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Drivechains with the creator, Paul Sztorc, or something.

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Don't you think?

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I mean, this is a funny title, but.

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Okay.

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Yeah.

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Hey, Paul.

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Oh, hey, Wayne.

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Having fun yet?

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I'm having fun.

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Good.

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I see you're working on most hated figure in Bitcoin status.

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I respect that.

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Yeah.

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It's easier than it looks.

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It's kind of funny.

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I think that one thing that's occurred to me, because obviously, I've been staying up to date on this stuff for almost 10 years now, is that the people who are criticizing you, some of them have legitimate reasons.

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Legitimate criticisms.

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And some of them who even are, whose criticisms are illegitimate, you might say, there's like a grain of truth in them, or they're just mistaken about something.

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But in totality, it almost feels like there's, it's almost like, this isn't quite the right metaphor, but it's like obfuscation through complexity.

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It's like, there's just so much of this stuff.

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And people don't know how to evaluate these claims for themselves.

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So just like with many other things in the world, they just gravitate towards some tribe or some figurehead, go along with whatever they say, pro or against the arguments.

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And it's, you know, it's kind of funny, because it feels like we're stuck in the same type of arguments that happen in politics, where people just yell at each other over things that they don't, that they have fundamental opposing views or misunderstandings about, in perpetuity, with nobody ever really having any intention of ever changing their mind.

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It's all just virtue signaling and tribalism.

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And doing that every day has got to be, it's got to wear and tear, wear on you.

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Well, I think it must, it doesn't really wear and tear on me, because again, I like have like, you know, I'm like working with the actual details up close.

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I think you're completely right.

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I wonder about, to your point about there being like this wide distribution of critics.

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I do wonder about some of the critics who have like something really intelligent or nuanced to say.

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I do wonder like, how do they feel when one of the terrible critiques that has nothing to do with anything is like completely false?

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If that one like, becomes really popular and trendy, I do wonder if like a smarter critic, does that make them feel like, how do they feel about, do they think like, oh, no, I'm in a group with really misinformed people, or do they, I wonder about that?

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Maybe, but I would suspect that even if that is the case, that it doesn't really matter.

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The net effect of that person realizing, hey, look, you know, the people on my team are not doing the best job of criticizing this, or they're doing it in an embarrassing way.

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I just think it's no different than other issues, whether it's your local school board or politics inside a large company or something.

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What people really matter, what matters to people is the tribe and the outcome, not so much the specific point.

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It's not, it's, this isn't sort of like academics, to a certain degree, where you prove somebody wrong on a particular point, and you don't really get a point, you don't score.

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It's just, the noise is enough to prevent change from happening, and the noise is enough to get other people excited about something that they don't really understand.

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I mean, who would ever, like, just to kind of extend the metaphor that I was using yesterday, who would ever feel really qualified about criticizing the deposit and withdrawal methodologies imposed by different Bitcoin exchanges?

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It's not a precise metaphor, but it kind of maps, whereas, you know, you have these software applications that you might be able to develop, and there's this way of essentially depositing and withdrawing Bitcoin from them.

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Like, that's just such an esoteric thing that most people don't really care about.

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But in this particular instance, people feel like they have to have an opinion on this.

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And even if their opinion is colored by the block size wars, where it's like, miners bad, node operators good, like, they can't come out and say that and have someone take them seriously.

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They have to come up with all these other things, and sometimes that are not so high level, that are more specific.

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And when they get more specific, sometimes their arguments fall apart.

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And it, it just becomes a lot of noise for everybody else who's listening or participating in the conversation, because people are bike shedding about all these little, very detailed minutiae, when people's root objections tend to be like, at more like a 50,000 foot level, and it's more like a conflict of visions than a disagreement about a specific technical implementation of the proposal.

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Software.

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I had a question.

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I think we have two more speakers now.

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So if someone has a question, I think, well, Jack rolled for initiative.

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So you can go ahead.

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Okay, so I was looking for the kind of stick your hand up button.

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I think things on Twitter have changed recently.

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So sorry to put in like that.

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But what the guy was just talking about there.

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It kind of reminds me about election cycles.

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Like, so I mean, if you look at if you regard Bitcoin as an election cycle, I mean, kind of the kind of kind of block subsidy goes, what was it created 2009 goes on to around 2001 40.

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So that's like, you know, it's over a century.

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And people can have like, kind of different views over that time about what the majority decision is, and who votes for this, who votes for that.

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And that kind of what the what the guy was just talking about there.

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That's what it kind of reminds me of.

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And so I don't I don't completely understand drivechain, I get it, it's some sort of idea where other coins or other kind of implementations can be introduced into Bitcoin.

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Ultimately, I think it does it come down to kind of what the majority decision is, as in what people are going to want to accept.

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And, you know, then you kind of get into the philosophy of forking and what's, you know, people want to follow.

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Yes, I agree with that.

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I think that I think there was a mistaken conclusion made in around 2017.

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There was this big fight, and it involved miners wanting a hard fork and involve this UASF.

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I don't know how many, actually, it's very hard to tell with any certainty how many people actually participated in the UASF.

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But it was probably not, you know, it's hard to measure, but it's like, it wasn't 100% of Bitcoiners running the UASF client.

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So this idea sprung up that we must have 100% of people agree on something, which, you know, 100% of human beings have never agreed on anything.

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So I'm not, you know, I don't think it's an open question how to deal with that.

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But before, like in the 20, you can go back and read interesting that Gavin Andresen's old, like, I think, like, I think it's in a GitHub commit or something or comments that he wrote in the code about how it's too difficult to do the difference between hard and soft changes, which can be hard and soft fork.

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And he said, it's too difficult to get everyone to upgrade.

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So we need to do this soft fork thing, because not everyone will upgrade.

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And so that idea has now changed.

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In my view, it has changed.

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But it's a hotly debated issue into something that says, even to do a soft fork, everyone must do it.

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So it's kind of become the opposite of what it was originally was, it's become, it no longer solves the problem that it originally had solved.

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Anyway, thanks for your comment about how sometimes people disagree, and it looks like an election.

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So I think Jack did want to say something first, and then we'll go to Rio, I guess.

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I was just wondering, I guess, like, where, like, were there like a Bitcoin or like a hive mind main chain with a drivechain, like Bitcoin sidechain, I guess, where do you think, like, the sort of like specialization that like a Bitcoin main chain can add versus like, I guess, like, people saying like, oh, other coins are going to add drivechains or something like that.

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Well, I think other coins might, it's not 100% completed project until we have this nice, pristine pull request, which Luke Dashjr has been helping us with, it's kind of kicked this party off, I think.

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So but there is, we have our own test software that we release, and someone has forked that is kind of unaffiliated with me, but they hang out in our drivechain telegram group, and they have forked that into an altcoin

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called Sky Doge, which I'm not shilling, but I do think it is kind of funny, and it is, it does exist. And I don't know what else they changed, probably not, but they're having fun over there with it, I suppose.

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So yeah, I think other people might, does that answer your question? I think people may do that. I mean, division of labor, I don't understand the question.

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Yeah, I don't know, it was, maybe you should go to Rio, because I could formulate it better.

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Okay, great. Come back when you have formulated it. Let's do Rio.

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Hi, thank you for having me up. And let me ask a question. I was going to transition to smidge technical, if I may. Paul, why can we not do drivechains with what we have with hash time lock, and a concept of atomic swaps with blind merge mining?

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What, what is preventing a drivechain now, with that we could have, you know, an extremely long hash time lock that essentially is federated or something like that? Just what's the main, if that's,

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And I think it's a very reasonable question, because people think like, why is, why push so hard for this soft fork? And it's because I'm determined, I think I really think it's what's best for literally everyone, including the people who think they don't want, you know, a soft fork, it's really best for them.

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And it's, it's also not a big deal. I'm also kind of very basically certain of that, but other people have different points of view, but I'm going to unpack that a little bit right now.

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So like, what BIP300 does is it puts the miners on a short leash. It has nodes, forcing the withdrawals to run this gauntlet, which is difficult, this 13,000 gate gauntlet.

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And that makes it more difficult for the miners to take the funds out of, they still can, but we force it through this, this lens where this force it through this kind of filter, where it's just very, very, very easy to prove that it wasn't an accident that they really, they really fully intended, they had every opportunity to not take the money or do the right thing or just do nothing, but they did.

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So, so that is what it does. BIP300 is full nodes, keeping miners on a short leash. And that is good for the miners because it facilitates people depositing to the sidechain in the first place.

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The miners can say, listen, you're holding a gun to our head to some extent, to the extent of BIP300. And say, you're, you, you've got, you've got some leverage on us because we can't withdraw like at 2am when you're asleep, we've got to go through this huge process.

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So it's actually, we could do it today with nothing. We could do BIP300 with nothing, but it would be as secure and we could do it with various other things, but it just wouldn't be as good. It would waste bytes or it would, it would not have the same game theoretic leverage.

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And so I just think that this is the technically superior way to do it. But of course, if anyone has a specific like technical thing, like about they think something should be done a different way, then I'm happy to answer those questions in detail. But it seemed to me like you were asking more generally, like, why don't we, why don't you just use the pieces we have?

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Yeah, I mean, your point stands. I think, I think if I may just poke at that string, just one more that you did at the stuff. If I get a substantial amount of miners that are willing to merge mine, and I get a substantial amount of miners that are willing to atomic swap their assets onto this other merged mine chain, I can do it today.

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With atomic swaps being the trustless bridge and a cartel of miners, which would have to agree to activate chains, which is part of the BIP, the 90%. I can do it today. Is BIP superior because it's more transparent and the game theory is explicit? Is that the premise?

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Yeah, I think so. I think that's very close to it. I think that's part of it. It's kind of like, you could do that, but it would just be, it would be like an off the books.

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OPEX, full on their rules. The miners cartel is the miners cartel. Now you're saying you're a cartel, but you have to agree with the gauntlet. Do you have to asking? What is the term?

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Acknowledge.

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Acknowledge. Oh, that's what it stands for. I was doing it wrong. Okay, thank you.

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Yeah, so that's kind of the, it's kind of like, the question can also sort of be flipped. It's kind of like, since so much of it could just be replicated with a miner handshake, it's kind of like, why not do it?

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But of course, the reason why, the reason why to deal with this would be to have layer one, you want layer one to enforce the BIP300 rules, since that enforces the smart contract. And the BIP300 rules are not, they are not the sidechain rules. They are just the counter counting up to.

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They do enforce that the sidechain can only give you consensus every 10 minutes still though, right?

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That's a very good question, because these things are often confused. And I think I get into, unfortunately, my job is made a little bit more difficult in this way, which is that the merge mining, 10 minute block time, etc. That is a completely separate thing.

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I think one of the smartest things I did was separate the BIP into two, because to try and do what little I could possibly do to get people to understand this, it's actually very difficult, difficult because, you know, I just think it's easy to mix these up.

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Whereas if I work with the code every day, it's impossible for me to mix them up. But it's the merge mining thing and the 10 minute block time, that is totally separate. That's already been done. We already merge mine Namecoin. We've been doing that for 10 years.

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Slush Pool, or what is now called Brains, they used to have a whole list of stuff they would merge mine. It's been going on for a long time. You can read BitMEX research. This is why people don't really have controversy over BIP301. You never really hear about that.

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BIP300 is the deposits and especially the withdrawals. So these are two completely separate things. It's true when you say there's a whole other question of, does merge mining with Bitcoin, does that tie you to the 10 minute block time?

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Which it mostly does. There are weird hacky ways of changing the block time, but I don't think they're actually that important. I think Satoshi picked a very good number with 10 minutes and a lot of the people who want something else, they'll be able to deal with some lightning style thing where they open a thing that confirms.

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And then after that thing is like 20 confirmations, you have some kind of instant back and forth. If it's not instant, then what's the difference between 15 seconds and 10 minutes? Because 15 seconds is too long.

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It's not horseshoes or grenades. You're right. Close doesn't count. Fair point. Granted.

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Okay. Jack, do you want to?

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Yeah, sure. I don't know. This is probably just a different question, but if you have a drivechain which is failing, rather than just steal, would you think that miners or some affiliated mining group like a pool or something like that would just buy the coins in the sidechain on a secondhand market for some percentage of their worth?

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And then just kind of make a deal with the miners to allow them to move them out as opposed to just killing the sidechain?

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Yeah, I think the answer is yes. And I would kind of like reframe that whole issue. And I would say that probably it will never be the case that miners will actually, even under like absurd circumstances where there's like the sidechain node software fails to work and it doesn't even work and no one even understands what the L2 blockchain is or just crashes and can never be recovered, all of which are kind of implausible.

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Or even if the miners are super evil, most self-interested, greedy, whatever, short-term miners, and there's tons of coins on the chain and the chain generates no fees and it will never generate fees and its failure will not even interrupt the reputation of the other drivechains or it won't even be – there'll be nothing bad about stealing.

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So even in the worst case scenario, I kind of don't think that anyone will ever lose 100% of their coins. There'll always be someone buying the coins, as you say, in the L2 world. The coins will be changing hands to the extent that that's possible as long as the blockchain still exists over there or at least something, some kind of like signatures can exist.

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People will buy and sell the claims to those coins and so probably what will ultimately happen is the miners themselves could buy the coins for like 80 cents on the dollar or something and then they would be the owners and then they could walk them out of the L2 world.

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You know, on the BIP300 rules on L1 and then they would have the coins that they get on.

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So I kind of think that even in a horribly disastrous scenario such as what you're talking

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about where the drivechains are going to fail, I think still people on there would probably

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not lose.

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They would probably still just be able to sell for 80 cents on the dollar, which is

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of course sad, but of course the whole idea behind drivechain is not that it offers like

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a completely perfect security because nothing actually offers that.

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There's literally nothing that really offers that under the hood, but this says you have

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the freedom to leave and use a different piece of software and you get the benefits and the

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risks.

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But yeah, I think this is an intriguing phenomenon that the peg, since the peg will always hold

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on L1 with the BIP300 rules, someone is going to get the coins out at one to one and the

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miners are kind of buyers of last resort because they know that they can just take

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the coins out.

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So it's kind of interesting like that.

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Do you think that there would be any like sort of like soft power disagreement among

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miners among like who would be able, I mean, I guess that would just be a market price

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of purchasing them on the secondhand market, but is there any other?

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An interesting question.

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One thing that I think is fascinating about it is that you might think it would like,

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oh, some people are going to form a group.

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They're going to form like a 51% group and then they'll want to, but the game theory

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of that is like very unstable in my view in a good way, which is like no one can really

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be cut out because you can always, if you form a 51% group and try to muscle the coins

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out, the 49% who aren't in the group, they can always cut a deal with like two or 3%

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in the 51 group.

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And so this is like, it's a game of rock, paper, scissors.

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It has no real converging.

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Do you think there's anything like additional BIP or something like that you could add on

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the main chain that would like, I guess like codify that in some like sort of op code for

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the two to 3% to be able to like?

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No, actually, because it's like, there's actually, this is actually, this is literally a, there's

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actual, an actual game theory game called the three person divide a dollar game.

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And I encourage anyone who's interested in this, who finds this to be like distressing

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and weird, then you can just look this up because it's kind of a sort of simple intuition

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that if, if you're, if two, if 51% is ganging up on you, you and you, you are outside of

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the winning group, you're getting nothing, but that's actually good for you because now

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you have, you have a lot of leverage, you cut a deal with the two, 3% and you, then

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you are back in the winning group and you say, we'll give you the two, two and 3%, we'll

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give you 90% of the spoils as long as you give us something because right now we're

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getting nothing.

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But it's just an endless chain of people stabbing each other in the back.

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And the only like Nash equilibrium of this game is that someone just proposes that they

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split it equally three ways and then no one opposes it.

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And then otherwise it would like never converge.

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So it just starts this endless argument.

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So another result in game theory that argument costs people things, but it doesn't benefit

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anyone, anything.

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So I mean, I guess like the difference between that, like sort of like game and like mining

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would be there is like some sort of like cost associated with mining.

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Well, yes, there's a cost associated with doing negotiation and like if you spend an

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hour negotiating that salary and you reach the same negotiation that you would have

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reached in five minutes, then you wasted 55 minutes and no one got anything out of that.

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So all I'm trying to say, though, is that this is kind of like a, uh, this is a, this

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is an entry that could be like intrigue and drama.

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But what I'm actually bringing this up is to say that there probably would not be

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because there is no there's no like easy way out.

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The either the so since there's no easy way out, it's just what I'm talking about with

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this divided dollar game where they just say, well, we'll just try to withdraw the

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coins normally or if the thing crashes, the miners will just divide all the coins and

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split them amongst those on hash rate or something like that.

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So these these are like worst case scenario situations where still everything kind of

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works, basically.

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So I think that.

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So those are some of my thoughts on that, I think those those types of things actually

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help. Um, drivechain work because they can I just make a quick point now about what you

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just said, Paul?

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Sure.

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Yes.

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You mentioned the Nash equilibrium and kind of whenever the realms of game theories

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kind of people kind of Nash equilibrium, you know, it's kind of people that's what

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they kind of.

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Kind of default to almost, but before Nash kind of wrote that kind of non-cooperative

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idea paper, non-cooperative games, you came up with the bargaining problem and he

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formulated an axiomatic solution to kind of games and like the two he kind of

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formulated an answer to the two person non-zero sum game.

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And I always kind of associate when I read the Bitcoin white paper, it says peer to

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peer. You've got peer one and peer two is like a two player game and kind of Satoshi

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says kind of explicitly that the main benefits are lost in Bitcoin.

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It is a third party required.

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So I kind of almost from that rightly or wrongly discount kind of third parties in.

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In a two player game and a kind of I just associate Bitcoin software or the Bitcoin

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client. It's kind of almost like a like a suedo third party.

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It's like a peer to peer two players and you've got the software acting as a third

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player canonical arbitrator with the software program to a set of values.

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That's kind of how I associate the game theory in Bitcoin.

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And I think this is my view on this is what you're suggesting is kind of over

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complicating what's kind of is a simplistic,

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generalized solution to a classical game theory problem in terms of how two players,

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whether those two players are individuals or nation states or groups or collectives

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interact and arrive at a deterministic kind of point of view as to a bargaining idea

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where the kind of the money or we call it money, but we could also maybe regard it as

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media to cooperative bargaining.

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And yes, whenever I whenever I'm sorry, whenever I hear the kind of like game

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theory, like game theories can sometimes become a bit of a hacking kind of phrase.

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That's kind of how I I completely agree, I think too many people use it as a like in

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place of an actual argument or whatever they want to say.

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They just say like, oh, the game theory.

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Yeah. And I'm you know, I actually really like game theory.

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I'm a real student of game theory.

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I studied actual academic game theory, which I actually don't even think is that great.

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My favorite. I like Tom Schelling and his style of his books, strategy of competition,

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strategy of conflict is one of my favorite books.

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Yeah, Nash is great. I think that, though, too many people just use the game theory and

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then they don't they don't just say whatever they want to say.

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I brought it up in that particular case because I just wanted to say that there's it

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actually is a racist because the questioner asked about miners buying up the coins

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themselves. And I wanted to try to explain why if they do that, they will probably just

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do that and withdraw the coins and divide them equally among the hash rate and or give

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them to their proper owners like in the worst case scenario.

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So kind of making kind of an arcane point.

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But I think I think everyone would benefit from reading about the two person divide a

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dollar game on Wikipedia.

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I think it's pretty easy to understand.

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And I hope I didn't confuse too many people by rambling about that.

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Could you post that on Twitter or something like that?

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I'll put it in the nest, probably.

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Yeah, we'll fill the nest with fun things to for people to look at.

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OK, now, Stuart in Dubai, what's up?

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Hi, everybody.

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I'd just like to sort of suggest that Rio mentioned that you referred to the miners

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as a cartel.

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I think it might be healthy to sort of change the perspective a little bit to change the

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point of view.

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I would think it's probably a better way of looking at it such that miners can be seen

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as board members of a company.

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And the sidechains themselves would be like the executive staff within the company.

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Now, you're going to have two hundred and fifty six different, you could say, staff

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members that need to sort of be managed.

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And, you know, these board members, they're not going to go out of their way to fucking

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destroy their own company.

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Do you see what I mean?

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They're going to be looking after this just as each of you are looking after your own

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business because it's feeding your goddamn families, man.

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And it just it's just like if there are if there are underperforming staff, you have

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no qualms in firing that staff member.

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So like if there is an underperforming sidechain, maybe they've gone rogue or something

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and they're stealing from people or something like that.

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It kind of, you know, very naturally these miners, these board members will come up with

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procedures to to sort of decide, OK, how will we choose to fire this person, this side

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chain?

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How will we choose to elect a new one?

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What are the processes that we will choose to select a sidechain such that it is most

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profitable for us?

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Because, goddammit, we're the ones that are fighting the thermodynamics, the laws of

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thermodynamics.

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And she is a very harsh mistress.

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So these board members now, it's not unheard of to hear of board members embezzling money

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from their company.

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But in this scenario, we've got difficulty adjustments and every two fucking weeks, we're

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going to have miners that just get fired from this from this from this situation.

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So you're looking at people who have to be on their toes all the goddamn time to keep

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the ship going.

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And anyway, so that's that's the sort of change of view I'd be keen to hear if there's

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any flaws in this different point of view or or maybe, for example, you want to stick

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with the whole hardcore crypto, this is, you know, Alice and Eve mentality and just

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view them as just like the enemy of the enemy.

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I don't think it's always healthy to take that perspective.

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And I very much don't believe miners are enemies.

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They are valuable members of the network and a participant in the in the game.

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And I think speak to the two person game game theory aspect of things.

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But but there I do feel very explicitly this crowns them as a before they had not a lot

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of incentive to really work together outside of pooling, but all work was the same.

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Now you have this 90 percent activation and you have the necessity for them to all come

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to consensus to activate these chains.

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They can be bribed to do so.

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One chain is extremely terrible for users.

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Users want miners to quit.

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As long as that chain keeps bribing the mine pool operators, they put our stuff in the

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software and everybody says, well, we're going to use these pools even if we are divided

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energy.

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We're not divided software operators anymore.

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This is where I do think the point comes of making pool mining and peer to peer and peer

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pool come back and then thinking about BIP300 is a valid critique.

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And I'm not saying that there are curtail now, but this gives cartelish moral hazard

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in my view.

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I don't feel we should demonize miners.

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Your point is well taken.

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Yeah, very good point.

300
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And I think people do demonize miners, which I think is wrong.

301
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And I think you are absolutely correct in pointing out that.

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Like this does give miners a way to make more money if they coordinate, but that does not

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necessarily mean anything bad at all.

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After all, that is exactly what the Bitcoin Core software already does.

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If the miners can coordinate on which blockchain tip is the tip, like the heaviest valid

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chain, then they.

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So it's just a matter of, as you also point out, it's a matter of writing software so

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that they can coordinate even if they're if there are many, many of them and they're in

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different locations and you just automate everything as much as possible.

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And so, you know, like 100% of the hash rate is coordinating on many things.

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But that doesn't mean that any human is literally making a decision anywhere.

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It can be all software.

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It's all automated.

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So just because things are coordinated does not literally mean that there's only like

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there's some like they all have each other's phone number and they're calling each other

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and talking to each other.

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People coordinating can just mean that the software does it like it's something like

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BitTorrent gives everyone the same file or something.

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I think it's worth just talking a little bit about how miners basically just get their

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block templates and the relationship between miners and pools just as a matter of defining

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terms within all of this.

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And, you know, I'm a healthy, healthy skeptic along all of this.

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And I think it's worth talking about just because it gives light to kind of the I don't

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think it's the centralizing force that's at play, but it's just it's just sort of the

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engineered reality.

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But basically, like there's two there's two largely used versions of the mempool.

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There's the mempool that sits on your nodes that are capped at 300 megabytes.

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And that is sort of the somewhat narrow snapshot of what are viewed as the most valuable

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transactions to be included in in the next series of blocks, let's say.

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And then there's mining pools that are running mempools themselves that are somewhere larger

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than 300 megabytes, you know, call it, you know, I don't know, a gig to a gig and a half,

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maybe two gigs tops.

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And the reason that they run a bigger mempool is because there might be transactions outside

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of the 300 megabyte slice that end up actually being more valuable for lots of reasons.

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We don't need to dig on right now, but they end up running this wider viewpoint into the

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future transactions to be included.

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And then what the what the pool does is they basically pre-generate a ton of block templates

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that include those transactions.

339
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And then they serve up those block templates to all of the mining constituents within their

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pool.

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And then we generate pool shares against that series of templates.

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And so, you know, when you when you think about like what coordination is happening,

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there's an algorithm that is running against that larger mempool on the pool side.

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The templates are really just sort by expected fee revenue and then give it to all the miners

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to mine against.

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And then once the next block is found, you know, that process repeats.

347
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It's sort of the straightforward way to think about it.

348
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But the pieces that confuse me a little bit or where I'm not clear on sort of the game

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theoretic piece are, and I think we saw this, we saw this pretty aggressively in ETH, where,

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you know, the economic value of some of the projects that are sitting on top of ETH basically

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end up becoming the decision makers for how the base chain is developed and functions.

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So this sort of multi-collateral environment, you know, the US dollar is not really governed

353
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the same way because the dollar is so big from a monetary based perspective.

354
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But like, you know, if you're if you're one of three or four projects on ETH, you know,

355
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you, you know, if it's, you know, USDC or some of these other sort of mega projects,

356
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you know, because you're built on top of a chain, if there were to be a fork,

357
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you know, you basically need to consent to the fork.

358
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And so that's the centralizing dynamic and economic piece that that starts to

359
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concentrate power along different members of the stakeholders within that kind of ecosystem.

360
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And sort of that that ability dovetails with the MEV component pretty closely.

361
00:38:23,379 --> 00:38:28,019
Yes, we can talk about that. But first, let me interject to say, I mean, first of all,

362
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I think it's actually kind of, you know, just a little side note that I definitely do think

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the US dollar is big, but I definitely think one of the biggest customers of the US dollar

364
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chain, so to speak, would be like the US government themselves.

365
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And I think we would all agree that the US government does influence monetary policy,

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you know, and fiscal policy, you know, obviously, to state the obvious.

367
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So I just think there's a kind of interesting side note.

368
00:38:54,259 --> 00:38:58,499
Yeah, I just want to double click there. Yeah, because I think it's interesting.

369
00:38:58,499 --> 00:39:03,300
But like, like what, but what's interesting is that the US government is, is all is all doing

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all doing dollar native things, right? It's not like Apple stock is able to govern monetary policy.

371
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Or, you know, so there ends up being sort of this, this, like dollar loop dollar ecosystem.

372
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Yeah, you're saying a big project, like a mega project on ETH, it has influence over

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the development, like with the full node, the next version of the full node software.

374
00:39:31,940 --> 00:39:32,739
Correct.

375
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Change in ways that but you see, this is exactly what one of the things I was worried about,

376
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that led me to have an interest in sidechains, in the first place and to create BIP300.

377
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Because you have several different in the the sidechain vision is you have like,

378
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you know, like a couple different versions of the L2 blockchain that compete.

379
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And so the L2 devs are the people they they should be worried about pleasing their customers

380
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and their big customers, but they also have to worry about some kind of like

381
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what you might call mission creep

382
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values slide where if they change the project too much, the whole ecosystem will

383
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leave, pick up and go to a different sidechain.

384
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So it's actually good.

385
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want to have the L1 blockchain not really change very much.

386
00:40:22,132 --> 00:40:22,832
and then when they have the

387
00:40:23,374 --> 00:40:28,234
L2s kind of the vulnerable to collapse,

388
00:40:29,134 --> 00:40:34,674
least vulnerable to losing their users to a different L2.

389
00:40:34,854 --> 00:40:36,734
So I think it's actually the best of both worlds.

390
00:40:36,854 --> 00:40:37,454
You have a situation

391
00:40:50,416 --> 00:40:54,876
much by one person, it will kill the whole L2.

392
00:40:55,196 --> 00:40:59,116
the fact that there are different L2s makes it very easy to just lose one.

393
00:40:59,216 --> 00:41:00,816
It's like a food court with many restaurants.

394
00:41:01,176 --> 00:41:01,856
say, well, wait a minute.

395
00:41:02,016 --> 00:41:04,749
People can just walk down this hallway

396
00:41:04,789 --> 00:41:07,589
to the next place.

397
00:41:07,909 --> 00:41:11,509
we have to make sure that, sir, a bunch of people come here and they tell us every time

398
00:41:11,509 --> 00:41:13,909
that they really like the lasagna over and over.

399
00:41:14,269 --> 00:41:17,909
we cannot, they have to worry about staying in business.

400
00:41:17,909 --> 00:41:19,183
So I think we get the

401
00:41:19,303 --> 00:41:21,643
best of both worlds.

402
00:41:22,223 --> 00:41:24,163
then you were going to say, oh, the MEV thing.

403
00:41:24,283 --> 00:41:25,003
We could talk about that.

404
00:41:25,103 --> 00:41:29,923
Yes. This is a similar thing where merge mining firewalls off the MEV effect.

405
00:41:30,523 --> 00:41:33,343
In ETH, it's not the same as it is in

406
00:41:33,616 --> 00:42:03,616
Proof-of-Work Bitcoin merge mining. With ETH, there's like this strong incestuous relationship. But with merge mining, all the stuff happened, all the MEV, the whatever, what you call the searchers, or all that stuff, that happens over there. And then they just, whoever has constructed the block, just pays on, they pay on L1. And the block is just whatever they say. And the layer one Bitcoin miner has no idea what's going on.

407
00:42:04,616 --> 00:42:08,616
It has no idea what MBV is, it has no idea what ETH is. It just knows, oh, I'm getting a lot of money now.

408
00:42:10,616 --> 00:42:25,616
So can you, I mean, and I'm not as technical as I'd like to be, but can you walk me through a little bit how that would function in the context of just getting more valuable transactions pushed to the mempool?

409
00:42:26,616 --> 00:42:43,616
There's a separate mempool on L2. So if we had, let's say we have ETH, the sidechain. It's funny because I just made pictures for this, but I wanted to see if they were any good before tweeting them. So I made some nice pictures, but this is like literally just off by like 10 minutes, which is kind of a shame.

410
00:42:44,616 --> 00:42:59,616
But I'll put up these pictures soon, and so they may help or they may not. But the L2 has its own mempool, and it has its own, in blind merge mining, there's like a miner of the L2 who's a different person than the L1 miner.

411
00:43:00,616 --> 00:43:16,616
And the L2 miner, they get a very raw deal because they get basically almost nothing. They get like a free tiny amount of money, and most of the money just goes to the L2 person.

412
00:43:16,616 --> 00:43:40,616
Excuse me, most of the money goes to the L1 miner. It's like 99.5%. It goes to the L1 miner, and the L1 miner has no idea what's going on. And the L2 miner is the one that does all the work. And this may be easier to explain with the pictures, but what's going on is you have a bunch of people running full nodes of the EVM sidechain.

413
00:43:41,616 --> 00:43:57,616
And they know their own mempool. So as you say, we start with a mempool. So they know their L2 mempool, and they're trying to figure out what the next block is going to be, even for their own self-interest, just so that it's easier propagation of the block.

414
00:43:57,616 --> 00:44:18,616
So your node, let's say you're just a random sidechain user. You use the EVM sidechain. Your node has a mempool, and your node is going to try to figure out what's the next block going to be anyway. People are broadcasting transactions. Some pay a higher fee than others. So you think, well, this is probably what the next block is going to be.

415
00:44:19,616 --> 00:44:34,616
What you do in blind merge mining is you say, this is the block I want. It has a certain hash, has a certain hashmerkle root. I want this to be the block. You pay yourself the fees on L2.

416
00:44:34,616 --> 00:44:49,616
It's very important that we use U.S. dollars, believe it or not. We can use anything, hamburgers, U.S. dollars. But the point is the L2 and L1 may actually have different value because the peg may not hold at this exact time.

417
00:44:49,616 --> 00:44:59,616
The next withdrawal might have just started or might be about to start. So it could be 99 cents on the dollar, the one-to-one peg, or it could be 99 and a half, or it could be something else.

418
00:44:59,616 --> 00:45:18,616
So this block is worth to you, let's say, $2,000. It's $2,000 worth of Bitcoin on L2. So is this making sense so far? I realize I haven't actually explained what happens yet, but I'm trying to set it all up.

419
00:45:19,616 --> 00:45:46,616
The next block is worth $2,000. You want to pay yourself. You aren't an actual miner yet. We haven't actually created this block, but I'm talking about merge mining. You aspire to make the next block. You hit block 43 and you're going to make block 44. It's going to pay you $2,000 worth of L2 Bitcoin in the L2 Coinbase. This is all in L2. L1, we haven't talked about yet. So is it making sense so far?

420
00:45:46,616 --> 00:45:56,616
Just to clarify, the $2,000, is that the 0.5% or is that the 100% or is that the 99.5%?

421
00:45:56,616 --> 00:46:03,616
Believe it or not, this value is going to end up being the – this will be the 100%.

422
00:46:03,616 --> 00:46:13,616
Okay. So it'll be whatever, $100 for the L2 miner and $1,900 for the –

423
00:46:14,616 --> 00:46:39,616
We have not split it yet, but it will be – you get paid on different chains, which I think is part of why people – even I was confused by this a lot. Sometimes I would be working on the software and I'd be like, what? And I would mix it up myself and then I'd be like, oh yeah, I forgot. I'd be like, why is it paying on L1 and not L08? Because that's the design. And I'd be like, oh yeah. So it's kind of mystifying.

424
00:46:39,616 --> 00:46:55,616
What makes blind merge mining work – I need to explain this. It's very important. The fundamental key idea of blind merge mining is there's going to be someone who has – the same individual, the same person who has coins on both chains.

425
00:46:55,616 --> 00:47:09,616
And that is how I cheat and get the trust to bridge, because everyone who's on L2 is also on L1. Now, not everyone has coins on both. You could be very poor, maybe have no coins on either network. But if you run a full node of L2, you have one on L1.

426
00:47:09,616 --> 00:47:23,616
So every user has some presence on both networks, and it just stands to reason that people won't have 100% of their coins in one network or the other.

427
00:47:23,616 --> 00:47:43,616
So you just need someone out there who is willing to do this, is willing to activate this, run this software part, and they will be the bridge of trust. I don't know if that makes any sense.

428
00:47:43,616 --> 00:47:57,616
But what I'm saying is the key is that it's the same individual. Someone's going to pay themselves in L2 – they will pay themselves in L2 coins worth 2,000 or whatever we said. Did we say 4,000 or 2,000? I don't remember. But say 2,000.

429
00:47:57,616 --> 00:48:15,616
And then on L1, they're going to pay the miners 1,996 with L1 coins, which are different. But it's the same person. So it's not like, oh, do I trust myself? Of course I do. I'm the same person. I trust myself completely.

430
00:48:15,616 --> 00:48:35,616
So maybe this is just mystifying to everyone, but I have some pictures that I'll put up later.

431
00:48:35,616 --> 00:49:03,616
Awesome. Okay, so everyone just give me a couple seconds. I don't know if this will help or not, but maybe it will. Just give me like 45 seconds. Talk amongst yourselves, and I'll screenshot these and send them.

432
00:49:03,616 --> 00:49:15,616
Austin, why don't you say something? It's just sad to hear so much silence. I'll do that while I'm getting these pictures.

433
00:49:15,616 --> 00:49:35,616
Yes, yes, very good. Yeah, I actually had trouble with that concept, I'd say, in the earlier days, trying to sort it out. And I have heard some interesting critiques around kind of locking up capital.

434
00:49:35,616 --> 00:49:56,616
That because you'd have to, worst case scenario, you would have to be a competitive miner on a very vibrant L2, you may have to have a lot of capital locked up for that time period.

435
00:49:57,616 --> 00:50:12,616
I think that the critique would be that only miners themselves are going to end up being the L2 miners as well. I mean, did you have a response to that?

436
00:50:12,616 --> 00:50:36,616
Well, I think you'll see, when you see how it works, you'll see that it's actually, I don't think it's really possible for miners to have an edge, because actually they always have an edge if they don't. It should be always more profitable to use blind merge mining because the full node, the sidechain full node is not going to cost zero.

437
00:50:37,616 --> 00:50:50,616
And you can just get away with not running the full node. But there's a tiny amount of overhead because it takes something like, I don't know, like a few bytes, like 50 bytes on L1. So there is a tiny, but whatever, it doesn't kind of really matter. It will just be, it will be like tiny, tiny amounts.

438
00:50:51,616 --> 00:51:11,616
I mean, it's kind of interesting when people really like to get into this minutiae, but it's like, the Ethereum network is paying $7 million a day in revenue. So it's like, how, you know, what do people, people are talking about like 10, literally like 10 cents worth of overhead or something. It's like, completely de minimis.

439
00:51:12,616 --> 00:51:15,616
I got two of the pictures so far. I think I got four good ones.

440
00:51:15,616 --> 00:51:44,616
I can elaborate on merge mining. So when we talk about merge mining, you're using the same set of proof of work, and you're just getting a portion, in this case, it's going to be a hash that is put on L1. So there is some portion of the thing.

441
00:51:45,616 --> 00:51:59,616
There's fees charged for the L2 on L1, but really, it's a very small portion that will stay because you're just saying there's this new type of way that I want to use L1 block space for a recognition of an L2 block, but it literally is like a tiny little header or hash or something, right?

442
00:51:59,616 --> 00:52:15,616
It's just competing for space like SegWit does compete for space or anything with ordinals, right? Anybody can put a dickbutt if they want on SegWit data. So the L2, there's people willing to pay L2 BTC to be included in an L2 block.

443
00:52:15,616 --> 00:52:37,616
If the miner includes the small portion of that in L1, they also will get the L2 portion. So in essence, that data becomes subsidized where it can be cheap to include it on L1 because you get this subsidy on L2. You get these L2 tokens as the merge miner.

444
00:52:37,616 --> 00:53:01,616
So they'd be like, why would you pick that level one data that's not paying you as much over my transaction? Well, you don't realize I'm getting subsidized on the other side. This is one of the concerns saying I have to now price my transactions knowing L2s environment of subsidy to try and place my L1 transactions.

445
00:53:01,616 --> 00:53:21,616
I now am beholden to L2. I think that's overblown unless L2 is extremely successful. But these are the things that I think, again, speak to. This is not as benign as it may seem when you play the game out and you think about humans in my view.

446
00:53:22,616 --> 00:53:42,616
Of course, if the L2 achieves that level of success, the trade-off is likely well worth it. That potential bit of uncertainty or confusion and on top of it, a massive new...

447
00:53:43,616 --> 00:53:56,616
It's not as though it affects the whole block. It's like one transaction that pays a huge fee. So it's not like anyone on L1 is really getting priced out because there's only 256 possibilities.

448
00:53:56,616 --> 00:54:15,616
The L1 block would be like, here's all the ones that are not part of an L2. They're not like an L2 accounting transaction. Those have a fee rate of like 50 cents per transaction. And then there'd be like one that pays like literally $7 million worth of Bitcoin. But it's like it's in its own category.

449
00:54:15,616 --> 00:54:31,616
Okay, I tried to post these pictures as a reply to the space. And I think it may have worked. But I don't know if anyone can see them. Or if they make any sense to anyone at all. But I think I put them in order.

450
00:54:32,616 --> 00:54:50,616
They're supposed to start with something that you know, which is normal Bitcoin. And then I say, how does blind bridge mining work normally? And then I say, what is Ethereum doing? And then I say, what would be something that has MEV?

451
00:54:50,616 --> 00:55:01,616
And then I say, why is it the case that MEV makes absolutely zero difference? Literally none whatsoever to the blind bridge mining?

452
00:55:02,616 --> 00:55:24,616
Alright, so I'm looking through the pictures. I guess where my question still sits is like, let's just say I pay one Bitcoin in fees on L2. And then there's one transaction that hits L1, where the fee is one Bitcoin.

453
00:55:25,616 --> 00:55:30,616
Who's sending the one Bitcoin on L1 in the transaction?

454
00:55:31,616 --> 00:55:43,616
This is this person, what I call the BMM miner in the picture. We used to call him the briber. We gave him a bad name, because they bribed him to just put this hash in which the hash defines the L2 block.

455
00:55:43,616 --> 00:55:59,616
So what's happening is the whole sidechain block, the whole L2 block is worth like, whatever it is $4,000, or one, you know, say whatever you like, like 0.2 Bitcoin. That's the whole sidechain block is worth that.

456
00:56:00,616 --> 00:56:18,616
On the side, Bitcoin. So then you assemble that block, this person, the BMM miner, this yellow, this diagonally sort of centric to the, you know, the guy in the middle of the five group with the yellow, he's BMM miner.

457
00:56:19,616 --> 00:56:35,616
That guy, he pays himself the 750, $750 in this, in the whatever, which is the second picture to he pays himself $750. Then on L1, he pays 749 as a fee to the miners.

458
00:56:35,616 --> 00:56:59,616
Got it. So, so, so basically, if, if the L2 miner doesn't have enough Bitcoin on L1, after he pays himself L2 Bitcoin, he then needs the liquidity in L1 to be able to pay for the fee.

459
00:57:00,616 --> 00:57:11,616
The, he's, in blind merge mining, you always pay on L1. I think as someone was saying, I think, was it you? Did you just say like, it could be, you could be vertically integrated.

460
00:57:12,616 --> 00:57:25,616
The miners could, L1 Bitcoin miners could just vertically integrate and they could say, we will run the sidechain. We will pay ourselves on L2. And then they don't do any of this, but they get paid on L2.

461
00:57:26,616 --> 00:57:46,616
So actually an advantage of blind merge mining is that the miners don't have to run the sidechain at all. And they get paid on L1. Now they may not get paid the same unit quantity of BTC, but it should be basically the same dollar amount because there's some inconvenience associated with withdrawing, not with deposit.

462
00:57:46,616 --> 00:57:53,616
Sure, sure. What's to stop the L2 miner from keeping more than that percent?

463
00:57:54,616 --> 00:58:13,616
It's a very good question. And the answer is competition. Every single, the way BIP301 is, every single sidechain node could connect to the L1 miner. And this is what BIP301 does. It makes it so that on L1, this is why BIP301 is its own, is its own concept.

464
00:58:14,616 --> 00:58:28,616
On L1, it says miners can only include, sorry, something else happened. I was distracted. Miners can only include one of the, what do we call the bids? So these are like a bidding process.

465
00:58:28,616 --> 00:58:46,616
Someone says, I'll pay 710, I'll pay 712, I'll pay 713, I'll pay 725. So they're broadcasting these all on L1. And then only one of them can actually be included in a block on L1. The rest just expire immediately. They're like fill or kill. So they're out.

466
00:58:46,616 --> 00:59:06,616
So since only one can be included, it's like an auction where you broadcast transactions, but they're really just you at an auction house raising the little thing with the number, the little whatever that's called, the bid flag that you have.

467
00:59:06,616 --> 00:59:27,616
And so you're broadcasting these transactions on L1. Now either you win, you say I'll pay you 710, I'll pay 715, I'll pay 716. Now if they include the one that pays 716, then the one that bids 710 cannot be included in a block, and so you safely keep your money.

468
00:59:27,616 --> 00:59:37,616
You didn't win the L2 block, but you didn't pay on L1 either. So it makes it an atomic, indivisible link between those two things.

469
00:59:37,616 --> 00:59:52,616
So a follow-up question is, what if there's two miners on the L2 who both contribute different hashes or have solved what they perceive as different blocks?

470
00:59:52,616 --> 00:59:54,616
That's if I include them both.

471
00:59:55,719 --> 01:00:10,219
That's not allowed under the, yeah, so this is also the case that the second thing that BIP301 does is it keeps the slot in a defined organization.

472
01:00:10,219 --> 01:00:18,719
So it says this part, it basically says this part of the Coinbase, defined by some little whatever code, like an algorithm basically.

473
01:00:19,719 --> 01:00:31,719
This part of the Coinbase is where the hash of sidechain 4 will go. Sidechain slot 4 or whatever. This is where that hash is. Whatever is there, that is the spot.

474
01:00:32,719 --> 01:00:43,719
And then on L1, people say, put my hash there. I'll pay 710. And then someone says, no, put my hash there. I'll pay 711. I'll pay 712.

475
01:00:43,719 --> 01:00:52,719
They can only put one hash in the slot because it's a defined piece of real estate. It's a 32-byte location, so it can only fit 32 bytes.

476
01:00:52,719 --> 01:01:15,719
And then what the BIP301 thing says, they can only take one bid. And if they include the bid in the L1 block, the body of the block, not the Coinbase, if they include this 301 bid, they have to include the BMM, what we call the BMM accept, which is to say the real estate has to match.

477
01:01:16,719 --> 01:01:27,719
So they say on L1, the person says, I'll pay this money straight to the miners as a transaction fee if this hash is in the special real estate spot.

478
01:01:28,719 --> 01:01:40,719
So then the miners say, you know what, sold. They set the 32 bytes in the Coinbase to what they were told to set them to. They have no idea why or what's going on. They don't care.

479
01:01:41,719 --> 01:01:45,719
And then they collect your transaction on L1.

480
01:01:46,719 --> 01:02:10,719
And then on L2, when the L2 software is programmed so that it's looking also at the special real estate, and when it sees that a hash has been put in the special real estate spot, the L2 node software says, this is a new block that meets what is the equivalent of the difficulty requirement.

481
01:02:10,719 --> 01:02:20,719
So it's like, this is a valid block header. And then it will download the block and check it for validity. It may still be invalid because it may, who knows, that block may not even exist.

482
01:02:20,719 --> 01:02:30,719
It could be filled with errors. But it first jumps what is in L1 Bitcoin, the proof-of-work requirement. So it does that.

483
01:02:31,719 --> 01:02:51,719
And then the L2 block, well, the L2 full node will then download a block header matching the hash and download the Merkle tree or whatever they've done over there, the equivalent thing of the vector of transactions or whatever is in the sidechain, the new block.

484
01:02:52,719 --> 01:02:55,719
And it will check all those for validity. And if that is valid, then it will extend the chain.

485
01:02:55,719 --> 01:02:58,719
And then, of course, your Coinbase, you're winning those coins in the Coinbase.

486
01:02:59,719 --> 01:03:13,719
So this is another reason why it may not be the same unit of coins equally, because on the sidechain you have reorg risk, and you also have the 100 block maturity period, and you have the difficulty withdrawing back to L1.

487
01:03:14,719 --> 01:03:25,719
So the numbers may not line up in terms of their BTC unit, but they really should be the same U.S. dollar amount or something really close.

488
01:03:26,719 --> 01:03:30,719
Do you know what I mean? Because this is just an inconvenience associated with the block maturity with those coins being on L2.

489
01:03:31,719 --> 01:03:37,719
It actually has nothing to do with the blind merge mining like conveyor. So I don't know. I hope that some of that made some sense.

490
01:03:44,719 --> 01:03:50,719
It does. I would say that it could – oh, sorry. Harry, did you want to – I think it does, if I may be real quick.

491
01:03:51,719 --> 01:04:03,719
But I will say that I think it speaks to the gentleman's critique of the lockup of capital of miners accumulating their returns on the L2 and having a big sell pressure, which could increase that discount.

492
01:04:04,719 --> 01:04:15,719
And then also saying I'm not going to activate on the L2 unless I know as a miner activating on L2 I'm going to be able to dump into your L2 community to get my mining rewards out, which again speaks to my cartel critique.

493
01:04:16,719 --> 01:04:25,719
Not that miners are currently acting that way, but it gives them a heck of incentive to say bribe me first to activate to make sure if I need to dump and I'm at a discount, I'm not going to take an LUR.

494
01:04:26,719 --> 01:04:42,719
Give me a security deposit to activate your chain. This is stuff that's that bargaining game theory commentary critique back before that pool mining potentially at least provides a counterargument or counterforce to which I don't find currently in the analysis.

495
01:04:43,719 --> 01:04:57,719
Again, they won't accumulate. If everyone's using blind merge mining, then the L1 miners will not accumulate. They're getting paid on L1, and it's someone who's using L2. They're accumulating L2 coins.

496
01:04:58,719 --> 01:05:07,719
Then the pressure is the L2 guy and the L1 not being the same one as your picture shows would be the same person. If it's not the same person, then those two people again have a negotiation game, right?

497
01:05:08,719 --> 01:05:13,719
In blind merge mining, it relies on them being the same person. So I don't know if you can see, it's kind of ghosted out, but the…

498
01:05:14,719 --> 01:05:27,719
Right, it's the same person. I'm accumulating on the other side, right? Granted, because I'm paying out on my side, and I'm accumulating on the other side, so I'm actually bridging in every time I solve a block. I'm bridging in. And if I want to bridge out, I'm a natural self-force.

499
01:05:28,719 --> 01:05:36,719
You're sort of bridging out, really, because you're the sidechain user, and you are… Oh yeah, I guess I see what you mean.

500
01:05:37,719 --> 01:05:47,719
As a dual miner, I'm accumulating in. And if I want to get out to pay for my expenses to mine, I have to pay for my electricity, I'm a natural self-force. I'm always going to sell on L2 first.

501
01:05:48,719 --> 01:05:51,719
The L2 miner doesn't spend any electricity, remember.

502
01:05:52,719 --> 01:05:54,719
It's the same person as the L1 miner, right?

503
01:05:55,719 --> 01:06:02,719
No, no, no, no, no. That is… That's not correct. When I have on these photos…

504
01:06:03,719 --> 01:06:04,719
It could be separate people.

505
01:06:05,719 --> 01:06:19,719
No, it's the person who is… The key, when I have blind merge mining, and I have these pictures, and I have this dotted line that's the same person, that is an L2, someone who is an L2 quote miner, but they're not doing any hashing.

506
01:06:19,719 --> 01:06:27,719
They're just getting paid in the Coinbase on L2. It's kind of weird where they're like a virtual miner, and they are a regular person on L1. So they don't own any hardware.

507
01:06:28,719 --> 01:06:34,719
But to keep paying the L1, I have to take my rewards that I get on L2 and put it back on L1 to keep paying the L1 people that's doing the mining for me.

508
01:06:35,719 --> 01:06:40,719
So that L2 person is still a natural self-force because they have their expenses paid in L1, and their revenue is on L2.

509
01:06:41,719 --> 01:06:46,719
Yeah, no, that is correct. I mean, of course, the miner has a flip side where the miner is getting more L1 currency.

510
01:06:47,719 --> 01:06:50,719
But yeah, you're absolutely right. The L1 person is protected. Fair, fair.

511
01:06:51,719 --> 01:07:02,719
But you're right. Anyone who does blind merge mining, they will get a tiny little bit of an opportunity for a little bit of a yield or a little bit of like – they'll collect some money.

512
01:07:03,719 --> 01:07:10,719
But they will be, in general, losing – they'll be shedding L1 coins and picking up L2 coins, which they will then have to swap.

513
01:07:11,719 --> 01:07:20,719
They can swap back or they can use the three-month withdrawal. But since anyone can use the three-month withdrawal, there should be always some people willing to swap.

514
01:07:21,719 --> 01:07:24,719
They can swap HTLC or they can go to whatever, Coinbase.

515
01:07:27,719 --> 01:07:36,719
Would a drivechain be able to support an atomic swap down to L2 to avoid the three-month? Is that a way that somebody could be prevented from doing that in some way?

516
01:07:37,719 --> 01:07:39,719
Absolutely. In fact, you can do that today.

517
01:07:40,719 --> 01:07:46,719
You can do that today with Litecoin or some altcoin. You just have an HTLC and you have the same hash algorithm. Sorry.

518
01:07:47,719 --> 01:07:53,719
So you're right. So if you don't want to wait the three months and you find a willing partner on the other side, you could peer-to-peer atomic swap down.

519
01:07:54,719 --> 01:07:55,719
Absolutely.

520
01:07:55,719 --> 01:07:59,719
You really have to wait for the three months if you're a whale. But again, mining pools are whales. They're not going to find a peer on the other side.

521
01:08:00,719 --> 01:08:07,719
So for the end user though, you're not as trapped as the potential B2B miner, which would need to have some vested interest in the continuation of the chain.

522
01:08:08,719 --> 01:08:14,719
Actually, I think I'm pretty sure I first had this idea because I had learned about the atomic swaps.

523
01:08:15,719 --> 01:08:18,719
And that is actually how I think came up with this drivechain idea.

524
01:08:19,719 --> 01:08:21,719
I thought these atomic swaps, because I was like, everything's so close.

525
01:08:22,719 --> 01:08:27,719
I remember the idea. It's like the people who want large blocks, they're willing to run the large block software.

526
01:08:28,719 --> 01:08:32,719
So they're willing to do the extra. It's just that some people aren't.

527
01:08:32,719 --> 01:08:40,719
And I was like, okay, we can have everyone share one megabyte and then seven megabytes only some people run, since people disagree.

528
01:08:41,719 --> 01:08:52,719
And then I thought, well, the coins can move in one direction easily because the one megabyte small block people don't have to pay attention.

529
01:08:53,719 --> 01:08:56,719
And the seven megabyte optional people, they want eight megabytes total.

530
01:08:57,719 --> 01:09:00,719
So they're still users of the original one. They have seven plus one.

531
01:09:00,719 --> 01:09:03,719
So they will know to them, it'll look like a normal transaction.

532
01:09:04,719 --> 01:09:10,719
So I was like, this is really close because we have people willing to run the eight megabyte nodes.

533
01:09:11,719 --> 01:09:17,719
You know, it's not like the large blockers were complete freeloaders or anyone who wants, if someone wants a Zcash, they run a Zcash node.

534
01:09:18,719 --> 01:09:22,719
So this is how I came up with drivechain, really partly because I was like, we're very, very close.

535
01:09:23,719 --> 01:09:25,719
We have merged mining already with Namecoin.

536
01:09:25,719 --> 01:09:31,719
We have people willing to do the extra less decentralized, more expensive node.

537
01:09:32,719 --> 01:09:35,719
They're willing to run for an extra seven megabytes.

538
01:09:36,719 --> 01:09:38,719
And we have a way of getting the deposits.

539
01:09:39,719 --> 01:09:42,719
And then we even had a way of doing, there was this thing, an extension block.

540
01:09:43,719 --> 01:09:44,719
And then I was like, what about the withdrawals?

541
01:09:45,719 --> 01:09:51,719
And I think you honestly have nailed it because what I thought was, my literal exact thought was something like,

542
01:09:52,719 --> 01:09:58,719
well, they can, they can, it can HTLC like atomic swap out at any time.

543
01:09:59,719 --> 01:10:04,719
They just need something somewhere to fix the price at a one to one ratio.

544
01:10:05,719 --> 01:10:10,719
Even if it's like really rare or really difficult to use, or if it's like, it's not perfect.

545
01:10:11,719 --> 01:10:15,719
So that is when I decided, oh, we can just make the withdrawals take a really long time.

546
01:10:16,719 --> 01:10:19,719
So it's because of, it's exactly because of this,

547
01:10:20,719 --> 01:10:24,719
the atomic swaps that I sort of came up with this idea.

548
01:10:25,719 --> 01:10:30,719
So I think the fact that you have picked up on that is very encouraging for me.

549
01:10:31,719 --> 01:10:34,719
I mean, some people out there are finally getting the idea, I think.

550
01:10:36,719 --> 01:10:39,719
I guess I'm still just like, I'm still just struggling with the,

551
01:10:40,719 --> 01:10:47,719
the piece where somebody takes in currency A and is obligated to pay in currency B.

552
01:10:49,719 --> 01:10:50,719
In blind merge mining, you mean?

553
01:10:51,719 --> 01:10:53,719
Yeah, in the blind merge mining component.

554
01:10:54,719 --> 01:11:04,719
The other piece is just that there's also now a huge incentive for the miner to also vertically integrate into the second component.

555
01:11:05,719 --> 01:11:06,719
I don't think so.

556
01:11:06,719 --> 01:11:15,719
And take, well, the reason being that the miner can then, you know, A, you know, they've got,

557
01:11:16,719 --> 01:11:20,719
they've got incentive to take currency A, you know, L2 coin.

558
01:11:21,719 --> 01:11:28,719
They pay, they pay L1 coin and then they just short L2 coin heading into the release of the lockup.

559
01:11:28,719 --> 01:11:36,719
Like there's a, it just, it creates a bunch of these synthetic complexities where you're betting for perverse incentives.

560
01:11:37,719 --> 01:11:45,719
Well, they could short, the miners could try to create chaos on the sidechain and force people to lose hope.

561
01:11:46,719 --> 01:11:48,719
And they could threaten to steal the coins.

562
01:11:49,719 --> 01:11:55,719
And in fact, they can also not only threaten, but they can literally take the coins.

563
01:11:55,719 --> 01:12:01,719
That is the unfortunate consequence of giving this freedom and this loose coupling.

564
01:12:02,719 --> 01:12:08,719
And I, you know, I've explained the economic model, why I think they probably won't in many scenarios.

565
01:12:09,719 --> 01:12:12,719
And I've also explained that this is a long run economic model of Bitcoin.

566
01:12:13,719 --> 01:12:16,719
And of course, each individual user is free to take this risk if they want or not take it.

567
01:12:17,719 --> 01:12:24,719
But the thing is, the miners can threaten to take all the coins and then buy them up cheap and then walk them out.

568
01:12:25,719 --> 01:12:30,719
Or the miners can actually just actually take all the coins, you know, it's the case.

569
01:12:31,719 --> 01:12:33,719
So if since they can do that, I don't really see it.

570
01:12:34,719 --> 01:12:41,719
The reason why they don't annoy, like threaten to take the coins is the same reason why they won't actually take the coins.

571
01:12:42,719 --> 01:12:51,719
Either they will take the coins and it's just not a, you know, it's basically the sidechain is being gutted and killed or they won't.

572
01:12:52,719 --> 01:12:54,719
I don't really see why they would do like 10% of the way, you know.

573
01:12:55,719 --> 01:13:02,719
They're either because users would just say this sidechain is not supported or they would say the drivechain idea doesn't work.

574
01:13:03,719 --> 01:13:07,719
Because look, this is like miners are not being, you know, being very mean to us.

575
01:13:08,719 --> 01:13:09,719
So we're not doing it.

576
01:13:10,719 --> 01:13:12,719
Just like it introduces a huge amount of vulnerability to me.

577
01:13:13,719 --> 01:13:22,719
It's like it's a very similar problem to like it's an abstracted senior age environment where, you know, the miners are basically able to print themselves.

578
01:13:22,719 --> 01:13:23,719
No, no, no.

579
01:13:24,719 --> 01:13:25,719
They can take the coin.

580
01:13:26,719 --> 01:13:28,719
They can take the coins on L1.

581
01:13:29,719 --> 01:13:30,719
They don't print though.

582
01:13:31,719 --> 01:13:37,719
They take the coins on L1 and that they can also do things that are like milder versions of that.

583
01:13:38,719 --> 01:13:43,719
Like they can say we might take the coins and then buy them for 90 cents on the dollar.

584
01:13:44,719 --> 01:13:48,719
Everyone panics and then legitimately withdraw them having taken.

585
01:13:48,719 --> 01:13:53,719
But you see, if they do stuff like that, then it's just kind of the equivalent of just killing the coin.

586
01:13:54,719 --> 01:13:55,719
They're killing the whole idea off.

587
01:13:56,719 --> 01:13:57,719
So, yeah.

588
01:13:58,719 --> 01:14:03,719
And what we found is that wherever the extraction of value can be taken, it is taken.

589
01:14:04,719 --> 01:14:07,719
Yes, but that's only if you extract the value and there's no consequence.

590
01:14:08,719 --> 01:14:09,719
This is we were talking about Tom Schelling before.

591
01:14:10,719 --> 01:14:14,719
He wrote another great book called Choice and Consequence, which is another great one.

592
01:14:14,719 --> 01:14:18,719
Now, I'm not saying that because I've read some magic book by Tom Schelling that this is all going to work.

593
01:14:19,719 --> 01:14:29,719
But what I am saying is as a consequence of supporting the sidechain honestly by mining its blocks and by doing the withdrawals,

594
01:14:30,719 --> 01:14:34,719
which is copying and pasting one hash every three months.

595
01:14:35,719 --> 01:14:42,719
As a consequence of that, they get the fees, which again is no guarantee that that will be enough.

596
01:14:42,719 --> 01:14:48,719
But I'm just saying it's worth trying and it has no risk and people who are against it don't really understand it.

597
01:14:49,719 --> 01:14:58,719
So that is what I'm saying is that it's 7.2 million in fees per day when I did the math like two days ago or something.

598
01:14:59,719 --> 01:15:03,719
You can go on cryptofees.info and see if Ethereum is having a good day or a bad day or whatever.

599
01:15:04,719 --> 01:15:05,719
But that's a lot of money.

600
01:15:06,719 --> 01:15:08,719
The net present value is $33 billion.

601
01:15:09,719 --> 01:15:16,719
So let me ask you, if I could offer you $33 billion, do you want $33 billion?

602
01:15:17,719 --> 01:15:27,719
Are you going to risk that so that you can maybe steal whatever you think it is like 10,000 BTC?

603
01:15:28,719 --> 01:15:29,719
Well, you'd kind of do some math and you'd say how much.

604
01:15:30,719 --> 01:15:34,719
And that's exactly the math that I did, question number five of Tidwell's list of questions.

605
01:15:35,719 --> 01:15:44,719
So that's like you lose the $33 billion if you don't play ball with the drivechain idea.

606
01:15:45,719 --> 01:15:49,719
I don't think it's that clear cut and straightforward.

607
01:15:50,719 --> 01:15:52,719
Well, that's good.

608
01:15:53,719 --> 01:15:58,719
But I think you can look at the, that is reductive, but it's supposed to be like a little model.

609
01:15:58,719 --> 01:16:04,719
So you can just like, if you look at it, you can see what the logic of it is and where the numbers come from.

610
01:16:05,719 --> 01:16:06,719
No, I understand.

611
01:16:07,719 --> 01:16:14,719
I think like the two pieces that are worth highlighting as it relates to that math are, you know, number one,

612
01:16:15,719 --> 01:16:25,719
there's a ton of development and work and users and effort that's gone into generating that fee revenue over the last five to seven years.

613
01:16:25,719 --> 01:16:33,719
Now, do I think that, you know, building on a proof of stake, you know, fundamental consensus mechanism is building on bedrock?

614
01:16:34,719 --> 01:16:40,719
No. Do I think that the risk profile of all of those projects are high and higher than my tolerance?

615
01:16:41,719 --> 01:16:48,719
Yes. But to say that like that just ports over and we're leaving all of that on the table today.

616
01:16:49,719 --> 01:16:51,719
You know, I don't think that that's, I don't think that's accurate.

617
01:16:52,719 --> 01:16:54,719
Well, I agree that, yeah, I think that we've got to go to Portland.

618
01:16:55,719 --> 01:16:58,719
That it's ended up very patiently and it was like I started to ignore Portland.

619
01:16:59,719 --> 01:17:02,719
And then I was like, we've already ignored it for so long that the damage is done.

620
01:17:03,719 --> 01:17:09,719
So we might as well. But I think the it is like I agree that it won't port over overnight.

621
01:17:10,719 --> 01:17:17,719
But what what I'm trying to demonstrate is that is a situation where something was built up over years.

622
01:17:17,719 --> 01:17:20,719
You know, it it was built up from nothing.

623
01:17:21,719 --> 01:17:23,719
So I'm just trying to say, like, listen, it is possible.

624
01:17:24,719 --> 01:17:28,719
See, I kind of think if you ever want to demonstrate something, they'll always be skeptics every step of the way.

625
01:17:29,719 --> 01:17:32,719
Like when I first wrote the idea in 2015, people will say, well, that's just a blog post.

626
01:17:33,719 --> 01:17:36,719
We need more details. And they say, OK, here's I give them more details.

627
01:17:37,719 --> 01:17:40,719
And they say, well, we need an analysis of all the different risks.

628
01:17:41,719 --> 01:17:42,719
And then I do this analysis of all the different risks.

629
01:17:43,719 --> 01:17:45,719
And I say, well, we need working software.

630
01:17:45,719 --> 01:17:49,719
And they say, we need a BIP. And then they say, we need such and such.

631
01:17:50,719 --> 01:17:57,719
Every single step of the way, people will say, well, sure, you have a BIP and you have software and you have a pull request.

632
01:17:58,719 --> 01:18:02,719
And you have lots of relevant experience in the industry and you have a lot of experts signing off on it.

633
01:18:03,719 --> 01:18:05,719
And you have this examples.

634
01:18:06,719 --> 01:18:12,719
And we have something like wrapped BTC in the real world that is demonstrating this idea in a different context.

635
01:18:13,719 --> 01:18:16,719
But you still need some other thing.

636
01:18:17,719 --> 01:18:22,719
And then when you finally do all the things, all those same people, I'm absolutely certain,

637
01:18:23,719 --> 01:18:27,719
all those same people are going to say, this idea was obvious the whole time.

638
01:18:28,719 --> 01:18:30,719
OK, then we'll go to Portland.

639
01:18:31,719 --> 01:18:33,719
Thank you very much.

640
01:18:34,719 --> 01:18:38,719
We talked about blind merge mining and I'm still putting together some pieces.

641
01:18:39,719 --> 01:18:41,719
So please tell me if I'm wrong in any of these points.

642
01:18:42,719 --> 01:18:45,719
But basically, that would imply that validation is being outsourced.

643
01:18:46,719 --> 01:18:51,719
That's like the primary use case of blind merge mining is that the miner wouldn't have to do validation at their site.

644
01:18:52,719 --> 01:18:57,719
They would offload that in the form of a bid for the block from the blind merge miner.

645
01:18:58,719 --> 01:19:02,719
So my next thing was, OK, like I was thinking about myself as a node runner.

646
01:19:03,719 --> 01:19:05,719
Like I got a pretty powerful server at home.

647
01:19:05,719 --> 01:19:11,719
And even if somebody had like a bigger block sidechain, maybe 10 megabyte blocks and they come in very fast.

648
01:19:12,719 --> 01:19:18,719
But I could validate that and I could then bid with my blind merge mine block.

649
01:19:19,719 --> 01:19:26,719
What if suddenly I had miner extracted value outside of the actual value of the coins, for example,

650
01:19:27,719 --> 01:19:32,719
because I'm assuming that my block, if accepted, would be the state of the sidechain.

651
01:19:33,756 --> 01:19:44,056
So would that stop me from bidding even more on L1 fees than L2 to bribe a miner to take my side?

652
01:19:44,056 --> 01:19:51,055
And then does centralization of the sidechain become a function, centralization of validation of the sidechain

653
01:19:51,055 --> 01:19:57,856
become purely a function of the person who is able to validate at the least cost, right?

654
01:19:57,856 --> 01:20:01,656
Or basically who's able to provide the most value for the miner.

655
01:20:01,756 --> 01:20:07,456
And if I continuously say, hey, I'll do it for free, you can collect all the fees on L1 and I'll just take L2

656
01:20:07,456 --> 01:20:11,256
or even I'll give you a bonus on L1 to take my blocks. Does that make sense?

657
01:20:11,256 --> 01:20:17,355
Like centralization becomes a function of basically who's able to race to the bottom the fastest, right?

658
01:20:17,355 --> 01:20:22,555
First of all, it makes perfect sense. This is what I was trying to explain to Alex B for like the last 10,000 years.

659
01:20:22,555 --> 01:20:25,355
And he doesn't understand it at all. He would just overbid.

660
01:20:25,355 --> 01:20:35,456
And that's why I repeated to him over and over again, the sidechain MEV income is no different than having extra fees on L2.

661
01:20:35,456 --> 01:20:39,156
But I don't understand why you think it's some kind of a problematic thing.

662
01:20:39,156 --> 01:20:43,955
But luckily, since you at least understand that concept, you can hopefully explain it to Alex B

663
01:20:43,955 --> 01:20:47,656
because I can't possibly deal with repeating it any longer.

664
01:20:47,656 --> 01:20:51,056
But I did make these pictures. But please explain why you say it's centralizing.

665
01:20:51,056 --> 01:20:59,355
See, it's a problem on L2. It's a problem on L2, but it's a problem that has to do with the design. Okay, yes.

666
01:20:59,355 --> 01:21:03,656
So I'll explain why. And first, I really don't like ad hominem.

667
01:21:03,656 --> 01:21:08,556
Like I respect everybody in this community. If it takes somebody longer to get an idea, it's fine.

668
01:21:08,556 --> 01:21:14,855
If they get it quick, whatever. But basically, my thought on this was I, Portland Hoddle,

669
01:21:14,855 --> 01:21:19,855
want to either for personal reasons, I really don't like a sidechain.

670
01:21:19,855 --> 01:21:23,156
But I have the server. I can validate very easily.

671
01:21:23,156 --> 01:21:28,556
At worst case, I can at least tell the miner, hey, I'll front some of my Bitcoin to you on L1

672
01:21:28,556 --> 01:21:34,955
so I can get these sidechain tokens on L2. And I'll be very disingenuous, guaranteeing me the withdrawal of my coins.

673
01:21:34,955 --> 01:21:39,355
But everybody else just gets shafted, right? And the miners go, oh, that's cool, whatever.

674
01:21:39,355 --> 01:21:42,455
That's the state of truth because this guy bidded the highest.

675
01:21:42,455 --> 01:21:45,655
And if I really had a vendetta against a sidechain,

676
01:21:45,655 --> 01:21:52,056
why couldn't I just incentivize a miner with some coins I got a long time ago from some Silk Road?

677
01:21:52,056 --> 01:21:55,256
Not that I've ever partaken in that or some older coins.

678
01:21:55,256 --> 01:22:00,056
I'm thinking of maybe another participant going, hey, I'll give you an extra Bitcoin per block

679
01:22:00,056 --> 01:22:05,056
for these 13,000 blocks just to nuke the sidechain.

680
01:22:05,056 --> 01:22:14,856
Aha. Well, that's a very good question because the answer is that it's a perfect analog of a 51% attack on L1.

681
01:22:14,856 --> 01:22:22,356
So meeting the difficulty adjustment on Layer 2, since there's no real hashing or proof of work,

682
01:22:22,356 --> 01:22:30,756
it's only if you're included in L1. So basically, it's like the total amount of, I'm trying to,

683
01:22:30,756 --> 01:22:36,556
so like, let's think about it like this. You use thermodynamic energy on L1, L1 thermodynamic energy.

684
01:22:36,556 --> 01:22:42,256
And you say, okay, I have this much thermodynamic energy and have A6, I have the physics world.

685
01:22:42,256 --> 01:22:50,955
I spend, it's going to cost me, whatever, $20 million to rewrite, to do this reorg.

686
01:22:50,955 --> 01:22:56,356
On L1, excuse me, on L2, God, I really hope I don't mix that up because it's going to be extra confusing.

687
01:22:56,356 --> 01:23:02,455
On L2, instead of expending thermodynamic energy, you're just expending L1 Bitcoin.

688
01:23:02,455 --> 01:23:08,955
So I've turned the thermodynamic energy, we've gone up a level, we've moved up a layer.

689
01:23:08,955 --> 01:23:18,056
So now everything that was true before about Layer 1 Bitcoin reorgs is also true on Layer 2 with L1 BTC.

690
01:23:18,056 --> 01:23:25,655
So you're spending the L1 BTC. Now, what you can do, you can do the same things that you can do on,

691
01:23:25,655 --> 01:23:31,256
you can do the same types of things on L2 that you could do on L1 today if you had hashrate.

692
01:23:31,256 --> 01:23:41,056
So you can do, as you say, you can mine 13,000 blocks in a row and you can then block other people from withdrawing.

693
01:23:41,056 --> 01:23:48,155
You can really control the chain, but the value of, okay, yes, yes.

694
01:23:48,155 --> 01:23:51,155
No, please, I was just, I was putting it up for my final comment.

695
01:23:51,155 --> 01:23:55,956
Then I do got to jump off, but yeah, I'm really interested in kind of one final question,

696
01:23:56,655 --> 01:24:03,655
I think it's a part of this Layer thing, like you can do mischief on L2, just like on L1, but it costs you money.

697
01:24:03,655 --> 01:24:09,856
Just like on L1, you can do mischief, but it costs you, you actually have to run the electricity through the hashrows

698
01:24:09,856 --> 01:24:15,155
and you have to pay the opportunity cost of not getting the fees and not getting the block subsidy and L1.

699
01:24:15,155 --> 01:24:20,856
So I hope that's making some sense that it's, you can do all the things.

700
01:24:20,856 --> 01:24:25,456
Basically, it's going to be expensive and at worst, I'm sorry.

701
01:24:25,456 --> 01:24:30,456
Well, let me just say, you have to buy this, it's better if you buy this security budget frame,

702
01:24:30,456 --> 01:24:36,655
because the frame is the L2 block is only worth what its fees pay.

703
01:24:36,655 --> 01:24:44,655
And so just as on L1, I could outbid everyone and I could put an ordinal, I could inscribe a picture of me.

704
01:24:44,655 --> 01:24:50,155
I could outbid everyone, but it would cost me, it costs me basically, what is the total fees on L1?

705
01:24:50,356 --> 01:24:56,856
So let's say the most recent Bitcoin block paid $5,000 in fees, I just made that up, it's a completely fake number.

706
01:24:56,856 --> 01:25:04,856
But if it did, if I pay $5,001, I can outbid everyone and inscribe a JPEG of my face.

707
01:25:04,856 --> 01:25:12,856
And I can, you know, I can basically, I'm taking over L1 and I can do this over and over again if I wish.

708
01:25:12,856 --> 01:25:19,356
Similarly on L2, if you bid, if you outbid whatever that is amount, whatever the L2 is paying in fees,

709
01:25:20,055 --> 01:25:21,555
you control that block.

710
01:25:21,555 --> 01:25:26,555
So I'm saying I just take that as reality and I don't try to fight that because I think that it is reality.

711
01:25:26,555 --> 01:25:34,555
So I think that ultimately the value of the L2 block is the fees, that is the security, that is the inducement,

712
01:25:34,555 --> 01:25:37,555
that is the opportunity cost of just not mining that block.

713
01:25:37,555 --> 01:25:39,555
So it's all based around that.

714
01:25:39,555 --> 01:25:41,555
If there's no fees, it won't work.

715
01:25:41,555 --> 01:25:44,055
If there are fees, it probably will work.

716
01:25:44,256 --> 01:25:47,756
So I hope that is clarifying what you were saying.

717
01:25:47,756 --> 01:25:50,756
Like that someone could, someone with L1 coins could just be like,

718
01:25:50,756 --> 01:25:56,756
okay, that's kind of like you just recreationally mining, you know, you just decided for fun,

719
01:25:56,756 --> 01:26:00,756
you're going to mine Bitcoin SV or do a 51% attack or something.

720
01:26:00,756 --> 01:26:02,756
I mean, people have done it.

721
01:26:04,756 --> 01:26:10,756
So with that said, my final kind of question on this, and I get what you're saying as well.

722
01:26:11,456 --> 01:26:17,456
But on layer one, there's an element of decentralization in terms of miners.

723
01:26:17,456 --> 01:26:21,456
So it's not like one miner just gets to choose the block each and every time.

724
01:26:21,456 --> 01:26:28,456
On the L2, the centralization or decentralization is in the form of basically in terms of blind merge mining.

725
01:26:28,456 --> 01:26:32,456
Like you could obviously have a mix where some miners actually validate in-house

726
01:26:32,456 --> 01:26:35,456
and then some will do blind merge, correct, for sidechain?

727
01:26:36,155 --> 01:26:42,155
The side, well, in drivechain is sort of defined as something that is using BIPs 300 and 301.

728
01:26:42,155 --> 01:26:48,155
It's possible to actually split, you can split them into four groups of like yes, no for each.

729
01:26:48,155 --> 01:26:51,155
You could actually blind merge mine in altcoin.

730
01:26:51,155 --> 01:26:55,155
And you could also have, you can like mix and match.

731
01:26:55,155 --> 01:26:58,155
I don't know why you would, but you could.

732
01:26:58,155 --> 01:26:59,155
Okay, yeah.

733
01:26:59,856 --> 01:27:05,856
So, but I don't know this, this central, I think the metric for decentralization,

734
01:27:05,856 --> 01:27:09,856
it must be the cost of running the full node.

735
01:27:09,856 --> 01:27:13,856
And everyone who has tried to define it as some other thing,

736
01:27:13,856 --> 01:27:18,856
I think has run aground and caused like enormous confusion and disaster.

737
01:27:18,856 --> 01:27:23,856
I actually think we want, we want the cost of running the full node to be low.

738
01:27:23,856 --> 01:27:26,856
That is decentralization, because that's the peer-to-peerness of it.

739
01:27:27,555 --> 01:27:30,555
You say everyone's an equal peer, everyone runs a node, all the nodes are equal.

740
01:27:30,555 --> 01:27:36,555
If we have 100,000 nodes and then the government cracks down

741
01:27:36,555 --> 01:27:40,555
and there's only 73 nodes remain and we all go into hiding

742
01:27:40,555 --> 01:27:42,555
and then we start turning on our computers again.

743
01:27:42,555 --> 01:27:47,555
Just one or two or three of the remaining nodes can regenerate the entire network.

744
01:27:47,555 --> 01:27:50,555
Just like a cell that's replicating.

745
01:27:50,555 --> 01:27:55,555
And then once they do, once we're back up to like maybe 80,000 in this scenario,

746
01:27:56,256 --> 01:27:57,256
they'll all be exactly the same.

747
01:27:57,256 --> 01:27:58,256
So that is what it is.

748
01:27:58,256 --> 01:28:00,256
It's the cost of the cell dividing.

749
01:28:00,256 --> 01:28:02,256
It's the cost of the full node.

750
01:28:02,256 --> 01:28:05,256
Now there's a separate thing in mining, which I think is the security budget,

751
01:28:05,256 --> 01:28:09,256
which is how much total fees paid, how much money are we paying the miners.

752
01:28:09,256 --> 01:28:13,256
Do the, are the miners like getting paid a ton of money

753
01:28:13,256 --> 01:28:18,256
and doing a lot of proof of work so that we cannot get reorg'd or Sybil attacked.

754
01:28:18,256 --> 01:28:20,256
So I think that number we want to be very high.

755
01:28:20,256 --> 01:28:24,256
And that's my conception of it, but I think other people use the word decentralization

756
01:28:24,956 --> 01:28:25,956
and all this other stuff.

757
01:28:25,956 --> 01:28:26,956
I think it doesn't work.

758
01:28:26,956 --> 01:28:30,956
And I think it's, I think it's very bad for the conversation, but yes.

759
01:28:32,956 --> 01:28:34,956
My final question before I got to jump off,

760
01:28:34,956 --> 01:28:36,956
and thank you for answering all these, by the way, I really appreciate it.

761
01:28:36,956 --> 01:28:39,956
At the end of the day, if a chain is blind merged mining

762
01:28:39,956 --> 01:28:44,956
or blind merged mine by the majority of basically actual hash rate

763
01:28:44,956 --> 01:28:48,956
that's available on this planet to mine SHA-256,

764
01:28:49,656 --> 01:28:55,656
will basically with a almost guarantee, like by game theory, I guess I would say,

765
01:28:55,656 --> 01:28:59,656
they're going to pick the bid that where they're going to receive

766
01:28:59,656 --> 01:29:03,656
the most L1 Bitcoin for that block template, right?

767
01:29:03,656 --> 01:29:04,656
Or that template?

768
01:29:04,656 --> 01:29:05,656
Yes.

769
01:29:05,656 --> 01:29:07,656
Well, they don't, remember they don't.

770
01:29:07,656 --> 01:29:09,656
Are we talking about L1 or L2?

771
01:29:09,656 --> 01:29:15,656
I'm talking the L2 sidechain proposing a template to L1 to mine.

772
01:29:15,656 --> 01:29:17,656
It doesn't really propose the template really.

773
01:29:18,355 --> 01:29:23,355
It just says, because this L2, one person will, they have their own block template,

774
01:29:23,355 --> 01:29:27,355
but they make the whole block as a finished product.

775
01:29:27,355 --> 01:29:28,355
Yeah.

776
01:29:28,355 --> 01:29:30,355
And it's just the hash of the...

777
01:29:30,355 --> 01:29:31,355
Okay.

778
01:29:32,355 --> 01:29:33,355
But otherwise...

779
01:29:33,355 --> 01:29:37,355
It proposes hash, and then, so the miners will pick the highest bid.

780
01:29:37,355 --> 01:29:43,355
But according to that, basically, if an individual participant was willing to take a zero cost,

781
01:29:44,055 --> 01:29:47,055
like basically, I'll give you full L1 for these L2 tokens,

782
01:29:47,055 --> 01:29:50,055
I'll withdraw them later for some reason or whatnot.

783
01:29:50,055 --> 01:29:54,055
They would take that person's basically block every single time

784
01:29:54,055 --> 01:29:56,055
or their hash every single time, right?

785
01:29:56,055 --> 01:30:00,055
Until another participant came in and offered a higher bounty,

786
01:30:00,055 --> 01:30:06,055
or they stopped offering that much, and then the market became more competitive.

787
01:30:06,055 --> 01:30:08,055
Well, it doesn't matter if it's the same person, right?

788
01:30:08,756 --> 01:30:12,756
Because what they're doing in that scenario is,

789
01:30:12,756 --> 01:30:17,756
if we're ignoring a situation where people are being altruistic or destroying their own money,

790
01:30:17,756 --> 01:30:21,756
what they're doing is they're assembling every single transaction they can find on L2

791
01:30:21,756 --> 01:30:23,756
that's valid and that would fit in the block.

792
01:30:23,756 --> 01:30:26,756
They're doing all the work that we need them to do,

793
01:30:26,756 --> 01:30:30,756
which fortunately, the sidechain nodes, they already have a mempool.

794
01:30:30,756 --> 01:30:32,756
They're already doing all the work.

795
01:30:32,756 --> 01:30:34,756
They already propagate transactions.

796
01:30:34,756 --> 01:30:36,756
They already propagate blocks.

797
01:30:37,456 --> 01:30:40,456
We're asking the L2 network, it already does this.

798
01:30:40,456 --> 01:30:43,456
You just say, everyone just act as though you were a miner.

799
01:30:43,456 --> 01:30:47,456
Act as though you were a miner and as though the difficulty were just like,

800
01:30:47,456 --> 01:30:50,456
it's minimum value and anyone could find a block in like one second.

801
01:30:50,456 --> 01:30:52,456
Just act as though you were.

802
01:30:52,456 --> 01:30:55,456
And that person is doing everything right.

803
01:30:55,456 --> 01:31:00,456
They are collecting all the Layer 2 transactions that they can find in the block.

804
01:31:00,456 --> 01:31:05,456
There's no transaction censorship, so they are fully in great health

805
01:31:06,156 --> 01:31:09,156
and they are working diligently.

806
01:31:11,156 --> 01:31:14,156
And then they pay on L1, they pay the full amount.

807
01:31:14,156 --> 01:31:18,156
So they pass through the entirety of the fees.

808
01:31:18,156 --> 01:31:20,156
They don't lose any money.

809
01:31:20,156 --> 01:31:27,156
We assume that whatever they lose on L1 has exactly the same economic value

810
01:31:27,156 --> 01:31:29,156
as what they gain on L2.

811
01:31:29,156 --> 01:31:31,156
The miners make the most amount of money.

812
01:31:31,855 --> 01:31:38,855
It is exactly as if the miners themselves included all those transactions on L2,

813
01:31:38,855 --> 01:31:40,855
but they didn't have to do anything.

814
01:31:40,855 --> 01:31:44,855
They did nothing at all except include in L1.

815
01:31:44,855 --> 01:31:46,855
Yeah, they outsource the work.

816
01:31:46,855 --> 01:31:51,855
So before I go, I'm going to zoom out like 5,000 feet for my brain.

817
01:31:51,855 --> 01:31:56,855
And basically in summary, the solution to the Oracle problem

818
01:31:56,855 --> 01:31:59,855
that exists between main chain and sidechain or that bridge,

819
01:32:00,555 --> 01:32:04,555
which is the hash, the state of the sidechain that represents truth

820
01:32:04,555 --> 01:32:09,555
is now basically solved by a bidding process.

821
01:32:09,555 --> 01:32:14,555
Or the highest bidder is the source of truth for the sidechain

822
01:32:14,555 --> 01:32:17,555
in that round or over time.

823
01:32:17,555 --> 01:32:19,555
Is that a good way of thinking about it?

824
01:32:19,555 --> 01:32:24,555
You bid in electricity in proof of work on L1 and then on L2 you just bid with actual Bitcoin.

825
01:32:25,256 --> 01:32:29,256
I want to fight for that metaphor.

826
01:32:29,256 --> 01:32:33,256
I want to say both that...

827
01:32:33,256 --> 01:32:35,256
Stuart, I think you have some feedback.

828
01:32:35,256 --> 01:32:37,256
Maybe you can mute.

829
01:32:37,256 --> 01:32:43,256
I just wanted to mention that the proof of work, the hashing is inherited.

830
01:32:43,256 --> 01:32:46,256
You just can't mess around with that.

831
01:32:46,256 --> 01:32:49,256
It's inherited.

832
01:32:49,256 --> 01:32:51,256
Do you see what I mean?

833
01:32:51,956 --> 01:32:55,956
Well, the proof of work then covers all the L2 chains, if that's what you mean.

834
01:32:55,956 --> 01:32:59,956
But what I'm saying, I'm fighting for this metaphor because I want to explain

835
01:32:59,956 --> 01:33:02,956
that it has all of the pros and all of the cons.

836
01:33:02,956 --> 01:33:05,956
It's like a perfect, almost perfect metaphor.

837
01:33:05,956 --> 01:33:10,956
So it's like rather than explain the details,

838
01:33:10,956 --> 01:33:16,956
I would rather just explain this is the same as you bid with A6,

839
01:33:16,956 --> 01:33:19,956
hydroelectric power, immersion cooling or whatever.

840
01:33:20,656 --> 01:33:22,656
And then on L2 it's the same thing.

841
01:33:22,656 --> 01:33:24,656
You just have to be willing to pay.

842
01:33:24,656 --> 01:33:26,656
So all the differences are as a result of that.

843
01:33:26,656 --> 01:33:28,656
It's actually not true.

844
01:33:28,656 --> 01:33:32,656
I'm sure that Will Settle will come up here and say a bunch of clever things.

845
01:33:32,656 --> 01:33:34,656
I guess.

846
01:33:34,656 --> 01:33:36,656
I guess I'm a little bit.

847
01:33:36,656 --> 01:33:40,656
But you have some advantages actually and one disadvantage,

848
01:33:40,656 --> 01:33:42,656
which is that it's easy.

849
01:33:42,656 --> 01:33:47,656
Everyone's got coins, but most people don't just buy an ASIC like on a LARC.

850
01:33:48,355 --> 01:33:51,355
But it actually has some advantages as well.

851
01:33:51,355 --> 01:33:55,355
There's this Professor Warner who wrote this interesting post.

852
01:33:55,355 --> 01:33:58,355
I think he mostly covered the advantages.

853
01:33:58,355 --> 01:34:01,355
He thinks they're disadvantages, but he covered the advantages.

854
01:34:01,355 --> 01:34:03,355
Anyway, his post is interesting.

855
01:34:03,355 --> 01:34:06,355
People should find it and read it if you wish.

856
01:34:06,355 --> 01:34:12,355
As a final note before I go, I guess you could do the same thing in real life.

857
01:34:12,355 --> 01:34:14,355
I just feel it would be a little bit more difficult.

858
01:34:15,055 --> 01:34:20,055
But you could go to mining pools and bribe them to build blocks the way you would like.

859
01:34:20,055 --> 01:34:24,055
And I think we've actually seen this to a degree with ordinals and inscriptions.

860
01:34:24,055 --> 01:34:27,055
Because people will pay extra money to the miner to say,

861
01:34:27,055 --> 01:34:29,055
hey, please ignore these other transactions.

862
01:34:29,055 --> 01:34:33,055
I want my taproot wizard in this block.

863
01:34:33,055 --> 01:34:35,055
I'm not saying that's a good thing that that exists.

864
01:34:35,055 --> 01:34:41,055
And I do believe deep down that L1 is harder to pull this off at scale

865
01:34:41,055 --> 01:34:43,055
than a layer 2 sidechain.

866
01:34:43,756 --> 01:34:45,756
It would be easier to centralize with one player on an L2 sidechain.

867
01:34:45,756 --> 01:34:49,756
Because right now you really only see one participant really participating

868
01:34:49,756 --> 01:34:53,756
in these kind of added value type of transactions that are out of band.

869
01:34:53,756 --> 01:34:55,756
And that's Luxor, right?

870
01:34:55,756 --> 01:34:59,756
They'll take your money to put your JPEGs in there for that side hustle.

871
01:34:59,756 --> 01:35:03,756
But yeah, it makes sense, but I still don't think it applies one-to-one.

872
01:35:03,756 --> 01:35:05,756
That is my final statement.

873
01:35:05,756 --> 01:35:07,756
So thank you, Paul. I appreciate it.

874
01:35:07,756 --> 01:35:09,756
Great space.

875
01:35:10,456 --> 01:35:14,456
I just have one response to what Portland just said.

876
01:35:14,456 --> 01:35:20,456
The first is that the difference is that a drivechain needs block space

877
01:35:20,456 --> 01:35:25,456
in every block, or almost every block, in order for it to function properly.

878
01:35:25,456 --> 01:35:33,456
Whereas an ordinal or inscription just needs a one-time amount of block space

879
01:35:33,456 --> 01:35:39,456
for each time that that image hash needs to move.

880
01:35:40,156 --> 01:35:42,156
So there's exceedingly different dynamics.

881
01:35:42,156 --> 01:35:44,156
Can you repeat what you said?

882
01:35:44,156 --> 01:35:46,156
Because my phone glitched out.

883
01:35:46,156 --> 01:35:50,156
I'm getting better at telling when it's about to crash,

884
01:35:50,156 --> 01:35:52,156
but this has been happening a lot.

885
01:35:52,156 --> 01:35:54,156
I was about to say, hey, wait, this is about to freeze and crash,

886
01:35:54,156 --> 01:35:56,156
but then I think I got cut off.

887
01:35:56,156 --> 01:35:58,156
Could you repeat what you said?

888
01:35:58,156 --> 01:36:04,156
Yeah, the difference between what Portland said about ordinals

889
01:36:04,156 --> 01:36:06,156
and the competition for block space there

890
01:36:06,855 --> 01:36:08,855
is that the difference between that

891
01:36:08,855 --> 01:36:10,855
and what I understand drivechains to function as

892
01:36:10,855 --> 01:36:12,855
is that drivechains require block space

893
01:36:12,855 --> 01:36:16,855
on an ongoing basis in order to function,

894
01:36:16,855 --> 01:36:20,855
whereas an ordinal is a one-time usage of it.

895
01:36:20,855 --> 01:36:24,855
And so there's pretty different fee pressure and fee dynamics there,

896
01:36:24,855 --> 01:36:28,855
where bidding for an out-of-band transaction for an inscription

897
01:36:28,855 --> 01:36:31,855
is a one-time usage of block space,

898
01:36:32,555 --> 01:36:36,555
whereas a drivechain is going to just be a persistent demand for block space.

899
01:36:36,555 --> 01:36:40,556
Well, I would actually flip that premise around a little bit.

900
01:36:40,556 --> 01:36:44,556
I would say that Portland was right when he said

901
01:36:44,556 --> 01:36:46,556
that it's difficult to sustain.

902
01:36:46,556 --> 01:36:50,556
I think it's kind of like it was a cool novelty

903
01:36:50,556 --> 01:36:54,556
when they spent $4,000 to make that whatever,

904
01:36:54,556 --> 01:36:57,556
Tapper Wizards-like picture or whatever,

905
01:36:57,556 --> 01:37:00,556
but notice that they didn't decide to just keep doing it

906
01:37:01,256 --> 01:37:03,256
block after block after block forever

907
01:37:03,256 --> 01:37:05,256
because that would have gotten expensive.

908
01:37:05,256 --> 01:37:07,256
And they would think, you know,

909
01:37:07,256 --> 01:37:09,256
they put on their little economist hat and they say,

910
01:37:09,256 --> 01:37:11,256
you know what, we've got a lot of little notoriety

911
01:37:11,256 --> 01:37:13,256
for doing this stunt,

912
01:37:13,256 --> 01:37:15,256
but how much are we going to get

913
01:37:15,256 --> 01:37:17,256
by doing this over and over again?

914
01:37:17,256 --> 01:37:19,256
Not very much.

915
01:37:19,256 --> 01:37:21,256
Diminishing returns.

916
01:37:21,256 --> 01:37:23,256
Not worth $4,000.

917
01:37:23,256 --> 01:37:25,256
I would rather buy.

918
01:37:25,256 --> 01:37:27,256
There's lots of things I'd rather buy with $4,000.

919
01:37:27,256 --> 01:37:29,256
So I kind of flip it around.

920
01:37:29,955 --> 01:37:33,955
But actually, it's because the L1 block space

921
01:37:33,955 --> 01:37:37,955
is expensive enough that it deters too much

922
01:37:37,955 --> 01:37:39,955
of a repeated frivolous use,

923
01:37:39,955 --> 01:37:41,955
if that makes any sense.

924
01:37:41,955 --> 01:37:43,955
So I don't think in principle they're different

925
01:37:43,955 --> 01:37:47,955
because it's just each individual transaction

926
01:37:47,955 --> 01:37:49,955
is like a one-time thing, I think.

927
01:37:49,955 --> 01:37:51,955
I mean, don't you?

928
01:37:51,955 --> 01:37:55,955
Like each TFID or each whatever you want to call it,

929
01:37:55,955 --> 01:37:57,955
like each transaction.

930
01:37:58,656 --> 01:38:00,656
If I may add to Orville's thing there,

931
01:38:00,656 --> 01:38:02,656
you're talking about SegWit data, which is fungible.

932
01:38:02,656 --> 01:38:04,656
SegWit data is not,

933
01:38:04,656 --> 01:38:06,656
any part of the SegWit data that wants to contain a dickbutt

934
01:38:06,656 --> 01:38:08,656
is just as good as any other area

935
01:38:08,656 --> 01:38:10,656
of the SegWit data that wants to have a dickbutt.

936
01:38:10,656 --> 01:38:12,656
This is different with the drivechain,

937
01:38:12,656 --> 01:38:14,656
again, to your point of a reserved real estate position.

938
01:38:14,656 --> 01:38:16,656
We are taking and devoting

939
01:38:16,656 --> 01:38:18,656
a very specific portion

940
01:38:18,656 --> 01:38:20,656
of every single block

941
01:38:20,656 --> 01:38:22,656
to the drivechain mechanic.

942
01:38:22,656 --> 01:38:24,656
It is a perpetual acceptance

943
01:38:24,656 --> 01:38:26,656
of fiefdom for that area

944
01:38:27,355 --> 01:38:29,355
and a very specific area

945
01:38:29,355 --> 01:38:31,355
to be devoted to that drivechain,

946
01:38:31,355 --> 01:38:33,355
which is why it requires activation

947
01:38:33,355 --> 01:38:35,355
so it doesn't get out of hand.

948
01:38:35,355 --> 01:38:37,355
But it is a claim

949
01:38:37,355 --> 01:38:39,355
on permanent block spaces,

950
01:38:39,355 --> 01:38:41,355
and I think the gentleman does have a strong point.

951
01:38:41,355 --> 01:38:43,355
Well, no, I don't think,

952
01:38:43,355 --> 01:38:45,355
first of all, I'm not sure that was what he was saying,

953
01:38:45,355 --> 01:38:47,355
but what I mean is that

954
01:38:47,355 --> 01:38:49,355
for blind merge mining,

955
01:38:49,355 --> 01:38:51,355
there is a way, it's really a way

956
01:38:51,355 --> 01:38:53,355
of finding the 32 bytes.

957
01:38:53,355 --> 01:38:55,355
You don't have to,

958
01:38:56,056 --> 01:38:58,056
that every L1 block must mine

959
01:38:58,056 --> 01:39:00,056
every drivechain

960
01:39:00,056 --> 01:39:02,056
or even any drivechains.

961
01:39:02,056 --> 01:39:04,056
They don't have to do that at all.

962
01:39:04,056 --> 01:39:06,056
They can just not include,

963
01:39:06,056 --> 01:39:08,056
because think about it like this,

964
01:39:08,056 --> 01:39:10,056
what if the drivechain just doesn't find,

965
01:39:10,056 --> 01:39:12,056
there's no reason to find a new block.

966
01:39:12,056 --> 01:39:14,056
There's no transactions at 10 minutes,

967
01:39:14,056 --> 01:39:16,056
so they just don't make.

968
01:39:16,056 --> 01:39:18,056
So it's basically an option

969
01:39:18,056 --> 01:39:20,056
to use some of the Coinbase

970
01:39:20,056 --> 01:39:22,056
space in a certain way,

971
01:39:22,056 --> 01:39:24,056
and that's no different than

972
01:39:24,756 --> 01:39:26,756
There was something else I wanted to say

973
01:39:26,756 --> 01:39:28,756
about what Portland said before he left,

974
01:39:28,756 --> 01:39:30,756
which is about this idea that

975
01:39:30,473 --> 01:39:40,473
the Ordinals reveals that security, the way I would tell this story is I would say that Ordinals reveals that the security budget framing was the right frame the whole time.

976
01:39:40,473 --> 01:39:56,473
And what I mean by that is the Bitcoin community is fighting this frame and in various ways has fought it in the past, such as, you know, I love Luke Dashjr.,

977
01:39:56,473 --> 01:40:04,473
but he's always been against people using OpReturn, even though he himself has put prayers on the blockchain, I'm pretty sure.

978
01:40:04,473 --> 01:40:11,473
But I think, but he has always been against these people storing random graffiti and stuff in the chain.

979
01:40:11,473 --> 01:40:17,473
And people have always tried to discourage this. They limited OpReturn to a certain size.

980
01:40:18,473 --> 01:40:33,473
Now Peter Todd wants to discourage a bare multisig. Luke Dashjr. didn't like BIP-47, even though it really only wasted like maybe, it made the first transaction between two people like 20% larger.

981
01:40:33,473 --> 01:40:39,473
And then afterwards, neither of them had to share addresses with each other. They could just go back and forth.

982
01:40:40,473 --> 01:40:48,473
So they have fought this the whole time with the OpReturn limit is the biggest fight where it's a standardness limit, but actually it's not a block validity limit.

983
01:40:48,473 --> 01:41:00,473
So they have tried to fight this this whole time. And I think as a result, the Ordinals thing is really just the mistake finally being completely like, I don't know.

984
01:41:00,473 --> 01:41:06,473
I don't want to say corrected, but I want to say like, this resistance to this idea is futile.

985
01:41:06,473 --> 01:41:26,473
And it's especially futile when you consider that Mikeinspace, who is in the audience, has decided to go completely rogue and literally do something that probably Alan Turing would like, which is build out of actual Bitcoin transactions, something that converts to like an image.

986
01:41:26,473 --> 01:41:35,473
Because Alan Turing had this universality of computation idea, which is a fascinating idea that I'd be happy to digress on, but it's not really that.

987
01:41:35,473 --> 01:41:39,473
But the point of this idea is that you don't know if something is a JPEG.

988
01:41:39,473 --> 01:41:44,473
Like you take a file and in Windows, you can change it to .JPEG.

989
01:41:44,473 --> 01:41:49,473
You can have the computer try to interpret it as a JPEG.

990
01:41:49,473 --> 01:41:53,473
And you could interpret it as a PNG or something.

991
01:41:53,473 --> 01:41:56,473
So everything is interpretable as everything else.

992
01:41:56,473 --> 01:42:01,473
And so this is the ultimate equilibrium outcome of storing data on chain.

993
01:42:01,473 --> 01:42:06,473
You just store it on chain in the form of UTXOs or in the form of transactions.

994
01:42:06,473 --> 01:42:11,473
And so that's why I think it's just foolish to fight this the whole time and inevitable that it wouldn't work.

995
01:42:11,473 --> 01:42:16,473
And this is just kind of the moment when finally it's going to work.

996
01:42:16,473 --> 01:42:19,473
Paul, can I see that David Bailey's here?

997
01:42:19,473 --> 01:42:30,473
So I know that he had posted something that was somewhat controversial earlier today about miners activating a miner activated soft fork or something like that.

998
01:42:30,473 --> 01:42:33,473
I kind of replied to Frank and David, but I didn't finish it in time.

999
01:42:33,473 --> 01:42:36,473
I was like literally like 90 percent done.

1000
01:42:36,473 --> 01:42:48,473
Well, maybe maybe, Paul, you can kind of play out how it might look if there was some sort of a miner activated soft fork.

1001
01:42:48,473 --> 01:42:58,473
How how what if you could steal, man, like what the opposition could do as far as a user resisting software?

1002
01:42:58,473 --> 01:43:05,473
I don't know why we're having this conversation because I have officially killed the 300 and it's over.

1003
01:43:05,473 --> 01:43:07,473
So I don't even know. Shut the space.

1004
01:43:07,473 --> 01:43:10,473
What was it like? It was like incivility or something.

1005
01:43:10,473 --> 01:43:16,473
Did he say I don't even remember the word, but it was like it was because of your because of your actions, David.

1006
01:43:16,473 --> 01:43:20,473
It was we were on track and then it was your tweet.

1007
01:43:20,473 --> 01:43:24,473
And now that it's over.

1008
01:43:24,473 --> 01:43:26,473
So I wrote this big response to Frank and I love it.

1009
01:43:26,473 --> 01:43:30,473
So I'll just give it here verbally to people.

1010
01:43:30,473 --> 01:43:32,473
And I was going to tweet this, but I didn't I just didn't quite finish it.

1011
01:43:32,473 --> 01:43:36,473
And it became 1 p.m. and I was like, darned.

1012
01:43:36,473 --> 01:43:42,473
And I didn't, you know, you know, not enough hours in the day, but I'm going to finish it and I'll send it to him.

1013
01:43:42,473 --> 01:43:51,473
But, you know, Francis seems to think that if Francis favors this bit eight LLT true form of activation.

1014
01:43:51,473 --> 01:43:54,473
But I think that I mean, I think Francis is great.

1015
01:43:54,473 --> 01:43:56,473
I think I think Francis is completely crazy.

1016
01:43:56,473 --> 01:44:02,473
But I think in a good way, which is, you know, it's kind of crazy that Bitcoin does certainly need some of.

1017
01:44:02,473 --> 01:44:04,473
And he's he runs a great service.

1018
01:44:04,473 --> 01:44:08,473
If you know anyone who's Canadian bull Bitcoin.

1019
01:44:08,473 --> 01:44:15,473
So I, Francis, I think he has this preferred way of activation.

1020
01:44:15,473 --> 01:44:19,473
But I think that a couple of misunderstandings or paradoxes have emerged.

1021
01:44:19,473 --> 01:44:22,473
So I was going to send this to him and then he can reply.

1022
01:44:22,473 --> 01:44:26,473
But since we're all talking in the space, I'll just kind of.

1023
01:44:26,473 --> 01:44:30,473
Talk about it, which is he likes this bit eight thing.

1024
01:44:30,473 --> 01:44:35,473
And my guess is stupid phone is I think the phone will Apple crash again soon, but I'm going to keep talking.

1025
01:44:35,473 --> 01:44:37,473
So it's not going to.

1026
01:44:37,473 --> 01:44:39,473
So it's like he likes his bit eight.

1027
01:44:39,473 --> 01:44:41,473
He says you should make bit eight.

1028
01:44:41,473 --> 01:44:42,473
You should make like a website.

1029
01:44:42,473 --> 01:44:44,473
You should proselytize.

1030
01:44:44,473 --> 01:44:47,473
And he doesn't want the miners to be in charge.

1031
01:44:47,473 --> 01:44:55,473
But the thing the curious thing is bit eight allows the miners to activate the soft fork kind of early.

1032
01:44:55,473 --> 01:44:58,473
Or at least like it's like where are the money?

1033
01:44:58,473 --> 01:45:02,473
It's like a it's like a there's like an important date.

1034
01:45:02,473 --> 01:45:07,473
And then there's this debate over lock in true versus false.

1035
01:45:07,473 --> 01:45:09,473
And if it's locking on false, then nothing happens.

1036
01:45:09,473 --> 01:45:11,473
If you don't meet the hash rate threshold, you try again.

1037
01:45:11,473 --> 01:45:15,473
And if it's true, then you basically force them.

1038
01:45:15,473 --> 01:45:20,473
You try to force the miners to upgrade and add the feature.

1039
01:45:20,473 --> 01:45:24,473
So this is Francis's preferred method.

1040
01:45:24,473 --> 01:45:29,473
And the weird thing is, I think that I'm more or less doing that, actually.

1041
01:45:29,473 --> 01:45:30,473
That's one point.

1042
01:45:30,473 --> 01:45:31,473
There's three points.

1043
01:45:31,473 --> 01:45:33,473
I think I'm actually more or less in line with this method.

1044
01:45:33,473 --> 01:45:35,473
It's just kind of not.

1045
01:45:36,473 --> 01:45:41,473
It's just kind of like happening in a weird way that involves social media and narratives going out of control.

1046
01:45:41,473 --> 01:45:45,473
But then the second thing I'd like to mention is.

1047
01:45:45,473 --> 01:45:50,473
This is since this particular soft fork just happens to be very miner centric.

1048
01:45:50,473 --> 01:45:55,473
You know, it just works better if the 300 works better if miners really understand it and like celebrate it.

1049
01:45:55,473 --> 01:46:03,473
You know, since the security model, it relies entirely on like calculations of miner profitability.

1050
01:46:03,473 --> 01:46:06,473
You know, fees collected by miners and stuff.

1051
01:46:06,473 --> 01:46:08,473
So it happens to be a very miner centric BIP.

1052
01:46:08,473 --> 01:46:16,473
Whereas something like the BIP that we did that bans duplicate transaction IDs, it does not affect.

1053
01:46:16,473 --> 01:46:21,473
You know, no one needs to like know anything about that or like the wrong S value.

1054
01:46:21,473 --> 01:46:28,473
So in that situation, it's pretty normal, I would say, to talk to miners about this BIP.

1055
01:46:28,473 --> 01:46:33,473
And the other thing that I think we have to push back on, which we touched on this earlier in this conversation,

1056
01:46:33,473 --> 01:46:39,473
which is the idea that miners are like the enemy and everyone miners need to be like.

1057
01:46:39,473 --> 01:46:43,473
Miners are like a dangerous and wild animal.

1058
01:46:43,473 --> 01:46:46,473
And I think that's kind of mean, you know, miners are Bitcoiners, too.

1059
01:46:46,473 --> 01:46:49,473
Right. So can't we just talk to the miners?

1060
01:46:49,473 --> 01:46:51,473
Like, why does it have to be a big deal?

1061
01:46:51,473 --> 01:46:55,473
So that's my second point is BIP300 is miner centric.

1062
01:46:55,473 --> 01:46:58,473
And also, why are we being so mean?

1063
01:46:58,473 --> 01:47:01,473
You know, like miners are fine.

1064
01:47:01,473 --> 01:47:06,473
It's fun to kind of almost troll people with that because people are so sensitive to it.

1065
01:47:06,473 --> 01:47:08,473
You know, they're like the evil miner.

1066
01:47:08,473 --> 01:47:12,473
So it's SegWit2x all over again, even though that was a hard fork.

1067
01:47:12,473 --> 01:47:18,473
So my third thing, though, I realize this is very rambly, but I'll get through it.

1068
01:47:18,473 --> 01:47:23,473
This third thing is that I think Francis's method is actually has a kind of paradox

1069
01:47:23,473 --> 01:47:27,473
because he says BIP-8, lock in, true.

1070
01:47:27,473 --> 01:47:38,473
But it's like, I mean, does he think that we're going to you're going to be able to have miners run the like?

1071
01:47:38,473 --> 01:47:40,473
What exactly does he like?

1072
01:47:40,473 --> 01:47:44,473
Because he says make a client first and do BIP-8, but BIP-8 has miner signaling.

1073
01:47:44,473 --> 01:47:52,473
So what's the difference between that and start to work on the client like via Luke's pull request

1074
01:47:52,473 --> 01:47:57,473
and then ask miners their opinion and then have miners like publish their opinion?

1075
01:47:57,473 --> 01:48:03,473
That just like is BIP-8, just like not in the software version.

1076
01:48:03,473 --> 01:48:07,473
So it's kind of like not really any different.

1077
01:48:07,473 --> 01:48:15,473
And so that's why I wonder about because Francis basically says campaign with your client and get people to install it.

1078
01:48:15,473 --> 01:48:17,473
But what if those people are miners?

1079
01:48:17,473 --> 01:48:22,473
And what if they then tell the world, you know, the miners are all wearing the UASF hat?

1080
01:48:22,473 --> 01:48:23,473
You know what I mean?

1081
01:48:23,473 --> 01:48:26,473
If you have a photo of a bunch of miners, mining pools, huge.

1082
01:48:26,473 --> 01:48:30,473
You get everyone at mining disrupts to wear the UASF hat.

1083
01:48:30,473 --> 01:48:33,473
Does it become a miner activated soft fork at that point?

1084
01:48:33,473 --> 01:48:38,473
And then if so, does Francis switch from saying this is the process?

1085
01:48:38,473 --> 01:48:42,473
Does he switch to saying, oh, this is an attack on Bitcoin?

1086
01:48:42,473 --> 01:48:43,473
Like that's what he wanted.

1087
01:48:43,473 --> 01:48:48,473
So I was going to send him this note and hopefully he can unravel his paradox.

1088
01:48:48,473 --> 01:48:51,473
But that's my rambly speech about it.

1089
01:48:51,473 --> 01:49:00,473
I was confused about it as well because I thought like with BIP-8, if you don't hit your activation threshold from the hash power,

1090
01:49:00,473 --> 01:49:04,473
like you have the flag date and it moves ahead, right?

1091
01:49:04,473 --> 01:49:08,473
Like doesn't that make it easier to actually get a soft fork?

1092
01:49:08,473 --> 01:49:16,473
Yeah, BIP-8 has the like the miner threshold idea contained within it, or at least the last time I checked.

1093
01:49:16,473 --> 01:49:24,473
So I don't know if BIP-8, like it's hard to say which of these have ever been tried.

1094
01:49:24,473 --> 01:49:26,473
But anyone can look this up.

1095
01:49:26,473 --> 01:49:29,473
BIP-8, and I think you'll find that it's like you have a hash rate.

1096
01:49:29,473 --> 01:49:32,473
Hash rate can activate the feature.

1097
01:49:32,473 --> 01:49:43,473
And then the debate, there was this debate last time with Taproot about what should be done if the miners, if we do not get enough signaling.

1098
01:49:43,473 --> 01:49:59,473
And Luke, of course, was militantly L-O-T true, saying something like, Luke's version, as well as I understand it, is something along the lines of,

1099
01:49:59,473 --> 01:50:06,473
the community has decided, because with Luke, everything is always very black and white, which is a very funny thing about talking to him.

1100
01:50:06,473 --> 01:50:12,473
For example, he just says, we haven't had a real pope since whatever the year, 1960 something.

1101
01:50:12,473 --> 01:50:20,473
And he just says that with the exact same confidence that he'll say some Bitcoin thing, which is always quite funny.

1102
01:50:20,473 --> 01:50:24,473
But Luke is a genius. He's really a genius, and he knows a lot about Bitcoin.

1103
01:50:24,473 --> 01:50:30,473
And so his view is that we, the community, have decided to upgrade to this.

1104
01:50:30,473 --> 01:50:34,473
And then it says, miners, you have this long to get on board.

1105
01:50:34,473 --> 01:50:44,473
And if you don't, we don't care. We are activating it anyway, because it is now the next, it is the protocol.

1106
01:50:44,473 --> 01:50:46,473
And I had a kind of a little bit of a different view.

1107
01:50:46,473 --> 01:50:51,473
My view is more like I'm more into like error correction and like feedback loop type of a thing.

1108
01:50:51,473 --> 01:50:53,473
So I was kind of thinking more back at the time.

1109
01:50:54,473 --> 01:51:04,473
I was thinking it should be LOT false, which is to say if we try to upgrade, but if the miners, who are the main people we can actually measure,

1110
01:51:04,473 --> 01:51:09,473
if the miners have not upgraded in the time period, it kind of means like something is going wrong.

1111
01:51:09,473 --> 01:51:19,473
And so it's kind of like, OK, we won't activate. We will try to figure out what's going wrong and then fix it.

1112
01:51:19,473 --> 01:51:31,473
And then the counter argument to my point is people say the problem with my, what was my preferred thing, LOT false.

1113
01:51:31,473 --> 01:51:40,473
The problem with my view and the advantage of Luke's view is that the miners can kind of like either be lazy or they can use it as some kind of leverage.

1114
01:51:40,473 --> 01:51:50,473
They can say, well, we, the miners like will not, you know, it kind of like leaves the door open for them to just not upgrade.

1115
01:51:50,473 --> 01:51:57,473
Whereas if the LOT true says we will force them to upgrade, so they might as well get it in gear and do it.

1116
01:51:57,473 --> 01:52:03,473
So blah, blah, blah. I don't know if, but that was, that was the, that was like the sort of debate last time.

1117
01:52:03,473 --> 01:52:07,473
And then speedy trial, if I'm remembering it correctly, I don't know.

1118
01:52:07,473 --> 01:52:11,473
It was honestly kind of confusing, but I think speedy trial just came out of nowhere on the list.

1119
01:52:11,473 --> 01:52:17,473
And then someone made the taproot.watch and then it just kind of happened.

1120
01:52:17,473 --> 01:52:25,473
I should have researched that as to whether or not, but I think it's like, I don't understand why Francis thinks his view is so different.

1121
01:52:25,473 --> 01:52:29,473
This is something that people really split hairs over. They really think, yeah.

1122
01:52:29,473 --> 01:52:39,473
Another question is like, you know, it seems like there's parts of the community that are just like very pro user activated soft fork.

1123
01:52:39,473 --> 01:52:50,473
Like, could we not take that same approach for BIP300 to a user activated soft fork and also go pitch the miners on being a part of it?

1124
01:52:50,473 --> 01:52:54,473
Well, right. That's what I was trying to say is that what difference does it make?

1125
01:52:54,473 --> 01:52:57,473
Because the miners are also users.

1126
01:52:57,473 --> 01:53:08,473
So it's kind of like, and it's also like, it's not like you would have the miners activate and then prevent non-miners from running the software.

1127
01:53:08,473 --> 01:53:12,473
Like no one would really want, literally no one would want that, I think.

1128
01:53:12,473 --> 01:53:18,473
So I don't, so I think that's why I'm, that's the paradox is like what Francis would prefer.

1129
01:53:18,473 --> 01:53:30,473
I think his optimal thing is just, it's really like very, very, very, very, very close to what has happened so far.

1130
01:53:30,473 --> 01:53:35,473
So I think it's just like a weird, I think this is a weird thing.

1131
01:53:35,473 --> 01:53:39,473
This is just like a weird tribal, this triggers people somehow.

1132
01:53:40,473 --> 01:53:48,473
But yeah, I don't know, but I wanted to send him this message and hopefully he'll, maybe, I mean, of course, if anyone can get him to join the space.

1133
01:53:48,473 --> 01:53:52,473
I'll see if he'll join.

1134
01:53:52,473 --> 01:53:56,473
Tell him, well, yeah, I was going to message, yeah, he should join the space.

1135
01:53:56,473 --> 01:54:02,473
Yeah, it's just that I redrafted this giant thing and now it's going to be useless.

1136
01:54:02,473 --> 01:54:06,473
I can read it to him now.

1137
01:54:07,473 --> 01:54:13,473
Anyway, so yeah, people really get touchy.

1138
01:54:13,473 --> 01:54:16,473
It's a very touchy subject, this activation.

1139
01:54:16,473 --> 01:54:19,473
And this is ever since SegWit activation.

1140
01:54:19,473 --> 01:54:24,473
And this is all because of baggage that goes back many years.

1141
01:54:24,473 --> 01:54:30,473
And Paul, what was the most controversial software prior to SegWit?

1142
01:54:31,473 --> 01:54:35,473
That's the thing.

1143
01:54:35,473 --> 01:54:38,473
The idea of this controversy didn't really exist.

1144
01:54:38,473 --> 01:54:47,473
But you could say people, there were a lot of regrets with pay to script hash.

1145
01:54:47,473 --> 01:54:50,473
There have been many times where there were regrets.

1146
01:54:50,473 --> 01:54:53,473
But there wasn't controversy.

1147
01:54:54,473 --> 01:55:00,473
There wasn't controversy in the sense of, I don't think there was anything like what there was with SegWit.

1148
01:55:00,473 --> 01:55:06,473
SegWit was literally like, because I think stuff had become so high stakes also.

1149
01:55:06,473 --> 01:55:14,473
The previous soft forks were not, many of the soft, what we would call a soft fork was just some kind of boring bug fix thing.

1150
01:55:14,473 --> 01:55:17,473
Like this thing that bans duplicate TXIDs.

1151
01:55:17,473 --> 01:55:21,473
There's no controversy over that.

1152
01:55:21,473 --> 01:55:28,473
And like CheckLockTimeVerify taking OpNop2 or whatever, no one cares.

1153
01:55:28,473 --> 01:55:30,473
It wasn't like a thing.

1154
01:55:30,473 --> 01:55:34,473
That would be a really funny experiment if we could have a parallel universe.

1155
01:55:34,473 --> 01:55:39,473
And we could say there was no CheckLockTimeVerify somehow until 2023.

1156
01:55:39,473 --> 01:55:42,473
And then just have someone just come up with it.

1157
01:55:42,473 --> 01:55:48,473
And to see how badly would it be bike-shedded.

1158
01:55:48,473 --> 01:55:50,473
I don't know.

1159
01:55:50,473 --> 01:55:52,473
That's a good question.

1160
01:56:00,473 --> 01:56:05,473
Paul, I'd like to understand more the security budget.

1161
01:56:05,473 --> 01:56:09,473
As well as, you know, you mentioned it was different like security budget framing.

1162
01:56:09,473 --> 01:56:13,473
How to see it in a different light.

1163
01:56:13,473 --> 01:56:16,473
Could you expand on that please?

1164
01:56:17,473 --> 01:56:20,473
Yes.

1165
01:56:20,473 --> 01:56:25,473
The security budget, for some reason, this has taken on some kind of controversial element.

1166
01:56:25,473 --> 01:56:28,473
And I have absolutely no idea why.

1167
01:56:28,473 --> 01:56:37,473
I think it's because of this delusion people have that in the future people will willingly pay $50 per transaction as a fee.

1168
01:56:37,473 --> 01:56:41,473
For the privilege of using the great and sacred Bitcoin.

1169
01:56:41,473 --> 01:56:45,473
And I think that – but I don't know.

1170
01:56:45,473 --> 01:56:47,473
I don't even understand how that connects.

1171
01:56:47,473 --> 01:56:50,473
I can smell the correlation, but I don't even know why.

1172
01:56:50,473 --> 01:56:52,473
But anyway, it shouldn't be controversial at all.

1173
01:56:52,473 --> 01:56:54,473
It's a very simple idea.

1174
01:56:54,473 --> 01:57:02,473
It's just saying the total amount of money we pay to miners, that's miners' revenue.

1175
01:57:02,473 --> 01:57:06,473
And they can't spend any more than that.

1176
01:57:06,473 --> 01:57:07,473
You know what I mean?

1177
01:57:07,473 --> 01:57:09,473
Because they run a business.

1178
01:57:09,473 --> 01:57:15,473
So they have to pay for all their costs and including the cost of their own time, the opportunity cost, et cetera.

1179
01:57:15,473 --> 01:57:17,473
So we have all the miners' costs.

1180
01:57:17,473 --> 01:57:22,473
Now some miners spend less on hashing than others, and they're all equally efficient.

1181
01:57:22,473 --> 01:57:28,473
And some are – eventually the difficulty will rise and put some out of business.

1182
01:57:28,473 --> 01:57:33,473
So this total amount of money that we pay to miners, which is the total L1 fees.

1183
01:57:33,473 --> 01:57:36,473
So let's say the L1 fees are $5,000 per block.

1184
01:57:36,473 --> 01:57:38,473
It's just a made-up number.

1185
01:57:39,473 --> 01:57:42,473
We pay the miners $5,000 per block.

1186
01:57:42,473 --> 01:57:52,473
This is what it costs to – this number happens to be equal to several different things at once that all seem kind of unrelated but are not.

1187
01:57:52,473 --> 01:57:53,473
They're all the same number.

1188
01:57:53,473 --> 01:58:01,473
So first of all, if you want to censor all those transactions, the opportunity cost you pay is $5,000.

1189
01:58:02,473 --> 01:58:09,473
And if you want to instead inscribe a JPEG of yourself, you pay the opportunity cost of $5,000 to do that.

1190
01:58:09,473 --> 01:58:19,473
And so this total fees is equal to the value of the block, which is also equal to what it would cost to destroy the block basically,

1191
01:58:19,473 --> 01:58:26,473
which is also equal to what it would cost to like denial-of-service attack mute the block.

1192
01:58:26,473 --> 01:58:28,473
So this is $5,000 per block.

1193
01:58:28,473 --> 01:58:30,473
That's what it costs to make the block.

1194
01:58:30,473 --> 01:58:32,473
That is the miners' revenue for the block.

1195
01:58:32,473 --> 01:58:36,473
That is also basically the miners' costs.

1196
01:58:36,473 --> 01:58:47,473
$5,000 per block should be about their costs if you include all the economic opportunity costs, cost of capital, cost of profit, whatever, etc.

1197
01:58:48,473 --> 01:58:56,473
So eventually, the total amount of money paid to miners should be the total amount of money that miners spend on hashing.

1198
01:58:56,473 --> 01:58:59,473
So it should be equal to the cost of the proof of work basically.

1199
01:58:59,473 --> 01:59:09,473
And this should also be equal to the cost of renting 100% of the hash rate because it's just the miners' costs.

1200
01:59:09,473 --> 01:59:15,473
So that's how much it should cost to rent it out in some kind of abstract economic way.

1201
01:59:15,473 --> 01:59:21,473
And additionally, this would be the cost of not only renting 100% of the hash rate,

1202
01:59:21,473 --> 01:59:28,473
but it should also be the net present value of that cost should be how much it would cost to build the entire parallel hashing.

1203
01:59:28,473 --> 01:59:39,473
If you wanted to copy and paste and double the size of the Bitcoin mining universe, it should cost you the net present value of that.

1204
01:59:39,860 --> 01:59:46,340
Security budget number. So this is the cost of doing a 51% attack. This is the cost of the block.

1205
01:59:46,980 --> 01:59:54,820
This is the cost of, you know, this is the proof of work number. So one thing that's important to

1206
01:59:54,820 --> 02:00:00,500
keep in mind is that this is a per time number. It's $5,000 per block, $5,000 per 10 minutes.

1207
02:00:00,500 --> 02:00:04,980
So you could take net present value if you wished, but it's $5,000 per time.

1208
02:00:04,980 --> 02:00:10,900
And as a result, it's sort of like this is how much it would cost if you wanted to hold down a

1209
02:00:10,900 --> 02:00:16,660
button that disables the Bitcoin network. Because you could just mine empty blocks or you could

1210
02:00:16,660 --> 02:00:22,500
mine blocks that are filled with transactions that are from you to yourself, which sort of

1211
02:00:22,500 --> 02:00:30,980
don't look empty, but they de facto are empty. And so this is the cost of attacking the Bitcoin

1212
02:00:30,980 --> 02:00:37,379
network from the proof of work direction. This is how much does it cost. If it only costs $0.10

1213
02:00:37,379 --> 02:00:43,620
a year to make all these blocks, then we basically don't have any proof of work. Because anyone can

1214
02:00:43,620 --> 02:00:48,580
just rewrite. Rewriting six blocks is something that anyone's CPU could do because it only costs

1215
02:00:48,580 --> 02:00:55,379
$0.10 a year. But on the other hand, the higher this number gets, the more expensive it is to

1216
02:00:55,780 --> 02:01:03,699
interfere with what the miners do, which is order transactions and order blocks and order

1217
02:01:03,699 --> 02:01:10,900
trajectories of blocks. So it's kind of just an interesting idea that all these things are like

1218
02:01:10,900 --> 02:01:18,739
the same number in a sense of being a zoomed out economic theory point of view. So some people say

1219
02:01:18,739 --> 02:01:22,820
the security budget isn't real, but I don't know what they mean. Because if all it's doing is

1220
02:01:23,299 --> 02:01:29,059
adding up the total amount of money paid to miners, and that undoubtedly is real. So that's

1221
02:01:29,059 --> 02:01:35,059
the idea. And I wrote this huge post about it. You can find it, I think, at securitybudget2

1222
02:01:36,419 --> 02:01:43,220
when I discuss merge mining. And it's securitybudget2, low fees, merge mining.

1223
02:01:44,900 --> 02:01:49,379
Great. Yes, I know about the blog post, but do you think you could also try to

1224
02:01:49,540 --> 02:01:56,340
try harder to try to understand what Luke Dashjr's concerns are? And maybe there's somebody

1225
02:01:56,340 --> 02:02:05,460
else in this in this space that understands what Luke Dashjr's understanding is of this

1226
02:02:05,460 --> 02:02:10,820
security budget issue? I don't know if Luke has ever commented on this security budget issue. It's

1227
02:02:10,820 --> 02:02:17,139
not him that... it's these other people. Well, then who was it? It sounds like you

1228
02:02:17,859 --> 02:02:25,460
who was it? Sometimes, like the people who are like, like the like the safe team kind of group,

1229
02:02:26,420 --> 02:02:33,139
they, they just think it's kind of like, maybe Joe knows, I think some they say something like

1230
02:02:33,139 --> 02:02:40,659
it implies that there's a certain amount of fees that is needed for security. And whereas they say

1231
02:02:40,659 --> 02:02:44,739
they don't really buy this 10 cents a year thing, they just think, well, it's probably gonna work

1232
02:02:44,739 --> 02:02:48,659
no matter what the number is, or they just think something happened. Anyway, maybe Joe will tell us.

1233
02:02:50,019 --> 02:02:55,780
Hey, yeah, I just related to that topic. I just wanted the smart people in this room to just

1234
02:02:55,780 --> 02:03:02,900
think about one thing. So when miners 51% attack Bitcoin, they still get the subsidy. So the

1235
02:03:02,900 --> 02:03:09,939
subsidy isn't clearly related to certain aspects of Bitcoin security. And I just think this makes

1236
02:03:09,939 --> 02:03:15,139
the argument for more transaction fees even better. So I just wanted to say that. So kind of

1237
02:03:16,019 --> 02:03:22,980
Paul's sort of steelmanning that, that concern a little bit, but transaction fees are even

1238
02:03:22,980 --> 02:03:32,180
better than subsidy. So yeah, that's all. The subsidies, of course, this, remember,

1239
02:03:32,180 --> 02:03:36,980
used to be 50 Bitcoin per block, and then 25, and then halves every four years, and now it's six-ish

1240
02:03:37,060 --> 02:03:45,939
Bitcoin per block. And if you just mine empty blocks, or you mine transactions that pay from

1241
02:03:45,939 --> 02:03:49,780
yourself to yourself, and they pay a fee to from yourself to yourself, you're still getting

1242
02:03:50,340 --> 02:03:56,500
six BTC, you know, change, you're still getting that subsidy. So you don't actually lose anything

1243
02:03:56,500 --> 02:03:59,620
by being an attacker. But the fees are what you do lose.

1244
02:04:00,579 --> 02:04:07,859
Paul, I'm interested in, you know, your thoughts on activation of BIPs more broadly through this

1245
02:04:07,859 --> 02:04:13,380
process. Like, after our space yesterday, we did like another space right afterwards. I was on

1246
02:04:13,380 --> 02:04:18,979
spaces like all day yesterday. And, you know, part of the conversation went and I kind of became

1247
02:04:18,979 --> 02:04:26,019
clear. And I don't think this is a BIP300 specific issue that like there is a bit of a

1248
02:04:26,019 --> 02:04:29,780
I don't want to call it cognitive dissonance, but there's a bit of a breakdown happening

1249
02:04:30,419 --> 02:04:38,259
in terms of the historical, you know, Bitcoin doesn't have any leaders, but it definitely has

1250
02:04:38,259 --> 02:04:46,500
people that are respected and help navigate or create like a Schelling point around certain ideas

1251
02:04:46,500 --> 02:04:52,259
to be put forward. And over time, those kind of structures have eroded to now we're starting to

1252
02:04:52,259 --> 02:04:58,019
find ourselves in this place where like no one really is quite sure about how something moves

1253
02:04:58,019 --> 02:05:06,739
forward. And I don't want to call it a crisis of confidence because I feel like that's a reach. But

1254
02:05:09,220 --> 02:05:14,340
you know, I think that there's like a bigger issue here of like, how does stuff get activated,

1255
02:05:14,979 --> 02:05:22,180
period? Like, who's calling the shots? And if no one's calling the shots, how do things happen?

1256
02:05:22,739 --> 02:05:31,780
And, you know, I feel like we've like demonized the miner activated soft fork, but it does seem

1257
02:05:31,780 --> 02:05:42,100
like that is the most straightforward way to have something be activated. And, you know, I'm just

1258
02:05:42,500 --> 02:05:49,940
interested in hearing your thoughts on it in general, like, you know, should it be an easier

1259
02:05:49,940 --> 02:05:56,579
process or should there be like a, I don't want to say an easier process, like the process of getting

1260
02:05:56,579 --> 02:06:07,539
BIP300 activated, like, what do you think it's going to do in terms of creating a, I don't know

1261
02:06:08,500 --> 02:06:15,620
what the right way to frame this is, a treaded path for other BIPs to follow down later?

1262
02:06:19,220 --> 02:06:27,460
I think that it's, so for starters, the miner activated soft fork, it's really like basically

1263
02:06:27,460 --> 02:06:34,259
the case that every soft fork that has activated has been a miner activated soft fork. Tapper was

1264
02:06:34,819 --> 02:06:40,660
Tapper was speedy trial and the miners upgraded it. No one, no one would ever, we would never

1265
02:06:40,660 --> 02:06:48,419
know if it was LOT true or LOT false because the miners upgraded. So it didn't even, it was a

1266
02:06:48,419 --> 02:06:54,340
moot point. And then with the SegWit UASF, certainly the UASF happened and kind of held

1267
02:06:54,340 --> 02:07:03,460
the gun to the miner's heads, but they actually activated SegWit before they, before it would have

1268
02:07:05,139 --> 02:07:09,220
before the UASF part would have kicked in. And they did anyway, as part of their signed

1269
02:07:09,220 --> 02:07:14,739
agreement that they'd signed in May, the 83% of the hash signed the SegWit, the infamous SegWit 2x

1270
02:07:15,780 --> 02:07:22,259
agreement. But the agreement was to activate SegWit and then later try to do this block size,

1271
02:07:22,259 --> 02:07:28,819
which of course that was a really doomed idea. And there was lots to say about that traumatic

1272
02:07:28,819 --> 02:07:33,780
event in Bitcoin's history. But yeah, every like soft fork has been like activated, like

1273
02:07:34,979 --> 02:07:39,699
there, you know, well, that's not exactly the case. The one with the same transaction ID,

1274
02:07:39,699 --> 02:07:49,539
which is BIP30, I think, but that was March, 2012. So, and then the one that I mentioned

1275
02:07:49,539 --> 02:07:54,419
before, the pay to script hash, that was, what was that BIP16, the multi-sig-ish one.

1276
02:07:55,380 --> 02:07:59,620
Uh, that one had a funny, there's so much regret with that one where

1277
02:08:02,340 --> 02:08:07,620
something, some, like there was a 55 hash rate threshold, but not enough miners activated. And

1278
02:08:07,620 --> 02:08:14,259
so it was like delayed. They pushed it back a month. So that was also in 2012. So like,

1279
02:08:14,259 --> 02:08:20,179
does it matter what happened in 2012? I don't know, but everything was miner activated. And

1280
02:08:20,179 --> 02:08:27,619
then secure to your point, like, or it's like a paradox. Miners are users. So if we want users

1281
02:08:27,619 --> 02:08:32,980
to be wearing hats and signaling that they are activating, they go on their website and they

1282
02:08:32,980 --> 02:08:42,100
say, we support SegWit. And they put USF in their Twitter. How is that any different than a miner,

1283
02:08:42,100 --> 02:08:45,939
you know, upgrading and putting that in the blocks? Like at least we can prove that they

1284
02:08:45,939 --> 02:08:50,420
are what they say they are. And it seems to be a strict improvement. So I get it.

1285
02:08:50,420 --> 02:08:55,139
I see Francis in the audience. Can we have him come up to talk about BitBait?

1286
02:08:55,139 --> 02:08:59,540
And I wrote you a big thing, but I just barely didn't finish it in time.

1287
02:09:02,660 --> 02:09:11,139
Before like Francis speaks, my question to that is like, uh, uh, like, is it necessarily

1288
02:09:11,699 --> 02:09:19,619
bad that that is how activations happen? And like, what is, what is the right way? If users wanted to

1289
02:09:19,619 --> 02:09:25,699
reject BIP300, what is the most effective and appropriate way for them to do that? So that

1290
02:09:25,699 --> 02:09:29,939
there's tension on both sides of the, of the activation process?

1291
02:09:32,179 --> 02:09:38,579
Well, I think what's the best way to, I think, so like, personally, I don't think of it as like a

1292
02:09:38,579 --> 02:09:45,139
subjective thing. I just think of it as like soft fork should meet certain criteria and they should

1293
02:09:45,139 --> 02:09:50,980
be, it doesn't interfere with any other Bitcoin operation, like on the technical level, like if

1294
02:09:50,980 --> 02:09:55,699
people are trying to send money to each other or people are trying to use multi-sig or people are

1295
02:09:55,699 --> 02:10:03,220
trying to use whatever, then they should not like the BIP should be written so that it doesn't

1296
02:10:03,220 --> 02:10:07,540
interfere with it. And it also doesn't interfere with other more nebulous things like how much,

1297
02:10:07,540 --> 02:10:13,619
how difficult it is to do upkeep on the code and how difficult it is to review the code. Those

1298
02:10:13,619 --> 02:10:21,460
things persist through time. But I see it as like, you know, the soft fork should, should not harm

1299
02:10:21,460 --> 02:10:26,740
anything. And I think that's really the only criterion. And once that criterion is met, I don't

1300
02:10:26,740 --> 02:10:33,300
see the difference between a soft fork and any other pull requests really, other than, uh, well,

1301
02:10:33,300 --> 02:10:36,340
I mean, there's some differences, but I don't see any fundamental difference.

1302
02:10:38,340 --> 02:10:40,900
Soft fork should not break public contracts.

1303
02:10:43,059 --> 02:10:44,499
Sorry, I couldn't really hear you there.

1304
02:10:45,460 --> 02:10:48,740
Soft fork should not break public contracts.

1305
02:10:50,259 --> 02:10:57,699
Yeah, well, it shouldn't break any, any existing use case of Bitcoin. I mean, plenty of stuff is

1306
02:10:57,699 --> 02:11:05,139
merging to Bitcoin all the time that any of it could break Bitcoin. You know, of course it doesn't,

1307
02:11:05,139 --> 02:11:08,660
but it's like there was a speed up. I don't know, you know, this could happen to anyone, but there

1308
02:11:08,660 --> 02:11:14,980
was a speed, a tiny bug where that allowed inflation that was just to like speed up some

1309
02:11:14,980 --> 02:11:22,980
operation by a few milliseconds or something. So, but that's part of the, part of what makes the

1310
02:11:22,980 --> 02:11:26,819
soft fork great is that people don't have to upgrade. You can stay on the old, if you really

1311
02:11:26,900 --> 02:11:30,420
want to, if you don't want the feature, you actually can just not upgrade.

1312
02:11:31,460 --> 02:11:36,980
SegWit was kind of an unusual case and also script versioning. It's very nuanced, so it's

1313
02:11:36,980 --> 02:11:43,619
unfortunate that I think, I actually think that probably we should just retire the entire, the

1314
02:11:43,619 --> 02:11:51,139
whole hard and soft fork language. I think it's probably doing more harms than good or whatever,

1315
02:11:51,939 --> 02:11:58,579
because I think the, it's kind of like, it encourages people to,

1316
02:12:00,740 --> 02:12:04,019
people don't think about it as like the right way, which is like, is this

1317
02:12:04,019 --> 02:12:08,019
objectively a good idea? Maybe this is evading the answer or something, I don't know.

1318
02:12:08,980 --> 02:12:15,059
No, I agree with you completely there, Paul. It's so easy to misunderstand it and can become

1319
02:12:15,059 --> 02:12:20,819
controversial very quickly. Yeah, let's just do away with the terminology.

1320
02:12:20,819 --> 02:12:25,619
Anyway, I'm going to bed. It's like three o'clock in the morning. Thanks very much. Good night.

1321
02:12:31,139 --> 02:12:35,139
Anyway, Francis, I was going to write you this big thing and it was only 12.55

1322
02:12:35,139 --> 02:12:39,540
and then I didn't finish it. But what I'm trying to say is that a couple of different things,

1323
02:12:39,540 --> 02:12:45,300
which is, okay, so as I understand it, the way you prefer things to be activated is

1324
02:12:45,300 --> 02:12:51,379
make BIP-8 LLT true client that is not officially affiliated with Bitcoin Core,

1325
02:12:52,340 --> 02:12:56,900
like per se, and then like make a website and then proselytize and get people to wear hats and

1326
02:12:58,259 --> 02:13:04,179
then hope that it activates on the day. And is that more or less the shape of it?

1327
02:13:04,900 --> 02:13:08,579
Hey, Paul, I just joined. Are you asking this question to me?

1328
02:13:09,460 --> 02:13:14,579
Yes. Yes, I think that's the best way to activate the soft fork. I was listening to like the last

1329
02:13:14,579 --> 02:13:21,460
five minutes. First things is you are correct in saying that the miners ultimately activate

1330
02:13:21,460 --> 02:13:26,900
the soft fork. They're the ones who technically deliver the block production to the users.

1331
02:13:27,619 --> 02:13:35,780
And with SegWit, as you pointed out, the users can't activate the soft fork without the miners

1332
02:13:35,780 --> 02:13:42,420
agreeing to it. That's why BIP-8 exists. That's why BIP-148 existed. It was, as you mentioned,

1333
02:13:42,420 --> 02:13:48,019
to put a gun to the miners' heads and to force them to activate the soft fork. And I think,

1334
02:13:48,100 --> 02:14:01,220
you know, before kind of like Taproot and before BIP300 and BIP-119, the premise was that we were

1335
02:14:01,220 --> 02:14:07,780
afraid that miners would refuse to activate a soft fork. We were refused, you know, for whatever

1336
02:14:07,780 --> 02:14:13,460
reason. And the users wanted or needed to have a mechanism to force the miners to activate the soft

1337
02:14:13,460 --> 02:14:25,300
fork. So this is what essentially BIP-148 did. I think BIP-8 locking on time equals true with a

1338
02:14:25,300 --> 02:14:31,540
good decent activation period is the way to go. The decent activation period is also so that the

1339
02:14:31,540 --> 02:14:37,139
users who want to reject that soft fork can have time to properly mount a user-resistant soft fork

1340
02:14:37,139 --> 02:14:41,300
and to also, you know, put a gun to the miners' heads and say, we don't want you to activate the

1341
02:14:41,300 --> 02:14:48,100
soft fork. What really worries me about a soft fork is that the users do not have the time to

1342
02:14:48,100 --> 02:14:52,579
have their say either with speedy trial. And I agree with you. I don't think speedy trial was a

1343
02:14:52,579 --> 02:14:59,220
good idea at all. I think the concept of speedy trial is that it's so fast that users who don't

1344
02:14:59,220 --> 02:15:05,860
want a soft fork, they don't have the time to mount a resistance. And what's worse than that is,

1345
02:15:05,860 --> 02:15:11,540
you know, a secret soft fork, as you pointed out, which by the way, it was kind of like the first

1346
02:15:11,540 --> 02:15:17,059
time I was made a little bit wary of BIP300. And, you know, you and I have talked about this. I

1347
02:15:17,059 --> 02:15:22,900
don't have any strong opinion towards BIP300. I kind of even had a little kind of like bias

1348
02:15:22,900 --> 02:15:27,939
towards BIP300 because I'm generally a fan of sidechains, even though, you know, as we've

1349
02:15:27,939 --> 02:15:33,379
discussed, I think the market, that's another issue, but I don't think the market really wants

1350
02:15:33,379 --> 02:15:38,660
them. But I kind of have a little, you know, small bias towards sidechains. I think what's

1351
02:15:38,660 --> 02:15:44,579
really dangerous is a secret soft fork. So in the case of a secret soft fork, the miners could, as

1352
02:15:44,579 --> 02:15:50,499
you point out, activate a soft fork. Nobody would even know that there is a soft fork. And then we

1353
02:15:50,499 --> 02:15:56,980
would presumably only discover that there is a soft fork afterwards by, you know, running the

1354
02:15:56,980 --> 02:16:04,420
sidechains capable clients, assuming it's not, you know, in Bitcoin Core. And then we would be

1355
02:16:04,420 --> 02:16:11,139
in front of an accomplished fact. And if that's the case, then the only thing that we can do as

1356
02:16:11,139 --> 02:16:18,179
users to prevent that soft fork from remaining active on the Bitcoin network is to force,

1357
02:16:18,179 --> 02:16:22,819
essentially force a chain split. I don't know exactly the mechanism that would be used to do

1358
02:16:22,819 --> 02:16:28,420
that, but it would essentially force the network into a chain split. And obviously, that's a

1359
02:16:28,420 --> 02:16:34,499
terrible, that's a terrible outcome, because that would create a downtime in the Bitcoin network.

1360
02:16:35,379 --> 02:16:40,179
The best outcome for the miners in that case is that there's like a week or two of downtime in

1361
02:16:40,179 --> 02:16:45,380
the Bitcoin network. There would probably be loss of funds on one chain, on the losing chain. And

1362
02:16:45,380 --> 02:16:53,140
that would be a terrible outcome for everybody in the network. And you also said that, okay,

1363
02:16:53,140 --> 02:16:58,260
if the soft fork meets certain parameters, one of the parameters that you outlined was that there is

1364
02:16:58,260 --> 02:17:04,819
no externality imposed on other users of the Bitcoin network. There's no harm done to the

1365
02:17:04,819 --> 02:17:10,579
Bitcoin network. And I know that you believe that BIP300 doesn't have any externality or harm on the

1366
02:17:10,579 --> 02:17:18,020
rest of the Bitcoin network. Honestly, I haven't paid that much attention to BIP300 to be able to

1367
02:17:18,020 --> 02:17:25,380
determine whether or not there is some harm on other users. There is one thing that you cannot

1368
02:17:25,380 --> 02:17:32,340
opt out of, though, in Bitcoin is we all share the same hashers. So we all have the same hashers

1369
02:17:32,340 --> 02:17:38,100
providing the service to us. We all share the same unit of account, and we all share the same brand.

1370
02:17:38,659 --> 02:17:45,779
So whether or not the soft fork has a direct harm on people who don't opt in,

1371
02:17:47,380 --> 02:17:53,699
if for some reason it causes a misalignment of incentives with miners, which is, I guess,

1372
02:17:53,699 --> 02:18:00,179
a popular concern with BIP300, or if it causes some impact, the existence of

1373
02:18:01,299 --> 02:18:06,579
Drivechain or BIP300 causes some impact on the Bitcoin price, on Bitcoin reputation,

1374
02:18:06,579 --> 02:18:15,299
this affects all of us. So as I said, I think if you want to activate BIP300 or any soft fork,

1375
02:18:16,020 --> 02:18:22,260
run a BIP8 client that has a long enough activation period so that the miners can make up their minds.

1376
02:18:22,260 --> 02:18:26,740
The miners are going to see, okay, there's a constituency of people that are willing to fork

1377
02:18:26,740 --> 02:18:33,380
me off if I don't activate a soft fork. There's also another constituency of people that are

1378
02:18:33,380 --> 02:18:39,059
willing to fork me off if I activate this soft fork, and then we can let the game theory

1379
02:18:39,059 --> 02:18:45,939
play itself out. And ideally, the miners are going to be able to gauge

1380
02:18:46,980 --> 02:18:54,500
somehow the commitment and dedication and motivation and capital behind one group or another

1381
02:18:55,140 --> 02:19:02,020
and be able to make a decision that reflects consensus. I also posted a meme today

1382
02:19:02,020 --> 02:19:07,699
regarding consensus. We can't know what the consensus truly is

1383
02:19:07,699 --> 02:19:13,539
unless there is a chain split. The only way to know where consensus truly lies is

1384
02:19:14,659 --> 02:19:19,059
if there is a chain split and that chain split is resolved for a winning side, which in UASF,

1385
02:19:19,059 --> 02:19:23,460
we didn't have a chain split. It was resolved before, presumably because the miners

1386
02:19:24,579 --> 02:19:29,699
understood that they were going to end up on a losing chain. So yeah, that's my

1387
02:19:29,699 --> 02:19:35,539
thoughts on that. What really concerns me is the idea of a secret hard fork, which is

1388
02:19:36,179 --> 02:19:41,699
activated, and then later, just randomly, we figure out that the soft fork has been activated,

1389
02:19:42,260 --> 02:19:47,699
and then those who want to oppose it are forced into the decision of forcing a chain split.

1390
02:19:48,819 --> 02:19:52,899
Since it's already been activated, there's a good, decent chance that

1391
02:19:54,467 --> 02:20:05,467
there would be a chain split if users were to, for example, say, okay, we're going to invalidate the blocks of miners who are running BIP300 or implementing a sidechain.

1392
02:20:08,467 --> 02:20:19,467
Yeah, I hear you. I think that makes perfect sense because more time is something that usually, like an attacker or someone who's up to something bad,

1393
02:20:19,467 --> 02:20:25,467
they normally would want to rush things because they'd say, well, I'll do this, and it will be the fait accompli.

1394
02:20:27,467 --> 02:20:34,467
Amusingly, I was amused that you translated it into English because in English, we never say fait accompli.

1395
02:20:35,467 --> 02:20:38,467
So I hear what you're saying, and I have actually a lot of comments, and I wrote a bunch down.

1396
02:20:39,467 --> 02:20:47,467
Okay, so I think there's some interesting points that may be some misunderstandings or something.

1397
02:20:52,467 --> 02:21:04,467
Okay, what I mean by that is, BIP300 is a miner-centric idea, so I think it's kind of normal to talk to the miners about it first, before even,

1398
02:21:04,467 --> 02:21:08,467
because it's kind of like if they don't like the idea, then it's already dead, so then it would never even progress.

1399
02:21:09,467 --> 02:21:16,467
You know what I mean? It's not like the soft fork that requires the Coinbase transaction to include the block height, where it's like,

1400
02:21:18,467 --> 02:21:21,467
it's like some, it's not really, this is like a slightly more ambitious type of thing.

1401
02:21:22,467 --> 02:21:29,467
So you'd say, okay, we'll go to the, we'll talk to the miners first and see if they're even interested in this, because if they are definitely not, then the idea is already dead.

1402
02:21:30,467 --> 02:21:36,467
But if you go and you say, well, you know, the thing about, like, if we go, we're not going to go and ask them, like, are you interested in pay-to-script hash or something?

1403
02:21:37,467 --> 02:21:41,467
Like, we don't really care if they are interested in pay-to-script hash, and neither do they.

1404
02:21:42,467 --> 02:21:51,467
So I think, and also another thing is that when I pointed out the secret soft fork, that's partly because, I hate for that to be misunderstood,

1405
02:21:52,467 --> 02:21:57,467
like as you probably know, Francis, I write on my blog a lot about, I wrote like this post, the UASF contradiction,

1406
02:21:57,467 --> 02:22:10,467
and I wrote this thing about the miner-activated hard fork, and this is like 30, 40 pages of just like kind of like theoretical interest in how people activate forks or what they are.

1407
02:22:11,467 --> 02:22:18,467
So I kind of was like tweeting that in the vein of like a researcher pointing out a potential problem.

1408
02:22:19,467 --> 02:22:23,467
I wasn't really, and similarly when I said, I was sort of saying, well, I really think this is inevitable,

1409
02:22:23,467 --> 02:22:32,467
because I think it's, it makes, miners can make a ton of money off of this if it works, and it's the long-run security model of Bitcoin,

1410
02:22:33,467 --> 02:22:35,467
so we might as well try it early and see if it works.

1411
02:22:36,467 --> 02:22:44,467
So some of the things I wrote down, we do all share the same miners and the same price and the same reputation,

1412
02:22:45,467 --> 02:22:52,467
but that is kind of like a double-edged argument, because it's saying if something bad is done, then everyone suffers,

1413
02:22:53,467 --> 02:22:54,467
but also if something good is done, then everyone benefits.

1414
02:22:55,467 --> 02:23:03,467
So it's kind of like, it kind of becomes a, they're all kind of tied up into one, because of course the reputation influences the price.

1415
02:23:04,467 --> 02:23:05,467
Is it miners, price, reputation?

1416
02:23:06,467 --> 02:23:13,467
But they're really kind of all the same thing to some extent, because the price and the reputation are obviously related.

1417
02:23:14,467 --> 02:23:22,467
And the miners are paid in BTC only, and so they, did you want to say something?

1418
02:23:23,467 --> 02:23:24,467
No, no, no, go ahead.

1419
02:23:25,467 --> 02:23:33,467
So the miners are paid in BTC, and they must pay, they have to pay in electricity and in physical items that are not BTC.

1420
02:23:34,467 --> 02:23:36,467
So they're always in BTC world.

1421
02:23:37,467 --> 02:23:42,467
And so it's kind of like, they're kind of all the same thing, and then at that point, that kind of reintroduces the idea of,

1422
02:23:43,467 --> 02:23:46,467
is it really the worst thing if it's like a 51% miner threshold?

1423
02:23:47,467 --> 02:23:53,467
Because it's actually a pretty decent take on price, reputation, miner, like hashers.

1424
02:23:54,467 --> 02:23:56,467
It's kind of like, they're all somewhat aligned.

1425
02:23:57,467 --> 02:24:05,467
But another thing I wanted to say is, I kind of don't see what I have been doing as out of line with your preferred activation method,

1426
02:24:06,467 --> 02:24:09,467
because Luke's pull request didn't have any activation logic in it at all.

1427
02:24:10,467 --> 02:24:11,467
So it could never activate by itself.

1428
02:24:12,467 --> 02:24:18,467
And of course, the pull request, it has enormous value, even if it's never actually merged into core,

1429
02:24:19,467 --> 02:24:23,467
because you kind of have to have review of the code and of the details.

1430
02:24:24,467 --> 02:24:29,467
Until there's the reviewed code, there can't be a client, right, or any client.

1431
02:24:30,467 --> 02:24:39,467
I don't think you've done anything that's contrary to, at least publicly, and I'm going to trust you on that, Paul.

1432
02:24:40,467 --> 02:24:45,467
That's contrary to how I would activate a soft fork.

1433
02:24:46,467 --> 02:24:54,467
You haven't, for example, proposed a speedy trial pull request to Bitcoin Core, as far as I can tell, have you?

1434
02:24:55,467 --> 02:24:56,467
Or I don't think so.

1435
02:24:57,467 --> 02:24:58,467
No, I have not.

1436
02:24:59,467 --> 02:25:02,467
So this is part of the problem, is activation was so traumatic because of SegWit,

1437
02:25:03,467 --> 02:25:07,467
and that now people don't even, it's a third rail, and no one even wants to have conversations about it.

1438
02:25:08,467 --> 02:25:14,467
And honestly, I found the taproot activation to be even a little bit more traumatic than SegWit.

1439
02:25:15,467 --> 02:25:17,467
Maybe not more traumatic, but more dangerous.

1440
02:25:18,467 --> 02:25:24,467
Because, you know, and also with, you know, a lot of my concern stems from the taproot activation.

1441
02:25:24,467 --> 02:25:33,467
I was friends with a guy who works at a really big mining pool, and he told me his side of the story with taproot,

1442
02:25:34,467 --> 02:25:39,467
which was that, you know, he was on the phone with other mining pools, and their mentality was,

1443
02:25:40,467 --> 02:25:43,467
we're going to fucking get this done, we're going to get taproot activated ASAP.

1444
02:25:44,467 --> 02:25:49,467
And the mining pools actually did have, you know, I wouldn't call them like secret cabal kind of negotiations,

1445
02:25:49,467 --> 02:25:56,467
but they definitely had private meetings where a bunch of pools just basically decided we are going to activate taproot.

1446
02:25:57,467 --> 02:26:02,467
What was a little bit more traumatic to me was that, okay, that was done in collusion with the Bitcoin Core developers,

1447
02:26:03,467 --> 02:26:10,467
which, you know, by integrating the taproot speedy trial into, you know, into Bitcoin Core itself,

1448
02:26:11,467 --> 02:26:16,467
you're kind of like forcing everybody, all right, if you want to continue using the updates to Bitcoin Core

1449
02:26:16,467 --> 02:26:20,467
and the reference client and all the optimizations and security patches that come with it,

1450
02:26:21,467 --> 02:26:28,467
you don't have a choice, you need to opt out of Bitcoin Core if you don't want to activate, you know, this soft fork.

1451
02:26:29,467 --> 02:26:36,467
What concerned me, to be honest, was David's comments about, you know, okay, so there's miners talking about activating soft fork,

1452
02:26:37,467 --> 02:26:45,467
and then, okay, when I hear that, I feel, okay, so miners are talking to each other, kind of like similar to taproot,

1453
02:26:46,467 --> 02:26:52,467
there's the idea of the secret hard fork that's floating around, there's people that might be trying to convince them,

1454
02:26:53,467 --> 02:26:58,467
hey, you know, if the Bitcoin Laser, Bitcoin Maxi, Laser Eye people don't want to activate this,

1455
02:26:59,467 --> 02:27:06,467
are you aware that you could secretly activate this soft fork? That's a scenario that I want to avoid.

1456
02:27:07,467 --> 02:27:14,467
It's actually not that hard to convince miners to do something like that, you know, for example, for Bitcoin Unlimited,

1457
02:27:14,467 --> 02:27:20,467
you'll probably remember, Paul, the Tumen brothers, you know, these two guys, the Tumen brothers,

1458
02:27:21,467 --> 02:27:30,467
yeah, so they spent, yeah, they were wiped out from Bitcoin history, they recused themselves from Bitcoin history.

1459
02:27:31,467 --> 02:27:39,467
Probably so, they should have been, I mean, the part where Adam Beck confirmed on Slack that the one was like blazed out of his mind,

1460
02:27:39,467 --> 02:27:43,467
he's like, yeah, well, it's a story for a different time.

1461
02:27:44,467 --> 02:27:49,467
Yeah, but, you know, what they did was they went to convince the Bitcoin miners to run Bitcoin Unlimited,

1462
02:27:50,467 --> 02:27:52,467
I can't remember, either it was Bitcoin Unlimited or…

1463
02:27:53,467 --> 02:27:55,467
Classic, I thought.

1464
02:27:56,467 --> 02:27:58,467
Oh, yeah, Classic, yeah, that's right, that's right, yeah, it was Bitcoin Classic.

1465
02:27:59,467 --> 02:28:07,467
So they went around and they convinced the miners, and then, you know, how much hash rate were they able to motivate to signal for Classic,

1466
02:28:07,467 --> 02:28:09,467
like 40%, 50% or something like that.

1467
02:28:10,467 --> 02:28:18,467
And then in the case of Taproot, it really was a small number of developers that contacted a small number of mining pools

1468
02:28:19,467 --> 02:28:24,467
and told them, hey, like, we're going to merge this into Bitcoin Core, do you want to do a speedy trial and just get this done?

1469
02:28:25,467 --> 02:28:30,467
Because, you know, we don't, the Bitcoin Core developers, and I don't want to single them out,

1470
02:28:31,467 --> 02:28:34,467
but, you know, there's other developers that are not Bitcoin Core developers.

1471
02:28:34,467 --> 02:28:41,467
And there was this part of the Bitcoin developer kind of group of peers that felt like,

1472
02:28:42,467 --> 02:28:47,467
okay, we feel like Taproot has consensus, there's not a lot of opposition to it,

1473
02:28:48,467 --> 02:28:53,467
we don't want to go through another UASF, we don't want to go through another BIP9 episode,

1474
02:28:54,467 --> 02:28:55,467
do you just want to activate this?

1475
02:28:56,467 --> 02:28:58,467
And I thought that was pretty scary.

1476
02:28:59,467 --> 02:29:01,467
I didn't have any objection to Taproot.

1477
02:29:02,467 --> 02:29:07,467
There's nothing about Taproot that, for example, I thought was harmful, but I don't know.

1478
02:29:08,467 --> 02:29:11,467
Maybe other people thought that there was something harmful with Taproot,

1479
02:29:12,467 --> 02:29:15,467
and they didn't get a say in that decision.

1480
02:29:16,467 --> 02:29:19,467
And as we saw with Stegwit, there are some things that you can do with Bitcoin.

1481
02:29:20,467 --> 02:29:26,467
If a soft fork is deployed, for example, it inevitably will become adopted by nodes over time.

1482
02:29:26,467 --> 02:29:28,467
That's just something, right?

1483
02:29:29,467 --> 02:29:34,467
And in the case of Stegwit, okay, we had the block size increase with Stegwit that was added as a soft fork.

1484
02:29:35,467 --> 02:29:39,467
And now, you know, everybody's using Stegwit because it's become the standard,

1485
02:29:40,467 --> 02:29:45,467
and you don't really have a choice to opt in to opt out of the four megabyte blocks

1486
02:29:46,467 --> 02:29:47,467
that are now being mined on Bitcoin.

1487
02:29:48,467 --> 02:29:54,467
We had almost a three and a half, four X block size increase with Stegwit as a soft fork.

1488
02:29:54,467 --> 02:30:00,467
And whether or not you implement Stegwit yourself or you use Stegwit yourself,

1489
02:30:01,467 --> 02:30:06,467
you have to deal with the fact that most Bitcoin transactions have witness transactions,

1490
02:30:07,467 --> 02:30:09,467
or not sure if most, but a lot of them.

1491
02:30:10,467 --> 02:30:14,467
And we now have four megabyte blocks, and if you want to run a full archival node,

1492
02:30:15,467 --> 02:30:19,467
then you need to spend four times more disk space and bandwidth to do that.

1493
02:30:20,467 --> 02:30:22,467
So that's really mainly my concern.

1494
02:30:22,467 --> 02:30:28,467
And again, I do understand that, and your point is that there's no downside to drivechains

1495
02:30:29,467 --> 02:30:30,467
because it doesn't affect the other users.

1496
02:30:31,467 --> 02:30:34,467
But, you know, that's also not up to the miners to decide,

1497
02:30:35,467 --> 02:30:38,467
because if there are downsides to drivechain,

1498
02:30:39,467 --> 02:30:42,467
maybe the downside risk is at the miner level.

1499
02:30:43,467 --> 02:30:47,467
Maybe there's something about the game theory of drivechain that's going to fuck up with miners.

1500
02:30:47,467 --> 02:30:48,467
I don't know.

1501
02:30:49,467 --> 02:30:52,467
But maybe there's something that's going to fuck up with the price of Bitcoin

1502
02:30:53,467 --> 02:30:56,467
or some aspect of decentralization or some aspect of validation

1503
02:30:57,467 --> 02:31:01,467
or some reputation or some legal risks that are going to be borne by the nodes.

1504
02:31:02,467 --> 02:31:08,467
So definitely, the fact that the benefit is concentrated at the miner level primarily,

1505
02:31:09,467 --> 02:31:13,467
and I understand your point that if, you know, if BIP300, as you say, kills all coins,

1506
02:31:13,467 --> 02:31:14,467
that's another debate.

1507
02:31:15,467 --> 02:31:18,467
But, you know, you also imagine that it's not just the miners that benefit.

1508
02:31:19,467 --> 02:31:22,467
I know that you imagine that the users also benefit from drivechain.

1509
02:31:23,467 --> 02:31:28,467
But the downside risk of drivechains seems to me to be concentrated more at the user level,

1510
02:31:29,467 --> 02:31:30,467
not the miner level.

1511
02:31:31,467 --> 02:31:36,467
And, you know, my opposition to BIP300, which is not really an opposition,

1512
02:31:37,467 --> 02:31:44,467
my opposition is to miners deciding when and how a soft fork gets activated.

1513
02:31:45,467 --> 02:31:48,467
And I don't debate that miners are the ones who ultimately do activate the soft fork.

1514
02:31:49,467 --> 02:31:50,467
That's just a fact.

1515
02:31:51,467 --> 02:31:58,467
But miners deciding when and how a soft fork is activated is kind of like my main concern.

1516
02:32:00,467 --> 02:32:02,467
And I had another point, which I'm forgetting.

1517
02:32:02,467 --> 02:32:03,467
Sorry, guys.

1518
02:32:04,467 --> 02:32:05,467
I have a hand on my pan.

1519
02:32:06,467 --> 02:32:07,467
I'm cooking a steak right now.

1520
02:32:08,467 --> 02:32:15,467
Can I jump in real quick just to clarify that, you know, the picture I shared earlier,

1521
02:32:17,467 --> 02:32:20,467
like there's no secret activation plan.

1522
02:32:21,467 --> 02:32:24,467
I think that there was a response to the tweet I put out two days ago,

1523
02:32:25,467 --> 02:32:27,467
saying miners are interested in this topic.

1524
02:32:27,467 --> 02:32:31,467
And, you know, there were some miners in the comments on that tweet saying,

1525
02:32:32,467 --> 02:32:33,467
hey, miners are interested.

1526
02:32:34,467 --> 02:32:37,467
And so I had a couple of people reach out to me from the mining industry saying,

1527
02:32:38,467 --> 02:32:43,467
hey, actually, you know, our firm is interested or X firm or whatever.

1528
02:32:44,467 --> 02:32:46,467
And so there's nothing really deeper than that.

1529
02:32:47,467 --> 02:32:50,467
Just like people talking and disseminating an idea amongst themselves.

1530
02:32:51,467 --> 02:32:54,467
And then I guess my question for you is like with BIP8,

1531
02:32:55,467 --> 02:33:03,467
like I don't understand like exactly what the differences are between the activation.

1532
02:33:04,467 --> 02:33:07,467
Like, OK, so first off in our kind of thread today that we were talking,

1533
02:33:08,467 --> 02:33:11,467
there's a lot of people who were upset about this idea of basically users

1534
02:33:12,467 --> 02:33:16,467
that are against BIP300 having to lobby against it.

1535
02:33:17,467 --> 02:33:20,467
But it sounds like through a BIP8 process,

1536
02:33:20,467 --> 02:33:24,467
that's exactly the type of environment you're trying to create

1537
02:33:25,467 --> 02:33:28,467
where users who oppose it have enough time to organize themselves

1538
02:33:29,467 --> 02:33:32,467
and have their own user rejected soft fork.

1539
02:33:34,467 --> 02:33:36,467
Well, it's a lot harder, right?

1540
02:33:37,467 --> 02:33:41,467
So if users want to lobby for a soft fork via BIP8, it's a lot harder.

1541
02:33:42,467 --> 02:33:49,467
So and especially if the BIP8 is done with an activation client,

1542
02:33:50,467 --> 02:33:52,467
which is a fork of Bitcoin Core, which is not just Bitcoin Core itself.

1543
02:33:53,467 --> 02:33:55,467
So first of all, you need to code the activation client.

1544
02:33:56,467 --> 02:33:57,467
You need to get that reviewed.

1545
02:33:58,467 --> 02:34:01,467
And you need to specifically opt out of running Bitcoin Core and running.

1546
02:34:02,467 --> 02:34:04,467
So you can't just like opt into a soft fork by auto updating Bitcoin Core.

1547
02:34:05,467 --> 02:34:09,467
You have to like consciously decide, I'm going to run a fork of Bitcoin Core.

1548
02:34:10,467 --> 02:34:13,467
And then if you want the soft fork, you have to put your skin in the game

1549
02:34:14,467 --> 02:34:15,467
and your money on the line with BIP8.

1550
02:34:15,467 --> 02:34:20,467
So it puts the onus of demonstrating commitment and activation motivation

1551
02:34:21,467 --> 02:34:22,467
to people who want the soft fork.

1552
02:34:23,467 --> 02:34:25,467
What do you mean by that? I don't follow that part.

1553
02:34:26,467 --> 02:34:29,467
Okay, because if you want a soft fork activated with BIP8,

1554
02:34:30,467 --> 02:34:32,467
you need to run a separate client that's not Bitcoin Core.

1555
02:34:33,467 --> 02:34:36,467
So first of all, you need to be aware of an activation client.

1556
02:34:37,467 --> 02:34:39,467
You need to be very interested in this topic.

1557
02:34:40,467 --> 02:34:43,467
You need to make a decision to trust an activation client,

1558
02:34:43,467 --> 02:34:46,467
which is obviously rebased on Bitcoin Core.

1559
02:34:47,467 --> 02:34:48,467
And it would probably be coded by Luke Jr.

1560
02:34:49,467 --> 02:34:51,467
or a very reputable Bitcoin developer.

1561
02:34:52,467 --> 02:34:55,467
But you still need to trust that very far less reviewed activation client.

1562
02:34:56,467 --> 02:35:01,467
And you need to be able and willing to put your money on the line

1563
02:35:02,467 --> 02:35:05,467
so that if the miners don't activate this soft fork,

1564
02:35:06,467 --> 02:35:07,467
you will essentially lose money.

1565
02:35:08,467 --> 02:35:13,467
You're risking your money if you do that.

1566
02:35:14,467 --> 02:35:15,467
Because you're good.

1567
02:35:16,467 --> 02:35:17,467
In your mind, though, about that,

1568
02:35:18,467 --> 02:35:20,467
you could just kind of basically play chicken with that

1569
02:35:21,467 --> 02:35:23,467
and then back off at the last minute if you didn't get enough support.

1570
02:35:24,467 --> 02:35:25,467
Yeah, you could.

1571
02:35:26,467 --> 02:35:27,467
Of course, you could back off at the last minute

1572
02:35:28,467 --> 02:35:29,467
and stop supporting it at the last minute.

1573
02:35:32,467 --> 02:35:33,467
We got Lucas here.

1574
02:35:34,467 --> 02:35:35,467
Luke, I don't want to start anything,

1575
02:35:35,467 --> 02:35:37,467
but moments ago Francis did say that

1576
02:35:38,467 --> 02:35:41,467
miners are the ones who ultimately activate every soft fork.

1577
02:35:42,467 --> 02:35:44,467
But we can return to that in a moment

1578
02:35:45,467 --> 02:35:46,467
because I think, Francis, I was listening carefully

1579
02:35:47,467 --> 02:35:49,467
to the ideas you were expressing.

1580
02:35:50,467 --> 02:35:54,467
And maybe I can generalize it as

1581
02:35:55,467 --> 02:36:00,467
people need a lot of time to make a decision.

1582
02:36:01,467 --> 02:36:02,467
Because I was also concerned about

1583
02:36:02,467 --> 02:36:07,467
what bothered me about SegWit and Taproot

1584
02:36:08,467 --> 02:36:10,467
was a lot of people clearly had no idea

1585
02:36:11,467 --> 02:36:12,467
what it was they were activating.

1586
02:36:13,467 --> 02:36:16,467
And I think that's what bothers me.

1587
02:36:17,467 --> 02:36:18,467
It's the lack of knowledge.

1588
02:36:19,467 --> 02:36:20,467
How can you give consent for something

1589
02:36:21,467 --> 02:36:22,467
if you don't know what it is?

1590
02:36:23,467 --> 02:36:24,467
That is significantly better

1591
02:36:25,467 --> 02:36:27,467
than people actively opposing SegWit and Taproot,

1592
02:36:28,467 --> 02:36:29,467
which no one did.

1593
02:36:29,467 --> 02:36:30,467
Apart from, you know,

1594
02:36:31,467 --> 02:36:32,467
we can talk about the obvious exceptions,

1595
02:36:33,467 --> 02:36:34,467
but there is obviously clear,

1596
02:36:35,467 --> 02:36:36,467
massive opposition to Drivechain.

1597
02:36:37,467 --> 02:36:38,467
So the idea that you'd ever get consensus

1598
02:36:39,467 --> 02:36:40,467
and discussion of activation

1599
02:36:41,467 --> 02:36:42,467
is basically you stating an intention

1600
02:36:43,467 --> 02:36:44,467
to ignore the will of the community.

1601
02:36:45,467 --> 02:36:46,467
So a quick question about that.

1602
02:36:47,467 --> 02:36:48,467
And I think, Francis, you mentioned it earlier,

1603
02:36:49,467 --> 02:36:52,467
but how do you determine actually

1604
02:36:53,467 --> 02:36:56,467
what is consensus without having the game theory

1605
02:36:57,467 --> 02:36:58,467
actually work itself all the way out?

1606
02:36:59,467 --> 02:37:00,467
Okay.

1607
02:37:01,467 --> 02:37:02,467
So as I mentioned,

1608
02:37:03,467 --> 02:37:04,467
there's no way to truly determine consensus

1609
02:37:05,467 --> 02:37:06,467
unless there's actually a chain split

1610
02:37:07,467 --> 02:37:08,467
that is resolved.

1611
02:37:09,467 --> 02:37:10,467
But I know you don't want to hear this,

1612
02:37:11,467 --> 02:37:12,467
but, you know, hats on Twitter,

1613
02:37:13,467 --> 02:37:14,467
people putting the hats,

1614
02:37:15,467 --> 02:37:16,467
there's a reason why people were putting

1615
02:37:17,467 --> 02:37:18,467
the USF hats.

1616
02:37:19,467 --> 02:37:20,467
I mean, it's not just a trivial meme.

1617
02:37:21,467 --> 02:37:22,467
The point of it is I am willing

1618
02:37:23,467 --> 02:37:24,467
to risk my money on this soft fork

1619
02:37:25,467 --> 02:37:26,467
on invalidating the miners potentially.

1620
02:37:26,467 --> 02:37:27,467
And if the miners decide

1621
02:37:28,467 --> 02:37:30,467
not to implement the soft fork,

1622
02:37:31,467 --> 02:37:32,467
I will invalidate their blocks

1623
02:37:33,467 --> 02:37:34,467
and I'm willing to lose money on this.

1624
02:37:35,467 --> 02:37:37,467
I'm willing to accept Bitcoin payments

1625
02:37:38,467 --> 02:37:40,467
and invalidate other Bitcoin payments

1626
02:37:41,467 --> 02:37:42,467
depending on which, you know,

1627
02:37:43,467 --> 02:37:44,467
blocks they're mining.

1628
02:37:45,467 --> 02:37:47,467
So signaling on Twitter

1629
02:37:48,467 --> 02:37:49,467
is whether you like it or not

1630
02:37:50,467 --> 02:37:51,467
is an important part.

1631
02:37:52,467 --> 02:37:54,467
Another way, for example,

1632
02:37:54,467 --> 02:37:55,467
as I mentioned also today,

1633
02:37:56,467 --> 02:37:57,467
there was a breaking Bitcoin conference

1634
02:37:58,467 --> 02:38:01,467
in Paris in 2017.

1635
02:38:02,467 --> 02:38:03,467
And, you know, there was a

1636
02:38:04,467 --> 02:38:05,467
raise your hands poll

1637
02:38:06,467 --> 02:38:07,467
as to who here supports SegWit2x.

1638
02:38:08,467 --> 02:38:10,467
And, you know, there was 150 people in the room.

1639
02:38:11,467 --> 02:38:12,467
I don't know if you were there, Paul,

1640
02:38:13,467 --> 02:38:14,467
breaking Bitcoin Paris in 2017.

1641
02:38:15,467 --> 02:38:16,467
You might have been there.

1642
02:38:17,467 --> 02:38:18,467
It was awesome.

1643
02:38:19,467 --> 02:38:20,467
But there was like 150 people in the room.

1644
02:38:21,467 --> 02:38:22,467
And I want to be careful not to say

1645
02:38:22,467 --> 02:38:23,467
that like Bitcoin is, you know,

1646
02:38:24,467 --> 02:38:25,467
determined by experts.

1647
02:38:26,467 --> 02:38:28,467
But there was 150 very high level

1648
02:38:29,467 --> 02:38:31,467
security and Bitcoin experts in the room.

1649
02:38:32,467 --> 02:38:33,467
And none of them were supporting SegWit2x.

1650
02:38:34,467 --> 02:38:35,467
There were businesses that were

1651
02:38:36,467 --> 02:38:37,467
putting themselves on lists publicly

1652
02:38:38,467 --> 02:38:39,467
saying if you want to use, you know,

1653
02:38:40,467 --> 02:38:41,467
if you want to use a service

1654
02:38:42,467 --> 02:38:43,467
that is a UASF enabled service,

1655
02:38:44,467 --> 02:38:46,467
you can use my service

1656
02:38:47,467 --> 02:38:48,467
and I will accept your UASF coins

1657
02:38:49,467 --> 02:38:51,467
and I will give the price of Bitcoin

1658
02:38:52,467 --> 02:38:53,467
to you.

1659
02:38:53,627 --> 02:38:57,787
To the UASF enabled chain and not to the other one that I will reject.

1660
02:38:59,147 --> 02:39:04,587
There were futures markets. I don't know if there was one for UASF, but there was definitely one for

1661
02:39:04,587 --> 02:39:10,427
SegWit2x. So there was a futures market for that. That's a good indicator. So basically, the miners,

1662
02:39:10,427 --> 02:39:15,387
like they have to look at all of these elements combined and say, OK, so first of all,

1663
02:39:15,387 --> 02:39:19,946
they have to look at the opposition. Right. So SegWit had almost no opposition. I think

1664
02:39:19,946 --> 02:39:25,387
Bitcoin Mechanic, I think it was you or Grasshopper Bitcoin anyway, who just said,

1665
02:39:25,387 --> 02:39:30,027
yes, SegWit had almost no opposition. So I think it was safe to say that. And, you know,

1666
02:39:30,027 --> 02:39:33,867
that was also discussed for like two and a half years and nobody was really opposed to SegWit.

1667
02:39:34,667 --> 02:39:39,867
There were some, but even the ones who were opposed to SegWit, they were opposed to SegWit

1668
02:39:41,307 --> 02:39:45,867
only as a mechanism to obtain a concession for the larger blocks. So their opposition to SegWit,

1669
02:39:45,867 --> 02:39:48,667
you know, and I think a lot of them were like, we're not really opposed to SegWit,

1670
02:39:48,667 --> 02:39:52,746
but we want larger blocks, too. So we're going to block SegWit in order to get larger blocks.

1671
02:39:53,467 --> 02:39:57,707
Taproot, there was not a lot of opposition to Taproot. I mean, I was definitely opposed to

1672
02:39:57,707 --> 02:40:01,707
SpeedyTrial. And if you guys remember, I was not a fan of the SpeedyTrial activation of Taproot.

1673
02:40:01,707 --> 02:40:07,787
But ultimately, my opposition to SpeedyTrial and Taproot was not sufficient enough for me to say,

1674
02:40:07,787 --> 02:40:14,906
you know, all right, let's URS of this thing. For BIP-119, because we had had and because I knew

1675
02:40:14,906 --> 02:40:20,826
nothing about BIP and Taproot, I had some degree of knowledge of what Taproot did and what it

1676
02:40:20,826 --> 02:40:28,266
didn't do. And, you know, but for BIP-119, when I saw the SpeedyTrial proposal by Jeremy for BIP-119,

1677
02:40:28,266 --> 02:40:34,906
then, you know, we were definitely ready to do a URSF for that one, for sure. Right. So in that

1678
02:40:34,906 --> 02:40:38,667
case, the miner is looking at, you know, I would suppose the miner looks at this and, all right,

1679
02:40:38,667 --> 02:40:44,186
so there's people who are so opposed to this thing. And I was opposed to it because I didn't

1680
02:40:44,186 --> 02:40:48,747
know what it was. And I was like, I don't want a soft fork to come in if I don't know what it is.

1681
02:40:49,946 --> 02:40:55,707
And a miner would see the opposition first and be like, all right, there is a strong core of people

1682
02:40:55,707 --> 02:41:00,747
that are willing to lose money to oppose this thing. So that's the number one way to gauge

1683
02:41:00,747 --> 02:41:05,387
consensus is to look at, all right, so who's opposed to it? And are the people opposed to it

1684
02:41:05,946 --> 02:41:12,986
motivated enough to, you know, your URSF? That's probably the best way to gauge it.

1685
02:41:12,986 --> 02:41:18,426
And then a good way for a miner to do that, to gauge, all right, so which side has consensus,

1686
02:41:18,426 --> 02:41:21,706
because the miner doesn't want to do that. The miner wants the same consensus because the miner

1687
02:41:21,706 --> 02:41:28,187
doesn't want to lose its block reward and its fee reward, is to have a long period of time

1688
02:41:28,187 --> 02:41:34,907
where people are signaling. And yes, it is possible to, you know, spin up a bunch of nodes on AWS,

1689
02:41:35,786 --> 02:41:41,066
but it's a lot harder to clone your reputation. So you attach your personal and your company's

1690
02:41:41,066 --> 02:41:46,747
reputation to a certain fork, you know, you're going to say, okay, I want to activate BitApe,

1691
02:41:46,747 --> 02:41:51,307
and I'm willing to say that my exchange will activate BitApe, or me personally will activate

1692
02:41:51,307 --> 02:41:56,827
BitApe. And you make a promise, basically, you know, you can call it a bluff if you want, but

1693
02:41:58,027 --> 02:42:03,146
sometimes it is a bluff. You know, in the case of USF, it's, you know, debatable that it was more

1694
02:42:03,146 --> 02:42:07,627
of a bluff. I mean, I wasn't bluffing, but there was not that many of us who were pushing for USF.

1695
02:42:07,627 --> 02:42:14,027
So the miners had decided, in the case of USF, to, you know, not implement SegWit.

1696
02:42:15,307 --> 02:42:20,986
It would have been pretty tough for people like me who were committed to losing their

1697
02:42:20,986 --> 02:42:30,586
money on the SegWit chain. So yeah, I guess the miners need to have two competing factions

1698
02:42:30,586 --> 02:42:36,986
that are signaling publicly and via software, their commitment to lose money for implementing

1699
02:42:37,706 --> 02:42:44,586
a fork. That's the only thing they can do. So it's a very good idea, but it does have a drawback

1700
02:42:45,226 --> 02:42:50,907
of that, you know, it's not, it's psychopathic in terms of like, everyone is private, everyone has

1701
02:42:50,907 --> 02:42:57,467
like a NIM, you know, everyone is like anonymous or something. It is kind of like, not that that

1702
02:42:57,467 --> 02:43:01,866
should be the only criterion, but you could do something else where there could be like,

1703
02:43:02,827 --> 02:43:06,986
whenever someone has news they want to announce, they put, they pay an unusually high fee

1704
02:43:07,627 --> 02:43:11,146
in OP_RETURN or something. So because I'm imagining a world where there is no Twitter

1705
02:43:11,146 --> 02:43:15,467
and all of us are hiding in bunkers and none of us use a real name and stuff, just hypothetical

1706
02:43:15,467 --> 02:43:22,187
idea. If someone pays an abnormally high fee to broadcast this conspicuous message,

1707
02:43:22,907 --> 02:43:28,666
and they point people to like the, this onion site that has the software, and then maybe

1708
02:43:29,227 --> 02:43:35,386
miners could signal interested, there could be different periods where a miner signals interest,

1709
02:43:35,386 --> 02:43:38,826
because you have to, the miner signaling is the only signaling that is like, you know,

1710
02:43:38,826 --> 02:43:41,706
it's very like robust, so like tampering.

1711
02:43:46,747 --> 02:43:50,586
Let me jump in for a sec, because there's two pieces of the puzzle here that are missing that

1712
02:43:50,586 --> 02:43:56,826
are kind of bewildering me. One is the point that there's this notion going around that miners

1713
02:43:56,826 --> 02:44:01,866
activate or don't activate. And what they're doing is much more important to be viewed as

1714
02:44:01,866 --> 02:44:08,027
coordination than activation, because you can't activate anything as a miner. The only reason we

1715
02:44:08,027 --> 02:44:14,187
had a UASF movement in the first place is because if we got our way running these alternative

1716
02:44:14,187 --> 02:44:19,706
clients, we would activate stuff that the actual nodes that ran vanilla clients would still be

1717
02:44:19,706 --> 02:44:25,706
enforcing because the SegWit logic existed. And the logic for Oh, if miners flip this version bit,

1718
02:44:25,706 --> 02:44:30,106
we will start enforcing these new SegWit rules were everywhere in the Bitcoin network.

1719
02:44:30,106 --> 02:44:35,947
If the miners tried to do a similar thing that UASF clients forced miners to do to activate SegWit,

1720
02:44:35,947 --> 02:44:40,586
if they did that with drivechain, you have a new rule set that's being enforced by miners

1721
02:44:40,586 --> 02:44:45,146
that is totally ignored by all of the nodes in the space because none of this stuff is getting

1722
02:44:45,146 --> 02:44:50,826
into Bitcoin Core. So that is, that is the definition of a 51% attack. It's a totally

1723
02:44:50,826 --> 02:44:55,467
different scenario. There, there is no enforcement of the drivechain rules. I'm not talking about

1724
02:44:55,467 --> 02:45:01,546
the rules of the drivechains. I'm talking about the rules of drivechain as its own soft fork.

1725
02:45:01,546 --> 02:45:05,627
None of that would be enforced by any nodes on the network. So it wouldn't just be miner

1726
02:45:05,627 --> 02:45:10,907
coordination that's necessary. You need the actual nodes to run it. Yes, you would need some,

1727
02:45:10,907 --> 02:45:14,826
some nodes. I don't think anyone has ever disputed that at that point.

1728
02:45:15,706 --> 02:45:21,947
It's a very different circumstance, right? Like the UASF, the BIP-148 battle, the Bitmain,

1729
02:45:21,947 --> 02:45:27,947
all that stuff, it came in an environment where you had SegWit logic in all of the nodes,

1730
02:45:27,947 --> 02:45:32,426
basically on the network. So there was actually something to activate on a network-wide level.

1731
02:45:32,426 --> 02:45:39,546
SegWit existed, it was acknowledged. Well, but you understand, I'm sure, that in order for miners

1732
02:45:39,546 --> 02:45:46,507
to even activate the soft fork, the client software must exist somewhere. Yeah, but does it?

1733
02:45:46,507 --> 02:45:53,146
I don't know of a drivechain enforcing node that you can run. Well, yes. No, I have not produced

1734
02:45:53,146 --> 02:45:58,106
one and that one does not exist as far as I'm aware. But that's what we were originally talking

1735
02:45:58,106 --> 02:46:01,227
about. I don't know if you've been here, you may have been here the whole time, maybe not. But we

1736
02:46:01,227 --> 02:46:09,467
were talking about Francis, he has like Puyo activation. Instead of speedy trial, it's because

1737
02:46:09,467 --> 02:46:14,347
I think I've been listening carefully and taking notes. For Francis, it's very important that

1738
02:46:14,347 --> 02:46:19,307
people have a lot of time to carefully consider the issues. So it could actually be called something

1739
02:46:19,307 --> 02:46:24,907
like instead of speedy trial, it would be like something slow, like I don't know, like slow

1740
02:46:25,866 --> 02:46:34,106
trial or something. But what if I didn't catch that because I only did just get here like around

1741
02:46:34,106 --> 02:46:40,666
10 minutes ago. And initially, I'm saying consensus is what's important. And you bring up a counter to

1742
02:46:40,666 --> 02:46:46,747
that, which does warrant adding more nuance to it. Because anyone can come along and actually

1743
02:46:46,747 --> 02:46:52,507
characterize the massive opposition to SegWit as a genuine breaking consensus. Because what it was,

1744
02:46:52,507 --> 02:46:58,027
is more, it was it was not actually consensus in the end, it was a genuine analysis by the

1745
02:46:58,027 --> 02:47:03,546
community that all of the concerns against it were actually unfounded. So people were against

1746
02:47:03,546 --> 02:47:07,787
SegWit because it got used as a political football. And people said, Oh, if we try and scale via

1747
02:47:07,787 --> 02:47:12,507
lightning, which SegWit allows, then we'll lose motivation to have big blocks, knack, right?

1748
02:47:12,507 --> 02:47:16,507
People just think that's not a good enough argument against SegWit. We're fixing transaction

1749
02:47:16,507 --> 02:47:20,907
malleability, we can't scale with big blocks, it's not the right approach. So people said those

1750
02:47:20,907 --> 02:47:26,106
claims are unfounded. And we had to, we had a split in the community. And that was it, like

1751
02:47:26,106 --> 02:47:30,267
everyone that didn't want this went over to Bcash. And then, you know, decided Craig Wright was our

1752
02:47:30,267 --> 02:47:34,267
Lord and Savior and all this stupid stuff. So obviously, it's not valid, right? And we're not

1753
02:47:34,267 --> 02:47:39,627
going to go down that path. But then you also have taproot. Like, where was the opposition to that?

1754
02:47:39,627 --> 02:47:43,947
There wasn't really any the only legitimate opposition that ever really came around was

1755
02:47:43,947 --> 02:47:49,067
one guy saying it was paid to public key instead of paid to public key hash. So quantum FUD,

1756
02:47:49,067 --> 02:47:53,546
you know, it's not safe from quantum computers. And everyone said, that's just not really a

1757
02:47:53,546 --> 02:47:58,747
concern. So we're going to proceed with it. Like, but the concern about drivechain is founded,

1758
02:47:58,747 --> 02:48:04,187
the concern about drivechain is totally founded. It's a, we're talking about massive changes to the

1759
02:48:04,187 --> 02:48:09,226
ecosystem, a complete, I'm not going to say corruption of miner incentives, but it's certainly

1760
02:48:09,226 --> 02:48:14,507
a big, chaotic change that most people are like, I don't even trust that we could figure out all

1761
02:48:14,507 --> 02:48:17,627
the ramifications of doing this, even if I like what's on offer.

1762
02:48:17,627 --> 02:48:22,026
I disagree with all of that. But I think it's not the point. The point is about taproot and

1763
02:48:22,026 --> 02:48:27,546
SegWit was actually that, to me, in my own personal view, is there were many downsides

1764
02:48:28,106 --> 02:48:34,346
that were not the people who, it's true that what you say, first of all, your story is mostly true.

1765
02:48:34,346 --> 02:48:40,666
And I agree with it about the SegWit opposition. And it was mostly, it's mostly exactly the way

1766
02:48:40,666 --> 02:48:46,507
you said, and it's true that we didn't hear complaints about SegWit or taproot, except from,

1767
02:48:46,507 --> 02:48:51,707
from Luke, of course, who is a genius, but he was not very many other people. A lot of people were

1768
02:48:51,707 --> 02:48:57,947
for SegWit, but they had no idea that it was a block size increase. You know, John Carvalho or

1769
02:48:57,947 --> 02:49:02,827
something in 2019, he said, like, oh, I had no idea it was, this was like two years after it

1770
02:49:02,827 --> 02:49:07,627
had activated after he'd been like militantly signaling for it. So you're right to say that

1771
02:49:07,627 --> 02:49:13,147
we didn't hear any opposition. But then sometimes it's just because people don't realize that

1772
02:49:13,786 --> 02:49:19,947
there should be opposition with taproot. It was abundantly clear to me that most of the people,

1773
02:49:19,947 --> 02:49:25,947
many people knew a lot about it, like a small number, but lots of people were faking it. They

1774
02:49:25,947 --> 02:49:29,866
were bullshitters. They were just saying, oh, taproot, we don't want to repeat it.

1775
02:49:31,707 --> 02:49:36,026
You're completely right about this, but I don't, when it comes to advocating for drive

1776
02:49:36,026 --> 02:49:40,426
chain, doesn't this just make your life harder? Because in the case of SegWit and taproot,

1777
02:49:40,426 --> 02:49:45,067
unintended consequences, people signaling in favor of it, despite not fully understanding it,

1778
02:49:45,067 --> 02:49:49,947
with drivechain you have active opposition already. Yeah, well, we aren't actually, we're

1779
02:49:49,947 --> 02:49:54,507
sort of, you kind of jumped, as you said, you jumped into the conversation kind of midway.

1780
02:49:54,507 --> 02:49:58,187
We weren't really, we were talking about a conversation between Francis and David,

1781
02:49:58,187 --> 02:50:02,426
so it was kind of like a different, kind of really not on that topic right now, per se,

1782
02:50:02,426 --> 02:50:08,986
but I'm sure we'll return to it very soon. But Paul, your point about people not understanding

1783
02:50:08,986 --> 02:50:14,426
the full ramifications of SegWit and people bullshitting with taproot, both of them I agree.

1784
02:50:16,026 --> 02:50:20,986
I did not fully understand the ramifications of, I knew about the block size increase,

1785
02:50:20,986 --> 02:50:24,587
I didn't actually understand, I thought the logic was a lot more technical than political

1786
02:50:25,147 --> 02:50:31,786
of SegWit, of the block size increase of SegWit, and for taproot, I was also kind of, you know,

1787
02:50:31,786 --> 02:50:36,026
upset about the marketing. The marketing was around, you know, taproot will make bitcoin more

1788
02:50:36,026 --> 02:50:40,827
private and taproot will enable bitcoin to compete with Monero and Zcash and all that.

1789
02:50:40,827 --> 02:50:44,747
They were, there was all this kind of disappointment and smart contract upgrade,

1790
02:50:44,747 --> 02:50:55,226
like I heard, but I think this proves the point that people need even more time to study the

1791
02:50:55,226 --> 02:51:05,947
potential downsides. And, you know, the downsides of drivechain are, you know,

1792
02:51:06,986 --> 02:51:11,226
Bitcoin Mechanic pointed out, there's a lot of people that see a lot of downsides in drivechain.

1793
02:51:12,026 --> 02:51:20,507
I'm the first to say that I don't understand the downsides of drivechain enough to be very opposed

1794
02:51:20,507 --> 02:51:26,986
to the idea. I've always had a kind of like neutral-ish stance on drivechain, because

1795
02:51:27,866 --> 02:51:32,507
even though I don't believe in the upside, I also don't fully understand the downside. So that's

1796
02:51:32,507 --> 02:51:39,627
where my neutral-ish position came about. But I witnessed through, you know, Twitter, through

1797
02:51:39,627 --> 02:51:43,226
mailing lists, through discussion groups, that there is a sizable group of people

1798
02:51:43,226 --> 02:51:49,707
that, you know, they definitely see a lot of downsides to drivechain, and that's after studying

1799
02:51:49,707 --> 02:51:54,426
drivechain. And as you point out, Paul, a lot of people don't even study drivechains that much,

1800
02:51:54,426 --> 02:51:58,346
you know, and then you study drivechain for a couple of months, and then they see a lot of

1801
02:51:58,346 --> 02:52:05,147
downsides. So maybe we're going to see more downsides after a year or two. And for me,

1802
02:52:05,866 --> 02:52:13,866
the unknown downsides of drivechain and the potentially unlimited downsides of drivechain

1803
02:52:14,747 --> 02:52:21,226
are, they, even though I don't fully understand them, I don't see any significant benefit to

1804
02:52:21,226 --> 02:52:26,906
drivechain. And also, that's not my, I don't plan to use drivechain personally, but I don't really

1805
02:52:26,906 --> 02:52:32,507
see a lot of upside to drivechain. Some people do, some people don't, but a lot of people see

1806
02:52:32,507 --> 02:52:39,067
the downsides to drivechain. So, you know, and again, I think all of this discussion is going

1807
02:52:39,387 --> 02:52:43,786
around, okay, the potential for a secret hard fork, or the potential for a speedy trial,

1808
02:52:43,786 --> 02:52:49,866
or the potential for miners to, you know, miners could activate, you know, drivechain, and you,

1809
02:52:49,866 --> 02:52:53,866
Paul, could be the only person, assuming there's a drivechain client, like, you, Paul, should be

1810
02:52:53,866 --> 02:52:58,587
the only, could be the only person basically using, you know, drivechain in the entire network,

1811
02:52:58,587 --> 02:53:06,267
and the miners would have implemented BIP300. And then the potential of just you using drivechain

1812
02:53:06,267 --> 02:53:11,466
and that having some externality on the rest of Bitcoin users, that's still something that's

1813
02:53:11,466 --> 02:53:19,786
possible, right? Can I ask two questions here, a bit related? You know, first off, like, I think

1814
02:53:19,786 --> 02:53:25,786
you're, you know, in terms of people's opinions on drivechain, they're, at the end of the day,

1815
02:53:25,786 --> 02:53:32,666
a lot of them are opinions. Like, there has to be a process to adjudicate, like, which,

1816
02:53:32,666 --> 02:53:36,827
which opinions are valid, and which ones are, like, where do people sway to? And so, like,

1817
02:53:36,827 --> 02:53:43,627
I like having people have the opportunity to reject a soft fork, but like, people are busy,

1818
02:53:43,627 --> 02:53:49,627
they have to have a reason to care. So there should be some sort of activation process put

1819
02:53:49,627 --> 02:53:55,546
forward that actually drives people to, to make up their mind. If they don't like it, great,

1820
02:53:55,546 --> 02:54:02,587
they don't, they don't like it. But I don't think that that's a, it's not a justifiable reason for

1821
02:54:02,747 --> 02:54:08,106
stopping the process from ever even beginning. If, you know, so that's one, one kind of comment.

1822
02:54:08,106 --> 02:54:16,026
Second thing, with BIP-8, like, the, if it's going to be like, the, I mean, with user-activated

1823
02:54:16,026 --> 02:54:23,147
soft fork approach, you know, it's about the economic power of the nodes that are, are voting

1824
02:54:23,147 --> 02:54:26,986
for or against, etc, that are threatening to fork off the network. My fear with...

1825
02:54:26,986 --> 02:54:27,786
No, it isn't.

1826
02:54:28,747 --> 02:54:34,587
Okay, well, my fear with that is that, like, if you had a Coinbase, who signed on and said,

1827
02:54:34,587 --> 02:54:40,426
hey, like, we're going to go all the way with, with supporting this specific BIP soft fork,

1828
02:54:40,426 --> 02:54:48,267
or rejecting the specific soft fork, their economic power in the, in the ecosystem would

1829
02:54:48,267 --> 02:54:53,707
be such that it would have a pretty immense effect on miners trying to make a determination of what

1830
02:54:53,707 --> 02:54:59,147
they're going to choose. Maybe I'm wrong on that. But like, like, is it not the economic power of

1831
02:54:59,147 --> 02:55:00,026
the nodes that matters?

1832
02:55:01,147 --> 02:55:06,747
That, that's true. That's true. If, if, for example, Paul was to put out a BIP-8 client,

1833
02:55:06,747 --> 02:55:14,026
and, you know, Coinbase was to publicly claim, okay, we will run BIP-8. And if the miners don't

1834
02:55:14,026 --> 02:55:20,106
activate BIP-8, Coinbase, we, Coinbase will invalidate the miners blocks. That would obviously

1835
02:55:20,106 --> 02:55:25,707
have a huge effect on the miners decision making process. There's no doubt about that.

1836
02:55:26,666 --> 02:55:30,986
But Coinbase did also sign the SegWit2x and the NYA agreement.

1837
02:55:32,106 --> 02:55:35,627
Yes, but no, this is actually, I'm glad you brought that up. That was something I've written

1838
02:55:35,627 --> 02:55:40,747
down when you were talking before. And I wanted to come back to it, which is, it's theoretically

1839
02:55:40,747 --> 02:55:46,666
possible that Coinbase could, it's, I'm not, you know, don't, this is like a hypothetical scenario.

1840
02:55:47,466 --> 02:55:50,747
But it's theoretically possible that Brian Armstrong could be sitting there thinking,

1841
02:55:51,707 --> 02:55:56,426
oh, those stupid Bitcoiners, the last thing I want is for them to succeed. And the last thing

1842
02:55:56,426 --> 02:56:04,506
I want is for my exchange business to go away. So I should actually run the, I should, to make

1843
02:56:04,506 --> 02:56:10,666
Bitcoin worse, I should run the user resisted soft fork. And I thought that was an intriguing

1844
02:56:10,666 --> 02:56:19,146
idea, that is. That, well, I mean, that's certainly possible. If we were to run BIP-8 today,

1845
02:56:20,906 --> 02:56:31,146
I think BIP300 via BIP-8 would lose. I think if Coinbase today was to support BIP-8,

1846
02:56:32,506 --> 02:56:38,746
BIP300, people would be very suspicious. There's enough opposition to that so that people would

1847
02:56:38,746 --> 02:56:43,707
run a URSF against that BIP-8 in case the miners. So what would happen basically is, all right,

1848
02:56:43,707 --> 02:56:47,867
so let's say, Paul, you launch BIP-8 clients, and then, you know, nothing happens. The, you know,

1849
02:56:47,867 --> 02:56:51,067
miners are not signaling, miners are not interested. And then suddenly Coinbase,

1850
02:56:51,707 --> 02:56:56,026
and then, you know, most economic node runners, they're just like, we don't give a fuck, you know,

1851
02:56:56,827 --> 02:57:00,266
Paul is running his BIP-8 client and, you know, he's either going to get

1852
02:57:00,266 --> 02:57:07,786
forked off at the lock-in time or, you know, he's going to, you know, you're going to get

1853
02:57:07,786 --> 02:57:12,187
forked off or you're going to bail out at the last minute. I think most reasonable people would

1854
02:57:12,187 --> 02:57:16,187
assume that if it was just like just you, your organization, and then maybe like a few people.

1855
02:57:16,187 --> 02:57:17,067
But if, you know…

1856
02:57:17,707 --> 02:57:22,187
Francis, sorry to interrupt, but I've got to jump off in two minutes. So I just wanted to

1857
02:57:22,187 --> 02:57:27,626
say a little thing before I… Ultimately, it comes down to the legitimacy of people's

1858
02:57:27,626 --> 02:57:33,546
reasons for doing things. Because if Drivechain suddenly gets maliciously pushed onto us as a

1859
02:57:33,546 --> 02:57:39,146
soft fork that people haven't consented to, or that we feel that the negative consequences of

1860
02:57:39,146 --> 02:57:44,026
which haven't been properly addressed, then people are going to run URSF clients. And once that's

1861
02:57:44,026 --> 02:57:49,386
happened, we've totally changed the dynamic of soft forks forever. Because every… We'll have

1862
02:57:49,386 --> 02:57:54,587
established a mechanism by which we can do this. And even as you say, a bad actor like Brian

1863
02:57:54,587 --> 02:58:00,026
Armstrong is in your hypothetical scenario, and also in reality, by the way. Even if that was the

1864
02:58:00,026 --> 02:58:04,347
circumstance, people will just launch URSFs for future soft forks that are actually warranted and

1865
02:58:04,347 --> 02:58:09,467
good. That's a nightmare scenario. So it comes down to analysis. What's the motivation? What's

1866
02:58:09,467 --> 02:58:14,426
the legitimacy behind it? Why is it a nightmare scenario though? Because it seems like that's

1867
02:58:14,426 --> 02:58:18,746
a valid way to resolve some of these outcomes. If someone says they have valid concerns,

1868
02:58:18,746 --> 02:58:24,827
but they're not valid, and then they run a user-activated rejection, then they're just

1869
02:58:24,827 --> 02:58:26,506
going to be bounced.

1870
02:58:26,506 --> 02:58:31,506
Well, it comes down to your judgment about what's actually good for Bitcoin and what's not.

1871
02:58:31,506 --> 02:58:38,506
It's not like we got SegWit and that was it. Hooray. There literally was a big break-off of genuine people that thought we have to scale with big blocks.

1872
02:58:38,506 --> 02:58:43,506
Medium of exchange is the only thing that matters, and not people being able to run nodes or anything like that.

1873
02:58:43,506 --> 02:58:46,506
And they're gone, and the community broke up over it.

1874
02:58:46,506 --> 02:58:50,506
Is that the difference between a hard fork and a soft fork?

1875
02:58:50,506 --> 02:59:00,506
Well, that doesn't matter because a URSF essentially becomes its own hard fork away from the new, more tightly enforced rule set of the soft fork that Drivechain would become.

1876
02:59:00,506 --> 02:59:05,506
We'd essentially hard fork away from the malicious soft fork.

1877
02:59:05,506 --> 02:59:09,506
It kind of depends on how you do it and how the URSF actually works.

1878
02:59:09,506 --> 02:59:19,506
It might be just us doing a UASF of a rule set that conflicts with Drivechain, or it can just be us rejecting a version bitflip.

1879
02:59:19,506 --> 02:59:22,506
So it depends on how you guys plan on running your activation.

1880
02:59:22,506 --> 02:59:29,506
If you're going to do it in an open way, in an appropriate way that follows precedent, you're just going to flip a version bit.

1881
02:59:29,506 --> 02:59:41,506
But in reality, we know there's already been threats as well made by you guys that you're just going to get 51% of the miners in backhanded conversations to activate it without even signaling on the network.

1882
02:59:41,506 --> 02:59:44,506
So if you're going to do that, then the URSF looks very different.

1883
02:59:44,506 --> 02:59:49,506
So it kind of depends. There's a lot of question marks here about how you guys plan to move forward.

1884
02:59:49,506 --> 02:59:55,506
But essentially, it's a proposal that has very good reasons for people not to want to activate it on the network.

1885
02:59:55,506 --> 02:59:59,506
And it's going to encounter a lot of resistance, as it very well should.

1886
02:59:59,506 --> 03:00:01,506
And I don't really know how you plan to proceed with that.

1887
03:00:01,506 --> 03:00:03,506
Thank you. Thank you for the conversation.

1888
03:00:03,506 --> 03:00:09,506
Nonetheless, I have to jump off now and have a good one.

1889
03:00:10,506 --> 03:00:18,506
Well, that was nice. But I do think it's as far as Drivechain critics go, it's kind of par for the course, because he jumped in halfway through.

1890
03:00:18,506 --> 03:00:25,506
He had no idea what we were really talking about, presumed that he did, and then was in a bad mood.

1891
03:00:25,506 --> 03:00:29,506
So that's normally what our critics are like.

1892
03:00:29,506 --> 03:00:36,506
But it just so happens that me and Lex are pretty aligned on this, pretty much perfectly.

1893
03:00:36,506 --> 03:00:44,506
And the point that he made in the end is a very important point, which is that you cannot create a URSF client if you don't know how it's being activated.

1894
03:00:44,506 --> 03:00:53,506
So for example, in the case of BIP119, I and a bunch of others, we're like, okay, fuck, there's another speedy trial coming.

1895
03:00:53,506 --> 03:00:57,506
So what can we do in the case of a BIP119 speedy trial?

1896
03:00:57,506 --> 03:01:04,506
And then we're like, all right, I think it was Michael Folkestone who presented the idea of a URSF on the mailing list.

1897
03:01:04,506 --> 03:01:07,506
I don't know if it was the first time ever, or people had discussed it before.

1898
03:01:07,506 --> 03:01:09,506
But all right, so I became interested in that.

1899
03:01:09,506 --> 03:01:15,506
And then I went to a Bitcoin Core developer, and I was like, all right, so could you code up a URSF client?

1900
03:01:15,506 --> 03:01:24,506
And that Bitcoin Core developer told me, well, I can't, because there is no UASF activation client, or there is no activation proposal at all for BIP119.

1901
03:01:24,506 --> 03:01:31,506
It's just talk so far. So we have to wait until we see the activation client to be able to do the URSF client.

1902
03:01:32,506 --> 03:01:41,506
But if there is a secret miner arrangement, and the activation client is a secret one,

1903
03:01:41,506 --> 03:01:46,506
so let's say that, Paul, you were actually malicious, and you have this software that is not open source,

1904
03:01:46,506 --> 03:01:51,506
and the miners are running the BIP300 soft fork without telling anyone,

1905
03:01:51,506 --> 03:01:58,506
we couldn't do a URSF until after we've detected that it has happened.

1906
03:01:58,506 --> 03:02:03,506
Presumably, because one day you would be like, ha-ha, I released the client, it's now open source,

1907
03:02:03,506 --> 03:02:05,506
and you can check, Drivechain is actually activated.

1908
03:02:05,506 --> 03:02:09,506
And that would be from that point on that we could do something.

1909
03:02:09,506 --> 03:02:17,506
And then in that case, it's not even a question of whether or not people are going to back out of a soft fork or of being forked off.

1910
03:02:20,506 --> 03:02:24,506
I don't see a scenario where a chain split would not occur in that case.

1911
03:02:24,506 --> 03:02:26,506
I have a question, like a dumb question.

1912
03:02:26,506 --> 03:02:34,506
I don't understand what the difference are between, like if the miners kept it secret and then revealed to the users later,

1913
03:02:34,506 --> 03:02:41,506
and users, once they find out, do a chain split, versus if the miners did it publicly,

1914
03:02:41,506 --> 03:02:47,506
and users got upset and decided to run a user-activated rejection,

1915
03:02:47,506 --> 03:02:53,506
and the miners just decided, I don't care, go ahead and do it, and chain split.

1916
03:02:53,506 --> 03:02:56,506
Is it kind of like the same outcome either way?

1917
03:02:56,506 --> 03:02:59,506
Well, there is a chance of no chain split.

1918
03:02:59,506 --> 03:03:03,506
If it's all done transparently with enough time, there is a chance that there is no chain split.

1919
03:03:03,506 --> 03:03:08,506
If it's done in secret, and we have to oppose it after the fact, there is for sure going to be a chain split.

1920
03:03:11,506 --> 03:03:19,506
So you're like removing the opportunity for one side to back out, essentially, by doing it in secret.

1921
03:03:19,506 --> 03:03:21,506
So I think it's better to do it publicly.

1922
03:03:21,506 --> 03:03:26,506
I think that's how you get people to actually give their true and full attention.

1923
03:03:26,506 --> 03:03:30,506
I think, unfortunately, the gentleman derailed us a little bit,

1924
03:03:30,506 --> 03:03:36,506
because what I was saying before he joined that he didn't hear, but now everyone else is going to have to hear twice,

1925
03:03:36,506 --> 03:03:44,506
is that I write commentary like this often on my blog, which I've done for many years,

1926
03:03:44,506 --> 03:03:50,506
like a long time, 10 years, about various puzzles in Bitcoin and strategies and activation.

1927
03:03:50,506 --> 03:03:53,506
I've written many. I've written an essay called The UASF Contradiction.

1928
03:03:53,506 --> 03:03:58,506
And I wrote an essay about the miner-activated hard fork and replay protection.

1929
03:03:58,506 --> 03:04:01,506
I write about all these kinds of things, so I'm interested in that.

1930
03:04:01,506 --> 03:04:07,506
And so I was commenting on what could be possible, which I'm sure a bunch of people took as a threat.

1931
03:04:07,506 --> 03:04:14,506
But here's the thing about that is the really threatening thing would have been for me to not –

1932
03:04:14,506 --> 03:04:19,506
to know that that is the case and not to tweet it, because that would have been actually very threatening.

1933
03:04:19,506 --> 03:04:24,506
So I kind of didn't really see it that way. I was just kind of pointing it out that, hey, you don't actually have –

1934
03:04:24,506 --> 03:04:32,506
the people who want the UASF, they don't have like – they don't have the cards that I think they have, if that makes sense.

1935
03:04:32,506 --> 03:04:37,506
Well, I mean, you tweeting it got me thinking about it, so I think it was a good thing.

1936
03:04:37,506 --> 03:04:41,506
And just to be clear, I never accused you of trying to do a secret hard fork.

1937
03:04:41,506 --> 03:04:46,506
Although, you know, it's in the back of my mind, but I didn't accuse you on Twitter of leading that.

1938
03:04:46,506 --> 03:04:53,506
But the idea is out there, right? And then it can – and if the miners are talking about this,

1939
03:04:53,506 --> 03:04:57,506
which I'm sure they are now because it's attracted their attention, clearly.

1940
03:04:57,506 --> 03:05:03,506
I also have had a miner like 45 minutes ago contacting me and saying, by the way, Francis, like, we don't want drivechains.

1941
03:05:03,506 --> 03:05:08,506
I don't know who these miners are, but we specifically don't want, and our mining pool doesn't want that either.

1942
03:05:08,506 --> 03:05:15,506
So, you know, miners are obviously talking about it now. So the concept of, you know, all right, we can just fuck politics.

1943
03:05:15,506 --> 03:05:19,506
Fuck the politicking. We're just going to run the code and activate the soft fork.

1944
03:05:19,506 --> 03:05:25,506
Like, the idea that that's possible exists in the dieguys, and it's like it's always existed.

1945
03:05:25,506 --> 03:05:28,506
Nothing has changed since you've tweeted that.

1946
03:05:28,506 --> 03:05:38,506
And nothing has changed, like, you know, in practice since Dave tweeted his recounting of conversations with miners.

1947
03:05:38,506 --> 03:05:41,506
But, you know, people are like, oh, people are discovering now.

1948
03:05:41,506 --> 03:05:44,506
Most people are discovering now that that's something that's possible.

1949
03:05:44,506 --> 03:05:50,506
I mean, I genuinely didn't really think about this, the evil, quote unquote, secret soft fork.

1950
03:05:50,506 --> 03:05:55,506
I probably thought about that, you know, five years ago during the UASF.

1951
03:05:55,506 --> 03:06:01,506
And it was probably part of the discussion at some point, but it was not part of my day to day, you know, thoughts.

1952
03:06:01,506 --> 03:06:09,506
And now it definitely is. So I think it's definitely understandable that people are scared that that will happen because the idea is out there.

1953
03:06:09,506 --> 03:06:13,506
And there's another thing also, you know, and it's not just people on this call.

1954
03:06:13,506 --> 03:06:22,506
There's other people that are either professional trolls or spooks or agents of chaos.

1955
03:06:22,506 --> 03:06:29,506
And they definitely are the types of people, I think, that would start talking to mining pools.

1956
03:06:29,506 --> 03:06:34,506
You know, a lot of these people were associated to ordinals and that kind of movement.

1957
03:06:34,506 --> 03:06:41,506
And maybe for the lols, maybe just for the fucking fun of it, maybe because they hate Bitcoin, maybe because they hate the maximalists.

1958
03:06:41,506 --> 03:06:44,506
Maybe because they generally think it's good for Bitcoin.

1959
03:06:44,506 --> 03:07:03,506
They might go. It's definitely a possibility that these people might go and convince the miners to either do a secret hard fork or do a very quick, you know, public bit nine, you know, type situation where, you know, or even I mean, and actually got this idea from people.

1960
03:07:04,506 --> 03:07:11,506
A speedy UASF is almost indistinguishable from just a regular miner activation.

1961
03:07:11,506 --> 03:07:23,506
Because, you know, maybe Udi is going to say, all right, I'm going to do a bit eight client for drivechain and I'm going to, you know, put a lock in time in two months.

1962
03:07:23,506 --> 03:07:27,506
And I'm going to enforce it and all the miners signal for that in two months.

1963
03:07:27,506 --> 03:07:32,506
And nobody has time to do a UASF because, you know, we're kind of taken by surprise of this thing.

1964
03:07:32,506 --> 03:07:35,506
So that's definitely a concern.

1965
03:07:35,506 --> 03:07:41,506
It's a very real concern that people have that miners are just going to get this idea.

1966
03:07:41,506 --> 03:07:44,506
And the miners are also different miners than in 2017.

1967
03:07:44,506 --> 03:07:54,506
So I think the miners in 2017 probably learned their lesson saying, all right, we're going to stop the idea that we control the hash rate by voting.

1968
03:07:55,506 --> 03:08:02,506
The idea that miners are voting for consensus rules, like that's kind of like died in 2017, kind of.

1969
03:08:02,506 --> 03:08:04,506
But the miners that we have today are different miners.

1970
03:08:04,506 --> 03:08:05,506
So maybe they haven't learned that lesson.

1971
03:08:05,506 --> 03:08:07,506
Maybe they don't even know about 2017.

1972
03:08:07,506 --> 03:08:12,506
And maybe they're going to get someone whispering in their ear saying, hey, like, we know you're hurting really hard.

1973
03:08:12,506 --> 03:08:16,506
You know, your stock is fucking crumbling on your public miner.

1974
03:08:16,506 --> 03:08:20,506
Did you know that you actually control Bitcoin and you could actually assert your control over Bitcoin?

1975
03:08:20,506 --> 03:08:25,506
I mean, that might be a concept that's alluring to a big miner, you know.

1976
03:08:25,506 --> 03:08:34,506
So the idea that there's potentially scheming going on, I think it's totally a reasonable assumption for us to have.

1977
03:08:34,506 --> 03:08:35,506
Oh, absolutely.

1978
03:08:35,506 --> 03:08:44,506
But you can see that, of course, as I was saying, the more threatening thing, since I already knew that to be possible, the more threatening thing would be probably not to tell anyone about it, per se.

1979
03:08:44,506 --> 03:08:46,506
But I would say.

1980
03:08:46,506 --> 03:08:49,506
Correct.

1981
03:08:49,506 --> 03:08:56,506
So earlier you complained about the taproot activation, about it's just a bunch of people called each other and he says, we're going to get this done.

1982
03:08:56,506 --> 03:08:58,506
I wrote it down in my little notebook here.

1983
03:08:58,506 --> 03:09:07,506
And I think actually that was the pendulum over swinging back and over correcting from the SegWit.

1984
03:09:07,506 --> 03:09:13,506
I think they were thinking, we don't want anyone to think that we will hold up this soft fork.

1985
03:09:13,506 --> 03:09:15,506
It's not going to be held up because of us.

1986
03:09:15,506 --> 03:09:18,506
So instead they did something else that you didn't like, which is they rushed it.

1987
03:09:18,506 --> 03:09:32,506
So I kind of think, yes, I'm not exactly sure what our North Star is supposed to be here, which I think what David was talking about is should there be like some actual process so that you know when someone is not following the process?

1988
03:09:32,506 --> 03:09:35,506
Because otherwise it's just kind of like everyone's just going to make it.

1989
03:09:36,506 --> 03:09:50,506
Your point, Francis, about like a secret 51% attack, like if that can be done, we used to have this view that like if you can attack Bitcoin in a certain way, it will be attacked like that.

1990
03:09:50,506 --> 03:09:55,506
So to me, it seems like we would benefit from a process that people should go through.

1991
03:09:56,506 --> 03:10:05,506
So that way, if someone does try to pull an attack like that, there are people realize that's not kosher and hit a red alarm or something like that.

1992
03:10:05,506 --> 03:10:14,506
It's not a terrible point. It's not a terrible point. It's a similar point than the ordinal spam attack where people are like, well, you know, if you can attack Bitcoin by spamming it, then we might as well do it right now.

1993
03:10:14,506 --> 03:10:17,506
The thing is also like we don't have fucking time for this shit.

1994
03:10:17,506 --> 03:10:28,506
Like there's no reason for us to go through to purposefully put ourselves through a 51% attack just so that we can learn that we can defend from a 51% attack.

1995
03:10:28,506 --> 03:10:30,506
Like people will lose money. We're going to lose a lot of time.

1996
03:10:30,506 --> 03:10:33,506
Like I lost like basically six months of my life with SegWit.

1997
03:10:33,506 --> 03:10:36,506
You know, I was going to fucking conferences all the time.

1998
03:10:36,506 --> 03:10:39,506
I was going to meetups. I was on Twitter almost every single day.

1999
03:10:39,506 --> 03:10:44,506
I was in chat rooms like we don't want to have to go through that.

2000
03:10:44,506 --> 03:10:55,506
I agree with you that if it happens, if, for example, there was a secret hard fork and then or a 51% attack or, you know, miners were to implement a blacklist or something like that.

2001
03:10:55,506 --> 03:10:59,506
And then we wanted to, you know, I don't know, invalidate certain miners.

2002
03:10:59,506 --> 03:11:03,506
We didn't always wanted to invalidate certain miners for another reason.

2003
03:11:03,506 --> 03:11:08,506
And we could demonstrate that the nodes can protect themselves from the miners in the long term.

2004
03:11:08,506 --> 03:11:17,506
I think it would probably be beneficial for Bitcoin, but it's kind of like saying like, I'm going to make myself sick right now so that I have any bodies in the future.

2005
03:11:17,506 --> 03:11:21,506
Well, it's like, I don't know. I don't feel like making ourselves sick.

2006
03:11:21,506 --> 03:11:25,506
I don't feel like we want to go through this like right now.

2007
03:11:25,506 --> 03:11:28,506
Everybody's honestly pretty fucking busy building their own stuff.

2008
03:11:28,506 --> 03:11:30,506
And we don't want to have to deal with this.

2009
03:11:30,506 --> 03:11:34,506
And Paul, to your point about the pendulum swing, there was two pendulum swings.

2010
03:11:34,506 --> 03:11:38,506
You're very correct that I think the miners, they were for Taproot.

2011
03:11:38,506 --> 03:11:40,506
They're like, oh, we're totally going to play ball with Bitcoin Core.

2012
03:11:40,506 --> 03:11:42,506
We're going to absolutely do what Bitcoin Core says.

2013
03:11:42,506 --> 03:11:44,506
We've learned our lesson.

2014
03:11:44,506 --> 03:11:54,506
And I think also Bitcoin Core had this pendulum swing where they were like, all right, it was a really, really traumatic event where we did, where we were opposed to miners.

2015
03:11:54,506 --> 03:12:01,506
And we don't want to have a lengthy activation process like we did for SegWit that was too long.

2016
03:12:01,506 --> 03:12:05,506
And because it was too long, there was too much opportunity for drama to happen.

2017
03:12:05,506 --> 03:12:13,506
And also, I think, you know, maybe the Bitcoin Core devs or some of these devs, they were like, well, in the end, the users actually don't even know what the fuck they're doing with SegWit and Taproot.

2018
03:12:14,506 --> 03:12:16,506
They don't understand any of this anyway.

2019
03:12:16,506 --> 03:12:19,506
So let's just get it done and let it get over.

2020
03:12:19,506 --> 03:12:29,506
So there was definitely a pendulum swing, both from the miners and both from the developer community, which I call the SegWit PTSD or the 4Core PTSD.

2021
03:12:29,506 --> 03:12:31,506
It's definitely a real thing.

2022
03:12:31,506 --> 03:12:35,506
People are still traumatized by the 4Core in the dev community.

2023
03:12:35,506 --> 03:12:46,506
And then, you know, there is that middle ground, which, you know, I should probably write it down at some point, which I propose, which is open BIP-8 for like two years or two and a half years or three years or something like that.

2024
03:12:46,506 --> 03:12:50,506
This gives people time to do the ERSF and to go back to the Coinbase example.

2025
03:12:50,506 --> 03:12:56,506
OK, let's say you, Paul, you run BIP-8 and then nobody, miners don't give a fuck.

2026
03:12:57,506 --> 03:13:07,506
OK, miners start to signal for BIP300 and then Coinbase joins BIP-8 and the miners suddenly get interested in BIP-8 because, oh, fuck it, we don't want to get forked off by Coinbase.

2027
03:13:07,506 --> 03:13:16,506
We have a lot of our coins, which are eventually being sold on Coinbase because whoever's buying the coins from us, a large portion of them are presumably going to sell them on Coinbase.

2028
03:13:16,506 --> 03:13:22,506
And Coinbase is custodian of a lot of other exchanges and Coinbase is a liquidity provider to a lot of exchanges.

2029
03:13:22,506 --> 03:13:30,506
I definitely recognize that the economic node ecosystem is highly, highly centralized at the custodial level, at the metacustodial level.

2030
03:13:30,506 --> 03:13:42,506
Like BitGo, for example, BitGo is probably the biggest economic node in the network because not only are exchanges big economic nodes, but they're not even nodes because they're not running their nodes.

2031
03:13:42,506 --> 03:13:45,506
BitGo is running their node for them and validating the inbound payments for them.

2032
03:13:46,506 --> 03:13:49,506
BitGo or an ETF.

2033
03:13:49,506 --> 03:13:51,506
Yeah, or an ETF, sure.

2034
03:13:51,506 --> 03:13:58,506
Although the ETF is probably a little different because the ETF is not like, I don't think they're accepting, they're validating inbound payments.

2035
03:13:58,506 --> 03:14:08,506
Of course, they would decide which chain they spend it on, but if you're just holding and not transacting a lot, you don't risk as much.

2036
03:14:08,506 --> 03:14:11,506
You can just do nothing, basically, and wait it out.

2037
03:14:11,506 --> 03:14:14,506
You don't have to put skin in the game for at least a few weeks.

2038
03:14:14,506 --> 03:14:18,506
GBTC could say, I'm not going to touch Bitcoins for a month until this is resolved.

2039
03:14:18,506 --> 03:14:24,506
Coinbase and BullBitcoin, we don't have a choice to make a stand on day one because people are making deposits every single day.

2040
03:14:24,506 --> 03:14:30,506
And we have to determine, well, is that deposit worth 30 grand or is that deposit worth a thousand bucks?

2041
03:14:30,506 --> 03:14:36,506
We have to choose which fork is the one that we're going to price as Bitcoin and the one that we're going to price as the altcoin.

2042
03:14:36,506 --> 03:14:43,506
But with BitAid, if Coinbase was to do that and people thought, okay, well, we don't trust.

2043
03:14:43,506 --> 03:14:52,506
And I think also, Paul, people are not very good at determining the pros and cons and the trade-offs of a soft fork.

2044
03:14:52,506 --> 03:14:58,506
I've been in Bitcoin forever, and I cannot articulate the downsides of drivechain against you.

2045
03:14:58,506 --> 03:15:03,506
You would smoke me, I don't understand it enough to have an opinion.

2046
03:15:03,506 --> 03:15:07,506
But people are actually quite good at sniffing out consensus.

2047
03:15:07,506 --> 03:15:14,506
So the average pleb on Twitter may not understand the trade-offs, but they are good at understanding consensus.

2048
03:15:14,506 --> 03:15:22,506
That's why people were supporting Taproot, even though they didn't know what it did and what the benefits were and what the downsides were.

2049
03:15:22,506 --> 03:15:28,506
People were still intuitively able to determine, okay, Taproot seems to have consensus.

2050
03:15:28,506 --> 03:15:31,506
But it has its own problem, though, of course.

2051
03:15:31,506 --> 03:15:34,506
Well, how is – I mean –

2052
03:15:34,506 --> 03:15:40,506
You can create the appearance of total consensus, and then it's self-perpetuating.

2053
03:15:40,506 --> 03:15:44,506
And then similarly, you can create – anyone can create the appearance of controversy.

2054
03:15:44,506 --> 03:15:46,506
That would be self-perpetuating, too.

2055
03:15:46,506 --> 03:15:49,506
They say, well, why are they pushing something controversial?

2056
03:15:49,506 --> 03:15:50,506
They must be –

2057
03:15:50,506 --> 03:15:52,506
This is why we use proof of work.

2058
03:15:52,506 --> 03:15:54,506
I mean, this is like – that's – yeah.

2059
03:15:55,506 --> 03:15:57,506
Well, I mean –

2060
03:15:57,506 --> 03:16:00,506
I did have something else that is so big that you may want to hear it.

2061
03:16:00,506 --> 03:16:01,506
It's a big idea.

2062
03:16:01,506 --> 03:16:02,506
It's kind of interesting.

2063
03:16:02,506 --> 03:16:03,506
Go ahead.

2064
03:16:03,506 --> 03:16:09,506
It relates to this idea of if there can be an attack on Bitcoin, then we should so that we build antibodies or whatever.

2065
03:16:09,506 --> 03:16:14,506
But it's bigger than that because it's an intriguing possibility.

2066
03:16:14,506 --> 03:16:15,506
I mean, I'll just share it with you.

2067
03:16:15,506 --> 03:16:16,506
I mean, hopefully you like it.

2068
03:16:16,506 --> 03:16:18,506
But it goes something like this.

2069
03:16:19,506 --> 03:16:25,506
Miners could activate something with like they have op-nop 5 or op-nop 6 or something.

2070
03:16:25,506 --> 03:16:27,506
We're talking about a soft fork where you –

2071
03:16:27,506 --> 03:16:33,506
Miners activate, and then it ends up being really bad for Bitcoin.

2072
03:16:33,506 --> 03:16:38,506
This idea refers to the miner's incentive to get it right.

2073
03:16:38,506 --> 03:16:40,506
Like the miner wants to get it right.

2074
03:16:40,506 --> 03:16:43,506
If the miner gets it wrong – I've expressed this idea already.

2075
03:16:44,506 --> 03:16:52,506
So like if the miners add something with op-nop 6 and then something goes wrong, the miners can then just ban op-nop 6 from being like –

2076
03:16:52,506 --> 03:16:57,506
you can't spend any money to op-nop 6, and then eventually you can't spend from op-nop 6.

2077
03:16:57,506 --> 03:17:01,506
They can just shut it off, and it would be as if it had never happened.

2078
03:17:01,506 --> 03:17:06,506
So in that sense, the miner has like an error correction option.

2079
03:17:06,506 --> 03:17:10,506
So you could try something, it's not working, and then untry it.

2080
03:17:10,506 --> 03:17:21,506
But of course, any serious person will now say, well, maybe something about it is like unfixable or brainwashes the miners, or maybe the miners like it, but it's not good for the nodes.

2081
03:17:22,506 --> 03:17:25,506
But this is the idea that I was going to bring up.

2082
03:17:25,506 --> 03:17:38,506
That also is not exactly a coherent, consistent belief because what it's basically saying is at some point an idea will come into the world, idea X.

2083
03:17:39,506 --> 03:17:44,506
And miners will want idea X, and then it will be good for miners and bad for nodes.

2084
03:17:44,506 --> 03:17:56,506
And either – like if it's an unblockable idea X, it kind of doesn't matter if I have the idea and it's called BIP300, or if the miners themselves have it and it's called something else.

2085
03:17:56,506 --> 03:17:59,506
Or if it's like someone – you know, the world is full of people having ideas.

2086
03:17:59,506 --> 03:18:07,506
It's kind of like if someone has an idea for op-nop-6 or something, it doesn't have an aura of inevitability about it, I think.

2087
03:18:07,506 --> 03:18:18,506
Which is like if this is the way to attack Bitcoin, and the miners think that they want it or something, then this sort of will inevitably happen.

2088
03:18:18,506 --> 03:18:35,506
It is possible, but in that case, the URSF scenario or the users opt into this new software that invalidates blocks of miners and punishes them by refusing them as valid blocks is also inevitable.

2089
03:18:37,138 --> 03:18:45,138
You know, from a very theoretical perspective, like as a – what do you call it? – a suspicious person, or there's a term for it, I forget.

2090
03:18:48,138 --> 03:18:53,138
Adversarial thinker, you can say, all right, like whatever attack is going to happen, so it's inevitable.

2091
03:18:53,138 --> 03:18:58,138
But you know, is your point like someone's going to attack Bitcoin, so it might as well be me?

2092
03:18:58,138 --> 03:19:02,138
You know, that's kind of like the UDI point for ordinals.

2093
03:19:03,138 --> 03:19:09,138
It was something like, why hold this against this change?

2094
03:19:09,138 --> 03:19:15,138
It's kind of like, if it's this easy to kill Bitcoin, then what are we all doing here?

2095
03:19:15,138 --> 03:19:17,138
So I think it was something like that.

2096
03:19:17,138 --> 03:19:28,138
It's not that easy to kill Bitcoin because the users would still have this mechanism, which is to invalidate evil miners.

2097
03:19:28,138 --> 03:19:31,138
It's just not something that we want to go through.

2098
03:19:32,138 --> 03:19:33,138
It really isn't.

2099
03:19:33,138 --> 03:19:40,138
It's like the best outcome is that consensus is determined like way beforehand.

2100
03:19:40,138 --> 03:19:42,138
I think we all agree on that.

2101
03:19:43,138 --> 03:19:51,138
There's an important disagreement, though, because it's kind of like people will not pay attention to the idea.

2102
03:19:51,138 --> 03:19:59,138
The idea is from 2015, so I see myself as having gone about obtaining consensus in an incredibly slow way.

2103
03:19:59,138 --> 03:20:00,138
But here's the thing.

2104
03:20:00,138 --> 03:20:04,138
It's just that everyone ignores it until Luke's pull request.

2105
03:20:04,138 --> 03:20:06,138
And then they say, why is everyone rushing this?

2106
03:20:06,138 --> 03:20:07,138
You know what I mean?

2107
03:20:07,138 --> 03:20:09,138
Because the idea is from November 2015.

2108
03:20:09,138 --> 03:20:13,138
I mean, honestly, people were still ignoring it after Luke's pull request.

2109
03:20:13,138 --> 03:20:16,138
I think it was like Dan Held tweeting about it that got people riled up.

2110
03:20:16,138 --> 03:20:18,138
To be honest, that's the way that I saw it.

2111
03:20:18,138 --> 03:20:22,138
I saw Luke's pull request and I was like, that's great.

2112
03:20:22,138 --> 03:20:24,138
Luke's getting paid to do something.

2113
03:20:24,138 --> 03:20:29,138
And it's pretty clear that he's not coding the activation client.

2114
03:20:29,138 --> 03:20:31,138
And it's pretty clear that it's not...

2115
03:20:31,138 --> 03:20:33,138
Details, of course.

2116
03:20:33,138 --> 03:20:38,138
That should benefit everyone that we say, well, this is the actual details of the proposal.

2117
03:20:38,138 --> 03:20:46,138
What actually drove the attention to Drivechain is like, okay, so whether or not you like Ordinals yourself,

2118
03:20:46,138 --> 03:20:48,138
people fucking hate Ordinals overall.

2119
03:20:48,138 --> 03:20:53,138
Because, yes, it may be good for miners and like miners made, I don't know, like a thousand bitcoins more.

2120
03:20:53,138 --> 03:20:58,138
But it's not people issuing the Ordinals that were paying the transaction fees to the miners.

2121
03:20:58,138 --> 03:21:04,138
It's not like the miners took the money from the Ordinals issuers and like, oh, the fucking scammers.

2122
03:21:04,138 --> 03:21:07,138
It's like all of us were paying those transaction fees.

2123
03:21:07,138 --> 03:21:08,138
All of us.

2124
03:21:08,138 --> 03:21:15,138
So anybody who's transacting on Bitcoin that is not of four Ordinals specifically is like against it.

2125
03:21:15,138 --> 03:21:18,138
Because they were paying a fucking ton of money on transaction fees.

2126
03:21:18,138 --> 03:21:20,138
Which, okay, it's inevitable one day.

2127
03:21:20,138 --> 03:21:21,138
Okay, fine.

2128
03:21:21,138 --> 03:21:23,138
But I mean, we paid it like this year.

2129
03:21:23,138 --> 03:21:25,138
Specifically non-custodial exchanges.

2130
03:21:25,138 --> 03:21:27,138
It was fucking brutal.

2131
03:21:27,138 --> 03:21:34,138
So when people saw that the Ordinals people were also promoting Drivechain,

2132
03:21:34,138 --> 03:21:37,138
I think that's what caused the...

2133
03:21:37,138 --> 03:21:40,138
I don't think it had anything to do with Luke's pull request.

2134
03:21:40,138 --> 03:21:45,138
I think it had everything to do with, you know, shit corners and grifters are suddenly paying attention to something.

2135
03:21:45,138 --> 03:21:47,138
And people are like, well, I don't like this person.

2136
03:21:47,138 --> 03:21:50,138
This person's opinions are usually very bad.

2137
03:21:50,138 --> 03:21:53,138
And they are supporting this Drivechain thing.

2138
03:21:53,138 --> 03:21:55,138
Let's look into this Drivechain.

2139
03:21:55,138 --> 03:21:57,138
I think that's probably what happened.

2140
03:21:57,138 --> 03:21:59,138
That's not really a true framing.

2141
03:21:59,138 --> 03:22:04,138
Because the same fucking thing happened to BIP119 and Jeremy Rubin.

2142
03:22:04,138 --> 03:22:08,138
And like, you know, I think there's...

2143
03:22:08,138 --> 03:22:12,138
I don't think there's ever going to be consensus on a soft fork again in the future.

2144
03:22:13,138 --> 03:22:18,138
I think that we're at the point where people's issues that they have with the soft fork include stuff like,

2145
03:22:18,138 --> 03:22:20,138
why are you rushing it?

2146
03:22:20,138 --> 03:22:23,138
Or why do we need this now?

2147
03:22:23,138 --> 03:22:25,138
Things that are not falsifiable.

2148
03:22:25,138 --> 03:22:28,138
So it's like, what's a legitimate...

2149
03:22:28,138 --> 03:22:30,138
How do you push back on something like that?

2150
03:22:30,138 --> 03:22:32,138
It can't be proven wrong.

2151
03:22:32,138 --> 03:22:35,138
It's just like an opinion with, yeah, no counterfactual.

2152
03:22:36,138 --> 03:22:43,138
There has to be a mechanism to battle these topics out where consensus can actually be determined.

2153
03:22:43,138 --> 03:22:44,138
There just has to be.

2154
03:22:44,138 --> 03:22:47,138
Or otherwise, we're going to get to this point where everything's fucking frozen.

2155
03:22:47,138 --> 03:22:51,138
And if you take a step back and you just look at it big picture,

2156
03:22:51,138 --> 03:22:53,138
we had fucking SegWit.

2157
03:22:53,138 --> 03:22:57,138
Then we had Taproot.

2158
03:22:57,138 --> 03:22:59,138
Then we had...

2159
03:22:59,138 --> 03:23:02,138
Now we've had two different BIPs that have come up since then.

2160
03:23:02,138 --> 03:23:06,138
Both of those have been shouted down and shut down.

2161
03:23:06,138 --> 03:23:15,138
I think the community is searching for an activation method and path forward,

2162
03:23:15,138 --> 03:23:17,138
and it's getting harder to find one.

2163
03:23:17,138 --> 03:23:20,138
And I would just say in general with BIP300,

2164
03:23:20,138 --> 03:23:22,138
if BIP300 is going to be a thing,

2165
03:23:22,138 --> 03:23:29,138
I think there are very strong feelings from the critics of BIP300 about how things should be activated.

2166
03:23:29,138 --> 03:23:32,138
Those ideas need to be injected into the conversation,

2167
03:23:32,138 --> 03:23:36,138
because if BIP300 is successful in getting activated,

2168
03:23:36,138 --> 03:23:39,138
it's going to lay a path for other BIPs to go down.

2169
03:23:39,138 --> 03:23:44,138
So we're creating a framework of how shit is going to work going forward that's contentious.

2170
03:23:46,138 --> 03:23:52,138
The main difference with BIP300 is that the contention against it is not towards the activation method.

2171
03:23:53,138 --> 03:23:59,138
The contention towards the activation method of BIP300 is pretty much the last three days.

2172
03:24:01,138 --> 03:24:06,138
It's pretty much from your tweets about miners talking about activating BIP300,

2173
03:24:06,138 --> 03:24:08,138
and it's coming mostly from me.

2174
03:24:08,138 --> 03:24:14,138
So most of the actual contention against BIP300 is completely unrelated to the activation method,

2175
03:24:14,138 --> 03:24:18,138
which is a huge difference from Taproot and BIP 119.

2176
03:24:18,138 --> 03:24:21,138
BIP 119 was absolutely based on the activation method.

2177
03:24:21,138 --> 03:24:28,138
And then you had James O'Brien put OP_VAULT,

2178
03:24:28,138 --> 03:24:32,138
and when I looked at the OP_VAULT BIP, it said in the BIP,

2179
03:24:32,138 --> 03:24:35,138
well, we should activate this just like we activated Taproot, which was a speedy trial.

2180
03:24:35,138 --> 03:24:38,138
And then there was some backlash to OP_VAULT,

2181
03:24:38,138 --> 03:24:44,138
and I think James got a lot of flack, maybe mostly from me, I guess,

2182
03:24:44,138 --> 03:24:49,138
because it was implied or suggested that it would be a speedy trial.

2183
03:24:49,138 --> 03:24:54,138
And no one has committed to any activation method for BIP300

2184
03:24:54,138 --> 03:24:58,138
other than the anonymous miner that you just talked about on Twitter.

2185
03:24:58,138 --> 03:25:02,138
The only thing that we've heard is there is a miner who's like,

2186
03:25:02,138 --> 03:25:04,138
fuck it, I'm going to run the software.

2187
03:25:04,138 --> 03:25:09,138
I'm suggesting that that's an opportunity for the critics of BIP300

2188
03:25:09,138 --> 03:25:14,138
to improve the process for activation going forward.

2189
03:25:14,138 --> 03:25:17,138
I'm not saying that activation is the specific concern with BIP300.

2190
03:25:17,138 --> 03:25:22,138
Well, BIP300 is not the right one because it clearly does not have consensus yet.

2191
03:25:22,138 --> 03:25:27,138
I'm not saying it will never, perhaps in 10 years, perhaps in 5 years, perhaps.

2192
03:25:27,138 --> 03:25:31,138
Is that not the right type of BIP to do this on?

2193
03:25:31,138 --> 03:25:36,138
It's CTV. I think it's CTV. I think it's BIP 119.

2194
03:25:36,138 --> 03:25:42,138
I guess my question is, do we not want a BIP in which there is people who are resistant to it,

2195
03:25:42,138 --> 03:25:46,138
where we can trial a way for them to express their resistance and shut it down?

2196
03:25:46,138 --> 03:25:50,138
I don't really fucking care if at the end of the day BIP300 doesn't go through,

2197
03:25:50,138 --> 03:25:52,138
if the community doesn't want it.

2198
03:25:52,138 --> 03:25:57,138
I think we should minimize conflict. I think we should minimize conflict for a while.

2199
03:25:57,138 --> 03:26:00,138
I don't think we need conflict at this point.

2200
03:26:00,138 --> 03:26:04,138
I think having conflict now is not better than having conflict in 5 years.

2201
03:26:04,138 --> 03:26:07,138
I don't think it's like a kid that you want to get them sick when they're younger

2202
03:26:07,138 --> 03:26:16,138
because it's not like some disease that is worse for older people.

2203
03:26:16,138 --> 03:26:21,138
If we can avoid conflict, that's the best outcome.

2204
03:26:21,138 --> 03:26:24,138
But I think we're in conflict right now.

2205
03:26:24,138 --> 03:26:28,138
No, I don't think so. I don't think there's serious conflict

2206
03:26:28,138 --> 03:26:30,138
because Paul hasn't even put out an activation client yet.

2207
03:26:30,138 --> 03:26:34,138
Right now it's just rhetoric. There's no conflict.

2208
03:26:35,138 --> 03:26:37,138
There's a looming potential.

2209
03:26:37,138 --> 03:26:41,138
I think this is not David's point, and also I just want to point out my app is frozen again,

2210
03:26:41,138 --> 03:26:44,138
so it will probably crash soon. So sorry about that.

2211
03:26:44,138 --> 03:26:51,138
The other thing is though, I think when David's pointing out that there's no process,

2212
03:26:51,138 --> 03:26:54,138
that doesn't mean there's no process in the open,

2213
03:26:54,138 --> 03:26:56,138
but that doesn't mean that there's no process

2214
03:26:56,138 --> 03:27:00,138
because this is like when people feel like democracy doesn't work

2215
03:27:00,138 --> 03:27:03,138
or their activism doesn't work, then they just riot.

2216
03:27:03,138 --> 03:27:04,138
You know what I mean?

2217
03:27:04,138 --> 03:27:09,138
You can't just say there's no process and then expect the status quo to hold

2218
03:27:09,138 --> 03:27:16,138
because if there's no process, that is what will trigger some kind of insane bad process

2219
03:27:16,138 --> 03:27:18,138
that actually no one wants.

2220
03:27:18,138 --> 03:27:21,138
So you can't fight the fact that there's no process.

2221
03:27:21,138 --> 03:27:26,138
If people just say, well, we'll just have the status quo for a while, for five years,

2222
03:27:27,138 --> 03:27:31,138
and why have conflict?

2223
03:27:31,138 --> 03:27:33,138
But it's like you don't get to choose.

2224
03:27:33,138 --> 03:27:34,138
You know what I mean?

2225
03:27:34,138 --> 03:27:39,138
Someone declares war on your country, you can't just say, I choose not to have conflict.

2226
03:27:39,138 --> 03:27:45,138
Well, yeah, but what David's saying is that he wants the opponents of BIP300 to suggest a process.

2227
03:27:45,138 --> 03:27:50,138
Obviously, Paul, you're the one who's supposed to suggest this is how I want to activate.

2228
03:27:50,138 --> 03:27:55,138
I think at this point, unless you want to debate it again further,

2229
03:27:55,138 --> 03:28:00,138
you may want to because right now, I mean, there seems to be a kind of momentum.

2230
03:28:00,138 --> 03:28:03,138
You may want to wait a little bit before you try to activate,

2231
03:28:03,138 --> 03:28:06,138
just as a friendly advice if you really want this to go through.

2232
03:28:06,138 --> 03:28:11,138
But I mean, it should be up to you to be like, all right, this is the activation.

2233
03:28:11,138 --> 03:28:14,138
And we've talked about it for a while.

2234
03:28:14,138 --> 03:28:18,138
And now it's time to make the final bet.

2235
03:28:18,138 --> 03:28:24,138
If you want to use the poker analogy, it's like, all right, I'm putting my bet or I'm folding.

2236
03:28:24,138 --> 03:28:31,138
But certainly not as the opponents of BIP300 that are going to suggest the best path forward for BIP300.

2237
03:28:31,138 --> 03:28:35,138
I think if we're going to use a BIP to have an activation method,

2238
03:28:35,138 --> 03:28:40,138
which I believe is the most appropriate one, the least conflictual,

2239
03:28:40,138 --> 03:28:45,138
or not necessarily the least conflictual, because obviously, speedy trial is the least conflictual.

2240
03:28:45,138 --> 03:28:53,138
But the most, I guess, decentralization preserving, we should do that with CTV.

2241
03:28:53,138 --> 03:28:58,138
Because CTV has at this point, like Lex was saying,

2242
03:28:58,138 --> 03:29:03,138
there is not a lot of legitimate and credible opposition to CTV.

2243
03:29:03,138 --> 03:29:08,138
Other than the speedy trial, which is a separate thing.

2244
03:29:08,138 --> 03:29:11,138
It does seem to have some level of consensus.

2245
03:29:11,138 --> 03:29:22,138
And thanks to them, what CTV has missing is an app that's actually ready for production.

2246
03:29:22,138 --> 03:29:27,138
I think there are probably some, I haven't looked into that too much.

2247
03:29:27,138 --> 03:29:36,138
And as you said, what worries me the most is not a specific BIP300 activation method.

2248
03:29:36,138 --> 03:29:40,138
As you said, it's like there is potentially a secret one that we're not aware of.

2249
03:29:40,138 --> 03:29:43,138
And I see tweets, for example, from Udi.

2250
03:29:43,138 --> 03:29:46,138
I saw a tweet, a screenshot today.

2251
03:29:46,138 --> 03:29:48,138
I don't know what the context was, but it was like,

2252
03:29:48,138 --> 03:29:53,138
laser-eyed maxis are about to learn a very important lesson in consensus.

2253
03:29:53,138 --> 03:29:55,138
The soft fork is definitely coming.

2254
03:29:55,138 --> 03:29:58,138
You know, I don't know, is he fucking trolling?

2255
03:29:58,138 --> 03:30:00,138
Is he trolling?

2256
03:30:00,138 --> 03:30:04,138
Is he friends with F2Pool? I don't know.

2257
03:30:04,138 --> 03:30:07,138
I will tell you this.

2258
03:30:07,138 --> 03:30:10,138
I don't know, I have no idea what he's referring to there.

2259
03:30:10,138 --> 03:30:17,138
But I think Udi is, just from having spoken to him over the last 12 months,

2260
03:30:17,138 --> 03:30:22,138
I can tell that he is a fan of the fake accompli.

2261
03:30:22,138 --> 03:30:25,138
As like, you know, he's like that with Organos.

2262
03:30:25,138 --> 03:30:26,138
He's like, well, we just did it.

2263
03:30:26,138 --> 03:30:29,138
And if he would have said, if we had asked for permission from Organos,

2264
03:30:29,138 --> 03:30:31,138
people would have stopped us.

2265
03:30:31,138 --> 03:30:33,138
He's the exact character that Paul was talking about,

2266
03:30:33,138 --> 03:30:38,138
where when you don't have guardrails or a system in place, anarchy reigns.

2267
03:30:38,138 --> 03:30:41,138
And he's like the joker who thrives in an environment like that.

2268
03:30:42,138 --> 03:30:47,138
And I think the framing that Paul gave it is like an election.

2269
03:30:47,138 --> 03:30:50,138
The only way consensus is determined in Bitcoin is by the hash rate.

2270
03:30:50,138 --> 03:30:53,138
That's the violent path.

2271
03:30:53,138 --> 03:30:56,138
If we're going to layer rules on top of that,

2272
03:30:56,138 --> 03:31:00,138
and try to be more civil and gentlemanly about it,

2273
03:31:00,138 --> 03:31:06,138
then both sides of a topic need to be aligned on how an election works.

2274
03:31:06,138 --> 03:31:09,138
Both sides have to buy into the legitimacy of the process,

2275
03:31:09,138 --> 03:31:11,138
or otherwise it's just going to devolve to the violent process.

2276
03:31:11,138 --> 03:31:14,138
I'm just going to say that that's not entirely correct,

2277
03:31:14,138 --> 03:31:21,138
because if 90% of the hash was to switch to a version of Bitcoin,

2278
03:31:21,138 --> 03:31:25,138
which is either 2x block size or is printing more Bitcoin,

2279
03:31:25,138 --> 03:31:27,138
it wouldn't work.

2280
03:31:27,138 --> 03:31:31,138
That wouldn't determine what is Bitcoin.

2281
03:31:31,138 --> 03:31:32,138
You know what I mean?

2282
03:31:32,138 --> 03:31:35,138
But if 95% of the hash rate did that,

2283
03:31:35,138 --> 03:31:37,138
and Coinbase and Binance supported it,

2284
03:31:37,138 --> 03:31:39,138
that would determine it.

2285
03:31:39,138 --> 03:31:41,138
No, it's still not Bitcoin.

2286
03:31:41,138 --> 03:31:46,138
If you would change the rules of Bitcoin to a degree which is obviously non-consensual,

2287
03:31:46,138 --> 03:31:52,138
even if you have 100 Bitcoin exchanges and 95% of the hash rates,

2288
03:31:52,138 --> 03:31:55,138
there is something that's not quantifiable,

2289
03:31:55,138 --> 03:31:58,138
that you have to use your judgment on,

2290
03:31:58,138 --> 03:32:02,138
which is if the exchanges and the miners decide to print more Bitcoin,

2291
03:32:02,138 --> 03:32:04,138
it's just not Bitcoin.

2292
03:32:05,138 --> 03:32:09,138
I don't have a logical reasoning behind it,

2293
03:32:09,138 --> 03:32:11,138
other than we all know it's not Bitcoin.

2294
03:32:11,138 --> 03:32:15,138
I think I understand what you're saying,

2295
03:32:15,138 --> 03:32:17,138
and I think David probably does also,

2296
03:32:17,138 --> 03:32:20,138
because we all see in Bitcoin something.

2297
03:32:20,138 --> 03:32:23,138
Even Bitcoin today is not really Bitcoin.

2298
03:32:23,138 --> 03:32:26,138
What Bitcoin is is a vision for the future.

2299
03:32:26,138 --> 03:32:29,138
It's like this abstract thing.

2300
03:32:30,138 --> 03:32:34,138
So it's kind of like a near versus far, abstract versus concrete thing.

2301
03:32:34,138 --> 03:32:36,138
But I think what David is saying,

2302
03:32:36,138 --> 03:32:39,138
and what I think you would also agree with, Francis,

2303
03:32:39,138 --> 03:32:45,138
is that if you really do have 95% hash rate and some large exchanges,

2304
03:32:45,138 --> 03:32:51,138
and we're using the word Bitcoin to describe something on Monday,

2305
03:32:51,138 --> 03:32:53,138
this was Roger Ver's problem.

2306
03:32:53,138 --> 03:32:57,138
They tried to get Bitcoin in the ticker for Bitcoin Cash,

2307
03:32:57,138 --> 03:32:59,138
but words don't really work that way.

2308
03:32:59,138 --> 03:33:03,138
A word has to refer to something on Tuesday that it refers to on Monday,

2309
03:33:03,138 --> 03:33:05,138
otherwise people get really annoyed.

2310
03:33:05,138 --> 03:33:07,138
So I don't know where that would leave,

2311
03:33:07,138 --> 03:33:09,138
the intersection of all those different effects,

2312
03:33:09,138 --> 03:33:17,138
but it really would be the case that one thing would just be sticky enough.

2313
03:33:20,138 --> 03:33:25,138
There are things that are not to the core identity of Bitcoin,

2314
03:33:25,138 --> 03:33:26,138
like script type.

2315
03:33:26,138 --> 03:33:29,138
And that's maybe why Taproot got a free pass,

2316
03:33:29,138 --> 03:33:31,138
even though people didn't understand it,

2317
03:33:31,138 --> 03:33:32,138
and it was Russian.

2318
03:33:32,138 --> 03:33:35,138
It didn't have the same flag that you're getting.

2319
03:33:35,138 --> 03:33:37,138
SegWit as well.

2320
03:33:39,138 --> 03:33:42,138
But there are some things that are at the core of Bitcoin

2321
03:33:42,138 --> 03:33:44,138
that the layman understands.

2322
03:33:44,138 --> 03:33:50,138
And one of the reasons why BIP300 is getting so much flack versus Taproot

2323
03:33:50,138 --> 03:33:52,138
is that it's touching the miner incentives.

2324
03:33:52,138 --> 03:33:54,138
So miner incentives.

2325
03:33:54,138 --> 03:33:57,138
People believe that it is, but it really…

2326
03:33:57,138 --> 03:33:58,138
I know. I don't know.

2327
03:33:58,138 --> 03:34:00,138
I know you believe it doesn't.

2328
03:34:00,138 --> 03:34:02,138
I know you believe it doesn't.

2329
03:34:02,138 --> 03:34:04,138
It improves the miner incentives.

2330
03:34:04,138 --> 03:34:06,138
It saves the miner incentives in a way.

2331
03:34:06,138 --> 03:34:08,138
It's the only extent that it changes them.

2332
03:34:08,138 --> 03:34:10,138
It gives an opportunity to make huge amounts of money.

2333
03:34:10,138 --> 03:34:12,138
It doesn't affect L1.

2334
03:34:12,138 --> 03:34:15,138
So this is a meme that is spreading, unfortunately.

2335
03:34:15,138 --> 03:34:20,138
It has an effect on the economics of Bitcoin.

2336
03:34:20,138 --> 03:34:23,138
Your contention is that it's good.

2337
03:34:23,138 --> 03:34:24,138
Yes.

2338
03:34:24,138 --> 03:34:28,138
But you understand that because it's established that it has an effect

2339
03:34:28,138 --> 03:34:30,138
on the economics of Bitcoin,

2340
03:34:30,138 --> 03:34:31,138
it is understandable that people are like,

2341
03:34:31,138 --> 03:34:34,138
well, maybe it has a downside on the economics of Bitcoin.

2342
03:34:34,138 --> 03:34:40,138
Whereas SegWit arguably did have an effect on the economics of Bitcoin,

2343
03:34:40,138 --> 03:34:42,138
but we didn't really foresee that,

2344
03:34:42,138 --> 03:34:46,138
which was people using the Witness signatures to store JPEGs.

2345
03:34:46,138 --> 03:34:50,138
Had we known that in advance, for example,

2346
03:34:50,138 --> 03:34:52,138
that was not part of the contract,

2347
03:34:52,138 --> 03:34:54,138
like the social contract of SegWit.

2348
03:34:54,138 --> 03:34:55,138
You know what I mean?

2349
03:34:55,138 --> 03:34:58,138
The social contract of SegWit is we're going to fix malleability,

2350
03:34:58,138 --> 03:35:00,138
which allows us to have lightning.

2351
03:35:00,138 --> 03:35:04,138
It's also going to be easier to spam Bitcoin.

2352
03:35:04,138 --> 03:35:10,138
There is an informal understanding that this is the core contract,

2353
03:35:10,138 --> 03:35:12,138
the identity of Bitcoin.

2354
03:35:12,138 --> 03:35:13,138
It's decentralized.

2355
03:35:13,138 --> 03:35:15,138
It's this.

2356
03:35:15,138 --> 03:35:18,138
There's a delicate balance between miners and nodes.

2357
03:35:18,138 --> 03:35:22,138
The incentives and mining incentives are pretty clear to anybody

2358
03:35:22,138 --> 03:35:24,138
that studies it for more than three or four months.

2359
03:35:24,138 --> 03:35:28,138
You can be a layman and understand these incentives reasonably well

2360
03:35:28,138 --> 03:35:32,138
without understanding how script works and how the block formats work

2361
03:35:32,138 --> 03:35:33,138
and all that.

2362
03:35:33,138 --> 03:35:37,138
So that is why B300 is getting more flack

2363
03:35:37,138 --> 03:35:41,138
because it does have an effect on the economics of Bitcoin.

2364
03:35:41,138 --> 03:35:50,138
Whereas the other soft forks, they might, but it's unknown.

2365
03:35:50,138 --> 03:35:53,138
Whereas for Drivechain, it's known.

2366
03:35:53,138 --> 03:35:58,138
It will affect the incentives of miners in maybe a positive way,

2367
03:35:58,138 --> 03:36:00,138
but also maybe a negative way.

2368
03:36:00,138 --> 03:36:04,138
I think it was always part of the vision for Bitcoin.

2369
03:36:04,138 --> 03:36:07,138
This is, of course, the territory of what is the vision for Bitcoin.

2370
03:36:08,138 --> 03:36:11,138
If Jenobi is here, we will get to him in a second.

2371
03:36:11,138 --> 03:36:15,138
But I think it was always part of the vision for Bitcoin.

2372
03:36:15,138 --> 03:36:19,138
Sidechains was part of the vision for Bitcoin at one point,

2373
03:36:19,138 --> 03:36:23,138
and it was certainly part of Bitcoin's vision to dominate the world

2374
03:36:23,138 --> 03:36:29,138
and take on enormous influence and be used by lots of people.

2375
03:36:29,138 --> 03:36:33,138
Generally, sidechains has been part of the vision for Bitcoin

2376
03:36:33,138 --> 03:36:35,138
for at least a while.

2377
03:36:36,138 --> 03:36:40,138
Merge mining, whether we like it or not,

2378
03:36:40,138 --> 03:36:44,138
was part of the original inventor's vision for Bitcoin.

2379
03:36:44,138 --> 03:36:47,138
However, hashrate escrow is not.

2380
03:36:47,138 --> 03:36:52,138
Hashrate escrow is the component that people are...

2381
03:36:54,138 --> 03:36:58,138
And also the fact that we need to change Bitcoin's rules

2382
03:36:58,138 --> 03:37:03,138
to satisfy a business case, essentially.

2383
03:37:04,138 --> 03:37:08,138
The sidechain idea was the SPV proof.

2384
03:37:08,138 --> 03:37:10,138
So it's really a hashrate escrow.

2385
03:37:10,138 --> 03:37:12,138
It's not quite the same, of course,

2386
03:37:12,138 --> 03:37:15,138
but the SPV proof was like the Blockstream,

2387
03:37:15,138 --> 03:37:20,138
white paper, sidechain definition, as I remember.

2388
03:37:20,138 --> 03:37:23,138
So hashrate is like a type of that.

2389
03:37:23,138 --> 03:37:27,138
Can I lob one grenade in this conversation, another grenade,

2390
03:37:27,138 --> 03:37:32,138
which I think is a real part of the resistance to BIP300,

2391
03:37:32,138 --> 03:37:38,138
is the pervasive cultural attitude and identity

2392
03:37:38,138 --> 03:37:44,138
that has come to Bitcoin of hating and despising shitcoiners.

2393
03:37:45,138 --> 03:37:48,138
Yes, that's a great attitude.

2394
03:37:48,138 --> 03:37:54,138
And the framing of BIP300 as shitcoin technology

2395
03:37:54,138 --> 03:37:57,138
because as an opt-in system,

2396
03:37:57,138 --> 03:37:59,138
it gives users the ability to do things

2397
03:37:59,138 --> 03:38:03,138
that other users look down upon or don't like.

2398
03:38:04,138 --> 03:38:10,138
I think that that's a real part of this.

2399
03:38:10,138 --> 03:38:13,138
I think it's a complicated part of it.

2400
03:38:13,138 --> 03:38:15,138
And I think that when we talk about,

2401
03:38:15,138 --> 03:38:19,138
at the end of the day, how is consensus determined

2402
03:38:19,138 --> 03:38:21,138
or who gets to make up what Bitcoin is?

2403
03:38:21,138 --> 03:38:23,138
I've been taking heat for this,

2404
03:38:23,138 --> 03:38:26,138
but my view is that it's the users.

2405
03:38:26,138 --> 03:38:27,138
It's the users of Bitcoin.

2406
03:38:27,138 --> 03:38:29,138
It's the people who pay fees.

2407
03:38:29,138 --> 03:38:33,138
They may aggregate themselves into one large economic node,

2408
03:38:33,138 --> 03:38:35,138
but it's the people that actually use Bitcoin.

2409
03:38:35,138 --> 03:38:38,138
And a lot of those users...

2410
03:38:39,468 --> 03:38:43,468
We're extremely dismissive of. I mean, we're extremely dismissive of.

2411
03:38:43,468 --> 03:39:04,468
And so I don't know. I do think that there is cultural misalignment between the people that actually operate Bitcoin and the masses, the tens of millions of people that actually pay transaction fees and actually kind of make the whole business of Bitcoin tick.

2412
03:39:04,468 --> 03:39:06,468
So I just want to surface that issue.

2413
03:39:07,468 --> 03:39:26,468
Real quick, David, before we move too far past things, I have two things to say to two prior topics. One, Paul, your claim that BIP300 and 301 don't alter miner incentives, that is just objectively, factually false.

2414
03:39:26,468 --> 03:39:52,468
The entire having an independent ordering for sidechain blocks that can have conflicting states on the main chain absolutely alters the incentives by allowing mainchain miners to reorg sidechain blocks, both without having to redo any work and lose the money for past work, but two, without taking money from the miner who, air quote, mined it last time.

2415
03:39:52,468 --> 03:39:58,468
Because without sourcing block production, that outsourced person pays the original miner.

2416
03:39:59,468 --> 03:40:22,468
Every other miner can see that there was an anomalously high fee there, and then they can simply reorg the sidechain without reorging the mainchain, claim that money themselves on the sidechain without taking it from the miner who received it on the mainchain for the prior block, which is a huge disincentive for anybody as an outsourced block constructor to take that risk.

2417
03:40:23,468 --> 03:40:27,468
And it's completely risk-free for a miner, because they can just do it themselves.

2418
03:40:28,468 --> 03:40:33,468
And also, miners can try to do that amongst themselves, even if it's only miners doing this.

2419
03:40:34,468 --> 03:40:40,468
So it drastically alters, just through that mechanism alone, mining incentives.

2420
03:40:41,468 --> 03:40:55,468
And two, what you guys were saying earlier in regards to trying to push BIP300 and 301 through just to test contentious changes, like, are you guys even listening to yourself?

2421
03:40:55,468 --> 03:41:16,468
Instead of doing something productive, instead of moving forward with things there are consensus for, or with at least wider consensus than something like drivechains, and actually enabling productive changes people will use right now, we should waste our time trying to ram something through with no consensus just to see what happens?

2422
03:41:17,468 --> 03:41:18,468
That's fucking insane.

2423
03:41:19,468 --> 03:41:31,468
That's not what was being suggested. What was being suggested is that we have a mechanism for contentious topics to be rejected by the community, rather than just people on Twitter saying, I reject this idea, because that is not...

2424
03:41:32,468 --> 03:41:45,468
Well, I mean, I didn't just say I reject that idea, David, I just factually went through how it significantly alters the entire miner incentive structure, which Paul repeatedly denies, and that's a substantial criticism.

2425
03:41:46,468 --> 03:41:49,468
Where's the response to that? Besides, you're wrong, facelessly.

2426
03:41:50,468 --> 03:42:01,468
Let's talk about that issue. I'm not really making a statement about BIP300, it could be BIP119, it could be any of the BIPs that come in the future. It's just like there's always going to be people that are detractors of any BIP at this point.

2427
03:42:01,468 --> 03:42:15,468
Yeah, but David, this is an established thing. There is an established process for this. It's called rough consensus. It's what the Internet Engineering Task Force uses, which is how it was actually adopted for the process of Bitcoin development.

2428
03:42:16,468 --> 03:42:38,468
There is no voting, there is no convinced people, how many are there? Unconvinced people, how many are there? It's substantial arguments. Is there a substantial criticism or worry of harm that has not been addressed, either through a modification to solve that problem, or through showing that that problem doesn't really exist? That's the criteria.

2429
03:42:39,468 --> 03:42:42,468
And right now, drivechain does not meet that criteria.

2430
03:42:43,468 --> 03:42:56,468
So, separate from drivechain, what happens if you get to the point where someone is of the view that all the substantive arguments have been addressed, and that the remaining criticism is not valid, and the people who have that criticism have the other view?

2431
03:42:57,468 --> 03:43:10,468
That's always how it's going to be. You ignore them, and you move on. You see what happens then. But until you've reached that point, we're still at the phase of what are the problems, and have they been addressed?

2432
03:43:11,468 --> 03:43:12,468
That's fair.

2433
03:43:13,468 --> 03:43:32,468
On that topic, there isn't even an activation proposal, and I've already spent seven hours on this, so if ever there actually was an activation proposal for this, as Shinobi said, it is a fucking huge time sink. Huge, huge, huge, for people who are building in Bitcoin and care about it.

2434
03:43:32,468 --> 03:43:42,468
So, on this note, I'm going to leave you guys. Great to talk, David, and Paul. That was a good conversation. So, thanks for your time, guys.

2435
03:43:43,468 --> 03:43:55,468
Hey, Francis, before you bounce, I just want to say thank you for joining the space, and I know Twitter can get heated. Well, he's gone. All right. Love, Francis.

2436
03:43:56,468 --> 03:44:03,468
So, Shinobi, your example was basically something like the L2 blockchain can reorg.

2437
03:44:04,468 --> 03:44:09,468
That's all you took away from that point of criticism?

2438
03:44:10,468 --> 03:44:16,468
No, I was just trying to zero in on it. So, what exactly is it that you're complaining about?

2439
03:44:17,468 --> 03:44:23,468
I literally just went through that. Did you ignore me?

2440
03:44:23,468 --> 03:44:32,468
No, I don't think so. I think you said something like mainchain can reorg the sidechain without reorging the mainchain. They can claim fees.

2441
03:44:33,468 --> 03:44:38,468
Seriously, Paul? This is what we're going to do?

2442
03:44:39,468 --> 03:44:47,468
Well, I mean, this is where I say seriously also, because I think you're like a fake critic many times. I'm just asking you to explain whatever your critique is.

2443
03:44:47,468 --> 03:44:53,468
No, you're asking me to explain for the second time instead of responding to it. But okay, we'll play this game.

2444
03:44:54,468 --> 03:45:07,468
When there is an anomalously high spike in fees on a drivechain, the outsourced block constructor has to pay real on-chain Bitcoin to collect that and a profit margin on it.

2445
03:45:08,468 --> 03:45:17,468
When people see that, the miner of the next block, he can just redo that block and claim those coins on the sidechain instead.

2446
03:45:18,468 --> 03:45:23,468
And he has an incentive to do that because it's an anomalously high block that he missed out on.

2447
03:45:24,468 --> 03:45:31,468
And there is no real big disincentive because he doesn't waste any of his work taking the mainchain backwards.

2448
03:45:31,468 --> 03:45:37,468
And he also does not disrupt the other miner who claimed the mainchain funds for the last block.

2449
03:45:38,468 --> 03:45:42,468
So there's really no big negative consequences for doing that.

2450
03:45:43,468 --> 03:45:46,468
And if the incentives are there for that, it's probably going to happen.

2451
03:45:47,468 --> 03:45:54,468
And if that becomes normal, who is going to risk being an outsourced block constructor for the sidechain?

2452
03:45:55,468 --> 03:45:57,468
No one. It'll just be the miners doing it.

2453
03:45:58,468 --> 03:46:07,468
And then we're back at that situation where the incentives have taken us that miners wind up doing this themselves because no one else will.

2454
03:46:08,468 --> 03:46:10,468
Because there's an incentive to do that that's more profitable.

2455
03:46:11,468 --> 03:46:14,468
And you do have those centralization pressures.

2456
03:46:15,468 --> 03:46:18,468
But it does boil down to the fact that they're just real.

2457
03:46:19,468 --> 03:46:24,468
It's like the long run future of Bitcoin where there's no block subsidy and it's fees only.

2458
03:46:24,468 --> 03:46:26,468
And this is called fee sniping.

2459
03:46:27,468 --> 03:46:30,468
And this is the fate that awaits Bitcoin L1.

2460
03:46:31,468 --> 03:46:33,468
And it will be on the drivechain immediately.

2461
03:46:34,468 --> 03:46:35,468
Well, you're asserting that.

2462
03:46:36,468 --> 03:46:40,468
You're presupposing that with a bunch of assumptions that you're not even defending.

2463
03:46:41,468 --> 03:46:50,468
And two, you're ignoring the fact that with drivechains, this dynamic removes most of the negative externalities that that behavior imposes on miners.

2464
03:46:51,468 --> 03:46:53,468
No, I don't think so at all.

2465
03:46:54,468 --> 03:47:00,468
I think I'm trying to explain to you that what you're describing is just reorg risk on L2.

2466
03:47:01,468 --> 03:47:07,468
And it may impact how much the person is willing to pay on the BMM conveyor.

2467
03:47:08,468 --> 03:47:13,468
But if so, then miners will wonder about why that is and what they can do to get more money.

2468
03:47:14,468 --> 03:47:15,468
So I mean, I guess in that sense...

2469
03:47:16,468 --> 03:47:18,468
Or they'll just turn the nodes on themselves.

2470
03:47:19,468 --> 03:47:21,468
Yeah, but they may if that's very cheap now.

2471
03:47:22,468 --> 03:47:27,468
No, again, you can't assert that because it's totally unbounded.

2472
03:47:28,468 --> 03:47:30,468
The resource cost, block size, etc.

2473
03:47:31,468 --> 03:47:37,468
If it's cheap, they'll do whatever makes them the most money.

2474
03:47:38,468 --> 03:47:42,468
So that's not really changing miner incentives from my point of view.

2475
03:47:43,468 --> 03:47:51,468
See, when I use the changing miner incentives phrase, I'm zooming out and I'm looking at miners have done many things.

2476
03:47:52,468 --> 03:47:53,468
There was a time before ASICs.

2477
03:47:54,468 --> 03:47:55,468
There was a time before pools.

2478
03:47:56,468 --> 03:47:58,468
There was a time before immersion cooling.

2479
03:47:59,468 --> 03:48:02,468
So I say, what does it really mean to change miner incentives?

2480
03:48:03,468 --> 03:48:11,468
I mean, like some situation where they would want to censor transactions or do reorgs or something, some new kind of thing.

2481
03:48:12,468 --> 03:48:13,468
But there is no new kind of thing in this.

2482
03:48:14,468 --> 03:48:15,468
It's the same thing it always has been.

2483
03:48:16,468 --> 03:48:20,468
Oh, so you're saying it's impossible for there to be new incentive factors?

2484
03:48:22,468 --> 03:48:26,468
No, I'm just saying that with BIP300, there isn't anything new.

2485
03:48:27,468 --> 03:48:28,468
Okay, there isn't anything new.

2486
03:48:29,468 --> 03:48:38,468
Okay, so if a massive, say, BSV style sidechain got spun up using drivechains, that would not be subject to incentive distortions.

2487
03:48:38,468 --> 03:48:50,468
Like if the chain got absurdly large and centralized, that it's impossible to enter as a new competitor in producing blocks for that sidechain.

2488
03:48:51,468 --> 03:48:57,468
Because so few people have a copy of it, you literally need one of their permission to enter that set of people.

2489
03:48:58,468 --> 03:49:03,468
Well, that's basically liquid today, ironically, because no miner can become a liquid.

2490
03:49:03,468 --> 03:49:09,468
Liquid does not distort mining incentives because miners are not involved in liquid as a system beyond...

2491
03:49:10,468 --> 03:49:13,468
That's your criterion, though, that you can't break in.

2492
03:49:14,468 --> 03:49:15,468
No miner can collect.

2493
03:49:16,468 --> 03:49:18,468
Liquid fees are collected and they go straight to Blockstream.

2494
03:49:19,468 --> 03:49:23,468
So liquid, but you cannot break in and get those fees.

2495
03:49:24,468 --> 03:49:25,468
I think the bigger problem, though...

2496
03:49:26,468 --> 03:49:30,468
No, see, you're glossing over a very important distinction there.

2497
03:49:30,468 --> 03:49:37,468
Those systems don't hitch into or depend on proof of work for your consensus on the state of the system.

2498
03:49:38,468 --> 03:49:40,468
Things using drivechains do.

2499
03:49:41,468 --> 03:49:47,468
But liquid certainly does because you can't establish which deposits have taken place without consensus.

2500
03:49:48,468 --> 03:49:50,468
That's not the internal state of the system.

2501
03:49:51,468 --> 03:49:55,468
Something where the internal state depends on...

2502
03:49:56,468 --> 03:49:58,468
That's every merge mine thing, including Namecoin.

2503
03:49:58,468 --> 03:49:59,468
Exactly.

2504
03:50:00,468 --> 03:50:02,468
That is not something like liquid.

2505
03:50:03,468 --> 03:50:06,468
Liquid does not interfere or involve itself.

2506
03:50:07,468 --> 03:50:15,468
If liquid had been merge mined, but the deposits and withdrawals were gated and had infinite cost to join,

2507
03:50:16,468 --> 03:50:18,468
then you would have a problem with liquid if it was merge mined.

2508
03:50:18,468 --> 03:50:24,468
Paul, why do you keep asking half rhetorical questions that you know the answers to?

2509
03:50:25,468 --> 03:50:27,468
Like, yes, I have a problem with merge mine systems.

2510
03:50:28,468 --> 03:50:33,468
I've literally gone through these problems I have with you for years until you've lied to me.

2511
03:50:34,468 --> 03:50:37,468
I genuinely don't understand what you are saying most of the time.

2512
03:50:38,468 --> 03:50:42,468
So I'm sorry about that, but I'm going to give it a try.

2513
03:50:42,468 --> 03:50:45,468
You're saying if you have a problem with liquid just because it's merge mined,

2514
03:50:46,468 --> 03:50:51,468
if Blockstream decided, because all the liquid transaction fees go to a wallet controlled by Blockstream,

2515
03:50:52,468 --> 03:50:55,468
if they just decided that they were going to donate the proceeds to miners,

2516
03:50:56,468 --> 03:50:58,468
then you would say that's affecting miner incentives.

2517
03:50:59,468 --> 03:51:02,468
And then it would be equivalent to BIP300 in your view.

2518
03:51:07,468 --> 03:51:09,468
Paul, I'm going to ask you a question.

2519
03:51:10,468 --> 03:51:18,468
Paul, no, it wouldn't if somebody freely just donated money unconditionally to miners.

2520
03:51:19,468 --> 03:51:28,468
That, like, dude, like, see how far you have just walked us away from the concrete example

2521
03:51:29,468 --> 03:51:35,468
of fee sniping now becoming something that does not require redoing work,

2522
03:51:35,468 --> 03:51:38,468
which is a factual incentive change.

2523
03:51:39,468 --> 03:51:43,468
And how far you've walked the conversation away from addressing that point?

2524
03:51:44,468 --> 03:51:45,468
Like, on any level?

2525
03:51:46,468 --> 03:51:51,468
I mean, is it your view, though, that affecting miner incentives is just if someone pays like 10 cents a year?

2526
03:51:52,468 --> 03:51:53,468
Like, if I start a new mining pool?

2527
03:51:54,468 --> 03:52:00,468
See, no, you're just being a smartass and reducing things to the most absurd possible irrelevant.

2528
03:52:01,468 --> 03:52:04,468
It has no impact in terms of scale of effect.

2529
03:52:05,468 --> 03:52:14,468
This is a structural change to the incentives, to the opportunities available to miners added by this fork,

2530
03:52:15,468 --> 03:52:20,468
something that you have explicitly and repetitively claimed it does not do.

2531
03:52:21,468 --> 03:52:24,468
Here is a factual example of a structural change.

2532
03:52:25,468 --> 03:52:26,468
So what's your response to that?

2533
03:52:26,468 --> 03:52:30,468
I don't believe that it is a change because it's just...

2534
03:52:31,468 --> 03:52:34,468
So your response is to redefine the word change.

2535
03:52:35,468 --> 03:52:36,468
Okay.

2536
03:52:37,468 --> 03:52:38,468
Well, let's go with your example.

2537
03:52:39,468 --> 03:52:41,468
And let's say that line merge mining doesn't exist at all.

2538
03:52:42,468 --> 03:52:43,468
And there's fee sniping on L2.

2539
03:52:44,468 --> 03:52:48,468
How is that a change in miner incentives?

2540
03:52:49,468 --> 03:52:53,468
So what are you talking about, Paul?

2541
03:52:53,468 --> 03:52:54,468
What are you talking about, Paul?

2542
03:52:55,468 --> 03:52:59,468
Let's remove the thing from the conversation that introduces this dynamic.

2543
03:53:00,468 --> 03:53:02,468
And then let's talk about that dynamic.

2544
03:53:03,468 --> 03:53:04,468
That makes no sense.

2545
03:53:05,468 --> 03:53:06,468
Okay, well, which thing are we supposed to reintroduce?

2546
03:53:10,468 --> 03:53:12,468
Which is the thing that causes the dynamic?

2547
03:53:13,468 --> 03:53:14,468
I thought you were saying before that...

2548
03:53:15,468 --> 03:53:16,468
Dude, are you serious?

2549
03:53:16,468 --> 03:53:21,468
You are just like going in circles trying to go repeat yourself every five minutes

2550
03:53:22,468 --> 03:53:24,468
and just refusing to actually respond.

2551
03:53:25,468 --> 03:53:26,468
You claim there are no incentive changes.

2552
03:53:27,468 --> 03:53:33,468
I have just given you a crystal clear concrete structural change to the incentives.

2553
03:53:34,468 --> 03:53:39,468
And now you're just arguing, well, let's talk about the incentive change of the thing that introduces it.

2554
03:53:40,468 --> 03:53:42,468
Or, well, what does change really mean?

2555
03:53:43,468 --> 03:53:49,468
Well, is that really unfair to ask if I start a mining pool and I pay an extra 10 cents a year?

2556
03:53:50,468 --> 03:53:51,468
Does that count as incentive?

2557
03:53:52,468 --> 03:53:54,468
Again, the most ridiculous fucking strategy here.

2558
03:53:55,468 --> 03:54:03,468
You're trying to equate something that you say will 10x miner revenue be millions of millions of dollars

2559
03:54:04,468 --> 03:54:06,468
and the variable that represents in this situation.

2560
03:54:07,468 --> 03:54:09,468
And you're trying to compare that to 10 cents?

2561
03:54:09,468 --> 03:54:11,468
Do you not see how ridiculous that is?

2562
03:54:12,468 --> 03:54:13,468
That's just deflecting.

2563
03:54:14,468 --> 03:54:15,468
You're not responding.

2564
03:54:16,468 --> 03:54:19,468
First of all, my phone, I think, is probably going to crash again, but I'll be back if it does.

2565
03:54:20,468 --> 03:54:25,468
But I think it is taking an extreme case.

2566
03:54:26,468 --> 03:54:29,468
And it's a well-known thought experiment like in physics and stuff.

2567
03:54:30,468 --> 03:54:31,468
You get the underlying picture.

2568
03:54:32,468 --> 03:54:34,468
You take two extreme cases and then you blend things in between.

2569
03:54:35,468 --> 03:54:41,468
So I'm just trying to get an idea of if it's really the case that you think that…

2570
03:54:42,468 --> 03:54:43,468
I mean, I don't know what you mean by effect.

2571
03:54:44,468 --> 03:54:48,468
Like if someone broadcasts a Layer 1 transaction, does that affect miner incentives?

2572
03:54:49,468 --> 03:54:54,468
If they pay 10 cents more with that transaction, if they pay 15 cents more, are they required?

2573
03:54:55,468 --> 03:55:00,468
As if a gun was being held to their head, are they required to mine the transaction?

2574
03:55:01,468 --> 03:55:04,468
I'm just trying to figure out what these words you're using mean to you.

2575
03:55:05,468 --> 03:55:10,468
So that's the only way I know how to understand what it is you're saying.

2576
03:55:12,468 --> 03:55:18,468
So for me, the fee sniping, that has always been part of Bitcoin's incentives.

2577
03:55:19,468 --> 03:55:20,468
And people even do it today.

2578
03:55:21,468 --> 03:55:26,468
There have been times in Bitcoin's history when someone paid an unusually high fee

2579
03:55:27,468 --> 03:55:29,468
that was way higher than the fees of the surrounding blocks.

2580
03:55:30,468 --> 03:55:35,468
I think there was a case where miners kind of fought over it, the fee.

2581
03:55:36,468 --> 03:55:39,468
But that raises some other questions.

2582
03:55:40,468 --> 03:55:45,468
Fee sniping is already part of Bitcoin today and so is the risk of reorg.

2583
03:55:46,468 --> 03:55:49,468
We don't want there to be any reorgs, but reorgs are part of Bitcoin

2584
03:55:50,468 --> 03:55:54,468
and that's why people wait for more than one confirmation usually.

2585
03:55:55,468 --> 03:55:59,468
Okay, Paul, it's like you ignored every single thing I say.

2586
03:56:00,468 --> 03:56:04,468
That risk of reorg to the main chain has nothing to do with anything I said

2587
03:56:05,468 --> 03:56:08,468
because that's the whole change that drivechains introduce.

2588
03:56:09,468 --> 03:56:13,468
You can reorg the layer two without reorging the layer one.

2589
03:56:14,468 --> 03:56:16,468
You do not incur that opportunity cost.

2590
03:56:17,468 --> 03:56:25,468
And this disincentivizes outsourced people from producing blocks for these drivechains.

2591
03:56:25,468 --> 03:56:30,468
And if there is still economic demand for them, that leaves only the miners to do this.

2592
03:56:31,468 --> 03:56:36,468
So this winds up in complete contradiction to your assertions

2593
03:56:37,468 --> 03:56:44,468
with miners having incentives pushing them towards being the ones that have to run these systems.

2594
03:56:45,468 --> 03:56:49,468
Well, it seems to me that the first part of what you said goes something like this.

2595
03:56:50,468 --> 03:56:56,468
It says something like, because of fee sniping on L2,

2596
03:56:57,468 --> 03:57:03,468
the miners will use classical merge mining instead of blind merge mining,

2597
03:57:04,468 --> 03:57:09,468
which I don't actually agree with, but I think is at least a sentence that I could understand.

2598
03:57:10,468 --> 03:57:13,468
So is that the first part of what you were saying?

2599
03:57:14,468 --> 03:57:18,468
Well, you don't agree with that? Why don't you agree with that, Paul?

2600
03:57:19,468 --> 03:57:22,468
Well, because I think it doesn't actually play out in equilibrium.

2601
03:57:23,468 --> 03:57:27,468
Because I think the sidechain will have its own fee maximizing block size.

2602
03:57:28,468 --> 03:57:39,468
And so it will not be possible to, it will not be desirable to fee snipe on L2 in the first place.

2603
03:57:40,468 --> 03:57:46,468
What does the block size have to do with that?

2604
03:57:47,468 --> 03:57:53,468
Here's this pot of money that somebody tried to claim and paid main chain coins to a miner to claim,

2605
03:57:54,468 --> 03:58:00,468
being free for a miner because they do not have to pay themselves on chain Bitcoin

2606
03:58:01,468 --> 03:58:03,468
to commit to that block and re-orbit that money.

2607
03:58:04,468 --> 03:58:05,468
What does block size have to do with that?

2608
03:58:06,468 --> 03:58:07,468
It's literally completely irrelevant.

2609
03:58:08,468 --> 03:58:12,468
It's the dynamic of, they can claim, miners can claim that twice,

2610
03:58:13,468 --> 03:58:16,468
once from a third party and once themselves,

2611
03:58:17,468 --> 03:58:21,468
without the miner who takes it the second time in the re-org

2612
03:58:22,468 --> 03:58:25,468
economically harming the miner who took it the first time.

2613
03:58:26,468 --> 03:58:27,468
They both get to claim that money.

2614
03:58:29,753 --> 03:58:33,753
Block size is irrelevant to that. That's a complete non sequitur.

2615
03:58:33,753 --> 03:58:39,753
Well, it sets on L2 the value of each sidechain block. So if there are 5,000 blocks, $5,000 each.

2616
03:58:39,753 --> 03:58:40,753
But I think...

2617
03:58:40,753 --> 03:58:44,753
Paul, that has no relationship to this conversation.

2618
03:58:44,753 --> 03:58:49,753
But I think I now understand what you really meant, which is that there are two people who are harmed.

2619
03:58:50,753 --> 03:58:58,753
The person who paid, as you know, you're saying this person who used blind merge mining in the first block gets scammed out of their money.

2620
03:59:01,753 --> 03:59:04,753
Because they paid on L1, but now they're not going to get an L2 block.

2621
03:59:04,753 --> 03:59:09,753
That's what I correctly summarized as re-org risk on L2.

2622
03:59:10,753 --> 03:59:15,753
And then there is the miner on L1, when they mine the sidechain block a second time.

2623
03:59:15,753 --> 03:59:20,753
So maybe we call them mainchain block 100 and 101.

2624
03:59:20,753 --> 03:59:23,753
And then we have sidechain block 7 and 8.

2625
03:59:23,753 --> 03:59:30,753
So they're going to, instead of mining block 8 in block 101, they'll mine like 7B or something.

2626
03:59:30,753 --> 03:59:34,753
An alternative 7 to claim the fee, having vertically integrated.

2627
03:59:35,753 --> 03:59:46,753
But the miner doesn't necessarily, the L1 miner doesn't necessarily get that money until the sidechain block on L2 has its maturity period, and then they withdraw the coins back to L1.

2628
03:59:46,753 --> 03:59:52,753
So there's kind of like a live by the sword, die by the sword re-org risk.

2629
03:59:54,753 --> 03:59:57,753
Except the miners don't have that capital cost.

2630
03:59:57,753 --> 03:59:59,753
They just hitch the commitment in there.

2631
03:59:59,753 --> 04:00:03,753
They don't have to pay money and take the risk of being robbed.

2632
04:00:03,753 --> 04:00:05,753
Only non-miners do.

2633
04:00:08,753 --> 04:00:09,753
Well, yes, but that's not the point.

2634
04:00:09,753 --> 04:00:11,753
The point is that on L2...

2635
04:00:11,753 --> 04:00:13,753
That is exactly my point.

2636
04:00:15,753 --> 04:00:17,753
Yes, but they can get re-org'd on L2.

2637
04:00:17,753 --> 04:00:18,753
They can get counter-re-org'd.

2638
04:00:18,753 --> 04:00:28,753
If someone builds on the original 7 versus 7B, then they didn't collect anything, for they paid an opportunity cost of a block.

2639
04:00:28,753 --> 04:00:31,753
So they lose, they actually just lose the money in that case.

2640
04:00:32,753 --> 04:00:45,753
That if the L2 does not go through with the fee sniping, then the L1 miner who attempted to take the block, they found a block on the sidechain that is re-org'd out.

2641
04:00:46,753 --> 04:00:48,753
And so they lost money by doing that.

2642
04:00:49,753 --> 04:00:52,753
So it's just like the risk you want to take if you start this.

2643
04:00:52,753 --> 04:00:57,753
And because people will lose money in fee sniping, that's exactly why I don't think anyone will do it.

2644
04:00:57,753 --> 04:01:00,753
But if anyone does do it, it's only affecting people on L2 anyway.

2645
04:01:00,753 --> 04:01:05,753
So it doesn't even make really any difference to the users, regular users on L1.

2646
04:01:05,753 --> 04:01:08,753
But do you understand what I'm saying about the L...

2647
04:01:08,753 --> 04:01:10,753
You're saying a miner...

2648
04:01:10,753 --> 04:01:12,753
You have block 100 and 101 on the mainchain.

2649
04:01:12,753 --> 04:01:14,753
You find block 7 and 8.

2650
04:01:14,753 --> 04:01:15,753
So block...

2651
04:01:15,753 --> 04:01:19,753
You have mainchain block 100.

2652
04:01:20,753 --> 04:01:22,753
They find block 7.

2653
04:01:22,753 --> 04:01:23,753
And then you're saying...

2654
04:01:23,753 --> 04:01:28,753
This person's thinking, okay, I just took L1 cash to find block 7.

2655
04:01:29,753 --> 04:01:34,753
Now when I find block 101, I'm going to mine a different version of sidechain block 7.

2656
04:01:35,753 --> 04:01:37,753
Re-org that person out, basically.

2657
04:01:38,753 --> 04:01:39,753
Take their money.

2658
04:01:40,753 --> 04:01:42,753
Take the L2 coins.

2659
04:01:42,753 --> 04:01:44,753
That's what you're saying, right?

2660
04:01:45,753 --> 04:01:47,753
And then I'm going to get away with it.

2661
04:01:47,753 --> 04:01:48,753
Yes or no?

2662
04:01:50,753 --> 04:01:52,753
Sorry, I didn't hear what you said.

2663
04:01:52,753 --> 04:02:05,753
Yes, you have introduced an entirely different dynamic for this that does not involve redoing and wasting the cost and the profit for your base work and your machines looking at the mainchain.

2664
04:02:05,753 --> 04:02:12,753
Yeah, but to me, each of the sidechain blocks is just as if it were one transaction on L1.

2665
04:02:12,753 --> 04:02:17,753
And so when the sidechain miners are on 101, they find the L2...

2666
04:02:17,753 --> 04:02:19,753
They find block 7B.

2667
04:02:20,753 --> 04:02:24,753
They are finding it at a risk of themselves being re-org'd out.

2668
04:02:25,753 --> 04:02:28,753
Because when block 8 is eventually made...

2669
04:02:28,753 --> 04:02:31,753
Because the sidechain has the block maturity period the same as the mainchain.

2670
04:02:31,753 --> 04:02:33,753
But it really doesn't matter if it didn't.

2671
04:02:33,753 --> 04:02:40,753
But the point is, you can't actually get the coins back to L1 for some period of time.

2672
04:02:41,753 --> 04:02:45,753
You can swap them out, as you like to point out all the time.

2673
04:02:45,753 --> 04:02:48,753
Sure, but that's in the next block or so.

2674
04:02:48,753 --> 04:02:52,753
So if the sidechain is re-org'd, then that doesn't happen.

2675
04:03:00,753 --> 04:03:02,753
So if the person is...

2676
04:03:02,753 --> 04:03:08,753
If you start with block 7 and someone has 7B, and then someone makes block 8...

2677
04:03:08,753 --> 04:03:10,753
It depends on which one they build on.

2678
04:03:10,753 --> 04:03:12,753
One of those people is going to lose their money.

2679
04:03:15,753 --> 04:03:17,753
Yeah, but here's the thing.

2680
04:03:17,753 --> 04:03:23,753
They, according to you, if they aren't just running their own node, they don't care.

2681
04:03:23,753 --> 04:03:25,753
It's whatever pays the most.

2682
04:03:25,753 --> 04:03:28,753
So the miner who just grabbed that money...

2683
04:03:28,753 --> 04:03:34,753
I'll just overpay a little bit to make sure somebody grabs one building on the block that I just made.

2684
04:03:34,753 --> 04:03:40,753
And that also is a very small risk, considering the incentive there.

2685
04:03:40,753 --> 04:03:46,753
And those miners having no way to tell anything except what's bidding the highest bid.

2686
04:03:48,753 --> 04:03:51,753
Yeah, but I don't see why you think it matters so much.

2687
04:03:51,753 --> 04:03:54,753
To me, it's just the same thing that miners already do, which is...

2688
04:03:54,753 --> 04:04:02,753
Because, Paul, this dynamic playing out and the low, extremely low level of risk for miners doing this...

2689
04:04:02,753 --> 04:04:11,753
Is a massive risk for anybody who is not a miner trying to take advantage of this to get fees.

2690
04:04:11,753 --> 04:04:15,753
It is a huge risk and a huge disincentive for them.

2691
04:04:15,753 --> 04:04:21,753
So that's also a reason for them to really bid low for these fees, like you said.

2692
04:04:21,753 --> 04:04:27,753
Which means that the margin miners have to capture if they do it themselves is that much larger.

2693
04:04:28,753 --> 04:04:34,753
It's that much greater of an incentive financially for miners to do this themselves.

2694
04:04:35,753 --> 04:04:44,753
I don't really think so, because why would it not also apply to the miners themselves who can re-org for free the sidechain?

2695
04:04:44,753 --> 04:04:46,753
For free, they pay opportunity costs.

2696
04:04:46,753 --> 04:04:51,753
But when they mine the block themselves, they're mining a block that itself can get re-org'd.

2697
04:04:51,753 --> 04:04:55,753
So the risk hits them both, which is, again, part of my point.

2698
04:04:55,753 --> 04:04:59,753
Okay, dude, it's like you literally just ignored everything I said.

2699
04:04:59,753 --> 04:05:06,753
If most miners aren't running these nodes themselves, all they see is the fee for a block commitment.

2700
04:05:06,753 --> 04:05:16,753
And the miner who just double-spent and fee-sniped that really juicy block has more money to pay a higher fee to ensure their block is the one that gets built on.

2701
04:05:16,753 --> 04:05:19,753
And that miner sees nothing but the fee.

2702
04:05:19,753 --> 04:05:24,753
That is a much, much smaller risk than you are trying to make it out to be.

2703
04:05:24,753 --> 04:05:30,753
Because you're ignoring the dynamic of the block that comes after and the economics there.

2704
04:05:30,753 --> 04:05:36,753
And the scenario you assume, which is most miners don't run these nodes themselves.

2705
04:05:55,753 --> 04:06:00,753
I didn't hear what was said in the last, like, five seconds.

2706
04:06:00,753 --> 04:06:09,753
But what I'm getting at is if there's re-org risk on the sidechain, then every single person finding blocks over there, it hits all of them.

2707
04:06:09,753 --> 04:06:15,753
It hits the value because every block you find is reduced in value because you don't know.

2708
04:06:15,753 --> 04:06:18,753
You have to say, like, maybe there's only a 50% chance that I keep this block.

2709
04:06:19,753 --> 04:06:30,753
So it seemed to me like what you were saying was people will bid low, and then the re-org risk will price the blind merge miner people out of the market.

2710
04:06:30,753 --> 04:06:33,753
And it will only be L1 miners who vertically integrate.

2711
04:06:33,753 --> 04:06:39,753
But after they vertically integrate, the threat of people re-org-ing will still be there.

2712
04:06:39,753 --> 04:06:43,753
So actually, the value will fall again.

2713
04:06:43,753 --> 04:06:47,753
Yes, Paul, which is why miners will just do it themselves.

2714
04:06:47,753 --> 04:06:48,753
That's what I'm saying.

2715
04:06:48,753 --> 04:06:53,753
They will not bid in the open to try to get a sidechain block in other miners' blocks.

2716
04:06:53,753 --> 04:06:56,753
They will just include their own commitments and their own blocks.

2717
04:06:56,753 --> 04:06:58,753
And that will be how it goes.

2718
04:06:58,753 --> 04:07:01,753
That will be how it reaches an equilibrium.

2719
04:07:01,753 --> 04:07:09,753
No one's willing to create the risk because you have to actually bid and pay on the main chain to set this whole scenario up.

2720
04:07:09,753 --> 04:07:11,753
So miners won't do it.

2721
04:07:12,753 --> 04:07:20,753
It will devolve to just miners doing this themselves in their own blocks and not bidding for inclusion in any other miners' blocks.

2722
04:07:20,753 --> 04:07:22,753
So what I'm saying is it won't stop there.

2723
04:07:22,753 --> 04:07:24,753
They'll still be feesniping each other.

2724
04:07:24,753 --> 04:07:30,753
And this will just reduce objectively the value of each coinbase by the same factor.

2725
04:07:32,753 --> 04:07:34,753
And that will reach an equilibrium.

2726
04:07:34,753 --> 04:07:41,753
But that equilibrium will be reached with miners running all of this themselves, contrary to your claims,

2727
04:07:41,753 --> 04:07:48,753
with massive disincentives for non-miners to participate and pretty big incentives for miners to directly participate.

2728
04:07:48,753 --> 04:07:52,753
I think we should have a separate—I'm going to continue to explain why I think I'm right,

2729
04:07:52,753 --> 04:07:56,753
but I think we should have a separate conversation that just said, like, if blind merge mining had never been invented,

2730
04:07:56,753 --> 04:08:08,753
because I think it has substantially distracted you and JC from the bigger picture of why I don't think this whole category of things matters.

2731
04:08:08,753 --> 04:08:14,753
But first, let's finish, because what you're saying is the sidechain will have feesniping,

2732
04:08:14,753 --> 04:08:22,753
so let's say one out of every two blocks is reorg, so you only have a 50% chance of getting the coinbase, the L2 coinbase money.

2733
04:08:23,753 --> 04:08:28,753
And you'll say, well, that's not enough, because the person—BMM mining—

2734
04:08:28,753 --> 04:08:33,753
Paul, you're trying to claim equal risk here. That's not true.

2735
04:08:33,753 --> 04:08:37,753
It's proportional risk to your share of the hash rate as a pool.

2736
04:08:37,753 --> 04:08:40,753
So you do not have evenly distributed risk here.

2737
04:08:42,753 --> 04:08:45,753
But that's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying this—

2738
04:08:45,753 --> 04:08:47,753
No, that's what I'm saying.

2739
04:08:47,753 --> 04:08:53,753
You're saying that if someone has more L1 hash rate, they can more easily reorg the L2 block.

2740
04:08:54,753 --> 04:08:58,753
No, I'm saying their risk of being reorg is lower,

2741
04:08:58,753 --> 04:09:04,753
because their probability of finding the next block to guarantee their block is built on is higher.

2742
04:09:04,753 --> 04:09:08,753
It is not a symmetric risk profile for every participant.

2743
04:09:08,753 --> 04:09:14,753
I know, but I don't think we can go into, like, every single—we have to, like, continue each—we have to, like, consider each—

2744
04:09:14,753 --> 04:09:17,753
No, see, this is the whole problem, Paul.

2745
04:09:17,753 --> 04:09:26,753
My issue with this proposal is how all of these things interact with each other to change the incentives.

2746
04:09:26,753 --> 04:09:30,753
And you refuse to engage with that complete picture.

2747
04:09:30,753 --> 04:09:37,753
You consistently try to narrow things down to a tiny aspect of something and look at that in a vacuum.

2748
04:09:37,753 --> 04:09:44,753
And that's pretty much the exact same as just totally ignoring my argument and pretending it's not there.

2749
04:09:44,753 --> 04:09:52,753
Okay, so why don't we just—let me give you this one little example first, and then we'll see if it matches.

2750
04:09:52,753 --> 04:09:59,753
See, because what I'm saying is the sidechain has reorg risk, so now maybe the sidechain coinbases are worth $10.

2751
04:09:59,753 --> 04:10:06,753
But since one out of every two is reorg-ed, the person's really not willing to bid more than, like, $4.99 or whatever.

2752
04:10:06,753 --> 04:10:09,753
So the miners vertically integrate into your story.

2753
04:10:09,753 --> 04:10:11,753
That's what you just said.

2754
04:10:11,753 --> 04:10:14,753
The miners are the only ones running the sidechain.

2755
04:10:14,753 --> 04:10:22,753
But the L1—the miners can reorg—continue to reorg L2 at the same rate.

2756
04:10:23,753 --> 04:10:37,753
But it does not have the same downside because those miners are not having to capitalize Bitcoin up front in proportion to what they're claiming, like people who don't mine.

2757
04:10:37,753 --> 04:10:42,753
So the downside now that miners are the ones doing it is very different.

2758
04:10:43,753 --> 04:10:45,753
Isn't it the same thing, though, at the end of the day?

2759
04:10:45,753 --> 04:10:54,753
You get a coinbase for $10 on the L2, but you only get it—you only actually win it half the time because of the reorg, because of the fee sniping.

2760
04:10:54,753 --> 04:10:56,753
No, that's a new equilibrium.

2761
04:10:56,753 --> 04:10:57,753
Yes.

2762
04:10:57,753 --> 04:11:07,753
That is not—I actually paid somebody money to get this extra money, and I did not get the extra money and also lost what I paid for it.

2763
04:11:07,753 --> 04:11:09,753
That's not what's happening here.

2764
04:11:09,753 --> 04:11:15,753
That equilibrium is just bringing down the average of the revenue being generated by that.

2765
04:11:15,753 --> 04:11:21,753
And it does not come with the double whammy of you lose money you already had to.

2766
04:11:21,753 --> 04:11:23,753
Yes, but you haven't let me finish my story.

2767
04:11:23,753 --> 04:11:28,753
The story is that we start with blind merge mining and 100% of it goes through and there's no fee sniping.

2768
04:11:28,753 --> 04:11:31,753
Then we enter a time—there's no reorging.

2769
04:11:31,753 --> 04:11:35,753
Then we enter a time of troubles where there's reorging.

2770
04:11:36,753 --> 04:11:41,753
The revenues are cut in half because you don't know what you're going to get.

2771
04:11:41,753 --> 04:11:45,753
You don't know if you're going to win or not, the actual block.

2772
04:11:45,753 --> 04:11:52,753
And then we enter a period where people stop using blind merge mining and the miners vertically integrate.

2773
04:11:52,753 --> 04:11:55,753
Then there's still fee sniping.

2774
04:11:55,753 --> 04:12:02,753
So then why is it a different number is the question because it should be just $5 or $4.99.

2775
04:12:03,753 --> 04:12:11,753
The miners do not—it's like you literally just ignore everything I say.

2776
04:12:11,753 --> 04:12:20,753
Miners don't have to pay anyone anything to get their sidechain block committed to in a mainchain block.

2777
04:12:20,753 --> 04:12:22,753
So they'll just do that.

2778
04:12:22,753 --> 04:12:27,753
And because that risk is low, they will stick with just doing that.

2779
04:12:27,753 --> 04:12:36,753
They will not try to bid to get a sidechain block in other miners' blocks because that increases their risk profile.

2780
04:12:36,753 --> 04:12:42,753
Whereas sticking with just including theirs in their own blocks does not increase their risk profile.

2781
04:12:42,753 --> 04:12:50,753
Yeah, but do you believe that if a miner vertically integrates with Drivechain and they find the L2 block,

2782
04:12:50,753 --> 04:12:54,753
do you believe that they pay anything on L1 to do that?

2783
04:12:55,753 --> 04:12:58,753
No, Paul. They do not.

2784
04:12:58,753 --> 04:13:00,753
They only get the coins on L2.

2785
04:13:00,753 --> 04:13:06,753
So why are you fighting it when I say if that L2 block is then reorked, then that first miner didn't get anything.

2786
04:13:06,753 --> 04:13:12,753
Whereas before, when everyone was playing nice, they got $10 per block per sidechain or whatever.

2787
04:13:12,753 --> 04:13:17,753
Because again, you're just ignoring my argument, essentially.

2788
04:13:17,753 --> 04:13:28,753
You're trying to pretend, let's look at this one block in isolation and not look at the long time horizon and average of when they do or do not get to keep that block,

2789
04:13:28,753 --> 04:13:34,753
which will exceed that $5 that's all anyone will pay because they actually have to pay money.

2790
04:13:34,753 --> 04:13:43,753
It's like, dude, every single time I lay out an argument, you ignore it and find some tiny isolated piece of it

2791
04:13:43,753 --> 04:13:53,753
and then just try to focus the entire discussion on that and that alone and refuse to even acknowledge the whole overarching argument exists.

2792
04:13:55,753 --> 04:13:57,753
Well, I'm having trouble understanding what it is.

2793
04:13:57,753 --> 04:14:00,753
It seems to me that it is about what…

2794
04:14:00,753 --> 04:14:06,753
Well, Paul, you seem to be one of the only people who has trouble understanding this.

2795
04:14:06,753 --> 04:14:13,753
Because when I make these arguments and I explain these things to all kinds of other people, they seem to understand it just fine.

2796
04:14:13,753 --> 04:14:18,753
Maybe they just nod and say, well, that sounds bad, but they don't really understand it.

2797
04:14:20,753 --> 04:14:21,753
Okay, Paul.

2798
04:14:22,753 --> 04:14:37,753
So we'll just throw out a little random subtle ad hominem insulting all kinds of other anonymous people to just dismiss the possibility that you are in fact the one missing something here that other people are in fact understanding.

2799
04:14:40,753 --> 04:14:42,753
Well, I'm going to try to understand it one more time.

2800
04:14:43,753 --> 04:14:57,753
It seems like you were saying that miners will reorg L2 without reorging L1 so that everyone who's pre-drivechain is not affected at all.

2801
04:14:57,753 --> 04:15:00,753
There's no reorgs happening on L1 and no one cares.

2802
04:15:00,753 --> 04:15:03,753
But something is happening to the quote, miner incentives unquote.

2803
04:15:03,753 --> 04:15:10,753
And so the miners are looking at these drivechains and they're saying, listen, I'm going to reorg and feesnipe these drivechains.

2804
04:15:11,753 --> 04:15:20,753
And then if they feel that that will maximize their revenue, they'll engage in that behavior.

2805
04:15:20,753 --> 04:15:26,753
Even though what it does is makes the sidechain more difficult to use, makes the users unhappy.

2806
04:15:26,753 --> 04:15:33,753
It doesn't really achieve anything because if you reorg every other block, then half of your blocks will be reorged out also.

2807
04:15:33,753 --> 04:15:37,753
So it's kind of like just adds a lot of risk for no reason.

2808
04:15:37,753 --> 04:15:40,753
Paul, you're the only one who thinks it's got to happen that frequently.

2809
04:15:40,753 --> 04:15:43,753
That can just happen with feespike outliers.

2810
04:15:43,753 --> 04:15:44,753
Who knows?

2811
04:15:44,753 --> 04:16:00,753
But it introduces risk for non-miners trying to produce those blocks that will disincentivize them from participating, which more and more over time leaves miners as the only candidates who can take this role without that risk.

2812
04:16:01,753 --> 04:16:03,753
Well, let's say that they did, though.

2813
04:16:03,753 --> 04:16:15,753
But before I want to say something else, though, which is that imagine that someone pays an unusually high fee on layer one and then miners fight over that block.

2814
04:16:16,753 --> 04:16:18,753
I mean, that has happened in Bitcoin already.

2815
04:16:18,753 --> 04:16:20,753
That could happen at any time.

2816
04:16:21,753 --> 04:16:28,753
Yeah, that's not an analogous situation there because the opportunity cost is drastically higher than my scenario, Paul.

2817
04:16:28,753 --> 04:16:30,753
It's not the same situation.

2818
04:16:30,753 --> 04:16:33,753
The risk profile is radically different.

2819
04:16:34,753 --> 04:16:39,753
Well, let's say that there is no blind merge mining at all and everyone classically merge mines.

2820
04:16:40,753 --> 04:16:43,753
And then there's a feespike on L2.

2821
04:16:44,753 --> 04:16:46,753
The miners fight over it over there.

2822
04:16:46,753 --> 04:16:49,753
I mean, how is this like a different miner incentive is the question.

2823
04:16:49,753 --> 04:16:51,753
I'm still trying to figure out how it's different.

2824
04:16:52,753 --> 04:17:06,753
Because without the composite picture of 300 and 301, the peg and the merge mining scheme, it's a completely different game.

2825
04:17:06,753 --> 04:17:18,753
Because you're talking now either a trusted, explicit federated system, which things like RSK and Liquid have shown people are not interested in, or you're talking a free floating shitcoin.

2826
04:17:18,753 --> 04:17:22,753
See, the thing about a free floating shitcoin is it doesn't follow the price of Bitcoin.

2827
04:17:22,753 --> 04:17:36,753
And no matter how much traffic is happening on that chain, that can occur while the price of that coin trends down, which is objectively what has historically happened.

2828
04:17:36,753 --> 04:17:43,753
It has trended down to a nothing percentage of miner revenue.

2829
04:17:43,753 --> 04:17:53,753
And it is a completely different picture and scenario than something actually anchored to the price of Bitcoin that cannot just freely drop in price on its own.

2830
04:17:55,753 --> 04:18:00,753
Yeah, but I'm just asking about your example so that I can figure out more about what it is.

2831
04:18:00,753 --> 04:18:02,753
So let's just say there is no blind merge mining.

2832
04:18:02,753 --> 04:18:04,753
And there's only classical merge mining.

2833
04:18:07,753 --> 04:18:09,753
Paul, what are you talking about?

2834
04:18:09,753 --> 04:18:14,753
That is a meaningless, pointless discussion.

2835
04:18:14,753 --> 04:18:21,753
Because my entire assertion here, my entire problem is that blind merge mining does not do what it claims to do.

2836
04:18:21,753 --> 04:18:26,753
That it devolves to the situation that exists in merge mining.

2837
04:18:26,753 --> 04:18:32,753
So what in the actual fuck do you mean, let's talk about if blind merge mining didn't exist?

2838
04:18:32,753 --> 04:18:37,753
This entire conversation is about blind merge mining.

2839
04:18:37,753 --> 04:18:41,753
That's literally the core of the discussion.

2840
04:18:43,102 --> 04:18:58,102
OK, well, let's talk about blind merge mining in general then. So let's say the blind merge mining is not only not invented, but it's impossible. And everyone, every miner must run. We go back to the pre-BIP301 world and every miner must run.

2841
04:18:59,102 --> 04:19:00,102
Jesus Christ.

2842
04:19:01,102 --> 04:19:13,102
Yeah, isn't that fair? I want to find out what the problem is with that. So let's say that happens. And then what is the issue? Where is the negative impact on someone?

2843
04:19:16,102 --> 04:19:27,102
To me, someone who runs mining, someone who like it's not even the full node cost of the sidechain miner is a lot like paying for like an immersion cooling.

2844
04:19:27,102 --> 04:19:55,102
Dude, Paul, it's like you don't actually try to have a conversation with people. You don't actually listen to what they're saying. You don't actually try to consider the arguments they make and the scope that they make them. It's like you just hear words come out of people's mouths and then go, let's have this different conversation. Like that's not the conversation I'm having. That's not the things that I'm commenting on.

2845
04:19:56,102 --> 04:20:12,102
You're saying BIP301 has some kind of flaw and will not be used because of L2 fee sniping. I disagree, but I say let's look at it for the sake of argument and we'll just assume that it doesn't exist. And then I want to see what the problem is with that. Because to me, blind merge mining is...

2846
04:20:12,102 --> 04:20:27,102
Paul, I have said and I am saying the same things I have said for literally years until you blocked me and just prevent me now from responding to anything or repeating these things.

2847
04:20:27,102 --> 04:20:44,102
The problem is a peg that holds a token's price to Bitcoin's price in combination with a blind merge mining scheme devolves into something that does affect miner incentives.

2848
04:20:44,102 --> 04:21:08,102
And the difference between blind merge mining in general or merge mining in general when it comes to miner incentives is the price. Is it pegged to Bitcoin or can it independently crash? Because empirically, all the historical data is that they trend down to nothing if they freely float with their own price.

2849
04:21:09,102 --> 04:21:36,102
And miners eventually just don't care. You point at Namecoin. Do you know how many times miners stopped merge mining Namecoin and then start again when the price pumps? It's a little irrelevant nothing that always trends to a irrelevant tail end. That is not possible when the peg is combined with things and keeps the price of something anchored to Bitcoin.

2850
04:21:37,102 --> 04:21:50,102
But I think it would be very easy for most people to see why I bring up Namecoin because Namecoin was invented by Satoshi and has been used for 10 years and is in constant use. It's true that it's not very popular. It doesn't generate a lot of revenue.

2851
04:21:50,102 --> 04:22:03,102
But it's something that no one can stop miners from doing and that they already are doing. So what you're really saying is I hope merge mining, which is this inevitable thing that has always existed and always will exist.

2852
04:22:04,102 --> 04:22:21,102
You're saying I hope that this thing remains small and niche. But you can see how when I'm criticized for changing miner incentives, why I just think, well, that's just clearly not true because merge mining has always been part of miner incentives. It's just been very small.

2853
04:22:21,102 --> 04:22:37,102
So if that's, you know, there's no in principle change in miner incentives. It's just they would get a lot more money from merge mining than they used to. So you can hopefully understand why when the critique is something like, oh, you're changing miner incentives, that it would be fair game to point out.

2854
04:22:37,102 --> 04:23:01,102
It absolutely is a change in miner incentives, Paul, because you are taking something that has empirically, observably always trended to nothing. And by combining it with the peg and anchoring the price of those things to Bitcoin, you are removing a factor in the current incentives, which is those things are freely priced.

2855
04:23:02,102 --> 04:23:14,102
They don't just track the price of Bitcoin. By removing that possibility and anchoring the price to Bitcoin, you are changing the incentives. You are changing the situation.

2856
04:23:15,102 --> 04:23:25,102
Well, I mean, it seems to me like now you're saying something like you would support the 300 of Namecoin were worth as much as Bitcoin. I mean, I know that's not literally what you're saying, but...

2857
04:23:25,102 --> 04:23:33,102
No, Paul, that has no relationship to anything I just said at all. That reflects nothing of what I was trying to convey.

2858
04:23:34,102 --> 04:23:35,102
Why do you do that?

2859
04:23:35,102 --> 04:23:39,102
Billy phrases Shinobi about this has nothing to do with, it has nothing at all, 0%.

2860
04:23:40,102 --> 04:24:03,102
Because you are consistently trying to reframe everything I'm saying in a different context to ascribe a different meaning to it in a public discussion with numerous people listening to it. That's why I'm saying that, Paul. I'm correcting you. And I'm stopping you from just putting words in my mouth, essentially, which you have repetitively done this entire time.

2861
04:24:04,102 --> 04:24:20,102
Well, I'm going to do it right now because you know full well that you just said a moment ago, empirically trends to zero. And then I said, well, what if the price was the same? And you said, the problem is the peg. And then I said, what if the price of Namecoin was the same as Bitcoin? So it's not like it had absolutely no relationship whatsoever. And I'm some kind of bad faith.

2862
04:24:21,102 --> 04:24:47,102
Yes, it does. It's not anchored to that price, Paul. It's completely freely formed. If a shitcoin pumps, you know what it has done empirically every time? Crash. It does not just track Bitcoin's price. It is not perpetually, permanently linked to it in a way where it will never substantially deviate from it. Those are not the same situations.

2863
04:24:48,102 --> 04:25:14,102
Namecoin could be in a situation where its price happens to pump when it gets less usage, and then as a merge mine's chain, and then when the price goes down, the chain gets more usage. And so even though the price is not pegged, then despite being not pegged, the monetary value of the L2 blocks could still be the same amount of US dollar value as if it had been pegged to Bitcoin.

2864
04:25:15,102 --> 04:25:31,102
Paul, you are trying to take any extreme fringe edge case example with an insanely low probability and trying to hold that up to the comparison of this is guaranteed 100% of the time. That's absurd.

2865
04:25:31,102 --> 04:25:32,102
Oh, that's true.

2866
04:25:32,102 --> 04:25:33,102
Absolutely.

2867
04:25:33,102 --> 04:25:42,102
I'm just trying to say that you're saying that your case is based on this empirical concept that something that may or may not happen.

2868
04:25:42,102 --> 04:25:50,102
Yes. The historical, empirical reality of all of these coins that have been merged is that it crashes.

2869
04:25:51,102 --> 04:26:10,102
Hey, can I attempt to moderate just a little bit? Because I think Shinobi is probably the most valid critic of BIP300 that I've heard, and I really don't want this to be something where Shinobi leaves and then we all suffer because of it.

2870
04:26:11,102 --> 04:26:24,102
And in Shinobi, I'm also, I do find it a little bit hard to follow your rationale, but I also find it equally hard to follow Paul's rationale too in his responses.

2871
04:26:24,102 --> 04:26:42,102
So I'm not going to claim to fully understand you or Paul's response to your points, but it seems like to me, Paul, what Shinobi is saying, and Shinobi, please correct me if I'm wrong, there are things that are already possible.

2872
04:26:42,102 --> 04:26:55,102
There's already kind of issues with MEV and ideas here, but drivechain exacerbates these things and makes them even worse, and just because we can do something doesn't mean we should do it.

2873
04:26:56,102 --> 04:27:22,102
It's like shooting yourself in the foot. Even though we already have examples of this, which I think you're pointing out, I think what Shinobi is trying to say is this releases it and opens up the ceiling for this to get way, way worse, and it gives people a direct path to it, versus right now it's sort of muddled on how this necessarily becomes worse, even though it is possible for this to become worse.

2874
04:27:23,102 --> 04:27:33,102
Yes, that is the core of my entire argument. If your oven has a 1% chance of blowing up in your face, why do you want to increase that?

2875
04:27:34,102 --> 04:28:01,102
So, Paul, I think what you need to prove out in order to satisfy this concern, which is somewhat .8 on the list, this list I'm trying to promote, but whatever, I think what you need to try to prove out, or at least acknowledge that, yes, this is a problem, but does it make it any worse?

2876
04:28:02,102 --> 04:28:25,102
And I don't know how easy it is to prove, hey, this isn't going to make it worse, because Shinobi is pretty convinced that this does enable easily for this to get way worse, and I think Shinobi is coming from a very, very good place with his concerns here, so I don't want you to necessarily brush this off as if Shinobi is trolling you right here.

2877
04:28:25,102 --> 04:28:46,102
I think he's being completely sincere with his concerns, and Paul, I'll just step aside. I don't want this to be something where it's like we're missing this opportunity to progress the conversation, either acknowledging issues or making people understand things differently, you know what I mean?

2878
04:28:47,102 --> 04:29:01,102
Yes. Okay, so I think if we zoom out, my plan for explaining why there is no issue is, see, like, blind merge mining is an optional thing.

2879
04:29:01,102 --> 04:29:24,102
They can always reintegrate the same person. Blind merge mining is designed to separate the L1 miners from the L2 blockchain on a day-to-day, but you could always have a vertical integration where the Layer 1 miner decides that they want to wear both hats, so to speak.

2880
04:29:25,102 --> 04:29:52,102
So what Shinobi seems to be saying is that, for me to be correct, it relies critically on that never happening, but I don't feel that way at all. To me, it makes no difference if it happens every time, and so I think that is where we should take the conversation next, because to me, blind merge mining is like a clever way of helping the miner not run a node.

2881
04:29:52,102 --> 04:30:21,102
And I actually think it will work, and I think the fee sniping thing doesn't apply, and actually I think Professor Warner's essay, he frames it in a certain way, but I think he actually explains sort of why it won't happen in that long essay, so people should maybe look it up if they're interested in that, or I can continue to talk about that detail, but I think maybe it's just easier to just say that Shinobi, he thinks that there's a problem if there's no blind merge mining.

2882
04:30:22,102 --> 04:30:41,102
I'm convinced also that there is absolutely zero problem, even if blind merge mining had never been invented, and in fact was impossible, and every sidechain miner, I would say that it has not changed miner incentives, even if it were required that every miner run every sidechain node, I would still say it doesn't affect miner incentives.

2883
04:30:42,102 --> 04:30:53,102
So that's, I think, where the conversation should go next, but I need Mike to tell me whether or not any of this is making any sense to him or the other people in the audience.

2884
04:30:54,102 --> 04:31:16,102
Who do you love more, Mike, your child, your crying child, or the Bitcoin community who wants you to moderate this important…

2885
04:31:17,102 --> 04:31:28,102
The thing that I think Shinobi has brought up in the past, which I'm not exactly sure if this is what he or you are getting at is…

2886
04:31:29,102 --> 04:31:43,102
Well, Mike, you mind real quick if I just get a quick word in to what Paul just said. Like, please. Like, Paul, you just said you don't care if miners always wind up running these nodes themselves.

2887
04:31:44,102 --> 04:32:01,102
So what you have just explicitly said then is you do not care if miners are affected by the consensus equivalence of a block size increase and the incentive changes that creates, especially in pool dynamics and all of that.

2888
04:32:02,102 --> 04:32:16,102
So then there's just an impasse, like, period. You will never get consensus on this proposal ever if that's your attitude, because a shit ton of people in this space, that is a line.

2889
04:32:17,102 --> 04:32:25,102
That is a serious concern, and you have literally just said you don't care, you don't see that as a concern, you don't even see that as something to address.

2890
04:32:26,102 --> 04:32:32,102
That's a final impasse. Like, there is no moving forward here. There is no moving towards consensus.

2891
04:32:33,102 --> 04:32:39,102
We just got started, though. I was just saying that we should talk about what this is really about, which is the prejudice against miners…

2892
04:32:40,102 --> 04:32:47,102
That's what this is about. That's what this is about, Paul. What I just said, what you said you don't care about, is what this is entirely about.

2893
04:32:48,102 --> 04:32:49,102
But let me ask you this.

2894
04:32:50,102 --> 04:32:52,102
That is a complete and total impasse. That's a brick wall.

2895
04:32:52,102 --> 04:33:11,102
If it's the case that a miner must spend a certain amount of money to buy an S9, or if it's the case that you must have a certain amount of hash rate to join a pool, why is that any different from any other requirement, including the requirement to run onerous sidechain node software?

2896
04:33:12,102 --> 04:33:20,102
Because the entire viability of Bitcoin as a system, Paul, is neutrality and censorship resistance.

2897
04:33:21,102 --> 04:33:25,102
That was accomplished through the limitation of the block size.

2898
04:33:26,102 --> 04:33:30,102
That was not just about miners and how it affects miners. That was also about users.

2899
04:33:31,102 --> 04:33:33,102
It was about how both of those things interact.

2900
04:33:34,102 --> 04:33:45,102
It's about users being able to actually validate things, but it's also about the mining ecosystem having a floor of decentralization that they can hit.

2901
04:33:46,102 --> 04:33:55,102
And when you start trying to turn this up in a way that only affects miners so that you can look to users and go, this has no effect on you, it does.

2902
04:33:55,102 --> 04:34:08,102
Because it starts creating those centralization pressures that have a big effect on censorship resistance, on neutrality, by raising the floor of how decentralized things can be.

2903
04:34:09,102 --> 04:34:18,102
By raising the floor consciously and artificially, by tweaking this knob, how small scale of a participant in the mining system can be viable.

2904
04:34:19,102 --> 04:34:25,102
Yeah, but it's true that there is a knob as how small scale a miner can be viable.

2905
04:34:26,102 --> 04:34:35,102
But that's my point, is that to buy even like a block eruptor or something, or like an S9, it's like thousands of dollars.

2906
04:34:36,102 --> 04:34:39,102
This is why pools exist, to pool things.

2907
04:34:40,102 --> 04:34:47,102
This is why people are looking at pools, which are a point of centralization and researching how to turn them into distributed protocols,

2908
04:34:48,102 --> 04:34:54,102
where every individual miner running hardware can actually have their own node plugged into this protocol,

2909
04:34:55,102 --> 04:35:08,102
do their own block selection to actually decentralize the block template construction as much as, or at least allow it to be decentralized as much as the actual hardware ownership is.

2910
04:35:09,102 --> 04:35:15,102
And drivechains and these merged mine systems artificially increase the cost of that.

2911
04:35:16,102 --> 04:35:19,102
They raise the floor of how low you can go there.

2912
04:35:20,102 --> 04:35:21,102
Well, but let me ask you this, though.

2913
04:35:22,102 --> 04:35:26,102
You're saying that you have a problem with anything that increase a miner's costs.

2914
04:35:28,102 --> 04:35:35,102
In terms of coordination of a pool, the validation cost of doing that, yes.

2915
04:35:36,102 --> 04:35:43,102
The entire system was designed, Paul, to increase the cost and the profit margins with the difficulty adjustment.

2916
04:35:44,102 --> 04:35:48,102
So please do not try to take this conversation down the road of conflating those two things.

2917
04:35:49,102 --> 04:35:54,102
That's what the system was explicitly designed and needed to be designed for, to function properly.

2918
04:35:55,102 --> 04:36:02,102
The block template construction, the actual validation aspect of pooling, that needs to be decentralized, too.

2919
04:36:03,102 --> 04:36:13,102
And drivechains is something that makes it harder and harder and more expensive and less inclusive in terms of shit we can do to improve decentralization.

2920
04:36:14,102 --> 04:36:17,102
So you're talking about how much it costs to start a new pool.

2921
04:36:18,102 --> 04:36:24,102
You are not at all talking about how much it costs to become like a hasher, like someone who's buying an S9.

2922
04:36:25,102 --> 04:36:33,102
Because you seem to agree with me that the miners have huge costs, even a small miner has costs that are much, much higher.

2923
04:36:34,102 --> 04:36:36,102
I'm not just talking about starting a pool.

2924
04:36:36,102 --> 04:36:44,102
I am also talking about the cost of participating in a protocol that replaces pools.

2925
04:36:45,102 --> 04:36:48,102
What do you mean by that?

2926
04:36:49,102 --> 04:36:56,102
I mean, every miner hashing away is also running a node, and they are picking their own transactions.

2927
04:36:56,102 --> 04:36:59,102
They are actually making their own block templates.

2928
04:37:00,102 --> 04:37:07,102
And when their share actually meets the difficulty, their block template that they constructed themselves is what's sent out to the network.

2929
04:37:08,102 --> 04:37:15,102
And all you need is fancy scripting in the Coinbase, and you can have a totally trustless way to divvy that money up between miners.

2930
04:37:16,102 --> 04:37:18,102
There are numerous designs out there for that right now.

2931
04:37:18,102 --> 04:37:28,102
The possibility of design space gets bigger and bigger the more you start adding things like CTV, or APO, or other very basic covenants.

2932
04:37:29,102 --> 04:37:37,102
And drivechains completely undermines how decentralized that type of landscape can be in the future.

2933
04:37:38,102 --> 04:37:45,102
And I know for a fact that there are major mining operations, even pools, who want to see things go in that direction.

2934
04:37:45,102 --> 04:37:54,102
Because they see that as a protection of their investment long term by actually maintaining and optimizing those specific properties.

2935
04:37:55,102 --> 04:38:03,102
So I don't know if maybe Mike can answer the question about if he's talking about costs of starting a new pool.

2936
04:38:04,102 --> 04:38:07,102
I honestly don't understand what the...

2937
04:38:08,102 --> 04:38:09,102
Jesus Christ.

2938
04:38:09,102 --> 04:38:10,102
Jesus Christ.

2939
04:38:11,102 --> 04:38:12,102
Paul, I have a question for you.

2940
04:38:13,102 --> 04:38:20,102
I just want to simplify the conversation because I have an ADIQ smooth brain here.

2941
04:38:21,102 --> 04:38:22,102
No you don't.

2942
04:38:23,102 --> 04:38:27,102
I guess what I want to get at is, would you be able to...

2943
04:38:28,102 --> 04:38:31,102
Because what I really want to do is see if I can find common ground between you and Shinobi.

2944
04:38:31,102 --> 04:38:44,102
Would you be able to agree that if MEV opportunities exist on sidechains, that that is a centralizing factor as mining pools and miners would need to...

2945
04:38:47,083 --> 04:38:49,083
benefit by running those sidechains?

2946
04:38:50,083 --> 04:39:00,083
We actually did it before and you can maybe see that in the reply to this tweet thread, I put some images and we actually already discussed it at the beginning.

2947
04:39:01,083 --> 04:39:04,083
I apologize. I apologize.

2948
04:39:05,083 --> 04:39:10,083
But the MEV on the sidechain is contained completely on L2 and the people who...

2949
04:39:10,083 --> 04:39:15,083
The L2 nodes are separate from the L1 nodes. So sidechains just firewall everything off.

2950
04:39:16,083 --> 04:39:31,083
Even though there could be MEV, whoever's collecting on L2, that's the software that gets you that money and there's nothing that L1 miners need to do differently.

2951
04:39:32,083 --> 04:39:35,083
Paul, that's a completely oversimplification.

2952
04:39:36,083 --> 04:39:43,083
Just as a concrete example, if you have chains with MEV going on, all of them need frontends and most of them are centralized.

2953
04:39:44,083 --> 04:39:53,083
Whoever's running that frontend has a massively privileged position in terms of extracting more MEV than people who don't run that frontend.

2954
04:39:53,083 --> 04:40:01,083
And that is not just guaranteed to be an open access thing that anyone can do and just have equal footing for competition.

2955
04:40:02,083 --> 04:40:09,083
No, I was saying that the sidechain is contained in the... it's like basically running a sidechain full node.

2956
04:40:10,083 --> 04:40:12,083
It's just sidechain full node plus MEV.

2957
04:40:13,083 --> 04:40:19,083
And so that the coinbase, the value of the sidechain L2 coinbase goes up basically.

2958
04:40:20,083 --> 04:40:24,083
But it's contained completely on the sidechain, it doesn't affect L1.

2959
04:40:25,083 --> 04:40:38,083
Well now you're just like essentially pretending every argument I've made up until this point about the interactions between L2 and L1 are just invalid and don't exist and you're back to ignoring them.

2960
04:40:39,083 --> 04:40:49,083
Wait, hold on. Let me, on behalf of Shinobi, and I might bastardize his points so Shinobi can give me shit later.

2961
04:40:50,083 --> 04:40:59,083
But I want to just hone in on this idea just because I don't actually understand your answer to Shinobi, Paul.

2962
04:40:59,083 --> 04:41:28,083
Or at least the take I'm trying to explain here, which is miners are going to be in a position to have asynchronous kind of skill sets and asynchronous kind of abilities to be involved with these MEVs that your, I guess you could call it your average pleb, your average node runners on these blockchains are not going to be able to compete with.

2963
04:41:29,083 --> 04:41:43,083
The idea is miners are going to be more or less in a privileged position because of their scale and their, I guess you could say their resources, and I use resources abstractly as well as human resources.

2964
04:41:43,083 --> 04:42:12,083
But they're going to be in a position to produce MEV asynchronously better, or I guess you could say uniquely better than other people, which would then give them the opportunity, which would then put them in a position where blind merge mining is going to be completely out the door where you have these more sophisticated, large scale, complicated blockchains potentially.

2965
04:42:13,083 --> 04:42:28,083
Maybe not every sidechain is going to be, give really this opportunity for MEV, but there will be enough or one or multiple of these that will cause miners to essentially be centralizing, especially if these sidechains…

2966
04:42:28,083 --> 04:42:45,083
See, why do people say it's true and then people just throw this word centralizing in there? Like what if I said that miners have a unique advantage, they run software that allows them to collect transaction fees, and so they give an inherently centralizing advantage.

2967
04:42:45,083 --> 04:42:59,083
It's like, no, that's just what they do. What miners are doing is they pay a list of costs, which include running full nodes and getting power and shedding their variance by joining a pool.

2968
04:43:00,083 --> 04:43:18,083
Miners pay, they do a list of tasks, they pay a list of costs, and in revenue they collect the block subsidy plus transaction fees, and that is why I'm mystified when people say the incentives change, because they seem to be saying something like, instead of running this software, they'd run some other software.

2969
04:43:18,083 --> 04:43:22,083
Instead of collecting these fees, they'd collect some other fees, but it doesn't really make any difference.

2970
04:43:22,083 --> 04:43:45,083
Let me attempt to demystify. So in the situation where you are… We talked about this in the past, almost as a joke but not really, where we're talking about terabyte blocks, which would require an incredible amount of infrastructure coordination and all this stuff, and potentially something that's producing well above layer one fees.

2971
04:43:46,083 --> 04:44:12,083
If there's some sort of minimum fee on this terabyte blockchain, terabyte blocks being produced, and there's some sort of minimum fee, and it's just the gravy of Bitcoin, and everyone's using it, and it's creating tons of transaction volume and tons of transaction fees, and now it's dwarfing layer one fees and ideas, I think this is more in line with,

2972
04:44:12,083 --> 04:44:35,083
okay, well something over there now can perversely mess up layer one. In terms of if something goes down there, people are going to be incentivized to act differently, and maybe reject blocks, mine differently, 51% attack, whatever, if there's kind of these unique fee opportunities going on on these layer twos.

2973
04:44:36,083 --> 04:44:42,083
Shinobi, I really hope I'm not mischaracterizing your argument, by the way. I'm going to mute myself now.

2974
04:44:44,083 --> 04:44:49,083
Well, it did seem like you switched there from saying they'll be really popular, so that miners will care about them more.

2975
04:44:50,083 --> 04:45:03,083
Yeah, but the whole premise of Shinobi's arguments are not whether or not drivechain will work, it's if drivechain does work and becomes exceedingly popular, is that going to essentially be bad for Bitcoin?

2976
04:45:04,083 --> 04:45:23,083
The whole premise of what Shinobi's talking about is the extremes of if drivechain actually does work, I would argue he probably doesn't think it will, but if it does, we're kind of two ifs deep or something, where it's like, it's not good, but if it is good, it's still bad kind of idea.

2977
04:45:23,083 --> 04:45:34,083
So even if drivechain gets a lot of adoption, that's kind of where we're at. So it's already the assumption that this is going to be something that gets popular.

2978
04:45:37,083 --> 04:45:46,083
Well, I don't know, let's say there's terabyte blocks, the full node costs a fortune. I mean, how much do you think it could cost? Because there is actually a ceiling on how much it can cost.

2979
04:45:47,083 --> 04:45:51,083
Well, let's just say Google and AWS.

2980
04:45:52,083 --> 04:45:53,083
Economies of scale.

2981
04:45:54,083 --> 04:46:04,083
There have to be some full node users who are basically 0% hashers, so there is some ceiling to how much it can cost before the network just dies off.

2982
04:46:05,083 --> 04:46:18,083
Right, but let's say AWS, Jeff Bezos, I mean, Jeff Bezos isn't CEO anymore, but you know what I mean. Let's just say Amazon's fully in support and they're the only people, they've dedicated a whole data center just for...

2983
04:46:19,083 --> 04:46:21,083
$10 million a day it costs to run the full node.

2984
04:46:22,083 --> 04:46:27,083
Sure, sure, whatever. And literally no one else wants to do this with them.

2985
04:46:28,083 --> 04:46:31,083
Right, so then continue the example.

2986
04:46:32,083 --> 04:46:47,083
So in this example, there's like a minimum fee. There's obviously no pressure on block size, but there is like a minimum fee, so you end up getting some sort of large amount of fees in comparison to L1.

2987
04:46:48,083 --> 04:47:01,083
The fees must be larger than the costs because of course the costs are, I mean, surely it must be like $30 million a day.

2988
04:47:02,083 --> 04:47:15,083
Paul, get inventive. Amazon ran at a loss for 20 years. Companies at those scale have lots of profitable things that they can use to subsidize loss leaders. It's not that simple.

2989
04:47:16,083 --> 04:47:19,083
You pick the example then. Let Shinobi pick the numbers then.

2990
04:47:20,083 --> 04:47:25,083
I don't want anyone saying that Shinobi would pick, so shouldn't Shinobi pick all the numbers or no?

2991
04:47:26,083 --> 04:47:35,083
The numbers have nothing to do with it, Paul. I'm responding to your assertion that the fees have to cover the costs. They don't necessarily.

2992
04:47:36,083 --> 04:47:43,083
Well, I just thought that it wouldn't be a very interesting example if they didn't because if the fees, the total fees don't cover the costs, then it seems to me that no one is just running this network.

2993
04:47:44,083 --> 04:47:50,083
Well, hold on. It could be something even more abstract and even more extractable where the people…

2994
04:47:51,083 --> 04:47:56,083
What if Amazon gets a bunch of new business because people who couldn't buy things on Amazon can now?

2995
04:47:57,083 --> 04:48:06,083
So even though running this giant giga node is not profitable, the secondary effect of the commerce that it generates for Amazon makes it profitable.

2996
04:48:07,083 --> 04:48:12,083
Yeah, so they run this thing that's too expensive for… Oh, Portland is back. Hello.

2997
04:48:13,083 --> 04:48:22,083
They run this thing that is too expensive for anyone else to run. No one else can run a node, including the users, but people pay transaction fees.

2998
04:48:23,083 --> 04:48:31,083
I mean, now this is kind of just becoming like a Steam game marketplace or something. This isn't really even a blockchain anymore.

2999
04:48:32,083 --> 04:48:42,083
No, but Paul, it's Bitcoin because drivechain and people don't understand and you shouldn't expect users to understand all the technical nuance under the hood of things they're using.

3000
04:48:43,083 --> 04:48:46,083
And now it's generating this revenue and it's having this influence.

3001
04:48:47,083 --> 04:48:58,083
Maybe Portland can save us from this, but I did want to throw one last thing, which is to say that, again, I could already start a business today and I could say, I'm the only one allowed to run this node.

3002
04:48:58,083 --> 04:49:05,083
As far as everyone else is concerned, it's impossible. It has infinite costs. And I have a store and I sell things for Bitcoin.

3003
04:49:06,083 --> 04:49:13,083
And you pay here with Bitcoin. You pay micropayments. I give you whatever. I sell hats for a small amount.

3004
04:49:14,083 --> 04:49:22,083
And then that's just not a blockchain. So again, the fundamental effect of miner incentives, I hate to be so, but maybe Portland can help us.

3005
04:49:23,083 --> 04:49:36,083
I don't think I'm here to help, but I do have a statement that you could actually create a sidechain that has specialized validation hardware, if I'm correct.

3006
04:49:37,083 --> 04:49:45,083
You could have an Amazon AI compute sidechain that you would peg in your Bitcoin and you could pay Amazon addresses with this AI compute coin.

3007
04:49:46,083 --> 04:49:54,083
And literally they would put it on their calculations. The actual script you want to execute on the sidechain would get ran on their GPU clusters.

3008
04:49:55,083 --> 04:50:09,083
Nobody has access to some of that stuff that we have. That would be a one-node scenario that would basically control the validation of the sidechain, because no user could possibly validate the computation they're doing with the scripts on that sidechain.

3009
04:50:10,083 --> 04:50:14,083
Yes, that's correct. But you wouldn't say that that's the end of Bitcoin, though.

3010
04:50:15,083 --> 04:50:22,083
No, I think that Amazon would control the consensus on that entire sidechain.

3011
04:50:23,083 --> 04:50:24,083
But you see Amazon already controls.

3012
04:50:25,083 --> 04:50:32,083
Well, actually, they wouldn't control the consensus on the sidechain because the miners still could vote against what they say. So the miners actually technically still control the entire situation.

3013
04:50:33,083 --> 04:50:54,083
It's a very perplexing situation would be that they're using BIP300 for some reason, but all it would say to run the sidechain node software would just be a hyperlink to a URL controlled by Amazon.

3014
04:50:55,083 --> 04:51:00,083
And they would say, this is where we will put the hash. So it's kind of bizarre. It doesn't really make sense that they would use BIP300.

3015
04:51:01,083 --> 04:51:13,083
I was just saying, you could create a blockchain on Amazon clusters where literally the scripting language of the blockchain is outputs of tokens or something, or a hash of some result of work that this thing has done.

3016
04:51:14,083 --> 04:51:19,083
And so no other user on Earth could have that kind of compute to ever validate.

3017
04:51:20,083 --> 04:51:27,083
I guess, yeah, you're right. It doesn't make any sense. They could just falsify the results unless you're doing actual some proof of work that's added into that.

3018
04:51:28,083 --> 04:51:39,083
But nonetheless, I just feel that you can create drivechains and it would pay the miners fees with specialized hardware that nobody would have access to. You could do FPGAs.

3019
04:51:40,083 --> 04:51:52,083
You're quite right, of course. But the reason why I assumed the revenues would be more than the costs was because I just thought it's not a very interesting example if the costs exceed the revenues.

3020
04:51:52,083 --> 04:52:09,083
Paul, whether you think it's interesting or not is kind of irrelevant. It can happen. The scenario laid out does make sense. If it can be used as a loss leader to generate secondary profit, that is an economically rational thing to do.

3021
04:52:10,083 --> 04:52:22,083
This is the basket we can open for every type of idea for a blockchain out there. And they're all open now if you turn drivechains on. These are all possible things.

3022
04:52:23,083 --> 04:52:27,083
AWS was a loss leader for Amazon for probably three or five years.

3023
04:52:28,083 --> 04:52:36,083
I've been misunderstood two times in a row, though, because when I say not an interesting example, I mean no one in the audience will care about it because it has no implication on anything.

3024
04:52:36,083 --> 04:52:40,083
So you know what everybody sitting here listening now is interested in?

3025
04:52:41,083 --> 04:52:53,083
Okay, let's go into it. Let's say it costs $10 million a day and it only makes $30,000 a day in transaction fees. So let's go. Now we'll see how the miners incentives are affected.

3026
04:52:54,083 --> 04:53:06,083
Now let's look at $15 million of revenue generated on Amazon against all of that. You make $5 million in profit when you look at it.

3027
04:53:07,083 --> 04:53:13,083
Okay, so now I would like to hear now how the miners incentives are affected by this.

3028
04:53:14,083 --> 04:53:19,083
How much of what they're getting paid is required?

3029
04:53:20,083 --> 04:53:31,083
If you remove all of the revenue from that node, are miners still profitable or not? Can they selectively withhold or share that revenue with only certain miners?

3030
04:53:32,083 --> 04:53:45,083
All of a sudden, they have a very interesting role and position to be coercive, to directly and consciously mess with individual miners' profitability with their revenue.

3031
04:53:46,083 --> 04:53:57,083
I'm a miner. I want to make money. And someone says, there's this new sidechain that comes out. It generates $30,000 a day in transaction fees. I'm like, wow, that's pretty good.

3032
04:53:58,083 --> 04:54:08,083
It's not bad. It's not quite an Ethereum, which is $7 million a day, but $30,000 a day. And then they say, oh, the full node cost is $10 million a day.

3033
04:54:09,083 --> 04:54:21,083
I would be like, okay, well, I'm not running a node. I'll tell you that. At best, I'm going to try to find another node that exists and ask them what's going on, which is basically what blind merge mining is, which is the whole point of blind merge mining.

3034
04:54:22,083 --> 04:54:32,083
I'm not paying $10 million a day if I don't have to. But I want to get my hands on this $30,000 a day if I can. Maybe I look at the pool.

3035
04:54:33,083 --> 04:54:37,083
He says it's only $30,000, Paul. They make $5 million in revenue.

3036
04:54:38,083 --> 04:54:50,083
No, again, Paul, this is what I mean, where you just refuse to engage with the point someone else makes, and you just try to look at one piece only and pretend like that's the whole argument.

3037
04:54:50,083 --> 04:55:07,083
Here's the scenario. The node costs $10 million to run. The transaction fees are fucking $30,000 or whatever the hell. And there's $15 million of revenue that wasn't there before to Amazon products.

3038
04:55:07,083 --> 04:55:24,083
So they are in net making $5 million and $30,000. Economically, that $5 million can be dipped into to pay miners. That can become way more than $30,000 of miner revenue.

3039
04:55:24,083 --> 04:55:37,083
And that might be something that over time brings operational costs, because new miners come online when new revenue is available, above the point where miners can continue their operations without that.

3040
04:55:38,083 --> 04:55:52,083
Now, that fucking Amazon node can actually start directly interfering with the entire mining landscape. It could selectively withhold fees from miners that aren't doing something they want them to do.

3041
04:55:52,083 --> 04:56:08,083
It can play games and delegate who gets that money or who doesn't get that money after it's ramped up the difficulty and brought operational costs to the point where that money from Amazon is necessary now to run profitably with this difficulty.

3042
04:56:09,083 --> 04:56:14,083
Amazon is giving out $30,000. Oh, Portland wants to say something. Guys, you have to let me know.

3043
04:56:14,083 --> 04:56:30,083
You don't have to give me the floor every time. It's fine. I just raised my hand because in my mind, I'm assuming that basically if a node is unprofitable to run, it basically relegates it to blind merge mining only.

3044
04:56:31,083 --> 04:56:38,083
No mining operation would ever run this. And as such, it would be a blind merge mine sidechain only.

3045
04:56:39,083 --> 04:56:52,083
Yes, I would like to point out that I think of blind merge mining as not only a BIP, but as a kind of equilibrium outcome of just outsourcing, of just trying to shed the cost of running a node.

3046
04:56:53,083 --> 04:57:02,083
So if there's a $10 million node, I'm a miner. I'm thinking, I don't want to run this node. I'm going to look at a pool and I'll see, do you have the node? Because I'm not going to run it.

3047
04:57:03,083 --> 04:57:10,083
And I'll ask the pool, do you have some way of proving to me that you're really going to pay me the money that I'm supposed to be getting? I'm going to shop around at the pools.

3048
04:57:11,083 --> 04:57:17,083
And then the pools probably also, if it's $10 million a day and I'm running a pool, I would be like, wow, this sucks.

3049
04:57:18,083 --> 04:57:28,083
And we're only getting 30,000 a day is coming in total for everyone to split up across the pools or whatever across the days block winning.

3050
04:57:29,083 --> 04:57:41,083
I would be like, well, I would be like, who is running this pool? Who can I partner with? And then this is like a blind merge mining type situation where they say, well, okay, I'm not.

3051
04:57:42,083 --> 04:57:48,083
But if I'm an individual miner and I'm hashing, I'm doing my SHA-256 hashing, I got my S9 plugged in.

3052
04:57:49,083 --> 04:57:55,083
I want to connect to a pool that's at least trying something to get the $30,000 in fees because I want that.

3053
04:57:55,083 --> 04:57:58,083
So I want all the revenue and I don't want to pay the costs.

3054
04:57:59,083 --> 04:58:01,083
I have no choice when it comes to my hash rate.

3055
04:58:02,083 --> 04:58:06,083
I would cheat the laws of physics if I could, but I can't.

3056
04:58:07,083 --> 04:58:11,083
But I would love to get these additional revenues.

3057
04:58:12,083 --> 04:58:16,083
It's like a weird ordinal or something, this mysterious Amazon chain.

3058
04:58:16,083 --> 04:58:17,083
It's like Amazon is just paying people money.

3059
04:58:18,083 --> 04:58:25,083
And that is why Shinobi is not trying to evade the issues or do something weird or mysterious and nefarious.

3060
04:58:26,083 --> 04:58:38,083
Before, when many minutes ago, I asked you a question along the lines of, if I just start a pool and I start paying people extra money, such as $30,000 a day.

3061
04:58:38,083 --> 04:58:43,083
If I just start a pool and I just start paying people extra money.

3062
04:58:43,842 --> 04:58:49,122
Have I now changed the miner incentives in your view? And is this now bad for Bitcoin?

3063
04:58:49,122 --> 04:58:52,562
And this is the reason why we shouldn't have this BIP, because I'm changing miner incentives.

3064
04:58:52,562 --> 04:59:04,242
I'm starting Paul's generous pool, payout pool, and out of my own, I just pay $30,000 out of the goodness of my heart to anyone who connects to me.

3065
04:59:04,721 --> 04:59:10,401
Yeah, see Paul, but that was ridiculous. And my contention with that was the fact you're trying

3066
04:59:10,401 --> 04:59:15,282
to compare 10 cents to something like millions of dollars. And two, what I just did here,

3067
04:59:16,162 --> 04:59:23,601
piggybacking on Mike's initial example, is lay out a concrete, actually properly structured scenario

3068
04:59:23,601 --> 04:59:32,002
where I, as an outsider, can actually profitably generate a pretty big pool of money to use

3069
04:59:32,082 --> 04:59:39,601
specifically to attack Bitcoin. And that is enabled by drivechains. That's not possible

3070
04:59:39,601 --> 04:59:44,961
in the same way with the same guarantees, with the same incentives, because you're using the

3071
04:59:44,961 --> 04:59:52,642
Bitcoin token without drivechains. You enabled that new attack factor where it can actually be

3072
04:59:52,642 --> 04:59:58,401
profitable for me, the outside actor, to come in and start fucking with mining incentives,

3073
04:59:58,401 --> 05:00:04,882
just to fuck things up. Can I ask a like a just a person's question? I mean, is it different than

3074
05:00:04,882 --> 05:00:12,882
like, let's say, Bitmain, running a profitable hardware manufacturing company, and then using

3075
05:00:12,882 --> 05:00:19,041
the profits from that company to subsidize the operation of the, you know, amp pool or whatever,

3076
05:00:19,041 --> 05:00:27,121
and, you know, artificially giving users of amp pool a competitive advantage just subsidized off

3077
05:00:27,121 --> 05:00:32,242
of another business? Like, does it have to be a drivechain that uniquely accomplishes what you're

3078
05:00:32,242 --> 05:00:40,322
describing? A drivechain makes it a lot fucking smoother and a lot simpler and more incentive

3079
05:00:40,322 --> 05:00:46,562
secure, in my opinion, because you're not dealing with outside value. It's Bitcoin. It's the native

3080
05:00:46,562 --> 05:00:52,642
token miners are already going after. It's not some new consideration or some new market. It's

3081
05:00:52,642 --> 05:01:04,881
just, here's more Bitcoin. Well, I will say that there is a phenomenon that existed in mining.

3082
05:01:06,162 --> 05:01:12,481
I don't know if it's still around, but where basically new mining pools got going, and they

3083
05:01:12,481 --> 05:01:19,521
would provide, you know, better luck, effectively, for miners who are like different incentives to

3084
05:01:19,521 --> 05:01:24,802
try to get a hash rate to come to them. So that way, they could climb up the rankings of the

3085
05:01:24,802 --> 05:01:30,562
largest pools. And it was like, they looked at it like an advertising cost. And so, there are like,

3086
05:01:31,681 --> 05:01:37,681
maybe some examples of that happening on layer one in a lesser way. But yeah, just throwing that out

3087
05:01:37,681 --> 05:01:46,642
there. Should we integrate that possibility more tightly with layer one? Should we bake it into

3088
05:01:46,642 --> 05:01:52,802
consensus rules and couple those things tighter? Should we make the likelihood and possibility that

3089
05:01:52,802 --> 05:01:58,722
these types of scenarios happen more likely by anchoring the price of that token to Bitcoin

3090
05:01:58,722 --> 05:02:05,442
instead of it has to make or break on its own? Like, why should we make these things worse?

3091
05:02:05,442 --> 05:02:12,961
Like materially worse, make the risks materially higher? Why? Yeah, but it seems to me it's just

3092
05:02:12,961 --> 05:02:20,321
the risk of, if I start a pool, and I give away $30,000 a day, then miners are getting more money

3093
05:02:20,321 --> 05:02:28,562
temporarily, that may induce more people to join the mining ecosystem, the difficulty will then

3094
05:02:29,121 --> 05:02:34,722
adjust upwards. And then taking my $30,000 a day will be in some sense mandatory.

3095
05:02:35,442 --> 05:02:42,321
But to me, that doesn't add up to, like, I now control Bitcoin, or now Bitcoin is doomed.

3096
05:02:42,321 --> 05:02:49,681
Because you're again, doing what you've done this entire time, Paul, you selectively ignore me.

3097
05:02:49,681 --> 05:02:56,802
I, it's not just required, I can decide to give it to Michael and to Portland, but I can withhold

3098
05:02:56,802 --> 05:03:03,442
it from you. I am a conscious actor who can now for my own reasons, selectively withhold that.

3099
05:03:04,401 --> 05:03:10,562
It's not just this amorphous, abstract thing. Yes, but you know, for a while, I could say,

3100
05:03:10,562 --> 05:03:16,722
I'll give $30,000 to everyone in my pool. But only if they send me their driver's license

3101
05:03:16,722 --> 05:03:22,401
or something. And then people would decide, they would say, why do you keep doing this

3102
05:03:22,401 --> 05:03:27,121
and come up with these ridiculous examples? This is a fleshed out example of something

3103
05:03:27,842 --> 05:03:34,882
profitable. And you keep trying to compare that to I'll just pull infinite money out of my pockets,

3104
05:03:34,882 --> 05:03:40,002
that's not generating any profit for me. And you're trying to compare the two.

3105
05:03:40,562 --> 05:03:45,442
Well, you seem to be saying it was conditional on something. Like you were saying before,

3106
05:03:45,442 --> 05:03:49,921
maybe it would give it to Michael, but not me. And the reason why it doesn't really matter to

3107
05:03:49,921 --> 05:03:55,921
me if it's profitable or if it's subsidized by me is because I take it for granted, I presumably,

3108
05:03:55,921 --> 05:04:00,801
you don't have a problem with people making money, like in general, in the abstract,

3109
05:04:00,801 --> 05:04:06,081
like, you know, people making money is good for them. But you must, you clearly must care

3110
05:04:06,081 --> 05:04:11,282
about something that is induced as like a side effect of all this money making.

3111
05:04:11,282 --> 05:04:17,602
So you don't care about the difference between rational profit generating economic behavior versus

3112
05:04:17,602 --> 05:04:24,002
complete, full, retard, illogical behavior that generates no profit. You see no point in drawing

3113
05:04:24,081 --> 05:04:29,201
any distinction between those two things at all. They're the same. They're equivalent. Are you

3114
05:04:29,201 --> 05:04:36,002
serious? I think it's kind of like testing an airplane in like a wind tunnel before you fly

3115
05:04:36,002 --> 05:04:41,042
it outside. It's like, no, it's not Paul. That's not let's not do the analogy hopping thing where

3116
05:04:41,042 --> 05:04:46,801
you just keep trying to obscure the topic and shift away from it hopping from analogy to analogy.

3117
05:04:46,801 --> 05:04:52,961
Like no. Well, I think because you seem to be worried that something bad will happen to

3118
05:04:53,042 --> 05:04:56,322
like some guy who's listening in the audience. They own Bitcoin.

3119
05:04:56,322 --> 05:05:03,361
No, I seem to be, oh, maybe no, Paul, I have explicitly in crystal clear English,

3120
05:05:03,361 --> 05:05:11,602
this entire time delineated my exact concerns in exact scenarios. And you just keep backing away

3121
05:05:11,602 --> 05:05:18,401
and coming up with exert just totally batshit, absurd examples, or trying to compare things

3122
05:05:18,401 --> 05:05:25,681
that are literally the opposite and pretend like they're equivalent things. Like this is ridiculous.

3123
05:05:27,442 --> 05:05:33,762
Well, my view is that someone listening probably is thinking like, I own Bitcoin, is BIP300 going

3124
05:05:33,762 --> 05:05:40,002
to hurt my Bitcoin? And so they were thinking, oh, change miner incentives. They're thinking,

3125
05:05:40,002 --> 05:05:46,081
okay, what's going to happen that's going to make these incentives for me in the audience,

3126
05:05:46,081 --> 05:05:52,241
some guy who owns like some Bitcoin and they're just like, I like my Bitcoin the way it is. I

3127
05:05:52,241 --> 05:05:56,482
like being able to broadcast transactions. I really like multi-sig or whatever. They're

3128
05:05:56,482 --> 05:06:02,801
thinking like, what's the change going to be? And so when you lay out this story that says,

3129
05:06:03,442 --> 05:06:08,081
it may at some point be profitable. It's not a story, Paul. It's an argument. Like that's

3130
05:06:08,081 --> 05:06:13,521
a subtle thing you're doing. Just like, this is story time. We're all just making things up.

3131
05:06:14,482 --> 05:06:19,842
When you lay out your argument, the reason why I use story is because it's a scenario involving

3132
05:06:19,842 --> 05:06:24,641
lots of people doing things over time. It's not supposed to be disparaging comment about

3133
05:06:24,641 --> 05:06:31,121
the level of seriousness of the argument. But when you lay out your scenario where

3134
05:06:32,322 --> 05:06:43,201
someone is, a pool finds it profitable to obtain $30,000 a day via some other network,

3135
05:06:43,201 --> 05:06:48,401
which would be like a drivechain. And that costs $10 million a day, but is somehow,

3136
05:06:48,401 --> 05:06:53,361
they have some arrangement with someone else who's running that software and a loss. They have it as

3137
05:06:53,361 --> 05:06:59,521
a loss leader and they have other ways of earning money. So like the US government or Amazon or

3138
05:06:59,521 --> 05:07:07,681
whatever, they have this node that costs them $10 million a year. They pay 30,000 into the

3139
05:07:08,641 --> 05:07:13,521
Bitcoin world. It doesn't matter if it's the US government or Amazon or a drivechain,

3140
05:07:13,521 --> 05:07:19,441
it seems to me. And then what you're saying, so the person in the audience is thinking,

3141
05:07:19,441 --> 05:07:27,842
how is this going to affect me? Okay, miners will be greedily gobbling up the $30,000 a day extra.

3142
05:07:27,842 --> 05:07:32,961
Paul, no, we're not going to sit here and pretend like, oh, there's no difference here.

3143
05:07:32,961 --> 05:07:38,001
The government just printing money out of thin air, there's negative externalities that limit

3144
05:07:38,001 --> 05:07:42,961
how much they can do that. Inflation, if they go insane, having to reallocate budget money from

3145
05:07:42,961 --> 05:07:48,081
other things that are then not going to be taken care of. You pulling money out of your ass, you

3146
05:07:48,081 --> 05:07:52,802
can only fucking do that for so long because you don't have a money printer, Paul. Amazon here

3147
05:07:52,802 --> 05:07:59,042
though, actually generates profit. That's a sustainable thing that can continue long term.

3148
05:07:59,042 --> 05:08:04,881
So no, I'm not going to sit here and just go through analogy chain and pretend that those

3149
05:08:04,881 --> 05:08:10,001
are in any way equivalent things. Those are not equivalent things. Stop trying to pretend like

3150
05:08:10,001 --> 05:08:17,441
they are. First of all, we'll just say that it's Amazon and we'll leave it at that. But I would

3151
05:08:17,441 --> 05:08:24,561
like to just give a little comment purely for everyone's benefit as to why it doesn't seem to

3152
05:08:24,561 --> 05:08:29,201
matter to me where it comes from because to me it's kind of like, I know you don't like my

3153
05:08:29,201 --> 05:08:35,122
analogies but I'm doing the best that I can to explain what I really think. It's like you order

3154
05:08:35,122 --> 05:08:42,961
a restaurant and you want a hamburger made by Chef A and there's Chef A and B. You order a

3155
05:08:42,961 --> 05:08:48,081
hamburger made by Chef A and it comes out the door and then you eat it and then you come in the next

3156
05:08:48,081 --> 05:08:54,641
day and you say you want it made by Chef A but then Chef B watched, he's been an observant of

3157
05:08:54,641 --> 05:09:01,122
Chef A. Actually, Chef B makes the sandwich the exact same way, the hamburger and because you're

3158
05:09:01,122 --> 05:09:06,001
not in the kitchen, you don't really know and if they both can really make it the same way

3159
05:09:06,001 --> 05:09:11,282
and they put the cover over the tray of the two plates and then they shuffle the plates around,

3160
05:09:12,162 --> 05:09:15,201
it kind of doesn't actually make any difference which one comes out the door. There's no way

3161
05:09:15,201 --> 05:09:18,722
of telling but so it's like it's a thirty thousand. Yeah, it makes a big difference,

3162
05:09:18,722 --> 05:09:22,961
Paul, because one of them is going to stop being able to do that and the sandwich is going to taste

3163
05:09:22,961 --> 05:09:28,482
like shit on day three. The other one is not going to be able to do that after the first week because

3164
05:09:28,482 --> 05:09:34,001
hey, guess what? He's not making it up there. He's got to go get another fucking job and only Chef A

3165
05:09:34,001 --> 05:09:40,001
is going to be the one there consistently making the same sandwich and just like what, dude,

3166
05:09:40,001 --> 05:09:46,802
these analogies do not help people understand this shit at all and I know this for a fact

3167
05:09:46,802 --> 05:09:51,842
because people come to me and they ask me to directly explain things because they hear shit

3168
05:09:51,842 --> 05:09:58,802
like this and they go, what the fuck does that mean? This is not a productive conversation.

3169
05:10:01,521 --> 05:10:06,881
Can I ask you just a dumb question? Is the whole crux of this argument just boiling down to

3170
05:10:07,441 --> 05:10:13,042
the ability for someone to have a sustained competitive advantage through subsidizing

3171
05:10:15,362 --> 05:10:23,362
miner revenue through a profitable business of some type whether in whatever format?

3172
05:10:26,401 --> 05:10:32,802
Specifically tightly integrated into the base consensus and a sidechain and its interactions

3173
05:10:32,881 --> 05:10:38,321
directly with miners. Yes, that's the core of this specific example right now.

3174
05:10:38,961 --> 05:10:46,961
Can you explain how, what about the sidechains makes that dynamic unique? I guess that's the

3175
05:10:46,961 --> 05:10:54,321
part I'm struggling with. Because instead of taking out, you have an existing business that

3176
05:10:54,321 --> 05:11:00,722
has nothing to do with Bitcoin. You have a profit margin. Your board, your shareholders, your owners,

3177
05:11:00,722 --> 05:11:07,441
whatever, expect a profit margin and they're going to go, what the fuck? You're just going

3178
05:11:07,441 --> 05:11:14,081
to take this and give this away? In my scenario, the entire thing is about this being pitched as

3179
05:11:14,081 --> 05:11:23,042
a equivalent good for Bitcoin and actually generating new revenue and new profits indirectly

3180
05:11:23,042 --> 05:11:29,441
that did not exist before. So they're not a business that's just for no rational reason

3181
05:11:29,441 --> 05:11:34,802
cutting into their profit to give to miners to fuck with things. They've actually generated a

3182
05:11:34,802 --> 05:11:41,842
whole new surplus of profit, which they can take a small cut of or a percentage of to mess with

3183
05:11:41,842 --> 05:11:48,001
miners. And they're still making more net profit than they did with their previous venture.

3184
05:11:48,001 --> 05:12:00,961
Hey Shinobi, can I back up real quick into what you're saying about how you can basically

3185
05:12:00,961 --> 05:12:07,602
curate incentives on a per-miner basis? In your example of the Amazon basically chain,

3186
05:12:07,602 --> 05:12:12,961
drivechain, in that example, the chain would have to be blind merge-mined or very centralized

3187
05:12:12,961 --> 05:12:16,401
to the point where the miners could never afford to actually validate it themselves, correct?

3188
05:12:17,362 --> 05:12:25,042
Yes. And the point of this example is that you can have very disastrous incentives on both

3189
05:12:25,042 --> 05:12:31,682
extremes when it's just something miners can run and do that increases the cost, but you can also

3190
05:12:31,682 --> 05:12:37,842
have similar disastrous consequences on the other extreme when it's so big and expensive to run,

3191
05:12:37,842 --> 05:12:42,162
even miners can't run. Both of those create bad incentives.

3192
05:12:42,961 --> 05:12:48,482
Yeah. And then, so the mechanism for the actual delivery of these different incentives based on

3193
05:12:49,042 --> 05:12:53,761
who you want to have them, basically, maybe Foundry is favorable and Luxor is not favorable

3194
05:12:53,761 --> 05:12:59,122
in this case. Do you just create a different block for these people before you deliver it?

3195
05:12:59,122 --> 05:13:05,922
Like your on-chain reward for minting this block for me for Foundry will be 1.1 Bitcoin and for

3196
05:13:05,922 --> 05:13:11,362
Luxor you get 0.9. Is that kind of how you'd curate those incentives on a per-miner basis?

3197
05:13:11,842 --> 05:13:17,441
No, you just stop broadcasting in the public men pool and start reaching out directly to miners.

3198
05:13:17,441 --> 05:13:23,042
And then if a miner doesn't want that to respond, well, then they're not getting the revenue. And

3199
05:13:23,042 --> 05:13:27,441
once you've established a private back channel, you can just selectively withhold it.

3200
05:13:27,441 --> 05:13:28,961
So it's just like out of band, basically.

3201
05:13:30,081 --> 05:13:30,482
Yeah.

3202
05:13:30,482 --> 05:13:31,201
Yeah.

3203
05:13:31,201 --> 05:13:35,922
Okay. Nice. Thank you for clarifying that.

3204
05:13:41,441 --> 05:13:45,441
So I want to know what Michael Thidwell thinks of this so far.

3205
05:13:47,362 --> 05:13:51,602
Is that allowed? He's too busy, I think.

3206
05:13:51,602 --> 05:13:53,122
This is your space, Paul.

3207
05:13:54,561 --> 05:13:59,521
Well, okay. So, but it does still seem to me. So we have Amazon paying for 30,000

3208
05:14:00,482 --> 05:14:02,961
and then difficulty goes up.

3209
05:14:05,122 --> 05:14:11,922
Then I, as Amazon, can selectively choose who I'm going to pay,

3210
05:14:13,042 --> 05:14:17,441
you know, which I'm going to pay Antpool, but not Foundry or vice versa.

3211
05:14:18,881 --> 05:14:20,242
Portland, yes, you have your hand up.

3212
05:14:20,802 --> 05:14:24,722
Oh, no. Once you're done, I just want to jump to a different topic on drivechain specifically

3213
05:14:24,722 --> 05:14:28,001
as a node runner and a couple of options I was thinking about.

3214
05:14:29,922 --> 05:14:36,482
Cool. So what's happening is Amazon is running something that costs $10 million a day,

3215
05:14:36,482 --> 05:14:41,362
but they have other revenue that pays for this, or they have other funding.

3216
05:14:42,321 --> 05:14:47,842
It generates $30,000 worth of fee revenue a day for miners.

3217
05:14:50,561 --> 05:14:52,242
At first, everyone is invited.

3218
05:14:54,001 --> 05:14:58,321
And so mining, everyone takes this up. The miner said, thank you for the free money.

3219
05:14:59,521 --> 05:15:04,961
The difficulty increases. And now the Amazon can say,

3220
05:15:07,682 --> 05:15:16,802
I will remove this $30,000 unless you do such and such. Is that the argument?

3221
05:15:18,641 --> 05:15:24,001
Yes, Paul, except it's not just the $30,000 because like I've explained in this example,

3222
05:15:24,001 --> 05:15:31,602
running this chain indirectly generates $5 million of profit per block with new business to

3223
05:15:31,602 --> 05:15:38,081
Amazon because these people who didn't have access to that now because of payment infrastructure

3224
05:15:38,081 --> 05:15:41,602
now do and they have now expanded their customer base.

3225
05:15:41,602 --> 05:15:46,482
Can I ask another question that might be dumb? What's the competitive advantage that they have

3226
05:15:46,482 --> 05:15:50,242
operating this drivechain? Because if we were to just like take drivechains out of it and just

3227
05:15:50,242 --> 05:15:58,081
talk conceptually, if you had one business that was basically using a profitable venture to

3228
05:15:58,081 --> 05:16:05,681
subsidize another business in order to say gain market share and influence, typically the answer

3229
05:16:05,681 --> 05:16:11,122
to how that would be solved in the free market is a new business would come along and would out

3230
05:16:11,122 --> 05:16:17,921
compete the business that was effectively spending their profits subsidizing a tertiary business.

3231
05:16:18,561 --> 05:16:23,122
Is there some built in moat to the drivechain that they're operating that keeps

3232
05:16:23,122 --> 05:16:26,321
another actor from out competing them?

3233
05:16:26,321 --> 05:16:33,281
Yeah, Amazon. The whole value of this chain is that Amazon will accept Bitcoin on it as payment.

3234
05:16:33,281 --> 05:16:39,762
So unless you want to go out compete Amazon in their entire core business model of being Amazon,

3235
05:16:40,642 --> 05:16:41,441
good luck with that.

3236
05:16:41,762 --> 05:16:50,961
So if the story is or the scenario is without Amazon, without drivechain, Amazon would never

3237
05:16:50,961 --> 05:17:00,402
have been able to create this sidechain that gives this 30,000 to it's not it's 30,000

3238
05:17:00,402 --> 05:17:04,722
in selective transaction fee revenue. That is the scenario.

3239
05:17:05,681 --> 05:17:12,081
Paul, there are a million scenarios for this. Maybe they want to get into mining and they want

3240
05:17:12,081 --> 05:17:18,081
to gain an advantage there. Maybe they just want to fuck with Bitcoin and try to break it so they

3241
05:17:18,081 --> 05:17:24,242
can launch Amazon coin and instead of something like Bitcoin, we can enter the world of fortune

3242
05:17:24,242 --> 05:17:30,161
500 fucking mega coin. And I think that's the scenario.

3243
05:17:31,122 --> 05:17:40,961
Fortune 500 fucking mega coin for everything. Like this is the point, Paul. This is such a

3244
05:17:40,961 --> 05:17:48,961
complicated design space and incentive space. Once you turn it on, you cannot control

3245
05:17:49,681 --> 05:17:57,842
what happens within that space. All of this kind of shit is now you just open the door,

3246
05:17:57,842 --> 05:18:04,882
you turned it on. So you better pray to fucking God that not even a fraction of this happens or

3247
05:18:04,882 --> 05:18:11,762
it's going to start fucking things up. It's going to start opening new ways to attack this system.

3248
05:18:11,762 --> 05:18:15,122
But what is the way, though? Because so far, all they can do is.

3249
05:18:15,122 --> 05:18:20,402
Oh, my God, I got another one that came to my mind. Okay, so you have Amazon,

3250
05:18:20,402 --> 05:18:25,762
Amazon drivechain and slot 40 or whatever. And people are using this for some AI computational

3251
05:18:25,762 --> 05:18:30,402
workloads through Bitcoin script. Okay, so there's a pot of Bitcoin. Could the miners then

3252
05:18:30,402 --> 05:18:35,842
hold that pot like glued together and hold that pot hostage against Amazon at some point just

3253
05:18:35,842 --> 05:18:39,362
because they know that it's a single entity, a single point of validation and nobody could

3254
05:18:39,362 --> 05:18:42,002
actually prove anything is true.

3255
05:18:42,616 --> 05:19:11,936
Well, I think in a mysterious situation where there's a node that no one can run and it's all controlled by one party, you would think that why would like the miners might think, especially if the fees are going to be selectively withheld from the miners, this person says, listen, because remember, the decision calculus is the stream of

3256
05:19:12,136 --> 05:19:16,016
transaction fee revenue versus how much can I just take today?

3257
05:19:16,255 --> 05:19:19,136
So yeah, that's what this evolves to.

3258
05:19:19,496 --> 05:19:40,215
There's a certain amount in the sidechain, certain amount in drivechain 40, the Amazon drivechain, whatever. If there's a certain amount there, then maybe the fees make it worth it. But then if Amazon says, well, I'm not giving you the fees unless you, you know, do something that, see, it kind of depends on what they ask you to do.

3259
05:19:40,856 --> 05:19:43,136
That, that can never play out, Paul.

3260
05:19:43,176 --> 05:19:48,776
If you jump up and down three times, then they'll just do it and they'll keep the fees. But if they say, we want you to...

3261
05:19:49,096 --> 05:20:05,936
No, no, Paul, that, no, that is just, that cannot play out that way. Paul, if you selectively withhold coins from a small percentage of miners, there's nothing they can do to try to steal from that peg because you need 75% of miners to actually withdraw coins.

3262
05:20:05,936 --> 05:20:13,455
So no, that, that is not a recourse available to small miners who are having that money withheld with conditions attached to it.

3263
05:20:13,575 --> 05:20:16,895
I was saying they, they, they withhold it from everyone.

3264
05:20:17,296 --> 05:20:27,616
In my scenario, they're saying we won't, we'll give it to whichever miners, you know, I don't know, like sign a deal with us, granting us half of their equity.

3265
05:20:29,135 --> 05:20:32,135
And then they might even say, okay, we're not doing this anymore.

3266
05:20:32,135 --> 05:20:33,135
We're done with this.

3267
05:20:34,016 --> 05:20:38,096
And then, so I was, I wasn't saying that they'll single out small miners.

3268
05:20:38,096 --> 05:20:41,696
And then they'll get driven out of business by miners who do do it.

3269
05:20:42,736 --> 05:20:47,455
Yeah, but that, so, okay, that's an interesting scenario where you say...

3270
05:20:48,096 --> 05:20:58,056
That's, that's an unstable game that the equilibrium of that game is, oh, okay, I'll do it because that, that, that mitigates the most risk.

3271
05:20:58,336 --> 05:21:03,095
But it's whatever, it's, but it's really no different than moving the 30,000 number up to something else, right?

3272
05:21:03,095 --> 05:21:09,336
Because if the cost is less than the revenue, then it's just more profits for the miner.

3273
05:21:09,336 --> 05:21:11,295
So it's just more mandatory things that they have to do.

3274
05:21:11,295 --> 05:21:19,696
They have to take the 30,000, they have to cut deals with Amazon, they have to, anyone, anywhere who's offering them money, they, they must do it.

3275
05:21:19,696 --> 05:21:20,576
They have no choice.

3276
05:21:21,895 --> 05:21:23,056
That, yes?

3277
05:21:24,015 --> 05:21:32,015
Dude, you're completely, like, dude, it's again, like, every single time you just selectively choose, I'm going to ignore half of what he said.

3278
05:21:32,576 --> 05:21:41,936
This is the entire dynamic that, like, is subtly different than just this in a vacuum with a business that has nothing to do with Bitcoin.

3279
05:21:42,496 --> 05:21:49,136
I can just ease into it and give no indication I'm going to do something like this.

3280
05:21:49,136 --> 05:21:54,455
And then, oh, everything's cranked up difficulty-wise, now I start trying to do this.

3281
05:21:54,455 --> 05:21:58,976
Versus you just culled out of nowhere trying to approach miners.

3282
05:21:58,976 --> 05:22:09,095
Even though the game is very similar there, you can't just ensnare people into it ahead of time before you change the game.

3283
05:22:19,416 --> 05:22:20,095
Did we lose Paul?

3284
05:22:20,095 --> 05:22:20,895
Did we lose Paul?

3285
05:22:21,375 --> 05:22:21,655
Yeah.

3286
05:22:27,136 --> 05:22:27,776
Nice.

3287
05:22:28,095 --> 05:22:29,175
Thank you for coming back.

3288
05:22:29,696 --> 05:22:36,255
Can I change topic to, as kind of the user side of this as a node runner, some things I was thinking about?

3289
05:22:36,255 --> 05:22:39,856
I think we can take a break from this topic for now and maybe return to it.

3290
05:22:41,936 --> 05:22:42,976
Are you okay with that, Shinobi?

3291
05:22:43,976 --> 05:22:45,136
Not my space.

3292
05:22:46,655 --> 05:22:47,455
Okay, I'm going to do it.

3293
05:22:47,455 --> 05:22:58,496
So I was thinking about, basically, as a node runner, let's say I really, I strongly oppose drivechains and their implications that they can cause.

3294
05:22:59,455 --> 05:23:00,656
And I have my reasons.

3295
05:23:01,816 --> 05:23:15,415
So far, the only options I can think of, if the miners have activated the soft fork or even if it's been merged into core, is I can abstain completely by using an older version of Bitcoin Core that doesn't have drivechains enabled.

3296
05:23:16,295 --> 05:23:23,496
I could manually invalidate blocks or a block that has a drivechain op in it.

3297
05:23:24,376 --> 05:23:31,656
Or I can basically mark anything with a drivechain or UTXO with a drivechain op as unspendable on my nodes.

3298
05:23:31,656 --> 05:23:36,336
I can patch it so that if UTXO has an op drivechain, it's just marked as unspendable.

3299
05:23:36,536 --> 05:23:38,776
And if anybody tries spending it, it's invalid on my node.

3300
05:23:38,975 --> 05:23:43,575
And then I'd have to wait for hash rate to kind of join up and uninstall my node.

3301
05:23:44,575 --> 05:23:46,135
Is that all? Is that it?

3302
05:23:46,135 --> 05:23:57,855
Are those the only options I have as a node runner is basically abstain, actively invalidate blocks or invalidate the script op to mark it as unspendable to kind of push back against this.

3303
05:23:59,415 --> 05:24:05,575
Yeah, this scenario is you run a full node, but you do not want to validate the drivechain rule.

3304
05:24:05,616 --> 05:24:12,656
I think the first one makes the most is the most straightforward because now you you're getting what you wanted.

3305
05:24:13,735 --> 05:24:15,816
You're not validating the drivechain rules.

3306
05:24:15,816 --> 05:24:17,135
I guess it depends a little bit on what you want.

3307
05:24:17,135 --> 05:24:29,816
If you if you want if you don't want anyone else to do it either and you want to mount the URISF campaign, then you certainly want the second one where you say, don't touch this opnop5.

3308
05:24:31,015 --> 05:24:36,536
And in fact, I think just to be safe, you'd have to say opnop5 is burned forever because otherwise you have kind of an awkward.

3309
05:24:37,175 --> 05:24:45,496
Unspendable, you just put it as a part of is unspendable and you'd put opnop5 in script and then basically burn them as part of the second one.

3310
05:24:45,496 --> 05:24:51,895
I thought I was talking about when you say I militantly because in this one, you're not just trying to.

3311
05:24:53,695 --> 05:25:01,216
You don't it's not just that you don't want to do the work of validating the BIP300 rule of like counting to 13000, et cetera.

3312
05:25:01,735 --> 05:25:10,135
You want you also want to you say anyone who is doing this, I'm not friendship over and you go to a different network.

3313
05:25:10,135 --> 05:25:17,295
You know, the hope of being, yes, with the hope of being, you know, with the economic majority.

3314
05:25:17,975 --> 05:25:22,855
And so that would be so it depends on what you want.

3315
05:25:23,056 --> 05:25:30,336
Did you understand what I was trying to convey there is like I think the first one is kind of like if you just really don't want.

3316
05:25:30,336 --> 05:25:39,415
If you think there's some problem with the software, you don't want it, you don't want BIP300 rules being enforced on your computer, then you just run the old version.

3317
05:25:39,455 --> 05:25:42,735
You say, I don't know, I know other people are enforcing those rules.

3318
05:25:43,216 --> 05:25:55,936
But if the thing is, you just don't want anyone sending their Bitcoin to a BIP300 script on the network that you participate in, then you would do the second one.

3319
05:25:56,295 --> 05:26:01,056
I'm not really sure when you would do that third one you you mentioned.

3320
05:26:01,096 --> 05:26:15,575
I guess you're like, it would it would basically be if miners were to attempt to spend an op, basically, because right now my node would see this op drivechain as a spendable transaction when it validates because of the fact that it's spendable.

3321
05:26:15,616 --> 05:26:17,336
It basically will evaluate to one.

3322
05:26:17,735 --> 05:26:26,015
And so what I would do is I would say that, OK, anybody who attempts to spend from these drivechain or op drivechain transactions, those are not valid.

3323
05:26:26,135 --> 05:26:32,936
And thus that block will not validate on my node because they're trying to spend from an unspendable UTXO from the perspective of my node.

3324
05:26:33,015 --> 05:26:39,175
I would basically be soft forking my node into that because I'm actually reducing the rule set of that.

3325
05:26:39,216 --> 05:26:45,256
So, yeah, that's kind of my thought is like basically you could you could mark op six as unspendable or whatever op drivechain is.

3326
05:26:45,376 --> 05:26:53,135
And that way, if anybody attempts to spend from these drivechain deposits, it would automatically invalidate that block.

3327
05:26:53,336 --> 05:26:58,336
And anybody using them forever would just be these are burnt coins, same as OP_RETURN is now.

3328
05:26:59,295 --> 05:27:11,096
Well, it happens to be that's a very funny scenario, but remember, it happens to be a detail of drivechain that when you deposit coins in, you always spend the previous UTXO.

3329
05:27:11,096 --> 05:27:13,015
So you sweep the dust constantly.

3330
05:27:13,536 --> 05:27:17,056
So there's never so there would be funny amusing.

3331
05:27:17,215 --> 05:27:18,456
It's like an accumulator.

3332
05:27:19,256 --> 05:27:29,295
The amusing result would be that you just someone someone used it first and then and then that person's coins are gone and no one else can use it then.

3333
05:27:30,535 --> 05:27:34,016
So but yeah, I don't really know what the point of that would be, but that would that would be something you could do.

3334
05:27:34,735 --> 05:27:46,376
And last question kind of on that vein in this threaded UTXO, is each new output bound by op drivechain to those rules or is that how did that?

3335
05:27:47,136 --> 05:27:48,056
OK, cool.

3336
05:27:52,896 --> 05:28:03,095
I'm sorry, I'm just I was just going to clarify that that is only it's an intriguing situation where that that only is only you increasing the number of coins.

3337
05:28:03,095 --> 05:28:19,335
So it's a it's a kind of a funny thing where the the the block the block validity rules are aware of whether or not it is a deposit or withdrawal literally by using the coin amount.

3338
05:28:19,896 --> 05:28:23,775
So that is unusual.

3339
05:28:24,576 --> 05:28:30,696
Of course, there's nothing bad with that, but it's just a funny little quirk so that because you can see how when you withdraw, that can't be the case.

3340
05:28:30,816 --> 05:28:34,215
Those people want the money wherever they want it to go.

3341
05:28:34,376 --> 05:28:36,936
They want to take it out of the drivechain.

3342
05:28:37,016 --> 05:28:38,496
So sorry, what were you saying after that?

3343
05:28:43,136 --> 05:28:45,215
Hey, I just want to say I got to bounce.

3344
05:28:45,535 --> 05:28:55,576
I promised the family that I'm going to take the weekend off of Twitter, but Paul, thank you for running the space.

3345
05:28:55,576 --> 05:28:56,696
Catch you all later. Ciao.

3346
05:28:57,775 --> 05:28:58,775
Thanks, David. See you later.

3347
05:29:01,576 --> 05:29:16,256
So basically, at that point, those are the three things I could think of, basically, is you invalidate the block, you completely abstain from upgrading your version and you still will just accept the results of whatever's happening while mining or you invalidate the op.

3348
05:29:16,295 --> 05:29:25,376
Are there any other ways as a node runner that I could basically push back or like resist this change if I wanted to?

3349
05:29:25,376 --> 05:29:48,975
I'm trying to think of let me try to think of you and I'm using consequence of the first one is you're kind of just saying you're doing exactly what you were doing before by just running the old you're really just not doing something you're not upgrading so that you're not enforcing the node.

3350
05:29:49,016 --> 05:29:54,016
And then I guess rejecting the whole block is the other.

3351
05:29:54,016 --> 05:30:02,775
And I mean, like in terms of like there's like, you know, social things you could do, like you would come on this space and you could tell me why this BIP is a bad idea.

3352
05:30:05,655 --> 05:30:06,896
I'm still trying.

3353
05:30:07,576 --> 05:30:08,576
The.

3354
05:30:09,896 --> 05:30:14,775
OK, so I guess I think it is certainly the case.

3355
05:30:14,775 --> 05:30:20,456
I mean, Francis was here before, for instance, and he was like, we do all share the same.

3356
05:30:20,735 --> 05:30:28,016
We share the same brand. We share the same market price and we share the same miners, which I regard as kind of very similar things.

3357
05:30:28,496 --> 05:30:33,576
And he was saying, you know, so but I think that's certainly fair game to some extent that the miners.

3358
05:30:34,896 --> 05:30:57,975
Are in some sense trying to get the right answer and they haven't they have an interest in getting the right answer, they it's at least clear that they will tend to benefit financially if they do things that are good for the price, good for fees, good for users in general, and they will tend to suffer if they get it wrong.

3359
05:30:58,215 --> 05:31:10,696
If they say don't turn on SegWit that people like or if they don't turn on other things that people like or if they make the market price go down or if they make it look like the Bitcoin brand isn't going to be a super winning.

3360
05:31:12,696 --> 05:31:15,576
Coin or whatever, so I'm just saying in general.

3361
05:31:17,295 --> 05:31:19,576
You could try that, you could say, I'll make a site.

3362
05:31:20,496 --> 05:31:23,056
If you're under the Sox dot com or whatever and then.

3363
05:31:24,576 --> 05:31:26,335
Send people there, send miners there.

3364
05:31:26,616 --> 05:31:42,335
I think pretty much covered it, though you just either you either you just go along and you say I'm compatible, but I don't enforce this, I don't I don't run this code, but I don't care either, or you say the paradox of the second one is you kind of need to know something about.

3365
05:31:43,655 --> 05:31:44,535
The.

3366
05:31:45,016 --> 05:31:45,775
The.

3367
05:31:46,696 --> 05:31:52,696
Drivechain code inactivation, this is kind of a paradox, you know going out of your way to.

3368
05:31:53,655 --> 05:31:56,056
Identify the op drivechain.

3369
05:31:57,376 --> 05:31:58,896
And now you are going to.

3370
05:32:00,175 --> 05:32:06,655
Reject the block if it is used, but I think those are basically the two ways I think I can't think of anything else.

3371
05:32:07,376 --> 05:32:27,175
OK, so then I want to scale this idea of OK, so we have node runners that abstain from upgrading and the consequence of that would be that their nodes would see that there's spendable transactions, but if miners are validating the rules they those transactions would never go through because miners wouldn't mint them and the outcome of that is that.

3372
05:32:27,775 --> 05:32:33,896
The miners could change the rules because the consensus is only among them, so drivechains really couldn't accrue value.

3373
05:32:34,616 --> 05:32:46,456
If the majority of node runners and economic actors didn't go with the plan so you could use drivechains, but they just it would be very tough to trust them to have value and then if you actively.

3374
05:32:46,975 --> 05:32:56,215
Use a resisted soft fork this thing you're basically having to bank on having enough economic power on your chain and hash rate to continue doing business.

3375
05:32:57,495 --> 05:33:01,495
that to me, I don't think my own opinion, I don't think most people would stomach that

3376
05:33:01,495 --> 05:33:06,115
to actually invalidate a block, even if they dislike Drivechains a lot.

3377
05:33:08,695 --> 05:33:14,415
My personal opinion is that, mean, we actually, yeah, you and I, like that you,

3378
05:33:14,615 --> 05:33:15,776
I like

3379
05:33:15,776 --> 05:33:18,716
liked that liked my analogy about the dog holding his own leash.

3380
05:33:19,056 --> 05:33:20,056
I think that's a good one.

3381
05:33:20,316 --> 05:33:23,996
And I know people don't like my analogies often, but that one I thought was good.

3382
05:33:24,676 --> 05:33:29,516
And then I think, as we already discussed, and then I think that I agree with you that

3383
05:33:29,516 --> 05:33:33,316
to choose to invalidate a block is to,

3384
05:33:35,975 --> 05:33:48,936
breaking the longest heaviest chain rule and you are you have effectively hard forked yourself because in order for people to even be on the same network as you they need to know which block you invalidated and why.

3385
05:33:49,295 --> 05:34:01,215
And so it is it's like incorporating new information into that just like how with Bitcoin Cash Incorporated changing a one to an eight and changing a certain block height at which whatever August 2017 was.

3386
05:34:01,215 --> 05:34:30,535
I think it inescapably the the option to invalidate a block is a hard fork and I think that I think that SegWit2x failed for many reasons but a big one was because there was a hard fork and every hard fork is a bad idea and I think this one would also be a bad idea it's just my guess but that's just this all hypothetical of course there is no current client or anything that will activate BIP300 on Bitcoin it does not exist.

3387
05:34:31,376 --> 05:34:32,496
Yet in any form.

3388
05:34:34,335 --> 05:34:40,415
Also just I think this concludes what I was looking for from this is the author Luke here.

3389
05:34:42,735 --> 05:34:44,655
He was here before but I don't think he's here now.

3390
05:34:45,696 --> 05:34:45,975
Okay.

3391
05:34:46,855 --> 05:34:48,936
Oh you mean Luke is the Luke is the pull request.

3392
05:34:48,936 --> 05:34:51,215
Yeah it says open discussion with the BIP author.

3393
05:34:53,295 --> 05:34:55,735
He's the he's the author of the pull request.

3394
05:34:56,016 --> 05:34:56,295
Yeah.

3395
05:34:56,295 --> 05:35:01,816
But I'm actually sorry I misheard that I'm dyslexic oh my god I'm so sorry.

3396
05:35:02,215 --> 05:35:03,095
Yeah that's okay.

3397
05:35:03,896 --> 05:35:17,415
Did anybody actually criticize the implementation at all yet or is it just been Ryndell Ryndell did code review on some of it I think it was actual work.

3398
05:35:17,415 --> 05:35:45,775
Yep I had hoped with the pull request I had hoped in vain it seems but I had hoped people can discuss the actual details and they'll say OK like we can at least like agree on what the best implementation would be and what the you know we can look at that and we don't have to like deal with.

3399
05:35:47,695 --> 05:35:52,496
We have like a real specific idea here this is where the rubber meets the road this is the idea.

3400
05:35:53,695 --> 05:35:56,616
Everything else is just a summary of the idea you know the code.

3401
05:35:57,896 --> 05:36:11,095
The pull request is the actual details of the idea so I thought that that would maybe help move the discussion in a productive way but it seems to have had an ambiguity.

3402
05:36:12,055 --> 05:36:38,815
Like Paul if that if that thread is a mess I'm sorry like I have stayed out of it for that exact reason that is not the place to attack the concept but like this like like I said earlier man like we are at a impasse this is a brick wall if your attitude to some degree is that increasing cost to miners even if they do run these all themselves doesn't matter.

3403
05:36:39,376 --> 05:36:48,575
Like this this is not moving forward while that criticism or concern is just brushed off like that it's not happening.

3404
05:36:50,656 --> 05:36:58,815
Well in the scenario you mentioned the car there was this 10 million dollar a day node but the miners avoided paying the cost because they could.

3405
05:36:59,136 --> 05:37:11,695
No that was that was the extreme example of the other end of the spectrum I'm talking about what we were discussing earlier with the fee sniping issue and just the incentives pushing miners towards running nodes themselves.

3406
05:37:12,455 --> 05:37:27,455
But I was saying before that let's just take it for granted because you seem to be requiring like the let's say that that example held and the miners had to run nodes themselves but they cost 10 million dollars.

3407
05:37:29,616 --> 05:37:35,455
Then I think they were just not they would just say well there's only $30,000 in revenue coming in so I'd just pass I won't do this at all.

3408
05:37:35,455 --> 05:37:45,616
Okay Paul this is a one-time offer you want some actual constructive criticism from me instead of just saying why this is a shit idea that shouldn't happen.

3409
05:37:46,975 --> 05:37:47,616
Yeah.

3410
05:37:48,335 --> 05:38:06,176
I don't think this entirely fixes the issue at all and it might even make no difference but it would be a lot smarter if you actually had a simple SPV proof that could be propagated along with a bid for a block in the main chain that just shows the coinbase transaction.

3411
05:38:06,496 --> 05:38:20,256
So that a blind merge mine block constructor can just give coins on the sidechain to the miner not require the capital up front and the miner actually has a transparent view directly in that how much is being kept from.

3412
05:38:22,975 --> 05:38:32,575
Well that's an interesting idea it certainly would work like you could have the layer one block have the include the whole Merkle branch.

3413
05:38:33,335 --> 05:39:03,335
Of the sidechains assuming that well one issue with that is you don't necessarily know that the sidechain has is using like a Merkle tree versus like some other tree you know like there's many implementations so they don't necessarily know but if you could just assume every drivechain has a Merkle tree and they all have a coinbase and always the coinbase is always the one to the left or whatever all the way. You could always just a lot if to account for new things like

3414
05:39:03,335 --> 05:39:33,335
the same way Tapscript or Witness does. This would accomplish the fact that L1 would know. I mean you say it should be part of BIP301 or you should just say it should be part of the understanding of blind merge mining that when the miner receives the bid from the people they also just ask them for like as a courtesy they ask them for the Merkle branch. No I'm saying it should be an explicit

3415
05:39:34,134 --> 05:39:42,455
part of BIP301 because this way you do not have to have that capital up front as a block proposer

3416
05:39:43,415 --> 05:39:49,415
though you know obviously this is still a DOS issue opening up here to consider but you would

3417
05:39:49,415 --> 05:39:55,415
no longer require that capital so the entire fee sniping risk that is going to push all of this

3418
05:39:55,415 --> 05:40:01,974
node operation responsibility onto miners would never occur because the actual outsourced block

3419
05:40:01,974 --> 05:40:08,534
proposer constructors do not have to have like Bitcoin they're capitalized with to pay on the main

3420
05:40:08,534 --> 05:40:15,894
chain in order to try to negotiate with a miner. Yes you're saying instead of bid with L1 coins

3421
05:40:15,894 --> 05:40:23,495
they just bid with the Merkle branch. Yes. Well that's an interesting idea but

3422
05:40:24,375 --> 05:40:30,455
yeah I'll consider that but shouldn't we stay focused on this scenario where

3423
05:40:31,254 --> 05:40:37,815
you seem to find it problematic when there's no more blind merge mining allowed and there's

3424
05:40:37,815 --> 05:40:42,855
the node that's 10 million dollars a day and it only brings in 30,000 dollars a day.

3425
05:40:44,215 --> 05:40:50,614
That's the scenario where blind merge mining does stay around like that that's my whole point

3426
05:40:50,614 --> 05:40:57,094
in drawing the comparison between these two examples both a situation where miners can and

3427
05:40:57,094 --> 05:41:02,935
do profitably run these nodes themselves as well as the insane extreme where even miners can't

3428
05:41:02,935 --> 05:41:08,695
afford to run it there are paths for massive incentive distortions on both sides of those

3429
05:41:08,695 --> 05:41:16,614
extremes. Yeah but what is the incentive distortion in the original case? So that

3430
05:41:16,614 --> 05:41:23,575
you actually have to be able to run all of these things to participate in a decentralized mining

3431
05:41:23,575 --> 05:41:30,135
pool protocol. Yeah but like everybody everybody's so focused on scaling right now Paul but we are

3432
05:41:30,135 --> 05:41:36,534
seeing a world where mining further and further vertically integrates. The biggest mining pool

3433
05:41:36,534 --> 05:41:42,935
right now is literally a relatively brand new pool set up by an actual mining operation.

3434
05:41:43,575 --> 05:41:49,894
That is vertical integration and that's happening right now. So we need to be thinking about how to

3435
05:41:49,894 --> 05:41:55,814
de-integrate that how to make that as scalable as possible and that necessitates turning pools

3436
05:41:55,814 --> 05:42:01,814
into a protocol which is two parts the actual block template construction and the transaction

3437
05:42:01,814 --> 05:42:07,174
sorting and then the handling of the payouts. The handling of the payouts could very easily be

3438
05:42:07,174 --> 05:42:13,814
accomplished with a lightning channel setup Belcher proposed. You could also do a multi-party

3439
05:42:13,814 --> 05:42:20,135
like general payout if we got APO. If we get CTV you could have a staged transaction tree

3440
05:42:20,695 --> 05:42:27,174
and even have cooperative paths if you buried it under taproot for more efficient like atomic

3441
05:42:27,174 --> 05:42:34,695
negotiation to condense UTXOs off-chain. Like that is a very easily solvable problem but the block

3442
05:42:34,695 --> 05:42:42,295
template problem for all of that to be constructed by individual miners maximally. The more nodes

3443
05:42:42,295 --> 05:42:48,695
they have to run the more expensive it is to be that type of participant and you degrade the

3444
05:42:48,695 --> 05:42:55,174
censorship resistance like that is there the higher you raise that cost and the more smaller players

3445
05:42:55,174 --> 05:43:03,174
have to outsource that aspect of it. Yeah but you in if they if the cost exceeds the revenue then

3446
05:43:03,174 --> 05:43:11,655
they just won't do it at all. Well see that's the whole thing Paul about why this is a problem.

3447
05:43:12,294 --> 05:43:20,055
A decentralized pool protocol right now is just a main chain node. Costs literally nothing. You can

3448
05:43:20,055 --> 05:43:27,255
copy paste and start a pruned node on a fucking raspberry pi that costs twenty dollars when you

3449
05:43:27,255 --> 05:43:33,574
already have thousands of dollars for hardware equipment. That is an insignificant thing but if

3450
05:43:33,574 --> 05:43:40,215
that same person now needs to do that and then run a BSV chain and a Zcash chain and a Monero chain

3451
05:43:41,815 --> 05:43:46,935
whatever the hell chain that all gets more expensive. It's not a neat no it's getting

3452
05:43:46,935 --> 05:43:52,454
cheaper because the only deal if it's profitable. Each blockchain makes the others cheaper actually.

3453
05:43:53,014 --> 05:44:02,375
Paul you are like just ignoring everything I said. I am not talking about the profitability

3454
05:44:02,375 --> 05:44:07,975
of running the piece of hardware. I'm talking about running the piece of hardware in addition

3455
05:44:07,975 --> 05:44:15,495
to validating and constructing your block templates yourself. Just the main chain as necessary

3456
05:44:15,734 --> 05:44:24,055
as necessary for optimal like profitability their optimal censorship resistance is one chain.

3457
05:44:25,255 --> 05:44:31,255
You start adding all these other nodes you are increasing the cost there. I am no longer the

3458
05:44:31,255 --> 05:44:39,174
member. If I cannot afford to run all these things myself I am not the one deciding what's the

3459
05:44:39,174 --> 05:44:45,894
optimal. I am not looking at optimal template construction myself. I am not the one ensuring

3460
05:44:45,894 --> 05:44:51,655
that things are not being censored. I am outsourcing that which weakens that guarantee

3461
05:44:51,655 --> 05:44:57,174
which weakens the decentralization of that property. Well okay you're pushing at an open

3462
05:44:57,174 --> 05:45:03,174
door with me if you say that the full node costs should be as low as possible because you know I

3463
05:45:03,174 --> 05:45:10,775
wrote that essay measuring decentralization in September 2015 and so we want everyone wants the

3464
05:45:10,775 --> 05:45:17,095
full node cost to be as low as possible. You should only pay additional full node costs if you opt in.

3465
05:45:17,095 --> 05:45:21,574
So this is the this is the idea of sidechains is the end user who's not a miner. We're not talking

3466
05:45:21,574 --> 05:45:28,294
about miners. The end user if they want to run big block sidechain then they can. It will be less

3467
05:45:28,294 --> 05:45:34,055
decentralized. It will be more expensive. If they want to run the Zcash sidechain they can.

3468
05:45:34,614 --> 05:45:41,095
So I completely 100% agree that the full node costs are of preeminent importance but now you

3469
05:45:41,095 --> 05:45:45,014
seem to be saying something else. You seem to be saying in one sense if these if running these nodes

3470
05:45:45,014 --> 05:45:51,174
is actually profitable and making life easier for miners then it's some kind of burden which

3471
05:45:51,174 --> 05:45:55,574
doesn't make sense to me and then the other alternative is that the miner for whatever reason

3472
05:45:56,535 --> 05:46:02,935
the miner for whatever reason finds the cost of running the node higher than their expected

3473
05:46:02,935 --> 05:46:10,694
revenues. Well if I'm a guy with one S9 running in a closet I can afford to have a main chain node

3474
05:46:10,694 --> 05:46:18,215
and do my own template construction and all that and then I directly broadcast that block that I

3475
05:46:18,215 --> 05:46:24,375
made when my machine is the one that finds the valid piece of work. I can't do that

3476
05:46:25,095 --> 05:46:33,335
with all these other chains. So I can't even make a profitable block because I can't construct all

3477
05:46:33,335 --> 05:46:38,215
this other shit and put it in there because I can't run these other nodes and now I'm sure

3478
05:46:38,215 --> 05:46:43,255
you're immediately going to say well BIP301 solves this you just propagate it across the

3479
05:46:43,255 --> 05:46:50,854
peer network. Well now hey you're talking more complexity to build into these distributed pool

3480
05:46:50,854 --> 05:47:00,454
protocols more things to consider. Then I am not able to be a participant in this distributed

3481
05:47:00,454 --> 05:47:07,975
pool protocol as an actual peer in it. I am not capable in all of that. You just say I'm not going

3482
05:47:07,975 --> 05:47:14,694
to run the Solana chain. Hey Paul you know what happens when my when my block like meets the

3483
05:47:14,694 --> 05:47:20,215
difficulty requirement and I shoot that out and then everybody else I'm mining with in my little

3484
05:47:20,215 --> 05:47:26,535
protocol pool sees that that block template sucked dick and was missing a shit ton of money because

3485
05:47:26,535 --> 05:47:32,134
it didn't consider all these other things. They're all going to ban me and I'm going to get evicted

3486
05:47:32,134 --> 05:47:38,855
from that pool protocol and now I can't participate in it because I constructed a suboptimal block

3487
05:47:38,855 --> 05:47:43,335
because I screwed everyone else out of money because I couldn't afford to do that.

3488
05:47:43,574 --> 05:47:48,615
Well again you could get it I would say again with blind merge mining is such a scenario where if it's

3489
05:47:48,615 --> 05:47:54,295
important you would work out some other way of obtaining the block. But the fee sniping Paul

3490
05:47:54,295 --> 05:47:59,655
the fee sniping risk there no one else is going to do that they're only going to put them in their

3491
05:47:59,655 --> 05:48:05,735
own blocks because only when you put it in your own block are you protecting yourself from that risk.

3492
05:48:06,134 --> 05:48:15,735
It doesn't blind merge mining it doesn't have to be the actual BIP301 blind merge mining it can just be you have

3493
05:48:16,775 --> 05:48:22,535
uh you have some kind of relationship with someone you pay them a you bet like let's say the node

3494
05:48:22,535 --> 05:48:27,975
costs 10 million dollars a year or 10 million dollars a day sorry and so in other words my

3495
05:48:27,975 --> 05:48:35,254
decentralized pool protocol and my participation in it is now dependent on a centralized entity

3496
05:48:36,134 --> 05:48:43,415
there you do not see how that kind of undermines the whole value and point of that protocol

3497
05:48:44,215 --> 05:48:50,454
of which protocol it does the L2 protocol I agree is kind of pointless I don't know why

3498
05:48:50,454 --> 05:48:57,814
anyone is on it but when it comes down to what effect it has on miner incentives it is equivalent

3499
05:48:57,814 --> 05:49:03,494
to just replace this protocol with just one guy an eccentric guy who's paying a fee

3500
05:49:05,735 --> 05:49:14,054
okay like Paul you do realize like the entire thing I'm discussing here is decentralizing

3501
05:49:14,694 --> 05:49:23,574
a mining pool making it a protocol so you don't have to depend on the guy that's the entire

3502
05:49:24,295 --> 05:49:30,215
purpose of that and now when I'm pointing out how drivechain introduces massive complexity

3503
05:49:30,215 --> 05:49:38,134
and problems with that your response is well just trust the guy the whole goal is to not have to do

3504
05:49:38,134 --> 05:49:44,295
that no I'm not saying that you should trust the guy I'm saying that is as part of the miners

3505
05:49:44,295 --> 05:49:50,775
efforts to minimize their costs and maximize their revenue they will do things that uh

3506
05:49:51,655 --> 05:49:57,175
they'll do like whatever they feel they have to do so they'll think okay I want these revenues

3507
05:49:57,175 --> 05:50:02,615
from this drivechain but I don't want to pay the cost of running the node so they'll say well

3508
05:50:02,615 --> 05:50:08,295
maybe we'll get some kind of way of we'll have you know have two nodes and we'll just check

3509
05:50:09,574 --> 05:50:14,054
some kind of subscription or something but to me it doesn't make any difference what it is because

3510
05:50:14,615 --> 05:50:19,814
it's just a conditional payment from it's in this case the conditional payment from the drive

3511
05:50:19,814 --> 05:50:28,054
chain it says we'll pay you this amount if you get if you obtain the block template if you pay

3512
05:50:29,415 --> 05:50:33,335
if you obtain the block template you get this amount of money and so whether or not they do

3513
05:50:33,335 --> 05:50:38,215
that by running the node or by pairing up with someone who does run the node it doesn't make that

3514
05:50:38,215 --> 05:50:43,655
much of a difference to me it makes a huge difference paul because he can look at me when

3515
05:50:43,655 --> 05:50:51,494
I go I need a template please and go no and then we're right back to I can't make the optimal block

3516
05:50:51,494 --> 05:50:57,814
template when I find a block everyone in my pool protocol goes fuck this guy he just lost his money

3517
05:50:57,814 --> 05:51:05,415
and I get banned by every peer in it and kicked out so you would measure how do you measure mining

3518
05:51:06,054 --> 05:51:08,615
centralization because you use that phrase a few times

3519
05:51:09,574 --> 05:51:14,374
I've literally written a whole article about it sitting on bitcoin magazine right now paul

3520
05:51:15,014 --> 05:51:21,655
it is a massive stack with multiple layers and each layer's degree of centralization or

3521
05:51:21,655 --> 05:51:29,735
decentralization impacts other layers it's not just a thing okay well I'll look for it

3522
05:51:30,694 --> 05:51:39,814
sounds interesting the scenario you've laid out where everyone must use p2pool and everyone must

3523
05:51:40,535 --> 05:51:45,655
use the solana chain or whatever you want to call it

3524
05:51:49,814 --> 05:51:55,335
that is the scenario where it's a it's like a conditional payment from the solana blockchain to

3525
05:51:55,415 --> 05:51:58,215
you if you are able to obtain the block template

3526
05:52:00,535 --> 05:52:06,295
paul it's with without any drivechains that type of protocol can get us to 10 on the

3527
05:52:06,295 --> 05:52:12,295
decentralization spectrum your spectrum you add drivechains no wait no we can only go as far as

3528
05:52:12,295 --> 05:52:18,775
seven oh wait nope only five wait oh nope only three depending on what types of drivechains

3529
05:52:19,574 --> 05:52:21,894
and it completely undermines that goal

3530
05:52:25,095 --> 05:52:30,694
to you it's very important that the cost of running every see I don't understand why you don't

3531
05:52:32,054 --> 05:52:38,934
uh the to me the running a sidechain node even in the case where blind merge mining is magically

3532
05:52:38,934 --> 05:52:43,975
impossible which I think is the case that we should probably focus on because I think you

3533
05:52:43,975 --> 05:52:51,415
can see how if in if if line merge mining is possible and easy and also the the handshake

3534
05:52:51,415 --> 05:52:54,855
version is done then it kind of doesn't matter because there'll always be a 10 million dollar

3535
05:52:54,855 --> 05:52:58,934
node and the miner will always say I'm not paying for that and they'll always say I'll get this from

3536
05:52:58,934 --> 05:53:06,775
somewhere else so if we just say that by merge mining is magically impossible then it's really

3537
05:53:06,775 --> 05:53:13,494
just saying that well how is it different for you from I guess you would say it's not different like

3538
05:53:13,494 --> 05:53:19,014
from some other fixed cost of mining so like it's a fixed because this is like how much it costs to

3539
05:53:19,014 --> 05:53:25,014
start up a new mining operation is all the nodes plus a bunch of other stuff about like what is

3540
05:53:25,014 --> 05:53:28,215
the smallest amount of money you could spend because there's you know various economies and

3541
05:53:28,215 --> 05:53:35,415
diseconomies of scale in mining of course as we both know so there's some today there's some

3542
05:53:35,415 --> 05:53:41,175
minimally viable miner size right that's profitable minimum profitable miner size

3543
05:53:41,175 --> 05:53:49,335
of like whatever it is two thousand dollars up front and then certain amount you know per day

3544
05:53:50,134 --> 05:53:56,775
so there's some minimal threshold for that and you're saying it's very bad if that goes up

3545
05:53:58,855 --> 05:54:05,494
paul we're back to conflating the cost of constructing your own block template to maintain

3546
05:54:05,494 --> 05:54:11,415
decentralization and censorship resistance of that with the cost of running the mining hardware

3547
05:54:11,415 --> 05:54:17,894
i have disentangled and clarified the separation of those two things i don't know how many times

3548
05:54:17,894 --> 05:54:26,054
we are talking about you're talking about the what when i think of the pool i think of the

3549
05:54:26,054 --> 05:54:30,535
person who is assembling the block and then the hashers are just blindly hashing away at it

3550
05:54:30,535 --> 05:54:35,254
so you're saying like basically your version of the pool and in your ideal scenario everyone is

3551
05:54:35,254 --> 05:54:42,374
in some kind of using like p2 pool or something yes yes paul that is incredibly important almost

3552
05:54:42,374 --> 05:54:48,535
like no more than i think 50 percent of the hash rate on the network is all kyc'd with their pools

3553
05:54:48,535 --> 05:54:54,615
right now all of the big pools are kyc'ing everybody like do you not see do you not think

3554
05:54:54,615 --> 05:55:01,254
that will get more invasive that that will not be a path explored by governments and regulators

3555
05:55:01,254 --> 05:55:07,335
to start talking with things we should be obsoleting that and replacing it with a protocol

3556
05:55:07,335 --> 05:55:13,655
and you're arguing right now to enact a change that makes that 10 times more difficult maybe

3557
05:55:13,655 --> 05:55:20,374
even impossible to get to a a good level of decentralization that will protect the network

3558
05:55:20,454 --> 05:55:26,215
from those types of attacks yeah i don't think that it's it is concerning that the miners will

3559
05:55:26,215 --> 05:55:32,295
sign up for kyc and so many of them are huge corporations that are publicly traded which

3560
05:55:33,254 --> 05:55:37,414
then of course can't forget kyc they have like auditors they have all kinds of stuff

3561
05:55:37,414 --> 05:55:45,735
they're fully plugged in to the matrix um but i don't understand why i think the focus on pools

3562
05:55:46,294 --> 05:55:53,495
is a mistake because it's very easy to switch from one mining pool to another and it's not easy

3563
05:55:53,495 --> 05:55:59,735
for a mining pool to just spin up a giant warehouse full of hash rate equipment so i

3564
05:56:00,294 --> 05:56:05,574
i don't actually think the i think what we should do is make it very easy to start up a new pool

3565
05:56:05,574 --> 05:56:10,934
and very easy to switch pools but i actually don't think that p2pool is the way to go because p2pool

3566
05:56:10,934 --> 05:56:18,294
has like a big coinbase transaction and it has uh i think it has just other issues it's partly

3567
05:56:19,015 --> 05:56:24,855
you can't just make a pool easier to spin up it's not that simple because you have the chicken and

3568
05:56:24,855 --> 05:56:31,335
the egg problem of yeah i would say we're distribution and the hash rate is first like

3569
05:56:31,335 --> 05:56:36,454
yeah i agree but we would make like open source pool software and we would make like there already

3570
05:56:36,534 --> 05:56:42,774
is open source pool software and if you if you open source that pool it still doesn't matter

3571
05:56:42,774 --> 05:56:49,975
because like you just said in your own comparison a pool can't snap their finger and bring a bunch

3572
05:56:49,975 --> 05:56:55,335
of hardware in a warehouse into existence how do they snap their finger and get people to switch

3573
05:56:56,294 --> 05:56:59,414
uh like just take no fees right

3574
05:57:01,895 --> 05:57:07,335
yeah they're okay so so so you have to subsidize that and eat a loss to no but that's not what i'm

3575
05:57:07,335 --> 05:57:13,095
saying so that's that's a capital requirement then portland which is a huge centralization

3576
05:57:13,095 --> 05:57:20,774
choke point in as far as who can actually do that well okay hold on you know the cost of

3577
05:57:20,774 --> 05:57:26,294
okay if i wanted to spin up portland pool today what is my cost of operation for my pool it's a

3578
05:57:26,294 --> 05:57:33,735
full node and bandwidth for internet right so a couple hundred oh no no no no no no no no no no

3579
05:57:33,735 --> 05:57:41,574
pools are not just a node and a connection they have redundant infrastructure all over the planet

3580
05:57:41,574 --> 05:57:46,855
they have different work servers like specifically located in different regions to

3581
05:57:46,934 --> 05:57:52,615
lower the latency as much as possible they have nodes scattered around connected to all of those

3582
05:57:52,615 --> 05:57:58,615
work servers so that they can optimally get blocks out as fast as possible once the the work server

3583
05:57:58,615 --> 05:58:04,615
actually verifies that it's actually a very complicated distributed like set of infrastructure

3584
05:58:04,615 --> 05:58:10,135
it's not just a node and then blah blah blah well okay i agree that that's probably the way it's

3585
05:58:10,135 --> 05:58:14,694
done at a commercial scale right because you want that redundancy and the lower latency for your

3586
05:58:14,694 --> 05:58:19,414
clients that are mining because mining a block faster or getting it propagated is better but in

3587
05:58:19,414 --> 05:58:25,015
terms of me just starting portland pool today in my no one's gonna want to do that straight to join

3588
05:58:26,135 --> 05:58:31,574
is that all i need though like all i need is if i say i'm gonna do zero percent fees on my pool

3589
05:58:31,574 --> 05:58:37,255
and i have a decent internet connection in a home computer and people sign up what the no okay

3590
05:58:37,745 --> 05:58:43,185
like i mean no one's gonna do that portland no also in addition to all all the broadcast

3591
05:58:43,185 --> 05:58:48,625
infrastructure you need a wallet system you need an accounting system you need to link that into

3592
05:58:48,625 --> 05:58:54,705
all of your work servers so that you can actually keep track of accounts and balances make sure

3593
05:58:54,705 --> 05:59:00,064
that's all redundantly stored because if you lose that data and don't know who who's owed what oh

3594
05:59:00,144 --> 05:59:05,505
shit that'll get fucking you need a withdrawal system and security for that

3595
05:59:07,585 --> 05:59:13,105
i guess what i'm getting at is though if you you're right it costs something to make a new

3596
05:59:13,105 --> 05:59:18,145
pool but one because the pools are also you know a pool is really not viable unless there's a

3597
05:59:18,145 --> 05:59:23,105
certain percentage of the hash and once you get into percentages it just inherently limits the

3598
05:59:23,105 --> 05:59:29,024
number of pools you can have like if each pool has to be at least one percent of the hash rate

3599
05:59:29,024 --> 05:59:35,985
then you can only have a hundred of them max of course uh and pool has to be each pool wants to

3600
05:59:35,985 --> 05:59:41,105
be around ten percent you can only have ten and i guess what i'm actually getting at is what if we

3601
05:59:41,105 --> 05:59:46,944
only had two like what could make a list of all the bad things a pool could do which would be

3602
05:59:46,944 --> 05:59:55,344
like sensor transactions or do a reorg basically maybe some other things like software activation

3603
05:59:55,344 --> 06:00:02,704
or something but would you be okay like would you trade if we could offer a magic trade and we say

3604
06:00:03,825 --> 06:00:11,105
there will only be two pools but both of them will always behave perfectly or something you

3605
06:00:11,105 --> 06:00:15,745
know like they none will ever transaction sensor and none will ever reorg and they both charge

3606
06:00:15,745 --> 06:00:21,745
minimum fees etc like that i mean that's i guess that's a question i would ask paul that's it's

3607
06:00:21,745 --> 06:00:28,944
ridiculous like here's some fantastical situation that in zero percent of any possible universe will

3608
06:00:28,944 --> 06:00:34,785
it ever occur where all the concerns of the system don't exist like would you take that

3609
06:00:34,785 --> 06:00:41,905
like if we lived in that world you don't need bitcoin yeah that'd be cool okay but the reason

3610
06:00:41,905 --> 06:00:49,025
it bridges to my next question which is what if people had every everyone actually hashing

3611
06:00:49,025 --> 06:00:55,425
the people doing the shot 256d of course the hasher miners what if they had a way of detecting

3612
06:00:55,425 --> 06:01:00,305
an error in a pool pool is charging too high a fee pool is censoring a transaction whatever

3613
06:01:01,344 --> 06:01:05,344
they had a very very cheap way of detecting that and then switching pools

3614
06:01:06,785 --> 06:01:13,824
would two pools be enough in that scenario just like what on earth are you thinking when you lay

3615
06:01:13,824 --> 06:01:20,704
out an example that is not a p2 pool like variant that that scales better with the payouts

3616
06:01:20,704 --> 06:01:27,425
um where it's like let's not do that but let's have the exact same requirements to keep these

3617
06:01:27,425 --> 06:01:31,824
two big pools in check because the you know how they how do they find that out they run a node

3618
06:01:31,824 --> 06:01:37,505
and they check the mempool against the the blocks like that is the exact requirements of just doing

3619
06:01:37,505 --> 06:01:44,225
p2 pool so like what is coherence about that question i don't see anything well i you know i'm

3620
06:01:44,225 --> 06:01:48,385
going somewhere with it of course but i think presumably you'd say the answer is that actually

3621
06:01:48,385 --> 06:01:54,704
two pools is enough as long as you can always switch when one is making a mistake we just need

3622
06:01:54,704 --> 06:01:59,505
that both not making a mistake at the same time or something like that but if they all switch now

3623
06:01:59,505 --> 06:02:03,824
i guess you could throw in as in a different ingredient you could say the ability to launch

3624
06:02:03,824 --> 06:02:10,145
a new pool from scratch if both of the pools screw up and in which case if everyone runs that

3625
06:02:10,145 --> 06:02:16,385
algorithm then if both pools screw up then a third pool will appear and immediately get 100%

3626
06:02:16,385 --> 06:02:22,704
of the hash rate in this kind of fictional example but the dude that that oversimplified

3627
06:02:22,704 --> 06:02:28,704
fictional example is like useless you know like here's a wild and in the final part of the

3628
06:02:29,505 --> 06:02:34,624
space the final part of the algorithm is if you're if you're if you have just done this

3629
06:02:34,624 --> 06:02:41,425
recreate a third pool move then uh 10 minutes next block split randomly flip a coin and flip

3630
06:02:41,425 --> 06:02:46,544
into two split into two pools again so now you think we should have open source software for

3631
06:02:46,544 --> 06:02:51,904
anybody to just be able to spin up an exchange and get millions of dollars of other people's

3632
06:02:51,904 --> 06:02:56,625
money that they're responsible for custodying because that is a wildly underappreciated part

3633
06:02:56,625 --> 06:03:01,425
of a pool it's not just the coordination infrastructure it's not just the work servers

3634
06:03:01,425 --> 06:03:06,305
not just the node not the careful latency management it's also you're effectively an

3635
06:03:06,305 --> 06:03:13,025
exchange you are a custodian of shit tons of other people's money so any anybody should just jump in

3636
06:03:13,025 --> 06:03:18,944
to do that that's easy to figure out like that's not something that requires a lot of specialization

3637
06:03:18,944 --> 06:03:24,865
and risk management that isn't widely available if there was open source exchange software i

3638
06:03:24,865 --> 06:03:30,465
would say that probably it would end up putting competitive pressure on the exchanges that exist

3639
06:03:30,465 --> 06:03:35,425
even though they have enormous network effects from liquidity it would be probably easier for

3640
06:03:35,425 --> 06:03:40,145
someone to start an exchange and then i i would imagine that brian armstrong wouldn't sleep

3641
06:03:40,145 --> 06:03:47,745
quite as soundly at night well i think you missed my point the answer is no like everybody is not

3642
06:03:47,745 --> 06:03:55,984
just equally competent at securing a giant pile of bitcoin that has to be connected to a hot wallet

3643
06:03:55,984 --> 06:04:02,784
to process withdrawals when miners want them that is a complicated incredibly delicate system to

3644
06:04:02,784 --> 06:04:09,264
keep secure it's not just spin it up question one was there's two magic pools that never make a

3645
06:04:09,264 --> 06:04:16,065
mistake that would be good and then i say well that's a fantastical scenario why are they never

3646
06:04:16,065 --> 06:04:21,745
making a mistake but then i have algorithm that if one pool makes a mistake you switch

3647
06:04:21,745 --> 06:04:29,504
and if both the mistake continues you start a new pool and and then if 100 of the people are

3648
06:04:29,504 --> 06:04:35,745
in a pool you flip a coin and split the pool into two now if everyone 100 of the miners run that

3649
06:04:35,745 --> 06:04:42,625
algorithm then we are actually in the first case the pools really cannot make it a mistake they'll

3650
06:04:42,625 --> 06:04:48,544
they'll go out of business instantly and die if they make a mistake and now we have this kind of

3651
06:04:48,544 --> 06:04:55,104
like stable scenario where no one's making a mistake and now as long as there's two pools

3652
06:04:55,664 --> 06:05:00,625
it actually does not matter what the costs are of the pool at all whether it be these software costs

3653
06:05:00,625 --> 06:05:06,625
or any other kind of cost because they're shared equally the two pools pay them equally and

3654
06:05:06,704 --> 06:05:13,025
whichever pool you know if it's really the case that the solana chain makes more money than it

3655
06:05:13,025 --> 06:05:19,745
costs to run then both pools will do it and if it's not the case then neither will do it paul you

3656
06:05:19,745 --> 06:05:25,824
know what this type of stuff is you know when you when you make arguments like this it's just

3657
06:05:26,704 --> 06:05:34,384
instead of reasoning towards this is why i'm right you just like drop an example and go i'm right

3658
06:05:34,384 --> 06:05:40,465
and then go backwards to explain why exactly how you constructed this example makes it impossible

3659
06:05:40,465 --> 06:05:47,984
for you to be anything but right like that is not constructed in any type of debate or conversation

3660
06:05:47,984 --> 06:05:54,865
it's glossing completely over any actual assessment or analysis of the things people

3661
06:05:54,865 --> 06:06:01,504
are actually arguing or putting forward it's just going from example to example to example

3662
06:06:01,504 --> 06:06:06,625
of the weird examples you come up with that are constructed specifically just so

3663
06:06:07,264 --> 06:06:13,025
i'm right in this example how is that productive well it seemed to me like you were concerned

3664
06:06:13,025 --> 06:06:22,944
about not being able to mine because the p2 pool would kick you out but now you don't have that

3665
06:06:22,944 --> 06:06:30,384
problem

3666
06:06:31,905 --> 06:06:39,824
because you have two pools that will run all the node software and they never make a mistake so

3667
06:06:39,824 --> 06:06:43,185
no one has to worry about that and so as a miner you don't need to run any of the nodes of course

3668
06:06:43,185 --> 06:06:48,145
every single user will need to be running a node if they want to actually have like a real wallet

3669
06:06:48,865 --> 06:06:53,185
but now this is not a question of mining profitability it's just a question of

3670
06:06:53,185 --> 06:06:58,544
regular decentralization which is the more important thing but it's now

3671
06:06:58,544 --> 06:07:02,544
you can like factor it out of the mining cost structure

3672
06:07:05,504 --> 06:07:12,305
you know what paul as fun as it has been to sit here for like three hours of you just

3673
06:07:12,305 --> 06:07:18,625
selectively ignoring half of everything i'm saying at all times um i think i'm going to

3674
06:07:18,625 --> 06:07:24,945
go cook dinner and do something actually productive with the rest of my day so yeah

3675
06:07:26,464 --> 06:07:33,745
see you next week see you later everyone i know thank you thanks for letting me up

3676
06:07:33,745 --> 06:07:35,265
thanks for hanging out

3677
06:07:40,144 --> 06:07:49,344
okay cool do we have anyone else who wants to speak i'm good thank you for hosting

3678
06:07:51,745 --> 06:07:59,185
you're welcome uh is there anyone raise your hand if you want to speak

3679
06:08:03,904 --> 06:08:07,664
uh okay here we have someone

3680
06:08:10,865 --> 06:08:17,185
ghost of something

3681
06:08:28,625 --> 06:08:30,625
paul can you uh can you rebut that

3682
06:08:31,344 --> 06:08:41,024
uh i want you to rebut what uh what that gentleman just did uh rebut his point i can't really hear it

3683
06:08:42,464 --> 06:08:48,065
oh my god okay i got i got one last question i guess before i'm gonna head out um but thank

3684
06:08:48,065 --> 06:08:52,705
you again for hosting um my final question would be to you what would you do if you were

3685
06:08:53,024 --> 06:08:57,344
okay i got i got one last question i guess before i'm gonna head out um but thank you

3686
06:08:57,344 --> 06:09:05,584
again for hosting um my final question would be to you paul and that is as if drivechains don't

3687
06:09:05,584 --> 06:09:11,825
work out for example and i'm always thinking of like adversarial events we have now merged this

3688
06:09:11,825 --> 06:09:18,464
into bitcoin core and it has been adopted by miners what technical debt does that induce or

3689
06:09:18,464 --> 06:09:25,104
what maintenance costs are required as part like can we just i'm pretty sure you could just stop

3690
06:09:25,104 --> 06:09:29,185
using it like everybody could just abandon it but you still would have like small implications

3691
06:09:29,185 --> 06:09:33,984
throughout the code base of like how to do potential workarounds for op drivechain is

3692
06:09:33,984 --> 06:09:38,865
gone officially now uh what other pieces of technical debt would be basically brought

3693
06:09:38,865 --> 06:09:45,904
about if this thing ends up like neopets technical debt well i mean i think it depends on the

3694
06:09:46,865 --> 06:09:53,664
software like the actual code details if no one ever actually wants to use it then you can just

3695
06:09:54,464 --> 06:10:03,185
ban op and op5 from ever being used again and um and then you could just delete all the code

3696
06:10:03,185 --> 06:10:09,024
after everyone upgrades to that you know especially after 51% hashrate upgrade to that

3697
06:10:09,664 --> 06:10:15,104
uh i think it's kind of like keeping it around yeah i think there's uh

3698
06:10:16,945 --> 06:10:23,745
i don't think it's that it's in the bit like the maximum size that the two caches can grow to

3699
06:10:24,705 --> 06:10:31,505
and it's very small so but then i mean like the code debt would always be there but also i think

3700
06:10:31,505 --> 06:10:35,984
it's not that many lines of code i think ryan doll said something like that like oh this is not as

3701
06:10:35,984 --> 06:10:41,185
many as i would have thought but yeah i think that is an issue where anyone who works with

3702
06:10:42,464 --> 06:10:48,464
bitcoin core or works on any software project with other people does not want to have lots of

3703
06:10:50,945 --> 06:10:55,664
code changes yeah just have to hang around for no no reason you got to make sure you

3704
06:10:55,664 --> 06:10:59,425
keep track of these things so that you don't actually run into some bug or you're testing

3705
06:10:59,425 --> 06:11:04,305
something and don't understand why and it turns out oh hey this feature implemented for the uh

3706
06:11:04,305 --> 06:11:09,505
sidechain registration of op drivechain is now causing me a problem that i have to go work around

3707
06:11:09,505 --> 06:11:15,185
now and i just was wondering like from a basically it sounds like the solution to remove it would be

3708
06:11:15,185 --> 06:11:23,425
to soft fork back out again into uh drive chainless bitcoin but um yeah but all the old

3709
06:11:23,984 --> 06:11:29,505
there's another name for that it's called the rug pull you could then comment out the

3710
06:11:29,505 --> 06:11:35,745
code and then eventually just delete it if you banned op not five the only incidents where that

3711
06:11:35,745 --> 06:11:42,385
would become a problem is if a miner you'd have to have miner consensus that that was the direction

3712
06:11:42,385 --> 06:11:47,425
we're going so that these miners wouldn't mint op not five blocks and they would get propagated to

3713
06:11:47,425 --> 06:11:53,024
these kind of former drivechain enabled nodes that this isn't a thing anymore and as such they

3714
06:11:53,024 --> 06:11:58,865
would stall out um or start building no because the newer chain would have more hash power ideally

3715
06:11:59,505 --> 06:12:03,185
but you would have to get miner consensus to soft fork it completely out the miners would

3716
06:12:03,185 --> 06:12:08,705
have to go hey we don't want this anymore we want to get out that using op not five would make the

3717
06:12:08,705 --> 06:12:20,865
block invalid okay thank you yeah good answer thank you we have a miner who is also a raccoon

3718
06:12:20,865 --> 06:12:27,584
or something cat yes yeah no i'm just gonna listen and respond to something that sounds interesting

3719
06:12:28,464 --> 06:12:37,584
okay i think we will have to end it soon because we have been going for six hours plus and um it

3720
06:12:37,584 --> 06:12:46,464
is a friday of course so but i hate to tear up take up too much of people's friday but let's see

3721
06:12:46,464 --> 06:12:53,904
if we can maybe do any last minute comments all right paul a lava grenade so when you uh

3722
06:12:53,904 --> 06:13:02,705
become evil uh bitcoin hitler which is that inevitable when when uh there's an evil miner

3723
06:13:02,705 --> 06:13:08,945
activated software i don't think i'll be evil miner hitler or whatever but you never know

3724
06:13:11,825 --> 06:13:17,984
i mean are you able to grow a mustache it doesn't look good it's like really red and weird

3725
06:13:17,984 --> 06:13:25,344
really red and weird i don't like it at all can we can we really trust a man that can't grow

3726
06:13:25,344 --> 06:13:30,865
a mustache probably not i mean like a software developer that doesn't have like a giant wizard

3727
06:13:30,865 --> 06:13:36,144
beard like are you kidding me like it's probably not keep me away from bitcoin that's why

3728
06:13:37,024 --> 06:13:38,305
we collaborated with luke

3729
06:13:39,185 --> 06:13:39,685
okay

3730
06:13:42,385 --> 06:13:51,904
paul this is uh you have stamina i'll give you that you have the most stamina um also suzy uh

3731
06:13:51,904 --> 06:14:00,705
you need to look at suzy's picture that she posted um why why is this the accurate representation of

3732
06:14:01,344 --> 06:14:09,984
BIP300 oh where's this picture it's uh it's shared on uh okay i'm gonna look for it

3733
06:14:09,984 --> 06:14:15,344
the twitter space it's right there it was shared by sir farts a lot

3734
06:14:17,344 --> 06:14:23,104
uh i don't think so i can't really see it very clearly but it does not look

3735
06:14:30,705 --> 06:14:38,464
like it maybe i have that for my i get that from my living room do you feel like you

3736
06:14:38,464 --> 06:14:48,305
and shinobi will ever find common ground uh i'm not sure i mean i don't know like i was trying to

3737
06:14:51,104 --> 06:14:54,945
analyze what he was saying he seemed to really think that i was not

3738
06:14:55,825 --> 06:15:01,024
um i also kind of thought he was just being disagreeable on purpose i would just be like

3739
06:15:01,024 --> 06:15:05,024
talking and he would say oh you're doing this again you're ignoring me and i was like i really

3740
06:15:05,024 --> 06:15:11,104
don't think that i am but you know that's sometimes you don't notice subconsciously i i was only half

3741
06:15:11,104 --> 06:15:20,144
listening and one thing i i kept hearing over and over was you're only addressing half of his

3742
06:15:20,464 --> 06:15:31,104
half of his argument um one thing that i would be interested in is uh you uh figuring out a way

3743
06:15:31,104 --> 06:15:36,144
where he feels or you are actually addressing his whole argument i don't know what that looks like

3744
06:15:36,144 --> 06:15:45,744
but he was he was pretty he he he definitely um was under the impression um and i was under the

3745
06:15:45,744 --> 06:15:51,024
impression after hearing him that he felt like he wasn't being heard or his whole point wasn't

3746
06:15:51,024 --> 06:15:59,024
being acknowledged yeah but i felt like i was trying to acknowledge it i mean so like what

3747
06:15:59,024 --> 06:16:05,425
was his point do you think it was it was the point really like if you that sometimes miners

3748
06:16:05,425 --> 06:16:11,985
have to pay costs in order to be competitive like was that his point i noticed i noticed something

3749
06:16:11,985 --> 06:16:20,465
that nobody talked about when bootstrapping a new pool um no miner wants to connect their pool

3750
06:16:21,024 --> 06:16:27,985
to a pool that doesn't find blocks or doesn't pay so if you're a pay per block pool and you don't

3751
06:16:27,985 --> 06:16:33,744
have the hash rate to find you know reasonably consistent blocks you're gonna have to pay per

3752
06:16:33,744 --> 06:16:40,945
share and that means you need to have some bitcoin up front to pay the miners even though no blocks

3753
06:16:40,945 --> 06:16:47,185
were found yet and that could be a sizable cost to starting a new pool it could be you know

3754
06:16:48,864 --> 06:16:56,225
tens hundreds of bitcoin yeah that makes sense i think um we

3755
06:16:59,585 --> 06:17:05,504
uh yeah i think that makes sense and i think another aspect of starting a new pool is actually

3756
06:17:05,504 --> 06:17:09,825
well what i was trying to go he didn't really you know not the easiest person to talk to in

3757
06:17:09,825 --> 06:17:14,384
my humble opinion you know i actually i was enjoying our conversation somewhat and the back

3758
06:17:14,384 --> 06:17:19,425
and forth but where i was trying to go with the whole two magic pools thing or what does it cost

3759
06:17:19,425 --> 06:17:25,185
to make a pool i was trying to actually touch on the idea that if all the pools are doing the

3760
06:17:25,185 --> 06:17:32,784
perfect thing like if they're all every existing pool is fine then you can't actually break in

3761
06:17:32,784 --> 06:17:39,264
at all without like altruism or without like destroying money or something so it's not like

3762
06:17:39,264 --> 06:17:45,744
anyone can run a node or anyone can run a new node or anyone can run a new miner unless some

3763
06:17:45,744 --> 06:17:50,384
part of the pool because it's pool it's just like slices of a pie you know it's 100 percentage

3764
06:17:50,384 --> 06:17:57,664
points but if all 100 percentage points are doing the right thing then there's no way to break in i

3765
06:17:57,664 --> 06:18:02,225
think it's kind of like an infinite cost or at least it's just involves altruism and like

3766
06:18:02,945 --> 06:18:07,904
burning money or something well choosing a pool is an inherently political decision

3767
06:18:09,664 --> 06:18:18,305
yeah that's another interesting uh a facet of it that perhaps we would wish that it was purely

3768
06:18:18,305 --> 06:18:23,024
economic but anyway i think i saw tao come up and raise his hand and now we have a surfer and jim i

3769
06:18:23,024 --> 06:18:29,904
think came up and raised their hand should we go to them yeah i'll be really quick um hey paul

3770
06:18:29,904 --> 06:18:35,024
so at the beginning of this space i went ahead and took a poll

3771
06:18:35,225 --> 06:18:42,585
and i just asked a simple questions do you want drivechain we have 105 votes so far

3772
06:18:44,825 --> 06:18:54,265
93 percent said no seven percent yes what are your thoughts about that i think even one percent

3773
06:18:54,265 --> 06:19:01,385
is actually enough to activate the feature because it's like how many people use you know

3774
06:19:01,385 --> 06:19:08,105
check lock time verify or how many people use uh who used how many people used to tap root for a

3775
06:19:08,105 --> 06:19:13,625
while until the ordinals but yeah i mean i don't think that's just some poll on twitter with 105

3776
06:19:13,625 --> 06:19:17,785
votes i don't think that i don't think that matters as much as like the actual economic

3777
06:19:17,785 --> 06:19:23,864
reality of the situation of like network effects being crucial for bitcoin to succeed wrapped

3778
06:19:23,864 --> 06:19:29,065
bitcoin having billions of dollars and being many many times 40 times the size of the lightning

3779
06:19:29,065 --> 06:19:34,105
network and stuff like that i think but there is one any individual poll can help i mean we could

3780
06:19:34,105 --> 06:19:41,225
certainly look like if you had run that poll last year it would have been a hundred percent would

3781
06:19:41,225 --> 06:19:50,824
have said i don't i've never heard of that so now we're up to seven percent yes so but it's a seems

3782
06:19:50,824 --> 06:19:58,665
like kind of a small poll to me so that's my thought so for jim uh yeah hey paul um good for

3783
06:19:58,665 --> 06:20:06,265
you going six hours dude uh i i i admire your willingness to help people understand something

3784
06:20:06,265 --> 06:20:12,665
that you believe in um i still don't know much about it i'm not a developer i i try to understand

3785
06:20:12,665 --> 06:20:18,665
the technical stuff uh but i i haven't studied it close enough um but i was listening to you

3786
06:20:18,665 --> 06:20:28,504
and shinobi and um my takeaway was that he his position seemed to be to me that um

3787
06:20:29,864 --> 06:20:33,705
uh the whatever it was you guys were discussing with these mining pools

3788
06:20:34,265 --> 06:20:42,265
was something that increases the cost for this for for for the smallest user let's just say um

3789
06:20:42,265 --> 06:20:45,864
you know one of these things i've always understood about the bitcoin network and why

3790
06:20:45,864 --> 06:20:51,545
the small blocks and and you know the whole block size war thing was the idea that you know

3791
06:20:51,545 --> 06:20:55,864
let's make it so that as many people as possible could run a note i think he was looking at from

3792
06:20:55,864 --> 06:21:01,864
that same perspective and that my takeaway was that he was asserting that this uh by implementing

3793
06:21:01,864 --> 06:21:09,144
the the drivechain into the base layer protocol you just made it harder now you guys are focusing

3794
06:21:09,144 --> 06:21:14,105
on mining but essentially it seems like you you've made it harder to the point where some people now

3795
06:21:14,105 --> 06:21:21,225
no longer can adequately or equally participate can get kicked off can be shunned by you know the

3796
06:21:22,025 --> 06:21:27,144
other people because they can't include the sidechain things because they cost more money

3797
06:21:27,144 --> 06:21:31,305
again you know i don't know enough about it i'm just paraphrasing and so it's just seemed to me

3798
06:21:31,305 --> 06:21:39,864
that he's going just with that one main argument and i didn't hear you rebut it but again maybe

3799
06:21:39,864 --> 06:21:44,665
it's too technical for me to understand and then the other the last thing i would say is that um

3800
06:21:45,225 --> 06:21:52,185
you were i think you also would say that anybody wanting to defend their position in in anything

3801
06:21:52,185 --> 06:21:57,704
related to bitcoin especially especially a change in bitcoin that if you're going to make an argument

3802
06:21:57,704 --> 06:22:06,984
for a thing it should be the most rational logical potentially executable thing not a um

3803
06:22:07,945 --> 06:22:16,105
not a uh for lack of a better word a fantasy of two mining pools and i get your point as to show

3804
06:22:16,105 --> 06:22:21,784
the pureness of if you had this it would it would equal that and i i don't know the significance the

3805
06:22:21,784 --> 06:22:26,665
overall significance of it but i i think i get what you mean but since the world will never see

3806
06:22:26,665 --> 06:22:32,665
that no all the miners in the world are not going to agree to join two pools so it's a silly argument

3807
06:22:32,984 --> 06:22:37,385
to use to make a point i think or let's put it this way i think what he was trying to say was

3808
06:22:37,385 --> 06:22:42,344
that if you're going to make that point make that point in a way that could actually happen in the

3809
06:22:42,344 --> 06:22:48,984
real world so instead of using a two mining pool example use an example of what we have now and

3810
06:22:48,984 --> 06:22:56,985
show how that could work i think that's again i think that's what he was getting at but without

3811
06:22:56,985 --> 06:23:02,184
the level of technical knowledge you guys have i could be off and i apologize if i am i want to say

3812
06:23:02,184 --> 06:23:08,665
also i compliment both you guys for being so cordial while completely disagreeing on things

3813
06:23:08,665 --> 06:23:15,784
that shit felt like shinobi was holding back um wanting to scream and you you have such a calm

3814
06:23:15,784 --> 06:23:21,705
demeanor about this whole thing i give you a lot of credit boy um because most of what i see in

3815
06:23:21,705 --> 06:23:27,865
the bitcoin space is pushing back against your idea i see a lot of very um knowledgeable people

3816
06:23:28,425 --> 06:23:35,464
um you know well-known people not agreeing with your position and since i don't understand it

3817
06:23:35,464 --> 06:23:40,504
well enough i'm just sitting here watching essentially not really knowing what side to take

3818
06:23:40,504 --> 06:23:44,184
because i don't know how it works and i don't know what effect it would have ultimately to

3819
06:23:44,184 --> 06:23:49,145
everything but i still just want to give you a lot of credit for trying i don't i don't perceive you

3820
06:23:49,145 --> 06:23:54,024
as a bad actor you've been around a long time i've listened to you on podcasts um i think you just

3821
06:23:54,024 --> 06:24:00,024
believe in an idea that almost nobody else believes in so this is what's good about bitcoin

3822
06:24:00,024 --> 06:24:04,985
what i think we're watching here is literally what's been going on for 14 plus years in the

3823
06:24:04,985 --> 06:24:11,624
bitcoin space is really smart people hashing it out writing code testing trying to prove their

3824
06:24:11,624 --> 06:24:18,024
point and and making bitcoin what it is today so um even if you don't get what you want i don't

3825
06:24:18,024 --> 06:24:22,744
see this as an exercise in futility because it's an exploration into a direction that may

3826
06:24:22,744 --> 06:24:28,665
actually benefit bitcoin if it can be proven so and everybody agrees so i'll stop there thank you

3827
06:24:28,665 --> 06:24:32,024
for letting me up just to say all that and i appreciate everything you guys are trying to do

3828
06:24:32,024 --> 06:24:39,545
for me and for bitcoin and for everybody else cool yeah thanks for your uh comments so i think

3829
06:24:39,545 --> 06:24:46,665
it is absolutely the case i wish people you know because i agree that this whole running a node

3830
06:24:46,665 --> 06:24:52,184
should be cheap thing i wish people would read the essay that i wrote measuring decentralization

3831
06:24:52,584 --> 06:25:02,344
september 2015 and it's a it's a very crucial idea because exactly as surfer jim said the higher it

3832
06:25:02,344 --> 06:25:09,225
is to the more expensive it is to run a full node the less decentralized the network becomes and it

3833
06:25:09,225 --> 06:25:13,705
makes the blockchain dark and it's hard to see into the blockchain whereas the node is really

3834
06:25:13,705 --> 06:25:21,865
really cheap really really easy to run it's very very easy to spin up a new node sometimes people

3835
06:25:21,865 --> 06:25:25,464
give the example of like the government cracks down and everything and most of the nodes get

3836
06:25:25,464 --> 06:25:30,744
shut off but as long as there's you know two or three or four or five nodes that remain they can

3837
06:25:30,744 --> 06:25:36,825
regenerate the entire network and the cost of that is the cost of spinning up a new node and so i

3838
06:25:36,825 --> 06:25:44,425
want the full node cost to be cheap and in fact i in in favor of a layer one block size reduction

3839
06:25:45,624 --> 06:25:51,464
i'm one of the few people who openly is some people think i'm doing it ironically but i am not

3840
06:25:51,464 --> 06:25:57,225
i actually think layer one block size should shrink so that the node is even more affordable

3841
06:25:58,344 --> 06:26:04,265
so then why is it that i don't care about miners having to run expensive nodes quite as much

3842
06:26:04,985 --> 06:26:10,744
and the answer is because mining is a different thing than running a node in order to mine you

3843
06:26:10,744 --> 06:26:18,024
need to run a node but it's not the other way around so if you run a node it's not like you

3844
06:26:18,024 --> 06:26:22,105
must mine like if you if you don't have one percent of the hash rate your your node just

3845
06:26:22,105 --> 06:26:28,744
bursts into flames or something so the miners are customers they they uh it's not the case that we

3846
06:26:28,744 --> 06:26:34,985
need to to worry about the miners it's true that we all share this mining network but the mining

3847
06:26:34,985 --> 06:26:40,665
industry is this cutthroat uh fight to the death when you say mine do you mean a pool

3848
06:26:42,024 --> 06:26:46,584
i mean the whole thing this is another way in which i think my view is a little bit different

3849
06:26:46,584 --> 06:26:50,665
from other people so a lot of people look at like the causality of time and they say

3850
06:26:51,624 --> 06:26:59,145
the pool assembles the block and most miners don't really run nodes right i mean it's an

3851
06:26:59,145 --> 06:27:05,304
intriguing question like the the fact that most miners don't run nodes is kind of a funny outcome

3852
06:27:05,304 --> 06:27:11,464
because it kind of shows that blind merge mining already is real and that shinobi's concern is not

3853
06:27:11,464 --> 06:27:18,584
doesn't really apply but that we don't we don't want to dismiss him as easily as that but um the

3854
06:27:18,584 --> 06:27:23,384
miners the end miner kind of should run a node so that they know whether or not the pool is paying

3855
06:27:23,384 --> 06:27:29,144
them and cheating them and yet i know from personal experience that many do not many just

3856
06:27:29,144 --> 06:27:36,185
whatever they do or they use what i mean is most miners don't run a node that they mine to they

3857
06:27:36,185 --> 06:27:42,824
don't run a yeah they have the pool their own nodes they have their the pool do that i agree

3858
06:27:43,865 --> 06:27:49,464
when they use a node to verify that they're getting paid but that has nothing to do with

3859
06:27:50,505 --> 06:27:58,824
the mining part right now i agree with you um so the it's why so but i'm trying to draw this

3860
06:27:58,824 --> 06:28:05,225
important distinction between the important having cheap nodes is important and yet in a way

3861
06:28:05,865 --> 06:28:11,545
the problem of sidechains is how do we make the node more expensive because what the sidechain

3862
06:28:11,545 --> 06:28:15,625
world is saying is instead of just running one piece of software i actually want to run

3863
06:28:15,625 --> 06:28:23,144
two pieces of software or more i'm trying to read between the lines here and from what i understand

3864
06:28:23,144 --> 06:28:31,384
is mining pools already have so much invested into infrastructure that they can afford to run

3865
06:28:32,185 --> 06:28:37,225
uh more hardware because it's already expensive for them to operate

3866
06:28:38,425 --> 06:28:47,865
if it's a profitable activity you know a small increase for them anyway it may be like it may

3867
06:28:47,865 --> 06:28:52,024
affect the economies of scale of the pool although i think i personally think that this is basically

3868
06:28:52,024 --> 06:28:56,264
not possible because i think the economies of scale of the pool are set by the statistical

3869
06:28:56,264 --> 06:29:03,305
variance universe and i also think that the pool like the normal optimal pool size is already so

3870
06:29:03,305 --> 06:29:09,865
big that i find it implausible that any amount even 256 sidechain full nodes because something

3871
06:29:09,865 --> 06:29:14,264
that people have to keep in mind is the example with the 10 trillion dollar a day note is kind

3872
06:29:14,264 --> 06:29:20,264
of a good one because of how implausible it is because regular users of the sidechain like if

3873
06:29:20,264 --> 06:29:27,944
you're just using monero to buy things i'm a dark net market you're running like a monero node

3874
06:29:27,944 --> 06:29:34,904
so like they can't be so expensive that the end user finds it just completely impossible to do

3875
06:29:34,904 --> 06:29:40,505
the network just won't exist so i find it very implausible that even 256 drivechain nodes or

3876
06:29:40,505 --> 06:29:47,625
even many many could actually have a significant impact on the actual economics of scale of the

3877
06:29:47,625 --> 06:29:54,745
pool at all but but even if it did what i'm trying to say is so this is very important that we want

3878
06:29:54,745 --> 06:30:00,665
the full node cost to be down but the whole problem of sidechains is some people want more stuff they

3879
06:30:00,665 --> 06:30:08,745
say we want larger blocks or we want evm they want these are a few people a minority a subset

3880
06:30:09,464 --> 06:30:17,784
of people who who deliberately want the to increase the amount of money they spend on full nodes

3881
06:30:18,505 --> 06:30:23,944
so that is the whole point and so this is this may appear to be a contradiction but it's not it's

3882
06:30:23,944 --> 06:30:30,985
saying we everyone's forced to run the the L1 cheapest node but everyone else has the option

3883
06:30:30,985 --> 06:30:36,505
to run more so if you want you can run more so you see this is why it's not a bad thing

3884
06:30:36,505 --> 06:30:39,464
because only the people who really want the feature would do it

3885
06:30:42,024 --> 06:30:47,625
and it's so they're saying like oh i would i want whatever it is zcash level privacy so i want to

3886
06:30:47,625 --> 06:30:53,784
run the zcash node so the whole point is we're moving those costs up on purpose so that's on

3887
06:30:53,784 --> 06:30:58,985
that's on the node side this is the non-miner side so we have to i want to try to keep all

3888
06:30:58,985 --> 06:31:05,065
this straight here because i think it might be confusing for the audience which is the lower

3889
06:31:05,144 --> 06:31:11,784
the full node cost the better but actually that's just subject to the constraint that we're doing

3890
06:31:11,784 --> 06:31:17,065
everything that the user wants to do if the user wants to run more nodes than the node costs are

3891
06:31:17,065 --> 06:31:23,545
going up now we can switch to the mining world my take on the mining world is that the mining world

3892
06:31:23,545 --> 06:31:32,745
is a cutthroat place i did math two days ago about what is the value of like ethereum if we if we

3893
06:31:32,745 --> 06:31:39,784
could port ethereum the altcoin into bitcoin as a drivechain hypothetically that's just a

3894
06:31:39,784 --> 06:31:44,425
hypothetical scenario because i said look ethereum is doing all this stuff maybe they do it for weird

3895
06:31:44,425 --> 06:31:53,784
reasons or or what have you but they do this and that and um and they are getting this seven

3896
06:31:53,784 --> 06:32:03,784
million dollars a day in fee income so like in my view like even back in the day back when i came

3897
06:32:03,784 --> 06:32:09,944
up with drivechain the first time like just as a blog post in 2015 it was already the case that

3898
06:32:09,944 --> 06:32:16,904
in order to buy miners from bitfury you had to like buy them buy the 40 foot marine container

3899
06:32:17,704 --> 06:32:25,625
so you had to like to be a customer of bitfury you had to like play call them spend millions of

3900
06:32:25,625 --> 06:32:30,584
dollars uh they would send it in a marine container and then you'd load it onto like

3901
06:32:30,584 --> 06:32:36,185
an 18 wheeler or something so they would sell it by the marine container so it was kind of like

3902
06:32:36,745 --> 06:32:42,985
people say well what about these nodes oh the node is going to make it more difficult for a miner

3903
06:32:43,784 --> 06:32:48,985
to participate in the net i'm just like i don't know what these people are talking about you know

3904
06:32:48,985 --> 06:32:54,985
like people say that but it doesn't seem like it's actually like grounded in reality to me

3905
06:32:54,985 --> 06:33:00,904
nonetheless i am happy to continue to discuss like every detail i mean for now i'm happy to

3906
06:33:00,904 --> 06:33:06,505
continue to discuss every detail of what people think would affect the miner economies of scale

3907
06:33:06,505 --> 06:33:10,985
of mining but i i just don't think any of this actually will affect what because what is already

3908
06:33:10,985 --> 06:33:16,904
in place seems to be like not it seems to be stable enough that it's not going to be affected by

3909
06:33:18,024 --> 06:33:25,384
software that's my strong opinion so to me it sounds like in the absence of a ursf what you

3910
06:33:25,384 --> 06:33:35,464
end up with is a earmark feature and a chain that could get forked off at any time in the future

3911
06:33:35,464 --> 06:33:37,065
could be tomorrow could be in 10 years

3912
06:33:40,105 --> 06:33:42,745
well i didn't really understand what you meant about in the absence of what

3913
06:33:43,944 --> 06:33:50,425
in the absence of a ursf ursf yeah if there's no ursf and there is

3914
06:33:53,784 --> 06:33:56,505
activation somewhere and somebody's using this feature

3915
06:33:57,305 --> 06:34:04,745
and you don't know what the support is for this feature then you know it could be in sync until

3916
06:34:04,745 --> 06:34:13,784
it isn't it could be what i'm sorry it's just kind of hard for me to hear you it it could be

3917
06:34:13,784 --> 06:34:19,464
in sync until it isn't uh if a few people support the feature

3918
06:34:21,305 --> 06:34:25,944
what you mean like what is the long like 10 years from now the future of mining

3919
06:34:27,464 --> 06:34:28,824
could be 10 minutes

3920
06:34:29,784 --> 06:34:33,944
uh but i still don't understand what you're asking about you're saying that the feature is not used

3921
06:34:33,944 --> 06:34:38,425
and then it is used and mining economics i'm saying it's so that the feature is earmarked

3922
06:34:38,425 --> 06:34:48,185
it's some nodes run it some nodes don't um like it it doesn't necessarily have to be a fork until it

3923
06:34:48,185 --> 06:34:52,985
does oh i know well that was what i was to be honest with you that was what i was thinking with

3924
06:34:52,985 --> 06:35:01,944
luke's pull request i was thinking like we will just prepare it so that we have it uh there and

3925
06:35:01,944 --> 06:35:07,225
then um with the other commentary i was just like i i've repeated this a few times already but i

3926
06:35:08,185 --> 06:35:13,944
i like to muse about and i've done this on my blog i like to muse about different activation

3927
06:35:14,584 --> 06:35:19,625
ideas and i have written giant at huge essays about like i wrote this essay at the uasf

3928
06:35:20,425 --> 06:35:25,384
contradiction and then i wrote this other essay called the miner activated hard for hard fork and

3929
06:35:25,384 --> 06:35:32,105
replay protection the maf hf so i kind of like i'm interested in that topic and like just as a

3930
06:35:32,105 --> 06:35:39,704
separate type of a thing it's just like a you know bitcoin researcher anyway tau has his hand up now

3931
06:35:40,265 --> 06:35:41,865
anyway tau has his hand up now

3932
06:35:44,344 --> 06:35:52,505
hey um there's a request from the audience um they're wondering if you can invite beauty on

3933
06:35:52,505 --> 06:35:55,944
and i'm not sure if he wants to join either but if you can invite beauty on up here

3934
06:35:56,824 --> 06:36:02,745
and ask him for his input um the audience would appreciate it somebody just you know

3935
06:36:02,745 --> 06:36:08,985
reached out to me so i was wondering if you can do that on beauty on he's no longer here

3936
06:36:09,064 --> 06:36:16,745
he just left yeah he's gone can anyone say what he would have said if he were up

3937
06:36:18,505 --> 06:36:29,225
uh yes he would say um drivechain is probably not needed because

3938
06:36:31,544 --> 06:36:35,785
actually you know what i can't steal man beauty on's uh point

3939
06:36:36,184 --> 06:36:43,385
i i would i would i would say that he would be against it it would i'm like 99 sure but

3940
06:36:43,385 --> 06:36:50,344
i'm not sure what his rationale would be exactly he just left i just was looking earlier and he was

3941
06:36:51,304 --> 06:36:53,145
on um but that's fine

3942
06:37:00,105 --> 06:37:09,944
beauty on's an interesting guy i uh i i talked to him for the first time recently and um he

3943
06:37:12,584 --> 06:37:18,905
he wants so first off um ordinals are an attack on bitcoin

3944
06:37:20,344 --> 06:37:27,865
um i'm not 100 sure what he would what his exact thoughts would be on drivechain but i would

3945
06:37:27,865 --> 06:37:38,025
imagine that because it seems because it is a change that would change uh because it's the

3946
06:37:38,025 --> 06:37:45,304
software that would change bitcoin i would i would say i would go on a limb and be confident to say

3947
06:37:45,304 --> 06:37:52,424
he this is one of the primary reasons he would not be a fan of it i think it's because he thinks

3948
06:37:52,424 --> 06:37:59,225
bitcoin is money and that that conflicts with his idea of what bitcoin is okay yeah that's also a

3949
06:37:59,225 --> 06:38:05,064
good point if if you start introducing more use cases to bitcoin other than the use cases that

3950
06:38:05,064 --> 06:38:10,344
exist right now then it's completely like a distraction like not needed kind of thing

3951
06:38:11,304 --> 06:38:15,704
unfortunately my phone glitched out there but the essence of it is that he doesn't think it's needed

3952
06:38:17,385 --> 06:38:23,544
right now but if you're trying to add more cases to some extent i do understand this point of view

3953
06:38:23,544 --> 06:38:29,145
like hey this isn't gonna you know this isn't really i don't see how this benefits me so

3954
06:38:30,105 --> 06:38:34,505
just don't change anything but on the other hand i don't see that really at all because this is

3955
06:38:34,505 --> 06:38:39,704
giving you an option for something you might use later and i just like when else would we actually

3956
06:38:39,704 --> 06:38:42,505
say this you know what i mean like what if if satoshi

3957
06:38:43,081 --> 06:38:50,601
what if satoshi was working on bitcoin and then he met beauty on in a bar and he told beauty on about

3958
06:38:50,601 --> 06:38:55,081
bitcoin because i don't think we really need that i mean she's just shelved this idea like

3959
06:38:56,361 --> 06:38:58,761
i just it doesn't really make sense to me i think uh

3960
06:39:01,161 --> 06:39:04,841
people anyone can always say i don't think they need that even if it's life-saving

3961
06:39:05,800 --> 06:39:09,401
heart defibrillator or something you know like you never know what you're going to need

3962
06:39:09,401 --> 06:39:16,520
it might not be possible for beauty on and satoshi to meet in a bar because no one's act

3963
06:39:16,520 --> 06:39:21,720
no one has actually seen beauty on and satoshi in the same place at once there might be

3964
06:39:22,360 --> 06:39:28,680
some suspicion that he is indeed satoshi never know hey you could be satoshi

3965
06:39:31,161 --> 06:39:33,000
i mean there's at least a 50 50 shot

3966
06:39:33,880 --> 06:39:42,121
it's just as likely as not it's basically so um yeah uh i don't know like people say oh i don't

3967
06:39:42,121 --> 06:39:46,441
think we need it but it's kind of like that's it doesn't matter like what if some if someone else

3968
06:39:46,441 --> 06:39:52,360
thinks they need it it's kind of like uh you know it's like that meme isn't there someone you forgot

3969
06:39:52,360 --> 06:39:58,441
to ask or whatever it's like i consent i can say it's like the miners run it some users want it

3970
06:39:58,441 --> 06:40:05,801
some users want it isn't there somebody you forgot to ask and then beauty on so so uh paul

3971
06:40:05,801 --> 06:40:17,640
i did add uh an asterisk to 0.1 uh today um from hector lopez and the point it the the reason i

3972
06:40:17,640 --> 06:40:21,401
amended 0.1 and maybe this would be its own separate point because i'm trying to make these

3973
06:40:21,401 --> 06:40:26,040
points digestible and not try to conflate them too much from your list that i've been working

3974
06:40:26,040 --> 06:40:33,000
through yeah right when we saw that i had uh some answers to point to part eight which i don't know

3975
06:40:33,000 --> 06:40:38,040
if anyone could understand but i put them in the space here so i'm i've got i've done a few of them

3976
06:40:38,040 --> 06:40:42,600
i think i still have to do what six is the only other good one that i have to do and then there's

3977
06:40:42,600 --> 06:40:48,680
like some that i don't think are that i mean who are you right you can yeah there's going to be

3978
06:40:48,680 --> 06:40:55,000
some that you can't do anything about obviously but um but something that that was interesting

3979
06:40:55,000 --> 06:41:01,401
that i think a lot of people don't think about or um you know maybe maybe people haven't heard is

3980
06:41:02,441 --> 06:41:07,560
i would argue not there's not too many bitcoin people that are friends or at least in

3981
06:41:07,560 --> 06:41:13,640
communication whatsoever with people that are gung-ho on bitcoin cash and um

3982
06:41:15,480 --> 06:41:23,321
and there's a bitcoin cash guy hector lopez that um pretty much said like you know emotionally

3983
06:41:23,321 --> 06:41:28,840
appealed very very closely to you know i think i think his argument made perfect sense at least

3984
06:41:28,840 --> 06:41:34,521
like from how he thinks why would i go from a second class citizen on bitcoin cash to a second

3985
06:41:34,521 --> 06:41:45,640
class citizen on bitcoin via a worse um security model um and you know i i uh what he said to me

3986
06:41:45,640 --> 06:41:52,601
makes sense because every layer two has to make trade-offs and arguably i would say that there's

3987
06:41:52,601 --> 06:41:57,161
some merit to be said like layer two layer twos aren't going to be perfect there's going to be

3988
06:41:57,161 --> 06:42:01,241
some sort of trade-off and you're trying to optimize that trade-off as well but of course

3989
06:42:01,241 --> 06:42:06,280
that's an easy one though but that's the right half of the meme that i have on my twitter banner

3990
06:42:06,280 --> 06:42:10,760
about there's an awful lot of trade-offs you make by going onto a shift line also

3991
06:42:11,401 --> 06:42:18,360
like such as losing all your money and so so his his point of view is uh why would i go from

3992
06:42:18,360 --> 06:42:24,601
something bad to something bad when i want to go from something bad to like something amazing

3993
06:42:25,241 --> 06:42:34,840
well as you may remember he came on the space two weeks ago and he was like he was convinced

3994
06:42:34,840 --> 06:42:39,081
he's not see the thing is he's not actually a second class citizen because he's i thought he

3995
06:42:39,081 --> 06:42:44,840
was a bitcoin svr actually not a bitcoin cash person but either way he was in like the full

3996
06:42:44,840 --> 06:42:52,840
trust the miners mode completely already on his on the network he was on so he was already

3997
06:42:54,041 --> 06:43:01,160
trusting the miners far more than BIP300 requires like way more they're like completely full spv

3998
06:43:01,160 --> 06:43:07,320
mode like for everyone so he doesn't even realize that he's like he's not even a second class

3999
06:43:07,320 --> 06:43:12,040
citizen by his own standard he is by many people here who would not they don't want to use anything

4000
06:43:12,040 --> 06:43:23,241
with like the hash rate escrow but he's like uh so he's really not a second class citizen because

4001
06:43:24,040 --> 06:43:31,320
he would just stay he would he would stay on the L2 his entire life and if someone just told him

4002
06:43:32,440 --> 06:43:35,480
this is actually they lied to him and they said this is actually an L1

4003
06:43:36,920 --> 06:43:41,160
he wouldn't even really notice but this is kind of the funny thing if you work on this

4004
06:43:41,160 --> 06:43:45,640
because this idea is supposed to be a compromise and if you work on a compromise you do get people

4005
06:43:46,200 --> 06:43:49,880
it's sort of like everyone should be equally disappointed i actually wonder if there's like

4006
06:43:49,880 --> 06:43:55,480
an enormous silent majority out there i don't know that's like wishful thinking on my part perhaps

4007
06:43:55,480 --> 06:44:00,920
but it's like you have some people complain and they say i don't even want to see opnop5 be used

4008
06:44:01,880 --> 06:44:07,320
on bitcoin core i never want any line of code changed in bitcoin you have these extreme people

4009
06:44:07,320 --> 06:44:14,681
who are like you know the extreme gatekeepers and then you have like the extreme altcoiners who are

4010
06:44:14,681 --> 06:44:23,001
like well i want my what i what they would prefer is for bitcoin cash to just defeat btc and and

4011
06:44:23,001 --> 06:44:29,241
defeat everything and just win and it's kind of like this is in the middle and i do wonder about

4012
06:44:29,801 --> 06:44:35,721
how many people out there are just thinking like you know i don't really know what's going on in

4013
06:44:35,721 --> 06:44:42,600
zcash or ethereum but i'd like the option to just copy and paste all their code or i don't know how

4014
06:44:42,600 --> 06:44:48,681
many people out there in bitcoin cash thinking like oh man we made a huge mistake we should just

4015
06:44:48,681 --> 06:44:53,961
settle we should go back to btc if we can if we can get anything that is even remotely similar to

4016
06:44:53,961 --> 06:44:59,640
what we wanted and we can just get a way out we'll have our we'll have our own drivechain and we'll

4017
06:44:59,640 --> 06:45:10,200
have our own devs but we won't have to suffer as being a minority altcoin at ranked 46 or something

4018
06:45:10,200 --> 06:45:16,200
so i wonder how many people are in this silent this middle middle ground between these two

4019
06:45:16,200 --> 06:45:22,760
extremes you know these people who say well i don't want to use this i prefer my altcoin to just

4020
06:45:22,760 --> 06:45:29,241
do really well and the people who say we don't want you know bitcoin core to change at all in

4021
06:45:29,241 --> 06:45:35,480
any way even though bitcoin still has yet to you know if bitcoin obviously i would never i would

4022
06:45:35,480 --> 06:45:41,320
drop this issue completely if bitcoin like had taken over the entire planet earth but we haven't

4023
06:45:41,320 --> 06:45:48,681
done that yet so surfer jim has raised his hand and now hector is here so i'll just serve yeah

4024
06:45:49,640 --> 06:45:56,440
so i've always been of the opinion that um every altcoin out there is just slowing the adoption of

4025
06:45:57,081 --> 06:46:02,121
uh the worldwide adoption of global sound money like andrews always puts it on toxic happy hour

4026
06:46:02,121 --> 06:46:07,640
essentially you just made my point for me um we wouldn't need this stuff if the world was

4027
06:46:07,640 --> 06:46:14,521
on a bitcoin standard and everything that slows that down including the drive train that allows

4028
06:46:14,521 --> 06:46:19,801
shit coins to maintain their life and somehow stay pegged to bitcoin and let them not feel so bad

4029
06:46:20,440 --> 06:46:24,360
i don't know they should just come back to bitcoin directly uh you know maybe

4030
06:46:24,681 --> 06:46:27,801
that's what i'm suggesting that they're doing though because you understand that what i'm

4031
06:46:27,801 --> 06:46:35,401
suggesting that they do is copy and paste their software their the software but not the coin

4032
06:46:36,200 --> 06:46:41,081
so it's this is pro hard money because i'm saying the L1 part isn't changing at all

4033
06:46:42,040 --> 06:46:48,040
and yet you have like a pressure release valve for people to instead of defecting to the altcoin

4034
06:46:48,040 --> 06:46:53,721
they now get what they want it's still the same 21 million bit coins but it's the z cash software

4035
06:46:53,721 --> 06:46:58,521
so i think sometimes i don't know why but uh because this is wait how does excuse me how does

4036
06:46:58,521 --> 06:47:05,721
the bitcoin network benefit from some altcoin having their software tied to bitcoin and again

4037
06:47:05,721 --> 06:47:12,841
for my lack of technical knowledge i don't quite understand why how that benefits them or bitcoin

4038
06:47:12,841 --> 06:47:19,961
and why you know why can't they just abandon like the theory being not my theory what i've heard

4039
06:47:19,961 --> 06:47:26,921
that people will move to the hardest money the one only one will win and so i agree we need their

4040
06:47:26,921 --> 06:47:31,161
software is it because certain features in their software are not in bitcoin and then

4041
06:47:31,721 --> 06:47:37,320
the bitcoin network gets those features now without disrupting the layer one all right i

4042
06:47:37,320 --> 06:47:43,800
need to look into what that's a that's a a nice thought it sounds like most of the technical

4043
06:47:43,800 --> 06:47:49,161
community in bitcoin doesn't agree with either the idea of doing it but that it's it doesn't

4044
06:47:49,161 --> 06:47:53,721
sound like a bad idea to me but it's probably more the idea of how it gets implemented and

4045
06:47:53,721 --> 06:47:59,640
it sounds like with shinobi he thinks of it as an additional cost to certain people uh restricting

4046
06:47:59,640 --> 06:48:05,560
people from being allowed to participate in the network because of that and so even if it doesn't

4047
06:48:05,560 --> 06:48:10,521
have a direct effect although i've also heard that it requires some kind of a fork i think you

4048
06:48:11,081 --> 06:48:16,200
mentioned that a soft fork doesn't need yeah i mean you don't have to follow it right you don't

4049
06:48:16,200 --> 06:48:21,800
have to upgrade to it i get it so so um but it's still a code change at the base layer if i'm not

4050
06:48:21,800 --> 06:48:27,721
mistaken correct me if i'm wrong 300 is a small code change for to support BIP300 which is just

4051
06:48:27,721 --> 06:48:34,281
this counter so that's the pull request and the bit are about but it does not you do not actually

4052
06:48:34,281 --> 06:48:41,721
run the software on bitcoin layer one okay so you run a different piece of so attaching it like an

4053
06:48:41,721 --> 06:48:49,880
altcoin but there's no coin there so you run it's like as if you ran zcash the the privacy altcoin

4054
06:48:49,880 --> 06:48:55,961
but there's no there's no zec or whatever there and you you take a bitcoin from your wallet and

4055
06:48:55,961 --> 06:49:02,361
L1 and you send it there and it shows up over there it's like an atm you convert it and over

4056
06:49:02,361 --> 06:49:06,921
there now you have a z address you have zcash privacy and zk-snark you get whatever you want

4057
06:49:06,921 --> 06:49:13,640
and then you withdraw it and it comes back so the idea is really to have total freedom in which

4058
06:49:13,640 --> 06:49:19,320
piece of software you use with your own bitcoin you don't you're not don't have to only use

4059
06:49:19,320 --> 06:49:27,880
bitcoin core you could go to a sidechain that has 119 active in them already okay so

4060
06:49:29,320 --> 06:49:35,240
that that explains a lot to me that helps me understand this entire idea quite a bit because

4061
06:49:35,880 --> 06:49:41,000
i haven't heard it put that way and i definitely appreciate that but then my immediate thought

4062
06:49:41,000 --> 06:49:46,281
not knowing how code works and where the risks are is that my bitcoin is now at risk of course

4063
06:49:46,281 --> 06:49:51,640
i know that your position is that it's not i can't imagine why it wouldn't be that and and i don't

4064
06:49:51,640 --> 06:49:55,880
know and i don't need you to explain it to me now as a matter of fact i really can't keep

4065
06:49:55,880 --> 06:50:01,560
standing i can't believe you're doing this for probably now seven hours um i i you know i just

4066
06:50:01,560 --> 06:50:07,800
worry like so i i'm not if i can see the nuts and bolts and i can see how my bitcoin would never be

4067
06:50:07,800 --> 06:50:12,760
at risk and that there's some value in having this software and then what would the cost of that be

4068
06:50:12,760 --> 06:50:17,560
me to add it to my node or whatever else again some of these things you know we brought up that

4069
06:50:17,560 --> 06:50:23,320
i don't fully understand if i could see all that then i can make a judgment as to whether i think

4070
06:50:23,320 --> 06:50:27,800
i would care uh whether i think it's a good idea whether i think it's a horrible idea i think

4071
06:50:27,800 --> 06:50:34,521
there's essentially those three possible positions um and some people seem vehemently against it and

4072
06:50:34,521 --> 06:50:39,481
other people seem just like you know no we don't need it like i think beauty on did make a statement

4073
06:50:39,481 --> 06:50:44,841
like simply it's not needed why are you going to change the money why why do we need this and so i

4074
06:50:44,841 --> 06:50:48,440
hear what you're saying why we need it i would have to do more work on it i appreciate everything

4075
06:50:48,440 --> 06:50:52,440
you've done you helped me learn a lot so some of these other smart people that have been here

4076
06:50:52,440 --> 06:50:56,680
so thank you for everything and i can't believe you're still doing this it's like almost seven

4077
06:50:56,680 --> 06:51:03,640
hours you're crazy yeah thanks um before we go to hector i did want to mention something that i

4078
06:51:03,640 --> 06:51:10,680
think was i think i learned over the last two weeks which is i actually think it's the explanation is

4079
06:51:10,680 --> 06:51:18,440
actually flipped upside down where people have already published their book or they've already

4080
06:51:18,440 --> 06:51:23,401
published their thing that says bitcoin doesn't need anything bitcoin doesn't need to change

4081
06:51:23,401 --> 06:51:30,440
bitcoin is whatever and i weirdly think that that is the only reason that they are against this

4082
06:51:30,440 --> 06:51:35,320
proposal is because it would prove that they were mistaken when they wrote that into their book

4083
06:51:35,320 --> 06:51:40,601
and i think that that's literally but of course there's also various technical things but

4084
06:51:40,601 --> 06:51:44,680
but i actually think you know like shinobi and some of these other people have been against

4085
06:51:45,240 --> 06:51:50,680
this idea for a long time they've just been like you know to me there were just some internet random

4086
06:51:50,680 --> 06:51:56,521
person and i had this blog post from 2015 that i would like talk about sometimes and get invited

4087
06:51:56,521 --> 06:52:02,041
to speak at bitcoin conferences about from time to time and it just seems like there are just

4088
06:52:02,041 --> 06:52:09,081
some random guys against it and then uh now it kind of actually looks like that uh you know if

4089
06:52:09,081 --> 06:52:13,880
the idea ends up being a big success they'll be really embarrassed so i actually think the

4090
06:52:13,880 --> 06:52:20,521
embarrassment of people who have pre-committed to the idea that bitcoin does not need z cash level

4091
06:52:20,521 --> 06:52:27,081
privacy or that they just they want to sell this idea that ethereum could never be a threat even if

4092
06:52:27,081 --> 06:52:33,240
it flippens bitcoin and then the market cap is 100 times bitcoins and it has 700 times as many users

4093
06:52:33,240 --> 06:52:37,320
then that's some people actually say stuff like that they say i welcome the flippening or whatever

4094
06:52:37,320 --> 06:52:43,401
it's kind of they say well ethereum is just an illegitimate blockchain or it's like a silicon

4095
06:52:43,401 --> 06:52:49,000
valley startup and they can't be compared and i think it's honestly that the explanation is kind

4096
06:52:49,000 --> 06:52:53,640
of flipped around where people have said they already told someone else in an unrelated context

4097
06:52:54,601 --> 06:53:00,041
bitcoin doesn't need anything bitcoin is already perfect and now my idea comes along and says

4098
06:53:00,041 --> 06:53:06,041
actually bitcoin can go from what it's doing now to doing 10 million more things with really no

4099
06:53:06,041 --> 06:53:12,281
risk to the people who don't want to do the new things uh it's kind of as if we had like a

4100
06:53:13,240 --> 06:53:17,800
a broadcast state where it's like we're in television in the 19 1955 and there's only one

4101
06:53:17,800 --> 06:53:22,440
television station and everyone's talking about people are saying this is the greatest station

4102
06:53:22,440 --> 06:53:26,760
there is and then i'm turning it into like youtube where there's lots of competition

4103
06:53:27,961 --> 06:53:31,961
some people don't want they don't want to know how bad the show is we're going to do

4104
06:53:33,401 --> 06:53:39,481
hey i would just say that i don't i don't think you can as a percentage of everybody that's against

4105
06:53:39,481 --> 06:53:43,961
it i would have to say that's a small percent um that have stuck their neck out vehemently

4106
06:53:43,961 --> 06:53:49,320
against it wrote about it whatever i just can't imagine that's big i could be wrong um

4107
06:53:50,521 --> 06:53:57,961
the uh there are other proposed changes to bitcoin that some of these same people that are against

4108
06:53:57,961 --> 06:54:03,721
drivechains would potentially be in favor of like ctv or some of these other things that i've

4109
06:54:03,721 --> 06:54:10,041
learned about minimally again don't know enough technically um sound sound good but i i don't

4110
06:54:10,041 --> 06:54:19,721
know all the risks um so i don't i would say about that but i think you're 100 correct about

4111
06:54:19,721 --> 06:54:28,200
that but those are relatively small changes in this context you are actually escaping bitcoin core

4112
06:54:28,200 --> 06:54:33,320
and going to a different piece of software and in fact the idea the idea of the the youtube

4113
06:54:34,120 --> 06:54:38,361
versus just having one channel one television channel on broadcast television

4114
06:54:39,961 --> 06:54:48,921
is sort of closer because the idea actually is would that different software development teams

4115
06:54:48,921 --> 06:54:54,041
would actually compete and that they would they would hate each other and once the success of one

4116
06:54:54,041 --> 06:54:59,000
would be the failure of another and they would have to they would be grinding out software

4117
06:54:59,560 --> 06:55:03,961
quickly and there would be some software that doesn't change very much layer one would change

4118
06:55:03,961 --> 06:55:10,041
almost not at all and uh but other there would be like liberal and conservative versions of each

4119
06:55:10,041 --> 06:55:20,120
software maybe so the vision is kind of like it's much more subversive than just i think part of it

4120
06:55:20,120 --> 06:55:23,640
but i think you're right though to point that out you are right about that that there's like there's

4121
06:55:23,640 --> 06:55:29,240
other changes although i think that 119 is a good example of a change that didn't like go through

4122
06:55:29,240 --> 06:55:34,281
the proper channels like they didn't go to the the director of the broadcast television station

4123
06:55:34,281 --> 06:55:41,481
or whatever so they were canceled and so but yeah i think that's uh it's a very fair thing to say

4124
06:55:42,361 --> 06:55:48,520
um but i think that it was kind of like one person was saying this team naturally produces the best

4125
06:55:48,520 --> 06:55:54,440
shows or i'm saying we can always get it we can just get a completely new team at any time and i

4126
06:55:54,440 --> 06:56:00,520
think that is will that levels up the subversiveness a little but i think yeah you're right about that

4127
06:56:00,520 --> 06:56:07,001
that maybe that's only a small percent should we go to hector hector is here and he's going to tell

4128
06:56:07,001 --> 06:56:16,520
us about why he would prefer to be on bitcoin cash or bitcoin sv or wherever everywhere

4129
06:56:17,081 --> 06:56:24,601
so um as i understand it your entire premise as to why you're creating this thing is because

4130
06:56:25,320 --> 06:56:32,280
there is a limitation on the main chain right there's a 600 600 650 000 limitation i wouldn't

4131
06:56:32,280 --> 06:56:35,961
describe it like that i would say different people want different things no no but i'm saying but the

4132
06:56:35,961 --> 06:56:40,040
reason you're you are proposing what you're proposing is because that limit exists and

4133
06:56:40,040 --> 06:56:46,121
therefore you think that you want to appeal to more people because you can only appeal to up to

4134
06:56:46,121 --> 06:56:53,641
600 650 000 per day if you don't do something about it in the scaling direction you are right

4135
06:56:53,641 --> 06:57:00,520
that only we can only use the block space of L1 whereas drivechain does allow us to

4136
06:57:02,841 --> 06:57:08,200
and you do that because you believe that right that's part of your belief and you you do that

4137
06:57:08,200 --> 06:57:14,520
because you think that there is a security issue in terms of many more people using

4138
06:57:15,400 --> 06:57:21,481
bitcoin on the L2 drivechain not on L1 is that what you're referring to so you cut out for a

4139
06:57:21,481 --> 06:57:27,081
second i don't know if that was for me or for everyone i was saying while this is the case that

4140
06:57:27,081 --> 06:57:35,001
right now we only have the block space on L1 to use to onboard people to bitcoin and move them

4141
06:57:35,001 --> 06:57:40,841
from there to lightning network or whatever with drivechain it's possible that someone will send

4142
06:57:40,841 --> 06:57:47,001
coin to make a big deposit and then onboard people on L2 and if those people are onboarded

4143
06:57:47,001 --> 06:57:55,481
on L2 and they stay on L2 their whole lives then we have more people quote using bitcoin unquote

4144
06:57:56,601 --> 06:58:01,721
right on there too but they're not on that one there there in lies your whole theory right so

4145
06:58:01,721 --> 06:58:07,641
like you are agreeing with me that you can only serve 600 650 000 people per day on L1 and your

4146
06:58:07,641 --> 06:58:12,280
solution to onboard millions of people or the entire rest of the world or the seven point

4147
06:58:13,081 --> 06:58:19,160
basically almost eight billion people the rest of the world onto bitcoin is through a solution

4148
06:58:19,160 --> 06:58:26,121
such as drivechain because the current way won't allow it technically and you fear that since it

4149
06:58:26,121 --> 06:58:31,160
can't do it the miners will starve and the incentives to mine bitcoin will go down and

4150
06:58:31,160 --> 06:58:35,721
therefore that will become at risk right

4151
06:58:35,415 --> 06:59:05,415
um well i think this scaling future of bitcoin is uncertain but i do think that this is a good way because i think some people clearly prefer the large block they don't mind running the large block thing and i think we should just take those people at their word and then we've scaled those people so then why are you appealing to the people who want to serve the vast minority the 90 the 0.1 of the population instead of serving the 99.9 of the population in the fact that you're advocating for a trustless money

4152
06:59:05,415 --> 06:59:10,214
where everyone should be on L1 rather than what you're rather than the suggestion is these should

4153
06:59:10,214 --> 06:59:16,214
be L2 and if it's okay if they're L2 their whole lives that only furthers the fact that your whole

4154
06:59:16,214 --> 06:59:22,935
the whole purpose and reason why the 600 650 000 limitation exists is to have a copy but 99 of the

4155
06:59:22,935 --> 06:59:28,135
population like we're agreeing to won't ever be able to run be on L1 so what is the purpose of

4156
06:59:28,135 --> 06:59:33,735
having a copy only the riches of the rich will have a copy and they'll be the ones the 0.1

4157
06:59:33,735 --> 06:59:38,054
transacting on L1 because it would be too expensive and everyone else will be on a drive

4158
06:59:38,054 --> 06:59:45,175
chain future so then what is the point of bitcoin when you're just advocating for a non a non bitcoin

4159
06:59:45,175 --> 06:59:53,254
solution i didn't totally understand that part about the 0.01 being the only ones who are on L1

4160
06:59:53,254 --> 07:00:00,054
because of the fee rates on L1 is that what you were saying right we agree that 600 000 people

4161
07:00:00,054 --> 07:00:07,654
at most right can be served per day therefore we we entrance drivechain to allow the rest of the

4162
07:00:07,654 --> 07:00:12,614
world to come in and it's okay if they end up their whole lives like you said on L2s because

4163
07:00:12,614 --> 07:00:17,095
that's their way of getting exposure to bitcoin or using bitcoin right but you're saying that

4164
07:00:18,934 --> 07:00:24,535
and that that whole idea is that the majority of the world can only use drivechain because

4165
07:00:24,535 --> 07:00:29,495
they can't ever be part of that 600 000 because at 600 000 hey let's not get ahead of ourselves

4166
07:00:29,495 --> 07:00:34,855
right now it's right now it's only seven it's 93 percent saying that they're not even going to be

4167
07:00:34,855 --> 07:00:40,374
able to use anything because we don't have this drivechain idea we don't even have this idea yet

4168
07:00:40,374 --> 07:00:47,174
but anyway uh so i agree with you i'm saying your solution is is only a solution that allows the

4169
07:00:47,174 --> 07:00:53,814
whole world to jump on but it's based on the on the actual underpinning of everyone should run a

4170
07:00:53,814 --> 07:00:57,575
copy like you just said you gave reasons as to you even said you wrote at length as to why people

4171
07:00:57,575 --> 07:01:01,254
should have a copy of this blockchain but yet you're advocating for the exact opposite because

4172
07:01:01,254 --> 07:01:05,334
you know the majority won't ever be able to use the chain that you're advocating to have a copy for

4173
07:01:07,094 --> 07:01:13,415
most okay everyone who's using L2 needs an L1 full node that's part of the design so

4174
07:01:14,935 --> 07:01:20,215
but that doesn't matter because the L1 node is much smaller so they might have a copy of

4175
07:01:20,215 --> 07:01:26,694
something you can never use you when you say never use you mean the you just said you just

4176
07:01:26,694 --> 07:01:32,375
no yeah yeah you just said that people but the L1 is the smaller thing it's like uh you know the L1

4177
07:01:32,375 --> 07:01:37,735
is the bootloader it's like it was like why have electricity if you don't have an operating system

4178
07:01:37,735 --> 07:01:43,254
or something it's like the L1 is the lowest what is worse having a few economically incentivized

4179
07:01:43,254 --> 07:01:48,534
parties that may not like each other but have economic incentive to be truthful and have them

4180
07:01:48,534 --> 07:01:53,254
hold the ledger rather than just the elites hold the ledger because you're too poor to hold the

4181
07:01:53,254 --> 07:01:58,054
ledger because it's not irrelevant to your life like i think i think the arguments there aren't

4182
07:01:58,054 --> 07:02:04,375
very really really like clear like it seems that you guys for some reason think and i think that's

4183
07:02:04,375 --> 07:02:10,855
true that should be the challenge as to why that that idea of having a copy when the future is

4184
07:02:10,855 --> 07:02:15,254
telling you and you're advocating for that exact future that the majority and you're conceding to

4185
07:02:15,254 --> 07:02:20,694
the fact that the majority won't ever be able to use L1 or shouldn't use L1 so what is again like

4186
07:02:20,694 --> 07:02:27,495
your premise on everything is kind of like on on sand well you because the way it's designed

4187
07:02:27,495 --> 07:02:35,334
is that L2 every L2 node needs L1 node so the that part of the design is just because it doesn't

4188
07:02:35,334 --> 07:02:41,415
really make sense to put a small block L2 on top of a large block L1 but the reverse makes perfect

4189
07:02:41,415 --> 07:02:46,454
sense so you know what i mean you wanted a gradual escalation of commitment you know what i mean like

4190
07:02:46,454 --> 07:02:51,735
you don't say i love you on the first date so you first you get the L1 node then you get the

4191
07:02:51,735 --> 07:03:00,855
L2 node which costs more and um that is logical conclusion paul just take it to the end take it

4192
07:03:00,855 --> 07:03:06,455
to like the time that we're just dating and doing nothing it's irrelevant we're gonna get married

4193
07:03:06,455 --> 07:03:10,374
so when we get married we're going to understand this is what's actually going to happen who cares

4194
07:03:10,374 --> 07:03:14,615
what happens when we're dating what we care about is having a successful marriage and to you a

4195
07:03:14,615 --> 07:03:20,934
successful marriage is not using bitcoin it's using a using a layer on top why don't you think

4196
07:03:20,934 --> 07:03:24,455
that so we got into this before let me first let me finish what i was talking about which is to say

4197
07:03:24,455 --> 07:03:29,575
that you need the node first in order to even receive money so you have no money you get your

4198
07:03:29,575 --> 07:03:34,855
node now you receive money only then can you spend it and pay the transaction fee so it's kind of

4199
07:03:34,855 --> 07:03:40,295
just like an order of operations thing but why is it that you say that the L2 blockchain isn't real

4200
07:03:40,295 --> 07:03:43,974
this is what i was telling these people about maybe you overheard me and maybe you're in the

4201
07:03:43,974 --> 07:03:48,214
audience that i didn't notice i was telling them oh this guy hector is an interesting character

4202
07:03:48,214 --> 07:03:55,654
and he he thinks the L2 is something bad but really the L2 is just very very similar to what

4203
07:03:56,295 --> 07:04:02,295
he's already getting i mean do you run you run like uh electron sv or electron cash or something

4204
07:04:02,295 --> 07:04:08,774
right you don't run the full node correct right i know so it's kind of like what difference does

4205
07:04:08,774 --> 07:04:16,774
it make if you're on the drivechain or on L1 is my question to you so my question to you is the

4206
07:04:16,774 --> 07:04:23,094
exact same thing right like if the majority are on L1 why why does it matter to you if they are on L1

4207
07:04:23,094 --> 07:04:30,855
why don't you just let them be on L1 too because not every because it's a simple fact that some

4208
07:04:30,855 --> 07:04:36,534
people want the block size high up some people some people who are a very vast minority of this

4209
07:04:36,534 --> 07:04:41,175
world right and you're trying to create global money but the vast minority of this world

4210
07:04:41,175 --> 07:04:45,415
is somehow dictating what the world should do and i don't understand why that's the case

4211
07:04:46,934 --> 07:04:51,814
well if that were the case then i would agree with you but the reason is that you can always

4212
07:04:51,814 --> 07:04:56,934
increase you know it's it let's say one some people wanted eight megabyte block size other

4213
07:04:56,934 --> 07:05:02,374
people wanted to stay at one that was the original scaling or bubble or whatever so

4214
07:05:02,934 --> 07:05:09,654
it happens to the fact that you can you can say one plus seven equals eight and you can say okay

4215
07:05:09,654 --> 07:05:14,855
one is mandatory for everyone that's the small block L1 and then the seven is optional and then

4216
07:05:14,855 --> 07:05:18,694
that adds up to the desired amount and then people add you know it's like there's an optional

4217
07:05:18,694 --> 07:05:23,575
increase in costs for the end user opts into the full node cost but you don't want to be

4218
07:05:24,774 --> 07:05:29,895
you don't want to it doesn't make sense to opt to pay seven and then say oh i have an optional one

4219
07:05:29,895 --> 07:05:35,814
and you know it's just it's unreasonable like i understand i understand your goal

4220
07:05:37,254 --> 07:05:41,094
is to create more more ability for bitcoin and allow more people to use it like

4221
07:05:41,094 --> 07:05:43,814
if otherwise if your solution or a solution like

4222
07:05:45,814 --> 07:05:49,575
then you can't you nothing is going to happen like this is going to be the elite of the elite

4223
07:05:49,575 --> 07:05:55,335
of the elite using this because the majority will always be or it will be basically beat in price

4224
07:05:55,335 --> 07:05:59,895
so you're if you don't have a solution like drivechain there is no there is no future

4225
07:05:59,895 --> 07:06:05,654
of global money for bitcoin because it just technically can't do it so i i advocate the

4226
07:06:05,654 --> 07:06:10,374
opposite of like why the ideology is flawed you advocate you okay you're okay with the ideology

4227
07:06:10,374 --> 07:06:13,895
you're accepting the ideology today therefore you're trying to build within the parameters

4228
07:06:13,895 --> 07:06:17,814
of the ideology and i understand that and i commend that but i think that that's where

4229
07:06:17,814 --> 07:06:21,895
that's where it kind of falls like you must we must question the ideology before trying to build

4230
07:06:21,895 --> 07:06:27,494
something for the ideology all right i'm just trying to take people if someone says they want

4231
07:06:27,494 --> 07:06:36,855
something i just say okay i i take them at their work which is if the world wants global money

4232
07:06:36,855 --> 07:06:42,534
you can only you're only adhering to the 600,000 to want to have layer one solidified just for

4233
07:06:42,534 --> 07:06:46,774
them i tell you i agree with you on that and you may have seen if you watched all my tweets

4234
07:06:46,855 --> 07:06:55,895
carefully over the last week or so i don't i do i think inappropriately in my head i weigh

4235
07:06:55,895 --> 07:07:03,814
like we have like 50,000 80,000 full nodes of bitcoin i say that's how that's the size of the

4236
07:07:03,814 --> 07:07:12,695
bitcoin network and we do have half a trillion dollars but yeah in my head i'm thinking how do

4237
07:07:12,695 --> 07:07:17,735
we get eight billion nodes which which will make 50,000 look like a speck of dust that is

4238
07:07:17,735 --> 07:07:23,255
meaningless and i think how can we get we're really we should be getting we should be at you know 200

4239
07:07:23,255 --> 07:07:31,334
trillion or something so we're we're we're like 4 000 times or whatever hey paul can i uh can i

4240
07:07:31,334 --> 07:07:39,175
just come in uh and and just suggest you know you've been fighting people who are already pro

4241
07:07:39,175 --> 07:07:44,855
bitcoin right and we're talking we're talking to people who are quote-unquote btc maximalist

4242
07:07:45,574 --> 07:07:52,214
bitcoin you know true you know and and uh you know it's been going on what six seven hours i

4243
07:07:52,214 --> 07:07:57,175
think uh you know trying to fight multiple wars at the same time is is exhausting yeah but it's

4244
07:07:57,175 --> 07:08:04,454
the same it's the same world i was going to suggest for your own health maybe maybe you

4245
07:08:04,454 --> 07:08:10,774
think about a ending time yeah we should we can end this very soon we'll end it we'll end it uh

4246
07:08:10,774 --> 07:08:14,534
we'll end like right after this i guess if any people didn't come up by now they really don't

4247
07:08:14,534 --> 07:08:19,974
want to come up and talk so we'll end after this but it's important that i mentioned it's the same

4248
07:08:19,974 --> 07:08:27,094
war because to me it's a situation where you have two people who both want to use bitcoin but they

4249
07:08:27,094 --> 07:08:32,695
disagree and one says i want large blocks one say i wanted small blocks well in my head i understand

4250
07:08:32,695 --> 07:08:38,774
why one has to be L1 and the other has to be L2 but i actually it's kind of like it's actually

4251
07:08:38,774 --> 07:08:43,014
it's the same it's the same war so all these people who are like oh why do you need to change

4252
07:08:43,014 --> 07:08:46,615
bitcoin or whatever they actually think it's great that someone comes in here and says

4253
07:08:48,214 --> 07:08:53,495
like you know L1 small block ism is dead and we need something we need like a complete rethinking

4254
07:08:53,495 --> 07:08:58,695
of everything because then you get this is what we just heard moments ago was like oh nobody wants

4255
07:08:58,695 --> 07:09:03,014
this nobody needs this everyone's happy here in bitcoin core everyone loves everything that we do

4256
07:09:03,014 --> 07:09:08,375
and it's all perfect here and it's just weird paul is such a weird guy why is he doing this

4257
07:09:09,815 --> 07:09:17,894
so yeah i think all the altcoiners the fact that you know like the all the altcoiners the

4258
07:09:17,894 --> 07:09:24,935
existence of altcoins to some extent obviously not to a complete extent but the existence of

4259
07:09:24,935 --> 07:09:33,175
altcoins to some extent that all those are the people who want this they wanted they wanted this

4260
07:09:33,175 --> 07:09:38,855
instead many there's many cases vitalik was for bitcoin magazine roger veer tons of people

4261
07:09:39,654 --> 07:09:43,574
including myself was my prediction markets project that i never launched as an altcoin but

4262
07:09:44,454 --> 07:09:50,454
probably if i could do it over i probably would but the there's all kinds of people who wanted

4263
07:09:50,454 --> 07:09:57,415
to do something cool with bitcoin that they were forced into doing altcoin ism so anyway i'd be

4264
07:09:57,415 --> 07:10:02,375
austin has come up to whenever your final word austin before i well i was just gonna suggest that

4265
07:10:02,375 --> 07:10:11,735
maybe you could um go 24 hours as you know you are yeah that would be pretty neat but uh yeah

4266
07:10:11,735 --> 07:10:17,495
we probably shouldn't do it on a friday if we're gonna do that i think we should end it in fact

4267
07:10:18,454 --> 07:10:25,815
well it's uh much appreciated your efforts paul and uh all these months and months and months and

4268
07:10:25,815 --> 07:10:31,415
we were having spaces with three people and now uh there's 300 something here earlier i think

4269
07:10:31,415 --> 07:10:41,175
even 400 so it's a good growth okay cool well yeah happy to have everyone here so come back next week

4270
07:10:41,574 --> 07:10:47,735
although next week will be TABConf so we probably won't be able to do it that week but

4271
07:10:47,735 --> 07:10:54,454
hey TABConf i'm doing this debate with peter todd about drivechain on thursday so it's probably not

4272
07:10:54,454 --> 07:11:02,774
too late to get your tickets in atlanta um so yeah i think we let's end the space though thanks