04:12:12,964
I think another perspective that you can look at this is you generally probably don't want people to be able to entrench their market position and play these games.

2359
04:12:12,964 --> 04:12:18,964
Usually in the traditional world, I played with lobbying and buying politicians and regulators.

2360
04:12:18,964 --> 04:12:22,964
That's kind of how businesses entrench their position.

2361
04:12:22,964 --> 04:12:28,964
I think we could come up with examples from even Coinbase.

2362
04:12:28,964 --> 04:12:38,964
They usually break the laws, do shady shit, and then when they are in a winning position, they try to pull up the ladder behind them.

2363
04:12:38,964 --> 04:12:46,964
That's pretty widespread in the traditional world, but it's actually not a good thing to any free market type of system.

2364
04:12:46,964 --> 04:12:53,964
You probably generally want good ideas and good systems to be adoptable.

2365
04:12:53,964 --> 04:12:55,964
Well, Bitcoin can't protect itself.

2366
04:12:55,964 --> 04:13:02,964
If Bitcoin can't survive in that environment, then it just cannot survive in the real world and can only survive on paper.

2367
04:13:03,964 --> 04:13:04,964
That's not what I said.

2368
04:13:04,964 --> 04:13:08,964
I said it's bad for the users if this starts.

2369
04:13:08,964 --> 04:13:12,964
There is another chain coming in because they can give you more value.

2370
04:13:12,964 --> 04:13:23,964
They believe they can give you more value and someone can just stop them from coming in to preserve their position because they would take a haircut on the revenue.

2371
04:13:23,964 --> 04:13:25,964
That's probably not good for you.

2372
04:13:25,964 --> 04:13:27,964
It's not about Bitcoin surviving.

2373
04:13:27,964 --> 04:13:29,964
That's not what I'm talking about.

2374
04:13:29,964 --> 04:13:33,964
What is good for the people and why we don't really want monopolies?

2375
04:13:33,964 --> 04:13:50,964
In this situation, would there at least be some incentive somewhere for a chain to rival Bitcoin then, one that actually corrects for those mistakes and focuses on decentralization or focuses on the user?

2376
04:13:50,964 --> 04:13:52,964
I have a question related to that.

2377
04:13:52,964 --> 04:14:09,964
Do you think that there's a scenario where Bitcoin continues to accrue value and is an objective success but perhaps remains somewhat niche at the same time?

2378
04:14:12,964 --> 04:14:14,964
I guess so.

2379
04:14:14,964 --> 04:14:16,964
That's pretty plausible to me.

2380
04:14:16,964 --> 04:14:22,964
Right now as Bitcoin is, my baseline assumption is that it will remain very niche.

2381
04:14:22,964 --> 04:14:28,964
That's what I assume from how things are and how things are going.

2382
04:14:31,964 --> 04:14:33,964
I'm going to hop off in a few minutes.

2383
04:14:33,964 --> 04:14:36,964
I just want to say thanks everybody.

2384
04:14:36,964 --> 04:14:38,964
Yeah, me too.

2385
04:14:38,964 --> 04:14:41,964
Thanks for bringing me up here.

2386
04:14:41,964 --> 04:14:44,964
I didn't really contribute a whole lot but I enjoyed listening to the conversation.

2387
04:14:44,964 --> 04:14:45,964
Peace, y'all.

2388
04:14:46,964 --> 04:14:47,964
Thank you.

2389
04:14:47,964 --> 04:14:48,964
Top tier talent.

2390
04:14:51,964 --> 04:14:53,964
Maybe we should end it soon.

2391
04:14:53,964 --> 04:14:59,964
We have Fuzzy Bear as our speaker so maybe they can speak.

2392
04:14:59,964 --> 04:15:00,964
Thanks, Paul.

2393
04:15:00,964 --> 04:15:05,964
Hey, this might be something gone over a lot so forgive me if this is old hat.

2394
04:15:05,964 --> 04:15:10,964
I've been seeing a lot more BIP300, BIP301 stuff coming out on Twitter.

2395
04:15:10,964 --> 04:15:12,964
You've been retweeting a lot.

2396
04:15:12,964 --> 04:15:20,964
I just didn't know if that meant you have more time on your hands or if there's been some sort of shift in sentiment or publicity or demand or something.

2397
04:15:20,964 --> 04:15:27,964
Is the project accelerating or is there just people sharing more content about this?

2398
04:15:27,964 --> 04:15:31,964
It's probably that but it's probably also Luke's pull request.

2399
04:15:31,964 --> 04:15:40,964
He did a draft pull request for how BIP300 might be merged into the latest version of Bitcoin Core.

2400
04:15:40,964 --> 04:15:42,964
So I think that makes it much more real.

2401
04:15:45,964 --> 04:15:46,964
Paul, can you point me to this?

2402
04:15:46,964 --> 04:15:47,964
Sorry, which pull request?

2403
04:15:54,964 --> 04:15:55,964
Did you die?

2404
04:15:55,964 --> 04:15:56,964
Can you hear me?

2405
04:15:57,964 --> 04:16:02,964
I think if you have your permissions open or whatever, I can DM you if you'd like.

2406
04:16:03,964 --> 04:16:09,964
I don't remember the number but if you go to github.com slash Bitcoin slash Bitcoin, I'll try to look it up too.

2407
04:16:09,964 --> 04:16:12,964
Or you can just get it from Austin.

2408
04:16:24,964 --> 04:16:28,964
It's actually Paul's pinned tweet on his profile.

2409
04:16:28,964 --> 04:16:32,964
Luke Jr. merged last week, BIP300 various improvements, is that right?

2410
04:16:32,964 --> 04:16:33,964
Yes.

2411
04:16:33,964 --> 04:16:34,964
Thanks.

2412
04:16:35,964 --> 04:16:59,964
Also, I think a big reason for the kind of acceleration in BIP300 discussion is there's some of it on the back end from people associated with mining and how things can go viral.

2413
04:16:59,964 --> 04:17:04,964
But the reality is the market is kind of stagnant.

2414
04:17:04,964 --> 04:17:11,964
And during this last cycle, an insane, unbelievable amount of capital has been invested in the mining ecosystem.

2415
04:17:12,964 --> 04:17:30,964
And I think more and more mining participants, employees, people in management, at the pool level, at the miner level, I can say that on the back end of things, it's definitely getting a lot more discussed.

2416
04:17:30,964 --> 04:17:44,964
Because it's perhaps a way to, you know, sure up Bitcoin fee revenue and kind of drink the milkshake from these shit coins.

2417
04:17:44,964 --> 04:17:50,964
If you look at cryptofees.info, I think it is, you'll see that it's a really telling chart.

2418
04:17:51,964 --> 04:17:54,964
I think one of the most telling charts in the industry.

2419
04:17:54,964 --> 04:18:06,964
And it's that Ethereum every day for a long time now, years, outperforms Bitcoin in terms of fee revenue by on average like 10x.

2420
04:18:06,964 --> 04:18:13,964
And at certain points during the peak of the bull market, it was averaging 80x.

2421
04:18:13,964 --> 04:18:18,964
I think the record day was over 100x.

2422
04:18:18,964 --> 04:18:22,964
So this is, you know, we're getting our ass kicked in that metric.

2423
04:18:24,964 --> 04:18:30,964
I think another thing that kind of helped it be more talked about more recently could have been the ordinals and inscriptions.

2424
04:18:30,964 --> 04:18:37,964
Where people used to, a lot of people might have looked at Bitcoin as like this pet rock boomer coin.

2425
04:18:37,964 --> 04:18:42,964
And now they see that Bitcoin can potentially do things other than just that.

2426
04:18:42,964 --> 04:18:50,964
And it opened up discussion for Bitcoin potentially doing more things than what they thought of just being, you know, like a pet rock.

2427
04:18:50,964 --> 04:19:01,964
I think the timing from that can also show some kind of correlation because like after ordinals and inscriptions, you can see definitely a lot more discussion around drivechain after that.

2428
04:19:01,964 --> 04:19:12,964
And of course, Paul's been putting his pedal to the floor and busting his ass really hard on getting the word out there.

2429
04:19:12,964 --> 04:19:24,964
Yeah, I just want to add one tiny little thing I would really like.

2430
04:19:24,964 --> 04:19:35,964
If the debate and the conversation was like more on the technicals and less, you know, conspiratorial and stuff like that.

2431
04:19:35,964 --> 04:19:41,964
But like I said, everyone contributes on the level that they can, I guess.

2432
04:19:47,964 --> 04:19:51,964
I think we should give anyone who really wants to speak.

2433
04:19:52,964 --> 04:19:56,964
Like last opportunity to come up on stage.

2434
04:19:57,964 --> 04:19:59,964
Then we can end the space.

2435
04:20:06,964 --> 04:20:08,964
Have a good weekend, guys.

2436
04:20:10,964 --> 04:20:11,964
Thanks.

2437
04:20:15,964 --> 04:20:22,964
Okay, great. I guess no one else wants to say anything. So space over until next week.

2438
04:20:23,964 --> 04:20:28,964
By the way, next week, I think we're going to be having Pete Rizzo join us.

2439
04:20:29,964 --> 04:20:37,964
So, you know, he's the one of the most interesting people when it comes to analyzing Bitcoin culture and history.

2440
04:20:37,964 --> 04:20:44,964
And then he kind of thinks about the future track of Bitcoin from a very different perspective than a lot of people.

2441
04:20:44,964 --> 04:20:51,964
And I've been speaking to him a lot lately, and I think he's going to have a really I think he's going to be very interesting to have a discussion with.

2442
04:20:53,964 --> 04:20:57,964
That's September 1st.

2443
04:20:59,964 --> 04:21:01,964
Okay, cool. Thanks, everyone.