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Hello, and welcome to Drivechain Twitter Spaces,

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where we talk about Drivechain, which is BIP300 and BIP301.

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Welcome to those who've joined.

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Moon Settler, great to see you in the audience.

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Feel free to raise your hand and come up to speak if you'd like.

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Today should be a great conversation.

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We might have Post Capone and Super Testnet and others join.

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Some of those people I've chatted with about the possibility

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of having a conversation about what do ordinals and inscriptions

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mean for our understanding of Drivechain and its value proposition.

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Welcome to the stage, Paul.

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Thank you. I'm excited to learn more about Drivechain.

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Oh, great. Great.

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It's the talk of the town.

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People are interested more than ever.

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Definitely was in February.

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I mean, hopefully we can continue that in March.

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But it did seem like February

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saw an enormous amount of increase in interest.

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What do you think this ordinals and inscriptions episode

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in Bitcoin history means?

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In terms of our understanding of Drivechain.

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Do you feel that it's...

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Well, in general, what it means, a couple of different things.

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One thing is there's a group that thinks that Bitcoin should not be used

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and that it should only be store of value.

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Historically, that group is contrasted with the people

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who thought it should be a medium of exchange and it should be used.

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And I, of course, I just think that both are very important.

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It's like having heat in your house and air conditioning.

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And I just think the better that each gets, the better.

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But the issue is that there's a few dogmatic people

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who just think that there's no reason to use Bitcoin at all

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and that any use of the blockchain space

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other than for transactions is illegitimate.

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And those people have now been kind of shown up and frustrated

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because the ordinals thing has taken off.

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Because the ordinals thing has taken off

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without them being able to do anything about it.

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And then the other thing is that every cult is naturally an enemy of fun.

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So a cult emphasizes conformity.

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And of course, the current Bitcoin culture

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has unfortunately some cult-like properties.

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And so when they see anyone having fun,

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then they know that we can't have that.

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Everyone has to just be like a weird monk.

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Those are some of the things.

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Yeah. I think someone wrote on Twitter,

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maybe it was you, that when there are two groups

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and one of them is expending energy to enforce conformity of ideas,

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then that group will underperform another

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because of the energy that the one group

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is expending towards just policing itself.

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The group having fun will outperform.

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That's certainly the case. I don't remember saying that,

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but I would mostly agree with it.

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The worst thing is that it's not even so much the energy used to police,

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it is that innovation is the key to success

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and conformity is a natural enemy of novelty,

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whereas everything innovative must be novel.

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So to me, the novelty is a bigger factor,

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but that is also the case that you have to have all these people

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spending their time on a self-inflicted handicap.

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When you described Bitcoin being used versus just held,

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it's an interesting distinction

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because of course holding in economic theory is a form of using,

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saving is an activity.

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So the distinction some would draw is between Bitcoin as money

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and Bitcoin as a platform

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for a multitude of non-monetary applications.

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And then the people would cite, perhaps simplistically,

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the Oracle problem.

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Well, indeed, but you see actually this is, I think, backwards

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because money is a use, you're right, as savings is a use,

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all that is correct.

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But actually that just proves that the whole point

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is that it has to be used for something.

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So you make a list of uses and you can put at the top,

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you could put savings or money,

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but that just means that the reality of that list is undeniable.

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And if the list contains money,

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the reality of that list is undeniable.

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And if the list contained nothing, then it would be useless.

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So that's actually flipped around.

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Bitcoin should be useful and the more useful, the better.

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And if savings is one use,

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but we should stack the list with everything we can find.

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But when you say all that, are you focusing on the distinction

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between economies that are on blockchain versus those that aren't?

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Like, let's say all of Amazon were somehow more on the blockchain

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versus just using Bitcoin as a payment system.

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Isn't that the distinction?

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There's another different thing, which is that Bitcoin,

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there's 21 million coins,

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but that has nothing to do with how much block space there is.

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Block space is a completely different thing.

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That is something that we also want the demand for to be high

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because block space determines the security budget

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and the 51% attack cost.

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So they're related, but they're completely different goods.

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They're just as different as oil and Netflix subscriptions.

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Yes. Lately, I've been analogizing it to a store,

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a store that just sells meat and milk and cereal

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versus a store that sells those things plus candy and toys.

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The one with candy and toys is being more permissive

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in its value judgments about what to sell,

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and it'll probably sell more products.

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Right, and it can still sell meat, of course.

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So you have someone who really wants candy,

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and you're with a group, and you say,

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well, if we go to the first store, then someone has to go away empty handed.

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But if we all just go to the second store, then there's no issue.

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So that would be, in terms of who can attract a group and network effects,

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that would seem to be a pretty big advantage.

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Yes. The discussion on block space is so important

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and probably bodes well for drivechain understanding.

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Since we've had a lot of discussion about the security budget recently

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in the wake of this ordinals popularity and inscriptions popularity,

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but many people were saying,

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oh, well, the security budget will be solved

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by those doing this ordinals and inscriptions.

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But we haven't seen the fees rise very significantly.

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We haven't seen fees over $2 per transaction.

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We haven't seen total transaction fees per day over $1 million a day.

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So we haven't seen a spike in fees rivaling prior spikes,

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such as in 2017 or 2021.

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Yeah, it's important to notice that Michael Saylor

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seems to get this question wrong,

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because he does not appreciate the difference

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between the block space and the coins.

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So because he'll make statements like,

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well, it'll be with Bitcoin is $100 trillion asset,

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then it'll be a 1% fee.

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But that is not a legitimate argument,

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because there's absolutely no relationship

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between the two goods at all.

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So there's no sense in which one would be a percentage of the other

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any more than when you buy Netflix subscription,

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it should be a certain percentage of the price of oil.

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Yes. Everyone listening is welcome to raise their hand

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and come on up to the stage if you have a question or a comment or a rant.

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I think, yeah, this block space discussion is so important,

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because it improves understanding and awareness of how Bitcoin works.

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And the block space is a very interesting part

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of the drivechain value proposition.

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How surprised are you, Paul, at the evolution of ideas on drivechain

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and how the security budget became a way of understanding

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the value of drivechain,

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since that wasn't part of the original inspiration?

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Would you say that's a tremendously stunning development?

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It seems that way to me personally. Do you feel that way?

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I think it is interesting that drivechain already,

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you know, when it designed it, it already solved

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like three or four different huge problems.

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So one of those being, of course, this idea,

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this meta consensus idea that people disagree

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over what the blockchain should contain.

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So you can't have large blocks and small blocks.

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You have to have one or the other, and whichever one you choose,

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the other group will go away empty handed.

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So that's one, but then just people wanting to be creative,

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you know, the idea of Vitalik starting Ethereum,

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but he can't really do it on Bitcoin,

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because he wants a different design.

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And make no comment on whether or not that's a good idea or not.

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It's just the idea that people would want to try new things.

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And that's the relentless march of progress.

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So in addition to solving like block size, war, governance,

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questions of like the blockchain going from being a one size

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fits all to this full spectrum of things.

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I think it just happens to be interesting

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that it also solves the security budget problem

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that people weren't even talking about back in 2015.

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There was just a really vague question mark in people's heads

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about bees replacing the block subsidy.

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So I think that's a very interesting development.

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I think unfortunately, the security budget question

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is still completely misunderstood to the degree that makes it.

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It just makes it more obvious to me that the community is in bad shape,

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because you still have people who think that,

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for example, a block size increase decreases fees

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when there's really no evidence,

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that all of the evidence points in the other direction.

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And then you have people conflating fee rates and total fees,

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which is the difference between saying $4 per gallon

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is different than saying $4 per gallon

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is comparable to like $20,000 or something.

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One is per gallon and the other is just an amount of money.

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So the fact that people would even compare those

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shows how confused they are, unfortunately.

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To be sure I heard you right, you said that a block size increase

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would, in your view, increase total fees.

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Is that correct?

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Yeah, we really don't see.

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There's a couple cases such as Bitcoin SV

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where the fees are ultra low.

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But in general, everyone is paying some tiny fee.

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And so each transaction is giving a slightly right,

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adding slightly to the end.

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What we haven't seen is the fees stay up, right?

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They sometimes go up when there's a big bubble or something temporarily.

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But this is unreliable. They always fall back down.

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And they just if you just look at the amounts

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and just use a little common sense,

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like they don't go up in the way that would be affected

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by an increase in the block size.

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So it's not as though they are $200 per transaction.

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And then when we add and increase the blocks,

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they just behave a very different way when the blocks are full

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versus when they're even slightly empty.

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When they're even slightly empty, then it's just this $30,

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$0.30, $0.30 to $0.80 or less, $0.05 to $0.80 range,

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which is just like the range that we get.

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And then when they're full, they sometimes go up.

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But when they go up, people react with their behavior.

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They get annoyed and they transact less.

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They batch the transactions.

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They wait, they hold off on transacting

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until the fees go back down, which they do.

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Yes, I understand. That makes sense.

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Some of the errors people make is they think

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that if the fees aren't high enough for the miners,

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then the block size could be reduced.

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And that would increase total fees. And that's wrong.

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And they also think that the miners could impose a minimum fee

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that's higher than the current minimum fee.

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And that's wrong.

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It's wrong to think that either of those proposals

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would increase the total fee rate paid to the miners,

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which is what matters.

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The minimum fee is like anyone can do that, right?

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You could open a Burger King and you could say,

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well, I'm not making enough money.

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And you could say, well, instead of charging $5 per hamburger,

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I'm going to charge $7,000 per hamburger.

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I'm going to impose a minimum fee.

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That's like stupid that idea is. But yeah, people say that.

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Welcome to the stage, Super Testnet,

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one of my favorite speakers on Twitter Spaces.

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Thank you. Glad to be here.

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I wonder if we'll get Post Capone today.

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He was invited. Hopefully he'll join.

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But maybe if either of you have to drop for any reason, no worries.

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But I was wondering maybe we could have a combo between you two

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about one of the things you've spoken about a lot,

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Super Testnet, in your tweets,

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which is the censoring of inscriptions or ordinals.

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Is that something you'd be interested in talking with Paul about?

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Yeah. Yeah, I'd love to.

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Okay. That was sort of the intended topic for you and Post Capone

251
00:14:21,533 --> 00:14:23,134
to perhaps debate.

252
00:14:23,274 --> 00:14:28,314
And maybe Paul has a view that is somewhat aligned with Post's view.

253
00:14:28,873 --> 00:14:33,433
He's anti-censoring. And then you have an interesting view

254
00:14:33,574 --> 00:14:37,113
because you're someone who speaks very favorably about drivechain

255
00:14:37,233 --> 00:14:39,074
and has written a great essay on it.

256
00:14:39,214 --> 00:14:42,814
But I suspect Paul doesn't have the pro-censorship view that you have.

257
00:14:43,574 --> 00:14:47,033
Maybe that's something you could summarize for him.

258
00:14:47,173 --> 00:14:50,673
Sure. Sure. Well, it's gotten even more urgent recently.

259
00:14:50,733 --> 00:14:52,973
Or if urgency is the right word for this.

260
00:14:54,134 --> 00:14:58,334
There's even more people dumping ridiculous data on Bitcoin now

261
00:14:59,214 --> 00:15:05,814
because of the new sovereign roll-ups protocol or idea from Bitkip.

262
00:15:05,933 --> 00:15:06,413
Or not Bitkip.

263
00:15:06,533 --> 00:15:10,473
I have to compliment you on that because it really has been disappointing.

264
00:15:10,613 --> 00:15:12,074
As you may have saw me tweet recently,

265
00:15:12,214 --> 00:15:16,673
like a lot of people, what a lot of people seem to think from the title

266
00:15:17,673 --> 00:15:22,233
is that the roll-up thing is like some kind of Ethereum technology

267
00:15:22,373 --> 00:15:26,113
that we Bitcoiners can now take advantage of or something.

268
00:15:27,173 --> 00:15:28,613
When the reality is not.

269
00:15:30,113 --> 00:15:32,774
But you're one of the few people who seem to have actually noticed that.

270
00:15:33,613 --> 00:15:36,613
That is. But anyway, why don't you continue?

271
00:15:37,514 --> 00:15:41,074
Yeah, well, I would say, actually, I would agree with those who say

272
00:15:41,214 --> 00:15:44,733
it is an Ethereum technology that Bitcoiners can take advantage of.

273
00:15:45,394 --> 00:15:50,473
But we've always been able to like run transactions through the EVM

274
00:15:50,594 --> 00:15:52,774
and then and then dump the output to Bitcoin.

275
00:15:52,894 --> 00:15:54,694
Like that's that's really what they're doing.

276
00:15:55,533 --> 00:15:58,493
It's like it's not running the EVM on.

277
00:15:59,574 --> 00:16:01,774
It's not running Bitcoin transactions through the EVM.

278
00:16:01,894 --> 00:16:04,774
It's running these altcoin transactions through the EVM.

279
00:16:04,894 --> 00:16:05,694
That's what I mean.

280
00:16:05,834 --> 00:16:07,533
Dumping the output. Yeah.

281
00:16:09,274 --> 00:16:13,793
Yeah. So because there's a lot more people dumping ridiculous data on Bitcoin,

282
00:16:14,793 --> 00:16:20,533
using this taproot or not taproot, using this inscriptions, envelopes idea.

283
00:16:21,094 --> 00:16:25,694
I think it's even more of a good idea to block them and just say,

284
00:16:25,834 --> 00:16:27,433
yeah, sorry, you can't do that anymore.

285
00:16:29,194 --> 00:16:33,154
Also, also the fact that Ethereum people are using it now

286
00:16:33,293 --> 00:16:37,894
also makes that harder to do because they have a lot more tenacity

287
00:16:38,033 --> 00:16:41,754
than I think the monkey JPEG people do.

288
00:16:41,954 --> 00:16:44,214
And I think they would stick stick with it a lot longer

289
00:16:44,353 --> 00:16:46,754
and try to overcome any attempts of ours to block it.

290
00:16:47,353 --> 00:16:51,714
So that would be upsetting because I don't know who has more tenacity,

291
00:16:51,853 --> 00:16:53,553
the Ethereum people or the Bitcoin people.

292
00:16:57,814 --> 00:17:00,514
Yeah. So the basic idea is I don't think Bitcoin

293
00:17:00,654 --> 00:17:03,314
is a good place to dump to use as a dumping ground.

294
00:17:04,214 --> 00:17:06,854
I think there are much better places to do that.

295
00:17:06,994 --> 00:17:09,354
And if someone starts using Bitcoin as a dumping ground,

296
00:17:09,413 --> 00:17:12,513
like with inscriptions, I think it's a good idea

297
00:17:12,653 --> 00:17:17,614
if it becomes popular to block it and restore Bitcoin to just being,

298
00:17:17,753 --> 00:17:21,013
you know, just being money. That's that's my opinion.

299
00:17:24,954 --> 00:17:27,253
Well, I kind of agree with some of that.

300
00:17:27,393 --> 00:17:30,494
But really, I just think that the goal of the system

301
00:17:30,614 --> 00:17:34,194
is for the miners to maximize their profits,

302
00:17:34,314 --> 00:17:38,354
which includes all the cost minimization they do in the real world,

303
00:17:38,454 --> 00:17:41,094
but revenue maximization with whatever they do

304
00:17:41,214 --> 00:17:43,753
in the when they sell the block space.

305
00:17:44,753 --> 00:17:48,893
So I see that whoever is going to pay the most for the block space

306
00:17:50,214 --> 00:17:52,314
will be the owner.

307
00:17:52,454 --> 00:17:56,513
And there's really nothing anyone's going to be able to do

308
00:17:56,653 --> 00:17:59,013
to get around that reality.

309
00:18:01,513 --> 00:18:04,013
I don't think that they will be able to because of the universality

310
00:18:04,153 --> 00:18:07,753
of computation, anything that you try to,

311
00:18:07,814 --> 00:18:09,653
if you try to block something that's formatted like that,

312
00:18:09,793 --> 00:18:14,553
you can always you can always re-encode a JPEG as a PNG or something.

313
00:18:14,694 --> 00:18:18,094
You know, it's just zeros and ones that are interpreted a certain way.

314
00:18:19,253 --> 00:18:23,714
Isn't the solution that like you two might both agree with

315
00:18:23,854 --> 00:18:25,454
to reduce the block size,

316
00:18:26,413 --> 00:18:28,913
not for any reason related to security budget,

317
00:18:29,053 --> 00:18:34,994
but exclusively for reasons related to making full nodes less expensive?

318
00:18:35,994 --> 00:18:41,334
Well, the whole architecture needs to be fit for the task.

319
00:18:41,454 --> 00:18:44,133
So if you have small layer one block size,

320
00:18:45,594 --> 00:18:49,753
but you have layer two chains where people can do all this stuff

321
00:18:49,893 --> 00:18:51,933
that they're interested in doing cheaply,

322
00:18:52,653 --> 00:18:54,494
then they will do it over there.

323
00:18:54,633 --> 00:18:57,734
They won't do it on layer one. Everyone's happy.

324
00:18:58,494 --> 00:19:00,094
That's the basic situation.

325
00:19:01,094 --> 00:19:05,533
Yeah, I think a much more feasible plan to stop inscriptions

326
00:19:05,653 --> 00:19:08,793
would be to reduce the block size than to send soft fork them out.

327
00:19:10,494 --> 00:19:12,253
Especially now that Ethereum people are doing it

328
00:19:12,393 --> 00:19:16,454
and they wouldn't give up as easily as I think the NFP people would.

329
00:19:17,393 --> 00:19:21,334
But yeah, I think campaigning for a block size reduction

330
00:19:21,454 --> 00:19:23,553
is probably a better use of my time now

331
00:19:23,694 --> 00:19:25,994
than campaigning for blocking inscriptions.

332
00:19:30,393 --> 00:19:32,553
Yeah, I'm actually in favor of the block size reduction.

333
00:19:32,694 --> 00:19:35,793
And it's interesting to figure out who is and is not,

334
00:19:35,933 --> 00:19:41,094
because like for once, you know, I don't want to speak for Peter Todd.

335
00:19:41,234 --> 00:19:42,694
Anyone can find him on Twitter and look it up.

336
00:19:42,834 --> 00:19:44,633
But I remember and I talked to him,

337
00:19:44,753 --> 00:19:47,433
I think I was either March 2017 or 2018.

338
00:19:48,753 --> 00:19:51,194
Can't remember which one of those.

339
00:19:51,334 --> 00:19:55,854
I was talking to him in person in Italy, I think it was 2017.

340
00:19:55,854 --> 00:19:58,013
And…

341
00:19:57,281 --> 00:20:01,681
I asked him, what did he think of the SegWit discount being a block size increase?

342
00:20:01,681 --> 00:20:05,681
And he said, well, he said something like, and this is I'm just paraphrasing it from memory here,

343
00:20:05,681 --> 00:20:09,281
and anyone can talk to him in person and figure out what his views are.

344
00:20:09,281 --> 00:20:13,281
But he said something along the lines of, well, I think we really might need the space.

345
00:20:14,281 --> 00:20:18,281
So he was worried about not having enough block space, which how about that?

346
00:20:18,281 --> 00:20:23,281
So you never know who's going to endorse what position in this industry, you know,

347
00:20:23,281 --> 00:20:26,681
because everyone is so quirky and independent.

348
00:20:27,080 --> 00:20:31,080
So it'd be interesting to see who is still like, who's into what.

349
00:20:31,080 --> 00:20:35,681
And then, of course, we have, I've told this story a bunch of times, but it's a good one,

350
00:20:35,681 --> 00:20:40,080
because John Carvalho is saying he was all, he was on the warpath for SegWit.

351
00:20:40,080 --> 00:20:45,080
And then it wasn't until, I think, 2019 or 2020 that he even admitted that he didn't,

352
00:20:45,080 --> 00:20:50,080
he just learned that day, years later, that it was a block size increase.

353
00:20:50,080 --> 00:20:52,080
So he didn't even know that it was.

354
00:20:52,481 --> 00:20:58,481
Are you indifferent as to whether the block size is reduced before or after Drivechain is adopted?

355
00:20:59,481 --> 00:21:04,480
Well, I think it's just a more, the whole, the system overall works better

356
00:21:04,480 --> 00:21:07,480
if they, does happen around the same time.

357
00:21:07,480 --> 00:21:14,480
But I think that the reasons for lowering the block size are mostly independent.

358
00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:18,480
I mean, one of the reasons why I'm in favor of lowering the block size is because

359
00:21:18,880 --> 00:21:23,880
of my confidence in the view that people can take advantage of sidechains.

360
00:21:23,880 --> 00:21:26,880
So if that view were totally mistaken, then that would be,

361
00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:31,880
I might need to reconsider all of my other views in that light.

362
00:21:37,880 --> 00:21:41,880
Welcome to the stage, Alex and Post Capone.

363
00:21:42,281 --> 00:21:44,281
Alex and Post Capone.

364
00:21:46,281 --> 00:21:54,281
What are your thoughts on lowering the block size and adopting Drivechain and other matters?

365
00:21:55,281 --> 00:22:00,281
Drivechain is a good idea. Lowering the block size is not a good idea.

366
00:22:02,281 --> 00:22:04,281
Why would you say that?

367
00:22:05,281 --> 00:22:09,281
Well, because lowering the block size essentially disables the Lightning Network

368
00:22:09,680 --> 00:22:12,680
and the nodes are cheap enough at this point.

369
00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:19,680
Well, that is another point that, unfortunately, a lot of people do not notice.

370
00:22:19,680 --> 00:22:26,680
I tweeted about this recently, which is that I have a lot of familiarity with the Lightning Network

371
00:22:26,680 --> 00:22:33,680
and I designed a couple of things, 2015, 2016, some clever Lightning-type things.

372
00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:37,680
They require, it's a long story, but I won't get into it.

373
00:22:38,081 --> 00:22:43,081
But the Lightning Network, in order to do lots of really cool things,

374
00:22:43,081 --> 00:22:51,081
it must be possible to write the state, the intermediate state, to the Layer 1 blockchain

375
00:22:51,081 --> 00:22:53,081
or to whatever the host blockchain is.

376
00:22:54,081 --> 00:22:57,081
And so Lightning needs on-chain fees to be low.

377
00:22:58,081 --> 00:23:02,081
And they did the math in this post, I did Lightning limitations.

378
00:23:03,081 --> 00:23:07,081
The amount of marginal bytes, I mean, I should look it up, but it's quite a few.

379
00:23:07,480 --> 00:23:11,480
To add in, you have to write the HTLC and then you have to spend it later.

380
00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:18,480
So the total amount of bytes needed to write this output, if you get interrupted,

381
00:23:19,480 --> 00:23:22,480
if you get interrupted in your Lightning payment and you say,

382
00:23:22,480 --> 00:23:25,480
okay, the person went AWOL, I have to write it to the state,

383
00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:28,480
I have to write this whole if branch, I have to write the HTLC,

384
00:23:28,480 --> 00:23:31,480
I have to write what the hash should be, I have to write the preimage,

385
00:23:31,480 --> 00:23:34,480
you have to select that as an input and then spend it to wherever,

386
00:23:34,881 --> 00:23:38,881
whatever gets you your hamburger or whatever you were going to spend your money on.

387
00:23:39,881 --> 00:23:43,881
That total thing is like, I don't remember exactly what it was,

388
00:23:43,881 --> 00:23:45,881
but it was like 90 bytes or something, which is a lot

389
00:23:45,881 --> 00:23:51,881
because that is basically as much as a normal to any other on-chain output.

390
00:23:51,881 --> 00:23:54,881
So yes, Super Testnet.

391
00:23:54,881 --> 00:23:59,881
So what I'm saying is if that costs a lot, if that costs like $8 per transaction,

392
00:24:00,281 --> 00:24:04,281
you're really kind of up against the wall with respect to any Lightning payment

393
00:24:04,281 --> 00:24:10,281
that's less than $8 because you'd rather not write it to the blockchain.

394
00:24:10,281 --> 00:24:14,281
So you could say maybe we'll do trust or maybe we'll have tiny little,

395
00:24:15,281 --> 00:24:19,281
this is the interledger idea, we'll have it stream pennies at a time

396
00:24:19,281 --> 00:24:23,281
and we'll just hope that if it breaks, I'll find a different route.

397
00:24:24,281 --> 00:24:26,281
But anyway, you have your hand up.

398
00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:30,680
Yeah, I'd like to elaborate on that point.

399
00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:34,680
I think having a small blockchain or a small block size,

400
00:24:34,680 --> 00:24:36,680
I don't think it breaks the Lightning network.

401
00:24:36,680 --> 00:24:39,680
I think it increases the minimum size of an HTLC.

402
00:24:39,680 --> 00:24:44,680
You could have $100,000 fees on the blockchain

403
00:24:44,680 --> 00:24:50,680
and still the Lightning network would work just for payments greater than $100,000.

404
00:24:50,680 --> 00:24:54,680
And for other payments, you could put them on a drivechain.

405
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:59,080
You could say, all right, we're going to do micropayments on a drivechain

406
00:24:59,080 --> 00:25:01,080
or you can put the Lightning network on a drivechain.

407
00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:03,080
So that's a good way to think about it.

408
00:25:03,080 --> 00:25:05,080
That is a little like payments less than $100,000,

409
00:25:05,080 --> 00:25:09,080
that's kind of like the exception that proves the rule or whatever.

410
00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:13,080
But yeah, I agree that I think the drivechain,

411
00:25:13,080 --> 00:25:17,080
obviously, I think drivechain scaling is underappreciated.

412
00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:21,080
I think the idea of Lightning on drivechain is underappreciated.

413
00:25:21,481 --> 00:25:24,481
The big disadvantage with drivechain or anything merge-mined

414
00:25:24,481 --> 00:25:26,481
is that it still relies on confirmations

415
00:25:26,481 --> 00:25:30,481
and you get at most one confirmation every mainchain block.

416
00:25:30,481 --> 00:25:33,481
So you need even more sidechain confirmations.

417
00:25:33,481 --> 00:25:35,481
There's no block subsidy.

418
00:25:35,481 --> 00:25:40,481
So basically, the confirmations are slower and worth less on the sidechain.

419
00:25:40,481 --> 00:25:41,481
That's the big disadvantage.

420
00:25:41,481 --> 00:25:44,481
But that's also why it would work just fine for like all these casual things,

421
00:25:44,481 --> 00:25:47,481
coffee, whatever, these things where everyone's using Venmo

422
00:25:47,481 --> 00:25:49,481
or using the fiat world or whatever.

423
00:25:49,881 --> 00:25:52,881
So then when you go to a situation where those are slower

424
00:25:52,881 --> 00:25:56,881
and the confirmations are more onerous to obtain,

425
00:25:56,881 --> 00:25:59,881
well, that's also where you get all the benefits of Lightning

426
00:25:59,881 --> 00:26:03,881
because you open the channel before you go to sleep

427
00:26:03,881 --> 00:26:07,881
and then when you wake up, it has however many 50, 60, 70 confirmations,

428
00:26:07,881 --> 00:26:11,881
you're ready to go for the next week or whatever.

429
00:26:11,881 --> 00:26:15,881
And now in Lightning, the stuff is basically instant.

430
00:26:16,281 --> 00:26:21,281
I don't know if we should turn this into the Lightning complain fest,

431
00:26:21,281 --> 00:26:25,281
but I just saw Warren Togami I have a lot of mixed feelings about,

432
00:26:25,281 --> 00:26:29,281
but I think he knows more about Tor than probably anyone I know.

433
00:26:29,281 --> 00:26:33,281
And he had an interesting rant recently about Tor,

434
00:26:33,281 --> 00:26:36,281
Lightning will not work over Tor.

435
00:26:36,281 --> 00:26:39,281
And I don't know if we should try to unpack that,

436
00:26:39,281 --> 00:26:41,281
but I thought it was very interesting

437
00:26:41,680 --> 00:26:47,680
because he's squarely in the precious LN whatever camp,

438
00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:50,680
but he's very experienced with Tor.

439
00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:54,680
And without Tor, Lightning requires you to disclose your IP address

440
00:26:54,680 --> 00:26:57,680
in order that people can find you and pay you,

441
00:26:57,680 --> 00:27:03,680
which I would think is just a knife to the heart for privacy.

442
00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:09,680
And it would tip the scales back into Lightning being less private than on-chain.

443
00:27:10,080 --> 00:27:13,080
Could you post a link to that thread in which he talks about that?

444
00:27:13,080 --> 00:27:17,080
Let's find it. I'm going to try to find it now.

445
00:27:17,080 --> 00:27:21,080
Because I would say that although the Lightning protocol is currently designed

446
00:27:21,080 --> 00:27:24,080
only supports Tor and Onion,

447
00:27:24,080 --> 00:27:30,080
there's nothing stopping us from adding other data transport protocols to...

448
00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:34,080
I think ITP is better with better performance than Tor.

449
00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:39,080
So I don't know if that will ever happen, but...

450
00:27:39,481 --> 00:27:42,481
I don't think it means if you lose Tor,

451
00:27:42,481 --> 00:27:45,481
it doesn't mean you have to dox your IP address,

452
00:27:45,481 --> 00:27:48,481
or at least maybe right now it does, but we could change that.

453
00:27:48,481 --> 00:27:54,481
Now you have to only dox your I2P address or some other networking layer.

454
00:27:54,481 --> 00:27:58,481
Well, I mean, that sounds like a lot of work, doesn't it?

455
00:27:58,481 --> 00:28:01,481
Not only that, Paul, but like you pointed out,

456
00:28:01,481 --> 00:28:05,481
Tor, I mean, the cost of running a node must also include

457
00:28:05,481 --> 00:28:08,481
not just the physical cost of running a node,

458
00:28:08,881 --> 00:28:12,881
but the permission to be online or to stay alive.

459
00:28:12,881 --> 00:28:14,881
So if Tor doesn't work,

460
00:28:14,881 --> 00:28:20,881
then basically the cost of running a node is essentially infinite.

461
00:28:23,881 --> 00:28:27,881
I found this thing and I'm going to reply.

462
00:28:27,881 --> 00:28:30,880
I don't know how to do spaces and stuff and make it show up in the thing,

463
00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:35,880
but I will reply to the thing and maybe it will show up.

464
00:28:36,281 --> 00:28:38,281
I don't know how it works.

465
00:28:38,281 --> 00:28:40,281
Maybe Henry can do it.

466
00:28:40,281 --> 00:28:45,281
It didn't show up in the nest, but I see it here, so that's useful.

467
00:28:46,281 --> 00:28:48,281
In the comment box.

468
00:28:49,281 --> 00:28:51,281
There it is.

469
00:28:52,281 --> 00:28:55,281
I wish there were more people in Bitcoin who knew

470
00:28:55,281 --> 00:29:00,281
as much about Tor as Porn Togami does.

471
00:29:00,281 --> 00:29:02,281
I put it in the nest.

472
00:29:02,681 --> 00:29:04,681
Okay, cool.

473
00:29:04,681 --> 00:29:06,681
Maybe I'll delete it from the comments then.

474
00:29:06,681 --> 00:29:08,681
Because maybe he'll deny it.

475
00:29:08,681 --> 00:29:10,681
It's all right.

476
00:29:10,681 --> 00:29:12,681
They will come in.

477
00:29:12,681 --> 00:29:17,681
Anyway, Tor is one of those things that often I think people use as an excuse.

478
00:29:17,681 --> 00:29:19,681
They don't do their own thinking.

479
00:29:19,681 --> 00:29:21,681
They just think, oh, is it private?

480
00:29:21,681 --> 00:29:23,681
And then they just think Tor.

481
00:29:23,681 --> 00:29:25,681
They hold up a sign and they just like wave a magic wand.

482
00:29:25,681 --> 00:29:28,681
I once spoke to Warren about half a year ago

483
00:29:28,681 --> 00:29:30,681
in our Twitter spaces about Drivechain.

484
00:29:31,080 --> 00:29:33,080
And I recall him saying that

485
00:29:33,080 --> 00:29:35,080
something to the effect of

486
00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:37,080
he wasn't convinced that

487
00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:41,080
the Drivechain security budget marketing

488
00:29:41,080 --> 00:29:43,080
is entirely convincing.

489
00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:45,080
So he's not a

490
00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:47,080
security budget alarmist.

491
00:29:47,080 --> 00:29:49,080
Not security budget aligned.

492
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:51,080
Yeah, maybe he's optimistic about the security budget

493
00:29:51,080 --> 00:29:53,080
more than most DriveChainers.

494
00:29:53,080 --> 00:29:55,080
See, this is the other thing.

495
00:29:55,080 --> 00:29:57,080
The security budget

496
00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:59,080
argument

497
00:29:59,481 --> 00:30:01,481
leads to a lack of focus.

498
00:30:01,481 --> 00:30:03,481
People

499
00:30:03,481 --> 00:30:05,481
kind of show up for different reasons

500
00:30:05,481 --> 00:30:07,481
into the Drivechain group and then they leave

501
00:30:07,481 --> 00:30:09,481
for different reasons.

502
00:30:09,481 --> 00:30:11,481
Like if you're there because you want

503
00:30:11,481 --> 00:30:13,481
a cool feature

504
00:30:13,481 --> 00:30:15,481
then

505
00:30:15,481 --> 00:30:17,481
you'll eventually just join the altcoin

506
00:30:17,481 --> 00:30:19,481
that has that feature.

507
00:30:19,481 --> 00:30:21,481
After you join Bitcoin, you wait around.

508
00:30:21,481 --> 00:30:23,481
You're waiting for the feature.

509
00:30:23,481 --> 00:30:25,481
Waiting for Godot.

510
00:30:25,481 --> 00:30:27,481
It doesn't show up and then you just say,

511
00:30:27,880 --> 00:30:29,880
join the Namecoin project.

512
00:30:33,880 --> 00:30:35,880
Are you saying that people could show up to

513
00:30:35,880 --> 00:30:37,880
Drivechain

514
00:30:37,880 --> 00:30:39,880
because of a concern about the security budget

515
00:30:39,880 --> 00:30:41,880
and then

516
00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:43,880
join some other coin

517
00:30:43,880 --> 00:30:45,880
because it doesn't seem to have

518
00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:47,880
the same kind of problem?

519
00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:49,880
In that example, they would join Ethereum or something.

520
00:30:49,880 --> 00:30:51,880
Because it's doing inflation

521
00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:53,880
and doesn't seem to have a problem with that?

522
00:30:54,281 --> 00:30:56,281
Ethereum is not necessarily

523
00:30:56,281 --> 00:30:58,281
doing inflation at all.

524
00:30:58,281 --> 00:31:00,281
It just has more higher fees

525
00:31:00,281 --> 00:31:02,281
and in fact

526
00:31:02,281 --> 00:31:04,281
their ETH1000

527
00:31:04,281 --> 00:31:06,281
is about

528
00:31:06,281 --> 00:31:08,281
if they have enough fees

529
00:31:08,281 --> 00:31:10,281
they will destroy coins.

530
00:31:10,281 --> 00:31:12,281
But if they don't have enough fees then they inflate?

531
00:31:12,281 --> 00:31:14,281
Then they will inflate.

532
00:31:14,281 --> 00:31:16,281
Oh, the 1559.

533
00:31:18,281 --> 00:31:20,281
So inflation is part of their

534
00:31:20,281 --> 00:31:22,281
protocol just as a backup plan?

535
00:31:22,681 --> 00:31:24,681
Yes.

536
00:31:24,681 --> 00:31:26,681
The funny thing is

537
00:31:26,681 --> 00:31:28,681
if you go the Peter Todd route

538
00:31:28,681 --> 00:31:30,681
informally it is also part of

539
00:31:30,681 --> 00:31:32,681
the Bitcoin backup plan

540
00:31:32,681 --> 00:31:34,681
just denied.

541
00:31:34,681 --> 00:31:36,681
I don't

542
00:31:36,681 --> 00:31:38,681
agree that I think that

543
00:31:38,681 --> 00:31:40,681
Peter Todd would find it impossible

544
00:31:40,681 --> 00:31:42,681
to actually succeed

545
00:31:42,681 --> 00:31:44,681
in

546
00:31:44,681 --> 00:31:46,681
adding inflation to Bitcoin

547
00:31:46,681 --> 00:31:48,681
and he may be engagement trolling

548
00:31:48,681 --> 00:31:50,681
but

549
00:31:52,681 --> 00:31:54,681
still it's a thing

550
00:31:54,681 --> 00:31:56,681
that people say in Bitcoin.

551
00:31:56,681 --> 00:31:58,681
Well a big question is

552
00:31:58,681 --> 00:32:00,681
when will these concerns materialize?

553
00:32:00,681 --> 00:32:02,681
Right?

554
00:32:02,681 --> 00:32:04,681
We had concerns about selfish mining

555
00:32:04,681 --> 00:32:06,681
that never became a big topic

556
00:32:06,681 --> 00:32:08,681
in reality it was just a theoretical

557
00:32:08,681 --> 00:32:10,681
concern from 10 years ago.

558
00:32:10,681 --> 00:32:12,681
When will these security budget concerns

559
00:32:12,681 --> 00:32:14,681
become a reality?

560
00:32:14,681 --> 00:32:16,681
When will they manifest as a risk?

561
00:32:16,681 --> 00:32:18,681
We haven't yet seen

562
00:32:18,681 --> 00:32:20,681
a hostile or

563
00:32:20,681 --> 00:32:22,681
greedy miner of any

564
00:32:22,681 --> 00:32:24,681
substantial nature.

565
00:32:24,681 --> 00:32:26,681
Correct?

566
00:32:26,681 --> 00:32:28,681
Well

567
00:32:28,681 --> 00:32:30,681
my own thoughts are that

568
00:32:30,681 --> 00:32:32,681
first of all I never thought selfish mining

569
00:32:32,681 --> 00:32:34,681
would be an issue.

570
00:32:34,681 --> 00:32:36,681
I had like a little refutation of it

571
00:32:36,681 --> 00:32:38,681
at the time but

572
00:32:38,681 --> 00:32:40,681
with the

573
00:32:40,681 --> 00:32:42,681
I think the adversaries of these coins

574
00:32:42,681 --> 00:32:44,681
would have to get good at attacking

575
00:32:44,681 --> 00:32:46,681
decentralized coins first.

576
00:32:46,681 --> 00:32:48,681
They're going to warm up on that.

577
00:32:48,681 --> 00:32:50,681
They're going to get really good

578
00:32:50,681 --> 00:32:52,681
at whatever they have to do

579
00:32:52,681 --> 00:32:54,681
to take down the centralized coin.

580
00:32:54,681 --> 00:32:56,681
You know that only has a few people

581
00:32:56,681 --> 00:32:58,681
running it.

582
00:32:58,681 --> 00:33:00,681
What does that mean?

583
00:33:00,681 --> 00:33:02,681
Well out of all the

584
00:33:02,681 --> 00:33:04,681
coins that exist

585
00:33:04,681 --> 00:33:06,681
there's an existing spectrum.

586
00:33:06,681 --> 00:33:08,681
The Bitcoin SV

587
00:33:08,681 --> 00:33:10,681
would be more centralized.

588
00:33:10,681 --> 00:33:12,681
Ethereum would be more centralized

589
00:33:12,681 --> 00:33:14,681
than PTC.

590
00:33:14,681 --> 00:33:16,681
And the adversaries would warm up

591
00:33:16,681 --> 00:33:18,681
on that.

592
00:33:18,681 --> 00:33:20,681
And then once they warm up, once they have

593
00:33:20,681 --> 00:33:22,681
that cold, then they know all we have to do

594
00:33:22,681 --> 00:33:24,681
is attack the security budget and it will go

595
00:33:24,681 --> 00:33:26,681
from being decentralized to centralized.

596
00:33:26,681 --> 00:33:28,681
And then we can do it.

597
00:33:28,681 --> 00:33:30,681
So it would be like a chess game

598
00:33:30,681 --> 00:33:32,681
where they have to move on

599
00:33:32,681 --> 00:33:34,681
a certain territory first.

600
00:33:34,681 --> 00:33:36,681
Super, did you understand

601
00:33:36,681 --> 00:33:38,681
that whole point he just made?

602
00:33:38,681 --> 00:33:40,681
I didn't.

603
00:33:40,681 --> 00:33:42,681
I was replying to someone

604
00:33:42,681 --> 00:33:44,681
who was wrong on the internet so I didn't

605
00:33:44,681 --> 00:33:46,681
actually listen. What was the point?

606
00:33:46,681 --> 00:33:48,681
Paul, were you saying that

607
00:33:48,681 --> 00:33:50,681
when the security budget problem materializes

608
00:33:50,681 --> 00:33:52,681
if it does, it will first

609
00:33:52,681 --> 00:33:54,681
materialize on BSV and BCH?

610
00:33:54,681 --> 00:33:56,681
No.

611
00:33:56,681 --> 00:33:58,681
The security budget

612
00:33:58,681 --> 00:34:00,681
it only works

613
00:34:00,681 --> 00:34:02,681
the only thing it accomplishes

614
00:34:02,681 --> 00:34:04,681
strategically is it converts

615
00:34:04,681 --> 00:34:06,681
a decentralized cryptocurrency

616
00:34:06,681 --> 00:34:08,681
into a centralized one. Because people

617
00:34:08,681 --> 00:34:10,681
immediately, once the attack starts

618
00:34:10,681 --> 00:34:12,681
they'll look for some kind of

619
00:34:12,681 --> 00:34:14,681
person to say what is the state

620
00:34:14,681 --> 00:34:16,681
of the blockchain, like Coinbase or whatever.

621
00:34:16,681 --> 00:34:18,681
Does that make sense?

622
00:34:18,681 --> 00:34:20,681
Yes.

623
00:34:20,681 --> 00:34:22,681
Yes, this is what...

624
00:34:22,681 --> 00:34:24,681
This is the only thing it does.

625
00:34:24,681 --> 00:34:26,681
It doesn't instantly kill the coin.

626
00:34:26,681 --> 00:34:28,681
It will convert it

627
00:34:28,681 --> 00:34:30,681
from decentralized to centralized.

628
00:34:30,681 --> 00:34:32,681
Understood.

629
00:34:32,681 --> 00:34:34,681
Sounds like an easy way to kill Bitcoin then.

630
00:34:34,681 --> 00:34:36,681
Let's do it.

631
00:34:36,681 --> 00:34:38,681
Exactly. But my point is that the adversaries

632
00:34:38,681 --> 00:34:40,681
understand this industry so poorly

633
00:34:40,681 --> 00:34:42,681
that they will, before they

634
00:34:42,681 --> 00:34:44,681
realize what they can do

635
00:34:44,681 --> 00:34:46,681
they will have to

636
00:34:46,681 --> 00:34:48,681
learn about killing the centralized coins.

637
00:34:50,681 --> 00:34:52,681
And there'll have to be a slang term for this

638
00:34:52,681 --> 00:34:54,681
and there'll have to be examples of this.

639
00:34:54,681 --> 00:34:56,681
This will have to enter the Overton

640
00:34:56,681 --> 00:34:58,681
window, you know. This will be like a

641
00:34:58,681 --> 00:35:00,681
mainstream thing first.

642
00:35:00,681 --> 00:35:02,681
That's because you ask in practice. There's a difference

643
00:35:02,681 --> 00:35:04,681
between practice and theory, of course.

644
00:35:04,681 --> 00:35:06,681
That old joke that

645
00:35:06,681 --> 00:35:08,681
in theory there's no difference between theory and practice

646
00:35:08,681 --> 00:35:10,681
but in practice there is.

647
00:35:10,681 --> 00:35:12,681
If I understood correctly, are you saying that

648
00:35:12,681 --> 00:35:14,681
before Bitcoin is destroyed

649
00:35:14,681 --> 00:35:16,681
by the security budget, if that were to happen

650
00:35:16,681 --> 00:35:18,681
it would first happen to

651
00:35:18,681 --> 00:35:20,681
BCH and BSV?

652
00:35:20,681 --> 00:35:22,681
Oh, no, no.

653
00:35:22,681 --> 00:35:24,681
I think you're saying

654
00:35:24,681 --> 00:35:26,681
51% of the time.

655
00:35:26,681 --> 00:35:28,681
Yeah, right.

656
00:35:28,681 --> 00:35:30,681
Have you ever played a video game or something

657
00:35:30,681 --> 00:35:32,681
where you have to

658
00:35:32,681 --> 00:35:34,681
stun the boss first before you move in

659
00:35:34,681 --> 00:35:36,681
with the Master Sword

660
00:35:36,681 --> 00:35:38,681
and they don't glow red?

661
00:35:38,681 --> 00:35:40,681
They don't glow red unless

662
00:35:40,681 --> 00:35:42,681
you hit them at the right time.

663
00:35:42,681 --> 00:35:44,681
I think another way to put it was

664
00:35:44,681 --> 00:35:46,681
before they try it on Bitcoin

665
00:35:46,681 --> 00:35:48,681
they'll practice it on BCH and BSV

666
00:35:48,681 --> 00:35:50,681
and if it works there, then they'll

667
00:35:50,681 --> 00:35:52,681
be like, hey, maybe we could do this to Bitcoin.

668
00:35:52,681 --> 00:35:54,681
Well, right.

669
00:35:54,681 --> 00:35:56,681
There's a whole spectrum.

670
00:35:56,681 --> 00:35:58,681
So some are completely centralized

671
00:35:58,681 --> 00:36:00,681
already.

672
00:36:00,681 --> 00:36:02,681
So that would be like

673
00:36:02,681 --> 00:36:04,681
something where

674
00:36:04,681 --> 00:36:06,681
like,

675
00:36:06,681 --> 00:36:08,681
I don't know, the best example would be

676
00:36:08,681 --> 00:36:10,681
Solana, maybe, something like that.

677
00:36:10,681 --> 00:36:12,681
Where they would just be like

678
00:36:12,681 --> 00:36:14,681
compliant Solana

679
00:36:14,681 --> 00:36:16,681
or whatever the attack is.

680
00:36:16,681 --> 00:36:18,681
Or, you know,

681
00:36:18,681 --> 00:36:20,681
people from the Mafia

682
00:36:20,681 --> 00:36:22,681
find the Solana validators

683
00:36:22,681 --> 00:36:24,681
or they find whoever it is,

684
00:36:24,681 --> 00:36:26,681
a certain key person,

685
00:36:26,681 --> 00:36:28,681
Vitalik or whatever, and they

686
00:36:28,681 --> 00:36:30,681
broadcast messages.

687
00:36:30,681 --> 00:36:32,681
I think I

688
00:36:32,681 --> 00:36:34,681
interpret the

689
00:36:34,681 --> 00:36:36,681
hypothetical optimal strategy

690
00:36:36,681 --> 00:36:38,681
for a

691
00:36:38,681 --> 00:36:40,681
large-scale attack very differently

692
00:36:40,681 --> 00:36:42,681
than you. It's interesting. I'm hearing

693
00:36:42,681 --> 00:36:44,681
what you're saying. Also, by the way, hey, Paul,

694
00:36:44,681 --> 00:36:46,681
I have very much

695
00:36:46,681 --> 00:36:48,681
enjoyed listening to you

696
00:36:48,681 --> 00:36:50,681
rant,

697
00:36:50,681 --> 00:36:52,681
I'll say, over the years.

698
00:36:52,681 --> 00:36:54,681
It's been quite enjoyable

699
00:36:54,681 --> 00:36:56,681
and nice work. I like your work.

700
00:36:56,681 --> 00:36:58,681
I dig it.

701
00:36:58,681 --> 00:37:00,681
So

702
00:37:00,681 --> 00:37:02,681
I don't

703
00:37:02,681 --> 00:37:04,681
think I see it

704
00:37:04,681 --> 00:37:06,681
in actually the opposite

705
00:37:06,681 --> 00:37:08,681
window.

706
00:37:08,681 --> 00:37:10,681
If I were going

707
00:37:10,681 --> 00:37:12,681
to hypothetically

708
00:37:12,681 --> 00:37:14,681
detail

709
00:37:14,681 --> 00:37:16,681
an ideal attack scenario,

710
00:37:16,681 --> 00:37:18,681
I would say

711
00:37:18,681 --> 00:37:20,681
that

712
00:37:20,681 --> 00:37:22,681
attacking in any sort of

713
00:37:22,681 --> 00:37:24,681
material or demonstrable way

714
00:37:24,681 --> 00:37:26,681
a Solana or even an Ethereum

715
00:37:26,681 --> 00:37:28,681
is like

716
00:37:28,681 --> 00:37:30,681
this half step

717
00:37:30,681 --> 00:37:32,681
that only hardens an industry that you'd

718
00:37:32,681 --> 00:37:34,681
rather see go away.

719
00:37:34,681 --> 00:37:36,681
As long as the

720
00:37:36,681 --> 00:37:38,681
largest chain by market cap

721
00:37:38,681 --> 00:37:40,681
exists,

722
00:37:40,681 --> 00:37:42,681
then you don't really achieve

723
00:37:42,681 --> 00:37:44,681
anything meaningful.

724
00:37:44,681 --> 00:37:46,681
While you

725
00:37:46,681 --> 00:37:48,681
may learn something

726
00:37:48,681 --> 00:37:50,681
in practice, you may

727
00:37:50,681 --> 00:37:52,681
learn some technical skill,

728
00:37:52,681 --> 00:37:54,681
you don't achieve

729
00:37:54,681 --> 00:37:56,681
any ends and you ultimately harden

730
00:37:56,681 --> 00:37:58,681
the system.

731
00:37:58,681 --> 00:38:00,681
I would think that

732
00:38:00,681 --> 00:38:02,681
the optimal avenue

733
00:38:02,681 --> 00:38:04,681
for attack would be to get

734
00:38:04,681 --> 00:38:06,681
a chain that is easier

735
00:38:06,681 --> 00:38:08,681
to attack to be the highest

736
00:38:08,681 --> 00:38:10,681
chain by market cap and then proceed.

737
00:38:10,681 --> 00:38:12,681
Yes.

738
00:38:12,681 --> 00:38:14,681
I agree with you.

739
00:38:14,681 --> 00:38:16,681
They're really two sides of the same thing.

740
00:38:16,681 --> 00:38:18,681
You can imagine the decentralization

741
00:38:18,681 --> 00:38:20,681
as being some kind of antibiotic resistance

742
00:38:20,681 --> 00:38:22,681
or something.

743
00:38:22,681 --> 00:38:24,681
The question is, if you poured

744
00:38:24,681 --> 00:38:26,681
antibiotics into

745
00:38:26,681 --> 00:38:28,681
a lake and you're just pouring

746
00:38:28,681 --> 00:38:30,681
antibiotics into the lake,

747
00:38:30,681 --> 00:38:32,681
then eventually the only bacteria that

748
00:38:32,681 --> 00:38:34,681
are still in the lake will be

749
00:38:34,681 --> 00:38:36,681
antibiotic resistant

750
00:38:36,681 --> 00:38:38,681
bacteria.

751
00:38:38,681 --> 00:38:40,681
Then maybe all of the

752
00:38:40,681 --> 00:38:42,681
antibiotic

753
00:38:42,681 --> 00:38:44,681
bacteria, maybe all of them

754
00:38:44,681 --> 00:38:46,681
can be like, I don't know, I'm just making this up,

755
00:38:46,681 --> 00:38:48,681
but they can be eaten by a certain kind of

756
00:38:48,681 --> 00:38:50,681
algae or something.

757
00:38:50,681 --> 00:38:52,681
You put the algae in.

758
00:38:52,681 --> 00:38:54,681
You do all one and then you do all the other.

759
00:38:54,681 --> 00:38:56,681
I totally agree with that.

760
00:38:56,681 --> 00:38:58,681
I was just kind of saying

761
00:38:58,681 --> 00:39:00,681
you have it the other way around

762
00:39:00,681 --> 00:39:02,681
where it's kind of like

763
00:39:02,681 --> 00:39:04,681
what they'll

764
00:39:04,681 --> 00:39:06,681
probably do is they'll probably say

765
00:39:06,681 --> 00:39:08,681
we have this algae that most of the bacteria

766
00:39:08,681 --> 00:39:10,681
in this lake that we don't like.

767
00:39:10,681 --> 00:39:12,681
It's kind of funny because

768
00:39:12,681 --> 00:39:14,681
from the perspective

769
00:39:14,681 --> 00:39:16,681
of certain people,

770
00:39:16,681 --> 00:39:18,681
Bitcoin will be like the small fry

771
00:39:18,681 --> 00:39:20,681
because there'll be so much more fraud

772
00:39:20,681 --> 00:39:22,681
like FTX

773
00:39:22,681 --> 00:39:24,681
and maybe Solana or whatever

774
00:39:24,681 --> 00:39:26,681
and it'll be easier.

775
00:39:26,681 --> 00:39:28,681
Maybe it'll be easier for them to understand

776
00:39:28,681 --> 00:39:30,681
how...

777
00:39:30,681 --> 00:39:32,681
You can do it either way. Either you can say

778
00:39:32,681 --> 00:39:34,681
listen, we're going to make it

779
00:39:34,681 --> 00:39:36,681
so that the bacteria

780
00:39:36,681 --> 00:39:38,681
that dominate this lake

781
00:39:38,681 --> 00:39:40,681
are all vulnerable

782
00:39:40,681 --> 00:39:42,681
to antibiotics and then we'll just come in

783
00:39:42,681 --> 00:39:44,681
and then

784
00:39:44,681 --> 00:39:46,681
we'll shock it with

785
00:39:46,681 --> 00:39:48,681
huge antibiotics and everything will die.

786
00:39:48,681 --> 00:39:50,681
Or you do it the other way around

787
00:39:50,681 --> 00:39:52,681
where you say...

788
00:39:51,917 --> 00:39:58,157
We will make it so that the only bacteria in this lake are the antibiotic resistant ones

789
00:39:58,717 --> 00:40:03,757
and then we'll do the opposite strategy. So the 51% attack the security budget is what

790
00:40:05,917 --> 00:40:09,517
penalizes the antibiotic resistant bacteria. If this is making any sense at all. I mean,

791
00:40:09,517 --> 00:40:15,277
analogies are not very persuasive, I think. Yeah, no, you are making sense. I think maybe

792
00:40:16,236 --> 00:40:21,836
some of the endpoints where I see it becoming dramatically different aren't... Maybe they're

793
00:40:21,836 --> 00:40:30,076
not packaged in the conversation well. So, okay, let's do this. Let's go back to what we were

794
00:40:30,076 --> 00:40:34,076
talking about earlier where we said like, okay, an attack on the chain would result in a

795
00:40:34,957 --> 00:40:41,277
centralization of the coin due to this perception sort of phenomena where people would rely on

796
00:40:41,437 --> 00:40:46,236
a small subset of actors to inform them of the state of the chain, right? We'd all be like,

797
00:40:46,236 --> 00:40:49,597
oh my God, all the nodes are saying different shit. What does Coinbase say the state of the

798
00:40:49,597 --> 00:40:59,516
chain is, right? Is that a decent consumption of your point? Yes. All right. So I don't know

799
00:41:00,317 --> 00:41:07,437
that this actually is the way that it plays out, but let's say that it is. If an attack

800
00:41:07,437 --> 00:41:16,556
takes place, right? Let's go with the scenario of they make the chain larger, they get Ethereum

801
00:41:16,556 --> 00:41:20,796
to flip Bitcoin, and then the treasury says validators can't attest to blocks containing

802
00:41:21,516 --> 00:41:26,957
transactions, and they force Ethereum into a user-activated soft fork. Well, the system as

803
00:41:26,957 --> 00:41:32,876
an aggregate, I mean, a lot of people, the technicals here will escape them as the industry

804
00:41:32,876 --> 00:41:38,717
is made of goldfish. But for a lot of the system, it will become very apparent that this whole

805
00:41:38,717 --> 00:41:43,757
like distributed infrastructure, node operators, network participants over market participants

806
00:41:43,757 --> 00:41:50,476
kind of conversation space did have real meaning. And you would see an increase, I think you would

807
00:41:50,476 --> 00:41:56,876
see a pretty dramatic increase in network participation as a percentage of market

808
00:41:56,876 --> 00:42:03,116
participation. And especially considering the fact that a lot of the market participants

809
00:42:03,116 --> 00:42:09,597
would probably flee, then that metric would probably skyrocket. And if that metric skyrockets,

810
00:42:09,597 --> 00:42:15,277
then there becomes substantially less of a need for somebody to rely on a centralized perspective

811
00:42:15,277 --> 00:42:23,116
because the percentage of network participants has skyrocketed, right? You have more perspectives

812
00:42:23,116 --> 00:42:34,077
to share, right? Does that make sense? No, I'm a little, I guess. Okay. Yeah, I just see,

813
00:42:34,077 --> 00:42:39,036
I see the evolution of it. And it's all, it's dealing in hypotheticals for sure. Like this is

814
00:42:39,036 --> 00:42:44,396
all like game theory of like war room type stuff. So it plays out in a couple of different ways.

815
00:42:44,396 --> 00:42:49,357
But I mean, you don't see, the point is consensus is very difficult. So people will want to know

816
00:42:50,316 --> 00:42:54,877
what are other people going to use for consensus? And so it would naturally be like

817
00:42:55,836 --> 00:43:03,036
Coinbase or like one person. I think the odds of it being a reliance on Coinbase would be

818
00:43:03,036 --> 00:43:09,116
dramatically lower if an attack were to manifest somewhere else first. There's a great tweet from

819
00:43:09,116 --> 00:43:15,997
Nick Szabo from a few years ago, where he wrote something to the effect of what Bitcoin does is

820
00:43:15,997 --> 00:43:22,717
try to minimize the social coordination. And if there is a insufficiency, he doesn't say

821
00:43:23,517 --> 00:43:28,077
this much elaboration, but he says basically that it wouldn't be good to have the plan B.

822
00:43:28,077 --> 00:43:33,277
Well, if there is an attack because of low fees, insufficient economic security, then

823
00:43:33,277 --> 00:43:40,237
we'll just coordinate to solve it. That wouldn't be good because that's not what Bitcoin does well.

824
00:43:41,916 --> 00:43:45,836
That's what traditional finance does is people get together in a boardroom and make a decision.

825
00:43:46,956 --> 00:43:48,316
Bitcoin tries to do the opposite.

826
00:43:49,517 --> 00:43:55,836
Would it be fair to say that by increasing, if you see a dramatic increase in the number of

827
00:43:55,836 --> 00:43:58,637
network participants as a percentage of market participants,

828
00:43:59,196 --> 00:44:04,476
that you would avoid more of the coordination scenario?

829
00:44:09,037 --> 00:44:11,997
Are you talking about network participants defined as full nodes?

830
00:44:12,556 --> 00:44:13,116
Sure. Yep.

831
00:44:13,917 --> 00:44:18,556
So if there's tons of full nodes out there, if everyone in the world who uses Bitcoin,

832
00:44:18,556 --> 00:44:25,997
all 200 million Bitcoiners each has a full node, then if there is a low total fee rate

833
00:44:25,997 --> 00:44:34,796
and low Coinbase, then a 51% hostile miner can still destroy the network by making it impossible

834
00:44:34,796 --> 00:44:39,277
for anyone to send a transaction because they're reorging at every opportunity.

835
00:44:39,277 --> 00:44:44,396
I'm not saying they can't. I'm specifically addressing this notion of becoming reliant

836
00:44:44,396 --> 00:44:50,076
on a single perspective. I'm not trying to augment the nature of a 51% attack.

837
00:44:50,076 --> 00:44:54,556
I'm just discussing the idea that we would become reliant on a central perspective.

838
00:44:58,076 --> 00:45:00,076
Paul, what do you think of that?

839
00:45:00,636 --> 00:45:02,556
I have a lot of real work to do, so I have to leave soon.

840
00:45:02,877 --> 00:45:03,377
OK.

841
00:45:04,956 --> 00:45:15,516
The idea is that the 51% attack makes it so that the nodes do not tell people what the

842
00:45:17,676 --> 00:45:24,396
unique blockchain history is. So they will need to get that information from somewhere else.

843
00:45:25,917 --> 00:45:29,836
I was being charitable. I was saying instead of just the network dying immediately to the 51%

844
00:45:29,836 --> 00:45:35,597
attack, people will try something. They will tweet at Brian Armstrong

845
00:45:37,597 --> 00:45:41,917
and say, my money is at Coinbase. I'm on liquidity or whatever. Whoever has the most liquidity

846
00:45:44,317 --> 00:45:49,757
will just determine what it is until, you know, whatever. Brian Armstrong is,

847
00:45:50,717 --> 00:45:55,116
heaven forbid, assassinated or whatever the heck happens in this weird scenario,

848
00:45:55,597 --> 00:46:01,356
arrested or whatever. Anyway, I have a lot to do, unfortunately.

849
00:46:03,437 --> 00:46:04,717
Thank you for your time here.

850
00:46:04,717 --> 00:46:07,356
Yeah, I appreciate the time, Paul. It was a pleasure talking to you.

851
00:46:07,356 --> 00:46:09,116
Yeah, likewise.

852
00:46:09,116 --> 00:46:13,836
So, Post, what was your thought in response to that and kind of what I was saying, which is,

853
00:46:13,836 --> 00:46:19,437
I think, the same thing, which is that if you have the hostile attacker reorging at every opportunity,

854
00:46:19,437 --> 00:46:24,636
then the heaviest chain, the chain with most proof of work, is a chain with no transactions.

855
00:46:24,717 --> 00:46:29,437
And if they're doing this forever, then things aren't working. Bitcoin would devalue.

856
00:46:29,997 --> 00:46:37,757
Yeah. So, again, I don't want to augment any of the perceptions of a 51% attack. I guess I would

857
00:46:37,757 --> 00:46:42,556
butt heads a little bit with the idea that it's sort of an insta-death thing. If you have a

858
00:46:42,556 --> 00:46:48,636
substantial number of node operators, if there's some reasonable number of node operators, then

859
00:46:48,636 --> 00:46:55,597
the node operators have to make some sort of decision, right? And this may result in some

860
00:46:55,597 --> 00:47:00,157
social coordination that is less than desirable, but the node operators come to some decision where

861
00:47:00,157 --> 00:47:07,116
they say, okay, we have to change the hashing algorithm or something, right? And just burn

862
00:47:07,116 --> 00:47:13,917
all the ASICs to the ground or something to that effect, right? The node operators would have to

863
00:47:13,917 --> 00:47:19,597
make some decision. And without a doubt, this would be an unbelievably traumatic scenario. I

864
00:47:19,597 --> 00:47:24,317
mean, in the conversation about changing the hash rate, you're destroying good miners' chips.

865
00:47:25,437 --> 00:47:33,757
But I feel like if you reread Paul's 2021 blog post on the security budget, the second of his two

866
00:47:34,477 --> 00:47:38,396
lengthy essays on the security budget at truthcoin.info, what you'll see there

867
00:47:38,956 --> 00:47:44,636
is the argument that I agree with, which is that if Bitcoin deviates from proof of work,

868
00:47:44,636 --> 00:47:50,717
as you said, for example, viewing all of the ASICs as a sunk cost and pivoting to a new

869
00:47:51,277 --> 00:47:57,277
hashing algorithm with a new kind of machine, then the problem there is that the security

870
00:47:57,277 --> 00:48:02,717
budget problem once again exists. I don't disagree with that take.

871
00:48:03,037 --> 00:48:08,076
Right. Okay. So we're on the same page fully then. So it's not good if the plan is,

872
00:48:08,076 --> 00:48:12,717
well, if there aren't enough fees and the government can afford to just press this

873
00:48:12,717 --> 00:48:20,157
button that turns off Bitcoin by doing some mining, then if Jason Lowery builds his hashing

874
00:48:20,157 --> 00:48:27,117
force and then Janet Yellen orders him to make it mine empty blocks and reorg forever, then

875
00:48:27,917 --> 00:48:37,756
we have to, the problem is the cost of trying to overcome that is still there. Even if we change

876
00:48:37,756 --> 00:48:42,157
the algorithm, then we have to change again and again and again. And that's what Bitcoin becomes

877
00:48:42,157 --> 00:48:47,756
is a constant cat and mouse game. Yes. I think what honest network participants

878
00:48:47,756 --> 00:48:54,396
ultimately would sort of like be trying to fight for is the preservation of the state

879
00:48:55,117 --> 00:49:04,876
at least up to the point in the attack or to some point at or beyond the start of the attack.

880
00:49:04,876 --> 00:49:11,117
Right. Like that's what they would want to be preserving. And so there would be an enormous

881
00:49:11,117 --> 00:49:15,677
amount of conversation space that would have to exist around how to preserve that state,

882
00:49:15,677 --> 00:49:22,237
like how to move forward. But the more network participants there are, then the less I think

883
00:49:22,237 --> 00:49:28,157
it becomes dependent on a central observer. So again, like I'm not, I'm not trying to say like,

884
00:49:28,157 --> 00:49:32,316
oh, we can get through a 51% attack and it'll all be hunky dory. That's, that's not the point

885
00:49:32,316 --> 00:49:40,237
at all. It is just very, very simply that I think that in any course of events, like any way in

886
00:49:40,237 --> 00:49:47,677
which the narrative or scenario matures, that results in a higher percentage of network participants

887
00:49:47,677 --> 00:49:53,117
as, you know, as compared to market participants, the less reliant you become

888
00:49:53,117 --> 00:49:57,436
on the centralized perspective. That's, that's really the extent of the point.

889
00:50:02,316 --> 00:50:06,636
Super. Please jump in with your thought and anyone else is also welcome to join the stage.

890
00:50:09,357 --> 00:50:12,157
Yeah. One of the, one of the things that occurred to me during that

891
00:50:13,117 --> 00:50:18,797
back and forth was that right now there's about a two year, or it seems to me that there's about,

892
00:50:18,797 --> 00:50:23,917
we go about two years before we come out with new ASICs because it takes a certain amount of time

893
00:50:23,917 --> 00:50:28,636
to design new chips and to get them to even smaller nanometer levels. And then it takes a

894
00:50:28,636 --> 00:50:33,357
certain amount of time to get the contracts to get them built. But yeah, it seems like we have

895
00:50:33,357 --> 00:50:41,357
about a two year turnaround. And so if you, if you disable the current ASICs, then it'll be about,

896
00:50:41,436 --> 00:50:46,477
it'll buy you about two years of time at current levels before they come out with new ones that,

897
00:50:46,477 --> 00:50:51,756
that hash, whatever your new algorithm is. But it's possible that in the future,

898
00:50:52,557 --> 00:50:55,996
this, this timeframe, this time, this window of time will be greatly reduced.

899
00:50:56,956 --> 00:51:01,436
Because one of the reasons it takes a lot of time is because there's not that many designers.

900
00:51:01,436 --> 00:51:05,836
And another reason why it takes a lot of time is that there's, there's a lot of the companies

901
00:51:05,836 --> 00:51:09,597
that manufacture chips for us have contracts with other companies that they prioritize first.

902
00:51:10,557 --> 00:51:14,717
But should Bitcoin continue to grow as an industry, both of those things could easily change

903
00:51:14,717 --> 00:51:19,436
and you could easily pump out, there could be, there could be, there's a possible future where

904
00:51:19,436 --> 00:51:25,436
new ASICs come out every six months instead of every two years. And in that future, you don't,

905
00:51:25,436 --> 00:51:29,677
changing the hash rate doesn't buy you a lot of time before you have the same problem again,

906
00:51:29,677 --> 00:51:36,876
where like one big 51% attacker has all the ASICs again, because he can afford to buy them,

907
00:51:36,876 --> 00:51:45,597
to buy it, to buy up all the contracts. And then it would come down to how either,

908
00:51:46,717 --> 00:51:52,237
so it would come down to how aggressive the competition in the, the fabrication,

909
00:51:53,277 --> 00:51:59,996
like the end point of the fabrication industry is, or it could potentially include other variables,

910
00:51:59,996 --> 00:52:05,756
such as how controlled by the state, the fabrication process is right. So if, if

911
00:52:05,756 --> 00:52:10,956
competition, if there's a low level of control over the fabrication process and the competition

912
00:52:10,956 --> 00:52:16,956
for the end point of the fabrication supply line is high, then it's not a scenario where the attacker

913
00:52:16,956 --> 00:52:21,357
gets all the chips. It's a scenario where a bunch of new miners get the chips, which is like more

914
00:52:21,357 --> 00:52:26,956
along the lines of how we've seen the ASIC industry evolve thus far. Right. Or it's closer to that end

915
00:52:26,956 --> 00:52:32,557
of the spectrum. So it's, it's not so much like, oh, well they'll just make the chips and then

916
00:52:32,557 --> 00:52:38,797
attack you again. It's given these other set of variables, right? So what, you know, and those other

917
00:52:38,797 --> 00:52:44,237
set of variables might be important to understand as you, as you navigate how to preserve the state,

918
00:52:44,237 --> 00:52:48,876
like the conversation about how do we preserve the state may want to take into consideration, like,

919
00:52:49,677 --> 00:52:54,316
you know, the chip fab industry is like, you know, basically strangleholded by the state.

920
00:52:54,316 --> 00:52:59,597
And there's no chance of us changing the hashing algorithm and coming out of this with like

921
00:52:59,597 --> 00:53:07,196
competitive bids on ASICs. So maybe that doesn't work. Right. But it's not, it's not a static

922
00:53:07,196 --> 00:53:12,237
thing. Like there, there are variables at play. Right. Right. Yeah. There are more variables than

923
00:53:12,237 --> 00:53:20,477
just time it takes to manufacture and time it takes to design. Yeah, that's a, that's a good

924
00:53:20,477 --> 00:53:32,876
point. Thank you for bringing that up. So you want to argue again? That was, that was fun when

925
00:53:32,876 --> 00:53:40,717
we did that last week. Yeah. I mean, so I was telling Henry that I think for like you and I

926
00:53:40,717 --> 00:53:45,677
as individuals, like we've, we've spoken pretty extensively. I don't, I don't know how much more

927
00:53:45,677 --> 00:53:50,316
we'd cover, but for the sake of it being a public conversation, I'm certainly down. And if we do

928
00:53:50,316 --> 00:53:55,436
wind up covering new stuff, then great. Maybe one way to clarify the conversation in a slightly new

929
00:53:55,436 --> 00:54:00,876
light would be to talk about, given your agreement, if I understand correctly, you both agree that

930
00:54:00,876 --> 00:54:09,996
drivechain is a great idea. So given that, why does, why, why does it seem to you super to be

931
00:54:09,996 --> 00:54:22,316
good to think about like censorship when the long run goal would be just smaller block size and,

932
00:54:22,316 --> 00:54:28,797
you know, having things naturally move to a sidechain rather than try to force them out of layer

933
00:54:28,797 --> 00:54:37,597
one through censorship? Well, some forks, some soft forks are easier than others. And I don't,

934
00:54:37,597 --> 00:54:41,277
I don't want to remove one from the table just because there's another one that's out there as

935
00:54:41,277 --> 00:54:47,516
well. However, I, since then a couple of things have changed and I'd like to let Post Malone know

936
00:54:47,516 --> 00:54:53,117
that I think he's, he's basically, or circumstances have won me over to his side since our conversation

937
00:54:53,117 --> 00:54:59,836
happened. In the new circumstances, these roll up things came out, the roll kit protocol came out,

938
00:54:59,836 --> 00:55:06,157
which exacerbates the problem of using Bitcoin as a dumping ground even, even further, but introduces

939
00:55:06,157 --> 00:55:12,076
a new set of players. Now it's not just monkey JPEG people who are dumping data on Bitcoin.

940
00:55:12,717 --> 00:55:18,876
It's like these, these blockchain designers who have a vested financial interest in getting someone

941
00:55:18,876 --> 00:55:25,996
else to host their data for them. And I think that while the NFT people didn't have a lot of,

942
00:55:27,357 --> 00:55:34,076
or don't have a lot of, what's the word? I don't think they, they have stick-to-itiveness,

943
00:55:34,076 --> 00:55:37,996
where if we started blocking them and censoring their transactions, I think they would give up

944
00:55:37,996 --> 00:55:42,636
and move elsewhere pretty quickly. I don't think these Ethereum roll-up devs would. I think they

945
00:55:42,636 --> 00:55:51,357
would fight more our attempts to block them and continue dumping data on Bitcoin through

946
00:55:52,396 --> 00:55:59,756
means other than inscriptions. So I think that's a lost battle now. And I'm just going to advocate

947
00:55:59,756 --> 00:56:05,597
for a soft fork to reduce the block size rather than a soft fork to specifically kick out

948
00:56:05,597 --> 00:56:10,316
inscriptions, which is what you wanted, but you didn't want me to advocate for censoring

949
00:56:10,316 --> 00:56:15,277
inscriptions all along. So congratulations. Now I'm more aligned with you. What do you think?

950
00:56:18,717 --> 00:56:25,436
Well, you know, perhaps the answer is great, but I, I, my answer would really be that I,

951
00:56:26,157 --> 00:56:31,917
like, I find it unfortunate that the alignment comes in the form of like erosion like this.

952
00:56:33,436 --> 00:56:40,956
But the, the idea of roll-ups being something that existed within the use of this,

953
00:56:42,956 --> 00:56:48,956
this right story, this right space, right? Like this. Okay. So the way, the way that Ethereum,

954
00:56:49,516 --> 00:56:55,356
like it trajects its future for roll-ups is by leveraging blob space, right? Like they want,

955
00:56:55,356 --> 00:57:00,957
they want to do this blob space thing and they want to write the roll-up state in the blob space.

956
00:57:00,957 --> 00:57:09,037
And then they want to use smart contracts to settle to Ethereum, right? So what the envelope,

957
00:57:09,037 --> 00:57:14,876
the inscription envelope is, is effectively a cheaper version of the blob space that Ethereum

958
00:57:14,876 --> 00:57:23,116
already wants. And the people paying it, if you're, if you're paying really close attention

959
00:57:23,677 --> 00:57:28,876
to the evolution of several different narratives in Bitcoin over the course of the past year and a

960
00:57:28,876 --> 00:57:36,557
half, then the idea of roll-ups on Bitcoin was fairly apparent as far back as a year to a year

961
00:57:36,557 --> 00:57:44,636
and a half ago. I like, I personally have been sort of like chomping at the bit, sweating in

962
00:57:44,636 --> 00:57:51,197
anticipation of these roll-ups on Bitcoin. Now, in the case of this specific demonstration with

963
00:57:51,197 --> 00:57:59,596
Rollkit, it is, it is a substantially less than desirable, like prototypical demonstration of

964
00:57:59,917 --> 00:58:08,476
how you might start to go about the process. I personally, and this actually counts as a

965
00:58:08,476 --> 00:58:17,756
little bit of a criticism for 300301 as well, I think that mechanism design that does not allow

966
00:58:18,557 --> 00:58:24,236
for trustless deposit and withdrawal that is at the sort of like, let's say, let's call it

967
00:58:24,236 --> 00:58:30,716
native speeds of the L1, right? Like it's slower than the L1 is expected to be. Ultimately results

968
00:58:30,716 --> 00:58:38,557
in users being forced into LPs that facilitate these deposits and withdrawals. And those

969
00:58:38,557 --> 00:58:45,917
processes become sort of like on-chain KYC AML injection services. Not to mention that the, the,

970
00:58:45,917 --> 00:58:50,077
the absence of a trustless nature of deposit or withdrawals completely

971
00:58:50,636 --> 00:58:54,876
weakens a lot of the arguments made by the base layer of like the way things ought to be.

972
00:58:55,516 --> 00:59:00,476
So I'm not, I'm not super, I'm very excited about the conversation that Rollkit

973
00:59:01,037 --> 00:59:06,077
creates, like the conversation space around that, I think is awesome. I think that the way that

974
00:59:06,077 --> 00:59:14,636
that evolves, hopefully is into, you know, better executions than Rollkit is, right?

975
00:59:14,876 --> 00:59:20,157
But as a broad generalization, like we all knew, we all knew the roll-ups were coming and we were

976
00:59:20,157 --> 00:59:27,677
all pretty excited about it. And as I did with inscriptions, I would encourage you to try and

977
00:59:27,677 --> 00:59:34,476
see that there, there, there is a lot to be done with it without compromising Bitcoin, like with,

978
00:59:34,476 --> 00:59:43,916
with it without compromising Bitcoin, without dismissing what we intend Bitcoin to be, without

979
00:59:43,916 --> 00:59:45,596
increasing block space, without

980
00:59:47,573 --> 00:59:51,013
augmenting. all that data into witness data.

981
00:59:52,213 --> 00:59:57,733
Well, yeah, using it as a data availability surface is the point though, right? And there,

982
00:59:57,733 --> 01:00:04,453
there's a million amazing ways to use that. And it's not increasing block space. It's usual,

983
01:00:04,453 --> 01:00:10,853
it's using the block space that was already there. And I, I think where you and I just like,

984
01:00:10,853 --> 01:00:20,373
cannot come to merger is that you think that the block space should only be usable by some very

985
01:00:20,373 --> 01:00:27,492
narrow terms. And I, I would say, I don't think it's really possible, like the, the timeframe

986
01:00:27,492 --> 01:00:32,853
that we would have to wait for that block space to be used in like these very, like sort of

987
01:00:33,492 --> 01:00:39,332
turbo primitive mechanisms that you see it as ought to be used for would be very long.

988
01:00:39,332 --> 01:00:42,853
And by the time we get there, right? Like by the time we get to the point where the

989
01:00:42,853 --> 01:00:46,612
block space is being used by that, then all the things that you don't like about this stuff are

990
01:00:46,612 --> 01:00:52,212
going to be priced out anyway. No, like nobody's going to be printing fucking JPEGs for a half a

991
01:00:52,212 --> 01:00:58,053
million dollars. Like it's not going to happen. I don't want to say it's not going to happen.

992
01:00:59,013 --> 01:01:02,133
But I find it less than likely. Well, it could be less prevalent,

993
01:01:03,332 --> 01:01:11,013
a smaller percentage, a smaller issue if it's price. Oh, right. Yeah. Using blob space to

994
01:01:11,013 --> 01:01:17,493
facilitate other like, okay. So I don't know how familiar you are with like John light and

995
01:01:17,493 --> 01:01:23,413
Dugan's research into validity roll-ups, but like that whole thing goes around this sort of like,

996
01:01:23,413 --> 01:01:30,212
you know, you have, you have to write a proof, right. And like, according to Dugan,

997
01:01:30,212 --> 01:01:36,773
if we take Dugan at his word, then with no like material changes to the Bitcoin protocol,

998
01:01:36,773 --> 01:01:42,773
you could roll up a hundred thousand P2PKH transactions into a single block like today.

999
01:01:42,773 --> 01:01:49,812
Right. And those wouldn't require, those wouldn't require like novel liquidity channels,

1000
01:01:49,812 --> 01:01:54,213
like a lightning that wouldn't, you know, there'd be a lot of improvements to the scalability of

1001
01:01:54,213 --> 01:01:59,493
Bitcoin and people's ability to use Bitcoin affordably for financial transactions. And

1002
01:01:59,493 --> 01:02:04,612
the other really great thing in my, in my mind, the thing that I really like about John's research

1003
01:02:04,612 --> 01:02:12,213
thus far is that he has been, you know, very forward about advancing the ways in which Bitcoin

1004
01:02:12,213 --> 01:02:18,372
would assert rules on the L2, like on the rollup. We're like, okay, you can only do this type of

1005
01:02:18,372 --> 01:02:24,213
shit. Right. And I think that that is a very good angle to approach this from, but that requires us

1006
01:02:24,213 --> 01:02:29,493
to write to this, like, we have to be able to use this blob space on Bitcoin to do that. And

1007
01:02:29,493 --> 01:02:34,773
interestingly, as it turns out, it's actually about one sixth the cost to write to Bitcoin

1008
01:02:34,773 --> 01:02:39,092
than it is, than it is to Ethereum. So the people that are developing these tools in other networks

1009
01:02:39,092 --> 01:02:46,853
are actually like, you know, deeply attracted to it now. Yeah. I mean, that's only until we have

1010
01:02:47,653 --> 01:02:52,372
a whole other conversation. ETH will probably get cheaper and better.

1011
01:02:53,413 --> 01:02:57,732
Say it again. Sorry. I say ETH will likely improve and cheapen.

1012
01:02:58,773 --> 01:03:03,252
Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. So like once, once ETH has matured, some other development initiatives,

1013
01:03:03,252 --> 01:03:07,573
like they're like, they're, they actually are sort of in this interesting dilemma where

1014
01:03:08,933 --> 01:03:13,493
like the current regime of ZK rollups may not actually even demonstrate any material

1015
01:03:13,493 --> 01:03:18,612
bandwidth improvement or throughput improvement, which is like kind of, it's like kind of an

1016
01:03:18,612 --> 01:03:25,013
interesting dilemma to be in. But for the time being, like there is a lot of interest around

1017
01:03:25,013 --> 01:03:33,732
the space. And I think that you don't like what I, I personally have no interest in seeing the

1018
01:03:33,732 --> 01:03:38,293
tokenize everything agenda migrate its way to Bitcoin. Like as far as I'm, as far as I'm

1019
01:03:38,293 --> 01:03:43,252
concerned, that, that mindset, that, that approach to the development process or the financing

1020
01:03:43,252 --> 01:03:49,252
process can sort of fuck off. Like it's all just, it's such a, it's such a horrendously stupid way

1021
01:03:49,252 --> 01:03:57,173
to do it for like a vast plurality of reasons. But the, there is a lot of engineering skill there.

1022
01:03:57,173 --> 01:04:03,972
And if that engineering skill can be motivated to, I'll use my own Twitter bio as a reference here.

1023
01:04:03,972 --> 01:04:07,972
If it can be motivated to plug into the second control report, then like, I think there's a lot

1024
01:04:07,972 --> 01:04:14,052
of good to be had in that. And I think super is sort of stuck in this world where, you know,

1025
01:04:14,052 --> 01:04:19,652
he, he wants, he wants it to just be these, these sort of like primitive expected Bitcoin transactions

1026
01:04:19,652 --> 01:04:27,972
that occur. And I think that there is to, to some degree, a failure to recognize that there are

1027
01:04:28,532 --> 01:04:34,212
very, very useful end points for this. And we can't get those end points without also having

1028
01:04:34,212 --> 01:04:39,333
the permission to write JPEGs, right? Like I, we, like you, Bitcoin is permissionless. If you

1029
01:04:39,333 --> 01:04:43,333
can write data, then you can write data. Right? So right now people are writing JPEGs.

1030
01:04:43,333 --> 01:04:50,532
Well, if the mentality was to block it, like the overwhelming BTC-ers,

1031
01:04:51,413 --> 01:04:53,893
then it, then it wouldn't be blocked. Is that accurate?

1032
01:04:55,013 --> 01:04:58,293
Well, that's definitely not, it's not an overwhelming majority of BTC-ers.

1033
01:04:58,293 --> 01:04:59,733
I didn't say it was, I said it was.

1034
01:04:59,733 --> 01:05:00,613
Yeah, it's just me.

1035
01:05:00,613 --> 01:05:03,333
I'm asking you if it's worth it.

1036
01:05:03,333 --> 01:05:09,333
So if the, if the social consensus, if the social consensus were that we should block it,

1037
01:05:09,333 --> 01:05:13,252
then I like, you know, I, I would probably still try and rationalize with them.

1038
01:05:13,252 --> 01:05:18,372
I'm just saying, what I'm saying, let's have, would it get, would it get blocked?

1039
01:05:18,932 --> 01:05:21,893
Let's have super, sorry to interject, but just quickly.

1040
01:05:24,133 --> 01:05:31,893
It would require a dramatic fork that changes a number of features over an eight year time period,

1041
01:05:31,893 --> 01:05:35,413
well, a seven year time period in order to fork it out.

1042
01:05:35,413 --> 01:05:39,013
It would be extraordinarily difficult to remove this.

1043
01:05:40,693 --> 01:05:47,092
Or, or if it wasn't these tenacious Ethereum people trying to do roll-ups on it,

1044
01:05:47,092 --> 01:05:50,853
then, and it was just the monkey JPEG people, I think they would quickly give up.

1045
01:05:50,853 --> 01:05:55,173
If without, it wouldn't take eight years, I think it would take like maybe one year

1046
01:05:55,173 --> 01:05:58,693
of soft forking out every attempt to take it in descriptions.

1047
01:05:59,092 --> 01:06:02,613
And you'd have to unwind, you'd have to unwind seven years of feature ads.

1048
01:06:02,613 --> 01:06:03,333
That's what I'm saying.

1049
01:06:04,212 --> 01:06:07,812
You, you would, you would have to go back to 2016 to get rid of this, man.

1050
01:06:07,812 --> 01:06:09,333
Like it, it would be rough.

1051
01:06:10,613 --> 01:06:11,652
I don't think you would though.

1052
01:06:11,652 --> 01:06:15,173
I think if you just, if you just banned, you know, the, the inscription envelope,

1053
01:06:15,173 --> 01:06:17,733
the op-if op or op false op-if construction.

1054
01:06:18,293 --> 01:06:22,372
No, because then I would just do op true op dump off false op-if.

1055
01:06:22,372 --> 01:06:25,173
Like I would just like, there's a million different ways you could write this.

1056
01:06:26,133 --> 01:06:26,372
Right.

1057
01:06:26,372 --> 01:06:30,772
I know, but I don't think they have the patience to keep on rewriting their software every,

1058
01:06:30,772 --> 01:06:31,733
every, you know, three months.

1059
01:06:31,733 --> 01:06:34,932
We already have 18 different ways we could do it.

1060
01:06:34,932 --> 01:06:38,772
You, you would have to undergo a new soft fork every single time to mitigate something

1061
01:06:38,772 --> 01:06:40,932
that takes 45 minutes to slap together.

1062
01:06:41,652 --> 01:06:42,853
It just won't work, dude.

1063
01:06:42,853 --> 01:06:43,413
I'm sorry.

1064
01:06:43,413 --> 01:06:45,092
I don't, I don't want to frame it in that way.

1065
01:06:45,092 --> 01:06:48,532
Cause it sounds like, it sounds like it's this like malicious attack when you do that.

1066
01:06:48,532 --> 01:06:49,652
Like, okay, remediate.

1067
01:06:49,652 --> 01:06:51,173
And I'll just tap it again, this other angle.

1068
01:06:51,173 --> 01:06:54,453
Like, I don't, I hate framing it that way, but we have to be pragmatic about it.

1069
01:06:54,453 --> 01:07:02,133
It would take the envelope authors 45 minutes to work around a soft fork that you organized.

1070
01:07:02,133 --> 01:07:06,932
And now, now you have to organize another soft fork and then they do 45 minutes for

1071
01:07:06,932 --> 01:07:07,492
the tinkering.

1072
01:07:07,492 --> 01:07:09,972
And then you have to organize another soft fork.

1073
01:07:09,972 --> 01:07:12,052
And then they do 45 minutes for the tinkering.

1074
01:07:12,052 --> 01:07:16,052
The network winds up like the end of this process is like, that's the step that kills

1075
01:07:16,052 --> 01:07:16,532
Bitcoin.

1076
01:07:18,453 --> 01:07:24,133
So I don't think it would take them just 45 minutes to, to do all this because here's

1077
01:07:24,133 --> 01:07:28,052
one thing that would happen that I think would happen is you've already got like 15

1078
01:07:28,052 --> 01:07:34,453
different projects on ordinals and each of them has to do this, do this process of changing

1079
01:07:34,453 --> 01:07:39,013
the inscriptions and any new developer who wants to make a new project has to support

1080
01:07:39,013 --> 01:07:39,492
all of them.

1081
01:07:40,293 --> 01:07:44,613
So they literally merge and update to one GitHub repo and then do a notification in

1082
01:07:44,613 --> 01:07:47,972
the discord server that's like, Hey, version 0.5.7 is released.

1083
01:07:47,972 --> 01:07:48,532
Download it.

1084
01:07:52,372 --> 01:07:52,613
Okay.

1085
01:07:52,613 --> 01:07:53,333
I'll put it this way.

1086
01:07:53,333 --> 01:07:55,413
It would take less effort than the soft fork.

1087
01:07:55,413 --> 01:07:57,092
And that's the problem, right?

1088
01:07:57,092 --> 01:07:58,372
That's the reason this doesn't work.

1089
01:08:00,052 --> 01:08:05,413
I don't, I don't think that's true though, because even although it takes less effort

1090
01:08:05,413 --> 01:08:09,972
in some sense, I think the NFT people aren't willing to put in that, that effort.

1091
01:08:11,732 --> 01:08:15,732
Like just, I'm imagining if I'm coming on and I want to make the next ord swap and I

1092
01:08:15,732 --> 01:08:19,172
look at the ord documentation and it's like, okay, first you have to support up if, then

1093
01:08:19,172 --> 01:08:23,172
you have to support up if, up not up if, then you have to put up true, up not up if,

1094
01:08:23,172 --> 01:08:27,013
then you have to do up true to up not if, and you have to support all these different

1095
01:08:27,013 --> 01:08:28,773
formats because we're in a fight with Bitcoiners.

1096
01:08:29,333 --> 01:08:31,412
I think that you guys would be like, how about we just not.

1097
01:08:31,412 --> 01:08:34,453
I think you're underestimating how enthusiastic people are about this.

1098
01:08:34,453 --> 01:08:41,492
I personally taught literal hundreds of people how to use CLI so that they could become node

1099
01:08:41,492 --> 01:08:42,052
operators.

1100
01:08:43,172 --> 01:08:46,372
People are ravenously, ravenously excited about this.

1101
01:08:47,333 --> 01:08:51,893
I like, you know, I, the only way, the only way for us to really know is to play the cat

1102
01:08:51,893 --> 01:08:52,533
and mouse game.

1103
01:08:52,533 --> 01:08:54,052
So I guess go and play it.

1104
01:08:54,052 --> 01:09:00,453
But I will tell you that I'm extraordinarily confident in the sort of like analysis that

1105
01:09:00,453 --> 01:09:03,013
the cat and mouse game would not work.

1106
01:09:03,812 --> 01:09:09,412
And that, that even if you were successful in organizing a dozen back-to-back soft forks,

1107
01:09:09,412 --> 01:09:11,573
you still would wind up with people writing envelopes.

1108
01:09:12,453 --> 01:09:19,573
Yeah, so I, a reminder, I do agree with you now, because I think that the roll kit thing

1109
01:09:19,573 --> 01:09:23,492
changes things and that I think those, those people who want to do roll ups have a lot

1110
01:09:23,492 --> 01:09:26,052
more stick-to-itiveness than the NFP people do.

1111
01:09:26,052 --> 01:09:28,372
And so they would, they would not give up as easily.

1112
01:09:28,372 --> 01:09:32,533
They would, they would fight us back-to-back and they wouldn't care about updating their

1113
01:09:32,533 --> 01:09:34,932
software frequently because they already do that.

1114
01:09:34,932 --> 01:09:38,773
So were you, were you present or tuned into any of the conversations about roll ups on

1115
01:09:39,013 --> 01:09:41,412
Bitcoin prior to this roll kit thing?

1116
01:09:41,412 --> 01:09:44,052
Because that conversation space has existed for a year and a half now.

1117
01:09:45,573 --> 01:09:53,732
Yeah, I mean, the first deep dive I made into roll ups was when John Light published his

1118
01:09:53,732 --> 01:09:54,292
paper on them.

1119
01:09:55,252 --> 01:10:00,292
So I guess that wasn't a year and a half ago, but it was like six months ago, I think.

1120
01:10:00,292 --> 01:10:02,773
So that was when I first started becoming interested in them.

1121
01:10:03,732 --> 01:10:07,093
Although, but even before then, when roll ups first came out on Ethereum, I thought

1122
01:10:07,093 --> 01:10:11,333
they were interesting and I heard all good things about them, but I didn't read about

1123
01:10:11,333 --> 01:10:14,453
them until, until John Light made his paper.

1124
01:10:15,093 --> 01:10:19,412
Yeah, the, the, the introduction of ZK roll ups is really what sort of like gravitated

1125
01:10:19,412 --> 01:10:23,893
me back to like doing a lot of research in that ecosystem, because I do, I do think that

1126
01:10:23,893 --> 01:10:29,333
there's a lot of extraordinarily interesting use for, you know, use cases for cryptography

1127
01:10:29,412 --> 01:10:34,612
are interesting in general, but that one in particular offers a lot for like this industry.

1128
01:10:35,653 --> 01:10:38,372
So I guess I would be curious, sans roll kit.

1129
01:10:38,372 --> 01:10:43,573
All right, like, let's, let's leave, I think roll kit is like this prototypical conversation

1130
01:10:43,573 --> 01:10:44,052
starter.

1131
01:10:44,052 --> 01:10:47,252
It's not what we should, like, it's, it's not where we should want to be.

1132
01:10:47,252 --> 01:10:51,093
But in the larger conversation, that is the idea of roll ups on Bitcoin, where do, where

1133
01:10:51,093 --> 01:10:51,812
would you say you stand?

1134
01:10:53,333 --> 01:10:54,533
Yeah, I'm in favor.

1135
01:10:54,533 --> 01:11:00,773
I look at them as a probably slightly better version of drivechain in that if you, when

1136
01:11:00,773 --> 01:11:06,213
I compare them analytically, I think both of them are trying to take a lot of, a bunch

1137
01:11:06,213 --> 01:11:12,052
of state on a separate blockchain, compress it into something small with, with what's

1138
01:11:12,052 --> 01:11:17,893
with the drivechain, they compress it into a hash with ZK proofs or with roll ups, they

1139
01:11:17,893 --> 01:11:20,773
compress it into a proof, a proof of what happened on the blockchain.

1140
01:11:20,773 --> 01:11:23,492
They put that proof or that hash on Bitcoin.

1141
01:11:23,492 --> 01:11:26,372
And that's all that nodes have to validate is that one small thing.

1142
01:11:26,372 --> 01:11:29,732
I think that, from my perspective, that's, that's really good.

1143
01:11:29,732 --> 01:11:34,213
Roll ups are probably even a little bit better than, than drivechain.

1144
01:11:35,492 --> 01:11:39,573
So that my general stance is, I'm in favor, but let's do them.

1145
01:11:39,573 --> 01:11:42,133
Let's put that whatever we can do to get to a peg.

1146
01:11:42,133 --> 01:11:42,693
Let's do.

1147
01:11:43,333 --> 01:11:47,013
But I think the, to bring it back to roll kit, I think there are particular things that

1148
01:11:47,732 --> 01:11:53,973
they don't, they don't do that.

1149
01:11:53,973 --> 01:11:59,412
They don't put just a proof of what happens on an off chain system on Bitcoin.

1150
01:11:59,412 --> 01:12:03,973
They put the entire state into witness data, like every single block, the entirety of the

1151
01:12:03,973 --> 01:12:05,412
block goes into witness data.

1152
01:12:06,292 --> 01:12:07,333
And that's just stupid.

1153
01:12:07,333 --> 01:12:10,852
It's like, and the only reason they're doing that is because they're like, we don't want

1154
01:12:10,852 --> 01:12:15,412
to run a node of this sidechain and no one else wants to run a node of this sidechain.

1155
01:12:15,412 --> 01:12:17,252
So we'll just dump all the blocks onto Bitcoin.

1156
01:12:17,893 --> 01:12:18,453
And that's that.

1157
01:12:19,093 --> 01:12:22,773
So the way that I thought it would, I'll share with you the way that I thought it would have

1158
01:12:22,773 --> 01:12:23,732
been more interesting.

1159
01:12:23,732 --> 01:12:27,732
And like, maybe I should have diverted my own time to focus on this and I'd be out in front

1160
01:12:27,732 --> 01:12:28,773
of the roll kit conversation.

1161
01:12:28,773 --> 01:12:29,093
I don't know.

1162
01:12:29,732 --> 01:12:34,372
But what I thought would be more interesting is to define a state transition function in

1163
01:12:34,372 --> 01:12:40,773
the initial envelope and then have some sort of, like you, you use some, you know, multi

1164
01:12:40,773 --> 01:12:43,333
sig lock channel lock, right?

1165
01:12:44,052 --> 01:12:50,052
And some number of participants run the state transition function and they re-envelope,

1166
01:12:52,292 --> 01:12:56,292
we really shouldn't call it inscription because they really like, they're running this sort

1167
01:12:56,292 --> 01:12:59,492
of other thing that uses the same technique, but it's not really an inscription.

1168
01:13:01,252 --> 01:13:06,533
So they write the state transition function and then following the state transition function,

1169
01:13:06,533 --> 01:13:14,213
they write, you know, compressed state updates or, you know, hash state updates or state

1170
01:13:14,213 --> 01:13:15,573
routes or whatever it is, right?

1171
01:13:15,573 --> 01:13:17,492
Like there's a lot of different ways you can go about that.

1172
01:13:19,252 --> 01:13:23,333
And I think that would have been like a lot more, that still would have been a prototype

1173
01:13:23,333 --> 01:13:27,252
and not necessarily like the way it should be done in the end, but it would have been

1174
01:13:27,252 --> 01:13:29,653
like perhaps more desirable than what we have.

1175
01:13:29,653 --> 01:13:35,252
I see roll kit as a conversation starter and in its capacity as a conversation starter,

1176
01:13:35,252 --> 01:13:36,213
I like it.

1177
01:13:36,533 --> 01:13:40,612
If a year from now, roll kit is like the way we're doing business, then I would probably

1178
01:13:40,612 --> 01:13:42,612
join you in some very deep criticisms.

1179
01:13:45,732 --> 01:13:45,973
Cool.

1180
01:13:45,973 --> 01:13:48,052
Well, I guess we'll just wait a year then and see.

1181
01:13:48,773 --> 01:13:49,172
Yeah.

1182
01:13:49,172 --> 01:13:53,252
I hope that it's, that it isn't the way that the Ethereum people start doing roll ups,

1183
01:13:53,252 --> 01:13:59,812
but yeah, I guess I think they don't really care in my estimation of them.

1184
01:13:59,812 --> 01:14:03,893
They don't really care where the, about using data efficiently.

1185
01:14:03,893 --> 01:14:05,973
They just care about them not having to store it.

1186
01:14:07,653 --> 01:14:09,893
They don't want to have to store all that data.

1187
01:14:09,893 --> 01:14:14,133
So if they can shove it onto Bitcoin, I think that I would not be, I will not be surprised

1188
01:14:14,133 --> 01:14:19,333
if they're happy to do that and then continue doing super inefficient things, but now just

1189
01:14:19,333 --> 01:14:22,453
shove it all on Bitcoin as the data availability later.

1190
01:14:22,453 --> 01:14:33,973
I think they want a product development surface.

1191
01:14:33,973 --> 01:14:36,372
I think if it meant them storing it, they would store it.

1192
01:14:36,932 --> 01:14:42,533
But I think that the sort of hype narrative that comes baked into this notion of roll

1193
01:14:42,533 --> 01:14:48,612
ups on Bitcoin, it could definitely mature into like extraordinarily rushed development.

1194
01:14:48,612 --> 01:14:51,252
We already see problems with rush development, right?

1195
01:14:51,252 --> 01:15:00,372
I think that the inscriptions market right now is in this sort of limbo period where

1196
01:15:00,372 --> 01:15:05,573
the lazy developers who are rushing production to be first to market are developing far less

1197
01:15:05,573 --> 01:15:11,893
than desirable products, while the people that want to see a more robust, trustless,

1198
01:15:11,893 --> 01:15:18,453
distributed infrastructure emerge are hammering away at keyboards, trying to get to the point

1199
01:15:18,453 --> 01:15:21,893
where they can demonstrate meaningfully, these are the lazy shits, right?

1200
01:15:23,893 --> 01:15:25,013
And that'll happen.

1201
01:15:26,372 --> 01:15:27,492
I'm working in that team.

1202
01:15:27,492 --> 01:15:29,013
I'm working on those things every day.

1203
01:15:29,013 --> 01:15:29,732
It will happen.

1204
01:15:30,533 --> 01:15:32,213
It's just a process.

1205
01:15:33,732 --> 01:15:38,693
I think the interpretation there for the roll kit thing is the people who do want to see

1206
01:15:38,693 --> 01:15:44,213
it mature better, the John Lights, the Dougans, the Yous, the Me's, you just got to hammer

1207
01:15:44,213 --> 01:15:45,013
at the keyboard, man.

1208
01:15:45,573 --> 01:15:46,693
You got to make the better shit.

1209
01:15:47,653 --> 01:15:48,292
The only way to beat that.

1210
01:15:48,292 --> 01:15:49,412
I'm doing my best.

1211
01:15:49,412 --> 01:15:50,133
I'm doing my best.

1212
01:15:50,133 --> 01:15:53,412
Most of it's in the drivechain space, but I see them as pretty much equivalent.

1213
01:15:54,693 --> 01:15:56,852
The only way to beat it is to outship, man.

1214
01:15:56,852 --> 01:15:57,893
That's the only way to do it.

1215
01:15:59,893 --> 01:16:00,133
Yeah.

1216
01:16:00,852 --> 01:16:01,412
Yeah, you're right.

1217
01:16:01,412 --> 01:16:02,453
I agree with that.

1218
01:16:02,453 --> 01:16:03,172
Outship them.

1219
01:16:03,973 --> 01:16:06,773
If you don't build the better thing, they'll build the worst thing, and then that'll get

1220
01:16:06,773 --> 01:16:07,252
popular.

1221
01:16:11,412 --> 01:16:11,732
Cool.

1222
01:16:11,732 --> 01:16:13,013
Well, we agree too much.

1223
01:16:13,013 --> 01:16:16,052
I thought we were going to have a lot of fun arguing, and we only got a minute of that.

1224
01:16:16,693 --> 01:16:25,333
So anyway, what were you going to ask?

1225
01:16:26,292 --> 01:16:35,412
I was going to try to perhaps summarize and reset where it sounds like we might be in

1226
01:16:35,412 --> 01:16:40,932
agreement about smaller blocks being good and drivechain being good, and that things

1227
01:16:40,932 --> 01:16:46,613
like ordinals and inscriptions would, if we adopt drivechain and perhaps also a smaller

1228
01:16:46,613 --> 01:16:52,853
block size on layer one, then there wouldn't be any inspiration for censorship, and instead

1229
01:16:52,853 --> 01:17:00,932
the activity of users of all kinds would flow to their natural place on a sidechain that

1230
01:17:00,932 --> 01:17:02,932
is designed to facilitate that use.

1231
01:17:05,973 --> 01:17:09,172
Yeah, except I would say it's still censorship.

1232
01:17:10,052 --> 01:17:14,932
If you add a soft fork that creates small blocks, you're still censoring out something.

1233
01:17:14,932 --> 01:17:20,373
You're specifically censoring out anything larger than data size X.

1234
01:17:20,373 --> 01:17:22,853
Any block that's larger than X is what you're censoring.

1235
01:17:24,132 --> 01:17:25,733
So that's still censorship.

1236
01:17:25,733 --> 01:17:29,012
It's just censorship of a different thing, and perhaps one that more Bitcoiners would

1237
01:17:29,012 --> 01:17:31,733
be inclined to say is okay to censor.

1238
01:17:32,453 --> 01:17:37,093
Well, not every limit is a censor, right?

1239
01:17:37,093 --> 01:17:46,052
The word censorship refers to the imposition of a value judgment on a constituent of a

1240
01:17:46,052 --> 01:17:50,613
set of activities or data, doesn't it?

1241
01:17:50,613 --> 01:17:58,132
So if I say in this room we're talking about drivechain and everyone's free to talk about

1242
01:17:59,093 --> 01:18:05,573
BIP-119 in a different room, then that's not censorship.

1243
01:18:06,213 --> 01:18:09,652
That's just something else, isn't it?

1244
01:18:11,253 --> 01:18:12,132
In my opinion, it is.

1245
01:18:12,132 --> 01:18:21,973
I would say you're imposing a value judgment, but the value judgment is not that talk about

1246
01:18:21,973 --> 01:18:26,772
BIP-118 is inherently bad, just that it's bad in this context, because here we're trying

1247
01:18:26,772 --> 01:18:27,973
to talk about something else.

1248
01:18:28,373 --> 01:18:33,493
If Twitter says there can only be three hosts per Twitter space, that's not censorship.

1249
01:18:33,493 --> 01:18:36,532
That's a design choice.

1250
01:18:36,532 --> 01:18:45,573
So if they increase to four or to two instead of three as the maximum number, that's not

1251
01:18:45,573 --> 01:18:46,132
censorship.

1252
01:18:46,132 --> 01:18:51,333
That's just a design choice designed to facilitate value creation.

1253
01:18:54,292 --> 01:18:55,253
I would say it is.

1254
01:18:55,973 --> 01:19:02,453
I really doubt that anyone here is interested in a philosophical analysis of what counts

1255
01:19:02,453 --> 01:19:03,652
as censorship or not.

1256
01:19:03,652 --> 01:19:04,453
Okay, fair enough.

1257
01:19:04,453 --> 01:19:10,693
I just feel like censorship isn't really part of drivechain or smaller block size.

1258
01:19:10,693 --> 01:19:18,132
It's about the design of the protocol to enable the most value creation.

1259
01:19:19,093 --> 01:19:26,932
So that's the trick, is that the protocol, like what Satoshi chose, it required a somewhat

1260
01:19:26,932 --> 01:19:29,253
centralized planning, right?

1261
01:19:29,253 --> 01:19:31,493
He chose the issuance schedule.

1262
01:19:31,493 --> 01:19:34,373
He chose the one megabyte block size limit.

1263
01:19:34,373 --> 01:19:37,652
He chose 21 million coins.

1264
01:19:37,899 --> 01:19:45,819
So he had to make certain choices based on his view of reality. Yeah. Post, please chime in.

1265
01:19:46,539 --> 01:19:56,059
Yeah. So those things, it's not really feasible to start a network. If we wanted to start our own

1266
01:19:56,059 --> 01:20:04,538
network right now, some more centralized set of decision-making would have to occur before a

1267
01:20:04,538 --> 01:20:08,379
decentralized set of decision-making could. So the way I like to think about it is, you know,

1268
01:20:08,379 --> 01:20:13,259
like every idea starts in one person's head. And then if other people like the idea, they adopt it

1269
01:20:13,259 --> 01:20:19,178
and potentially augment it moving forward. So I don't think there's an... Excuse me. Hold on.

1270
01:20:22,779 --> 01:20:30,139
God bless you. I think, yeah, I agree with that. And I also think that you can launch

1271
01:20:30,939 --> 01:20:35,259
without having a central... It's possible to launch stuff that has no central

1272
01:20:35,259 --> 01:20:41,178
point of control, even if, well, it's just an idea. Yeah. You can do whatever you want with it.

1273
01:20:43,818 --> 01:20:47,899
Like some person sits down and writes the initial code and then it gets launched.

1274
01:20:47,899 --> 01:20:54,619
And so I guess my point to that is like using that as the sort of...

1275
01:20:54,939 --> 01:21:01,418
I don't know. Words are failing me. But to using that as like the argument, I don't think... I do

1276
01:21:01,418 --> 01:21:06,939
think that being really sensitive to the design choices of that person when they wrote it is like

1277
01:21:06,939 --> 01:21:14,619
really important. Like why was this decision made and should this decision be upheld at Infineon?

1278
01:21:14,619 --> 01:21:20,858
Those conversations should absolutely exist. But it doesn't necessarily always make sense to me

1279
01:21:21,098 --> 01:21:29,818
to be like, this decision was made... So the peer discovery process, right? This would be a really

1280
01:21:29,818 --> 01:21:35,339
good example. The initial peer discovery process for Bitcoin was like, it was literal jank. It was

1281
01:21:35,339 --> 01:21:43,979
complete jank. It was connected to Satoshi's IRC server. Right, exactly. You read a list of IPs off

1282
01:21:44,858 --> 01:21:50,859
of an IRC channel and you connect it up to them. So that had to be evolved, right? Like that was

1283
01:21:50,859 --> 01:21:55,658
an initial decision that was made that we absolutely would be like in the dumbest of

1284
01:21:55,658 --> 01:21:59,899
positions if we had said, oh, we should never change this because this is the way Satoshi did

1285
01:21:59,899 --> 01:22:04,699
it or something to that effect. So there are a lot of things he did that I think should never be

1286
01:22:04,699 --> 01:22:10,378
changed, right? Like if we can never change the 21 million supply, we should not, right?

1287
01:22:11,339 --> 01:22:17,018
But I don't think... I don't know. I'm not necessarily even accusing Henry of doing this,

1288
01:22:17,018 --> 01:22:21,738
but I think that it is sort of unfortunately common that we do things like say, Satoshi

1289
01:22:21,738 --> 01:22:25,818
designed it this way and that should never be changed. I think that we owe it to ourselves

1290
01:22:25,818 --> 01:22:30,538
to have better conversation about what should or should not change. I think I am sometimes

1291
01:22:30,538 --> 01:22:35,419
tempted to do that. And I wouldn't be surprised if Henry is sometimes the siren song of just

1292
01:22:35,419 --> 01:22:40,938
saying, well, Satoshi did it this way because everyone respects him. Satoshi agreed with me on

1293
01:22:40,938 --> 01:22:45,979
this. Therefore, you should agree with me too. But of course, Henry knows as well as anyone else

1294
01:22:45,979 --> 01:22:53,098
that Satoshi was wrong sometimes. So that's not a sufficient argument. The appeal to Satoshi's

1295
01:22:53,098 --> 01:22:59,339
authority is not sufficient, but there's nothing wrong with saying Satoshi agrees with this too.

1296
01:23:00,298 --> 01:23:05,979
Yeah, from a historical perspective, what Satoshi thought is a valid inquiry. We can,

1297
01:23:05,979 --> 01:23:10,779
as a historical matter, discuss scientifically what did he say based on the evidence of the

1298
01:23:10,779 --> 01:23:16,859
record of his public statements and messages. So that's interesting. But of course, what he said

1299
01:23:16,859 --> 01:23:26,139
isn't necessarily the truth. He failed to invent the two-way peg for sidechains. So he thought

1300
01:23:26,139 --> 01:23:33,499
in the BitDNS thread that every blockchain would be a merged mined altcoin of Bitcoin. He didn't

1301
01:23:33,499 --> 01:23:39,259
think of a two-way peg for a sidechain, which is a superior economic design because then instead of

1302
01:23:39,259 --> 01:23:47,658
merely sharing fees, every blockchain also shares the same unit of account. So the synthetic Bitcoin

1303
01:23:47,658 --> 01:23:53,419
on the sidechains trades one for one with the Bitcoin on layer one because of the two-way peg.

1304
01:23:53,419 --> 01:24:00,619
He failed to invent that. That's DriveChainBit300. So he also was like incorrect about a few other

1305
01:24:00,619 --> 01:24:06,858
things, like his understanding of network security wasn't the same as ours because he didn't conceive

1306
01:24:06,858 --> 01:24:11,659
of a hostile perpetual miner. And therefore he said, perhaps in the future, people will be able

1307
01:24:11,659 --> 01:24:19,499
to process fees for free, which wasn't quite right, this idea of relying on ideological mining.

1308
01:24:19,578 --> 01:24:25,339
And also he said that we wouldn't care how big the nodes get in the future. It wouldn't matter.

1309
01:24:25,339 --> 01:24:31,978
So he wasn't cognizant of our, he didn't have our sense of cheap nodes as being important. So that's

1310
01:24:31,978 --> 01:24:38,138
why the big blockers, they focus on those few sentences where he said that we, he effectively

1311
01:24:38,138 --> 01:24:43,659
said we'll have just huge blocks and it won't matter that people, ordinary people won't run nodes.

1312
01:24:43,659 --> 01:24:48,939
Today, we have a different view, at least within Drivechain, that small blocks and perhaps smaller

1313
01:24:48,939 --> 01:24:54,219
blocks is ideal and let the big blocks be opt-in, not mandatory.

1314
01:24:57,659 --> 01:25:03,418
I also, Sochi also changed his mind sometimes, and that's important to keep, or that's worth

1315
01:25:03,418 --> 01:25:07,499
noting. It's like sometimes he'll say one thing and then later he'll change his mind about it.

1316
01:25:09,178 --> 01:25:13,018
Or he'll have like a nuanced take where like there's two conflicting things that he,

1317
01:25:13,978 --> 01:25:19,339
nevermind. Yeah, I forget. I had something else and I forget what it was.

1318
01:25:23,978 --> 01:25:28,059
Another thing that I disagree with Satoshi about was his Rothbardian

1319
01:25:29,258 --> 01:25:32,939
notion that fractional reserve banking isn't good.

1320
01:25:36,059 --> 01:25:40,858
Oh yeah, I remember what it was. He didn't, he may not have come up with the two APEG

1321
01:25:41,099 --> 01:25:48,219
in that one post where he was discussing merged mining, but he did in the white paper, he talks

1322
01:25:48,219 --> 01:25:54,539
about escrow, which it seems that he conceived of as essentially a two of three multi-sig.

1323
01:25:55,178 --> 01:25:59,899
And in other posts, he talked about a two of two multi-sig as another way of doing escrow without

1324
01:25:59,899 --> 01:26:04,138
a third, without a trusted third party. And I suspect you can make a two way peg out of that.

1325
01:26:05,099 --> 01:26:12,379
So he may have thought of the tools we need to do a two way peg without inventing the concept.

1326
01:26:12,939 --> 01:26:18,298
But that's not a peer to peer two way peg. And I should have used that more extensive description

1327
01:26:18,298 --> 01:26:25,659
of what I was talking about. So BIP300 aspires to be a peer to peer two way peg. Whereas

1328
01:26:27,738 --> 01:26:32,619
what Satoshi was talking about in his escrow conversations, and he did seem very excited

1329
01:26:32,619 --> 01:26:39,819
about them, is he was interested in having like me send you an order for a box of shoes and you

1330
01:26:39,819 --> 01:26:45,099
send me the money, but you're not going to want to send me the money until the box of shoes arrives

1331
01:26:45,099 --> 01:26:50,298
in the mail. And therefore the plan would be that you send your money, your payment to the escrow

1332
01:26:50,298 --> 01:26:54,298
account. And then I see that it's there. So I know you're good for the money. And then I released

1333
01:26:54,298 --> 01:26:58,138
the shipment to you. And then when you get the shipment, you release the payment to me.

1334
01:26:58,858 --> 01:27:04,939
And that is Satoshi's arrangement for like escrow without a third party. That was the thing

1335
01:27:04,939 --> 01:27:12,379
that he was very excited about is that kind of anarchic voluntarist kind of Silk Road style,

1336
01:27:13,099 --> 01:27:19,258
you know, payment system where there's there's minimal reliance on trust. It's not perfect,

1337
01:27:19,258 --> 01:27:22,939
but it's trust minimized because I don't have to trust that you have the money. You've proven you

1338
01:27:22,939 --> 01:27:27,018
have the money. And then you send me the shoes. And then when you get them, you release the money

1339
01:27:27,018 --> 01:27:32,858
to me. So there is a worst case scenario where you spike me and you get the shoes and then don't

1340
01:27:32,858 --> 01:27:37,339
release the money. But at least you can't get the money back ever. So that was what he was talking

1341
01:27:37,339 --> 01:27:45,738
about, not a two way peg between blockchains. Right. But I think just as Liquid uses a

1342
01:27:45,819 --> 01:27:55,659
a large, what is it, 12, 11 of 15 multisig to do a two way peg, I think you can also use

1343
01:27:56,379 --> 01:28:03,899
a small, you know, two of two peg or two of two escrow to do a two way peg and then not have

1344
01:28:05,738 --> 01:28:13,739
the problems of like having of needing to trust the 11 of 13 people, to be honest.

1345
01:28:14,618 --> 01:28:19,498
Wait, can you explain how are how aren't the people being trusted who are running the

1346
01:28:19,498 --> 01:28:27,018
federated multisig? Those people are. If you get rid of them and do instead of instead of doing

1347
01:28:27,018 --> 01:28:33,578
that model of escrow, you do the two of two escrow that Satoshi talked about. Then if you do that

1348
01:28:33,578 --> 01:28:41,018
instead, then I don't think you have to trust the other people. I don't understand. I think that

1349
01:28:41,578 --> 01:28:45,818
like I gave you the shoes example where someone's buying shoes from someone else.

1350
01:28:46,458 --> 01:28:52,618
And then I talked about how that reduces trust because of the existence of an on chain verifiable

1351
01:28:52,618 --> 01:28:58,938
publicly visible escrow account where you send your payment as like an intermediate stop before

1352
01:28:58,938 --> 01:29:04,698
it gets to the goods seller. I don't see how that's related to what Liquid does.

1353
01:29:11,018 --> 01:29:15,899
Do you hear me?

1354
01:29:22,859 --> 01:29:26,938
Super, can you hear me or post? Are you there?

1355
01:29:29,258 --> 01:29:34,938
Yeah, I am here. I got distracted for a minute. No problem. Other related nonsense going on.

1356
01:29:35,659 --> 01:29:41,018
Sorry, maybe we lost super. But what I was saying is basically, oh, he's back. Okay.

1357
01:29:43,739 --> 01:29:47,179
Super, you're. Are you there now? Can you hear me?

1358
01:29:52,779 --> 01:30:01,179
Oh. Okay, great. Yeah, my app crashed. Yeah, I don't know. But basically, we've we've touched

1359
01:30:01,179 --> 01:30:06,779
on this before. But the basic fundamental idea in my mind is that, like in drivechain,

1360
01:30:06,779 --> 01:30:12,859
the two way peg is peer to peer. And like, that's how I see it. I think that's how Paul sees it.

1361
01:30:12,859 --> 01:30:18,138
I think that's how Adam Back sees it. Like, it's peer to peer because anyone can get involved in

1362
01:30:18,138 --> 01:30:22,618
mining. You don't need anybody's permission. And therefore you can it's peer to peer. You don't

1363
01:30:22,618 --> 01:30:29,659
need privileges to become a miner and participate in controlling the hash rate escrow. But in

1364
01:30:29,659 --> 01:30:35,099
liquid, all the money in the world might not be enough to get you control of that federated

1365
01:30:35,099 --> 01:30:39,739
multisig. So it's not peer to peer. It's not there's there's more than an economic barrier.

1366
01:30:39,739 --> 01:30:46,299
There's a social barrier to entry to participate in this in the role of a functionary on liquid.

1367
01:30:47,739 --> 01:30:52,458
So it's not peer to peer. That's the difference. That's what blockchain is all about. The whole

1368
01:30:52,458 --> 01:30:57,979
space is all about peer to peer protocols. That's like the most important narrative of any in my

1369
01:30:57,979 --> 01:31:01,179
personal understanding, which is probably wrong. But let me know your thought.

1370
01:31:01,979 --> 01:31:05,899
Yeah, I'm saying if you if each individual who pegged into the sidechain did so through a two

1371
01:31:05,899 --> 01:31:09,899
of two multisig and not through an 11 or 15, then I think you get you can get rid of

1372
01:31:10,539 --> 01:31:13,419
the get rid of the Federation and still have the two way peg.

1373
01:31:21,179 --> 01:31:24,458
I just don't know what that means. But I appreciate you sharing it.

1374
01:31:25,419 --> 01:31:28,618
It's not fully worked out yet. So I've got to do some more thinking about it.

1375
01:31:28,618 --> 01:31:34,859
And maybe it's just a dumb idea. I mean, are you saying that like billions of people would be

1376
01:31:34,859 --> 01:31:41,578
each participating in a two of two multisig? And that would be a user experience that's viable?

1377
01:31:43,339 --> 01:31:47,818
Yes, except probably not billions. I think sidechains are probably only get millions of

1378
01:31:47,818 --> 01:31:53,018
users each. But yeah, that's that's the basic idea. If if if the pegging operation involves

1379
01:31:53,659 --> 01:31:57,818
creating a two of two multisig, then I think you could do it without needing to trust a

1380
01:31:57,818 --> 01:31:59,419
without needing to trust anyone but yourself.

1381
01:32:06,618 --> 01:32:14,458
Interesting. Well, thank you very much for all of the conversation today. This has been another

1382
01:32:14,458 --> 01:32:21,578
drivechain Twitter spaces we've rebranded as drivechain talk, or Bitcoin drivechain talk

1383
01:32:21,578 --> 01:32:28,299
is the title here. So we tried that out today. I thought it would maybe be a smash hit. We got

1384
01:32:28,859 --> 01:32:34,618
a number of people in the audience and people on stage. Thank you super imposed for being here. I

1385
01:32:34,618 --> 01:32:40,458
really appreciate it. I really love listening to both of you speak. I hope that you'll always come

1386
01:32:40,458 --> 01:32:46,299
back anytime you'd like to share ideas or listen or chat. So we run these spaces every Monday and

1387
01:32:46,299 --> 01:32:53,258
Thursday, usually at 930am pacific time, although we're flexible to have different times. If either

1388
01:32:53,258 --> 01:33:00,859
of you would like to do like a debate or a talk about anything in the future, please don't hesitate

1389
01:33:00,859 --> 01:33:06,539
to let me know. Henry at LayerTwo Labs like I would love to schedule something around your time

1390
01:33:06,539 --> 01:33:13,258
or because both of you are people who I think understand drivechain very well and have all

1391
01:33:13,258 --> 01:33:17,979
kinds of exciting other ideas to talk about. So you're welcome to come back whenever you want and

1392
01:33:17,979 --> 01:33:24,219
as much as you want. So maybe I'll see you on Thursday or any other time. And our goal here is

1393
01:33:24,219 --> 01:33:29,979
to promote understanding of drivechain. I think that we have the truth on our side. So with enough

1394
01:33:29,979 --> 01:33:36,618
talk of drivechain in the community, we can incite more support for it and maybe get it to be part of

1395
01:33:36,618 --> 01:33:44,138
Bitcoin. Thanks for your time and for hosting. I'm going to I'm going to head out so I can go get

1396
01:33:44,138 --> 01:33:50,859
some lunch. See you later. Adios. Thank you for being here and post. Do you have any closing

1397
01:33:50,859 --> 01:33:55,899
thoughts? No, I was just going to say thanks and have a good one. That's it. Thank you very much.

1398
01:33:55,899 --> 01:33:57,179
Have a great day.