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This is a special archive recording of Paul Sztorc appearing on

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What to Expect When Expecting Forks,

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hosted and recorded by the MARA Foundation on July 30th, 2026.

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This was not an eCash X Space, but eCash, $ECX,

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was one of the main topics.

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Follow the MARA Foundation on X at MARAFoundation underscore.

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Now, here's the conversation.

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Hi, guys. Diego, can you hear me?

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Yes, I can.

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Hi. Yay. Okay. Okay, good. I'm glad that we were able

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to figure out how to turn off the music.

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Yay. Oh, my gosh. Okay, so we've got, we're just getting

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everyone on stage, guys. Bear with us for a moment.

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I see Matt's on stage, Paul's on stage, Vlad's on

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stage. I think Rob, Portland, and Peter, do we see,

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are they here or are they not here? They are here,

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but we need to get them on stage, right? If you're

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still a listener, if you can accept my invite, that'd be great.

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Very cool. Portland, are you on stage or no? Rob, Portland?

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Let's try to get Rob and Portland up here.

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Cool.

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Rob is ready.

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Yay. All right. Yeah, exactly. Sometimes I can't tell who's up

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because I don't think this thing refreshes super consistently.

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Hi, guys. Thank you so much for being

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here. I am really excited about this space.

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I feel like this has been kind of a long time

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coming, this space. And, yeah, we've got a very big

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month, the month of August, coming up with two

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special forks, one soft and one hard.

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Let's talk about it.

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So, yeah, I think we'll probably start talking with, we'll

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probably start chatting about BIP-110. We've got some folks up

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here who are very expert in that subject matter on both

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sides. We're going to try and keep this as neutral and

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balanced as possible. Thank you in advance to Matt Hill, who

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will be repping the BIP-110 sympathizing

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side of things. So very grateful to you for bringing the

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balance to the panel. And then, yeah, we're going to also

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be talking about eCash, which is a hard fork initiated

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by Paul Sztorc, who's on stage.

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And that will be, I think, set to be coming up

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just a couple of short weeks after the potential BIP-110

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soft fork. So, yeah, got a lot to chat about today.

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Really quickly, I'll just introduce myself for folks who are new.

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My name is Isabel Fox in Duke. I lead the MARA Foundation.

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MARA Foundation is sort of leading Bitcoin strategic initiatives for

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MARA, the Bitcoin miner,

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including Bitcoin R& D, Bitcoin education.

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Lots of fun stuff that we're working on here at the

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MARA Foundation. So feel free to give us a follow if

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you're interested in kind of consuming educational content like this, especially

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on the technical side and mining side of things.

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And, yeah, I'm just, like, thrilled with everyone here.

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Paul Sztorc, I've already kind of semi-introduced, author of Drive

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Chains, BIP300, BIP301, and also the mastermind behind

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the hard fork that will be coming up in a few

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weeks. eCash, which we'll get into.

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Leo, I am very excited to have you here as well,

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repping the spammers, as they may say, which I say is

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a term of endearment at this point. I think we should

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reclaim that term, Leo. And, yeah, I'm excited to kind of

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get your point of view on this. Rob and Portland, so

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happy to have you here. Hopefully be the voices of reason

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on the technical side of things.

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Repping Anchor Watch, one of the coolest companies in all

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of Bitcoin, in my opinion.

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And, yeah, I'm really also thrilled to have Chris and Vlad

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here who have been really covering these, both of these forks,

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I think, pretty well. You guys make amazing Bitcoin

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content, and I'm very glad to have you hopefully help me

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kind of wrangle this crew a little bit.

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And, yeah, see, I see Stu down there.

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That was, I was going to say, maybe we'll have to

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bring up Stu at some point as well. He also makes

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amazing content on these topics.

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So, yeah, I think I have introduced just about everyone.

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And, yeah, I'm just really excited to dive in.

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So, without further ado, I would love to just set the

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container. Again, for anyone, I think most of the folks listening

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may already kind of be slightly familiar with the

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BIP-110 TLDR.

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What is this thing? Why is this thing?

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But, yeah, I think it would be probably useful just to

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get a little bit of an introduction. I'm hoping maybe Matt

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will be the person who can kind of get us

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started with just giving like just straight up a little overview.

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What is BIP-110 and why? And then I, you know,

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anyone else on stage can feel free to jump in and

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maybe offer, you know, a counter argument. But, yeah, Matt, would

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you be would you be willing to do that? Would you

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be willing to give a little introduction to kind of BIP

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110 and the intention behind it and kind of why this

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is being put forward?

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I can try. I'm definitely not the best person in the

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world to kind of describe the gritty details and

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rationale and motivation behind BIP-110. I'm definitely in

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the loop enough to try to speak on behalf of that

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camp. I personally would like to see the fork succeed,

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but I definitely am not the most outwardly spoken proponent

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of that BIP. I tend to focus on Bitcoin

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governance. I like to talk about how Bitcoin works and its

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political nature a lot.

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I'm also very outwardly spoken in favor of spam mitigation

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through policy and network rate limiting.

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But BIP-110 itself, I have been less

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focused on and less of an expert on.

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But I will do my best. Fair enough. BIP-110, insofar

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as, again, I understand all the details,

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broadly speaking,

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is an effort to reassert Bitcoin and

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the network's willingness to fight spam.

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I believe that is the overarching motivation is to reassert

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hostility towards spam and the network's

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willingness to continue fighting against it.

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I believe that proponents of BIP-110, again,

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myself included,

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believe that if BIP-110 fails, the will

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to fight spam will go with it.

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That it will essentially be a permanent surrender to

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the idea that spam cannot be fought on

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Bitcoin and therefore no attempt to fight it should be made.

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And so I think a lot of people supporting this soft

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fork are not willing to make that concession at this time.

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And they view BIP-110 as a necessary

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event in order

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to reassert that will. BIP-110 itself does not stop spam.

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I don't think anybody makes that claim.

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But it does reassert the community's will to fight spam.

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So I think that's the best I can give.

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Matt, would you mind giving, and I know this is, I

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mean, maybe you disagree that this is a subjective term, but

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would you mind giving your definition of spam?

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Like, what is spam?

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Yeah, fun.

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So, you know, I think spam can be

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defined as you know it when you see it. It's something

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that you don't want. So, for example, when it comes to email,

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everyone can agree what spam is. And it's any emails

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that you receive that are of no interest to you that

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you do not want and sort

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of are a nuisance. They are annoying to you.

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They are distracting to you.

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And in a worst case scenario, they're actually causing harm to

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your system, right? Like, for example, the denial of service attack

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of just information could be classified as spam.

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That's on the extreme end of,

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you know, you would no longer call that spam. You would

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call that an attack. But spam is sort of the lesser

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manifestation of a denial of service attack.

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It's just stuff you don't want being thrown at you, even

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though you don't want it.

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So it's subjective in the sense of, you know, what I

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don't want being thrown at me is not what somebody else

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might want. One person's spam is another person's gold. That's fine.

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But I think in aggregate, most people would agree on what spam is.

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That doesn't mean somebody else can say it's not spam.

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They're welcome to do that. But most people would agree.

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And therefore, that is sort of how it gets the badge

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of spam. If a super majority of people agree that it is.

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Leo, I'm wondering if you would mind kind of offering your

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counter just because it's probably like the most opposite, like

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I would imagine, of Matt's. Like, you're probably like on the

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as, you know, somebody who's was very deep in the Ordinal's

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ecosystem. I would say you're probably have like the most far

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reaching outer end of this debate.

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And so I would love for you to maybe chime in

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on comment on whatever you think the counter might be here.

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And then, yeah, and then we'll open it up to the

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rest of the group. But I would I would love to

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get Leo's take first just to kind of set the polls.

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I mean, look, I don't really disagree with anything Matt just

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said. Like, if somebody wants to define something as spam, that's

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their opinion. They can do that. Obviously, to fork the Bitcoin

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network and make it the canonical Bitcoin network, you need to

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convince a lot of people to agree with you, which I

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think it's really it's really hard to do that.

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I think you're going to find out that this 110 is

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definitely not going to succeed.

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And, you know, I think that's just the obvious outcome here.

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But I think it's an interesting conversation to have.

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I'm happy to get into the details with Matt if he wants to.

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I actually think it's interesting that Matt's on this stage.

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I hadn't heard of Matt personally. I knew Start9, didn't

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didn't know the founders read a post the other day that

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Matt had worked on a protocol called Worker a few years

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back in 2019, where he developed an OP_RETURN based inscription

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protocol for basically essentially building like a Twitter clone

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on top of Bitcoin, using Bitcoin to store the tweets and

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the social graph and that sort of thing where you would

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like make a post and then it would make 189, you

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know, transactions. Each 80 byte OP_RETURN transaction, essentially

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storing tweets and whatever information you want to put on Bitcoin.

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I didn't know that. Just respect to Matt.

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I think that's super cool. I think it's kind of unfortunate

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to hear that maybe Matt's, you know, not still

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interested in doing experiments like that on Bitcoin anymore.

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But I just thought that was kind of neat. I hadn't

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really heard of anybody doing that before. And I had actually

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thought of that like years ago when Ordinal started.

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Like, wow, that would be pretty cool.

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To my knowledge, nobody's actually built that other than Matt that

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I just found out about. So I just wanted to kind

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of maybe pose Matt a question here.

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Like, why did you stop working on that? Like, what were

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your learnings? What was it that caused this sort of change

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of heart where maybe you're against that sort of activity on Bitcoin now?

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Well, I appreciate the compliment. And the reason I posted that

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was, you know, it wasn't to make a point, wasn't to

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brag. It was just to provide some context in hopes,

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I guess, that people would understand that I'm not coming at

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this blindly. Right. Like, I've been in the space for a

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while and I built data protocols on top of Bitcoin.

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And now we actually, you know, did most of the

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borking, so to speak. A borker is a dog that barks

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a lot. That's why we called it borker as opposed to

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Twitter, right? Just a bird that chirps.

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So and it aligned with Dogecoin as well, which is where

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we did most of our testing.

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It's where people were actually engaging. And the reason that we

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did it on Dogecoin, for obvious reasons, is that one, it

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was extremely cheap fees. Like every transaction on Doge back in

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2019 was one Doge, which at that time was, I think,

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you know, a fifth of a penny. So it was really,

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really cheap to do, even for, you know, long form posts.

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Block times were also one minute.

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And, you know, we didn't rely on mempool visibility for

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borks to show up in your feed.

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We actually relied on it being mined first.

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And so the one minute blocks were really, really useful there

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as well. Dogecoin also, you know, comparatively has a reasonable amount of protection.

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The hash rate is fairly high since it's merged mined with

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Litecoin. So for all of those reasons, we were like, yeah,

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this sort of makes sense to, like, have the main, you

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know, network and interactions taking place on Dogecoin.

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But it was chain agnostic. Any UTXO based blockchain

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that supported OP_RETURN could accommodate it, which means in the

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web UI that we built, we never actually got to this

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because we moved on, you know, and are very focused on

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Start9 first. But you would be able to choose your

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00:14:28,520 --> 00:14:31,720
chain. So when you went to put together a post or

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a bork, as we call them, you would say, I want

243
00:14:34,140 --> 00:14:36,680
to post this on Bitcoin, Litecoin or Dogecoin.

244
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You basically have your kind of gold, silver and bronze selection.

245
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And the idea was, well, if you're willing to pay Bitcoin fees,

246
00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:48,120
then this this message is really important. And so it carries

247
00:14:48,120 --> 00:14:52,320
more weight. So in people's feeds, right, we were

248
00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:56,520
we were indexing. We actually built a bespoke indexer for

249
00:14:56,520 --> 00:14:59,740
Dogecoin that we called Super Doge. That was basically an Electrum

250
00:14:59,740 --> 00:15:00,660
server for Dogecoin.

251
00:15:01,580 --> 00:15:03,920
But there was nothing like it out there and we couldn't

252
00:15:03,920 --> 00:15:05,740
use Electrum off the shelf. So we had to build our

253
00:15:05,740 --> 00:15:09,800
own indexer. But the idea is that the Borker server that

254
00:15:09,800 --> 00:15:12,500
you ran, which was an open source piece of software, would

255
00:15:12,500 --> 00:15:15,780
connect to indexers for each chain.

256
00:15:16,340 --> 00:15:19,300
And you would run those nodes yourself on your own server

257
00:15:19,300 --> 00:15:24,220
and basically have this self-sovereign feed coming from multiple blockchains

258
00:15:24,220 --> 00:15:26,860
where you could see all of the posts that people had

259
00:15:26,860 --> 00:15:29,160
made on the various chains. And you could filter for I

260
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:31,720
only want to see posts that are on Bitcoin because those

261
00:15:31,720 --> 00:15:34,340
are the most valuable, the most important. Or I want to

262
00:15:34,340 --> 00:15:37,060
see everything or you could rank them differently, etc.

263
00:15:37,220 --> 00:15:41,500
And an algorithm that's also self-hosted could determine what you

264
00:15:41,500 --> 00:15:44,020
see and when you see it. You could follow people.

265
00:15:44,460 --> 00:15:49,320
You could block people. You could flag posts as inappropriate and

266
00:15:49,320 --> 00:15:52,480
run an indexer that would filter those out locally for like

267
00:15:52,480 --> 00:15:54,960
child protection and stuff. I think we really thought this through.

268
00:15:54,960 --> 00:15:55,960
We built Twitter,

269
00:15:56,820 --> 00:16:01,360
a multi-chain Twitter that used Operaturn

270
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for all of this.

271
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And because of the 83 byte limit, we're very familiar with

272
00:16:07,460 --> 00:16:11,380
how this limit affected us because we had to design around

273
00:16:11,380 --> 00:16:16,020
it. We had to crack a message up into 180

274
00:16:16,020 --> 00:16:20,740
transactions like I posted about is Francisco de Ancona's

275
00:16:20,740 --> 00:16:23,400
money is the root of all good speech. I put that

276
00:16:23,400 --> 00:16:27,340
entire speech on Bitcoin, but it took 183 transactions.

277
00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:31,260
But the Borker protocol did it automatically. I just pasted the

278
00:16:31,260 --> 00:16:35,340
speech in, hit enter and 183 transactions spanning, I don't know,

279
00:16:35,400 --> 00:16:39,300
like five or six blocks, each linking to the prior one.

280
00:16:39,340 --> 00:16:41,740
It's just a linked list is on Bitcoin.

281
00:16:41,860 --> 00:16:44,760
And I posted the link to that transaction. The question is,

282
00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:48,140
why are you on the 110 side?

283
00:16:49,540 --> 00:16:53,600
Well, so I don't know.

284
00:16:53,780 --> 00:16:56,840
I learned a lot over the last seven years.

285
00:16:57,060 --> 00:16:57,680
I feel like I've,

286
00:16:59,700 --> 00:17:02,480
you know, a lot has happened in my life and in my business.

287
00:17:03,540 --> 00:17:05,800
And sure. But, you know, the idea that someone like Peter

288
00:17:05,800 --> 00:17:09,100
Todd can't just come up with some other linked list, which,

289
00:17:09,440 --> 00:17:11,920
of course, would take him 15 minutes.

290
00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:14,840
Yeah. So.

291
00:17:16,940 --> 00:17:19,660
I have come to recognize,

292
00:17:20,420 --> 00:17:22,480
so we worked around the 83 byte limit,

293
00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:25,160
but it was work.

294
00:17:25,940 --> 00:17:29,600
It was far more costly to do it that way than

295
00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:30,800
it would have otherwise been.

296
00:17:31,920 --> 00:17:36,280
But even that could have been filtered out.

297
00:17:36,280 --> 00:17:41,000
Right. Basically, for any method of embedding data,

298
00:17:42,140 --> 00:17:45,700
there can emerge a method of of stopping.

299
00:17:47,900 --> 00:17:50,580
And it's an endless cat and mouse game.

300
00:17:50,800 --> 00:17:53,380
Every way of stopping it, the way of getting around it.

301
00:17:53,380 --> 00:17:55,840
And, of course, at that point, you would a reasonable person

302
00:17:55,840 --> 00:17:58,740
would look at the cost benefit on both sides of like,

303
00:17:58,800 --> 00:18:02,660
how long does it take to coordinate the 110 soft fork?

304
00:18:03,700 --> 00:18:06,120
Well, you're not even going to get, by the way, because

305
00:18:06,120 --> 00:18:09,180
it's like probably nothing will happen on August 9th or whatever.

306
00:18:09,780 --> 00:18:12,260
But but, you know, it's taking months and months of planning

307
00:18:12,260 --> 00:18:15,420
versus then it just takes whoever wants to get around it.

308
00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:18,460
Just like, you know, well, that's a very small amount of

309
00:18:18,460 --> 00:18:22,220
effort. So I was very involved in the policy debates of

310
00:18:22,220 --> 00:18:25,740
2025. OK, and and this was the essence of that debate

311
00:18:25,740 --> 00:18:30,480
is, OK, well, you're going to you're going to filter some

312
00:18:30,480 --> 00:18:34,120
type of transaction. And you need to get everyone on the

313
00:18:34,120 --> 00:18:36,780
network. Right. Like 90 percent of the nodes on the network

314
00:18:36,780 --> 00:18:40,960
to agree with your filter to adopt this filter for to

315
00:18:40,960 --> 00:18:42,140
have any effect whatsoever.

316
00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:45,620
I shouldn't say that it'll have some effect around maybe 80

317
00:18:45,620 --> 00:18:49,560
percent. It's still kind of a quite imperfect figure, but above

318
00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:51,740
90 and it starts to become quite effective.

319
00:18:53,260 --> 00:18:55,540
So, one, you're going to be chasing this thing forever.

320
00:18:55,540 --> 00:18:58,200
Cat and mouse. And two, even if you do get the

321
00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:02,440
90 percent adoption, people can still build preferential relay networks

322
00:19:02,440 --> 00:19:05,620
and sideload to miners. And this was the essence of the

323
00:19:05,620 --> 00:19:09,920
debate. And where I came down on that debate was, yeah,

324
00:19:10,100 --> 00:19:11,540
it's cat and mouse forever.

325
00:19:12,540 --> 00:19:16,700
Preferential relay networks will emerge and can also be mitigated through

326
00:19:16,700 --> 00:19:19,360
spoofed nodes, things like garbage man.

327
00:19:19,360 --> 00:19:23,560
So there are basically, you know, offsetting

328
00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:25,860
tool sets, but there's no way to win.

329
00:19:27,340 --> 00:19:29,920
You just sort of this is a very small point, but

330
00:19:29,920 --> 00:19:32,060
I think it's worth clarifying. It's not a matter of really

331
00:19:32,060 --> 00:19:34,520
percent. It's not a matter of 80 percent or 90 percent.

332
00:19:34,580 --> 00:19:38,500
It's like one adversary can can get around the wall.

333
00:19:38,580 --> 00:19:41,060
That's what MARA did with Slipstream, right?

334
00:19:41,320 --> 00:19:43,560
Essentially, the miners. It's not a matter of percent.

335
00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:46,000
It's just the attacker can do as they like. You know,

336
00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:48,220
the strong do as they like in the weak, suffer what

337
00:19:48,220 --> 00:19:51,020
they must. Yeah. So there's there's two ways to get around.

338
00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:56,680
I got to go point out just regarding the

339
00:19:56,680 --> 00:20:01,060
preferential relay networks. While lever relay isn't

340
00:20:01,060 --> 00:20:04,340
that great at dealing with spoofing.

341
00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:07,940
We do have technology coming down that essentially deals with that

342
00:20:07,940 --> 00:20:11,020
perfectly to the point where spoofing is just not a thing anymore.

343
00:20:19,342 --> 00:20:23,262
Matt, your Borker protocol actually would have been more efficient and

344
00:20:23,262 --> 00:20:25,962
less harmful to the network if you weren't forced to use

345
00:20:25,962 --> 00:20:28,922
OP RETURN at 83 bytes. If you had your OP RETURN

346
00:20:28,922 --> 00:20:32,082
already lifted to consensus, you would have just been able to

347
00:20:32,082 --> 00:20:34,142
do one transaction with less overhead.

348
00:20:41,302 --> 00:20:45,582
Because of the filter, we had to do

349
00:20:45,582 --> 00:20:49,262
it differently. We had to put in more effort and more

350
00:20:49,262 --> 00:20:52,562
cost. Now, we did it anyway. Well, I shouldn't say that.

351
00:20:53,802 --> 00:20:56,862
We did this on Dogecoin because Bitcoin was going to be

352
00:20:56,862 --> 00:21:00,122
too expensive. Now, that could have been the case even if

353
00:21:00,122 --> 00:21:02,802
OP RETURN was open, just because fees in general are higher

354
00:21:02,802 --> 00:21:07,162
on Bitcoin. But it

355
00:21:07,162 --> 00:21:09,502
was not nothing. It was something.

356
00:21:09,782 --> 00:21:12,462
It was an obstacle we had to work around. But if

357
00:21:12,462 --> 00:21:15,262
there was sufficient demand for your service on Bitcoin, it could

358
00:21:15,262 --> 00:21:19,262
have been just ported straight to Bitcoin regardless. The demand creates

359
00:21:19,262 --> 00:21:20,522
the spam at the end of the day.

360
00:21:23,082 --> 00:21:25,482
It's what keeps it around. Sure. Yeah.

361
00:21:25,482 --> 00:21:28,562
I mean, someone can come up with something and if nobody

362
00:21:28,562 --> 00:21:30,842
cares or wants it, it just fizzles away, which is what

363
00:21:30,842 --> 00:21:32,602
we've seen a lot of the time.

364
00:21:33,502 --> 00:21:35,702
And ultimately, it was the case with Borker. There were some

365
00:21:35,702 --> 00:21:38,522
people that really, really liked this and thought it was just

366
00:21:38,522 --> 00:21:42,422
the coolest thing ever. We had quite a few people interacting.

367
00:21:42,742 --> 00:21:45,442
I'm sure at some point in the future, somebody might scan

368
00:21:45,442 --> 00:21:49,862
the Dogecoin blockchain and find our markers and recreate the social

369
00:21:49,862 --> 00:21:50,842
commentary that happened.

370
00:21:51,822 --> 00:21:55,942
Probably not because nobody cares. But that was where we moved

371
00:21:55,942 --> 00:21:57,042
on. It just wasn't interesting.

372
00:21:57,862 --> 00:22:00,222
We're doing it at Start9. I think it's really, really interesting

373
00:22:00,222 --> 00:22:02,662
and we love it and we think it's important.

374
00:22:02,662 --> 00:22:05,162
What we were doing with Borker was like a science experiment.

375
00:22:05,922 --> 00:22:08,282
We were just kicking rocks.

376
00:22:09,142 --> 00:22:12,042
It was fine. Okay, so I got a follow-up question

377
00:22:12,042 --> 00:22:15,242
to this. You weren't able to quite concisely define spam.

378
00:22:15,502 --> 00:22:18,562
You said you know it when you see it. So, because

379
00:22:18,562 --> 00:22:20,042
of the way that BIP-110,

380
00:22:20,862 --> 00:22:23,742
which is a consensus change that potentially may cause a fork,

381
00:22:24,782 --> 00:22:29,702
defines these eight rules of consensus to essentially eliminate spam, what

382
00:22:29,702 --> 00:22:33,062
do you think about the fact in the future other types

383
00:22:33,062 --> 00:22:35,782
of spam being defined? Because we don't have a clear definition

384
00:22:35,782 --> 00:22:39,182
of these bytes are spam or these aren't. Some of the

385
00:22:39,182 --> 00:22:41,702
views I could take, I guess, would be that potentially banks

386
00:22:41,702 --> 00:22:43,822
are large buyers of block space. What about in the future?

387
00:22:43,942 --> 00:22:47,382
Are those people that compete for that block space, then are

388
00:22:47,382 --> 00:22:50,922
they spam? What if an actor uses inefficient transactions at scale?

389
00:22:51,522 --> 00:22:53,982
What about whales just buying up block space for the sake

390
00:22:53,982 --> 00:22:56,302
of buying up block space through monetary transactions?

391
00:22:56,302 --> 00:22:59,142
It sounds like at the end of the day,

392
00:23:00,462 --> 00:23:04,122
whatever is spam to somebody is really an attempt to reduce

393
00:23:04,122 --> 00:23:06,842
competition of the free market and the mempool.

394
00:23:07,602 --> 00:23:09,442
All right, well, let me do something here because I don't

395
00:23:09,442 --> 00:23:13,702
want to monopolize this. I know this is a conversation

396
00:23:13,702 --> 00:23:16,602
about forks in particular, and I feel like we're sliding into

397
00:23:16,602 --> 00:23:19,522
the policy debate again. So let me do two things in

398
00:23:19,522 --> 00:23:23,742
one. Quickly sum up why I think policy is the correct

399
00:23:23,742 --> 00:23:27,342
place to be combating spam, however you define it, and not

400
00:23:27,342 --> 00:23:30,522
consensus, right? And then we can actually talk about consensus.

401
00:23:30,742 --> 00:23:33,122
Maybe I assume that's what Isabel wants to do. On the

402
00:23:33,122 --> 00:23:37,362
policy side, I don't think anyone

403
00:23:37,362 --> 00:23:40,662
on that side of the debate believes that spam can be

404
00:23:40,662 --> 00:23:44,102
perpetually and effectively fought using soft forks.

405
00:23:44,522 --> 00:23:48,502
They're slow, they're contentious, they're risky.

406
00:23:49,332 --> 00:23:53,282
It's not the right tool in the toolbox for something that

407
00:23:53,282 --> 00:23:54,822
can move so fast,

408
00:23:55,582 --> 00:23:58,282
like different ways of embedding data of which there are infinite

409
00:23:58,282 --> 00:24:03,442
and arbitrary. So you need an equally agile

410
00:24:03,442 --> 00:24:06,742
tool, right? So if somebody comes up with some new protocol

411
00:24:06,742 --> 00:24:08,442
of embedding data,

412
00:24:09,202 --> 00:24:11,942
at first, you don't care. You don't care that it exists.

413
00:24:12,102 --> 00:24:14,322
You don't need to react at all, right? Because it doesn't

414
00:24:14,322 --> 00:24:17,102
matter. It's not a nuisance. There's nobody using it.

415
00:24:17,102 --> 00:24:20,542
And as it starts to grow, maybe you start to take

416
00:24:20,542 --> 00:24:23,882
notice. And you're like, hey, there's this thing and it's kind

417
00:24:23,882 --> 00:24:27,482
of becoming a nuisance. And there's this niche market that is

418
00:24:27,482 --> 00:24:31,002
like really hitting it. Or maybe it's literally an attack, right?

419
00:24:31,002 --> 00:24:33,982
Like maybe somebody well funded is just trying to spam the

420
00:24:33,982 --> 00:24:37,902
network in order to flood it and raise fees, whatever.

421
00:24:37,902 --> 00:24:42,002
At some point, you okay, we should we should react to

422
00:24:42,002 --> 00:24:44,862
this. And it's not a fork, right?

423
00:24:44,862 --> 00:24:49,162
It's either an update to the node software, like the

424
00:24:49,162 --> 00:24:53,042
newest version of core or not has this filter built in.

425
00:24:53,542 --> 00:24:57,862
Or there is a method of sideloading

426
00:24:57,862 --> 00:25:00,962
filters, which is what we proposed, right? Like our proposal to

427
00:25:00,962 --> 00:25:04,502
the Bitcoin mailing list in 2025 was something that we called

428
00:25:04,502 --> 00:25:08,342
user defines dynamic filters, which would have removed policy from Bitcoin

429
00:25:08,342 --> 00:25:12,302
altogether would have removed the policy code policy dot CPP from

430
00:25:12,302 --> 00:25:16,802
Bitcoin forever and replaced it basically

431
00:25:16,802 --> 00:25:21,542
with a function call where it's just like,

432
00:25:21,542 --> 00:25:23,982
you know, a transaction comes in.

433
00:25:23,982 --> 00:25:27,922
And your node says, is this thing standard, and it sends

434
00:25:27,922 --> 00:25:30,422
it off to a sidecar, it sends it off to like

435
00:25:30,422 --> 00:25:33,362
a different engine. And you can load whatever scripts you want

436
00:25:33,362 --> 00:25:36,042
into that engine, they could be, you know, JavaScript scripts, or

437
00:25:36,042 --> 00:25:39,062
Lua scripts, it doesn't really matter just the scripting engine. And

438
00:25:39,062 --> 00:25:42,902
if all the scripts pass with, you know, zero, then it

439
00:25:42,902 --> 00:25:45,002
comes back and it's like, yep, this is standard accepted into

440
00:25:45,002 --> 00:25:49,222
the mempool relay. And if any of them fail, it drops

441
00:25:49,222 --> 00:25:52,362
it. And so we thought this was really, really clever, because

442
00:25:52,362 --> 00:25:56,622
it would have allowed Bitcoin Core as an organization to

443
00:25:56,622 --> 00:25:59,682
wipe their hands of policy forever, and just outsource it to

444
00:25:59,682 --> 00:26:04,722
this community driven community adopted second

445
00:26:04,722 --> 00:26:07,122
layer to network of spam filters.

446
00:26:07,942 --> 00:26:11,642
And just sort of like antivirus filters exist for your computer,

447
00:26:11,742 --> 00:26:14,202
right? Sure, Windows and Mac might ship some.

448
00:26:14,202 --> 00:26:17,502
Yeah, but he's also missing the point, like, imagine those filters

449
00:26:17,502 --> 00:26:20,962
just filtered everything. And then Peter Todd builds Libre one Libre relay.

450
00:26:21,762 --> 00:26:23,482
And the miners connect to it, because

451
00:26:24,822 --> 00:26:25,462
Sorry,

452
00:26:27,962 --> 00:26:32,542
guys, can we dog? Yeah, you're

453
00:26:32,542 --> 00:26:35,842
right. You're right. Oh, man, I really backslid there.

454
00:26:36,562 --> 00:26:39,482
Yeah. So policy behind it didn't work.

455
00:26:39,782 --> 00:26:42,882
Okay. Like, we couldn't agree. A huge chunk of the community

456
00:26:42,882 --> 00:26:46,782
decided, all right, we really want to do filtering and policy.

457
00:26:47,422 --> 00:26:51,302
And so we're going to soft fork to eliminate the current,

458
00:26:51,302 --> 00:26:55,682
current, you know, methods of embedding data that are being

459
00:26:55,682 --> 00:26:59,182
abused. Knowing that there are others that will emerge.

460
00:26:59,802 --> 00:27:02,782
However, the success of the soft fork will one eliminate those

461
00:27:02,782 --> 00:27:06,842
methods, potentially causing some harm to the capital that has been

462
00:27:06,842 --> 00:27:10,902
invested in them as a punishment, so to speak.

463
00:27:11,682 --> 00:27:16,302
And secondly, we'll reassert the community's will to

464
00:27:16,302 --> 00:27:19,222
fight spam in policy, that is the hope of BIP-110

465
00:27:19,222 --> 00:27:20,822
is that if BIP-110 succeeds,

466
00:27:21,662 --> 00:27:26,182
what it does is it doesn't portend future soft

467
00:27:26,202 --> 00:27:29,922
forks to fight spam, it brings policy back into the debate.

468
00:27:30,562 --> 00:27:31,202
That's the point.

469
00:27:57,082 --> 00:27:58,122
theoretically activates.

470
00:27:58,902 --> 00:27:59,842
But yeah, Chris, go ahead.

471
00:28:26,722 --> 00:28:31,282
is like a guardrail against a transaction relay,

472
00:28:31,402 --> 00:28:36,062
where the underlying like risk is a resource exhaustion.

473
00:28:36,762 --> 00:28:40,862
So like the protection of your node is the objective of

474
00:28:40,862 --> 00:28:45,482
policy. It's not deciding whether a

475
00:28:45,482 --> 00:28:48,422
economically like valid use case of block space is legitimate.

476
00:28:48,422 --> 00:28:50,202
And like historically,

477
00:28:51,062 --> 00:28:53,842
in addition to that, like the direction has always been to

478
00:28:53,842 --> 00:28:57,942
remove or to relax those very policy guardrails.

479
00:28:58,802 --> 00:29:02,862
So that's the software is like, I don't know, from Parliament,

480
00:29:03,302 --> 00:29:06,302
like multi sick, like went from non standard to standard.

481
00:29:07,122 --> 00:29:09,322
went from zero to 80.

482
00:29:10,382 --> 00:29:13,302
And not went down to 40. Again, but then now we

483
00:29:13,302 --> 00:29:18,542
removed it. So various script constructions became reliable.

484
00:29:19,342 --> 00:29:23,682
And today, like any, like, resource consumption problem appears.

485
00:29:23,862 --> 00:29:26,242
And then the goal is not to fix it by like

486
00:29:26,242 --> 00:29:30,582
a policy filter, but by just writing better software, which

487
00:29:30,582 --> 00:29:33,902
we've seen with core version 3031 32.

488
00:29:33,902 --> 00:29:38,962
Like there have been tremendous amounts of efforts put into making

489
00:29:38,962 --> 00:29:43,922
even low compute hardware like Raspi still re index and yeah,

490
00:29:43,922 --> 00:29:47,782
be able to participate and sink to the chain tip, even

491
00:29:47,782 --> 00:29:51,822
though we are like 17 years in. So like these, these

492
00:29:51,822 --> 00:29:56,442
additional restrictions that the policy has brought, we're never to

493
00:29:56,442 --> 00:29:58,942
to to mitigate or make spam more expensive.

494
00:29:58,942 --> 00:30:01,242
It's always just resource economics.

495
00:30:01,242 --> 00:30:03,802
Like we have a dust filter we have.

496
00:30:03,802 --> 00:30:07,562
What is it low as like these are like just for

497
00:30:07,562 --> 00:30:11,422
like transactional ability or like other things, but they're never to

498
00:30:11,422 --> 00:30:15,702
decide, you know, what kind of valid use case do I

499
00:30:15,702 --> 00:30:18,582
personally deem as worthy of block space?

500
00:30:18,582 --> 00:30:21,622
Like, I think Portland said, like, the definition of spam is

501
00:30:21,622 --> 00:30:25,522
any transaction other than mine. I want to be in the

502
00:30:25,522 --> 00:30:26,962
block. I don't care about your transaction.

503
00:30:27,962 --> 00:30:31,442
And yeah, really, a policy will never go back to being

504
00:30:31,442 --> 00:30:34,002
a spam mitigation because it never was.

505
00:30:34,002 --> 00:30:38,722
So like, it's always about disproportionate CPU and memory cost.

506
00:30:39,062 --> 00:30:40,942
And like, we, we surprisingly,

507
00:30:41,702 --> 00:30:45,982
like, if all the spam went into up return, it

508
00:30:45,982 --> 00:30:49,382
would be the most resource efficient way to to like deal

509
00:30:49,382 --> 00:30:52,702
with this data for like a Raspberry Pi. So it is

510
00:30:52,702 --> 00:30:55,522
about dust protection. It's not about spam.

511
00:30:55,922 --> 00:30:58,022
And if you can't even agree on spam,

512
00:30:59,102 --> 00:31:02,762
like, how would be ever, you know, gets Peter thoughts to

513
00:31:02,762 --> 00:31:05,362
stop spamming our notes. So it doesn't make any sense to

514
00:31:05,362 --> 00:31:07,602
have this discussion in policy.

515
00:31:07,602 --> 00:31:10,842
Adding on to this before we move on to like consensus,

516
00:31:11,902 --> 00:31:14,242
like consensus is way too slow to act on that.

517
00:31:14,342 --> 00:31:17,062
So like the only way in moving forward, if you don't

518
00:31:17,062 --> 00:31:21,782
want people to waste their Bitcoin on like

519
00:31:21,782 --> 00:31:24,642
data embedding, make it expensive for them.

520
00:31:24,642 --> 00:31:28,722
Because, you know, tragedy of the commons, if nobody uses it,

521
00:31:28,802 --> 00:31:32,162
people will put graffiti, whatever on the Taj Mahal.

522
00:31:32,382 --> 00:31:34,882
But if there's enough people there, and if you bring all

523
00:31:34,882 --> 00:31:38,202
your friends, we have a lot of visitors and nobody can

524
00:31:38,202 --> 00:31:41,322
put graffiti on the Taj Mahal. So instead of playing a

525
00:31:41,322 --> 00:31:43,102
cat and mouse game, which you can never win.

526
00:31:44,242 --> 00:31:46,602
Yeah, the only winning move is not to play, just get

527
00:31:46,602 --> 00:31:50,982
more people into this building. And we don't have to

528
00:31:50,982 --> 00:31:52,522
soft fork every six months.

529
00:31:56,382 --> 00:32:00,582
One thing I want to quickly point out is most of

530
00:32:00,582 --> 00:32:06,122
the policy rules in Bitcoin Core are really about making

531
00:32:06,122 --> 00:32:09,462
sure people don't prematurely use upgrade hooks.

532
00:32:09,622 --> 00:32:12,622
That is things like weird transaction version numbers,

533
00:32:13,902 --> 00:32:17,262
you know, op nops, op successes, etc. And one way you

534
00:32:17,262 --> 00:32:19,422
can think about that is the goal there is so that

535
00:32:19,422 --> 00:32:22,402
if you have a Bitcoin Core node and you're mining with

536
00:32:22,402 --> 00:32:26,502
it, after a soft fork, you should still be producing valid

537
00:32:26,502 --> 00:32:29,242
blocks, provided that other people are producing valid blocks.

538
00:32:30,142 --> 00:32:34,422
And this commercial demand, if you will, for violating

539
00:32:34,422 --> 00:32:35,682
those upgrade hooks is low.

540
00:32:39,342 --> 00:32:43,702
I was on the topics of like forks and consensus versus

541
00:32:43,702 --> 00:32:47,002
policy. Policy does not present any risk of forking.

542
00:32:47,842 --> 00:32:51,882
Consensus does. And consensus essentially is when like BIP-110 or

543
00:32:51,882 --> 00:32:56,162
whatever, it's essentially participants on networks saying I need these rules

544
00:32:56,162 --> 00:33:00,782
to be enforced, versus it's okay if mempool

545
00:33:00,782 --> 00:33:04,922
essentially accepts, but the blocks will contain that information will be

546
00:33:04,922 --> 00:33:07,922
considered valid. That's actually a really great segue.

547
00:33:08,322 --> 00:33:09,942
I want to hear a little bit more. I want to

548
00:33:09,942 --> 00:33:13,462
understand the technical risks or have like explainers for the audience

549
00:33:13,462 --> 00:33:15,922
of the technical risks of this particular soft fork.

550
00:33:16,022 --> 00:33:18,722
But before we do that, Leo, yeah, jump in.

551
00:33:19,802 --> 00:33:23,322
Yeah, not to drag us into the weeds on the Vorker

552
00:33:23,322 --> 00:33:27,982
stuff too much more. But basically, I still don't understand

553
00:33:27,982 --> 00:33:32,202
the motivation for why you've sort of had this change of heart,

554
00:33:33,042 --> 00:33:35,142
Matt. And I would love if you wanted to take one

555
00:33:35,142 --> 00:33:38,282
more stab at maybe explaining and I'm almost just giving you

556
00:33:38,282 --> 00:33:40,982
an opportunity here because I think there's this default assumption.

557
00:33:40,982 --> 00:33:43,362
And I'm not the one saying this, but I've heard people

558
00:33:43,362 --> 00:33:46,762
say it, that this is sort of a sales strategy for

559
00:33:46,762 --> 00:33:49,942
your company. Right. And I've seen a lot of KOLs on

560
00:33:49,942 --> 00:33:54,242
X basically spread a pervasive lie to the Bitcoin Knots and

561
00:33:54,242 --> 00:33:57,422
BIP-110 community over the past couple of years, that if

562
00:33:57,422 --> 00:34:01,662
you have a certain amount of nodes running relay filter

563
00:34:01,662 --> 00:34:06,182
policy stuff that are blocking these, you know, spam

564
00:34:06,182 --> 00:34:09,622
transactions, quote unquote, from being relayed around the Bitcoin network.

565
00:34:09,622 --> 00:34:13,882
There's some magical number, you know, 80 percent, 90 percent, 95

566
00:34:13,882 --> 00:34:17,522
percent, where all of a sudden you guys have this glorious

567
00:34:17,522 --> 00:34:19,802
victory and there's no longer spam.

568
00:34:19,802 --> 00:34:22,842
And I think a couple individuals on here already pointed out

569
00:34:22,842 --> 00:34:27,202
that through preferential pairing, through dark pools, there's

570
00:34:27,202 --> 00:34:31,462
many ways that even, you know, one person, a dozen

571
00:34:31,462 --> 00:34:36,022
running a dozen nodes of preferential pairing, running a single inscription

572
00:34:36,022 --> 00:34:39,002
website that you can connect your wallet to and pay them

573
00:34:39,002 --> 00:34:43,062
to inscribe something for you gets around, you know, literally a

574
00:34:43,062 --> 00:34:47,482
billion Start9 nodes running this sort of policy stuff.

575
00:34:47,522 --> 00:34:50,982
Right. So I just don't understand why.

576
00:34:51,902 --> 00:34:56,142
I don't understand why so many people have come to me

577
00:34:56,142 --> 00:35:00,102
telling me that I'm screwed because they're about to take over

578
00:35:00,102 --> 00:35:04,242
the network with their nodes and like the amount of misinformation

579
00:35:04,242 --> 00:35:07,982
and miseducation that these people have is it's very shocking to

580
00:35:07,982 --> 00:35:11,702
me how uninformed they are. And I just wanted to hear

581
00:35:11,702 --> 00:35:15,582
from you, you know, that default assumption is that you are

582
00:35:15,582 --> 00:35:19,742
part of this kind of lie because it's very profitable for

583
00:35:19,742 --> 00:35:23,222
your company. And I wanted to hear from yourself, you know,

584
00:35:23,222 --> 00:35:25,542
if you think that characterization by a lot of people is

585
00:35:25,542 --> 00:35:30,582
correct or if you wanted to defend yourself. Oh, God, that's so loaded.

586
00:35:31,762 --> 00:35:35,002
I want to be very cautious right now and respectful of

587
00:35:35,002 --> 00:35:36,242
the topic of this.

588
00:35:37,242 --> 00:35:39,882
I am happy to answer that. I'm not dodging at all.

589
00:35:40,082 --> 00:35:42,762
I just it's nuanced.

590
00:35:43,642 --> 00:35:46,402
And, and there's some history, right?

591
00:35:46,402 --> 00:35:49,122
And there's going to be objections. And it's just going to

592
00:35:49,122 --> 00:35:52,542
it's going to sort of drag us back into the why

593
00:35:52,542 --> 00:35:55,302
I think policy filters

594
00:35:56,582 --> 00:36:00,822
adopted at scale result in effective rate limiting of

595
00:36:00,822 --> 00:36:04,482
of certain types of transactions in an emergent way, right?

596
00:36:04,502 --> 00:36:08,282
No single party gets to like decide what is spam and

597
00:36:08,282 --> 00:36:11,622
what should be rate limited. But if through an emergent process

598
00:36:11,622 --> 00:36:16,002
of everyone making individual decisions on the edges, if there

599
00:36:16,002 --> 00:36:19,922
emerges consensus, right, a super majority of people, I shouldn't have

600
00:36:19,922 --> 00:36:22,502
used the word consensus, there emerges a super majority of nodes

601
00:36:22,502 --> 00:36:26,802
like 90% plus why that actually is a highly effective

602
00:36:26,802 --> 00:36:31,082
tool to rate limit the spam

603
00:36:31,082 --> 00:36:34,922
on Bitcoin. It's just not the topic of this.

604
00:36:34,922 --> 00:36:37,382
So I just I just explained to you that it literally

605
00:36:37,382 --> 00:36:40,402
has zero impact. You guys haven't stopped a single inscription from

606
00:36:40,402 --> 00:36:44,102
going on chain. There's 126 million of these files on Bitcoin.

607
00:36:44,202 --> 00:36:47,582
So are you basically just saying you agree that there's a

608
00:36:47,582 --> 00:36:50,562
magical number of these nodes? And that's that is your belief.

609
00:36:50,582 --> 00:36:53,002
I assume you don't actually believe that.

610
00:36:53,382 --> 00:36:56,022
But it sounds like maybe you're saying that you do.

611
00:36:56,442 --> 00:36:59,242
I would love to just hear like maybe specifically on that point.

612
00:37:00,342 --> 00:37:03,422
What do you think actually happens when 90% of the Bitcoin

613
00:37:03,422 --> 00:37:06,162
network is Start9 knots nodes? Like what do you what

614
00:37:06,162 --> 00:37:08,522
do you think happens? Do you think we can't inscribe anymore?

615
00:37:08,982 --> 00:37:11,682
Do you think anything changes? Because I'm telling you, like, it's

616
00:37:11,682 --> 00:37:16,522
simply a fact that it doesn't. It would have

617
00:37:16,522 --> 00:37:18,922
the effect that you would not be able to use the

618
00:37:18,922 --> 00:37:23,142
primary peer to peer network to get those transactions

619
00:37:23,142 --> 00:37:25,802
to miners. I've done the math on this.

620
00:37:26,622 --> 00:37:27,722
Go ahead.

621
00:37:29,202 --> 00:37:32,862
Yeah, I've done the math on this. The number the percent

622
00:37:32,862 --> 00:37:36,842
of nodes before you start having issues on your first like

623
00:37:36,842 --> 00:37:39,882
set of peers, 125 or sorry, I use 10 in my

624
00:37:39,882 --> 00:37:44,022
example is 94% of nodes need to be running a relay

625
00:37:44,022 --> 00:37:47,522
policy. That does not mean you can literally just disconnect your

626
00:37:47,522 --> 00:37:49,762
node and restart it to get a new set of peers.

627
00:37:50,222 --> 00:37:53,342
The ultimate filter for policy exists at the level of mining.

628
00:37:54,022 --> 00:37:56,982
Miners control what go into the blocks. If the miners ignore

629
00:37:56,982 --> 00:38:01,142
the policy, it doesn't matter how many peers run a filter.

630
00:38:01,482 --> 00:38:04,782
The miners, if a transaction can get to them, it will

631
00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:08,362
and it will get mined. And also as a note, as

632
00:38:08,362 --> 00:38:11,962
a note, there were basically super nodes peering with 10, 000

633
00:38:11,962 --> 00:38:14,602
peers ran really loose policy.

634
00:38:14,942 --> 00:38:16,822
Sorry. Can you explain? No, no, no. I want to just

635
00:38:16,822 --> 00:38:20,562
like, like, have full clarity on this 94% number.

636
00:38:20,962 --> 00:38:24,902
So this math means that 94% of nodes need to be

637
00:38:24,902 --> 00:38:29,002
running filters in order exactly for what in order for individuals

638
00:38:29,002 --> 00:38:32,362
to not be able to use public mempool in order to

639
00:38:32,362 --> 00:38:35,382
get inscription transactions through consistently.

640
00:38:35,382 --> 00:38:38,342
Let's pretend we're filtering. Let's pretend we're filtering inscriptions today.

641
00:38:38,462 --> 00:38:41,922
Okay. At 0% filter on the broader network.

642
00:38:41,922 --> 00:38:45,642
My method is will the first attempt to send raw transaction.

643
00:38:45,642 --> 00:38:48,342
That means I have this transaction. I want to send it

644
00:38:48,342 --> 00:38:51,602
to the network at 0% filters. There's 100% success rate.

645
00:38:51,742 --> 00:38:53,962
It's going to get to a minor because of the fact

646
00:38:53,962 --> 00:38:56,482
that it will propagate at 50%.

647
00:38:56,482 --> 00:38:58,882
That number is still 100% almost.

648
00:38:58,882 --> 00:39:03,302
And then only once you get up to 94%,

649
00:39:03,302 --> 00:39:07,642
do you actually start hitting 75% was my measurement of

650
00:39:07,642 --> 00:39:10,582
a success rate. So you lose 25% of the time you're

651
00:39:10,582 --> 00:39:13,602
going to fail. That's a 94%.

652
00:39:13,602 --> 00:39:17,782
And so with that stated, yeah, that was my metric.

653
00:39:18,022 --> 00:39:19,682
And I did this at pleb fine.

654
00:39:20,502 --> 00:39:24,022
So I think also, so this is like an important point

655
00:39:24,022 --> 00:39:27,202
is like is one. One thing I just want to be

656
00:39:27,202 --> 00:39:31,002
clear what you know what the scenario we're talking about is

657
00:39:31,002 --> 00:39:34,462
when someone isn't even trying to get their transaction correct.

658
00:39:34,462 --> 00:39:37,122
That's when you know they're not doing anything interesting.

659
00:39:37,422 --> 00:39:41,322
Like when they're actually trying the number is essentially 99.

660
00:39:41,322 --> 00:39:45,342
999% Yeah, that is absolutely correct.

661
00:39:45,442 --> 00:39:49,202
And a note here is I used a default 10 connections

662
00:39:49,202 --> 00:39:52,422
outbound on this note. I didn't even do the hey my

663
00:39:52,422 --> 00:39:55,562
ports open I get inbound as well. So I thought of

664
00:39:55,562 --> 00:39:59,122
it from the worst case perspective from trying to get a

665
00:39:59,122 --> 00:40:01,602
transaction out to the network and the number is still insanely

666
00:40:01,602 --> 00:40:04,382
high in terms of the number of nodes that need to

667
00:40:04,382 --> 00:40:08,162
be running this to even make it have any effect on

668
00:40:08,162 --> 00:40:10,642
somebody trying to broadcast a transaction at all.

669
00:40:10,642 --> 00:40:12,962
Unless you have a number higher than that nobody even noticed

670
00:40:12,962 --> 00:40:13,822
that it existed.

671
00:40:14,662 --> 00:40:17,122
Really, and in practice, I mean the way the way people

672
00:40:17,122 --> 00:40:20,022
use things like inscriptions usually they just do it through third

673
00:40:20,022 --> 00:40:22,782
party websites anyway, the third party website can go and do

674
00:40:22,782 --> 00:40:24,642
whatever they need to go make this stuff work.

675
00:40:25,682 --> 00:40:29,802
mempool. space right there appeared very, very well, you can literally

676
00:40:29,802 --> 00:40:34,242
just use their broadcast transaction, and you will very likely bypass

677
00:40:34,242 --> 00:40:37,342
filters, even at that rate, or that that percentage.

678
00:40:37,787 --> 00:40:39,387
Rob, do you want to jump in?

679
00:40:40,227 --> 00:40:43,447
I would love to, since we're like 45 minutes in, I

680
00:40:43,447 --> 00:40:46,287
don't want to try and moderate the panel, but we have

681
00:40:46,287 --> 00:40:50,107
a soft fork happening in nine days, and the consensus stuff

682
00:40:50,107 --> 00:40:53,447
is way more interesting at this point to talk about where

683
00:40:53,447 --> 00:40:57,007
we're at. Okay, so Rob, do you want to maybe take

684
00:40:57,007 --> 00:41:00,487
a crack at just actually like sort of explaining like, okay,

685
00:41:00,487 --> 00:41:03,087
what's going to happen on August 9th? What can people expect?

686
00:41:03,247 --> 00:41:05,857
And for me personally, I'm just like, okay, like, what are

687
00:41:05,857 --> 00:41:08,837
the risks to users? Like, what do users on the mining

688
00:41:08,837 --> 00:41:12,097
side and the node runner side, and just general users of

689
00:41:12,097 --> 00:41:14,997
Bitcoin kind of need to understand or what should they be

690
00:41:14,997 --> 00:41:18,477
concerned about in terms of risks associated with what is going

691
00:41:18,477 --> 00:41:21,457
to go down on August 9th? Yeah, and we do have

692
00:41:21,457 --> 00:41:24,377
two forks that we're talking about, because Paul is here too,

693
00:41:24,417 --> 00:41:26,517
right? And so there's a clear difference up front between a

694
00:41:26,517 --> 00:41:27,857
hard fork and a soft fork.

695
00:41:28,897 --> 00:41:31,277
Paul has a set block height, and at that time, there'll

696
00:41:31,277 --> 00:41:33,697
be a new set of rules being applied, whereas the BIP

697
00:41:33,697 --> 00:41:37,217
110 one is a soft fork, which is, you could best

698
00:41:37,217 --> 00:41:39,857
say, an attempt to try and bring everyone along with them,

699
00:41:40,257 --> 00:41:43,437
whereas Paul is explicitly changing rules in a way that would

700
00:41:43,437 --> 00:41:45,837
just cause an immediate break off, and you have to run

701
00:41:45,837 --> 00:41:48,317
Paul's software specifically to make that happen, right?

702
00:41:48,317 --> 00:41:51,817
So just to lay out there, for August 9th, this is

703
00:41:51,817 --> 00:41:53,457
depending on where you are in the world, because it's either

704
00:41:53,457 --> 00:41:56,437
the evening of August 8th or the morning of August 9th,

705
00:41:56,777 --> 00:42:00,457
there is going to be the end of a difficulty adjustment

706
00:42:00,457 --> 00:42:04,857
period, and with that is going to a set block height

707
00:42:04,857 --> 00:42:09,537
in which new rules, there's a divergence between

708
00:42:09,537 --> 00:42:11,957
consensus of what nodes will accept.

709
00:42:12,117 --> 00:42:17,437
The default nodes don't do anything, the BIP-110

710
00:42:17,437 --> 00:42:21,697
user-activated soft fork nodes are now looking for

711
00:42:21,697 --> 00:42:24,097
blocks to be produced with a certain version bit.

712
00:42:24,137 --> 00:42:28,717
This is what's called mandatory signaling. With mandatory signaling, there

713
00:42:28,717 --> 00:42:32,077
are no consensus rules being enforced yet, it's just a requirement

714
00:42:32,077 --> 00:42:36,117
that the miners, when they produce blocks, must have a particular

715
00:42:36,117 --> 00:42:38,957
version bit in their block header flipped on, saying that they're

716
00:42:38,957 --> 00:42:43,357
aware of this thing happening, and it's something that they're signaling

717
00:42:43,357 --> 00:42:45,117
for interest in being able to build upon.

718
00:42:46,057 --> 00:42:48,797
The initial thought is that,

719
00:42:49,617 --> 00:42:51,937
one, at that moment in time, if you want to be

720
00:42:51,937 --> 00:42:54,857
very risk-averse, as a user of the Bitcoin network, you

721
00:42:54,857 --> 00:42:57,737
would hold off on transacting on Bitcoin for a time until

722
00:42:57,737 --> 00:43:01,977
you see an emerging consensus of blocks being built on

723
00:43:01,977 --> 00:43:03,317
one chain or the other.

724
00:43:04,737 --> 00:43:08,237
Once we hit that block height, the more blocks that get

725
00:43:08,237 --> 00:43:11,457
built on a given chain, the higher confidence you could have

726
00:43:11,457 --> 00:43:15,897
at that point. As of today, we have one

727
00:43:15,897 --> 00:43:19,897
and a half, two percent of hash rate that are signaling

728
00:43:19,897 --> 00:43:21,837
already today for BIP-110,

729
00:43:22,737 --> 00:43:25,437
the remaining 98% are not.

730
00:43:26,057 --> 00:43:30,577
The first time after this mandatory signaling period starts, there

731
00:43:30,577 --> 00:43:33,317
is a block which does not signal, there will be a

732
00:43:33,317 --> 00:43:37,217
split in consensus, a chain split between the BIP-110 nodes

733
00:43:37,217 --> 00:43:40,757
and the non-BIP-110 nodes. From a risk-averse perspective,

734
00:43:40,917 --> 00:43:43,217
if you're transacting on Bitcoin, maybe you wait a couple hours.

735
00:43:43,357 --> 00:43:47,837
If you are a miner, you should be aware that

736
00:43:47,837 --> 00:43:51,177
this is happening to monitor both sides of the chain, and

737
00:43:51,177 --> 00:43:52,337
understand what's happening,

738
00:43:53,297 --> 00:43:56,877
and understand that if you mine on the wrong chain as

739
00:43:56,877 --> 00:43:59,977
a miner, your work may get thrown out, and that goes

740
00:43:59,977 --> 00:44:04,397
for both sides of the chain. If you build on

741
00:44:04,397 --> 00:44:07,477
top of the mandatory signaling, and the rest of the network

742
00:44:07,477 --> 00:44:09,677
does not care, you will have put the energy to make

743
00:44:09,677 --> 00:44:13,157
that block for no economic upside, because that chain will be

744
00:44:13,157 --> 00:44:16,377
different, and vice versa as well.

745
00:44:16,397 --> 00:44:19,897
There's one small caveat that's often made within the game theory

746
00:44:19,897 --> 00:44:22,697
of these, is that the BIP-110 nodes are a subset

747
00:44:22,697 --> 00:44:25,637
of the consensus rules that the other nodes follow, and what

748
00:44:25,637 --> 00:44:29,697
that means is, hypothetically, you could have a situation where the

749
00:44:29,697 --> 00:44:31,957
BIP-110 chain can wipe out the work of the other

750
00:44:31,957 --> 00:44:35,137
miners. I would, as a closing comment, say, at the current

751
00:44:35,137 --> 00:44:38,737
levels of hash rate, that does not seem likely. BIP 148,

752
00:44:38,817 --> 00:44:42,017
which is the SegWit soft fork, the last user-activated soft

753
00:44:42,017 --> 00:44:45,497
fork that, you know, had something like this happening, we had 70%

754
00:44:46,457 --> 00:44:49,457
of miners flipping the BIP showing signaling.

755
00:44:50,057 --> 00:44:51,757
Today, it is 1% to 2%.

756
00:44:52,537 --> 00:44:55,817
While it's often pointed to as a comparison, it's not really

757
00:44:55,817 --> 00:44:59,577
the same in terms of network adoption. Just for clarity, Rob,

758
00:44:59,957 --> 00:45:03,097
does this mean, I mean, if you're a miner, and you're

759
00:45:03,097 --> 00:45:06,457
just completely financially motivated, and you really don't care, you just

760
00:45:06,457 --> 00:45:10,457
don't want to lose money, right? Is the recommendation to just

761
00:45:10,457 --> 00:45:14,337
be mining on whatever chain just has the most hash rate,

762
00:45:14,417 --> 00:45:18,397
essentially, at any given point in time, and that's really all

763
00:45:18,397 --> 00:45:21,597
you can do, and if something goes wrong, that's, you know,

764
00:45:21,597 --> 00:45:24,977
you did the best you could? I think there's a very,

765
00:45:25,197 --> 00:45:29,717
very big caveat there, which is that many people

766
00:45:29,717 --> 00:45:33,497
believe that the BIP-110 chain is going to be propped

767
00:45:33,497 --> 00:45:38,117
up by rented hash power. And in that circumstance, even

768
00:45:38,117 --> 00:45:40,717
if you're a miner who just wants to, you know, go

769
00:45:40,717 --> 00:45:42,597
with the flow, if you will, you've got to think a

770
00:45:42,597 --> 00:45:45,817
little more long term than like the next X blocks, because

771
00:45:45,817 --> 00:45:48,057
it may be the case that this rented hash power is

772
00:45:48,057 --> 00:45:49,857
active for like a day or two, then just all goes

773
00:45:49,857 --> 00:45:52,497
offline when they run out of money. And under that circumstance,

774
00:45:52,697 --> 00:45:55,197
you may still think through, you know, a week or two

775
00:45:55,197 --> 00:45:58,357
ahead and say, well, I'm still going to mine on core

776
00:45:58,357 --> 00:46:03,277
rules rather than, like, preemptively

777
00:46:03,277 --> 00:46:07,557
switch, if you will. Now, that's complicated by the

778
00:46:07,557 --> 00:46:10,497
fact that this is soft fork. So, you know, it may

779
00:46:10,497 --> 00:46:13,657
be the case that, like, say there's 25% hash power on

780
00:46:13,657 --> 00:46:17,477
BIP-110 chain, and some people would argue, no, no, you should go switch.

781
00:46:18,377 --> 00:46:22,697
Whereas under this circumstance, you know, you probably should, even,

782
00:46:22,697 --> 00:46:24,957
you know, especially taking into account rented hash power.

783
00:46:25,297 --> 00:46:28,177
But it's, you know, it's a complex thing. And I think

784
00:46:28,177 --> 00:46:31,197
the good thing is more likely than not, they're going to

785
00:46:31,197 --> 00:46:33,597
be under 10%. And this will be a pretty clear decision.

786
00:46:33,857 --> 00:46:36,737
But let's say it is 10%.

787
00:46:36,737 --> 00:46:41,277
The recommendation for people just doing transactions remains very true.

788
00:46:41,597 --> 00:46:47,577
Because even just by luck, you know, the moment BIP-110

789
00:46:49,157 --> 00:46:50,957
mandatory activation enables,

790
00:46:52,477 --> 00:46:54,377
it's quite possible for you to just get that sort of

791
00:46:54,377 --> 00:46:58,237
one in 100 chance that's, or sorry, like one in 100

792
00:46:58,237 --> 00:47:00,897
chance that you get, say, two, you know, two block reorg,

793
00:47:01,317 --> 00:47:03,897
which is much more likely than it usually is.

794
00:47:04,197 --> 00:47:07,477
So basically, yeah, wait for more confirmations around that exact moment.

795
00:47:07,737 --> 00:47:09,897
Yeah. And one last thing, there actually may be a hidden

796
00:47:09,897 --> 00:47:13,737
third fork, which may appear this month, because Luke and Mechanic

797
00:47:13,737 --> 00:47:17,587
have already signaled in the event that the Bitcoin network refuses

798
00:47:17,587 --> 00:47:20,627
to follow them, they will hard fork to do a proof

799
00:47:20,627 --> 00:47:24,347
of work change. So they are very coy on talking about

800
00:47:24,347 --> 00:47:27,027
the details of that. But there could be even a third

801
00:47:27,027 --> 00:47:29,587
fork, which means that this month, we'll have one soft fork

802
00:47:29,587 --> 00:47:30,787
and two hard forks.

803
00:47:32,707 --> 00:47:34,767
What was what is the point of the third fork? Like,

804
00:47:34,827 --> 00:47:37,447
what is it? It's because so once you have the chain

805
00:47:37,447 --> 00:47:41,407
split, and you have one side, basically, the BIP-110 side does not get adopted.

806
00:47:42,587 --> 00:47:46,127
The belief is at that point that they need to change

807
00:47:46,127 --> 00:47:48,727
the proof of work algorithm to fire the miners because they

808
00:47:48,727 --> 00:47:50,967
have shown to be malicious because they disagree with Luke.

809
00:47:51,787 --> 00:47:54,987
And because they disagree with Luke, they are no longer allowed

810
00:47:54,987 --> 00:47:57,767
to be part of the Bitcoin network. And to change the

811
00:47:57,767 --> 00:48:00,947
proof of work algorithm is a hard fork. And Luke has

812
00:48:00,947 --> 00:48:03,987
precedent for this. He wrote code changes to change the proof

813
00:48:03,987 --> 00:48:06,207
of work algo a decade ago. You can go on GitHub

814
00:48:06,207 --> 00:48:08,447
and you can see the commit. So it's something he may

815
00:48:08,447 --> 00:48:12,667
very well have in his pocket waiting to kind of drop.

816
00:48:13,147 --> 00:48:16,027
They've said that to discuss the hard fork is to increase

817
00:48:16,027 --> 00:48:18,727
the likelihood that the hard fork would happen, which is why

818
00:48:18,727 --> 00:48:23,127
the BIP-110 proponents do not engage around the

819
00:48:23,127 --> 00:48:25,247
mechanisms of them doing a hard fork.

820
00:48:26,207 --> 00:48:28,287
Well, the reason why they would need a hard fork is

821
00:48:28,287 --> 00:48:31,227
because if they don't obtain the hash rate, that their chain

822
00:48:31,227 --> 00:48:34,367
will continue to produce blocks at a very, very slow pace

823
00:48:34,367 --> 00:48:37,567
until they have to hard fork because you can't just soft

824
00:48:37,567 --> 00:48:40,927
fork in an easier difficulty or a proof of work change.

825
00:48:41,047 --> 00:48:43,687
You have to literally go in and then say, hey, update

826
00:48:43,687 --> 00:48:46,507
your nodes because we're going to change this so that we

827
00:48:46,507 --> 00:48:49,867
can get the chain reset so we can produce blocks at

828
00:48:49,867 --> 00:48:52,727
a decent rate. That's why the chain's insecure then, right?

829
00:48:52,727 --> 00:48:54,587
If you have 1% of the hash rate, the rest of

830
00:48:54,587 --> 00:48:58,127
the network could 51% attack you trivially at a moment's notice.

831
00:48:58,127 --> 00:49:00,067
So you need to change the proof of work algorithm to

832
00:49:00,067 --> 00:49:02,887
keep your security. And can I can I also bring up

833
00:49:02,887 --> 00:49:06,547
the fact of like, okay, like why would transacting potentially be

834
00:49:06,547 --> 00:49:11,067
dangerous in this very small chance of a like, basically

835
00:49:11,067 --> 00:49:13,367
your chain gets wiped out and that there are two reasons

836
00:49:13,367 --> 00:49:17,647
for that. One is replay. So because there is no replay

837
00:49:17,647 --> 00:49:21,247
protection, any money that you move on one chain, if you're

838
00:49:21,247 --> 00:49:24,547
110 or the standard chain, it's going to move on the

839
00:49:24,547 --> 00:49:27,187
other side as long as that UTXO still exists.

840
00:49:27,247 --> 00:49:29,927
And the other side of this is if you take a

841
00:49:29,927 --> 00:49:33,507
payment on one side and that chain gets wiped out, that

842
00:49:33,507 --> 00:49:37,067
transaction probably is on the other side, but it is not

843
00:49:37,067 --> 00:49:39,407
a guarantee. So that's kind of why you wait for it

844
00:49:39,407 --> 00:49:43,247
to settle and you determine the winner of this, which I

845
00:49:43,247 --> 00:49:47,567
believe will be very quick and concise before you basically accept

846
00:49:47,567 --> 00:49:50,967
transactions or even if you you spend on one chain, just

847
00:49:50,967 --> 00:49:54,187
like understand it's moving on both sides potentially.

848
00:49:54,507 --> 00:49:57,967
And just for clarity, if the reason that they execute a

849
00:49:57,967 --> 00:50:01,507
hard fork is because they didn't have enough miner support to

850
00:50:01,507 --> 00:50:04,407
get a soft fork over the line, doesn't that, you know,

851
00:50:04,407 --> 00:50:07,667
mean that this hard fork risk is going to be pretty

852
00:50:07,667 --> 00:50:11,447
negligible by definition in terms of just like how it could

853
00:50:11,447 --> 00:50:14,967
potentially harm Bitcoin users? Like it sounds like at that point,

854
00:50:14,987 --> 00:50:17,567
they're just sort of by definition would be creating like some

855
00:50:17,567 --> 00:50:20,127
minority shit coin, essentially, excuse my language.

856
00:50:21,287 --> 00:50:21,637
Yes.

857
00:50:22,947 --> 00:50:23,507
Yeah.

858
00:50:24,827 --> 00:50:28,127
This would be the exact same this would be the exact

859
00:50:28,127 --> 00:50:31,807
same scenario as Paul Sztorc's hard fork, where the only concern

860
00:50:31,807 --> 00:50:34,507
there is maybe you want to do replay protection.

861
00:50:34,887 --> 00:50:38,027
And now one thing we should have a conversation.

862
00:50:38,507 --> 00:50:41,607
Yeah. Yeah. Well, one thing one thing that actually comes to

863
00:50:41,607 --> 00:50:45,167
mind, I don't know if anyone's pointed out is another approach

864
00:50:45,167 --> 00:50:47,647
that they may go use to go and

865
00:50:49,347 --> 00:50:53,687
potentially get their get their chain back moving fast

866
00:50:53,687 --> 00:50:56,167
enough in a reasonable amount of time might actually be some

867
00:50:56,167 --> 00:50:58,687
kind of time warp attack on their own chain.

868
00:50:59,587 --> 00:51:01,887
I haven't actually thought through the details. You can't do it.

869
00:51:02,267 --> 00:51:04,387
Portland and I thought through this already. You can't do it.

870
00:51:04,507 --> 00:51:08,467
Oh, you did? Yeah. Well, they're already going to be achieving

871
00:51:08,467 --> 00:51:12,227
the maximal difficulty adjustment because they have such a low hash

872
00:51:12,227 --> 00:51:14,827
rate that the time warp attack doesn't really make much sense

873
00:51:14,827 --> 00:51:17,067
anyways. They still have to get through the first and second

874
00:51:17,067 --> 00:51:18,267
and third difficulty periods.

875
00:51:19,327 --> 00:51:23,107
Yeah. Perfect. There's your answer. Yeah. The problem is that basically

876
00:51:23,107 --> 00:51:25,587
to do the time warp attack to get your minus 75

877
00:51:25,587 --> 00:51:29,207
if you wanted to go this route, you would still need to produce

878
00:51:30,087 --> 00:51:33,127
2016 blocks. If you're producing a block a day, that's three

879
00:51:33,127 --> 00:51:36,307
years before your chain is able to get to your first

880
00:51:36,307 --> 00:51:40,107
minus 75 percent, which if you take three years to get

881
00:51:40,107 --> 00:51:43,247
that far anyways and you get to your first difficulty adjustment,

882
00:51:43,307 --> 00:51:45,567
even if you were honest about your timestamps, you would still

883
00:51:45,567 --> 00:51:47,887
get your minus 75 percent. That's not a concern.

884
00:51:49,427 --> 00:51:51,547
And yeah, and it will be the key value will be

885
00:51:51,547 --> 00:51:54,527
the one hundred block maturity period also, because in this case,

886
00:51:54,567 --> 00:51:56,947
it's normally just one day, but it's so slow.

887
00:51:57,327 --> 00:52:00,327
In this case, it would be so long that people will

888
00:52:00,327 --> 00:52:02,467
despair of ever collecting. They have to pay one hundred percent

889
00:52:02,467 --> 00:52:04,767
of the cost. I just want to clear.

890
00:52:05,247 --> 00:52:05,607
So I worry

891
00:52:06,747 --> 00:52:09,667
just a quick thing with 100 blocks. So I do have

892
00:52:09,667 --> 00:52:13,007
to point out that they could go and apply a financial

893
00:52:13,007 --> 00:52:16,327
solution to this by having people go mine to their accounts

894
00:52:16,327 --> 00:52:18,947
and pay them out. So, you know, that's not that's not

895
00:52:18,947 --> 00:52:22,347
a guarantee that that it's true, but it's kind of just

896
00:52:22,347 --> 00:52:25,687
shifting the risk. And that does help letting you do like

897
00:52:25,687 --> 00:52:29,287
specialization of labor. But basically, it's just pushing the risk on

898
00:52:29,287 --> 00:52:31,727
to whoever's willing to assume it.

899
00:52:31,867 --> 00:52:34,307
So I think it's still an interesting thing that I think

900
00:52:34,307 --> 00:52:37,187
a lot of people would overlook that the miners don't get

901
00:52:37,187 --> 00:52:41,507
paid at all until there's one hundred people behind

902
00:52:41,507 --> 00:52:43,447
you in line basically to get paid.

903
00:52:44,287 --> 00:52:46,587
And so but I just want to boil it down. Most

904
00:52:46,587 --> 00:52:49,587
people listening, I think we can boil it down to like

905
00:52:49,587 --> 00:52:53,887
there's basically only two scenarios possible. And then the first one

906
00:52:53,887 --> 00:52:57,887
is more likely is that this the one ten soft fork

907
00:52:57,887 --> 00:53:00,327
just fails completely and it doesn't it fails to get,

908
00:53:01,087 --> 00:53:03,647
for example, even one hundred blocks and basically nothing happens.

909
00:53:03,647 --> 00:53:06,107
And it's very, very embarrassing for one ten. And it is

910
00:53:06,107 --> 00:53:08,707
just like a bloodbath crushing defeat.

911
00:53:09,487 --> 00:53:12,607
I suppose we have to acknowledge that the second possibility, I

912
00:53:12,607 --> 00:53:15,107
mean, basically hinges on whether or not a large percent of

913
00:53:15,107 --> 00:53:17,327
hashrate joins one ten or does not.

914
00:53:17,927 --> 00:53:21,687
And they try to draw comparisons to SegWit, which is a

915
00:53:21,687 --> 00:53:24,187
whole different thing we could discuss that I think this is

916
00:53:24,187 --> 00:53:28,527
nothing like SegWit. But really, it does hinge on, you know,

917
00:53:28,607 --> 00:53:31,087
because even SegWit had something like 20 something percent.

918
00:53:31,147 --> 00:53:35,127
It was 70 percent called the last two weeks before activation.

919
00:53:35,547 --> 00:53:38,707
It was 71 percent of blocks had the bit flipped.

920
00:53:39,467 --> 00:53:39,817
71.

921
00:53:40,887 --> 00:53:43,207
But for SegWit, but I was talking about even during the

922
00:53:43,207 --> 00:53:46,847
contentious SegWit2x period, it was like, oh, yeah, and even

923
00:53:46,847 --> 00:53:50,207
the people between 30 and 40 during that period, I suppose

924
00:53:50,207 --> 00:53:52,267
we can now since if people want to talk about this,

925
00:53:52,347 --> 00:53:55,507
we can go down the list right now about the long

926
00:53:55,507 --> 00:53:59,287
list of differences between SegWit and one ten there, of which

927
00:53:59,287 --> 00:54:02,567
there are two that are very, very big, very significant.

928
00:54:03,187 --> 00:54:07,767
The first is even the miners who didn't like SegWit openly

929
00:54:07,767 --> 00:54:09,687
admitted that it had nothing to do with SegWit at all.

930
00:54:09,767 --> 00:54:11,967
They liked SegWit and they thought it was a good idea.

931
00:54:12,607 --> 00:54:15,667
They were just kind of like holding it hostage, so to

932
00:54:15,667 --> 00:54:18,047
speak. So you can't hold something hostage unless you think it's

933
00:54:18,047 --> 00:54:20,087
valuable. You know what I mean? You don't hold like a

934
00:54:20,087 --> 00:54:22,987
bag of trash hostage. They liked everyone.

935
00:54:23,207 --> 00:54:27,787
It was totally and one million percent agreed throughout

936
00:54:27,787 --> 00:54:30,927
the whole. And this kind of bleeds into my second reason,

937
00:54:30,927 --> 00:54:33,287
which is that SegWit was to support lightning. There had been

938
00:54:33,287 --> 00:54:34,527
like a multi-year

939
00:54:35,907 --> 00:54:38,367
process involving the scaling Bitcoin conferences.

940
00:54:38,787 --> 00:54:41,487
SegWit had been discussed. Everyone like knew about it at the

941
00:54:41,487 --> 00:54:43,847
time. It was constantly discussed on social media.

942
00:54:44,027 --> 00:54:46,467
Even normal people kind of knew about it.

943
00:54:46,867 --> 00:54:50,427
And and so this this idea that it's related that, you

944
00:54:50,427 --> 00:54:53,627
know, what they have done, Luke and and Chris and these

945
00:54:53,627 --> 00:54:57,867
other people, they have extrapolated the situation where not me, the

946
00:54:57,867 --> 00:54:59,787
other Chris, Chris G.

947
00:55:02,147 --> 00:55:05,447
They have extrapolated the situation where it's like one tiny minority

948
00:55:05,447 --> 00:55:06,947
of nodes can just

949
00:55:08,047 --> 00:55:12,747
do a a transaction. And another thing is that we

950
00:55:12,747 --> 00:55:14,547
could just keep going down this road, but there's a long

951
00:55:14,547 --> 00:55:16,907
list of reasons. I'll stop after this third one.

952
00:55:17,187 --> 00:55:21,607
But really, SegWit was not about shrinking the quantity of

953
00:55:21,607 --> 00:55:25,267
transactions and neither is what I'm going for with BIP300 and

954
00:55:25,267 --> 00:55:28,687
with eCash hard fork is also part of expanding the

955
00:55:28,687 --> 00:55:31,327
quantity of transactions. And also that was kind of what SegWit

956
00:55:31,327 --> 00:55:34,487
was trying to do as well. Even if you ignored the

957
00:55:34,487 --> 00:55:37,387
block size increase and just forgot about it for a second

958
00:55:37,387 --> 00:55:40,127
so that it's not distracting. The idea of SegWit was that

959
00:55:40,127 --> 00:55:42,427
you take, you know, there would be new types of L1

960
00:55:42,427 --> 00:55:46,907
transaction possible. So the whole thing was expanding the network,

961
00:55:47,687 --> 00:55:51,467
expanding the use cases, whereas 1. 10 is shrinking things.

962
00:55:52,267 --> 00:55:54,607
It does a whole lot else besides, but that's some things

963
00:55:54,607 --> 00:55:56,347
I want to mention. But I wanted to really get that

964
00:55:56,347 --> 00:55:58,287
point in there, but we can shrink it to two scenarios.

965
00:55:58,487 --> 00:56:01,767
One is just basically fails long before it would have even

966
00:56:01,767 --> 00:56:05,267
activated in the mandatory signaling period, which is August 8th, 9th.

967
00:56:05,307 --> 00:56:09,687
And then the second possibility is that for whatever reason, the

968
00:56:09,687 --> 00:56:13,947
miners feel bullied or they just decide to just

969
00:56:13,947 --> 00:56:18,587
for fun experiment. You know,

970
00:56:19,187 --> 00:56:21,607
whatever, they just decide to do 1.

971
00:56:21,607 --> 00:56:24,907
10. We don't have to rethink about what exactly happened, but

972
00:56:24,907 --> 00:56:27,287
I suppose it's possible that they get some kind of large

973
00:56:27,287 --> 00:56:31,547
hash rate majority and then everyone else falls in line and

974
00:56:31,547 --> 00:56:34,367
jumps on to that. And in that case, I don't think

975
00:56:34,367 --> 00:56:37,627
it would really be because of the spam.

976
00:56:37,747 --> 00:56:40,027
I think it would just be because they didn't want to.

977
00:56:40,347 --> 00:56:42,607
It would say a bunch of other weird things we'd have

978
00:56:42,607 --> 00:56:45,287
to investigate and figure out. But those are really the only

979
00:56:45,287 --> 00:56:47,987
two possibilities as far as I see it.

980
00:56:48,207 --> 00:56:51,507
And of course, the first is very, very likely because as

981
00:56:51,507 --> 00:56:55,527
people have pointed out, that even now when the signaling is

982
00:56:55,527 --> 00:56:58,047
cheap, the signal doesn't cost anything at all.

983
00:56:58,347 --> 00:57:01,107
It's still only at 1%.

984
00:57:01,107 --> 00:57:05,527
And even the 1% could be fake because you

985
00:57:05,527 --> 00:57:07,787
could just signal, but then not when push comes to shove,

986
00:57:07,807 --> 00:57:09,967
not be willing to do it. So those are some things

987
00:57:09,967 --> 00:57:14,367
I wanted to clarify. I mean, the phrase signaling is

988
00:57:14,367 --> 00:57:16,987
cheap is a little tricky here, though, because one of their

989
00:57:16,987 --> 00:57:19,627
strategies could be to have agreements to rent a ton of

990
00:57:19,627 --> 00:57:23,847
hash power and start signaling in a large quantity, or

991
00:57:23,847 --> 00:57:26,147
maybe combine this with some sort of attack on

992
00:57:27,347 --> 00:57:31,507
the current Bitcoin Core group of miners to try to get

993
00:57:31,507 --> 00:57:33,647
their hash rate to go down for whatever reason.

994
00:57:37,207 --> 00:57:40,687
Yeah, it's all cheap talk because anyone could rent the hash

995
00:57:40,687 --> 00:57:42,747
rate for any reason, or they could say,

996
00:57:43,767 --> 00:57:47,187
our plan is to lull them into a false sense of

997
00:57:47,187 --> 00:57:50,087
security by not signaling until the last minute in order to

998
00:57:50,087 --> 00:57:53,387
build momentum. And so that's why the whole field of game

999
00:57:53,387 --> 00:57:57,467
theory has this cheap talk idea about like, there's nothing like

1000
00:57:57,467 --> 00:57:58,587
harming you if you signal,

1001
00:57:59,647 --> 00:58:02,087
you know, if you signal for 1. 10 and then back

1002
00:58:02,087 --> 00:58:05,127
out, or vice versa. So it's kind of like, what does

1003
00:58:05,127 --> 00:58:09,307
it really mean? This is all like a bizarre reinterpretation of BIP9.

1004
00:58:10,287 --> 00:58:12,907
And so it's interesting that Peter and I know how this

1005
00:58:12,907 --> 00:58:14,707
all came to be.

1006
00:58:16,147 --> 00:58:18,427
I don't think it's worth boring everyone else with it. But

1007
00:58:18,427 --> 00:58:22,107
originally, the signaling was like as a courtesy, and originally is

1008
00:58:22,107 --> 00:58:26,307
95%. But it's not really that important for anyone listening.

1009
00:58:26,547 --> 00:58:29,507
So it doesn't matter. One funny note, renting hash rate after

1010
00:58:29,507 --> 00:58:34,027
the mandatory signaling split happens, you can rent hash for

1011
00:58:34,027 --> 00:58:37,547
the non 1. 10 side and in the random chance that

1012
00:58:37,547 --> 00:58:40,027
rollback happens that the 1. 10 proponents say, then you get

1013
00:58:40,027 --> 00:58:40,887
your money back anyway.

1014
00:58:44,227 --> 00:58:50,207
Peter, I'm curious if you can just

1015
00:58:50,207 --> 00:58:53,847
quickly explain also this like poison block attack risk.

1016
00:58:53,847 --> 00:58:58,107
I'm like hearing rumblings about a potential poison block attack

1017
00:58:58,107 --> 00:59:02,407
against core perspectively, although I guess it could go

1018
00:59:02,407 --> 00:59:05,487
either way. But how would that work? And like, how concerned

1019
00:59:05,487 --> 00:59:08,547
should we be about something like that? And what would that mean?

1020
00:59:09,587 --> 00:59:11,127
I think Portland's the one to talk about this.

1021
00:59:12,167 --> 00:59:13,477
No, Peter can go. That's fine.

1022
00:59:16,067 --> 00:59:19,407
Yeah, I'll give my shot at it. So it is true

1023
00:59:19,407 --> 00:59:21,527
in Portland's and certainly put a lot of thought into this.

1024
00:59:22,207 --> 00:59:26,527
But essentially, we're using the term poison block here

1025
00:59:26,527 --> 00:59:30,487
for a block that is trying to go and take advantage

1026
00:59:30,487 --> 00:59:35,007
of sort of quadratic slowdowns related to

1027
00:59:35,007 --> 00:59:37,507
signature hashing. And that's one of the things the Great Consensus

1028
00:59:37,507 --> 00:59:41,127
Cleanup wants to go and fix. And this basically happens because

1029
00:59:41,127 --> 00:59:44,607
signature hashing inversion, you know, the very first version of Bitcoin

1030
00:59:44,607 --> 00:59:47,487
just wasn't designed very well. So you can make the validation

1031
00:59:47,487 --> 00:59:49,707
time kind of blow up from quadratically.

1032
00:59:50,947 --> 00:59:51,297
Now,

1033
00:59:52,467 --> 00:59:55,567
concretely, what this means is, you can make a block that

1034
00:59:55,567 --> 00:59:57,127
just takes a very long time to validate.

1035
00:59:58,027 --> 01:00:00,387
And there may be with I mean, first of all, the

1036
01:00:00,387 --> 01:00:04,847
there are there have been a bit not not

1037
01:00:04,847 --> 01:00:07,687
people who said that they would do, you know, some kind

1038
01:00:07,687 --> 01:00:11,547
of attack like this would happen. No clear details or anything.

1039
01:00:12,147 --> 01:00:15,227
But there's been rumblings of it. And maybe one way this

1040
01:00:15,227 --> 01:00:19,587
could play out is maybe they use this against core by

1041
01:00:19,587 --> 01:00:23,867
mining blocks that are not BIP-110

1042
01:00:23,867 --> 01:00:28,167
compliant, that try to disrupt mining

1043
01:00:28,167 --> 01:00:31,767
on the core chain, you can't do it.

1044
01:00:31,987 --> 01:00:36,809
Well, I don't think it's that simple. Like, They can

1045
01:00:36,809 --> 01:00:39,389
potentially use some hash power to try to mine blocks like

1046
01:00:39,389 --> 01:00:43,649
that, and the outcome of

1047
01:00:43,649 --> 01:00:46,029
this may not be directly trying to make money off of

1048
01:00:46,029 --> 01:00:49,569
this. It may be a PR attack. It may be something

1049
01:00:49,569 --> 01:00:53,489
where they're trying to go and just disrupt things to try

1050
01:00:53,489 --> 01:00:56,929
to convince hashers, ultimately placing their hash power to go switch.

1051
01:00:59,289 --> 01:01:03,549
I agree with you saying that, yeah, this isn't

1052
01:01:03,549 --> 01:01:06,429
necessarily a profit-making attack, but there are potentially ways you

1053
01:01:06,429 --> 01:01:09,549
can go spin this PR-wise. Now, the good thing about

1054
01:01:09,549 --> 01:01:12,629
this is you do get warning because to set up these

1055
01:01:12,629 --> 01:01:15,729
kinds of attacks, you've got to go create blocks with transactions

1056
01:01:15,729 --> 01:01:20,049
with old-school script pubkeys in them that

1057
01:01:20,049 --> 01:01:23,349
contain basically a lot of checks. You get warning that this

1058
01:01:23,349 --> 01:01:25,529
is happening, but it is something that they could go do

1059
01:01:25,529 --> 01:01:28,469
just before and try to go play the PR game and

1060
01:01:28,469 --> 01:01:31,349
say, hey, our stuff goes as quick as this.

1061
01:01:31,569 --> 01:01:34,989
Look at how the core chain fails to go stop spam.

1062
01:01:34,989 --> 01:01:39,409
I was going to state that they

1063
01:01:39,409 --> 01:01:43,709
would need basically about 150 blocks worth of setup

1064
01:01:43,709 --> 01:01:48,249
transactions to get a decent payload out to cause

1065
01:01:48,249 --> 01:01:51,109
a DOS block, essentially, to be put out to the network.

1066
01:01:51,549 --> 01:01:55,789
Those blocks would contain fully transactions that would be seen on

1067
01:01:55,789 --> 01:02:00,169
mempool. space, non-standard transactions, op check sig,

1068
01:02:00,269 --> 01:02:01,809
a bunch of data, op check sig.

1069
01:02:02,609 --> 01:02:05,329
Essentially, that's why I think it's impossible at this point to

1070
01:02:05,329 --> 01:02:08,809
really pull off because even if they use MARA's hash rate

1071
01:02:08,809 --> 01:02:12,809
starting today, I don't think they could get enough setup transactions

1072
01:02:12,809 --> 01:02:13,649
into the chain.

1073
01:02:14,789 --> 01:02:17,949
They're buying all of MARA's blocks through Slipstream, and that's not

1074
01:02:17,949 --> 01:02:20,609
even allowed through Slipstream, but let's just entertain it.

1075
01:02:21,829 --> 01:02:24,689
I don't think by August 8th or 9th they could pull

1076
01:02:24,689 --> 01:02:27,629
off a DOS block. Even if they had, they couldn't get

1077
01:02:27,629 --> 01:02:32,029
enough setup transactions into the chain. And then as a side note,

1078
01:02:32,889 --> 01:02:36,629
you could also do the same thing to Nott's nodes to

1079
01:02:36,629 --> 01:02:40,929
a degree because BIP-110 doesn't actually stop DOS blocks completely.

1080
01:02:40,929 --> 01:02:43,449
There's also the script sig way.

1081
01:02:43,569 --> 01:02:47,389
If you do a pay2script hash transaction, you can create a

1082
01:02:47,389 --> 01:02:50,629
less powerful DOS block. But yeah, I just don't see at

1083
01:02:50,629 --> 01:02:54,389
this point the ability for an attacker to set up a

1084
01:02:54,389 --> 01:02:57,189
true DOS block to kind of like, hey, our Nott's nodes

1085
01:02:57,189 --> 01:03:00,069
are protected from this with BIP-110, and the core nodes aren't,

1086
01:03:00,149 --> 01:03:02,669
so I'm going to lob this thing at them. You're right,

1087
01:03:02,889 --> 01:03:06,169
reputational damage could occur because if a pool like MARA starts

1088
01:03:06,169 --> 01:03:10,289
mining these transactions, these setup transactions, people will get very upset.

1089
01:03:10,449 --> 01:03:13,409
Like, why are you doing this? But the actual ability to

1090
01:03:13,409 --> 01:03:15,209
execute on that will be incredibly low.

1091
01:03:17,149 --> 01:03:21,989
I agree with you there, and I think this overlaps

1092
01:03:21,989 --> 01:03:26,489
with them renting hash power in degrees that we didn't expect.

1093
01:03:28,929 --> 01:03:33,489
Hypothetically, if they go and convince Foundry, maybe, but the

1094
01:03:33,489 --> 01:03:35,809
time window is certainly running out, so you do get warned.

1095
01:03:35,809 --> 01:03:39,829
Yeah, and the fact is, miner centralization as well right now

1096
01:03:39,829 --> 01:03:42,409
is kind of like becoming a guardian of the network too.

1097
01:03:42,529 --> 01:03:45,349
Like I've said this for a couple of years, these publicly

1098
01:03:45,349 --> 01:03:48,929
traded companies or whatnot, they don't want to be mining these

1099
01:03:48,929 --> 01:03:52,009
blocks. MARA will not mine these setup transactions for that reason,

1100
01:03:52,029 --> 01:03:54,309
right? It would be reputational damage to the company.

1101
01:03:54,569 --> 01:03:56,809
Foundry doesn't want to be caught mining these blocks.

1102
01:03:57,009 --> 01:03:59,589
F2Pool probably doesn't want to be caught mining these blocks.

1103
01:04:00,589 --> 01:04:05,409
Are there any other kind of risks or

1104
01:04:05,409 --> 01:04:09,869
set of preventions or precautions that either miners or

1105
01:04:09,869 --> 01:04:14,229
node runners should be aware of and executing

1106
01:04:14,229 --> 01:04:17,049
on before August 9th?

1107
01:04:18,989 --> 01:04:22,409
So one thing we haven't gone and brought up is legal attack.

1108
01:04:23,649 --> 01:04:26,649
And it may be that the Knots guys come up with

1109
01:04:26,649 --> 01:04:30,569
some kind of legal attack against, especially publicly traded miners in

1110
01:04:30,569 --> 01:04:32,749
the U. S. I mean, maybe it's something as simple as

1111
01:04:32,749 --> 01:04:37,029
just filing lawsuits. Maybe it's something as convoluted as putting

1112
01:04:37,029 --> 01:04:40,749
data in the core chain and trying to go and wind

1113
01:04:40,749 --> 01:04:43,749
up with some legal theft. It's hard to say. Now, the

1114
01:04:43,749 --> 01:04:47,309
one good thing is the fact there is a mandatory signaling

1115
01:04:47,309 --> 01:04:51,589
period where these rules aren't enforced could potentially

1116
01:04:51,589 --> 01:04:55,629
mean that you could disrupt this to a degree by mining

1117
01:04:55,629 --> 01:05:00,109
blocks on the Knots side that mine the transactions

1118
01:05:00,109 --> 01:05:02,589
they're claiming are bad or so on.

1119
01:05:02,629 --> 01:05:04,929
But like I say, it's a legal attack, and that's kind

1120
01:05:04,929 --> 01:05:06,469
of it's a harder thing to go predict.

1121
01:05:08,749 --> 01:05:11,409
Paul, I'm wondering if now's a good time for us to

1122
01:05:11,409 --> 01:05:13,889
maybe kind of chat a little bit more about eCash

1123
01:05:13,889 --> 01:05:17,849
specifically and kind of what people can expect when eCash

1124
01:05:17,849 --> 01:05:24,149
goes live. I mean, like, how would you TLDR that for people?

1125
01:05:25,329 --> 01:05:29,469
Creative destruction and chaos. Well, you know, the irony is I

1126
01:05:29,469 --> 01:05:33,789
planned out and announced this months in

1127
01:05:33,789 --> 01:05:36,529
advance what 1. 10 is going to like kind of do

1128
01:05:36,529 --> 01:05:39,749
like scrambling at the last minute, which is very bizarre, because

1129
01:05:39,749 --> 01:05:42,829
I was kind of like, well, hey, there's we have it's

1130
01:05:42,829 --> 01:05:45,309
very simple. There's many ways in which it's very similar, which

1131
01:05:45,309 --> 01:05:48,449
is ironic to me, because I think that, you know, it's

1132
01:05:48,449 --> 01:05:50,909
also like they have just some of the worst ideas in

1133
01:05:50,909 --> 01:05:53,409
the whole world. And I think I have really good we

1134
01:05:53,409 --> 01:05:54,949
have really good ideas over there.

1135
01:05:55,809 --> 01:06:00,009
But basically, I have also put out a soft

1136
01:06:00,009 --> 01:06:03,149
fork, which is BIP300/301, which is the enforcer that

1137
01:06:03,149 --> 01:06:05,489
anyone could run at any time. And we could activate it

1138
01:06:05,489 --> 01:06:08,109
with hash rate support. And it's kind of like it's there

1139
01:06:08,109 --> 01:06:10,449
and we're just giving it away for free. So you could

1140
01:06:10,449 --> 01:06:13,289
take it if you want. And then I'm like, you know,

1141
01:06:13,309 --> 01:06:15,449
no one no one is right now.

1142
01:06:16,489 --> 01:06:18,529
And of course, you know, it's hard not to take that

1143
01:06:18,529 --> 01:06:21,929
personally. But, you know, we have a cat and we have

1144
01:06:21,929 --> 01:06:23,869
all these other things that haven't gotten through either.

1145
01:06:25,109 --> 01:06:28,749
Basically, nothing is almost nothing has gotten through. If 110 activates,

1146
01:06:28,829 --> 01:06:30,789
it would be very embarrassing that that's the so. So the

1147
01:06:30,789 --> 01:06:32,749
point is, I also have like a soft fork and a

1148
01:06:32,749 --> 01:06:34,629
hard fork. So it's kind of like I have my soft

1149
01:06:34,629 --> 01:06:37,749
fork, which is the BIP300/301 activator. And you could

1150
01:06:37,749 --> 01:06:39,689
just take it if you want it. But I'm kind of

1151
01:06:39,689 --> 01:06:42,029
like, well, kind of no one is taking it.

1152
01:06:42,029 --> 01:06:45,989
So now I'm doing the basically what Luke would call the,

1153
01:06:46,029 --> 01:06:47,849
you know, the proof of work. I'm not changing the proof

1154
01:06:47,849 --> 01:06:51,529
of work, but I'm lowering the difficulty, which is more very,

1155
01:06:51,789 --> 01:06:55,069
very similar. And so that's basically all we do is we

1156
01:06:55,069 --> 01:06:57,269
lower the difficult. So it's very funny that what I'm doing

1157
01:06:57,269 --> 01:07:00,169
will be very similar to what Luke will scramble to do

1158
01:07:00,169 --> 01:07:03,189
on like August 10th. And I'm going to mine is going

1159
01:07:03,189 --> 01:07:06,909
to be around August 23rd again because of time zones and

1160
01:07:06,909 --> 01:07:07,809
because of block,

1161
01:07:09,349 --> 01:07:12,789
you know, block times. We don't actually know the exact moment.

1162
01:07:14,409 --> 01:07:15,909
So I'm not sure, you know, and of course, when I

1163
01:07:15,909 --> 01:07:17,749
did this, I was just thinking I want to announce it

1164
01:07:17,749 --> 01:07:20,489
before the Las Vegas conference. And I just saw four months.

1165
01:07:21,189 --> 01:07:24,329
It's probably enough time to like get it onto people's calendar

1166
01:07:24,329 --> 01:07:26,949
and stuff. So it's very bizarre for me to watch the

1167
01:07:26,949 --> 01:07:30,229
110 people. They're just kind of like complete Yolo, this soft

1168
01:07:30,229 --> 01:07:32,449
fork that's almost certainly going to fail. And then they're going

1169
01:07:32,449 --> 01:07:34,949
to scramble. And then, you know, I have to, you know,

1170
01:07:34,949 --> 01:07:37,489
from personal experience, I know that there's an awful lot of

1171
01:07:37,489 --> 01:07:41,629
details. The name, the domain name, like the GitHub or how

1172
01:07:41,629 --> 01:07:43,649
do people how can you let people know how they can

1173
01:07:43,649 --> 01:07:46,329
find? A lot of people are going to ask these questions like,

1174
01:07:47,109 --> 01:07:50,089
how do you derive addresses, blah, blah, blah. So there's like

1175
01:07:50,089 --> 01:07:52,909
kind of a lot of questions you have to answer just

1176
01:07:52,909 --> 01:07:55,889
to launch the hard fork. And so I'm kind of curious

1177
01:07:55,889 --> 01:07:59,409
as to what the 110 people are, you know, what they

1178
01:07:59,409 --> 01:08:02,669
are. Are they, you know, are they planning to I agreed

1179
01:08:02,669 --> 01:08:06,009
with what someone said before about I think for them to

1180
01:08:06,009 --> 01:08:07,129
discuss the hard fork.

1181
01:08:07,929 --> 01:08:10,409
They think it makes it it's defeatist and it makes it

1182
01:08:10,409 --> 01:08:14,049
seem like that they're not confident in the soft fork.

1183
01:08:15,109 --> 01:08:17,589
Personally, I don't think so at all. I think it's, you

1184
01:08:17,589 --> 01:08:19,969
know, imagine a military general is like trying to like invade

1185
01:08:19,969 --> 01:08:22,369
a country or something. You know, you would not want them

1186
01:08:22,369 --> 01:08:25,249
to just be like you'd want them to be confident, but

1187
01:08:25,249 --> 01:08:28,029
you wouldn't want them. I would have more confidence in 110

1188
01:08:28,029 --> 01:08:31,269
soft fork if they had actually like laid out like some

1189
01:08:31,269 --> 01:08:34,069
kind of document with like, this is what we're going to

1190
01:08:34,069 --> 01:08:36,169
this is what we're going to do. We're thinking about all

1191
01:08:36,169 --> 01:08:40,909
these issues. So it is intriguing that I'm

1192
01:08:40,909 --> 01:08:43,349
more surprised than you are more surprised than anyone.

1193
01:08:43,349 --> 01:08:46,209
There's a lot in common. I'm kind of like further along

1194
01:08:46,209 --> 01:08:51,249
in the I'm like my soft fork has pre failed, so

1195
01:08:51,249 --> 01:08:54,849
to speak. Notice I made a lot less noise about it

1196
01:08:54,849 --> 01:08:59,449
because I think it'll be just crushingly humiliating for 110

1197
01:08:59,449 --> 01:09:02,829
people on August 10. Paul, I think I would just say

1198
01:09:02,829 --> 01:09:04,929
that, like, I think the way you're going about it is

1199
01:09:04,929 --> 01:09:06,809
the more direct, honest way of going about like, hey, here's

1200
01:09:06,809 --> 01:09:08,729
my intentions. I wanted this is how I'm going to go

1201
01:09:08,729 --> 01:09:10,849
about it. I'm going to like put this all up front.

1202
01:09:11,269 --> 01:09:14,749
There are no tricks here. To be clear, that is mechanics

1203
01:09:14,749 --> 01:09:17,549
position that to discuss it is to admit defeat.

1204
01:09:17,549 --> 01:09:21,069
And I think it is also an attempt of what you're

1205
01:09:21,069 --> 01:09:23,229
doing with a hard fork. You're saying, hey, Bitcoin's going to

1206
01:09:23,229 --> 01:09:24,909
continue building on its chain over here and I'm going to

1207
01:09:24,909 --> 01:09:28,849
do my own thing, whereas they are trying to take the

1208
01:09:28,849 --> 01:09:30,809
mantle of we are the real Bitcoin, just like the B

1209
01:09:30,809 --> 01:09:35,229
cashers. Right. And I just haven't found anyone on

1210
01:09:35,229 --> 01:09:39,169
the 110 side who wants to talk about the mechanics of

1211
01:09:39,169 --> 01:09:40,229
the hard fork in detail.

1212
01:09:41,549 --> 01:09:44,029
It's to me at this point come off as a unified

1213
01:09:44,029 --> 01:09:46,829
party line and it's difficult to do a proof of work

1214
01:09:46,829 --> 01:09:50,089
change like you have to pick an algorithm and then you're

1215
01:09:50,089 --> 01:09:52,009
going to have winners and losers of people who know on

1216
01:09:52,009 --> 01:09:54,749
the inner circle. If you kind of drop it like you

1217
01:09:54,749 --> 01:09:56,909
to do it as a fair distributed kind of like we're

1218
01:09:56,909 --> 01:09:59,749
going to try and reset this. I'm assuming they're going to

1219
01:09:59,749 --> 01:10:01,529
try and do one with ASICs because if you use one

1220
01:10:01,529 --> 01:10:04,829
that doesn't use ASICs, all of these AI data centers are

1221
01:10:04,829 --> 01:10:07,009
going to be able to 51 percent attack trivially because they

1222
01:10:07,009 --> 01:10:09,989
have these H200s and H300s with CUDA.

1223
01:10:10,569 --> 01:10:13,709
Those are like FPGA ASICs that are going to out dwarf

1224
01:10:13,709 --> 01:10:15,569
anything. So you could just like rent a data center for

1225
01:10:15,569 --> 01:10:18,969
a couple hours and 51 percent attack the new network.

1226
01:10:18,969 --> 01:10:21,169
So like it's a rough spot to be in.

1227
01:10:21,389 --> 01:10:24,789
And I think because they're trying to manufacture this idea that

1228
01:10:24,789 --> 01:10:26,829
they are the real Bitcoin, they have to go about it

1229
01:10:26,829 --> 01:10:29,489
this way and make it look like an emergency. Remember, BIP-110

1230
01:10:29,489 --> 01:10:32,189
is an emergency. That's why it's a temporary soft fork. I'm

1231
01:10:32,189 --> 01:10:35,329
very glad. I know we have four hands up, but I

1232
01:10:35,329 --> 01:10:37,529
think you hit on two things that would really clarify for

1233
01:10:37,529 --> 01:10:40,829
lots of people, but maybe Isabel wants to. Well, I want

1234
01:10:40,829 --> 01:10:44,269
Matt to jump in if he has a comment on this.

1235
01:10:45,189 --> 01:10:46,749
I'm curious to get his take.

1236
01:10:48,529 --> 01:10:50,549
Yeah, I mean, there's there's been a lot and I just

1237
01:10:50,549 --> 01:10:52,189
wanted to weigh in on some of it real quick.

1238
01:10:53,069 --> 01:10:56,689
I think on this whole panel, I'm probably the only person

1239
01:10:56,689 --> 01:10:59,469
on the wanting to see BIP-110 succeed side.

1240
01:10:59,929 --> 01:11:01,809
So I think it'd be good to balance it a little

1241
01:11:01,809 --> 01:11:05,069
here. So earlier, Paul said a couple of things that I

1242
01:11:05,069 --> 01:11:08,309
want to comment on, especially since, like he said, there are

1243
01:11:08,309 --> 01:11:12,129
some some corollaries here between what he's doing and what BIP-110

1244
01:11:12,129 --> 01:11:16,389
is doing. Obviously, there's huge differences, too, in methodology and the

1245
01:11:16,389 --> 01:11:17,189
reason behind it.

1246
01:11:18,369 --> 01:11:22,189
So but one is that there's been multiple references to sort

1247
01:11:22,189 --> 01:11:24,389
of Luke soft forking the network.

1248
01:11:25,169 --> 01:11:28,009
I want to make it very clear to frame this properly,

1249
01:11:28,289 --> 01:11:32,709
that there are many thousands of

1250
01:11:32,709 --> 01:11:37,349
people in the world like real people who are

1251
01:11:37,349 --> 01:11:41,789
ideologically aligned with Bitcoin and who are politically kind

1252
01:11:41,789 --> 01:11:44,969
of libertarian and anarchist and who want to separate money from

1253
01:11:44,969 --> 01:11:49,209
state like good people. There are many, many thousands, which is

1254
01:11:49,209 --> 01:11:54,189
actually a meaningful portion of the Bitcoin community and network who

1255
01:11:54,189 --> 01:11:57,869
are very, very aggressively and passionately fighting for this fork.

1256
01:11:57,969 --> 01:12:00,269
So if you say that, like Luke is forking the network

1257
01:12:00,269 --> 01:12:05,269
is is is wrong to the point of being

1258
01:12:05,269 --> 01:12:09,369
dishonest and malicious. Right. It is a lot of people trying

1259
01:12:09,369 --> 01:12:12,129
to fork the network right now, like a lot. OK, so

1260
01:12:12,129 --> 01:12:15,269
I think that's important to keep in mind. Number two, Paul

1261
01:12:15,269 --> 01:12:18,009
had said something that caught my ear, which was, well, there's

1262
01:12:18,009 --> 01:12:21,309
this other scenario that could happen. And let's say, you know,

1263
01:12:21,369 --> 01:12:25,369
for some reason, all the miners start signaling before the mandatory

1264
01:12:25,369 --> 01:12:27,649
signaling period and it snowballs. And then everyone sort of has

1265
01:12:27,649 --> 01:12:30,409
to go along with this because of the fork dynamics and

1266
01:12:30,409 --> 01:12:34,649
game theory behind it. And that, for some reason, was

1267
01:12:34,649 --> 01:12:38,969
very just hand waved away. And there actually is an extremely

1268
01:12:38,969 --> 01:12:43,409
good and powerful reason why that could

1269
01:12:43,409 --> 01:12:48,189
happen. And it is because each large

1270
01:12:48,189 --> 01:12:50,929
miner or collection of small miners.

1271
01:12:51,169 --> 01:12:54,249
Right. So we'll call it some meaningful amount of hash.

1272
01:12:54,849 --> 01:13:00,189
Has the ability right now between now and

1273
01:13:00,189 --> 01:13:04,609
mandatory signaling or even right at mandatory signaling, but

1274
01:13:04,609 --> 01:13:06,969
probably before has the ability.

1275
01:13:08,009 --> 01:13:11,149
To avoid everything that we have been talking about on this

1276
01:13:11,149 --> 01:13:13,129
entire space, all of the risks,

1277
01:13:13,949 --> 01:13:17,229
all of the confusion, all of the chaos, everything.

1278
01:13:17,949 --> 01:13:21,049
Every large miner, a collection of medium miners or small miners

1279
01:13:21,049 --> 01:13:23,429
has the ability right now to pull out of their pocket

1280
01:13:23,429 --> 01:13:25,709
a avoid the whole thing card.

1281
01:13:25,769 --> 01:13:28,189
But you're imposing your will on them that at that point,

1282
01:13:28,209 --> 01:13:30,729
you're basically saying you must you must do this.

1283
01:13:31,849 --> 01:13:36,589
Otherwise, I am not talking about the

1284
01:13:36,589 --> 01:13:40,009
morality of it. I'm not talking about the motivation behind it.

1285
01:13:40,009 --> 01:13:41,989
I'm not talking about whether people like it or not. I

1286
01:13:41,989 --> 01:13:45,789
am saying a simple fact that every miner on the planet

1287
01:13:45,789 --> 01:13:48,509
right now has the ability to pull out of their card,

1288
01:13:49,309 --> 01:13:51,089
has the ability to pull out of their pocket the avoid

1289
01:13:51,089 --> 01:13:52,089
the whole thing card.

1290
01:13:53,709 --> 01:13:57,189
Let's just be very clear what we're saying when we say every miner.

1291
01:13:57,969 --> 01:14:01,229
We're saying a group of miners with at least 50 percent

1292
01:14:01,229 --> 01:14:02,289
hash power. Not 50.

1293
01:14:03,229 --> 01:14:07,309
This snowballs way before 50 because the risk of wipeout rises

1294
01:14:07,309 --> 01:14:08,389
with each percent.

1295
01:14:09,609 --> 01:14:12,769
It is just not that clear. It really isn't.

1296
01:14:13,129 --> 01:14:17,749
I mean, if this was sitting at 25, the way

1297
01:14:17,749 --> 01:14:19,849
this could play out could easily be the other way. Plus,

1298
01:14:19,969 --> 01:14:22,009
I mean, there are things that miners can go do to

1299
01:14:22,009 --> 01:14:24,709
go and make this wipeout risk go away. I mean, they

1300
01:14:24,709 --> 01:14:27,729
can go and react to this and do another soft work.

1301
01:14:28,229 --> 01:14:30,369
But hold on. Hold on. I want to be clear here.

1302
01:14:31,649 --> 01:14:32,829
There is no.

1303
01:14:34,089 --> 01:14:38,049
There's no good reason. So Paul was saying earlier, like for

1304
01:14:38,049 --> 01:14:41,629
some reason. Right. What is the reason on the other side?

1305
01:14:41,849 --> 01:14:44,089
Why wouldn't a miner pull this out of their pocket?

1306
01:14:44,149 --> 01:14:46,709
What is the harm to them? So let's say you're a

1307
01:14:46,709 --> 01:14:49,689
huge miner or you're a couple of small miners and you

1308
01:14:49,689 --> 01:14:51,689
pull this card out right now. It's risk free, as we've

1309
01:14:51,689 --> 01:14:53,949
all stated, because you pull it out now and you can

1310
01:14:53,949 --> 01:14:56,609
retract it before mandatory signaling. So there's this sort of risk

1311
01:14:56,609 --> 01:14:59,629
free reconnaissance or hedge that you can take right now as

1312
01:14:59,629 --> 01:15:01,789
a miner and be like, OK, I'm going to show this

1313
01:15:01,789 --> 01:15:04,729
thing. I'm going to signal. Let me finish. I'm going to

1314
01:15:04,729 --> 01:15:09,129
signal. Right. Just to see what happens, because ultimately,

1315
01:15:09,129 --> 01:15:11,809
if I signal and a few other people signal, the whole

1316
01:15:11,809 --> 01:15:15,029
risk vanishes. The network just moves on like it like it

1317
01:15:15,029 --> 01:15:17,509
always is really symmetric. You understand.

1318
01:15:17,649 --> 01:15:21,309
It's totally symmetric. So there's there's a there's a Queen song,

1319
01:15:21,469 --> 01:15:25,329
Hammer to Fall. And there's this lyric that says, what the

1320
01:15:25,329 --> 01:15:28,469
hell are we fighting for? Just surrender and it won't hurt

1321
01:15:28,469 --> 01:15:31,789
at all. And that's the joke of the lyric is that

1322
01:15:31,789 --> 01:15:32,809
people fight because,

1323
01:15:33,649 --> 01:15:35,709
yeah, of course, if some one side surrenders, the fight's over.

1324
01:15:35,709 --> 01:15:38,969
But, you know, it doesn't mean so. You're assuming the miners

1325
01:15:38,969 --> 01:15:41,389
have some kind of opposition to this card.

1326
01:15:41,849 --> 01:15:44,229
Anyone could say Peter could say the miners can just pull

1327
01:15:44,229 --> 01:15:47,409
out this card that says we will avoid all this by

1328
01:15:47,409 --> 01:15:49,629
just ignoring one time and not signaling.

1329
01:15:49,869 --> 01:15:52,989
And then they also avoid the whole thing. Well, but I

1330
01:15:52,989 --> 01:15:56,329
want to be clear. There's a very good reason for miners

1331
01:15:56,329 --> 01:15:59,449
to oppose this, which is that it's bad to set precedents

1332
01:15:59,449 --> 01:16:02,069
that we should do. And the technical change is the Bitcoin

1333
01:16:02,069 --> 01:16:03,469
consensus without good reasons.

1334
01:16:04,369 --> 01:16:07,709
And it is perfectly reasonable to go and take that viewpoint.

1335
01:16:08,889 --> 01:16:12,789
And it's also like you're letting the terrorists win, you're shrinking

1336
01:16:12,789 --> 01:16:16,009
the transaction fee revenue. So there's a lot of a lot

1337
01:16:16,009 --> 01:16:18,509
of you. I think there's a lot in a way.

1338
01:16:18,509 --> 01:16:21,709
Right. Imposing your own belief of what is good for Bitcoin

1339
01:16:21,709 --> 01:16:22,689
onto the miners.

1340
01:16:26,729 --> 01:16:29,389
It's not that there are opinion lists. It's not that there

1341
01:16:29,389 --> 01:16:33,669
aren't people at mining companies that have opinions about BIP-110

1342
01:16:33,669 --> 01:16:38,169
or not. Right. It's that doesn't it doesn't the indifferent person

1343
01:16:38,169 --> 01:16:41,109
win? It's really interesting. Totally symmetric.

1344
01:16:41,829 --> 01:16:44,769
Continue this. Right. I've triggered something. You know what you understand

1345
01:16:44,769 --> 01:16:49,149
what I'm saying? I'm trying to I'm trying to create

1346
01:16:49,149 --> 01:16:52,489
a vision here, a picture of something.

1347
01:16:52,489 --> 01:16:55,449
And when I'm done, I think it's really useful to kind

1348
01:16:55,449 --> 01:17:00,249
of debate it. Right. But there's emotions all of a sudden.

1349
01:17:01,129 --> 01:17:05,909
I'm just trying to paint a game theoretical picture for a moment. OK.

1350
01:17:07,689 --> 01:17:10,649
If there are people at mining companies that have opinions about

1351
01:17:10,649 --> 01:17:12,969
BIP-110, et cetera, that's fine. And I'm not saying that

1352
01:17:12,969 --> 01:17:15,349
they won't act on those opinions, that those opinions will not

1353
01:17:15,349 --> 01:17:18,709
sort of infiltrate the decision of the company.

1354
01:17:18,709 --> 01:17:22,149
But fundamentally, miners are rational economic actors.

1355
01:17:22,949 --> 01:17:27,189
Their goal is to make money.

1356
01:17:27,529 --> 01:17:30,989
Right. Their goal is to spend energy in order to mine

1357
01:17:30,989 --> 01:17:34,369
blocks in order to get Bitcoin rewards. It's not that simple

1358
01:17:34,369 --> 01:17:37,309
because they have an enormous amount of money tied up in

1359
01:17:37,309 --> 01:17:41,089
ASICs and they have to go think about longer term than

1360
01:17:41,089 --> 01:17:43,949
just tomorrow. Yeah, I think you'd have a better point if

1361
01:17:43,949 --> 01:17:46,569
mining didn't have ASICs in what you say.

1362
01:17:46,749 --> 01:17:49,149
Hypothetically, we're in a world where it was all, you know,

1363
01:17:49,149 --> 01:17:51,749
the AI people just mining on the side and their only

1364
01:17:51,749 --> 01:17:55,629
cost was electricity. But miners do have to think many weeks,

1365
01:17:55,809 --> 01:17:58,989
many years even down the road. And under that type of

1366
01:17:58,989 --> 01:18:03,369
circumstance, you certainly don't want to set precedence to turn on

1367
01:18:03,369 --> 01:18:04,429
bad technical changes.

1368
01:18:05,209 --> 01:18:09,949
Well, hold on. So you're making the claim right now that

1369
01:18:09,949 --> 01:18:12,489
you're speaking sort of on behalf of the largest miners in

1370
01:18:12,489 --> 01:18:15,549
the world, that they think that if BIP-110 activates,

1371
01:18:16,409 --> 01:18:19,129
it dooms Bitcoin and ruins their future.

1372
01:18:20,229 --> 01:18:24,049
I'm saying that it's perfectly reasonable for them to take that

1373
01:18:24,049 --> 01:18:28,429
position. I have a question slash like mild point

1374
01:18:28,429 --> 01:18:30,649
of view, but like maybe this is just a question I'm

1375
01:18:30,649 --> 01:18:33,109
not really sure. But I think, you know, if the argument

1376
01:18:33,109 --> 01:18:36,429
if the if the challenge with filtering, you know, for instance,

1377
01:18:36,429 --> 01:18:38,249
even at the policy level is that you'd have to kind

1378
01:18:38,249 --> 01:18:41,089
of like update the filters every six months to combat like

1379
01:18:41,089 --> 01:18:43,749
the newest way of getting arbitrary data in.

1380
01:18:44,389 --> 01:18:48,049
I would imagine the incentive for the miners to say no

1381
01:18:48,049 --> 01:18:52,349
to this would be. And again, this is just me spitballing

1382
01:18:52,349 --> 01:18:55,629
here. I'm not speaking on behalf of anyone, of course, would

1383
01:18:55,629 --> 01:18:57,689
be. Well, we don't want to have to be dealing with

1384
01:18:57,689 --> 01:19:01,269
the soft fork thing every six months, every time consensus needs

1385
01:19:01,269 --> 01:19:04,509
to upgrade to figure out how to block the next wave

1386
01:19:04,509 --> 01:19:07,349
of spam. Right. I mean, like I could see why that

1387
01:19:07,349 --> 01:19:11,189
would be a very reasonable, like a rational reason not simply

1388
01:19:11,189 --> 01:19:14,989
to fold to BIP-110 or any other similar soft fork

1389
01:19:14,989 --> 01:19:19,409
exclusively for the purpose of, you know, avoiding, you

1390
01:19:19,409 --> 01:19:22,729
know, having potential contention the day of.

1391
01:19:24,569 --> 01:19:27,909
So here's let me fast forward a little, because I'm trying

1392
01:19:27,909 --> 01:19:31,269
to get somewhere and I understand that, you know, there's.

1393
01:19:32,409 --> 01:19:36,729
I welcome honestly, because we already know, I

1394
01:19:36,729 --> 01:19:40,269
think, where you're trying to go. And that's that's the interruption.

1395
01:19:40,449 --> 01:19:42,729
The emotion is boredom.

1396
01:19:43,409 --> 01:19:46,549
Where I'm going with this. OK, and this should apply to

1397
01:19:46,549 --> 01:19:49,709
you. You should appreciate this. There are a few sort of

1398
01:19:49,709 --> 01:19:53,329
tenants in, you know, freedom circles and in Bitcoin.

1399
01:19:53,649 --> 01:19:56,829
OK, we say that often everyone does, which regardless of which

1400
01:19:56,829 --> 01:19:59,449
side you're on, which is, you know, you can just do

1401
01:19:59,449 --> 01:20:02,669
things. It's better to beg forgiveness than ask permission.

1402
01:20:04,769 --> 01:20:06,789
The question isn't who is going to let me. It's who's

1403
01:20:06,789 --> 01:20:11,289
going to stop me. I would argue that these these

1404
01:20:11,289 --> 01:20:15,409
phrases embody the essence of progress.

1405
01:20:15,729 --> 01:20:18,409
It's how things happen in the world and in Bitcoin.

1406
01:20:18,889 --> 01:20:21,129
Right. People just they have an idea.

1407
01:20:22,429 --> 01:20:25,929
They do it and they try to get support behind it.

1408
01:20:25,929 --> 01:20:29,009
OK. And the process of soft forks over the years.

1409
01:20:30,143 --> 01:20:32,823
has largely been, and again, there's not a whole lot of

1410
01:20:32,823 --> 01:20:35,363
precedent here, has largely been what you do, which is you

1411
01:20:35,363 --> 01:20:38,583
come up with an idea. And then you go try to

1412
01:20:38,583 --> 01:20:42,163
convince everyone, the technical community and everything, that it is what

1413
01:20:42,163 --> 01:20:45,083
we should do. And what you're hoping to get out of

1414
01:20:45,083 --> 01:20:48,043
this is a sort of social consensus. You're hoping to get a,

1415
01:20:48,803 --> 01:20:52,163
you know, some magical number in your head or from some

1416
01:20:52,163 --> 01:20:56,383
certain people, right? Maybe it's core developers, maybe it's miners,

1417
01:20:56,563 --> 01:20:59,983
whatever, you're just trying to get some adequate collection of people

1418
01:20:59,983 --> 01:21:03,463
in sufficient volume to support your idea before you're like, okay,

1419
01:21:03,463 --> 01:21:05,223
we're going to move forward with it. We kind of, we

1420
01:21:05,223 --> 01:21:07,523
have consensus. That is asking permission.

1421
01:21:08,083 --> 01:21:10,423
That is not begging forgiveness. That is asking permission.

1422
01:21:10,903 --> 01:21:14,143
And my point is that nothing will ever happen if that

1423
01:21:14,143 --> 01:21:17,023
is how Bitcoin governance works, because we're never, Bitcoin is too

1424
01:21:17,023 --> 01:21:20,143
big, too important, and too broad at this point to ever

1425
01:21:20,143 --> 01:21:23,643
get any kind of majority, right?

1426
01:21:23,983 --> 01:21:27,683
Consensus is not democracy, to get any kind of majority buy-

1427
01:21:27,683 --> 01:21:32,123
in on anything except maybe some kind of zero-day vulnerability

1428
01:21:32,123 --> 01:21:33,463
where the threat is so

1429
01:21:34,623 --> 01:21:39,263
obvious that even mis-and disinformation online can't

1430
01:21:39,263 --> 01:21:42,683
dissuade a meaningful amount of people from it. Paul, I'm curious

1431
01:21:42,683 --> 01:21:45,683
what you think about that, because I feel like you've said

1432
01:21:45,683 --> 01:21:48,283
similar things. I think we should just ignore all of that,

1433
01:21:48,523 --> 01:21:50,823
because isn't it all obvious? And I would rather go back

1434
01:21:50,823 --> 01:21:53,063
to what Rob was talking about. It was way more interesting

1435
01:21:53,063 --> 01:21:56,563
in every way, but we could continue to dwell on-see,

1436
01:21:56,563 --> 01:22:00,063
he was saying that we can't get consensus on a soft

1437
01:22:00,063 --> 01:22:02,083
fork anymore, and I agree. We can. I mean, this is,

1438
01:22:02,263 --> 01:22:05,303
again, part of the similarities between 1. 10 and myself, which

1439
01:22:05,303 --> 01:22:08,063
is that we both think that Bitcoin Core is mostly lazy,

1440
01:22:08,603 --> 01:22:12,083
they have bad priorities, they're corrupt, they're pretentious,

1441
01:22:13,803 --> 01:22:18,023
they're not great, and so we need more competition.

1442
01:22:18,623 --> 01:22:20,423
So I agree with that. I mean, I think it's a

1443
01:22:20,423 --> 01:22:22,843
terrible-what 1. 10 is doing, because 1. 10 has chosen

1444
01:22:22,843 --> 01:22:25,983
a losing issue, they've chosen a bad side of a bad

1445
01:22:25,983 --> 01:22:29,763
issue, and they have terrible strategy and terrible execution, and so

1446
01:22:29,763 --> 01:22:32,243
it will probably be an embarrassing failure, and it will probably

1447
01:22:32,243 --> 01:22:36,043
make everyone think, oh, core is infallible after all, and that

1448
01:22:36,043 --> 01:22:38,583
will be a huge setback for the critics of core, and

1449
01:22:38,583 --> 01:22:42,943
everyone will just think, yeah, we should just do whatever Gloria

1450
01:22:42,943 --> 01:22:45,503
Zhao or name whatever fake villain you like.

1451
01:22:45,983 --> 01:22:50,203
We should just do whatever Vladimir says forever, and they should

1452
01:22:50,203 --> 01:22:53,263
rule us as a king. That's what 1.

1453
01:22:53,263 --> 01:22:56,123
10 is going to actually achieve on August 10th, I think.

1454
01:22:56,563 --> 01:23:00,343
I hope that we get some momentum out of the-which

1455
01:23:00,343 --> 01:23:03,483
was-this was a nice thing about 1. 10, was that core was

1456
01:23:05,483 --> 01:23:09,843
uncriticizable for years, and then finally we had some criticism

1457
01:23:09,843 --> 01:23:12,143
of core, which I thought was overdue.

1458
01:23:14,063 --> 01:23:16,423
But otherwise, I don't think it's that interesting. I'd rather talk

1459
01:23:16,423 --> 01:23:18,343
about this whole idea of the real Bitcoin,

1460
01:23:19,163 --> 01:23:23,203
and this idea of why change the proof of work versus not.

1461
01:23:24,303 --> 01:23:26,783
That's what Rob started us on. Then we got sucked back

1462
01:23:26,783 --> 01:23:29,983
into the vortex of 1. 10. We can't stop talking about

1463
01:23:29,983 --> 01:23:32,123
it, which is perfectly fine. If that's what you want to

1464
01:23:32,123 --> 01:23:35,983
talk about, we can. I just-I personally think the audience

1465
01:23:35,983 --> 01:23:38,623
will get way more out of it. I want to get

1466
01:23:38,623 --> 01:23:40,963
back to a second, though, to a technical point about this

1467
01:23:40,963 --> 01:23:43,703
idea that you can just signal with no cost.

1468
01:23:45,603 --> 01:23:49,283
Actual miners do invest a lot of money into their software

1469
01:23:49,283 --> 01:23:52,063
setups, and there's a lot of risk associated with changing them.

1470
01:23:52,063 --> 01:23:54,723
At the moment, Bitcoin Core is offering

1471
01:23:56,063 --> 01:23:58,523
that if you just keep doing what you're doing,

1472
01:23:59,723 --> 01:24:01,943
more likely than not, the network's going to just keep doing

1473
01:24:01,943 --> 01:24:03,383
what it does, and you're not going to have to change

1474
01:24:03,383 --> 01:24:07,283
anything. Whereas, if you signal for BIP 1. 10,

1475
01:24:09,143 --> 01:24:13,163
you are setting in motion a thing where suddenly in less

1476
01:24:13,163 --> 01:24:18,223
than two weeks, you now potentially need to update your software.

1477
01:24:19,083 --> 01:24:21,623
There's a very strong reason not to go do that.

1478
01:24:22,623 --> 01:24:24,423
Really quickly, I want to-

1479
01:24:25,243 --> 01:24:27,763
I think Peter is right, actually. I would accept that as

1480
01:24:27,763 --> 01:24:30,223
a correction. I would actually say that the fact-

1481
01:24:31,263 --> 01:24:34,643
if you do signal and you appear on a Wicked Smart

1482
01:24:34,643 --> 01:24:38,883
Bitcoin's site, that does mean that at least you were willing

1483
01:24:38,883 --> 01:24:42,303
to actually go in and change the software from whatever it

1484
01:24:42,303 --> 01:24:46,583
was doing. Actually, that probably means that signaling is slightly more

1485
01:24:46,583 --> 01:24:49,003
reliable, which is even worse news for 1. 10, if you

1486
01:24:49,003 --> 01:24:52,243
think about it, because the number is so low. The reliable

1487
01:24:52,243 --> 01:24:55,123
signal is low. Think about another BIP, BIP 54.

1488
01:24:55,383 --> 01:24:59,623
We have 34% of miners signaling for that with their Coinbases.

1489
01:25:00,483 --> 01:25:03,663
The miners will signal when there's an incentive for them to

1490
01:25:03,663 --> 01:25:06,823
signal. BIP 54 is not some surprise activation like, hey, we're

1491
01:25:06,823 --> 01:25:09,823
all going to change our Coinbase and lock times and our

1492
01:25:09,823 --> 01:25:12,523
in-sequence value. It's like a slow grind to find consensus,

1493
01:25:12,743 --> 01:25:16,003
which that's why I believe it's possible to find consensus in Bitcoin today.

1494
01:25:17,843 --> 01:25:20,823
I'm just noting, miners are willing to change their software.

1495
01:25:23,923 --> 01:25:28,143
They are from OrangeSurf, who I know has done

1496
01:25:28,143 --> 01:25:31,103
a ton of interesting research on this, but Chris, go ahead.

1497
01:25:33,543 --> 01:25:36,323
Yeah, I just wanted to ask while Matt is here, and

1498
01:25:36,323 --> 01:25:40,143
we talked about proof-of-work chains, as the CEO of

1499
01:25:40,143 --> 01:25:45,023
Start9 and a big, big proponent of implementation diversity, my

1500
01:25:45,023 --> 01:25:48,483
curiosity would be, are you also happily going to support and

1501
01:25:48,483 --> 01:25:52,703
distribute a node implementation in StartOS that changes the proof-of-

1502
01:25:52,703 --> 01:25:57,583
work, or does your sense of diversity acquire boundaries there?

1503
01:25:57,643 --> 01:25:59,953
And will you also support an

1504
01:26:00,723 --> 01:26:03,003
implementation of Paul's eCash?

1505
01:26:04,283 --> 01:26:06,803
Yeah, this is an easy answer, finally.

1506
01:26:08,143 --> 01:26:11,923
So StartOS and the marketplace ecosystem are designed that we can't,

1507
01:26:12,023 --> 01:26:14,623
no matter how hard we tried, no matter what we did,

1508
01:26:14,963 --> 01:26:19,503
prevent anyone from distributing anything, including blatant malware, to other

1509
01:26:19,503 --> 01:26:23,683
people who willfully download it. Obviously, we won't list anything like

1510
01:26:23,683 --> 01:26:26,843
that on our hosted registry, and we have two.

1511
01:26:27,203 --> 01:26:29,623
One is the community registry, and one is the Start9 registry.

1512
01:26:30,383 --> 01:26:34,143
Community registry get cursory vetting. We look at them, we don't

1513
01:26:34,143 --> 01:26:36,463
vouch for them, but we do put them through the ringer,

1514
01:26:36,483 --> 01:26:38,623
just like Apple or Google would before something goes on their

1515
01:26:38,623 --> 01:26:41,303
store. And then we warn users like, hey, we have not,

1516
01:26:41,343 --> 01:26:43,563
we don't totally vouch for this, we don't necessarily recommend it,

1517
01:26:43,643 --> 01:26:48,303
but they can still download it with minimal effort from one

1518
01:26:48,303 --> 01:26:50,923
of our default registries, we call it the community registry.

1519
01:26:51,623 --> 01:26:55,163
The Start9 registry has a much higher bar. It means that

1520
01:26:55,163 --> 01:26:56,843
we vouch for, maintain,

1521
01:26:58,143 --> 01:27:01,563
recommend, and understand so that we can provide support for all

1522
01:27:01,563 --> 01:27:02,863
of the services in that registry.

1523
01:27:04,023 --> 01:27:07,183
What determines whether something goes on the community registry or the

1524
01:27:07,183 --> 01:27:11,003
Start9 registry is quality of the service, which is highly subjective,

1525
01:27:11,003 --> 01:27:13,443
basically, whether I think it's good enough to be on our

1526
01:27:13,443 --> 01:27:15,683
Start9 registry and that we're willing to put our brand behind

1527
01:27:15,683 --> 01:27:21,103
it. And two, that it is in

1528
01:27:21,103 --> 01:27:23,523
demand, that people want it.

1529
01:27:23,903 --> 01:27:27,983
So the answer is, if people want to run a Bitcoin

1530
01:27:27,983 --> 01:27:31,323
implementation that implements a proof of work change, or to run

1531
01:27:31,323 --> 01:27:35,783
Paul's fork, and they are technically sound,

1532
01:27:36,243 --> 01:27:38,883
then we would host them on the Start9 registry.

1533
01:27:39,723 --> 01:27:43,383
If people don't really care that much, or we think they're

1534
01:27:43,383 --> 01:27:45,603
really, really stupid and don't want to attach our brand in

1535
01:27:45,603 --> 01:27:47,823
any way to it, it would go on the community registry.

1536
01:27:48,163 --> 01:27:51,083
So it's very subjective. Do you have like a limit in

1537
01:27:51,083 --> 01:27:53,343
terms of like, is there a threshold, like for example, Ethereum

1538
01:27:53,343 --> 01:27:57,763
or Solana on a Start9 platform and the primary registry?

1539
01:27:58,163 --> 01:28:01,423
Or is like, what's, where's the point where like, hey, our

1540
01:28:01,423 --> 01:28:05,083
boundaries, we can't do this. The primary registry, and I wrote

1541
01:28:05,083 --> 01:28:07,723
a blog post about this at one point is, it checks

1542
01:28:07,723 --> 01:28:11,723
all the boxes, right? It's like, we think that this is

1543
01:28:11,723 --> 01:28:14,583
quality software, we recommend that you run it, or at least

1544
01:28:14,583 --> 01:28:16,763
we don't recommend that you don't run it, right? It's like,

1545
01:28:16,763 --> 01:28:19,963
we're not saying you should stay away from it. We're not

1546
01:28:19,963 --> 01:28:23,503
embarrassed by it. Like, it's not something that we're gonna, you

1547
01:28:23,503 --> 01:28:25,463
know, take a lot of flack for. It's very delicate. And

1548
01:28:25,463 --> 01:28:29,563
it mostly comes down to just kind of me deciding whether

1549
01:28:29,563 --> 01:28:33,523
this fits with the company's brand and mission.

1550
01:28:33,923 --> 01:28:38,843
For example, like Bitcoin Cash is on the community registry, right?

1551
01:28:39,603 --> 01:28:42,463
As in it passed the technical spec, it's not malware, somebody's

1552
01:28:42,463 --> 01:28:43,883
going to install it, and it's not going to blow up

1553
01:28:43,883 --> 01:28:47,283
their server. But it's also not something that we, you know,

1554
01:28:47,283 --> 01:28:51,243
are personally willing to kind of, you know, put alongside Bitcoin

1555
01:28:51,243 --> 01:28:54,403
Core and Bitcoin Knots, which are much more legitimate. I just

1556
01:28:54,403 --> 01:28:56,883
want to say I'm so impressed with the way that Portland

1557
01:28:56,883 --> 01:29:01,163
is very seriously asking those questions, as if it matters at

1558
01:29:01,163 --> 01:29:02,143
all to anything.

1559
01:29:03,023 --> 01:29:06,523
What kind of nodes Matt approves or doesn't approve on his

1560
01:29:06,523 --> 01:29:10,923
node, like the poorest, most broke people in Bitcoin

1561
01:29:10,923 --> 01:29:15,303
are running Start9 nodes. It absolutely doesn't matter what you guys

1562
01:29:15,303 --> 01:29:18,103
do list or do not list and which repository, yes or

1563
01:29:18,103 --> 01:29:20,963
no, like who the fuck cares, guys? It's like, that's the

1564
01:29:20,963 --> 01:29:25,443
most irrelevant question I've ever heard. In Portland, I'm so

1565
01:29:25,443 --> 01:29:28,443
impressed that you are asking it with a straight face as

1566
01:29:28,443 --> 01:29:31,363
if it has any meaning whatsoever, and if it matters to anything.

1567
01:29:32,163 --> 01:29:32,513
Well done.

1568
01:29:33,043 --> 01:29:35,903
25% of the Bitcoin network is running on Start9 servers.

1569
01:29:35,983 --> 01:29:39,203
You can run 900% if you want, it doesn't matter, like

1570
01:29:39,203 --> 01:29:42,043
there's nothing less relevant than your user base.

1571
01:29:42,323 --> 01:29:46,323
I cannot imagine anything that's less relevant to Bitcoin than your

1572
01:29:46,323 --> 01:29:49,283
user base. Okay, so you're here to troll and start fights,

1573
01:29:49,323 --> 01:29:51,083
not to have a meaningful discussion. It's not a troll, it's

1574
01:29:51,083 --> 01:29:53,203
not a troll. Everyone here knows it's true, like everyone is

1575
01:29:53,203 --> 01:29:55,783
pretending as if like this is a serious conversation. Everyone on

1576
01:29:55,783 --> 01:29:59,043
stage and everyone in the audience knows that it's absolutely immaterial

1577
01:29:59,363 --> 01:30:03,863
what your user base has in the community repository or the official repository.

1578
01:30:04,983 --> 01:30:08,383
Nothing is less important than that question. Okay, all right, okay.

1579
01:30:08,643 --> 01:30:10,983
Do you have any idea what we do? I don't think

1580
01:30:10,983 --> 01:30:12,023
you understand what we do.

1581
01:30:13,803 --> 01:30:15,703
No, I understand very well. Do you prefer a Bitcoin node?

1582
01:30:16,783 --> 01:30:19,243
Yeah, Matt, do you want to respond? Yeah.

1583
01:30:20,723 --> 01:30:23,303
I mean-You don't have to. Not really. You don't have

1584
01:30:23,303 --> 01:30:26,603
to. No, I mean, he's here for, he's obviously here to

1585
01:30:26,603 --> 01:30:29,303
disrupt conversations and if I was moderating this-I'm saying what

1586
01:30:29,303 --> 01:30:32,083
everybody here thinks. There's not a single person who doesn't agree

1587
01:30:32,083 --> 01:30:34,763
with me right now. Not a single person other than Matt,

1588
01:30:34,803 --> 01:30:37,083
and Matt agrees with me too, he just can't say it.

1589
01:30:37,123 --> 01:30:41,383
Okay, we're gonna-I disagree with Leo Mattis.

1590
01:30:41,443 --> 01:30:45,723
All right, there is an issue here

1591
01:30:45,723 --> 01:30:50,043
where, so the term that's often used is an

1592
01:30:50,043 --> 01:30:53,343
economic node for the obvious reason that, you know, anyone can

1593
01:30:53,343 --> 01:30:56,823
go spin up nodes on, say, AWS or something, and it

1594
01:30:56,823 --> 01:31:01,103
certainly is an interesting question what BIP-110 support actually looks like

1595
01:31:01,103 --> 01:31:05,123
in terms of economic nodes, that is, nodes associated with very

1596
01:31:05,123 --> 01:31:08,183
large amounts of coin purchasing. Because ultimately, when you look at

1597
01:31:08,183 --> 01:31:11,523
the feedback loop of mining, what ultimately matters is, are people

1598
01:31:11,523 --> 01:31:15,623
willing to buy miners' coins? And with that, things like Michael

1599
01:31:15,623 --> 01:31:19,503
Saylor, for instance, coming out saying he's against BIP-110 is quite relevant.

1600
01:31:21,883 --> 01:31:24,763
But for Michael Saylor, when he runs a node, is it

1601
01:31:24,763 --> 01:31:27,483
in the community repository or in the official repository?

1602
01:31:27,923 --> 01:31:32,463
That matters a lot for the weight of Michael Saylor's decisions.

1603
01:31:36,783 --> 01:31:40,083
Well, ultimately, when Michael Saylor quote-unquote runs a node, of

1604
01:31:40,083 --> 01:31:43,643
course, what he's actually doing is telling an employee of his

1605
01:31:43,643 --> 01:31:46,843
to go call up Coinbase and verify what nodes they're running.

1606
01:31:47,263 --> 01:31:49,463
But, you know, the economic decision is still the same there.

1607
01:31:50,743 --> 01:31:54,523
I honestly, jokes aside, I'm not even sure how that terminology

1608
01:31:54,523 --> 01:31:57,503
of economic node came to be. I mean, I know the

1609
01:31:57,503 --> 01:31:59,323
history and the legacy of it, but, like,

1610
01:32:00,263 --> 01:32:04,383
it's not really, like, the word inside of the term economic

1611
01:32:04,383 --> 01:32:07,463
node, the word node is not playing any part.

1612
01:32:07,483 --> 01:32:11,003
You can just say, like, economic actor. Whether or not the

1613
01:32:11,003 --> 01:32:13,783
economic actor is running a node is completely irrelevant.

1614
01:32:15,363 --> 01:32:17,923
To have his voice heard, that's, like, absurd.

1615
01:32:21,363 --> 01:32:24,703
The node does not play a part in the economic node.

1616
01:32:25,483 --> 01:32:28,603
I think it does, though, actually, because you could say if

1617
01:32:28,603 --> 01:32:31,583
one person is going to be receiving all of the incoming

1618
01:32:31,583 --> 01:32:33,283
transactions for the next two weeks,

1619
01:32:34,163 --> 01:32:37,043
they would look at their node to see if they're actually

1620
01:32:37,043 --> 01:32:40,523
being paid. If they want, they can manually do it with

1621
01:32:40,523 --> 01:32:42,383
a pen and paper. Like, it doesn't matter if they run

1622
01:32:42,383 --> 01:32:46,383
a node or not. That's completely orthogonal.

1623
01:32:47,063 --> 01:32:49,283
Well, I mean, in the example of Michael Saylor, the important

1624
01:32:49,283 --> 01:32:50,403
thing is, like anyone,

1625
01:32:52,543 --> 01:32:56,643
ultimately, for him and his purpose,

1626
01:32:57,883 --> 01:33:00,163
ultimately, somewhere out there, there's a node running.

1627
01:33:00,623 --> 01:33:04,763
Now, this may not be quite as controlled as if I

1628
01:33:04,763 --> 01:33:07,223
personally happen to run a node on my laptop, but there's

1629
01:33:07,223 --> 01:33:09,663
always issues around control there.

1630
01:33:09,823 --> 01:33:13,063
I mean, one example is maybe my laptop's actually compromised, and

1631
01:33:13,063 --> 01:33:15,243
what I think is my node isn't quite so much my

1632
01:33:15,243 --> 01:33:19,143
node. But the important thing is that the intent is there.

1633
01:33:19,423 --> 01:33:22,643
Michael Saylor intends to go run a node that ignores Bitcoin

1634
01:33:22,643 --> 01:33:26,683
10, and ultimately, that filters out to some node that's actually

1635
01:33:26,683 --> 01:33:29,743
sitting somewhere, probably in the data center. Just for the purpose

1636
01:33:29,743 --> 01:33:32,663
of education, and I think we'll wrap up this but I

1637
01:33:32,663 --> 01:33:35,723
do think it's a fair one, just the conversation about economic

1638
01:33:35,723 --> 01:33:39,183
nodes and sort of the power differentials between nodes, right, because

1639
01:33:39,183 --> 01:33:43,403
there is maybe this misunderstanding, right, that the absolute

1640
01:33:43,403 --> 01:33:46,483
number of nodes on the network running a soft fork, you

1641
01:33:46,483 --> 01:33:50,423
know, kind of, quote, unquote, matters, maybe more than it does,

1642
01:33:50,463 --> 01:33:53,703
when perhaps it's actually kind of the transaction volume that's running

1643
01:33:53,703 --> 01:33:57,523
between those nodes that's more meaningful in terms of putting pressure

1644
01:33:57,523 --> 01:34:00,003
on miners to change.

1645
01:34:00,823 --> 01:34:02,503
I don't know if anyone wants to kind of add to

1646
01:34:02,503 --> 01:34:05,443
that or just sort of, again, give like a TLDR explainer

1647
01:34:05,443 --> 01:34:08,183
on that. Just one last thing, and I don't mean to

1648
01:34:08,183 --> 01:34:12,263
be offensive to anyone, but I do think when people say economic nodes,

1649
01:34:13,323 --> 01:34:16,203
the node is orthogonal, and that's kind of like, we could

1650
01:34:16,203 --> 01:34:20,443
have also said like economic wives, like there are holders of

1651
01:34:20,443 --> 01:34:24,763
Bitcoin, and some of them have wives, and maybe some

1652
01:34:24,763 --> 01:34:27,743
of the wives have an opinion about Bitcoin forks.

1653
01:34:28,163 --> 01:34:30,783
So we could like do a survey of economic wives in

1654
01:34:30,783 --> 01:34:32,673
the network and see like, hey, for some

1655
01:34:33,443 --> 01:34:36,643
wives support BIP-110, and some wives don't.

1656
01:34:37,583 --> 01:34:39,923
But like the truth is, it's not about the nodes, and

1657
01:34:39,923 --> 01:34:41,683
it's not about the wives, and it's not about anything, it's

1658
01:34:41,683 --> 01:34:45,583
about the economic actors, and what they actually want and what

1659
01:34:45,583 --> 01:34:48,623
they actually support. Yeah, some of them have nodes, some of

1660
01:34:48,623 --> 01:34:51,603
them have wives, some of them have like horses. We can

1661
01:34:51,603 --> 01:34:54,223
talk about the economic horses and if they want BIP-110

1662
01:34:54,223 --> 01:34:56,783
or not, but like it doesn't matter. The point is, there's

1663
01:34:56,783 --> 01:35:00,663
an economic actor that holds Bitcoin, maybe buys more Bitcoin, maybe doesn't.

1664
01:35:01,463 --> 01:35:05,043
And it's really a question about who's buying or accumulating Bitcoin

1665
01:35:05,043 --> 01:35:08,583
and not really who already holds it, because for example, out

1666
01:35:08,583 --> 01:35:12,343
of the BIP-110 people, they might own like 0.

1667
01:35:12,343 --> 01:35:16,503
0002 BTC, but they're not planning to transact with them, they're

1668
01:35:16,503 --> 01:35:17,743
not planning to buy more.

1669
01:35:18,563 --> 01:35:21,583
So their opinion doesn't really matter that much.

1670
01:35:22,223 --> 01:35:26,363
So the whole conversation about economic nodes, it's just like, it's

1671
01:35:26,363 --> 01:35:28,943
not the nodes, man. The nodes don't matter, they don't really

1672
01:35:28,943 --> 01:35:29,963
play a part in this at all.

1673
01:35:31,323 --> 01:35:39,443
Well, anyway, economic nodes is a term that

1674
01:35:39,443 --> 01:35:42,883
gets used in the discussions of this stuff. Obviously, it's a

1675
01:35:42,883 --> 01:35:47,083
shorthand for a very complex concept, but it's reasonable

1676
01:35:47,083 --> 01:35:50,343
to use that shorthand and that's just kind of standard in this industry.

1677
01:35:51,103 --> 01:35:51,623
Really quickly.

1678
01:35:52,823 --> 01:35:55,663
Yeah, you can have an economic node without any Bitcoin.

1679
01:35:55,823 --> 01:35:58,783
And as long as you route many transactions, that is an

1680
01:35:58,783 --> 01:36:02,083
economic node. It's just about the impact that that node would

1681
01:36:02,083 --> 01:36:06,063
have if it goes down. And I think Michael Saylor met

1682
01:36:06,063 --> 01:36:07,583
us, even though he doesn't have a wife.

1683
01:36:09,183 --> 01:36:11,783
Have we asked him what Saylor thinks of eCash?

1684
01:36:11,843 --> 01:36:14,623
He's not telling us about it.

1685
01:36:15,363 --> 01:36:19,563
I'm pretty sure that Michael Saylor would not be a

1686
01:36:19,563 --> 01:36:23,803
fan of eCash, which I think is

1687
01:36:23,803 --> 01:36:26,603
probably evidence that eCash will do really well in the long

1688
01:36:26,603 --> 01:36:29,323
run. Because, I mean, when has Michael Saylor actually been right

1689
01:36:29,323 --> 01:36:32,783
about anything? The fact that he is against 110, I think

1690
01:36:32,783 --> 01:36:36,563
that has put more fear into me that we may be

1691
01:36:36,563 --> 01:36:39,903
on the wrong side of history than anything else in this whole saga.

1692
01:36:40,823 --> 01:36:44,943
So, I mean, it's just the eCash idea and BIP300 in general,

1693
01:36:45,763 --> 01:36:48,623
it completely obliterates his...

1694
01:36:48,623 --> 01:36:50,523
Michael Saylor has this idea that he wants to be able

1695
01:36:50,523 --> 01:36:53,663
to explain Bitcoin to his congressperson in 30 seconds or something.

1696
01:36:53,923 --> 01:36:58,883
And I'm opening it to an infinitely expanding canvas of L2s

1697
01:36:58,883 --> 01:37:04,723
and I'm throwing open this developer paradise

1698
01:37:04,723 --> 01:37:07,463
or playground or whatever you want to call it. And I

1699
01:37:07,463 --> 01:37:10,983
have this idea of infinite growth. So I'm rejecting all this

1700
01:37:10,983 --> 01:37:13,923
idea of stasis and overconfidence and complacency.

1701
01:37:14,183 --> 01:37:16,363
And then again, he is representing this view that Bitcoin has

1702
01:37:16,363 --> 01:37:18,963
already won. We don't need to lift a finger.

1703
01:37:19,063 --> 01:37:20,763
We don't need to change anything in Bitcoin. We don't need

1704
01:37:20,763 --> 01:37:23,363
to do anything in Bitcoin. In fact, everything we do might

1705
01:37:23,363 --> 01:37:26,183
be a mistake. So I think he would be against it.

1706
01:37:26,843 --> 01:37:29,963
But I'm not worried about that because he's also been describing

1707
01:37:29,963 --> 01:37:35,143
Bitcoin as Manhattan real estate, space

1708
01:37:35,143 --> 01:37:38,063
rocket fuel, digital credit, digital whatever.

1709
01:37:38,243 --> 01:37:42,343
So he's just got a new explanation every week.

1710
01:37:43,783 --> 01:37:45,943
And I don't think anything... You can go down the line

1711
01:37:45,943 --> 01:37:47,583
of everything Michael Saylor has attempted,

1712
01:37:48,663 --> 01:37:49,923
including the treasury companies.

1713
01:37:53,323 --> 01:37:56,223
And I don't know. But all this stuff was shuttered and

1714
01:37:56,223 --> 01:37:59,543
it was ultimately not successful. So I'm not sure what he's

1715
01:37:59,543 --> 01:38:02,883
done that actually has ever succeeded. Did you consider adding digital

1716
01:38:02,883 --> 01:38:04,063
credit to eCash?

1717
01:38:05,383 --> 01:38:08,303
Yeah, I'll get right on that. We're going to close the

1718
01:38:08,303 --> 01:38:09,363
loop on Michael Saylor.

1719
01:38:10,223 --> 01:38:13,823
I really would like to hear from OrangeSurf because he's done

1720
01:38:13,823 --> 01:38:16,643
some really excellent research on this. And then I want to

1721
01:38:16,643 --> 01:38:19,023
bring up Ryan Dowell, who currently doesn't have space on the

1722
01:38:19,023 --> 01:38:20,363
stage. So OrangeSurf,

1723
01:38:21,943 --> 01:38:22,293
go ahead.

1724
01:38:23,423 --> 01:38:26,003
So the first thing I was going to say is earlier

1725
01:38:26,003 --> 01:38:28,623
on, Matt claimed that he was underrepresented.

1726
01:38:28,883 --> 01:38:31,583
But I think actually, when you look at the 2% signaling,

1727
01:38:31,823 --> 01:38:33,923
he's pretty reasonably represented in this group.

1728
01:38:35,463 --> 01:38:39,843
In terms of signaling, I mean, basically the mandatory signaling to

1729
01:38:39,843 --> 01:38:41,863
hit that now, you're going to have to have like over

1730
01:38:41,863 --> 01:38:49,243
81% of the remaining blocks signaling. So that's

1731
01:38:49,243 --> 01:38:51,123
just the BIP-110 specification.

1732
01:38:52,243 --> 01:38:56,483
So, I mean, it's not really compatible with Bitcoin

1733
01:38:56,483 --> 01:38:59,223
10. So I think they should probably try and fix that.

1734
01:38:59,263 --> 01:39:01,703
And then the cost for a mining pool really signaling Bitcoin

1735
01:39:01,703 --> 01:39:03,703
10 is that miners are going to move away from the

1736
01:39:03,703 --> 01:39:06,663
pool because they want to mine Bitcoin. And they're going to

1737
01:39:06,663 --> 01:39:10,143
look embarrassed and foolish if it fails, which obviously it's going

1738
01:39:10,143 --> 01:39:12,703
to fail. So, I mean, the fact that we're not really

1739
01:39:12,703 --> 01:39:17,043
seeing any BIP-110 supporters with significant influence developing any widely

1740
01:39:17,043 --> 01:39:20,663
used product services or tools is basically like quite high signal.

1741
01:39:21,263 --> 01:39:23,023
And yeah, that's my contribution.

1742
01:39:24,703 --> 01:39:26,963
Thank you for that contribution. Okay.

1743
01:39:27,763 --> 01:39:32,663
I am going to bring up Reindell, because I

1744
01:39:32,663 --> 01:39:35,283
feel like he had something to say. And now we're going

1745
01:39:35,283 --> 01:39:37,903
to bring him up, one of my favorite speakers on this

1746
01:39:37,903 --> 01:39:42,223
subject. If anyone else has comments that they want to make,

1747
01:39:42,263 --> 01:39:44,183
this has been riveting, you guys.

1748
01:39:45,323 --> 01:39:48,403
I'm curious, Paul, actually, if you want to just kind of

1749
01:39:48,403 --> 01:39:51,443
maybe share a little bit about, you know, kind of your

1750
01:39:51,443 --> 01:39:54,203
vision for eCash. Like, where do you see this going?

1751
01:39:54,283 --> 01:39:57,503
I mean, is it, what's the reason to do this?

1752
01:39:57,523 --> 01:40:00,263
I mean, to everyone else's point, you're not trying to be

1753
01:40:00,263 --> 01:40:03,323
the next Bitcoin. You're not claiming like this is the real Bitcoin.

1754
01:40:04,263 --> 01:40:06,863
You're kind of just going and doing your own thing. Like,

1755
01:40:06,863 --> 01:40:09,263
why? Like, what are you, what are you trying to create?

1756
01:40:09,563 --> 01:40:10,803
And what's your end goal here?

1757
01:40:12,903 --> 01:40:16,843
Well, I do think there's only room for one cryptocurrency in

1758
01:40:16,843 --> 01:40:19,403
the long run. So the question is, how long is the

1759
01:40:19,403 --> 01:40:22,297
long run? And I don't know, but probably it's like 10

1760
01:40:22,297 --> 01:40:26,437
years in this case, because the strong network effects.

1761
01:40:26,657 --> 01:40:28,297
So I do think that in the end, there will only

1762
01:40:28,297 --> 01:40:31,697
be one currency that survives. I was more interested in like

1763
01:40:31,697 --> 01:40:35,037
the gravitational pull because Rob brought up this idea of the

1764
01:40:35,037 --> 01:40:39,217
real Bitcoin, and he brought up the psychology of the 110ers.

1765
01:40:39,657 --> 01:40:43,957
And it's about how it's really important to them to

1766
01:40:43,957 --> 01:40:49,157
win over the whole community. And they purport to represent this

1767
01:40:49,157 --> 01:40:51,977
conception of the public good of Bitcoin or something.

1768
01:40:53,777 --> 01:40:56,937
It doesn't occur to them to just create a new thing

1769
01:40:56,937 --> 01:40:59,317
as a demo or even a competitor.

1770
01:40:59,877 --> 01:41:02,037
And I think I just wanted to point out that that

1771
01:41:02,037 --> 01:41:06,937
is very, very, very, that's a very mesmerizing and

1772
01:41:06,937 --> 01:41:09,357
tempting thing that has caught a lot of people.

1773
01:41:09,417 --> 01:41:12,297
It's like the siren music, you know, from the Odyssey.

1774
01:41:12,817 --> 01:41:14,797
And you can see, you can go back to Roger Ver

1775
01:41:14,797 --> 01:41:17,217
and all these people. So a lot of people have been

1776
01:41:17,217 --> 01:41:20,077
caught in this whole the real Bitcoin thing.

1777
01:41:20,077 --> 01:41:23,417
And I do think it's unusual for me to, but even

1778
01:41:23,417 --> 01:41:25,777
I had like registered some domains in the past, I was

1779
01:41:25,777 --> 01:41:27,497
like, I'm gonna do my own thing. And I'm going to

1780
01:41:27,497 --> 01:41:30,117
call whatever Bitcoin extended or something like that.

1781
01:41:30,157 --> 01:41:33,497
So it's very tempting. And I think people really invest a

1782
01:41:33,497 --> 01:41:36,297
lot of their identity in being a Bitcoiner.

1783
01:41:36,877 --> 01:41:40,097
And I think that that deranges people. And it's not, it's

1784
01:41:40,097 --> 01:41:43,297
not good for you or anyone else. It's not necessarily good for Bitcoin.

1785
01:41:44,097 --> 01:41:46,637
Maybe it is because it creates this big cult. But I

1786
01:41:46,637 --> 01:41:49,517
think it's very smart of us to shine some light on

1787
01:41:49,517 --> 01:41:54,377
this phenomenon. If we can just be armchair psychologists, and

1788
01:41:54,377 --> 01:41:56,097
say that, yeah, it's very tempting to want to be like,

1789
01:41:56,257 --> 01:41:59,877
oh, I am the savior of Bitcoin, or I represent Bitcoin

1790
01:41:59,877 --> 01:42:02,217
or blah, blah, blah, I think that is very, very, very

1791
01:42:02,217 --> 01:42:06,337
common. And a lot of people have suffered enormously by giving

1792
01:42:06,337 --> 01:42:09,957
into that temptation. And I think the 110 people will be

1793
01:42:09,957 --> 01:42:14,017
the latest in a long line of people who have suffered

1794
01:42:14,017 --> 01:42:18,317
similarly. So that was a determination of mine was eventually,

1795
01:42:19,017 --> 01:42:21,297
at first, I was kind of like, not sure. But at

1796
01:42:21,297 --> 01:42:22,837
some point, I was like, okay, I just have to pick

1797
01:42:22,837 --> 01:42:26,597
something as a completely different name, completely different brand, you know,

1798
01:42:26,597 --> 01:42:29,657
different colors, ideally different, whatever. It's hard to make it all

1799
01:42:29,657 --> 01:42:32,577
different. But I was thinking like, it has to be a

1800
01:42:32,577 --> 01:42:34,557
different thing than Bitcoin. So that it's clear that, you know,

1801
01:42:34,557 --> 01:42:37,517
I'm just giving this making this new thing, giving everyone a

1802
01:42:37,517 --> 01:42:40,037
bunch of free coins. And I think that that's much more

1803
01:42:40,037 --> 01:42:42,657
sane. And I hope that I can kind of maybe set

1804
01:42:42,657 --> 01:42:46,017
a tiny example, maybe, where new people who think they have

1805
01:42:46,017 --> 01:42:47,617
the most important idea in Bitcoin,

1806
01:42:48,377 --> 01:42:50,777
just copy that, and they just give us all free coins

1807
01:42:50,777 --> 01:42:52,897
with a different name. And then it's easier to talk about

1808
01:42:52,897 --> 01:42:55,317
these things. I think one thing that's quite funny is that

1809
01:42:55,317 --> 01:42:58,017
people when they talk about the inevitable hard fork, they end

1810
01:42:58,017 --> 01:42:59,937
up using these phrases where they say, Oh, you have to

1811
01:42:59,937 --> 01:43:02,277
buy Bitcoin over here, and then you have to buy 110

1812
01:43:02,277 --> 01:43:04,917
coins. So that's the thing is, if you don't pick the

1813
01:43:04,917 --> 01:43:07,197
name, then the name is going to be picked for you

1814
01:43:07,197 --> 01:43:10,537
by by the people in, you know, in an x space

1815
01:43:10,537 --> 01:43:12,957
somewhere, they're just going to start calling it 110 coin, because

1816
01:43:12,957 --> 01:43:16,357
you and then you Yeah, I think that is a funny

1817
01:43:16,357 --> 01:43:19,497
name, or because that's a very, very witty name, but I

1818
01:43:19,497 --> 01:43:22,037
don't know how many other people will get that. joke. And

1819
01:43:22,037 --> 01:43:25,997
so and then, but it's funny that there's, I mean,

1820
01:43:26,957 --> 01:43:30,657
Paul, hard forking Bitcoin into a shitcoin that nobody cares about

1821
01:43:30,657 --> 01:43:31,757
is not novel.

1822
01:43:32,857 --> 01:43:34,057
Many people have done it before you.

1823
01:43:34,917 --> 01:43:37,377
And yet, how do you know how many people will care

1824
01:43:37,377 --> 01:43:40,737
about it? Before launch? It's not fair to because people are

1825
01:43:40,737 --> 01:43:43,197
still going to care about it, when Luke does it for

1826
01:43:43,197 --> 01:43:45,277
the proof of work change. So like people get to care

1827
01:43:45,277 --> 01:43:47,837
about the things they care about. And we can't really tell

1828
01:43:47,837 --> 01:43:50,157
them like, yeah, it won't be interesting or new.

1829
01:43:50,557 --> 01:43:53,037
It won't be Bitcoin anymore. But like, that is the survival

1830
01:43:53,037 --> 01:43:56,417
mode. Luke and mechanic have both staked out that they are

1831
01:43:56,417 --> 01:43:59,017
willing to go down burning with the ships. And I think

1832
01:43:59,017 --> 01:44:01,777
to Paul's point, it's a healthy way to just sort disagreements

1833
01:44:01,777 --> 01:44:06,577
and move on. See, I think if they were smart

1834
01:44:06,577 --> 01:44:10,197
about it, they would actually be trying to hype up the

1835
01:44:10,197 --> 01:44:14,017
proof of work change now. Because they could say like, hey,

1836
01:44:14,477 --> 01:44:17,277
you know, 15 years ago, you could mine Bitcoin on your

1837
01:44:17,277 --> 01:44:19,817
home computer. You haven't been able to do that in a

1838
01:44:19,817 --> 01:44:22,177
long time, we're going to change your proof of work algorithm

1839
01:44:22,177 --> 01:44:25,297
that you can you can make bitcoins on your computer again.

1840
01:44:25,297 --> 01:44:27,797
And that could be like a fun new thing that people

1841
01:44:27,797 --> 01:44:31,517
would actually be excited about. Yeah, no, if if the BIP

1842
01:44:31,517 --> 01:44:34,237
110 soft fork fails, and there is a move to proof

1843
01:44:34,237 --> 01:44:38,397
of work change and hard fork, and there is incentives to,

1844
01:44:38,817 --> 01:44:41,417
you know, mine, and it's for the plebs, etc. It's going

1845
01:44:41,417 --> 01:44:44,697
to be like a meaningful network, there will actually be users,

1846
01:44:44,697 --> 01:44:47,137
it's not going to be Bitcoin, right? Or, I mean, it depends.

1847
01:44:48,077 --> 01:44:51,497
But, but, like what Paul's doing, like, there's no, it's, it's

1848
01:44:51,497 --> 01:44:53,537
sort of, you know, it's just dead, like, nobody cares.

1849
01:44:54,337 --> 01:44:56,297
It's just a hard fork into a shitcoin. I do want

1850
01:44:56,297 --> 01:44:59,297
to just call out, I just pinned the tweet. 18 months

1851
01:44:59,297 --> 01:45:02,517
ago, I told Luke, he was gonna have to change, fire

1852
01:45:02,517 --> 01:45:04,317
the miners and change the proof of work to fix this.

1853
01:45:04,377 --> 01:45:07,477
And his response to me was liar. And here we are

1854
01:45:07,477 --> 01:45:10,477
two weeks out. It looks like that's about what's about to happen here.

1855
01:45:11,297 --> 01:45:12,557
I mean, if you want to play,

1856
01:45:13,357 --> 01:45:15,957
but yeah, yeah, Rob, if you want to play that game,

1857
01:45:16,217 --> 01:45:20,597
I wrote a shell script three years ago, that rejected

1858
01:45:20,597 --> 01:45:23,797
blocks that had inscriptions in them. And Luke said that it

1859
01:45:23,797 --> 01:45:28,117
was malware and blocked me. So like, you know, lots of

1860
01:45:28,117 --> 01:45:32,297
prior art for for people foreshadowing Luke, and then him telling

1861
01:45:32,297 --> 01:45:33,537
them that they're liars.

1862
01:45:36,857 --> 01:45:39,717
I think a great deal, you can go to, for example,

1863
01:45:39,797 --> 01:45:42,897
LayerTwo Labs. com slash friends. And you can see all

1864
01:45:42,897 --> 01:45:45,257
the people who have endorsed the 300, at least.

1865
01:45:46,037 --> 01:45:47,817
And this includes people like Adam back.

1866
01:45:48,737 --> 01:45:52,637
Robin Linus, these are like a lot of people, and they

1867
01:45:52,637 --> 01:45:55,437
seem to think that it is actually the best L2

1868
01:45:55,437 --> 01:45:56,717
out of everything available.

1869
01:45:58,097 --> 01:46:00,817
So there are quite a few people who are interested.

1870
01:46:00,997 --> 01:46:03,437
And I think, you know, I'm in a completely different realm

1871
01:46:03,437 --> 01:46:07,677
than 110. 110 wants to shrink some transactions that they call

1872
01:46:07,677 --> 01:46:11,597
spam, but which are actually very easy for the network to

1873
01:46:11,597 --> 01:46:15,677
process and store. And I'm trying to expand it so that

1874
01:46:15,677 --> 01:46:18,017
8 billion people can use Bitcoin.

1875
01:46:18,257 --> 01:46:21,277
I'm trying to add Zcash level privacy, I'm trying to add

1876
01:46:21,277 --> 01:46:25,317
like, the ability to endlessly add new L2s if the existing

1877
01:46:25,317 --> 01:46:27,257
set of L2s is insufficient.

1878
01:46:28,457 --> 01:46:32,037
With the CUSF activator, the L1 is the same as Bitcoin

1879
01:46:32,037 --> 01:46:34,077
Core, it's exactly the same as Bitcoin Core. So anything you

1880
01:46:34,077 --> 01:46:37,837
like about Bitcoin Core, you can keep on L1.

1881
01:46:37,997 --> 01:46:40,417
And then we can also do with the CUSF activator, we

1882
01:46:40,417 --> 01:46:42,317
can do quantum, we can do all this stuff without changing

1883
01:46:42,317 --> 01:46:45,437
any lines of code. In Bitcoin Core, so I think I'm

1884
01:46:45,437 --> 01:46:49,417
in like a completely different realm of solving like, like all

1885
01:46:49,417 --> 01:46:53,437
of the biggest problems in the entire cryptography, crypto coin cryptocurrency

1886
01:46:53,437 --> 01:46:57,797
industry. Like we have like kind of already solved are on

1887
01:46:57,797 --> 01:46:58,637
the way to solving.

1888
01:46:59,777 --> 01:47:03,877
And it's like, that is way more important than this fake

1889
01:47:03,877 --> 01:47:06,537
spam crusade that's going to just crash and burn and by

1890
01:47:06,537 --> 01:47:10,157
hitting a rocket on August 9, it's like completely different realm

1891
01:47:10,157 --> 01:47:14,437
of conversation. In fairness, to you, but not to

1892
01:47:14,437 --> 01:47:16,717
all the thousands of people fighting online about it.

1893
01:47:16,977 --> 01:47:20,017
Like clearly, many, many, many people care. So one of the

1894
01:47:20,017 --> 01:47:22,657
things that's interesting, Well, I just want to say, in fairness,

1895
01:47:22,977 --> 01:47:23,537
Paul, like,

1896
01:47:24,317 --> 01:47:27,717
you may have that viewpoint, but your viewpoint that Drivechain

1897
01:47:27,717 --> 01:47:31,157
solve these things is not widely shared. And in that regard,

1898
01:47:31,217 --> 01:47:33,597
it's not unlike, say, the BIP-110 issue.

1899
01:47:34,817 --> 01:47:36,957
But my point is, you have to go as soon as

1900
01:47:36,957 --> 01:47:40,217
my coworking space mats, but it's closed.

1901
01:47:40,597 --> 01:47:45,097
So good luck guys. Peter, thank you. It is certainly admit

1902
01:47:45,097 --> 01:47:48,717
that it is, you know, controversial,

1903
01:47:49,697 --> 01:47:52,797
but we have many supporters. So I think that that alone

1904
01:47:52,797 --> 01:47:54,457
means that it's kind of an open question.

1905
01:47:55,377 --> 01:47:57,957
But you don't feel the same way about BIP-110.

1906
01:47:58,177 --> 01:48:01,457
Like BIP-110 has orders of magnitude more supporters than drive

1907
01:48:01,457 --> 01:48:05,937
chains. I've only actually met like three or four people in

1908
01:48:05,937 --> 01:48:08,277
person who support one 10.

1909
01:48:08,677 --> 01:48:10,917
So maybe it's a representative.

1910
01:48:10,917 --> 01:48:14,337
Yeah, that's yours. That's yours. I've met thousands of real people.

1911
01:48:14,957 --> 01:48:18,897
Theoretically, I can't imagine a reason why someone would support one

1912
01:48:18,897 --> 01:48:21,917
10, because it doesn't actually stop the spam. And stopping the

1913
01:48:21,917 --> 01:48:24,377
spam is not actually a good idea. Because of course, You

1914
01:48:24,377 --> 01:48:27,557
keep fixating on your own opinion and projecting it onto the

1915
01:48:27,557 --> 01:48:30,997
world. What I'm saying is that thousands of real people passionately

1916
01:48:30,997 --> 01:48:34,617
disagree with that. Thousands of real people are less interesting than

1917
01:48:34,617 --> 01:48:38,917
a hundred people who are not broke. You keep forgetting that you are not broke.

1918
01:48:40,517 --> 01:48:43,197
It's just less interesting. It's a little bit interesting, but it's

1919
01:48:43,197 --> 01:48:46,257
not very interesting. People's right to spam.

1920
01:48:46,257 --> 01:48:49,997
They're not broke. They bought a Stardust for thousands of dollars.

1921
01:48:50,237 --> 01:48:54,377
They're clearly not broke. But they're also complaining that like having

1922
01:48:54,377 --> 01:48:56,577
to buy a new hard drive every 10 years is too

1923
01:48:56,577 --> 01:48:59,377
expensive. So like, I don't know.

1924
01:48:59,417 --> 01:49:03,957
But I'm looking at the BIP-110 company directory

1925
01:49:03,957 --> 01:49:08,257
that got passed around. And like, if you scroll through the

1926
01:49:08,257 --> 01:49:11,177
directory of companies who have claimed that they're going to support

1927
01:49:11,177 --> 01:49:14,677
BIP-110, it's like, you know, Start9,

1928
01:49:15,717 --> 01:49:19,037
Bitcoin University, and then a bunch of people who like, you

1929
01:49:19,037 --> 01:49:21,657
know, sell one t-shirt. And some of the, if you

1930
01:49:21,657 --> 01:49:23,957
click through the links for like the proof that they actually

1931
01:49:23,957 --> 01:49:26,377
support it, some of it is very spotty.

1932
01:49:26,377 --> 01:49:29,197
And it's like not at all clear that, you know, these

1933
01:49:29,197 --> 01:49:32,297
people actually support 110 or not. So I think part of

1934
01:49:32,297 --> 01:49:35,537
the reason why miners are ignoring this and are safe to

1935
01:49:35,537 --> 01:49:39,357
ignore it is because all of the actual economic actors on

1936
01:49:39,357 --> 01:49:42,197
the network are ignoring it. Like miners at the end of

1937
01:49:42,197 --> 01:49:45,137
the day have to sell their coins to somebody. So getting

1938
01:49:45,137 --> 01:49:48,357
back to the whole like economic node thing, a thought experiment

1939
01:49:48,357 --> 01:49:51,877
is imagine there was a chain split for like a hard

1940
01:49:51,877 --> 01:49:56,277
fork. And on one side of the chain split, there's

1941
01:49:56,277 --> 01:50:00,477
a million nodes running on EC2 that never buy Bitcoin.

1942
01:50:00,877 --> 01:50:03,797
And on the other side of the chain split is one

1943
01:50:03,797 --> 01:50:06,937
guy who has infinite bid and will buy all of the

1944
01:50:06,937 --> 01:50:09,557
Bitcoin. Like, where are the miners going to mine?

1945
01:50:09,777 --> 01:50:12,357
They're going to mine where they can sell their Bitcoin. So

1946
01:50:12,357 --> 01:50:16,657
like if there's no exchanges or merchants or big buyers

1947
01:50:16,657 --> 01:50:20,157
or anything supporting 110, then like why is there going to

1948
01:50:20,157 --> 01:50:22,837
be economics on that side? Because I think it's really important

1949
01:50:22,837 --> 01:50:25,237
to recognize that like this is not a hard fork.

1950
01:50:25,357 --> 01:50:27,937
There is no choice that the miners have to make.

1951
01:50:28,077 --> 01:50:32,217
They're not choosing between the BIP-110 people and the core people.

1952
01:50:32,297 --> 01:50:36,357
What they're choosing between is everyone and the core people.

1953
01:50:36,457 --> 01:50:39,917
They have the option to keep the entire network.

1954
01:50:39,917 --> 01:50:43,477
I disagree with this. You keep saying that it's important to

1955
01:50:43,477 --> 01:50:46,137
distinguish, but it's not important to distinguish. Actually, it's not important

1956
01:50:46,137 --> 01:50:49,077
to talk about this at all. Nothing, nothing is going to

1957
01:50:49,077 --> 01:50:50,737
change whether or not we talk about this. Nothing is going

1958
01:50:50,737 --> 01:50:54,137
to, the outcome is going to be identifiable. Why are you

1959
01:50:54,137 --> 01:50:55,997
here that all you do is, all everyone does is talk

1960
01:50:55,997 --> 01:50:57,257
about this? Why are you here if you don't want to

1961
01:50:57,257 --> 01:50:59,417
talk about it? Because it's fun and there's nothing else to

1962
01:50:59,417 --> 01:51:02,337
talk about. I'm having fun. So it's fun, it's interesting.

1963
01:51:02,817 --> 01:51:07,117
It's like, you're stating all the reasons why miners

1964
01:51:07,117 --> 01:51:11,337
would want to keep this contingency. Miners will, okay, will

1965
01:51:11,337 --> 01:51:15,357
when, Ben? At some point, you're going to need to say

1966
01:51:15,357 --> 01:51:16,417
miners did not.

1967
01:51:17,197 --> 01:51:19,857
What is the date when you're going to say that this

1968
01:51:19,857 --> 01:51:21,937
is going to pass? At some point, which might be August

1969
01:51:21,937 --> 01:51:25,477
8th, there will come a day when it is clear that

1970
01:51:25,477 --> 01:51:29,677
mining is centralized enough and corrupt enough to willfully

1971
01:51:29,677 --> 01:51:33,517
carve off 15% of its economy when it doesn't talk to

1972
01:51:33,517 --> 01:51:36,057
it. Did you rehearse this before you came here? This is

1973
01:51:36,057 --> 01:51:38,277
so, this is such bullshit.

1974
01:51:39,897 --> 01:51:42,957
There is no way you believe what you say right now.

1975
01:51:43,117 --> 01:51:46,757
There's no way you believe this. How do you keep a

1976
01:51:46,757 --> 01:51:47,897
straight face saying this?

1977
01:51:50,777 --> 01:51:52,997
I just want to go back to a different point that

1978
01:51:52,997 --> 01:51:55,997
I think is more interesting, which is this idea of 110

1979
01:51:55,997 --> 01:51:59,317
versus BIP300 or eCash, whatever you want to call

1980
01:51:59,317 --> 01:52:01,797
it, which is that I think a lot of people,

1981
01:52:02,577 --> 01:52:06,757
when they learn more about each of the two options, they

1982
01:52:06,757 --> 01:52:10,097
will actually like eCash more and they will like 110 less.

1983
01:52:11,137 --> 01:52:15,357
Matt brought up this point about, oh, well, maybe people don't

1984
01:52:15,357 --> 01:52:19,657
care as much. But when I talk to people personally, they

1985
01:52:19,657 --> 01:52:21,017
usually say, well, I don't really know a lot

1986
01:52:21,817 --> 01:52:24,297
about BIP300. If I talk to them a little bit

1987
01:52:24,297 --> 01:52:27,137
about it, they seem to like it more. If I talk

1988
01:52:27,137 --> 01:52:30,817
to people who dislike it, either it's clear that they have

1989
01:52:30,817 --> 01:52:34,337
gravely misunderstood it, or at least that's my opinion, and they

1990
01:52:34,337 --> 01:52:36,957
don't actually understand it, or when you talk to them about

1991
01:52:36,957 --> 01:52:38,837
it, they sort of like it more. Whereas, I think with

1992
01:52:38,837 --> 01:52:41,757
110, there's a lot of...

1993
01:52:41,757 --> 01:52:45,397
I think we can all tell that from the caliber of

1994
01:52:45,397 --> 01:52:48,957
the discussion, if these people actually studied it for 10 years,

1995
01:52:49,137 --> 01:52:51,457
they would not be saying the things that they're saying.

1996
01:52:51,577 --> 01:52:54,637
And in fact, the 110 people have very frequently shifted their

1997
01:52:54,637 --> 01:52:58,597
story. Remember, the original story was that Core V30 will be

1998
01:52:58,597 --> 01:53:00,717
coming out in three months, and it has a change that

1999
01:53:00,717 --> 01:53:04,497
will destroy Bitcoin or something. That was the original story.

2000
01:53:04,497 --> 01:53:06,437
Then they learned more about it, and they were like, well,

2001
01:53:06,437 --> 01:53:08,957
we have to change our story to some other thing. Like,

2002
01:53:09,037 --> 01:53:11,637
it might hypothetically cause some future... It's really important that you

2003
01:53:11,637 --> 01:53:15,877
stop applying the reasons behind it and your own opinion.

2004
01:53:16,097 --> 01:53:19,277
I'm trying to state a simple fact. It's not going to

2005
01:53:19,277 --> 01:53:21,677
change the outcome. It's not important if he stops at that.

2006
01:53:21,677 --> 01:53:22,857
You gotta let me talk. The outcome is going to stay

2007
01:53:22,857 --> 01:53:25,217
the same. You gotta let me talk. Ryan Dell... Wait, wait,

2008
01:53:25,217 --> 01:53:28,117
wait. Hand is up, and I'm going to try to bring

2009
01:53:28,117 --> 01:53:32,197
some decorum to this space. Ryan Dell, would you feel free to chime in?

2010
01:53:33,037 --> 01:53:37,217
Yeah, I mean, so to Paul's point just a second ago,

2011
01:53:37,277 --> 01:53:41,597
like the reason for BIP-110 to exist, which used to be

2012
01:53:41,597 --> 01:53:45,457
444, has gone through a bunch of big arcs and changes

2013
01:53:45,457 --> 01:53:47,757
over the last like six or nine months, right?

2014
01:53:47,757 --> 01:53:51,077
It used to be there's going to be this change in

2015
01:53:51,077 --> 01:53:54,437
Bitcoin V30 that's going to brick all of the nodes running

2016
01:53:54,437 --> 01:53:56,977
on cloud infrastructure. So this is going to be...

2017
01:53:56,977 --> 01:53:59,797
The reason why it's a one-year change is because we

2018
01:53:59,797 --> 01:54:03,257
need to hit an emergency panic button, and then that'll bias

2019
01:54:03,257 --> 01:54:05,797
the time to go and do it correctly.

2020
01:54:05,997 --> 01:54:09,317
And then like V30 came and went, and the network didn't

2021
01:54:09,317 --> 01:54:12,417
explode. So then it became about like rug the spammers.

2022
01:54:13,037 --> 01:54:16,517
But like the spammers already rugged themselves because markets do that.

2023
01:54:16,817 --> 01:54:19,057
And then after that, it became all about like we have

2024
01:54:19,057 --> 01:54:22,417
to fire core, and we have to like increase the decentralization

2025
01:54:22,417 --> 01:54:25,717
of the network, which, you know, moving to an implementation with

2026
01:54:25,717 --> 01:54:29,697
a single maintainer, who's also the chairman of the one mining

2027
01:54:29,697 --> 01:54:33,857
pool that's mining these blocks, that increasing decentralization somehow is

2028
01:54:33,857 --> 01:54:36,997
like still lost on me. So like the story keeps changing.

2029
01:54:37,257 --> 01:54:40,737
And to Matt's point about signaling for 1.

2030
01:54:40,737 --> 01:54:43,837
10 being a riskless option, it's not a riskless option because

2031
01:54:43,837 --> 01:54:48,057
like 1. 10 is this, you know, solution looking

2032
01:54:48,057 --> 01:54:50,797
for a problem. It doesn't actually fix any of the things

2033
01:54:50,797 --> 01:54:55,257
that it purports to fix. And making technical changes

2034
01:54:55,257 --> 01:54:59,517
to Bitcoin consensus rules for no good reason, but just because

2035
01:54:59,517 --> 01:55:02,617
like, there's a bunch of people yelling about it on Twitter

2036
01:55:02,617 --> 01:55:05,957
and yelling about it on GitHub comments is not a good

2037
01:55:05,957 --> 01:55:09,417
reason to change Bitcoin. And I think if you have millions

2038
01:55:09,417 --> 01:55:12,117
of dollars invested in ASICs, or if you have a business

2039
01:55:12,117 --> 01:55:16,497
behind Bitcoin, you don't want to support people changing

2040
01:55:16,497 --> 01:55:20,857
consensus rules because of Twitter politics, like that would actually

2041
01:55:20,857 --> 01:55:24,737
destroy Bitcoin. And so it's not, you know, a free option.

2042
01:55:24,737 --> 01:55:28,097
Like on the one hand, if you signal for BIP 1.

2043
01:55:28,097 --> 01:55:31,397
10, you are setting a horrible precedent that this is not,

2044
01:55:31,617 --> 01:55:34,797
you know, the strongest money ever. This is money that is

2045
01:55:34,797 --> 01:55:38,157
subject to the whims of Twitter mobs. On the other hand,

2046
01:55:38,157 --> 01:55:41,157
if you don't signal 1. 10, then you have an opportunity

2047
01:55:41,157 --> 01:55:45,597
to force like the most annoying and most hostile

2048
01:55:45,597 --> 01:55:48,977
group of Twitter users to fork themselves off the network, which

2049
01:55:48,977 --> 01:55:53,637
is like a phenomenal opportunity. So it's miners are incredibly

2050
01:55:53,637 --> 01:55:56,557
well incentivized to not signal for 1.

2051
01:55:56,557 --> 01:56:00,477
10, especially because as I pointed out earlier, there aren't any

2052
01:56:00,477 --> 01:56:03,737
real like major businesses that are saying that they're going to

2053
01:56:03,737 --> 01:56:06,217
buy 1. 10 coins. Right now, I'd even make it just

2054
01:56:06,217 --> 01:56:08,957
one step bigger. It's not just businesses not running it.

2055
01:56:08,957 --> 01:56:12,437
The people who are running 1. 10 themselves are not economically signaling.

2056
01:56:13,197 --> 01:56:16,897
Eight months ago, I built a trustless on-chain fork futures

2057
01:56:16,897 --> 01:56:19,497
contract where the Bitcoin blockchain is the oracle.

2058
01:56:20,017 --> 01:56:22,917
In a narrow domain, guys, we solved the oracle problem.

2059
01:56:23,097 --> 01:56:26,657
Since we're betting on Bitcoin consensus and we're understanding what do

2060
01:56:26,657 --> 01:56:29,857
we think is going to happen, there is this belief that

2061
01:56:29,857 --> 01:56:32,417
one, I built that contract, fully open sourced it. No one

2062
01:56:32,417 --> 01:56:34,157
wanted to take me up on it. No one wanted to

2063
01:56:34,157 --> 01:56:36,777
take me up on it at reduced odds. This is provably

2064
01:56:36,777 --> 01:56:39,957
auditable. You could dump it into Chad TPT or Grok or

2065
01:56:39,957 --> 01:56:43,077
Kimmy or whatever. And this is the thing is when a

2066
01:56:43,077 --> 01:56:46,597
chain split happens, miners are only able to mine one block

2067
01:56:46,597 --> 01:56:48,937
at a time. They cannot mine both blockchains.

2068
01:56:49,397 --> 01:56:51,777
And because of that, you need to not look at the

2069
01:56:51,777 --> 01:56:54,637
count of nodes, but how much is going to be put

2070
01:56:54,637 --> 01:56:57,017
on the line. Say what you will about Roger Ver and

2071
01:56:57,017 --> 01:57:01,357
Jihan, they put up hundreds of thousands of Bitcoin because they

2072
01:57:01,357 --> 01:57:03,577
believed in a different vision for what Bitcoin should be.

2073
01:57:03,677 --> 01:57:08,037
And in a chain split, we're capitalizing and economically supporting their

2074
01:57:08,037 --> 01:57:10,357
side of the chain. It's not just that there's no businesses

2075
01:57:10,357 --> 01:57:13,417
and there's no exchangers and there's scant little mining pools outside

2076
01:57:13,417 --> 01:57:15,697
of ones that are being rented. It is the fact that

2077
01:57:15,697 --> 01:57:18,077
every user who is saying that they are going to do

2078
01:57:18,077 --> 01:57:20,637
this and they will drag the whole network kicking and screaming

2079
01:57:20,637 --> 01:57:23,137
along with them. None of them want to put a Bitcoin

2080
01:57:23,137 --> 01:57:25,877
with this belief of, oh, I don't want to participate in

2081
01:57:25,877 --> 01:57:29,357
markets. I'm gambling. First off, I don't believe buying Bitcoin is

2082
01:57:29,357 --> 01:57:32,257
a gamble, right? It is not gambling. When you buy Bitcoin,

2083
01:57:32,657 --> 01:57:35,237
you are betting on yourself in the future and the prosperity

2084
01:57:35,237 --> 01:57:38,197
of the network. And if you think buying Bitcoin is gambling,

2085
01:57:38,677 --> 01:57:40,377
maybe that's for you then. But like it's investing.

2086
01:57:41,317 --> 01:57:44,737
That's incredibly important. And also, by not participating in the market,

2087
01:57:44,877 --> 01:57:48,037
you are providing a market signal. There's one little prediction market

2088
01:57:48,037 --> 01:57:50,137
that has about four Bitcoin in volume on it right now.

2089
01:57:50,217 --> 01:57:53,917
And that is largely because the pro 110 side of the

2090
01:57:53,917 --> 01:57:56,217
argument does not want to economically engage. They have a belief

2091
01:57:56,217 --> 01:57:58,617
that if they run software and they yell at people online,

2092
01:57:58,737 --> 01:58:01,317
they're going to be able to persuade and move the entire

2093
01:58:01,317 --> 01:58:04,037
network. And to Reindell's point, that would be a really weak,

2094
01:58:04,357 --> 01:58:07,737
bad thing for the Bitcoin network if people can socially peacock

2095
01:58:07,737 --> 01:58:10,377
and run software but not engage in economics.

2096
01:58:10,417 --> 01:58:12,537
And they would be able to influence the network. That would

2097
01:58:12,537 --> 01:58:16,537
be the end of Bitcoin, the experiment of Bitcoin being decentralized money.

2098
01:58:18,077 --> 01:58:19,037
Portland, go for it.

2099
01:58:21,397 --> 01:58:23,137
I don't think I can follow up after Rob. I just

2100
01:58:23,137 --> 01:58:26,117
had a point about signaling and why miners wouldn't flip the

2101
01:58:26,117 --> 01:58:30,317
bit just out of safety, essentially, to mine on both chains.

2102
01:58:34,037 --> 01:58:36,417
You would be the person that I would want to have

2103
01:58:36,417 --> 01:58:40,777
respond to that. OK. Yeah, basically, the reason why specifically

2104
01:58:40,777 --> 01:58:43,757
signaling is communication of intent. So it's like, am I ready

2105
01:58:43,757 --> 01:58:46,717
to enforce this rule or not? Essentially, if you have a

2106
01:58:46,717 --> 01:58:51,077
bunch of miners that don't intend to enforce the

2107
01:58:51,077 --> 01:58:54,237
rules come the enforcement date, you walk into essentially a fog

2108
01:58:54,237 --> 01:58:56,657
of war. The miners, if they all flip the bit, but

2109
01:58:56,657 --> 01:59:00,017
we don't know who's signaling, they then have to communicate amongst

2110
01:59:00,017 --> 01:59:03,937
themselves outside of the chain to go, OK, I will be

2111
01:59:03,937 --> 01:59:06,877
not running the rules anyways. I was just kind of like

2112
01:59:06,877 --> 01:59:09,977
trying to be nice here and ensure like I got my

2113
01:59:09,977 --> 01:59:12,957
Coinbase rewards. And so that could cause a lot of confusion.

2114
01:59:13,317 --> 01:59:15,417
And at the end of the day, like if they don't

2115
01:59:15,417 --> 01:59:19,197
coordinate well enough internally instead of externally through signaling, you

2116
01:59:19,197 --> 01:59:22,417
end up with a scenario potentially where essentially like some miners

2117
01:59:22,417 --> 01:59:25,337
might be running the enforcing client and some might not be.

2118
01:59:25,377 --> 01:59:28,417
And you end up with like a 30-70 split of

2119
01:59:28,417 --> 01:59:30,417
hash rate because of that. And then they would all have

2120
01:59:30,417 --> 01:59:33,857
to kind of scramble to figure out their situation. So I

2121
01:59:33,857 --> 01:59:36,557
don't believe it's truly costless just to flip this bit.

2122
01:59:36,977 --> 01:59:41,317
You're essentially obfuscating your true intent to signal if you just

2123
01:59:41,317 --> 01:59:45,637
signal because you want to mine these blocks on both chains

2124
01:59:45,637 --> 01:59:49,277
without any actual plan to run the enforcement mechanism.

2125
01:59:55,417 --> 01:59:56,037
Thoughts?

2126
01:59:56,937 --> 01:59:59,277
We're kind of about to be wrapping up on time.

2127
01:59:59,397 --> 02:00:01,917
This was riveting, you guys. So this is a good opportunity

2128
02:00:01,917 --> 02:00:03,357
if people have final thoughts.

2129
02:00:08,757 --> 02:00:12,617
Well, this was fun. This was fun. Leo, what's up?

2130
02:00:13,997 --> 02:00:17,597
Yeah, I mean, look, I still haven't gotten an answer from

2131
02:00:17,597 --> 02:00:21,777
Matt on why the guy who created Borker is pandering to

2132
02:00:21,777 --> 02:00:25,257
like this spam haters now. And I think it's a great

2133
02:00:25,257 --> 02:00:29,077
opportunity. We've got some people here listening who I think genuinely

2134
02:00:29,077 --> 02:00:33,397
would be curious to hear your counterargument to the prevailing narrative

2135
02:00:33,397 --> 02:00:36,497
that you're trying to sell overpriced raspberry pies to people.

2136
02:00:36,937 --> 02:00:39,157
And you saw a great opportunity to do that. And that

2137
02:00:39,157 --> 02:00:41,357
is what most people believe. And I'm not saying I believe

2138
02:00:41,357 --> 02:00:44,857
it, Matt. But that is the belief. And I'm just curious

2139
02:00:44,857 --> 02:00:47,237
if you have any sort of answer to that.

2140
02:00:47,237 --> 02:00:49,897
Because the first two times I asked it, you failed to

2141
02:00:49,897 --> 02:00:54,137
answer the question. So yeah, Borker guy, really cool thing you

2142
02:00:54,137 --> 02:00:58,217
built. All of a sudden, you're not a huge fan of

2143
02:00:58,217 --> 02:01:00,737
people inscribing arbitrary data into Bitcoin.

2144
02:01:01,057 --> 02:01:02,677
What happened? I'm going to read.

2145
02:01:03,597 --> 02:01:06,517
It's really interesting because Leonidas is the guy who made the

2146
02:01:06,517 --> 02:01:10,877
Start9 nodes useful. Like, there's no point to start

2147
02:01:10,877 --> 02:01:13,457
nine nodes. The only good thing they do is they're storing

2148
02:01:13,457 --> 02:01:16,297
valuables in a decentralized way.

2149
02:01:16,297 --> 02:01:18,817
And Leonidas created that use case for him.

2150
02:01:18,817 --> 02:01:21,737
And instead of like thanking him, he's like making this whole

2151
02:01:21,737 --> 02:01:24,717
story about miners being centralized and whatnot.

2152
02:01:25,017 --> 02:01:27,937
I mean, we're literally helping you build your company.

2153
02:01:28,217 --> 02:01:30,877
We're attempting to keep this as respectful as possible.

2154
02:01:31,197 --> 02:01:34,577
This is an official organizational Twitter space.

2155
02:01:35,657 --> 02:01:38,357
But Matt, I will... Isabel, I also have a question.

2156
02:01:38,777 --> 02:01:41,737
And sorry for interrupting. And I'm trying to keep this professional

2157
02:01:41,737 --> 02:01:44,417
and organizational and whatever. What's up?

2158
02:01:45,557 --> 02:01:49,537
What's your favorite Drivechain? My favorite Drivechain?

2159
02:01:49,777 --> 02:01:52,397
I want to hear people... So Matt is not going to

2160
02:01:52,397 --> 02:01:55,517
answer your question. It's like we've been on here two hours.

2161
02:01:55,877 --> 02:01:58,497
It's the only interesting question we've talked about.

2162
02:01:58,877 --> 02:02:02,317
And Matt's just not going to answer it. I might rephrase

2163
02:02:02,317 --> 02:02:04,657
it because I actually... I mean, I think we all know

2164
02:02:04,657 --> 02:02:07,517
the answer. I mean, I think that like you are kind

2165
02:02:07,517 --> 02:02:10,237
of trolling. OK, well, I think Matt doesn't know the answer.

2166
02:02:10,817 --> 02:02:13,917
I personally think I would rephrase that question, which is just

2167
02:02:13,917 --> 02:02:17,137
like, we haven't really done just like the basic education of

2168
02:02:17,137 --> 02:02:20,877
explaining like, why are these transactions with arbitrary data?

2169
02:02:21,297 --> 02:02:23,517
Like, why do you now consider them harmful when maybe you

2170
02:02:23,517 --> 02:02:26,257
previously historically didn't? I mean, I think that that's like a

2171
02:02:26,257 --> 02:02:28,477
fair question to ask. But I think we can ignore the

2172
02:02:28,477 --> 02:02:31,157
whole, you know, are you trying to sell nodes part of

2173
02:02:31,157 --> 02:02:34,417
the question? No, I think he's asking the question in good

2174
02:02:34,417 --> 02:02:36,977
faith. I mean, Udi's clearly on the attack.

2175
02:02:37,037 --> 02:02:39,517
But I think Leonidas is asking the question in good faith.

2176
02:02:39,677 --> 02:02:43,397
He wants to understand why the change, right, over the years.

2177
02:02:43,517 --> 02:02:46,717
And the answer is not complicated, right?

2178
02:02:46,717 --> 02:02:48,737
People change their minds over the years.

2179
02:02:49,837 --> 02:02:54,397
Back in 2019, when I was really learning Bitcoin

2180
02:02:54,397 --> 02:02:58,377
development, right, not just from the economic and political side, which

2181
02:02:58,377 --> 02:03:00,077
is what attracted me to it, but when I actually wanted

2182
02:03:00,077 --> 02:03:03,037
to start, you know, understanding technically how it worked, this was

2183
02:03:03,037 --> 02:03:06,277
a really interesting project to work on to help educate me,

2184
02:03:06,277 --> 02:03:09,437
right? Like reading Mastering Bitcoin like four times over and then

2185
02:03:09,437 --> 02:03:12,797
getting into the code and, you know, building something like Borker

2186
02:03:12,797 --> 02:03:15,097
was an educational experience.

2187
02:03:15,097 --> 02:03:17,717
I thought it was neat and cool.

2188
02:03:17,837 --> 02:03:20,837
But ultimately, it was just a science experiment that nobody cared

2189
02:03:20,837 --> 02:03:24,057
about and wasn't actually interesting. I know you think it was,

2190
02:03:24,277 --> 02:03:26,977
but ultimately, I viewed it as like, you know, just some

2191
02:03:26,977 --> 02:03:30,017
child's tinkering thing and moved on.

2192
02:03:30,477 --> 02:03:34,917
And over the years between 2019 and now, I believe

2193
02:03:34,917 --> 02:03:39,337
that I have come to understand Bitcoin dynamics and governance

2194
02:03:39,397 --> 02:03:41,957
and its nature better than I did.

2195
02:03:41,957 --> 02:03:46,417
And I believe that spam can absolutely effectively be

2196
02:03:46,417 --> 02:03:48,517
mitigated through policy and network rate limiting.

2197
02:03:49,397 --> 02:03:53,577
And I also am even more interested in soft fork dynamics

2198
02:03:53,577 --> 02:03:56,037
now that I've really kind of dug into it.

2199
02:03:56,037 --> 02:04:00,417
And I think that one way or another, an extremely valuable

2200
02:04:00,417 --> 02:04:02,997
lesson is about to be learned in the next week and

2201
02:04:02,997 --> 02:04:05,497
a half. And I think we all can agree that it's

2202
02:04:05,497 --> 02:04:09,177
an exciting moment where one way or another, somebody is going

2203
02:04:09,177 --> 02:04:10,817
to get punched in the face and learn a hard lesson.

2204
02:04:10,817 --> 02:04:13,337
I think that's fine. Right. I want to hear from Reindell,

2205
02:04:13,497 --> 02:04:16,377
but Matt, really quickly, what is your projection? I mean, we

2206
02:04:16,377 --> 02:04:18,237
haven't heard from you on like, I mean, it seems like

2207
02:04:18,237 --> 02:04:20,957
everyone seems to think this is just going to like DOA

2208
02:04:20,957 --> 02:04:23,637
and like not a big deal, nothing burger. Like what is

2209
02:04:23,637 --> 02:04:25,897
your projection as to like what's going to happen?

2210
02:04:25,997 --> 02:04:28,577
What do you speculate is going to happen on August 9th?

2211
02:04:30,157 --> 02:04:33,137
It's hard to put percentages on, but I think that there

2212
02:04:33,137 --> 02:04:37,737
is a meaningful non-zero chance that between now

2213
02:04:37,737 --> 02:04:42,597
and the mandatory signaling period, you will see a

2214
02:04:42,597 --> 02:04:47,077
rapid and then overwhelming rise of signaling and hash supporting Bitcoin

2215
02:04:47,077 --> 02:04:49,857
10. I think that there is a meaningful chance that that

2216
02:04:49,857 --> 02:04:53,397
happens, but I am curious to see, right?

2217
02:04:53,397 --> 02:04:56,217
I'm very, very curious to see how this plays out.

2218
02:04:56,657 --> 02:04:59,177
Yeah. Reindell, you want to jump in? Yeah.

2219
02:04:59,377 --> 02:05:02,317
Two things that Matt said that I think are really important

2220
02:05:02,317 --> 02:05:04,637
that I just want to like massively plus one.

2221
02:05:05,157 --> 02:05:09,117
The latter one, which is, you know, in whatever, nine days,

2222
02:05:09,357 --> 02:05:09,977
10 days, something,

2223
02:05:10,757 --> 02:05:13,537
a whole bunch of people are going to learn something, which

2224
02:05:13,537 --> 02:05:15,957
I think is great. I think everybody's going to learn something.

2225
02:05:16,997 --> 02:05:19,817
And like, that's just always good. And then the other thing

2226
02:05:19,817 --> 02:05:21,737
that he said, he said, you know, he picked up this

2227
02:05:21,737 --> 02:05:23,697
project as a way to learn development of Bitcoin.

2228
02:05:24,517 --> 02:05:24,997
I,

2229
02:05:26,257 --> 02:05:28,857
you know, the first time that I really understood how Taproot

2230
02:05:28,857 --> 02:05:31,797
worked was actually contributing to Ord.

2231
02:05:32,677 --> 02:05:36,177
Because Ord was like a very approachable code base, and it

2232
02:05:36,177 --> 02:05:40,617
was an interesting thing to work on that required actually,

2233
02:05:40,617 --> 02:05:44,297
you know, building tap trees and like actually like building those

2234
02:05:44,297 --> 02:05:46,857
transactions. And it kind of gave me a reason. So I

2235
02:05:46,857 --> 02:05:48,577
would just say for anybody out there listening,

2236
02:05:50,157 --> 02:05:54,397
finding novel ways to shove data into Bitcoin transactions is

2237
02:05:54,397 --> 02:05:58,437
actually a very good constructive way to learn Bitcoin development.

2238
02:05:58,997 --> 02:06:03,537
And I think we've seen over the last three years, you

2239
02:06:03,537 --> 02:06:07,857
know, there's more developers in the world who know how

2240
02:06:07,857 --> 02:06:12,397
to work on Bitcoin because of things like Ordinals than before.

2241
02:06:12,677 --> 02:06:15,037
You know, for a really long time, if you wanted to

2242
02:06:15,037 --> 02:06:17,977
like build software on Bitcoin, you could build a wallet or

2243
02:06:17,977 --> 02:06:20,277
a block explorer, and that's it.

2244
02:06:20,477 --> 02:06:23,277
There wasn't really thing else much to build.

2245
02:06:23,897 --> 02:06:28,377
And, you know, like, it's been great to get more

2246
02:06:28,377 --> 02:06:32,257
developers working on Bitcoin, thinking on Bitcoin, doing Bitcoin things.

2247
02:06:32,257 --> 02:06:36,237
So I strongly co-sign what Matt was saying about sticking

2248
02:06:36,237 --> 02:06:39,377
arbitrary data into Bitcoin transactions is a great way to learn

2249
02:06:39,377 --> 02:06:41,677
about Bitcoin, and I encourage more people to do it. I

2250
02:06:41,677 --> 02:06:44,037
have to seriously-I'd like to respond to that.

2251
02:06:44,217 --> 02:06:46,497
I want to respond to that real quick once you're done

2252
02:06:46,497 --> 02:06:49,037
as well. Okay, Matt, you go ahead, and then I'll say

2253
02:06:49,037 --> 02:06:50,377
my point and I'll wrap up.

2254
02:06:51,977 --> 02:06:54,797
Yes, one, thank you. And two, I agree. And I'll take

2255
02:06:54,797 --> 02:06:58,977
it even further, which is the more barriers that we put

2256
02:06:58,977 --> 02:07:02,557
up in policy and consensus to prevent arbitrary data in Bitcoin

2257
02:07:02,937 --> 02:07:05,497
actually pushes that envelope further,

2258
02:07:06,937 --> 02:07:10,377
right, forcing people to get increasingly creative about how to embed

2259
02:07:10,377 --> 02:07:13,997
data. Because if it becomes standardized, it gets boring, right?

2260
02:07:13,997 --> 02:07:18,037
Like if one emerges and nobody fights it, and there's nothing

2261
02:07:18,037 --> 02:07:21,357
to learn, and it's all just AI copy pasting from patterns

2262
02:07:21,357 --> 02:07:23,677
and templates, then you're not going to learn Bitcoin development.

2263
02:07:23,737 --> 02:07:26,117
You're not going to learn how it works. So you guys

2264
02:07:26,117 --> 02:07:28,777
should be, you know, fighting tooth and nail for policy and

2265
02:07:28,777 --> 02:07:30,997
consensus to block all this stuff so that people can come

2266
02:07:30,997 --> 02:07:33,637
up with increasingly creative ways to do it.

2267
02:07:33,737 --> 02:07:37,057
Fair point, yeah. If anybody wants to see, I put up

2268
02:07:37,057 --> 02:07:39,617
in the nest the thing that I was referencing

2269
02:07:40,497 --> 02:07:43,557
with Bitcoin Purifier. It's a project that's on GitHub.

2270
02:07:43,697 --> 02:07:45,197
It's only about 80 lines of shell.

2271
02:07:46,057 --> 02:07:50,177
I put it out on Christmas day in 2023.

2272
02:07:50,537 --> 02:07:52,777
My family was super mad at me because instead of hanging

2273
02:07:52,777 --> 02:07:56,757
out with my, you know, children on Christmas morning, I was

2274
02:07:56,757 --> 02:08:00,517
writing code to help the org disrespector crowd.

2275
02:08:00,777 --> 02:08:04,957
That's how much I love them. And so I put up Bitcoin Purifier.

2276
02:08:06,337 --> 02:08:09,517
You know, some people in the 110 crowd didn't like it

2277
02:08:09,517 --> 02:08:12,877
and said that it was malware, but it was actually really

2278
02:08:12,877 --> 02:08:17,257
the proto 110. So I feel like 110 is actually kind

2279
02:08:17,257 --> 02:08:21,497
of, you know, the intellectual nephew of my

2280
02:08:21,497 --> 02:08:24,437
own work, and I'm thrilled to see it flourishing.

2281
02:08:25,237 --> 02:08:27,897
Love that, love that. I don't know about intellectual, but it's

2282
02:08:27,897 --> 02:08:30,397
a nephew. Full circle moment, Reindell.

2283
02:08:30,737 --> 02:08:33,197
Thank you for bringing that home for us.

2284
02:08:33,717 --> 02:08:37,877
This was really fun. You know, I feel like we kept it like

2285
02:08:39,517 --> 02:08:42,217
somewhat professional in this very professional,

2286
02:08:43,417 --> 02:08:47,557
highly organized space. Thank you guys so much for joining.

2287
02:08:48,177 --> 02:08:52,057
And yeah, I am going to close down now, but you

2288
02:08:52,057 --> 02:08:53,857
guys are awesome. And this was really fun. So thank you

2289
02:08:53,857 --> 02:08:55,817
so much for joining me and talk to you soon. And

2290
02:08:55,817 --> 02:08:58,577
special shout out to Matt for holding it down for his

2291
02:08:58,577 --> 02:09:01,577
crew. You did not have an easy job today, and I

2292
02:09:01,577 --> 02:09:03,997
think you actually did incredibly well. So thank you, Matt.

2293
02:09:04,117 --> 02:09:05,077
All right. Bye, guys.

2294
02:09:06,417 --> 02:09:06,767
Thanks.

2295
02:09:08,897 --> 02:09:09,737
Knots Army.