1 00:00:10,728 --> 00:00:12,728 Thank you. 2 00:00:40,728 --> 00:00:49,088 Hello, and welcome to Drivechain Twitter Spaces. 3 00:00:49,088 --> 00:00:58,048 Today is April 13th, and we are delighted to have another conversation about this tremendously 4 00:00:58,048 --> 00:01:03,768 important project to strengthen Bitcoin. 5 00:01:03,768 --> 00:01:07,448 Welcome everyone. 6 00:01:07,448 --> 00:01:33,768 Feel free to raise your hand and come on up to the stage if you'd like. 7 00:02:03,768 --> 00:02:14,327 Well, who would like to come on up and ask a question or comment? 8 00:05:03,768 --> 00:05:15,488 Welcome, everyone, into the audience. 9 00:05:15,488 --> 00:05:26,328 All are welcome to come up on stage and share your thoughts and latest ideas regarding Drivechain. 10 00:05:26,328 --> 00:05:34,488 We're just getting started here today. 11 00:05:34,488 --> 00:05:39,768 Don't everyone raise your hands at once. 12 00:05:39,768 --> 00:05:50,368 We would have a traffic jam. 13 00:05:50,368 --> 00:05:53,768 Drivechains have been in the news lately. 14 00:05:53,768 --> 00:05:58,807 There was an article by Jameson Lopp recently, a very excellent one, on the history of Bitcoin 15 00:05:58,807 --> 00:06:08,567 maximalism, and the article was posted to the Drivechain Reddit so that all of our many 16 00:06:08,567 --> 00:06:21,007 Reddit-based followers can be aware of it. 17 00:06:21,007 --> 00:06:23,928 Jameson Lopp said, 18 00:06:23,928 --> 00:06:29,407 Implementing Drivechains or validity rollups would not only improve overall network speed 19 00:06:29,407 --> 00:06:35,687 and capacity, but would also allow developers to test out various solutions in a way that 20 00:06:35,687 --> 00:06:39,048 keeps the underlying base layer safe. 21 00:06:39,048 --> 00:06:45,967 This should massively speed up development time and thus fight against the looming ossification 22 00:06:45,967 --> 00:06:53,768 threat. 23 00:06:53,768 --> 00:07:12,847 So Lopp is doing a great job there of talking about Drivechain. 24 00:08:12,847 --> 00:08:17,888 All right. 25 00:08:17,888 --> 00:08:34,448 We will patiently wait until people join to ask more questions. 26 00:09:05,447 --> 00:09:14,928 Maybe he will join and share the very latest on his exciting activities in the realm of 27 00:09:14,928 --> 00:09:19,488 ordinals and blocking of inscriptions. 28 00:09:19,488 --> 00:09:23,527 He's always up to something fascinating. 29 00:10:19,488 --> 00:10:46,608 Hello, SuperTestNet. 30 00:10:46,608 --> 00:10:54,608 Welcome to our Drivechain Talk Twitter space. 31 00:10:54,608 --> 00:11:00,688 If you would like to come on up and chat about your latest activities in the fascinating 32 00:11:00,688 --> 00:11:06,608 realm of sidechain development, you are welcome to. 33 00:11:06,608 --> 00:11:09,207 We'll send you an invite. 34 00:11:17,608 --> 00:11:21,608 Welcome to the stage, Mr. TestNet. 35 00:11:21,608 --> 00:11:24,608 Thank you. 36 00:11:24,608 --> 00:11:27,608 What's up? 37 00:11:27,608 --> 00:11:29,608 How's it going? 38 00:11:29,608 --> 00:11:31,608 Things are going pretty good. 39 00:11:31,608 --> 00:11:39,608 I just got back in Austin, Texas after being in Ohio for Easter and looking forward to 40 00:11:39,608 --> 00:11:46,608 the Bitcoin++ developer conference on the 28th. 41 00:11:46,608 --> 00:11:49,608 Cool. 42 00:11:49,608 --> 00:11:55,608 Recently, you were chatting in the Drivechain Talk Twitter telegram group about different 43 00:11:55,608 --> 00:12:01,608 sidechains and Paul's recent tweets about a contest. 44 00:12:01,608 --> 00:12:08,608 Can you say a little bit about the difference, in your view, between the nature of working 45 00:12:08,608 --> 00:12:17,608 on a drivechain versus the nature of working on a spacechain? 46 00:12:17,608 --> 00:12:23,608 As you know, I've worked on both quite a bit. 47 00:12:23,608 --> 00:12:28,608 One thing that's nice about working on spacechains is that you don't have to wait for anything. 48 00:12:28,608 --> 00:12:31,608 They work right now. 49 00:12:31,608 --> 00:12:35,608 Of course, the negative thing is that they don't work very well. 50 00:12:35,608 --> 00:12:38,608 They're kind of bad. 51 00:12:38,608 --> 00:12:40,608 I've been playing around with them. 52 00:12:40,608 --> 00:12:45,608 I made one spacechain launcher so that anyone can make their own. 53 00:12:45,608 --> 00:12:51,608 Then I started preparing a presentation for Bitcoin++ about it. 54 00:12:51,608 --> 00:12:57,608 As I was making it, it occurred to me that it would be cool to do what Paul's doing. 55 00:12:57,608 --> 00:13:03,608 Paul's making all these sidechains that work on testnet. 56 00:13:03,608 --> 00:13:05,608 He made one for Ethereum. 57 00:13:05,608 --> 00:13:06,608 He made one for Zcash. 58 00:13:06,608 --> 00:13:08,608 I've certainly thought those are really cool. 59 00:13:08,608 --> 00:13:11,608 I've wanted to see more stuff in that direction. 60 00:13:11,608 --> 00:13:17,608 I thought, why don't I make a spacechain for these things? 61 00:13:17,608 --> 00:13:22,608 That would work on mainnet because spacechains work right now. 62 00:13:22,608 --> 00:13:24,608 I thought of that. 63 00:13:25,608 --> 00:13:29,608 Actually, you told me there was a contest for making sidechains. 64 00:13:29,608 --> 00:13:32,608 I was like, oh, that's even better. 65 00:13:32,608 --> 00:13:36,608 If there's a contest for making these things, I could make one and maybe even earn a prize for it. 66 00:13:36,608 --> 00:13:42,608 I asked for more details, and it turns out it only qualifies if you make a drivechain. 67 00:13:42,608 --> 00:13:47,608 I don't have the coding prowess to probably do that. 68 00:13:47,608 --> 00:13:50,608 That's kind of where the state of it was. 69 00:13:50,608 --> 00:13:55,608 I was just thinking of making one of these things because it would work right now. 70 00:13:55,608 --> 00:13:58,608 Even though it works very poorly right now, it would still work. 71 00:13:58,608 --> 00:14:01,608 That was the whole genesis of the idea. 72 00:14:08,608 --> 00:14:10,608 Cool. 73 00:14:10,608 --> 00:14:12,608 Welcome, everyone, to the stage. 74 00:14:12,608 --> 00:14:14,608 To the room, rather. 75 00:14:14,608 --> 00:14:25,608 Porkchop, HeroGamer, all of the usual suspects have gathered for our twice-weekly drivechain chat. 76 00:14:28,608 --> 00:14:42,608 Super, I am confident that you will do well in the contest, that you will be unable to resist the urge to participate and submit your best possible work, and I hope that you succeed. 77 00:14:42,608 --> 00:14:49,608 I'm not involved in any of the judging, and I'm not sure it's even begun yet, but I think that when it does, you will prevail. 78 00:14:49,608 --> 00:14:51,608 I'm optimistic. 79 00:14:52,608 --> 00:15:15,608 It seems to me like you really understand the values and virtues of the drivechain project, which are about innovation and scientific experimentation and progress, building on Bitcoin and creating value for Bitcoiners through innovation. 80 00:15:15,608 --> 00:15:22,608 It's not about hodling and number-go-up and pump-it-up music. 81 00:15:22,608 --> 00:15:25,608 It's about technology. 82 00:15:25,608 --> 00:15:27,608 Now, of course, the two are related. 83 00:15:27,608 --> 00:15:47,608 And the people who want to talk about the investment angle of things all the time, the trading, stock-to-flow model, all the silly stuff that's obsessing over the price, those people actually benefit a lot from drivechain, potentially. 84 00:15:48,608 --> 00:15:50,608 There's two ways they could. 85 00:15:50,608 --> 00:15:57,608 First, by increasing the actual economic demand to hold Bitcoin. 86 00:15:57,608 --> 00:16:05,608 If more people want to hold Bitcoin, the value will go up because of the inelastic supply. 87 00:16:05,608 --> 00:16:11,608 But there's also the narrative around Bitcoin, and that narrative is so important. 88 00:16:11,608 --> 00:16:22,608 If the world thinks that it's hard to build on Bitcoin or impossible, then that creates a rationale for the launching of altcoins. 89 00:16:22,608 --> 00:16:26,608 And we see that in the white paper for Ethereum. 90 00:16:26,608 --> 00:16:36,608 The first few pages are about the limitations of Bitcoin as a platform for applications other than payments. 91 00:16:37,608 --> 00:16:47,608 And at this point in the crypto movement, there are people like Eric Wall, who spoke very well recently on the What Bitcoin Did podcast. 92 00:16:47,608 --> 00:16:52,608 I listened to it yesterday, and it's like two hours long. 93 00:16:52,608 --> 00:16:57,608 He's talking with Peter McCormack, and Eric speaks many sentences about drivechain. 94 00:16:57,608 --> 00:17:05,608 It starts at about 50 minutes into the interview, and he's completely in favor of drivechain. 95 00:17:05,608 --> 00:17:12,608 But at this point, I feel that there are actually some people who have one foot in Bitcoin and one foot in Ethereum. 96 00:17:12,608 --> 00:17:13,608 People like that. 97 00:17:13,608 --> 00:17:21,608 And they actually would like to see Bitcoin—well, I mean, Eric is explicitly in favor of drivechain. 98 00:17:21,608 --> 00:17:25,608 But also at this point, I think that for people who aren't partial to Bitcoin, 99 00:17:26,608 --> 00:17:36,608 they feel that it would almost be good from a kind of diversification standpoint for the crypto community to not favor changes to Bitcoin, 100 00:17:36,608 --> 00:17:40,608 and that Bitcoin should remain this conservative system. 101 00:17:40,608 --> 00:17:45,608 And that way, nothing is upset internally. 102 00:17:45,608 --> 00:17:51,608 However, of course, for the Bitcoin maximalists, those who are only in favor of Bitcoin, 103 00:17:51,608 --> 00:18:05,608 they benefit from not being excessively conservative, but instead growing Bitcoin to be able to internalize the value of innovation, 104 00:18:05,608 --> 00:18:10,608 rather than have that innovation occur outside of Bitcoin in a way that would, in the very long run, 105 00:18:10,608 --> 00:18:18,608 because of network effects, cause Bitcoin to be disadopted. 106 00:18:18,608 --> 00:18:25,608 In terms of the monetary network effects, if a thousand other projects are built outside of Bitcoin, 107 00:18:25,608 --> 00:18:30,608 eventually they would all unify onto one platform that has a drivechain-like design, 108 00:18:30,608 --> 00:18:36,608 and the base layer of that platform would be then ossified and become the world's money. 109 00:18:36,608 --> 00:18:44,608 So to the extent that the Bitcoin project is about succeeding in terms of being adopted and used and having value, 110 00:18:44,608 --> 00:18:46,608 then it has to be the big winner. 111 00:18:46,608 --> 00:18:49,608 There can't be more than one big winner. 112 00:18:49,608 --> 00:18:54,608 In economics, especially in the market for money, network effects are extremely important. 113 00:18:54,608 --> 00:18:58,608 They're more important in money than anything else in economics. 114 00:18:58,608 --> 00:19:04,608 There can only be one money in a society that is the dominant one. 115 00:19:04,608 --> 00:19:08,608 Some have two, and there's probably some regulatory reason for that. 116 00:19:08,608 --> 00:19:13,608 But in the long run, kind of like the language, in the very long run, a thousand years from now, 117 00:19:13,608 --> 00:19:16,608 there'll probably just be one language. 118 00:19:16,608 --> 00:19:22,608 Or in 10,000 years, one language across the globe, not many. 119 00:19:22,608 --> 00:19:25,608 Yeah, jump in, please. 120 00:19:25,608 --> 00:19:31,608 Yeah, I sympathize with the folks who don't want any more soft forks. 121 00:19:31,608 --> 00:19:36,608 Because the last two that we did, SegWit and Taproot, 122 00:19:36,608 --> 00:19:44,608 they've brought us some of the worst things from Ethereum have jumped over to Bitcoin because of those two soft forks. 123 00:19:44,608 --> 00:19:51,608 Now we regularly have 3.7, 3.8 megabyte blocks, which was like when SegWit went active, 124 00:19:51,608 --> 00:19:53,608 it was like, that'll never happen. 125 00:19:53,608 --> 00:19:55,608 It's only going to be maybe two. 126 00:19:55,608 --> 00:19:57,608 We might get two sometimes. 127 00:19:57,608 --> 00:20:00,608 And now it's regularly almost four. 128 00:20:00,608 --> 00:20:07,608 Now we've got monkey JPEGs all over the place and miners extracting MEV and stuff. 129 00:20:09,183 --> 00:20:14,183 Very bad things have come to Bitcoin due to the last two soft forks, which weren't possible before. 130 00:20:14,183 --> 00:20:21,183 So I can sympathize with people being like, you know what, these were touted as necessary changes to Bitcoin, and now Bitcoin's worse. 131 00:20:21,183 --> 00:20:26,183 So no more. No more soft forks. They're just going to screw everything up. 132 00:20:26,183 --> 00:20:33,183 I don't believe that. I don't think they did make things worse. I think Bitcoin's better due to SegWit and Taproot. 133 00:20:34,183 --> 00:20:41,183 But yeah, I can see why people think otherwise and then worry that if we do any more soft forks, it's just going to get worse. 134 00:20:41,183 --> 00:20:46,183 If they have the opinion that Bitcoin's worse now than it was before. 135 00:20:49,183 --> 00:20:51,183 Well said. 136 00:21:04,183 --> 00:21:13,183 Have you had a chance to look at Jameson Lobb's History of Bitcoin Maximalism article recently that he published on his blog? 137 00:21:13,183 --> 00:21:28,183 Or is that lengthy, non-technical kind of content too much of the popular discourse for a techie person like you? 138 00:21:29,183 --> 00:21:38,183 No, I read it and enjoyed it. Sometimes we techie people get in a mood. 139 00:21:38,183 --> 00:21:47,183 Yeah, I liked it. I thought it was kind of funny that he gives like six or seven different definitions of maximalism in that article 140 00:21:47,183 --> 00:21:53,183 and can't seem to really pin down one that he thinks is, he's just like, it's not well defined. 141 00:21:53,183 --> 00:21:58,183 Here's seven different definitions and he doesn't seem to be able to pick one to say that's his personal favorite. 142 00:22:05,183 --> 00:22:07,183 Where do you bring it up? 143 00:22:08,183 --> 00:22:15,183 I feel that for me personally, the Lobb article recently, along with Eric Wall's appearance on what Bitcoin did, 144 00:22:15,183 --> 00:22:26,183 are two recent examples of thinkers in the Bitcoin space grappling with what has been going on for the last few years, 145 00:22:26,183 --> 00:22:37,183 which in my humble understanding is the gradual kind of split of the whole crypto community into two groups 146 00:22:37,183 --> 00:22:45,183 where one group thinks that Bitcoin is cool, but there is a ton of interesting stuff going on on Ethereum. 147 00:22:45,183 --> 00:22:58,183 And then the other group are Bitcoin, like the Bitcoin only crowd, which says that if something isn't Bitcoin and it uses a blockchain, 148 00:22:58,183 --> 00:23:04,183 then it is illegitimate and it's just a money grab. 149 00:23:05,183 --> 00:23:13,183 So to me personally, as best as I can tell, there is a very dramatic, interesting phenomenon going on 150 00:23:13,183 --> 00:23:24,183 where at some point in the future, one of these two groups will be vindicated and the other group will drift away into a quiet and irrelevant status. 151 00:23:26,183 --> 00:23:28,183 What were the two opinions again? 152 00:23:28,183 --> 00:23:35,183 One is that there is a ton of interesting, legitimate work going on in Ethereum. 153 00:23:35,183 --> 00:23:50,183 And the other is that Bitcoin only, quote unquote, is the only productive and ethical path forward with regard to blockchain technology. 154 00:23:51,183 --> 00:23:54,183 Yeah, if you got rid of the word legitimate, those would be compatible. 155 00:23:54,183 --> 00:24:00,183 If you could just say that there's a ton of interesting stuff happening on Ethereum, but it's all illegitimate and immoral, 156 00:24:00,183 --> 00:24:08,183 that would be compatible with saying Bitcoin is the only legitimate and ethical whatever. 157 00:24:09,183 --> 00:24:23,183 Well, what I mean is that someone like Eric Wall would say that there's absolutely nothing wrong in any sense with owning and building Ethereum or Ethereum related assets and technologies. 158 00:24:24,183 --> 00:24:37,183 And then Lopp recently, if I understand correctly, and I haven't followed this very closely at all, but he's at this company Casa and they used to be purportedly Bitcoin only. 159 00:24:38,183 --> 00:24:48,183 And then they were, in more recent times, publicly acknowledging that they support custody of non-Bitcoin blockchain tokens. 160 00:24:49,183 --> 00:25:04,183 So I think his article is part of that, explaining and exploring the fact that there is an economy out there, a demand for non-Bitcoin assets at this time. 161 00:25:05,183 --> 00:25:10,183 And that's why he wrote all about it and how we got to this place. 162 00:25:10,183 --> 00:25:18,183 It used to be that Bitcoin was the only one, like back in 2013, Bitcoin was at 100% dominance. 163 00:25:19,183 --> 00:25:27,183 And then it used to be around 2020, something like 80% maybe, and then now it's like 40%. 164 00:25:28,183 --> 00:25:34,183 I agree with the statement that there's nothing morally wrong with owning and building on Ethereum. 165 00:25:34,183 --> 00:25:44,183 I personally choose not to do either of those things because I don't think Ethereum is a well-designed system and I think it functions poorly as money. 166 00:25:45,183 --> 00:25:50,183 Or at least it would if I projected the future the way it's currently been going. 167 00:25:51,183 --> 00:25:54,183 But if someone disagrees with that, I don't think that they're doing anything morally wrong. 168 00:25:54,183 --> 00:26:02,183 If they say, yeah, I think it's well-designed or I do think it's worth owning some, they just disagree with me. 169 00:26:03,183 --> 00:26:05,183 That doesn't make them a sinner or anything. 170 00:26:25,183 --> 00:26:28,183 End of a slow conversation today. 171 00:26:29,183 --> 00:26:39,183 Yes. It's a bit quiet. Sometimes we have quite the active exchange, other times it's a little bit calm. 172 00:26:40,183 --> 00:26:47,183 Maybe everyone's in an equanimous mood reflecting on all these things. 173 00:26:48,183 --> 00:26:52,183 Equanimous, that's a cool word. Is that a word? Equanimous? 174 00:26:52,183 --> 00:26:58,183 Yeah. Equanimity. If you're a person of equanimity. 175 00:26:59,183 --> 00:27:01,183 Oh, I like that one. That's a good word. 176 00:27:02,183 --> 00:27:13,183 Yes. Well, it's good to have a vocabulary for being calm and relaxed. That way you can explore that mental space. 177 00:27:13,183 --> 00:27:26,183 Super, do you have thoughts on the economics of the sidechains a lot? 178 00:27:27,183 --> 00:27:42,183 Do you think about things like when you're building a sidechain, do you reflect on the fact that people would say the fees on a sidechain are the upper bound of the economic security from reorders? 179 00:27:43,183 --> 00:28:03,183 So, for example, if a sidechain has low fees, then it can't have a lot of value moving around because the incentive against a reorder would be low because of the lack of the coinbase and other factors. 180 00:28:03,183 --> 00:28:30,183 Well, I think it sort of depends on the model of the sidechain. On something like Liquid, that's true because the Liquid Foundation produces blocks in return for the fees they get from people who use their sidechain. 181 00:28:30,183 --> 00:28:41,183 And if you wanted to double spend on Liquid, you could do something like pay someone with a low fee, wait for it to get confirmed, and then offer the block producers a bigger transaction, a double spend. 182 00:28:42,183 --> 00:29:00,183 If they'll undo that block and create a new one, they can get a bigger fee because you're respending that input with a higher fee. So you could incentivize the block producers over at Liquid to do a reorg by offering a higher fee on a double spend. 183 00:29:00,183 --> 00:29:29,183 But I don't think you can do that on the model that drivechain uses or that spacechains use of blind merge mining because as long as the Layer 1 blockchain is offering high fees to the miners, then you on a sidechain trying to do the same thing, you'd have to overcome the economic incentive that they have to keep going with the regular L1 chain because all of the sidechain's blocks are committed to on there. 184 00:29:30,183 --> 00:29:38,183 So in order to reorg the sidechain, you have to reorg the L1, which is hopefully much more difficult to do. So does that make sense? 185 00:29:39,183 --> 00:29:40,183 Yes, that's interesting. 186 00:29:40,183 --> 00:30:08,183 Yeah, I think that's kind of the whole point of making drivechains and of using blind merge mining. Well, it's not the whole point. A large part of the reason why they do that is so that they inherit the un-reorgability of Bitcoin or at least the hope for un-reorgability. 187 00:30:08,183 --> 00:30:26,183 Let me just clarify because I see Moonsettler gave a thumbs down. I might have missed what you said, so I don't want to say that I agreed with it entirely. I mean, I tend to agree with everything you say. However, let me just clarify in my simple… 188 00:30:26,183 --> 00:30:28,183 Well, don't do that. That's dangerous. 189 00:30:28,183 --> 00:30:51,183 I mean, I have tended in the past upon careful listening, but what you just said I might have misheard or maybe you misspoke because the security against a reorg attack of a drivechain is the fees, right? 190 00:30:52,183 --> 00:31:03,183 So if the fees are low, then someone could do double spending on a drivechain, correct? Without… 191 00:31:04,183 --> 00:31:25,183 I didn't think so, but you say that with enough confidence that perhaps I misunderstand how they work. My thought was that on a drivechain you have a bunch of block producers and they propose blocks to the mainchain for inclusion there or very often I think the expectation is that miners would mine both at once. 192 00:31:26,183 --> 00:31:46,183 And if that's happening, then you can follow the progression of the sidechain by just looking at the mainchain, finding the hashes that go into the coinbases and then saying, okay, here's the next block of the sidechain supposed to have this hash because that's what it is on the mainchain. 193 00:31:47,183 --> 00:32:00,183 That's what the mainchain says. And then you request that block on the sidechain. So if you do that, if you keep operating that way, then you can't reorg the sidechain because the order of blocks is committed to on the base layer. 194 00:32:01,183 --> 00:32:18,183 And so if you try to reorg the sidechain, the only way you can do it is by changing the order of hashes on the mainchain on the base layer, which is really difficult to do because miners are economically incentivized on Bitcoin not to reorg. 195 00:32:19,183 --> 00:32:35,183 That's my understanding, but perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps they don't work like that. Can you not identify the order of blocks on the sidechain based on the hashes on the mainchain or is that not the standard way to do it? 196 00:32:35,183 --> 00:32:52,183 Well, what I know for a fact is that the security budget of the drivechain is its fees, whereas the security budget of Bitcoin mainchain is its fees plus the fees of the drivechains plus the coinbase on the mainchain. 197 00:32:52,183 --> 00:33:10,183 So we know that the security of a certain kind is much greater on the mainchain necessarily than on the drivechain, unless the drivechain had astronomical fees that were greater than... 198 00:33:10,183 --> 00:33:22,183 Well, no, even so, the drivechain is always going to have less security budget than the mainchain. Do you agree with those statements? 199 00:33:24,183 --> 00:33:29,183 I need you to repeat the first ones. How did you define the security budget? 200 00:33:29,183 --> 00:33:31,183 I think Luke Settler could do it better than me. 201 00:33:32,183 --> 00:33:33,183 Hello, guys. 202 00:33:35,183 --> 00:33:36,183 Hello, Luke Settler. 203 00:33:36,183 --> 00:33:53,183 So the thing is, and this is according to Paul as well, so you can basically commit to any kind of hash really, even hashes that make absolutely no sense on the mainchain. 204 00:33:53,183 --> 00:34:03,183 So a miner can actually just include zeros or someone can actually pay because the miners don't even need to actively be involved in this. 205 00:34:03,183 --> 00:34:14,183 Someone can just basically deal with a sidechain, a drivechain, any managed mine sidechain really by including invalid hashes. 206 00:34:15,183 --> 00:34:24,183 And that means that the sidechain is stored. And if someone includes hashes that basically create an alternative history. 207 00:34:25,183 --> 00:34:33,183 So he keeps paying, he keeps outpaying the aggregate fees from the sidechain, he keeps paying over the sidechain security budget. 208 00:34:34,183 --> 00:34:38,183 He can basically create a reorg on the mainchain without reorging the mainchain. 209 00:34:39,183 --> 00:34:44,183 So I think Paul has a very good chart. 210 00:34:44,183 --> 00:34:45,183 Yeah, you're right. I see it now. 211 00:34:47,183 --> 00:34:48,183 Yeah, that makes sense. 212 00:34:50,183 --> 00:34:53,183 Okay, cool. So you switched me. 213 00:34:54,183 --> 00:34:55,183 Yeah, you can. 214 00:34:56,183 --> 00:35:01,183 Yeah, they are much more vulnerable to reorgs than Bitcoin is. 215 00:35:02,183 --> 00:35:14,183 I like to say that what they are not vulnerable to is having an unlimited number of alternate histories just showing up out of nowhere. 216 00:35:15,183 --> 00:35:24,183 So if you have proof of work or any other kind of consensus that is much, much, much weaker than Bitcoin, 217 00:35:25,183 --> 00:35:31,183 then basically you can find that millions of alternate histories can show up out of the blue. 218 00:35:32,183 --> 00:35:33,183 Someone can actually produce those. 219 00:35:34,183 --> 00:35:36,183 And your node is basically crashed. 220 00:35:37,183 --> 00:35:44,183 And this is a type of denial-of-service attack or just simply creating chaos and stuff. 221 00:35:45,183 --> 00:35:56,183 So by anchoring to Bitcoin blockchain, the drivechains basically only have a very limited number of alternate histories that they have to deal with. 222 00:35:57,183 --> 00:36:04,183 They can be denied, so they can be stalled or they can be reorged, but it doesn't come out of the blue. 223 00:36:05,183 --> 00:36:06,183 So it's telegraphed. 224 00:36:07,183 --> 00:36:14,183 You see, if someone is trying to do a 10-day preorg on a drivechain, then he can't just do it, you know, like a snap of a finger. 225 00:36:15,183 --> 00:36:16,183 He has to start working on it. 226 00:36:17,183 --> 00:36:19,183 And actually others can outbid him. 227 00:36:20,183 --> 00:36:22,183 So that is also a possibility that he will just fail. 228 00:36:23,183 --> 00:36:27,183 And this is what anchoring to Bitcoin actually gives you. 229 00:36:28,183 --> 00:36:35,183 But technically, I don't believe that drivechains have the same finality as mainchain. 230 00:36:38,183 --> 00:36:39,183 Yeah, yeah. 231 00:36:40,183 --> 00:36:46,183 I suppose another factor is that if the drivechain stalled, like everyone lost interest in using it. 232 00:36:47,183 --> 00:36:54,183 And so there was like a 20-block period, let's say, where no one was mining any sidechain blocks because no one was using it. 233 00:36:55,183 --> 00:37:07,183 Then it would be a lot easier to come along and reorg it because you could just start building up a bunch of blocks while no one's mining it to get higher than its currency. 234 00:37:08,183 --> 00:37:12,183 It would be just, you would just have to pay for block space basically on mainchain. 235 00:37:13,183 --> 00:37:14,183 That's your minimal entry. 236 00:37:14,183 --> 00:37:20,183 If the sidechain does not have an economic activity in the period, then that's your entry point. 237 00:37:21,183 --> 00:37:24,183 So you are competing with JPEGs and stuff. 238 00:37:26,183 --> 00:37:27,183 Yeah. 239 00:37:28,183 --> 00:37:33,183 I think it would be a lot harder to do it on an actively used sidechain. 240 00:37:34,183 --> 00:37:40,183 If every Bitcoin block has another sidechain block in it, then even if you pay a lot, you're going to have a hard time reorging it. 241 00:37:40,183 --> 00:37:47,183 Because you just have to wait until they stop mining blocks in order to overcome their chain tip. 242 00:37:48,183 --> 00:37:58,183 So this is the thing that makes me question the smartness or the logic of uber large blocks on a sidechain. 243 00:37:59,183 --> 00:38:06,183 Because we kind of see that when the block space is too abundant, then it has no price, it has no cost. 244 00:38:06,183 --> 00:38:12,183 And so the fees are actually low, the aggregate fees are low and the individual fees are extremely low. 245 00:38:13,183 --> 00:38:20,183 And you actually want a situation where everyone is paying for the maximum security that they can afford. 246 00:38:21,183 --> 00:38:27,183 So everyone is participating on the sidechain that gives them the best security for the blocks that they can afford. 247 00:38:28,183 --> 00:38:33,183 And if they are very rich, then they would just be on mainchain and have the best security ever. 248 00:38:33,183 --> 00:38:40,183 And this is why I kind of think sidechains don't actually need giga meg blocks. 249 00:38:41,183 --> 00:38:47,183 They actually may have smaller blocks, especially in the beginning, than Bitcoin. 250 00:38:48,183 --> 00:38:55,183 And they can grow organically and they can have a fairly healthy fee market. 251 00:38:55,183 --> 00:39:02,183 And that just makes it much more difficult to fight this economic activity. 252 00:39:03,183 --> 00:39:12,183 But if you are presented with a situation where reorging the sidechain comes with an additional economic benefit 253 00:39:13,183 --> 00:39:16,183 that is not expressible in fees so readily. 254 00:39:17,183 --> 00:39:21,183 So let's say there is an atomic swap between sidechain and mainchain. 255 00:39:22,183 --> 00:39:32,183 And someone is basically bidding for a reorg because mainchain can't be as cheaply reorgged as the sidechain. 256 00:39:33,183 --> 00:39:37,183 So he can screw his counterparty that is on the weaker consensus. 257 00:39:38,183 --> 00:39:48,183 And this may have arbitrarily large motivation behind it because it all depends on the size of the transaction and the finality assumptions. 258 00:39:48,183 --> 00:39:49,183 Right. 259 00:39:49,283 --> 00:40:08,283 So that is why I also said to people before that we really don't want a situation where there is a decentralized exchange between Bitcoin and an other asset that has better finality than Bitcoin, because then it's Bitcoin that is on the screwy end of things. 260 00:40:08,283 --> 00:40:19,283 If all the alternative assets and all the other chains are subordinate to Bitcoin, they are all sidechains, then this threat basically cannot threaten Bitcoin. 261 00:40:19,283 --> 00:40:37,283 So in this case, if you are a Bitcoin maximalist and you want mainchain to be immutable as much as possible, then you probably want that everything is subordinate to Bitcoin because then it would always be a home field advantage to mainchain. 262 00:40:39,283 --> 00:40:57,283 May I just say, you've got a very rich and deep, beautiful baritone voice, and I don't know if you've ever taken up singing, but I would love to hear you sing some Eastern European songs with your deep, beautiful voice and then record them and make them available so I can purchase them, because you sound awesome. 263 00:41:04,283 --> 00:41:06,283 Have you ever sung Moon Settler? 264 00:41:08,283 --> 00:41:09,283 Excuse me? 265 00:41:10,283 --> 00:41:13,283 Have you ever sung? Have you ever thought about singing? 266 00:41:13,283 --> 00:41:24,283 No, I can't, and it's probably because of the headset I'm using, because with other microphones I have a pretty horrible voice, so I don't know. 267 00:41:24,283 --> 00:41:44,283 Oh, okay. Yeah, well, thank you for clarifying that for me. I didn't realize that you need to keep on – if you stop the sidechain from being active, then it really loses its un-reorgability. 268 00:41:45,283 --> 00:42:05,283 Yeah, it really does depend on activity being large. Although, I wonder, though, you said that having small blocks on a sidechain helps this, but I don't know if you have one sidechain that has 10 megabyte blocks, or you have 10 sidechains that have 1 megabyte blocks, I doubt there'd be much difference. 269 00:42:06,283 --> 00:42:09,283 I imagine people would go to move to the one that's cheapest. 270 00:42:10,283 --> 00:42:31,283 My theory about this is that people will go to the fees that they can afford, because basically your finality in blockheads will be much better on a high-aggregate fee sidechain. 271 00:42:31,283 --> 00:42:59,283 So my theory is that everyone will organically find – so if fees get too high on a sidechain, let's say we are doing small sidechains and one sidechain is getting crowded, richer, better situated people move there, then basically those that can't afford those transaction fees will either start a new sidechain or look for another sidechain that has lower fees, more block space. 272 00:43:00,283 --> 00:43:21,283 And this will, I imagine, organically give birth to sidechains as needed, and those that don't have very much economic activity will not be very secure, so there will be motivation for people to leave them, actually, and consolidate the state in low-activity environments. 273 00:43:21,283 --> 00:43:41,283 Or when a sidechain was created but it's not really doing anything worthwhile or does not have serial demand, then only people who are fine with waiting a very long time for finality or only doing microtransactions would stay there, I imagine. 274 00:43:41,283 --> 00:44:02,283 So earlier in the drivechain group, me and a guy named Deleted Account were discussing one-way pegs versus two-way pegs. 275 00:44:02,283 --> 00:44:09,283 And I don't know if Deleted Account is in this group, but I'd love to talk to you more about this if you're in here. 276 00:44:12,978 --> 00:44:18,438 chains have this thing called a one -way peg, where you burn Bitcoins on the base layer 277 00:44:18,438 --> 00:44:24,418 and you get a corresponding amount on the space chain, and those are 278 00:44:24,418 --> 00:44:25,298 what you pay fees with. 279 00:44:25,358 --> 00:44:28,478 You pay fees with these burned Bitcoins, 280 00:44:32,283 --> 00:44:41,283 I think it would prevent them from having any speculative value because they can never be worth more than the Bitcoin that you can create them with. 281 00:44:42,283 --> 00:44:51,283 But according to Deleted Account, if I'm understanding him correctly, he thinks that any asset like that is only going to have one of two values. 282 00:44:52,283 --> 00:45:00,283 It's either going to be worth one full Bitcoin or it's going to be worth zero, in which case you can't use it for paying for fees. 283 00:45:00,283 --> 00:45:09,283 I think it would be neither. So I would bet on that they would trade more like GBTC. 284 00:45:10,283 --> 00:45:20,283 GBTC is a one-way street. So the only difference is you can just enter immediately into GBTC so it can trade at a premium. 285 00:45:20,283 --> 00:45:28,283 A sidechain space chain like this could never trade at a premium because you have immediate arbitrage opportunity. 286 00:45:29,283 --> 00:45:37,283 You can just lock in Bitcoin and immediately exchange it. So it will never trade above parity with Bitcoin for any amount of time. 287 00:45:37,283 --> 00:45:47,283 But it can trade below because you can't get out. And it's very likely that when the demand for the space chain asset actually is dropping, 288 00:45:48,283 --> 00:46:00,283 then immediately you will see a price drop. But it will never be probably truly zero until people actually start believing that it can have future use and future demand and future voice. 289 00:46:00,283 --> 00:46:16,283 So it's probably a safe bet that most of the time it would trade around 30-40% of Bitcoin when there is any demand for it and maybe a few percent when there is no demand for it. 290 00:46:17,283 --> 00:46:29,283 Yeah, that's my take too. It would float between zero and probably never approach, well it would only approach one if there was seriously high demand for using it, which seems unlikely to me. 291 00:46:30,283 --> 00:46:45,283 One way to fix this, which is interesting, is if you could construct a mechanism that constantly leaks the logged in escrow to mainchain a space for the miners so it gets back into circulation. 292 00:46:45,283 --> 00:46:57,283 So the escrow or the base, the monetary base, has a constant shrinkage, like 2% a year or something like that, some percent. 293 00:46:58,283 --> 00:47:05,283 And basically you would need to burn the corresponding amounts on the sidechain, the space chain, to make a new block. 294 00:47:05,283 --> 00:47:27,283 So you are keeping things in balance, you are not debasing the currency. You have a shrinking supply and if it has any utility, it would probably mean that this utility will incentivize people to actually value it and for it to have a price close to Bitcoin's price. 295 00:47:28,283 --> 00:47:45,283 And when demand drops, basically it gets shoveled out to mainchain miners who mine these blind merge mining transactions. They basically would get it as fee if you could make up a covenant or other construct for this. 296 00:47:45,283 --> 00:47:54,283 And it's not the same as a drivechain escrow, right? So miners can't just do anything about it. 297 00:47:55,283 --> 00:47:56,283 Yeah, it's much worse. 298 00:47:57,283 --> 00:48:07,283 It's a fixed rate of release, but it creates a scarcity. So if people want to use it, they need to put in more and the more it is, the more it leaks. 299 00:48:08,283 --> 00:48:20,283 So basically it would have a long-term self-regulating property that might, this is the theory, that might make it trade closer to Bitcoin parity. 300 00:48:21,283 --> 00:48:30,283 Because people would know that if someone has a demand for it, then he has a choice. Either he brings in new Bitcoin, at which point he immediately loses X percent, right? 301 00:48:31,283 --> 00:48:42,283 Or he can just buy it from them. So if they bought it at 30 percent and they can sell it at 60 percent, then they do a profitable trade. 302 00:48:43,283 --> 00:48:53,283 So you get speculators and arbitrage traders and they will just basically keep this asset in theory close to parity. 303 00:48:54,283 --> 00:49:01,283 I don't know how well it would work. I'm just saying that this is basically one way to do... 304 00:49:02,283 --> 00:49:04,283 Make it something more like a two-way peg. 305 00:49:05,283 --> 00:49:14,283 Yeah, you make something like an economic two-way peg, but it's not a real two-way peg or not a two-way peg that allows for explicit withdrawals. 306 00:49:15,283 --> 00:49:24,283 Yeah, it's an elastic, very elastic one that gradually approaches a two-way peg, even if demand for it shrinks. 307 00:49:25,283 --> 00:49:28,283 So the theory goes, yeah, I don't know how it would work. 308 00:49:29,283 --> 00:49:33,283 I don't know how it would work either, but it would certainly be a fun experiment to try it out. 309 00:49:34,283 --> 00:49:47,283 So one of the reasons I wanted to talk to Deleted Account about this is that if it's true that the space chain coins or space coins would have some value, less than one Bitcoin, 310 00:49:48,283 --> 00:49:53,283 then you could still use them to pay for fees on the space chain. 311 00:49:54,283 --> 00:50:00,283 And that would actually bring to truth what a lot of altcoins started out as. 312 00:50:00,283 --> 00:50:09,283 When Ethereum started, they said Ethereum won't compete with Bitcoin as money because it's only going to be used as fee payments, which should be very low. 313 00:50:10,283 --> 00:50:17,283 Very low usage. You only have a few ETHs to pay for fees, and then the rest of your money is in Bitcoin. 314 00:50:18,283 --> 00:50:21,283 But that's not how it panned out because, of course, that's a money use case. 315 00:50:22,283 --> 00:50:25,283 It's paying for transaction fees, and you need to have a certain amount on hand. 316 00:50:26,283 --> 00:50:32,283 And that number grows and shrinks, and then people start putting speculative value in it because they say everyone's going to want to use this thing. 317 00:50:33,283 --> 00:50:35,283 And then it just competes with Bitcoin on that level. 318 00:50:36,283 --> 00:50:39,283 But space chains couldn't, or at least they could do it much less. 319 00:50:40,283 --> 00:50:42,283 There'd be much more limited range within which they could compete. 320 00:50:43,283 --> 00:50:45,283 They actually would only be useful for paying for fees. 321 00:50:46,283 --> 00:50:51,283 And if you tried to speculate on them, there's a cap on how much they can increase in value. 322 00:50:52,283 --> 00:50:59,283 So you're incentivized not to have very many of them because they can't perform that well. 323 00:51:01,283 --> 00:51:04,283 So that's one of the reasons I wanted to make a space chain. 324 00:51:05,283 --> 00:51:10,283 It occurred to me that you could use this to make all those things that people used to say about Ethereum true. 325 00:51:11,283 --> 00:51:17,283 They used to say it would not compete with Bitcoin as money, and on a space chain, that would be accurate, or at least it would be more accurate. 326 00:51:18,283 --> 00:51:21,283 So that's my thinking on it. 327 00:51:22,283 --> 00:51:25,283 But his opinion is that there's a binary value. 328 00:51:26,283 --> 00:51:28,283 It's either worth the full Bitcoin or it's worth nothing. 329 00:51:29,283 --> 00:51:31,283 And I'd like to hear a justification for that more. 330 00:51:32,283 --> 00:51:34,283 It would obviously move around. 331 00:51:35,283 --> 00:51:36,283 It wouldn't be one or zero. 332 00:51:37,283 --> 00:51:43,283 I don't see how anyone could say that the price would be the maximum or the minimum all the time. 333 00:51:44,283 --> 00:51:52,283 What Paul has said is that the price would crash to zero because of the one-way peg. 334 00:51:53,283 --> 00:51:55,283 And that struck me as correct. 335 00:51:56,283 --> 00:52:08,283 If you imagine a market where there is a one-way peg for something, then on the side that has the stable value, you convert it through the one-way peg. 336 00:52:09,283 --> 00:52:12,283 And now that thing is never going to be worth more. 337 00:52:13,283 --> 00:52:18,283 So Moon Settler said it would be like GBTC, where it would fluctuate and go above and have a premium. 338 00:52:20,283 --> 00:52:23,283 No, I said it can't have a premium. 339 00:52:24,283 --> 00:52:25,283 A sidechain can't have. 340 00:52:26,283 --> 00:52:30,283 To the downside, when GBTC trades at a discount, that sounds more similar. 341 00:52:31,283 --> 00:52:37,283 So it's different than GBTC, since GBTC can have a premium, and did. 342 00:52:38,283 --> 00:52:41,283 It had a premium of 800% at one point. 343 00:52:42,283 --> 00:52:43,283 Because it was difficult to enter. 344 00:52:44,283 --> 00:52:48,283 Whereas with space chains, it's very easy for anyone to arbitrage their value. 345 00:52:49,283 --> 00:52:56,283 Right. I don't know why it had that premium, but GBTC was... I'm looking it up now. 346 00:53:01,283 --> 00:53:09,283 One of the reasons it had a premium was because you could buy it through regular trading software. 347 00:53:10,283 --> 00:53:18,283 And for a lot of firms who used that software, that was their only way to get exposure. 348 00:53:19,283 --> 00:53:21,283 Because they couldn't buy Bitcoin directly using their stuff. 349 00:53:22,283 --> 00:53:26,283 I remember going to companies and recommending they buy Bitcoin. 350 00:53:27,283 --> 00:53:30,283 And they opened up E-Trade or whatever thing they used, and they're like, I can't find it. 351 00:53:31,283 --> 00:53:33,283 And then they're like, oh wait, I found it. There's this thing called GBTC. I can buy that. 352 00:53:34,283 --> 00:53:35,283 And so then they would. 353 00:53:35,283 --> 00:53:39,283 And it was like, but if that's your only way to buy Bitcoin, because that's the software you use, 354 00:53:40,283 --> 00:53:43,283 and it's the only thing it offers, you might have to pay a premium. 355 00:53:44,283 --> 00:53:48,283 Because it doesn't trade at the spot. 356 00:53:49,283 --> 00:53:50,283 Right. I agree. 357 00:53:51,283 --> 00:53:55,283 So I was wrong. It's not 800%. It maxed out at 80%, approximately. 358 00:53:56,283 --> 00:54:03,283 So it was 80% above, and then the highest discount was about 50%. 359 00:54:03,283 --> 00:54:06,283 Half a year ago. 360 00:54:07,283 --> 00:54:11,283 And now it's at a discount of about 36%. 361 00:54:12,283 --> 00:54:17,283 Meaning it's worth 74% of the Bitcoin? 362 00:54:18,283 --> 00:54:21,283 Right. Of the underlying Bitcoin. 363 00:54:22,283 --> 00:54:23,283 So yeah, there's different markets. 364 00:54:24,283 --> 00:54:28,283 There's the market of people who are able to directly interact with GBTC. 365 00:54:28,283 --> 00:54:33,283 And they would bring down the premium. 366 00:54:34,283 --> 00:54:45,283 But when it's at a discount, the redemption mechanism isn't there to force the price back up towards the underlying value. 367 00:54:46,283 --> 00:54:50,283 By the way, that's not entirely the case. 368 00:54:50,283 --> 00:54:54,283 As far as I know and heard, it is a choice. 369 00:54:55,283 --> 00:54:58,283 Because GBTC actually has a leakage. 370 00:54:59,283 --> 00:55:01,283 So there is a 2% fee. 371 00:55:02,283 --> 00:55:08,283 And it's a special 2%, I think, because when it trades at a discount, it's actually much higher. 372 00:55:09,283 --> 00:55:16,283 So it's a huge cash cow for the, I don't know... 373 00:55:17,283 --> 00:55:18,283 Whoever's operating it. 374 00:55:18,283 --> 00:55:22,283 Genesis? I don't know who's operating it, but it's a huge cash cow. 375 00:55:23,283 --> 00:55:31,283 And basically, you have this possibility to actually allow withdrawals. 376 00:55:32,283 --> 00:55:34,283 But that would basically kill this business. 377 00:55:35,283 --> 00:55:38,283 Kill this fee business, if they let withdrawals. 378 00:55:39,283 --> 00:55:45,283 And that would be very good for the investors, because probably the discount would disappear overnight. 379 00:55:45,283 --> 00:55:51,283 If they announced that they allowed withdrawals or started processing withdrawals. 380 00:55:52,283 --> 00:55:57,283 Even if just one person can get these out, it would immediately create an arbitrage, right? 381 00:55:58,283 --> 00:56:02,283 So even if not everyone can exit, if just one person can exit, then it's... 382 00:56:03,283 --> 00:56:06,283 Yes, they've made some changes to their documentation. 383 00:56:07,283 --> 00:56:13,283 To make it harder for the shareholders to get together and, through a majority vote, dissolve the trust. 384 00:56:14,283 --> 00:56:21,283 To return the underlying asset, which would effectively force up the price, if they were to dissolve it. 385 00:56:22,283 --> 00:56:30,283 Because then the mechanisms of unwinding the whole thing would eliminate the discount in the process. 386 00:56:30,283 --> 00:56:44,283 So I agree with you that it seems like Grayscale has wanted to pursue the continuation of a receipt of a lot of fees. 387 00:56:45,283 --> 00:56:50,283 Rather than do what is in the best interests, arguably, of the shareholders. 388 00:56:51,283 --> 00:56:59,283 But if in a few months from now they could convert it to an ETF, then that would be the thing that would make everyone happy, I suppose. 389 00:57:00,283 --> 00:57:02,283 So it would have been worth the wait. 390 00:57:03,283 --> 00:57:13,283 Of course, ETF fees are much lower than the kind of fee that it's getting now. 391 00:57:14,283 --> 00:57:18,283 Right now they're charging 2% and the fee on an ETF would tend to be much lower. 392 00:57:19,283 --> 00:57:21,283 So if there's competition... 393 00:57:23,283 --> 00:57:27,283 So I think this highlights what is happening with GBTC. 394 00:57:28,283 --> 00:57:42,283 It actually highlights perfectly that if you have any withdrawal mechanism whatsoever, anything, then it will probably trade very close to parity. 395 00:57:43,283 --> 00:57:50,283 And if you have immediate fast entry and fast arbitrage, then it will never trade above parity. 396 00:57:51,283 --> 00:57:59,283 So I think the assumptions about drivechain in this regard are pretty much validated by just what we see there. 397 00:58:07,283 --> 00:58:09,283 Well, I got to get going, but it's been nice talking to you guys. 398 00:58:09,283 --> 00:58:11,283 Thank you for hosting this space. 399 00:58:12,283 --> 00:58:13,283 Thank you for joining. 400 00:58:16,283 --> 00:58:17,283 You're welcome. 401 00:58:18,283 --> 00:58:21,283 Everyone's welcome to come on up to the stage and chat. 402 00:58:22,283 --> 00:58:23,283 This is Drivechain Twitter Spaces. 403 00:58:24,283 --> 00:58:33,283 We meet every Monday and Thursday to discuss the state of the world with respect to drivechain, the most important idea of all time, in my personal opinion. 404 00:58:34,283 --> 00:58:36,283 Not everyone agrees with that, but that's fine. 405 00:58:39,283 --> 00:58:57,283 We're trying to achieve an upgrade for Bitcoin, which would increase its extensibility, enabling every altcoin to be deployed as a Bitcoin sidechain, enabling the whole crypto economy to use a single unit of account, one Bitcoin. 406 00:58:58,283 --> 00:59:09,283 So the idea here is that every sidechain will have a unit of account, which is one Bitcoin, because the native token of the sidechain will be redeemable for Bitcoin. 407 00:59:10,283 --> 00:59:29,283 And all of the fees on all of the sidechains will be paid to Bitcoin's layer one miners through blind merge mining, making sure that Bitcoin has a high security budget in the future from collecting all the fees from all of these big block thunderside chains. 408 00:59:29,283 --> 00:59:43,283 They'll pay a trillion pennies every day to Bitcoin's layer one miners, securing Bitcoin far into the future as the coinbase is halved towards zero every four years. 409 00:59:47,283 --> 00:59:48,283 It's a great mystery. 410 00:59:49,283 --> 00:59:52,283 Which will be the impetus for Drivechain? 411 00:59:53,283 --> 00:59:54,283 Will it be low security? 412 00:59:54,283 --> 00:59:59,283 Will there be a problem with the halving coming up where there's not enough miner funding in 2024? 413 01:00:00,283 --> 01:00:14,283 Or will the impetus for Drivechain be flippening, the risk that Ethereum accrues so much value that Bitcoin is at risk for losing its market cap crown status? 414 01:00:15,283 --> 01:00:21,283 The best justification for Drivechain is not security budget and flippening risk. 415 01:00:22,283 --> 01:00:30,283 The best justification in the view of Michael Tidwell, as he wrote in a tweet, is love of innovation. 416 01:00:31,283 --> 01:00:47,283 So the desire to see Bitcoin flourish with new innovation, that, in his view, is the best reasons to support Drivechain, not the desire to get Bitcoin's price up or to get more fees for miners. 417 01:00:52,283 --> 01:00:53,283 Can I say something? 418 01:00:53,283 --> 01:00:54,283 Please. 419 01:00:55,283 --> 01:01:09,283 So a lot of people like to rant about how blockchain is such a stupid thing and it's wasteful and inefficient and it's not good for anything at all. 420 01:01:10,283 --> 01:01:34,283 And it's a funny thing because, you know, when someone gets into data availability and public auditing, publicly proving sequences of events and data availability, then it suddenly becomes very hard to do anything without the blockchain. 421 01:01:34,283 --> 01:01:44,283 So it's an interesting narrative that is lately very widespread that we don't need any blockchains besides Bitcoin mainchain whatsoever. 422 01:01:45,283 --> 01:02:00,283 And the other interesting thing is I'm lately more involved in the thinking about Chaumian eCash, especially with KalaBTC in Cashu. 423 01:02:01,283 --> 01:02:15,283 And we are in the thinking of preventing and proving fraud, get to a point when we basically almost invented the blockchain and the peer-to-peer network that is Bitcoin all over again. 424 01:02:16,283 --> 01:02:24,283 So it's quite funny. I just want to note that there is clearly a use case for chains. 425 01:02:31,283 --> 01:02:33,283 I'm glad you feel that way. 426 01:02:35,283 --> 01:02:51,283 Paul has said that if a person thinks that there has never been and will never be an altcoin that has any legitimate purpose, then that person would have no reason to support Drivechain. 427 01:02:51,283 --> 01:03:17,283 Of course, only the most ideological person would say that no altcoin has any legitimate purpose because, of course, the privacy altcoins, the big block altcoins, the expressive altcoins all have interesting applications for low fee scaling, peer-to-peer oracles. 428 01:03:18,283 --> 01:03:24,283 The DNS and other applications and protocols. 429 01:03:25,283 --> 01:03:39,283 So it would be great if Bitcoin had on its blockchain a bunch of interesting sidechains that are innovative and experimental, enabling those kinds of building projects to happen on Bitcoin. 430 01:03:47,283 --> 01:03:49,283 Thank you. 431 01:04:18,283 --> 01:04:21,283 All are welcome to come on up to the stage. 432 01:04:22,283 --> 01:04:26,283 We have about 20 minutes left in our scheduled programming. 433 01:04:34,283 --> 01:04:42,283 I see some familiar faces in the audience. Hello, Lalo and Porkchop. 434 01:04:43,283 --> 01:04:45,283 Hello, Lalo and Porkchop. 435 01:05:02,283 --> 01:05:04,283 All right. 436 01:05:06,283 --> 01:05:08,283 Maybe now's a good time to break. 437 01:05:08,283 --> 01:05:10,283 Oh, OK. 438 01:05:11,283 --> 01:05:15,283 Maybe now's a good time to break and we can reconvene on Monday. 439 01:05:17,283 --> 01:05:19,283 I look forward to seeing you all then. 440 01:05:21,283 --> 01:05:23,283 Bring your questions and comments. 441 01:05:25,283 --> 01:05:26,283 OK. 442 01:05:27,283 --> 01:05:30,283 Thank you to our speakers. Thank you, Moon Settler and others. 443 01:05:31,283 --> 01:05:32,283 See you next time. 444 01:05:33,283 --> 01:05:34,283 I look forward to it. 445 01:05:34,283 --> 01:05:35,283 Ciao. 446 01:05:38,283 --> 01:05:39,283 Bye-bye.