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It's Block Time and this is Michael Tidwell.

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This is Paul Sztorc.

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We're going to do a deep dive with Drivechains and do some frequently asked
questions.

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I've compiled about 30 or so questions for us.

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We're excited to answer them because Drivechains, there's not a lot of people that
really know the technicals of it, just the concepts.

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They're new and haven't really been fully vetted in the public eye yet, I don't
know.

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We're going to get a little technical on the concepts and answer some questions, but
just as a little bit of a background,

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Drivechains is a technology that can implement sidechains that will essentially give
more functionality to Bitcoin.

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So if you see a cool project that you think is cool, maybe you think ring signatures
with Monero or some kind of smart contracts with Ethereum,

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then you can essentially make this part of the Bitcoin ecosystem, make it a
sidechain on Bitcoin.

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So you don't have to leave Bitcoin in order to utilize all this cool blockchain
technology.

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Paul, how's that for a quick summary?

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That was pretty good.

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Okay, so just a little bit of background.

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Paul briefed me.

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We had a pretty good briefing before this, so he taught me a lot.

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But Drivechains will need a couple chips into the main chain, and then for each
additional Drivechain, we'll need a soft fork.

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Is that right, Paul?

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Okay, perfect.

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I feel like you taught me well.

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So I think the style that we're going to go is a little weird.

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I think we're going to do some question and answers, and then we have a whiteboard
right here where we can maybe explain things in more detail.

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There's a lot I don't know about Drivechains, so I'm going to default to you, Paul.

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But I don't know one of these questions or the answers to one of these questions, so
let's get going.

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The first question that we have, and let's see.

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I don't know if you can hear that.

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Nope, I didn't hear.

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Am I supposed to be hearing things?

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I can't hear anything.

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Oh, my chair is not going to work.

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We'll just go all natural.

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From Sean, a.k.a. King David.

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I don't know if you know who that is.

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Ask Paul.

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We'll call this the Ask Paul section.

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Okay.

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But all these are Ask Pauls.

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I'm going to butt in to try to answer one or two.

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Ask Paul, are Drivechains just a type implementation of sidechains?

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What's the clarification there?

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So, if I can take a stab at this, I would just say I kind of went over this a little
bit earlier.

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It's just a technology that can implement sidechains, and sidechains is more of an
abstract idea where there's multiple ways to implement one.

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What would you say about that, Paul?

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Yeah, I think that's correct.

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Blockstream, or not really Blockstream really, but a bunch of people, some of which
who later helped co-found Blockstream,

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wrote a paper in October 2014 enabling Bitcoin innovation with paid sidechains that
you can find easily online.

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And there, that was kind of like a supermarket, whereas Drivechain is more like a
recipe.

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So, Drivechains do exactly this, but the original paper from October 2014 that
popularized the term,

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that was kind of just a big set of things you might do.

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You might do this, you might do that, but not any real advice about what to do
specifically.

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He had a follow-up question, which was, what would it take or cost putting an
existing cryptocurrency onto a Drivechain?

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So, I'm guessing what he means is taking an existing UTXO set and making it a
Drivechain, which I'm not sure is possible.

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Have you thought about that?

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No, I think you're right that that's some of what he's saying.

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But I think what he's really saying is how, if I wanted to make the Monero
sidechain,

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how difficult would it be to take Monero, the altcoin, and transform it into Monero,
the Drivechain?

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Okay, and how hard would that be?

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Would it be as easy as copying the code?

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We have right now a blank version.

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So, we have two forks of the code base of Bitcoin on GitHub,

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and one is the modifications required to make Drivechain work with Bitcoin Core,

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and the other instance on GitHub is basically a blank Drivechain itself.

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In that sense, we already have that, so it wouldn't cost anything to create.

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But if you wanted to create Monero, you'd have to basically merge the two in some
way,

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where you'd have to say, well, here's the Monero zone, and here is the blank side.

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You'd have to insert the Monero code into our blank sidechain, is what you'd have to
do.

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And it would get even more complicated for things like, remember when it was written
in Rust, and it's really weird.

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So, that would be more difficult, unfortunately.

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So, in other words, you'd probably have to rewrite a lot of it,

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but using the same kind of functionality and concepts, would you rewrite it in C++?

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Well, it depends.

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What you might do for MimboWimbo or something is you could rewrite the stuff that we
have in our blank Drivechain.

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You could rewrite that in Rust, in MimboWimbo, and then make that sidechain that
way.

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But I think it would require a lot of, I would probably, I would say that it would
probably require a good six months or more of work.

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I don't want to understate that that is like a weird thing, but the point is that
now there is actually a path.

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Before, there was no clear pathway for an altcoin to like either be successful or
not compete with Bitcoin.

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So, there's a kind of confusing, what's the fate of the altcoin going to be?

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But now there is at least a path that says eventually it will either fail because
it's a bad idea, or it will succeed and become a sidechain of Bitcoin.

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So, from an investing point of view, it doesn't actually matter because six months
is a long time.

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Six months is a long time.

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You only invest on information about things, not the things themselves.

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So, it has the same practical effect.

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But it would take, it could take a very minimal amount of effort or it could take a
really, like MimboWimbo, I don't know what it would take.

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It would take a lot.

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All right, the next question is, well actually about Monero.

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So, is Monero possible to get onto a sidechain or a Drivechain?

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Yes, everything is.

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How do you lose anonymity when you go back and forth to Bitcoin?

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Well, it depends on you.

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The going back and forth is public to both chains.

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Everything that happens on the Bitcoin blockchain is, on both blockchains is public.

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But, you know what I mean?

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So, it's not really.

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Yeah, any reinsurance stuff you did gets denominized if you go to a Bitcoin address
and then you get pegged to that Bitcoin address.

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Well, you wouldn't get pegged to, it depends, it kind of really depends on what you
actually, what everyone means by that.

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Because everything that happens on both blockchains is public.

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But the, and when you go back, you will be leaving the ring signature zone and
you'll be going back to it.

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Presumably, you can kind of go back however you like, but presumably you'd be going
back to like a one address per person situation.

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And then when you go back, you would be regressing to the Bitcoin level of privacy.

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But if you already shuffled enough, it would be pretty private when you came back
still.

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Interesting.

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So, would that somehow de-anonymize someone else when you leave Monero going to
Bitcoin?

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I don't think so.

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I think it's a strict increase.

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The very worst thing that could possibly happen would be that A and B have lost
privacy on mainchain Bitcoin.

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And then A and B both go to Monero and then they use a weird mixing thing and they
both become private.

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So, there's now question mark one and question mark two.

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And then they come back to Bitcoin.

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And so, now there's question mark one and there's address one and address two.

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And someone would know that that is some mixture of A and B there.

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And so, that you kind of, you can't like lose any more privacy than you gained in
Monero.

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So, the worst case is that nothing happened here.

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But you can go to Monero and just stay over there.

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But it would be, instead of being XMR, instead of being Monero as McAfee was
stating,

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instead of, you could just hang out over there and use Bitcoin rank signatures and
that could be sidechain Bitcoin over there.

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So, it's, but yeah, when you go back and forth, you are basically getting the
minimum privacy, if that makes sense.

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I mean, it depends on your definition of privacy, because if your privacy is just I
want to throw off people enough,

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then as soon as you've thrown them off, then you're home free.

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I'm not sure, I guess it's not, we can't answer with enough clarity, I think.

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Well, let's go to the next one. We got plenty to dive into it.

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So, Zcash, Zcash, zk-SNARK, that's possible on a sidechain? I would say, yeah, it is.

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Yes, everything. If it's possible on an altcoin, in general, anything that's true
for an altcoin will probably be true for a sidechain.

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So, the next question is about Dash and their masternodes, and I would say also
possible.

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Yeah, but there's no subsidy. That's important to keep in mind.

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So, you can't like reward them with anything.

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Yeah, so what would incentivize masternodes?

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What you'd have to do is you'd have to have an extra second transaction fee in the
sidechain that doesn't go to the miners,

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but eventually goes to the masternodes, which you could easily do.

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But yeah, there's no, you can't get blood from a stone, so to speak, and so you
can't.

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But that's a tribute. That doesn't matter because that's just a more honest
restatement of what already happens in Dash.

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Yeah, but real quick. Hey, Paul, can we whiteboard this? Because this is something I
don't really understand.

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So, if you have Bitcoin and you want to make a Dash Drivechain, a masternode kind of
network Drivechain, let's do that example.

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So, you have Bitcoin and let's have the Dash Drivechain. We'll call it, just call it
Dash drive.

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Okay.

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Alright, so these are chained together.

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Sure.

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And just for the viewers, the way this works, I'm going to try to explain it, Paul.

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Correct me if I'm wrong.

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You'd need a soft fork to get this Drivechain live, so everyone would need to
upgrade their code and see this as valid.

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Only people who want to use it.

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People who want to use it, yeah.

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Because it's a soft fork, it's not a hard fork.

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Yes, exactly.

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And essentially, you can almost imagine it like there's boxes here, so let's say ...

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There's like accounts.

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Let's make Dash blue, since that's their color.

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So, there can be multiple Drivechains, so Dash, let's say, is blue.

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Yes.

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So, every time you deposit Bitcoin into this box, there's some kind of rule where
I'll get some kind of equivalent Dash.

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So, let's say it's like a 1 to 10, let's just say the peg is 1 to 10, so I get 10
Dash over here.

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And essentially, I get this part, Paul.

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Yes.

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So, what I'm trying to understand is how would you then do this masternode setup if
you can't do inflation?

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Or would that also be part of the rule with the soft fork?

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Well, it depends on what you want the masternodes to do.

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But my understanding is that what they do is they perform some weird coin join
service where they collect some money and then spit it back out.

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So, is that your understanding as well?

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Because it's been a long time since I've looked into Dash.

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So, when you mine a block on Dash, a very small percentage just goes straight to the
masternodes.

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Regardless, let's say the masternodes provide no service, okay?

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For simplicity.

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Just for what I'm asking.

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Yes.

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But you have a thousand Dash or so locked up.

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You're given a little piece of the block reward for being a masternode.

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How can you do that with a system that you can't control the issuance besides people
just entering it in?

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Yes, you can do it however you like.

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But two ways that come to mind.

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One that would probably preserve the analogy the most would be some kind of
demurrage or something where you move over and you get 10 now.

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But in the next block, your 10 will go down to like 99.99.

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And then it will credit the masternodes the difference.

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Okay, so you'll slowly lose money.

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Yes.

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That's like inflation and taxation almost accomplish the same thing, right?

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That's what I was saying before. It's an inflation tax.

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Psychologically different.

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Because you have to watch your whole number, which is 10 is the most beautiful whole
number.

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And you have to watch it crumble into a weird string of nines.

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So it's very frightening to you.

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As an ape human, it's very frightening.

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But in reality, it's exactly what's happening already.

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It's the same functionality, but now I don't have 10 coins.

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The second way that comes to mind is that you could just say on that chain over
there, only some of the transaction fees go to the miners of that block.

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Because of Blind Merged Mining are also the Bitcoin miners.

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But if you just ignore that for a second, only some of the transaction fees go to
miners and the other transaction fees go to the masternodes.

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And in equilibrium, eventually Bitcoin will all be transaction fees anyway.

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So this will also end up being like the same thing basically.

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Yeah, but I mean, why can't you just make the soft fork for this Dash Drivechain
say, okay, all the total Dash, that makes the new peg and then just make it
inflationary.

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No, the soft fork only adds the box.

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It doesn't have any idea what the Dash is doing.

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Okay, so what exactly creates the peg of the 1 Bitcoin to 10 Dash that I gave in my
example?

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So what happens there is that the soft fork is this box and main chain Bitcoin.

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And you can put Bitcoin in and take Bitcoin out.

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Now, if you do a 1 to 10 peg going in, then it has to be 10 to 1 coming out.

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It has to be reversed.

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So it has no practical significance at all.

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So it's just like counting in inches instead of feet.

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Yeah, but what I'm saying is, is it possible instead of making it 10 to 1 coming
back out, now it's an inflated kind of thing.

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Now it's 11 to 1 coming out. Is that possible?

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Yes, but mathematically it's the same as just doing the demerge.

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No, no, I understand what you're saying. I'm just wondering what's possible.

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It is possible, yes.

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So I would say that you could replicate what Dash is doing to a large extent.

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Dash would have to do this weird calculation of doing 10 and keeping track of the
total.

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And then making sure that Dash would know how much was in the main chain Bitcoin
block.

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Excuse me, that made no sense.

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In the little box you have there, the account, the Dash chain will know how much
money is in there.

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So it will always be able to divide and multiply over that number.

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But all this stuff that you're talking about is just different versions of an
inflation tax or some other weird tax.

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It's all irrelevant.

211
00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:09,000
But I agree that it is more unsettling to see a 10 go down to 9, 9, 9, 9, 9 than it
is to see other things.

212
00:18:10,000 --> 00:18:16,000
But that's only because of weird quirks, parochial quirks of the human eye and
psychology.

213
00:18:17,000 --> 00:18:18,000
There's no bearing on it.

214
00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:20,000
Alright, let's keep moving.

215
00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:24,000
So the next one is asking about Steam.

216
00:18:25,000 --> 00:18:29,000
And I would say, so just a little bit of background.

217
00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:35,000
Steam does all kinds of stuff with powering up, powering down, locking up your
coins, and I'm guessing all that's possible.

218
00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:37,000
Yeah.

219
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:39,000
Because we just talked about inflation.

220
00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:41,000
You just cut the stuff out.

221
00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:45,000
A lot of these cryptocurrencies, especially Steam, is very inflationary based.

222
00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:52,000
So can you talk a little bit about inflationary based Drivechains and the
consequences of those?

223
00:18:53,000 --> 00:18:55,000
Because let's say you really want an inflationary one.

224
00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:57,000
The units of money…

225
00:18:58,000 --> 00:18:59,000
I know functionally what you're talking about doesn't make a difference.

226
00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:01,000
But I'm just saying…

227
00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:03,000
But it is ridiculous.

228
00:19:04,000 --> 00:19:08,000
I'm saying, you're saying, on a Drivechain, can we count in inches instead of feet?

229
00:19:09,000 --> 00:19:10,000
It's like on Mars.

230
00:19:11,000 --> 00:19:13,000
If we go to Mars, can we count in meters instead of feet?

231
00:19:13,000 --> 00:19:19,000
And then if we go to Venus, can we count in square kilometers instead of…

232
00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:22,000
Not everyone is so rational, man.

233
00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:24,000
Acres.

234
00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:25,000
Not everyone is so rational.

235
00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:26,000
It's like…

236
00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:27,000
I mean, because without…

237
00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:29,000
I know, but what am I supposed to say?

238
00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:31,000
Yes.

239
00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:33,000
No, but think of it like this.

240
00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:39,000
So the next one after this is, is proof of stake possible that pretty much relies on
inflation?

241
00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:47,000
I would say kind of no, because in this case, what you're doing is you're inheriting
the proof of work from the Blind Merged Mining anyway.

242
00:19:48,000 --> 00:19:49,000
So you have proof of work.

243
00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:51,000
You would put proof of stake also on top of that.

244
00:19:52,000 --> 00:20:01,000
And this question came up also with the having a block time that was faster than 10
minutes where you could do some secondary thing inside, in between the space.

245
00:20:01,000 --> 00:20:12,000
If you wanted it to be faster than 10 minutes, you could have once every four blocks
be a regular block, but then in between be proof of work, a new proof of work, or a
new proof of stake, or a new whatever.

246
00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:14,000
And you could, but I mean…

247
00:20:15,000 --> 00:20:19,000
But I think in this case, there is no proof of stake.

248
00:20:20,000 --> 00:20:24,000
I mean, it doesn't really matter, because my point of view is that proof of stake is
already totally pointless anyway.

249
00:20:24,000 --> 00:20:32,000
So this whole thing is like a weird, like it's like we divided by zero like seven
operations ago, and now you're asking me if it's a positive number or not.

250
00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:36,000
And it's like, it's been undefined for the last four paragraphs.

251
00:20:37,000 --> 00:20:41,000
So I'm not sure exactly even what, if the question has any meaning.

252
00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:44,000
But yeah, what would you do?

253
00:20:45,000 --> 00:20:47,000
I mean, what kind of, what would you, what it's like, what are these people trying
to accomplish?

254
00:20:48,000 --> 00:20:51,000
See, this is no, but you understand this, no, no, no, no, you understand this is the
real problem.

255
00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:53,000
No, all these questions have good answers.

256
00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:57,000
Some of these might not be valid questions.

257
00:20:58,000 --> 00:21:08,000
Yeah, but here's the thing though, is that when people talk about proof of stake,
what they really want to do is they really want to trick people who don't know
what's going on into thinking that they have an innovative project.

258
00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:12,000
And so, so that, but you understand that's the actual goal.

259
00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:16,000
These people have no, people who want proof of stake don't actually have like a
design goal.

260
00:21:16,000 --> 00:21:18,000
So it is dividing by zero.

261
00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:21,000
You asked me, can I help them achieve this goal?

262
00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:26,000
The goal is a fake goal to just trick people into thinking that they are doing an
innovative thing when they're not.

263
00:21:27,000 --> 00:21:28,000
So it's like, I don't know.

264
00:21:29,000 --> 00:21:34,000
I guess, so the answer to the question cannot help you deceive people to take their
money.

265
00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:38,000
It's just your ability to deceive people is on you 100%.

266
00:21:39,000 --> 00:21:40,000
So either you're good at that or you're not good at that.

267
00:21:41,000 --> 00:21:48,000
You remind me, you remind me of that one video where the engineer is asked to make
like a square with like three angles.

268
00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:51,000
No, it's a red, yeah, can it be like a red balloon?

269
00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:55,000
And they all have to be parallel with like two lines that are perpendicular.

270
00:21:56,000 --> 00:21:58,000
You know what I'm saying? Like, Paul, are you reminding me of that?

271
00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:00,000
Yeah, seven lines all perpendicular.

272
00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:02,000
But some of them, two of them are green ink.

273
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:04,000
Yeah, and two of them are green ink.

274
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:08,000
That video is called The Expert and it's very funny.

275
00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:10,000
I highly recommend it.

276
00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:12,000
But hold on, hold on.

277
00:22:13,000 --> 00:22:19,000
I know some of these questions, it's like you're the engineer and we're like the
people in the conference room, but just humor us.

278
00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:25,000
Even though, but don't, you know, just be like, even how ridiculous it sounds.

279
00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:27,000
Let's talk about it a little bit.

280
00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:32,000
Yeah, but you understand that in context that will be misconstrued as like some kind
of deficiency in it.

281
00:22:33,000 --> 00:22:38,000
This is like the engineer, he can't draw the lines in invisible ink, like that's the
problem, you know.

282
00:22:39,000 --> 00:22:43,000
And he can't draw one in the shape of a cat, which is another part of the video,
which is funny.

283
00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:45,000
Oh yeah, yeah, that was at the very end.

284
00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:47,000
In context.

285
00:22:52,000 --> 00:22:54,000
So that's a good point and I'm glad we brought that up.

286
00:22:55,000 --> 00:23:00,000
But one interesting thing that we did just kind of talk about was, okay, which is
perfect.

287
00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:02,000
This is actually falling right in line, like this is really nice.

288
00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:06,000
So decreased difficulty or faster blocks for the Drivechain.

289
00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:12,000
Just for the viewers, typically how this works is every time a Bitcoin block is
found,

290
00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:19,000
then have the privilege of writing the Drivechain block.

291
00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:21,000
Is that right, Paul?

292
00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:23,000
Yes.

293
00:23:24,000 --> 00:23:28,000
They can collect fees on these Drivechains and that gives the miners some incentive.

294
00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:32,000
Even if there is no fee, they still can do it for free pretty much.

295
00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:34,000
Yes, it doesn't cost them anything.

296
00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:37,000
With the Blind Merged Mining, they don't even need to run the node.

297
00:23:38,000 --> 00:23:40,000
So this is a very simple decision.

298
00:23:41,000 --> 00:23:42,000
Would you prefer having more money, yes or no?

299
00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:45,000
Very simple.

300
00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:49,000
Okay, but the question is, it's a very important question.

301
00:23:50,000 --> 00:23:52,000
Here it is over here.

302
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:57,000
So five minute on average block times for this Drivechain, how does that work?

303
00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:04,000
Well, it is a little bit like the expert thing that we were just talking about,

304
00:24:05,000 --> 00:24:10,000
because you could make that work, but the question is why.

305
00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:14,000
But even more importantly, it's not clear how you would even interpret those blocks,

306
00:24:15,000 --> 00:24:20,000
because, I mean, so if I'm running with the spirit of the question,

307
00:24:21,000 --> 00:24:25,000
and saying that in between Bitcoin blocks, which hypothetically arrive exactly every
10 minutes,

308
00:24:25,000 --> 00:24:27,000
so if we just assume that for simplicity,

309
00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:32,000
what the person would want for some reason is some kind of security

310
00:24:33,000 --> 00:24:37,000
to accumulate five minutes after the most recent block is found.

311
00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:44,000
So they want to have like half security at the five minute mark

312
00:24:45,000 --> 00:24:47,000
in between each of these 10 minute periods.

313
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:51,000
So if we run with the spirit of the question in that sense,

314
00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:54,000
then you could in fact do something where you say,

315
00:24:55,000 --> 00:24:59,000
the sidechain blocks are of two kinds, and they alternate.

316
00:24:59,498 --> 00:25:10,778
And the normal kind you find every 10 minutes in the normal way, and then you do use
some factor or some kind of division.

317
00:25:11,218 --> 00:25:21,738
So in this case, five minutes, you'd have like even odd, you'd have one to two,
where you'd say, okay, all the even ones are found every 10 minutes or what have
you.

318
00:25:22,258 --> 00:25:31,698
And then the odd ones are found with some kind of secondary proof of work, which was
needed to delay, is needed to delay the...

319
00:25:32,858 --> 00:25:36,058
Okay, and it would be like, otherwise everyone would find every other block.

320
00:25:37,338 --> 00:25:45,178
Yeah, so it's, yeah, so it would be, so it'd be getting like half its blocks. So for
this use case, it works out nice, where we can just talk about two.

321
00:25:46,098 --> 00:25:51,458
It just finds one block in between each of the proof of work. Now, the interesting
part comes in.

322
00:25:52,978 --> 00:25:59,818
If there's two blocks found back to back very quickly, does that mean...

323
00:25:59,898 --> 00:26:11,658
The secondary difficulty you have to adjust. But yeah, I have an even bigger
question, which is that if we did it this way, wouldn't the miners just try to mine
these intermediate blocks as well?

324
00:26:12,258 --> 00:26:22,858
And then they could, because since they're going to control ultimately with the
structure of the, I mean, it's like, I'm not really sure what's going on. But I
think this would work.

325
00:26:22,858 --> 00:26:25,978
No, it's okay. Yeah. Okay. I mean, pretty much.

326
00:26:27,498 --> 00:26:36,018
But I think it would be silly to make the secondary 56. Or maybe you wouldn't. I
don't know.

327
00:26:36,018 --> 00:26:42,498
Yeah, that would be really weird. But that's also possible. I don't know why you
would do that, but I think you could.

328
00:26:43,498 --> 00:26:59,578
I mean, and then also that kind of goes back to the Dash situation where they're
using X11. So if they want to do like really quick blocks, they could do like one
block is Bitcoin, and then like the next like 10 blocks are like these random
algorithms with low difficulty or something if they wanted to.

329
00:27:00,178 --> 00:27:15,818
They could do that. And one interesting thing is that that would decrease, I think,
the fees that are collected by the main chain Bitcoin miners. And I don't think it
would really matter because they're getting this for free. So it's just a free net
net.

330
00:27:19,698 --> 00:27:21,218
But yeah, that would happen.

331
00:27:22,218 --> 00:27:23,218
All right, let's go.

332
00:27:23,218 --> 00:27:42,218
The final thought, which is that I'm not sure what would happen if you competed.
Like, let's say you have a five-minute block situation, and then someone just did
something that had twice as much block space, but had 10-minute blocks twice as
long. And I'm not sure which of those networks you'd rather be on.

333
00:27:43,218 --> 00:27:53,218
I think you'd have just a pointless overhead in the five-minute block case. So I'm
not sure how it would compete with an equivalent system that had blocks every 10
minutes.

334
00:27:56,218 --> 00:27:58,218
So, we have a question from Wayne.

335
00:27:59,218 --> 00:28:01,218
Built in for no reason. Okay, yes.

336
00:28:04,218 --> 00:28:05,218
We discussed this.

337
00:28:05,218 --> 00:28:09,218
Sorry, your audio cut out. I didn't hear that. What was the question?

338
00:28:09,218 --> 00:28:14,218
Oh, thanks. Yeah, if my audio cuts out, let me know. We have a question from Wayne.

339
00:28:14,218 --> 00:28:15,218
Yes.

340
00:28:16,218 --> 00:28:17,218
What did he say?

341
00:28:17,218 --> 00:28:18,218
Wayne.

342
00:28:18,218 --> 00:28:21,218
Proof of Wayne? Can we do Wayne Chain? Is that what he asked?

343
00:28:21,218 --> 00:28:24,218
Yeah, time-traveling transactions. No.

344
00:28:24,218 --> 00:28:25,218
Can that be supported?

345
00:28:25,218 --> 00:28:26,218
His question was...

346
00:28:26,218 --> 00:28:30,218
My understanding of physics is that it is possible to do time travel, but...

347
00:28:30,218 --> 00:28:32,218
Can you read that?

348
00:28:32,218 --> 00:28:33,218
ERC-20.

349
00:28:33,218 --> 00:28:35,218
ERC-20.

350
00:28:35,218 --> 00:28:36,218
Now looks like a queue.

351
00:28:36,218 --> 00:28:40,218
So that's his question. And, like, what is it really going to take?

352
00:28:42,218 --> 00:28:45,218
As Jenseth would say, will it pamp?

353
00:28:46,218 --> 00:28:48,218
Yeah, well, this is a very exciting possibility.

354
00:28:48,218 --> 00:28:55,218
I think of this as an ERC-20 sidechain or, like, a counterparty sidechain where you
still have Bitcoin over there.

355
00:28:55,218 --> 00:28:58,218
You still need Bitcoin to operate the chain.

356
00:28:58,218 --> 00:29:01,218
You still need Bitcoin to broadcast messages.

357
00:29:01,218 --> 00:29:03,218
You have to pay network transaction fees.

358
00:29:03,218 --> 00:29:06,218
So it's very similar to counterparty in that respect.

359
00:29:06,218 --> 00:29:09,218
So I think this is a very interesting possibility.

360
00:29:09,218 --> 00:29:16,218
But the point is, on this chain, even though you're using Bitcoin to pay the miners
and using Bitcoin to stop, like, flooding and weird other stuff,

361
00:29:16,218 --> 00:29:25,218
you make, within each of these, you have many, many new assets, many, many new
dimensions that fulfill this, you know, this basically...

362
00:29:25,218 --> 00:29:34,218
I mean, all the modern ICOs are this kind of equity coin thing, which I don't really
like at all, but that is what it is.

363
00:29:34,218 --> 00:29:44,218
So we might as well, you know, we'll take whatever we can get, the stupid and, you
know, the pristine or whatever the saying is.

364
00:29:44,218 --> 00:29:51,218
But the point is, this would be designed in a very interesting way, where it would
be very much like counterparty,

365
00:29:51,218 --> 00:29:59,218
where you could have all these different tokens live on one sidechain, many
different tokens, the ERC-20 tokens, basically, move all around.

366
00:29:59,218 --> 00:30:06,218
And in order to send messages like buy and sell these, you would need Bitcoin to pay
the message transaction fee.

367
00:30:06,218 --> 00:30:11,218
You wouldn't really need this, but it would be the most organized way, most
efficient way of doing it.

368
00:30:11,218 --> 00:30:20,218
Where you'd have this kind of like little purse of Bitcoin over there, and you'd pay
these fees to send messages around for your ERC-20 tokens,

369
00:30:20,218 --> 00:30:27,218
to issue them, to buy them, to sell them, to trade them, and to do whatever with
them, destroy them maybe.

370
00:30:27,218 --> 00:30:35,218
But the thing is, this would contain, you know, the counterparty is the DEX, the
decentralized exchange.

371
00:30:36,218 --> 00:30:41,218
So like this would contain kind of like a little bit of like a mini Poloniex or
something in here.

372
00:30:41,218 --> 00:30:44,218
So I think that would be a really cool thing.

373
00:30:44,218 --> 00:30:48,218
Almost like a, you're saying like an exchange, like a DEX on the Drivechain?

374
00:30:48,218 --> 00:30:50,218
Yeah, basically, yes.

375
00:30:50,218 --> 00:30:56,218
And as well as digital assets like, you know, like a PepeCash or like a Spells of
Genesis or something.

376
00:30:57,218 --> 00:31:03,218
Would you see this implemented with like some kind of like Drivechain to Ethereum,

377
00:31:03,218 --> 00:31:07,218
and then the ERC-20 tokens just being done in the Ethereum Drivechain?

378
00:31:07,218 --> 00:31:08,218
Well, you could.

379
00:31:08,218 --> 00:31:15,218
This is another interesting question that the Ethereum root stock, whatever
philosophy,

380
00:31:15,218 --> 00:31:23,218
is to build a platform that's open-ended and just lets you do whatever smart
contracts you want.

381
00:31:23,218 --> 00:31:26,218
And I strongly disagree with that philosophy.

382
00:31:26,218 --> 00:31:29,218
I think instead you should build the smart contract that you want,

383
00:31:29,218 --> 00:31:36,218
which is like Monero's ring signatures or Namecoin's domain name, like registry
thing,

384
00:31:36,218 --> 00:31:41,218
and SiaCoin's hard drive rental thing.

385
00:31:41,218 --> 00:31:46,218
You should build that thing specifically, and you should make the sidechain of
that.

386
00:31:46,218 --> 00:31:49,218
So I don't think you should have a sidechain of like an open-ended process.

387
00:31:49,218 --> 00:31:52,218
I think you should wait and decide what you actually want to do.

388
00:31:52,218 --> 00:32:00,218
Because of the consensus nature of blockchains is that everyone has to agree down to
the last byte,

389
00:32:00,218 --> 00:32:02,218
and there's no real reason for you to.

390
00:32:02,218 --> 00:32:05,218
In Bitcoin, there is a reason for you to care about everyone's transactions

391
00:32:05,218 --> 00:32:08,218
because you don't want to get double spent and you don't want inflation.

392
00:32:08,218 --> 00:32:11,218
So there's a reason for you to care.

393
00:32:11,218 --> 00:32:19,218
And similarly for the other things like the ERC-20 or Dash or whatever, the sidechain version,

394
00:32:19,218 --> 00:32:25,218
you want to care that the functionality is working correctly, the new functionality.

395
00:32:25,218 --> 00:32:29,218
So like if you're in a Monero sidechain, you want to know that the ring signatures
are working correctly.

396
00:32:29,218 --> 00:32:35,218
That's actually an especially important example because of all the mixing that's
going on

397
00:32:35,218 --> 00:32:39,218
and all the kind of weird stuff, the big anonymity set.

398
00:32:39,218 --> 00:32:46,218
But even in a case like, I'm not sure what would be the best example, but maybe
David Vorek's SiaCoin,

399
00:32:46,218 --> 00:32:53,218
even if that were a sidechain, when that lets you kind of do like a storage thing,

400
00:32:53,218 --> 00:33:02,218
you would want that contract, that code, you would want to be auditing that

401
00:33:02,218 --> 00:33:05,218
because it affects you if that code stops working.

402
00:33:05,218 --> 00:33:10,218
So these are cases where you actually care about what's going on.

403
00:33:10,218 --> 00:33:15,218
But with Ethereum and Rootstock, there's a lot of other stuff going on that you
really don't care about.

404
00:33:15,218 --> 00:33:19,218
And this leads to, I think, tremendous inefficiency in the design.

405
00:33:19,218 --> 00:33:25,218
You want to only kind of pick and choose, use the sidechains that you care about.

406
00:33:25,218 --> 00:33:29,218
You don't want to be on the hook for some random thing that people can just create
whenever they want.

407
00:33:29,218 --> 00:33:34,218
And you can see that in the big size of the Ethereum, the growth of the Ethereum
block size.

408
00:33:34,218 --> 00:33:36,218
You can see that in these other.

409
00:33:36,218 --> 00:33:40,218
I mean, even they agree, though, because their attempt to shard is, I mean,

410
00:33:40,218 --> 00:33:44,218
there's very little difference between sharding and Drivechain.

411
00:33:44,218 --> 00:33:47,218
Other than the fact that Drivechain is a real idea that will probably succeed

412
00:33:47,218 --> 00:33:52,218
and sharding is a fake abstract concept that will probably not exist ever.

413
00:33:52,218 --> 00:33:59,218
But other than that, there's the same general idea of splitting this stuff into
different zones

414
00:33:59,218 --> 00:34:06,218
that you're fully validated in the zone, but just kind of partially validated
outside the zone.

415
00:34:06,218 --> 00:34:11,218
And so this is very similar to that, but it's by category, which I think is better,

416
00:34:11,218 --> 00:34:18,218
because you actually care about the people in your category, especially so with
Monero and other things like that.

417
00:34:18,218 --> 00:34:22,218
And in ERC20, it's like, who should be auditing all this stuff?

418
00:34:22,218 --> 00:34:26,218
Well, I guess other people who want to do this ERC20 junk, right?

419
00:34:26,218 --> 00:34:29,218
And it might even be modularized further, right?

420
00:34:29,218 --> 00:34:35,218
You might be able to only, within the ERC20 chain, there might even be like a
PepeCache SPV mode

421
00:34:35,218 --> 00:34:44,218
that is like SPV mode of ERC20, and then it only validates all the PepeCache stuff
or something.

422
00:34:44,218 --> 00:34:47,218
There might be some better design, which there probably is.

423
00:34:47,218 --> 00:34:53,218
So we want to minimize the amount of caring that you have to do about other people.

424
00:34:53,218 --> 00:34:54,218
You only care about yourself.

425
00:34:54,218 --> 00:34:57,218
That's more efficient because you already care about that.

426
00:34:57,218 --> 00:35:02,218
You're not going to – however much you care about yourself, you're stuck with that.

427
00:35:02,218 --> 00:35:04,218
I don't know.

428
00:35:04,218 --> 00:35:05,218
I don't know if that helps.

429
00:35:05,218 --> 00:35:14,218
But I think the Ethereum rootstock question is a bad design because it asks you to
care about so much that you don't care about.

430
00:35:14,218 --> 00:35:16,218
All right, Paul.

431
00:35:16,218 --> 00:35:17,218
Yes.

432
00:35:17,218 --> 00:35:20,218
Let's try not to go off tangent too much of the question.

433
00:35:20,218 --> 00:35:21,218
All right.

434
00:35:21,218 --> 00:35:26,218
Because I'm starting to – like when you go like five senses in, that's like as much
as my investment can hold.

435
00:35:26,218 --> 00:35:27,218
All right.

436
00:35:27,218 --> 00:35:31,218
So after everything you said, after the first five senses, I'm out.

437
00:35:31,218 --> 00:35:34,218
You should just interrupt me if you get really confused, I think.

438
00:35:34,218 --> 00:35:36,218
Well, you know, you're on a roll.

439
00:35:36,218 --> 00:35:37,218
Okay, all right.

440
00:35:37,218 --> 00:35:39,218
I can be more of an asshole if you want.

441
00:35:39,218 --> 00:35:45,218
But let me ask a quick question about this ERC20.

442
00:35:45,218 --> 00:35:50,218
If someone did an ERC20 token on Ethereum, like Wayne, with a TNT token,

443
00:35:51,218 --> 00:36:01,218
and wanted to move to a Drivechain because there was this Drivechain idea where this
guy made a counterparty or ERC20 kind of idea,

444
00:36:01,218 --> 00:36:06,218
what does that look like as far as a process of moving over?

445
00:36:06,218 --> 00:36:12,218
Would it literally just be like a centralized service that kind of just facilitates
that move over and then you're good once the move?

446
00:36:12,218 --> 00:36:14,218
I think it's even easier than that.

447
00:36:14,218 --> 00:36:20,218
You just issue a new token that happens to be issued to all the people who currently
own the other token, and you just call it a day.

448
00:36:20,218 --> 00:36:22,218
Okay.

449
00:36:22,218 --> 00:36:27,218
And then to prove ownership of the TNT token, we're talking about like signing
private messages?

450
00:36:27,218 --> 00:36:29,218
No, because you already know.

451
00:36:29,218 --> 00:36:34,218
Because you know the ERC – because you know the Ethereum blockchain, so you know the
state of the ERC20.

452
00:36:34,218 --> 00:36:36,218
You know which account owns which.

453
00:36:36,218 --> 00:36:38,218
Do you understand?

454
00:36:39,218 --> 00:36:45,218
You basically know the equivalent of the UTXO set of the ERC20.

455
00:36:45,218 --> 00:36:46,218
This is funny.

456
00:36:46,218 --> 00:36:47,218
Your head keeps moving around.

457
00:36:47,218 --> 00:36:49,218
Your head is like moving around.

458
00:36:49,218 --> 00:36:50,218
It's very funny.

459
00:36:50,218 --> 00:36:52,218
You're like – your head is moving.

460
00:36:52,218 --> 00:36:53,218
Am I moving around?

461
00:36:53,218 --> 00:36:54,218
I didn't even notice.

462
00:36:54,218 --> 00:36:55,218
It's fun.

463
00:36:55,218 --> 00:36:56,218
I'm just saying it's funny.

464
00:36:56,218 --> 00:37:02,218
I don't know if other people think it's funny, but I have you like on the – I have
you like zoomed in, and so it's just – it's funny to me.

465
00:37:02,218 --> 00:37:04,218
I don't know.

466
00:37:04,218 --> 00:37:08,218
But the point is you know who owns – you don't know who literally.

467
00:37:08,218 --> 00:37:17,218
You don't know their real world identity, but you know which key owns which ERC20
token for the entire length of time, for the entire history.

468
00:37:17,218 --> 00:37:20,218
Because you know the blockchain, right?

469
00:37:20,218 --> 00:37:22,218
Do you understand?

470
00:37:22,218 --> 00:37:27,218
Yeah, but I'm thinking you'd use a service to issue those new tokens.

471
00:37:27,218 --> 00:37:29,218
You don't even need a service.

472
00:37:29,218 --> 00:37:31,218
You can't stop someone from doing it.

473
00:37:31,218 --> 00:37:33,218
Someone could just say, look, you now –

474
00:37:33,218 --> 00:37:34,218
That's true.

475
00:37:34,218 --> 00:37:39,218
I'm some guy, and I just give you all the years you did the whatever crowd sale.

476
00:37:39,218 --> 00:37:43,218
You did the EOS token sale or whatever.

477
00:37:43,218 --> 00:37:44,218
I don't even know what they're doing.

478
00:37:44,218 --> 00:37:45,218
There's so many.

479
00:37:45,218 --> 00:37:48,218
It's like permission to use like an existing UTXO set.

480
00:37:48,218 --> 00:37:49,218
You don't need anyone's permission.

481
00:37:49,218 --> 00:37:50,218
Exactly.

482
00:37:50,218 --> 00:37:51,218
You can't stop someone from doing it.

483
00:37:51,218 --> 00:37:52,218
Okay.

484
00:37:52,218 --> 00:37:54,218
Let's move on.

485
00:37:54,218 --> 00:37:55,218
Let's do it.

486
00:37:55,218 --> 00:37:56,218
All right.

487
00:37:56,218 --> 00:37:59,218
So this is another one from Sean.

488
00:37:59,218 --> 00:38:08,218
Our sidechain, the only real use case is hosting shitcoin testnets variants for
features for Bitcoin.

489
00:38:08,218 --> 00:38:11,218
Is there anything else there?

490
00:38:11,218 --> 00:38:12,218
That's a good question.

491
00:38:12,218 --> 00:38:14,218
So that's certainly the primary –

492
00:38:14,218 --> 00:38:16,218
It's a little bit terse, but you know.

493
00:38:17,218 --> 00:38:30,218
The primary case is to make sure that there's a pathway to copying features from
altcoins into Bitcoin.

494
00:38:30,218 --> 00:38:37,218
So if an altcoin ever invents something cool, which is a big if, which possibly will
never happen at this point.

495
00:38:37,218 --> 00:38:39,218
But, I mean, it has already happened in one sense.

496
00:38:39,218 --> 00:38:47,218
You have Namecoin, Monero, and I think Scicoin, which are three examples of altcoins
that basically are not scams.

497
00:38:47,218 --> 00:38:52,218
And they actually have honest people who are trying to accomplish like an actual
purpose.

498
00:38:52,218 --> 00:38:58,218
So you have at least three examples of not shitcoins, right?

499
00:38:58,218 --> 00:39:02,218
Like a real altcoin, like an actual alternative for some reason.

500
00:39:02,218 --> 00:39:08,218
So the goal is to have some path for that to make it into Bitcoin.

501
00:39:08,218 --> 00:39:10,218
And so to thus protect Bitcoin from competition.

502
00:39:10,218 --> 00:39:18,218
But in a second sense, there's a completely different answer to Sean's question,
which is that you have –

503
00:39:18,218 --> 00:39:21,218
In some cases, you have stuff where not everyone will agree.

504
00:39:21,218 --> 00:39:30,218
We have this right now with the scalability block size debate where people don't
agree on what the qualities of the chain should be.

505
00:39:30,218 --> 00:39:36,218
Which is unfortunate because Bitcoin is a consensus system that requires everyone to
have consensus down to the last byte.

506
00:39:36,218 --> 00:39:39,218
So the only way you can have –

507
00:39:39,218 --> 00:39:41,218
The only way you can have –

508
00:39:41,218 --> 00:39:44,218
Sorry, now I hear an echo.

509
00:39:44,218 --> 00:39:46,218
Now I hear an echo.

510
00:39:46,218 --> 00:39:47,218
Oh, you do?

511
00:39:47,218 --> 00:39:48,218
Yeah, I do.

512
00:39:48,218 --> 00:39:50,218
Echo, echo, echo.

513
00:39:50,218 --> 00:39:52,218
Okay.

514
00:39:52,218 --> 00:39:56,218
So the only way you can have the block – you know, what you want is to have –

515
00:39:56,218 --> 00:40:03,218
I thought maybe Google Hangouts and YouTube could handle it, but I was wrong. Okay.

516
00:40:04,218 --> 00:40:09,218
So the issue is – so the first category is there might actually be good ideas that
make it on.

517
00:40:09,218 --> 00:40:13,218
And so they would not necessarily need to be shitcoins nor testnets.

518
00:40:13,218 --> 00:40:16,218
They could be actual altcoins that actually do actual things.

519
00:40:16,218 --> 00:40:20,218
But the second thing is that some people may want a small block size.

520
00:40:20,218 --> 00:40:22,218
Some people may want a large block size.

521
00:40:22,218 --> 00:40:28,218
And right now, the way things work is you have to choose one or the other for
everyone.

522
00:40:28,218 --> 00:40:37,218
But with sidechains, you could just say, well, if you want a small one, you can just
hang out in the small world, small block world.

523
00:40:37,218 --> 00:40:40,218
And if you want a large block, you can just hang out in the large block world.

524
00:40:40,218 --> 00:40:45,218
And it doesn't affect the 21 million coin limit, whereas it certainly does now.

525
00:40:45,218 --> 00:40:54,218
Sure. I mean I think changing the block size is probably the easiest, simplest use
case of a Drivechain.

526
00:40:55,218 --> 00:41:04,218
I think you get the most bang for your buck like as far as stuff that users would
actually want that we know that users want badly.

527
00:41:04,218 --> 00:41:10,218
You can literally make like a 20 – I mean a 30 megabyte block size or whatever,
right?

528
00:41:10,218 --> 00:41:19,218
Yeah, you can. I wrote a little Bitcoin discuss email about like what you would aim
for or what I thought you would aim for.

529
00:41:19,218 --> 00:41:21,218
You can do whatever you want.

530
00:41:21,218 --> 00:41:25,218
One issue is that if you screw it up too much, then you'll have no users.

531
00:41:25,218 --> 00:41:36,218
It's kind of like you're free to start any business you want, but if that business
doesn't meet some efficiency criteria and some customer criteria, it will just go
out of business.

532
00:41:36,218 --> 00:41:43,218
So you see the chain could just suck and no one could want to use it because it
could just be constantly below the limit and never be used by anyone.

533
00:41:44,218 --> 00:41:56,218
Paul, would you also say this would give an opportunity for a Drivechain with like
that 30 megabytes in size for each block to be pruned every so often and that's just
part of the rules?

534
00:41:56,218 --> 00:41:59,218
Yes, those are our advantages.

535
00:42:00,218 --> 00:42:06,218
It's like you could contain millions of transactions or whatever.

536
00:42:06,218 --> 00:42:13,218
Every year you could just prune the old year's data and everything.

537
00:42:13,218 --> 00:42:14,218
Correct.

538
00:42:14,218 --> 00:42:27,218
Since the sidechain is in SPV security mode necessarily because this is part of the
definition of a sidechain is that it requires SPV proofs, or as I prefer to call it,
the hashrate escrow.

539
00:42:27,218 --> 00:42:38,218
But since you're at that security level already, then you lose nothing further by
discarding blocks that are more than six months old or more than a year old or
something.

540
00:42:38,218 --> 00:42:40,218
So you can already do that.

541
00:42:40,218 --> 00:42:45,218
So there is actually some scalability gain just from using a sidechain.

542
00:42:47,218 --> 00:42:48,218
Okay.

543
00:42:48,218 --> 00:42:51,218
Paul, next question.

544
00:42:51,218 --> 00:42:54,218
Can altcoins implement Drivechains?

545
00:42:54,218 --> 00:42:55,218
Yes.

546
00:42:56,218 --> 00:42:58,218
I mean, yeah, it makes sense.

547
00:42:58,218 --> 00:43:01,218
So they could compete, I guess.

548
00:43:01,218 --> 00:43:02,218
They could.

549
00:43:02,218 --> 00:43:04,218
They could have a Bitcoin sidechain.

550
00:43:04,218 --> 00:43:06,218
Bitcoin core sidechain.

551
00:43:06,218 --> 00:43:07,218
They could.

552
00:43:07,218 --> 00:43:18,218
So I guess this kind of question kind of hones in on what's the most secure core
blockchain.

553
00:43:19,218 --> 00:43:28,218
The networks would compete not on the basis of their technical feature set anymore
because everyone would have the same technical feature set, sort of.

554
00:43:28,218 --> 00:43:31,218
But they wouldn't compete on that because it would be the same.

555
00:43:31,218 --> 00:43:42,218
So there would be no basis for distinguishing, one, Ethereum from Monero from Ripple
from Bitcoin because they'd all have the same features, which would be all the
features in this hypothetical world.

556
00:43:42,218 --> 00:43:46,218
But they would compete on the basis of their monetary network and their monetary
policy.

557
00:43:46,218 --> 00:43:54,218
And so in that way, they would still just get run over by Bitcoin, which has a
vastly superior monetary network because people actually use it as money and they
recognize it as money.

558
00:43:54,218 --> 00:44:02,218
And it has a monetary policy that's much more conducive to investing and holding
money.

559
00:44:02,218 --> 00:44:07,218
So that would attract economic agents in that way.

560
00:44:07,218 --> 00:44:09,218
So it doesn't matter.

561
00:44:09,218 --> 00:44:11,218
Bitcoin would win that competition.

562
00:44:11,218 --> 00:44:22,218
The only competitors would be very, very recognizable people like Ethereum, which is
the competition would be weak, and Ripple, like people, weird compromisers and doing
weird stuff like that.

563
00:44:22,218 --> 00:44:27,218
But in general, it would not be an issue of viability for Bitcoin.

564
00:44:27,218 --> 00:44:32,218
This next question, this is a loaded question.

565
00:44:32,218 --> 00:44:34,218
This is from Risho.

566
00:44:34,218 --> 00:44:36,218
I think that's how you pronounce it.

567
00:44:37,218 --> 00:44:48,218
He says, ask Paul about the fact that miners can steal the money out of a sidechain
and how the game theory prevents that from happening.

568
00:44:48,218 --> 00:44:53,218
So that's a very long explanation.

569
00:44:53,218 --> 00:44:56,218
I can take a crack at it.

570
00:44:56,218 --> 00:44:58,218
Okay, good, because my voice is...

571
00:44:59,218 --> 00:45:02,218
Exactly.

572
00:45:02,218 --> 00:45:12,218
All right, so I would say you have to talk about how they would steal the money in
the first place.

573
00:45:12,218 --> 00:45:24,218
You're trying to go back from a sidechain back to typically, if you want to make
that quick, you could do that instantly with atomic swaps.

574
00:45:25,218 --> 00:45:30,218
There's no danger of theft in those cases.

575
00:45:30,218 --> 00:45:31,218
Exactly.

576
00:45:31,218 --> 00:45:38,218
There's also this withdrawal feature, which Paul kind of described to me as like
guardrails.

577
00:45:38,218 --> 00:45:42,218
And this is essentially the same idea of like a payment channel.

578
00:45:42,218 --> 00:45:48,218
If you have bad actors, well, you just wait until you take your money back or
whatever.

579
00:45:48,218 --> 00:45:50,218
They call it.

580
00:45:50,218 --> 00:45:51,218
Yes.

581
00:45:51,218 --> 00:45:54,218
Yeah, so there's like an escrow period.

582
00:45:54,218 --> 00:45:57,218
So, yeah, the point is that you're tying stuff up in escrow.

583
00:45:57,218 --> 00:45:59,218
It's a feature of the box.

584
00:45:59,218 --> 00:46:01,218
So you have the blue box and the red box.

585
00:46:01,218 --> 00:46:09,218
When you add the escrow, you add the software to add the Drivechain or the sidechain, that box tells you how long you need to wait before the money comes out.

586
00:46:09,218 --> 00:46:12,218
Sure, and let's say it's three months.

587
00:46:12,218 --> 00:46:15,218
So you have a very long time, yes.

588
00:46:15,218 --> 00:46:22,218
Yeah, so let's say you're screwed and no one's willing to do atomic swaps with you.

589
00:46:22,218 --> 00:46:24,218
There's like no liquidity on the sidechain.

590
00:46:24,218 --> 00:46:28,218
Three months in order to get your Bitcoin back.

591
00:46:28,218 --> 00:46:34,218
And then the question really comes from Rishu.

592
00:46:34,218 --> 00:46:40,218
Rishu, I've been talking to you for a while on Telegram.

593
00:46:41,218 --> 00:46:47,218
What's the game theory on why the miners wouldn't just steal that money?

594
00:46:47,218 --> 00:46:49,218
So maybe, Paul, if you want to actually talk about this.

595
00:46:49,218 --> 00:46:52,218
Okay, well, I do want to say one game theory thing first, which is that you're
right.

596
00:46:52,218 --> 00:47:00,218
So there's like a fast way where the exchange rate is variable, but then there's the
slow withdrawal where it's fixed.

597
00:47:00,218 --> 00:47:10,218
And what's required is really for not a single person to offer you a decent swap
rate, the atomic swap or the lightning level.

598
00:47:10,218 --> 00:47:17,218
So there's these atomic swaps that you can do and there's these lightning network
swaps that you can do that are instant.

599
00:47:17,218 --> 00:47:22,218
Well, they're instant or they're atomic, so they will happen or they just won't
happen.

600
00:47:22,218 --> 00:47:28,218
But the point is, there's just finality that's very fast.

601
00:47:28,218 --> 00:47:32,218
You know, it's a normal Bitcoin transaction.

602
00:47:32,218 --> 00:47:34,218
So there's that way.

603
00:47:34,218 --> 00:47:38,218
And then there's this slow way where the exchange rate is fixed.

604
00:47:38,218 --> 00:47:45,218
Now, the issue is, how can we, what guarantee can we, we want to have our cake and
eat it too.

605
00:47:45,218 --> 00:47:47,218
We want it to be fast and we want the exchange rate to be fixed.

606
00:47:48,218 --> 00:48:01,218
And so in order for you to be unable to have your cake and eat it too, it really has
to be just about every single person, no matter who they are or like what their
circumstances.

607
00:48:01,218 --> 00:48:07,218
These people really have to be all, like almost everyone on the sidechain has to
be, I don't want to say irrational,

608
00:48:07,218 --> 00:48:16,218
but because you have this option at the very end to say, screw you guys, I'm going
to take the very slow three month trip back.

609
00:48:16,218 --> 00:48:27,218
Because you have that option, you can kind of like iterate from there in a game
theoretic sense and say, okay, everyone should be competing with you on improving
that option.

610
00:48:27,218 --> 00:48:39,218
And what I mean by that is they have money that they're, I'm not sure, maybe one
good way to explain it is that there's sort of a presence of arbitrage where people
can have like a bank CD.

611
00:48:39,218 --> 00:48:44,218
Or they send the money over to the sidechain and they slowly walk it back.

612
00:48:44,218 --> 00:48:51,218
But they get some yield from you in exchange for you moving your money across very
quickly.

613
00:48:51,218 --> 00:48:55,218
So the point is you leverage the fact that there's two things that are very
different.

614
00:48:55,218 --> 00:48:59,218
One is very fast, but has the potential to charge you a fee for convenience.

615
00:48:59,218 --> 00:49:04,218
And the other is slow, but pays a fee to compensate.

616
00:49:04,218 --> 00:49:13,218
Atomic swaps will be there for like for a slight premium.

617
00:49:13,218 --> 00:49:15,218
It should be close to the peg.

618
00:49:15,218 --> 00:49:16,218
Now, obviously.

619
00:49:16,218 --> 00:49:17,218
It should always be there.

620
00:49:17,218 --> 00:49:24,218
If the peg is like 1 to 10 and they're giving you 1 to 5 with atomic swap, well,
I'll just wait the three months and get the 1 to 10 instead.

621
00:49:25,218 --> 00:49:27,218
But the point is anyone could wait the three months.

622
00:49:27,218 --> 00:49:28,218
Anyone could say, okay.

623
00:49:28,218 --> 00:49:35,218
Yeah, so if I have a lot of money, I can just go, oh, you're willing to sell 1 to 5?

624
00:49:35,218 --> 00:49:37,218
I'll just buy all of it up.

625
00:49:37,218 --> 00:49:40,218
And let's say I'm a mining pool like Bitmain.

626
00:49:40,218 --> 00:49:44,218
Well, I know I'm not going to screw myself over, so I'm just going to take that free
money.

627
00:49:44,218 --> 00:49:45,218
Exactly.

628
00:49:45,218 --> 00:49:49,218
In particular, the miners should be always willing to offer good atomic swap rates.

629
00:49:49,218 --> 00:49:59,218
Now, this is only all this rests on the premise that you would be able to defect at
the last moment by taking the slow three-month.

630
00:49:59,673 --> 00:50:26,673
movement back. So if that piece is gone, then the rest of the game theory collapses.
And now there's no reason for anyone to pay anything for these coins because they
may be trapped over there. There's no three-month. There's nothing back. So they
might be worthless or they might have some weird value, some altcoin type I,
something like that. So the thing is, though, that if this last piece is in place at
all, you should always be willing to pay.

631
00:50:27,673 --> 00:50:41,673
There should always be someone, there should be huge amounts of thickness in this
market for atomic swaps and these other things. So all you need is for it to be
there in the first place. And then you will be able to have your cake and eat it
too, in theory.

632
00:50:41,673 --> 00:51:07,673
So now we have to talk about, how do we get this last thing in place? We're safely
moving it from the sidechain back to the main chain. And the answer is that you
have to do a strength in numbers thing, first of all, where you put everyone's
withdrawals into one big withdrawal. And you pool them all together. I was talking
about these classes. So in class one, you're using...

633
00:51:08,673 --> 00:51:14,673
I wrote down these classes. So if you want to go over them, when you're in class
one...

634
00:51:14,673 --> 00:51:15,673
You're doing normal...

635
00:51:15,673 --> 00:51:16,673
You're pretty much...

636
00:51:16,673 --> 00:51:20,673
You're just on the chain. You're not trying to withdraw yet.

637
00:51:20,673 --> 00:51:21,673
Exactly. You're hanging out.

638
00:51:21,673 --> 00:51:23,673
Class two is like you're...

639
00:51:23,673 --> 00:51:24,673
Yes, it's as if you're...

640
00:51:24,673 --> 00:51:34,673
Class two is like you went to the airport, and you haven't boarded the plane yet,
but you're in the lobby. Everyone's in the terminal, and they're about to call you
to...

641
00:51:35,673 --> 00:51:53,673
Everyone's on standby or something. So class one is like if all the chains were
different islands, and you're hanging out. In class one, you're hanging out at the
beach. You're hanging out at the store. You're hanging out at the whatever, the
resort. You're doing these different things. You're doing whatever you want to do on
the sidechain.

642
00:51:53,673 --> 00:52:01,673
Class two is you want to leave. So you go to the airport, and you can no longer do
anything fun because you're waiting to leave, and you're not even sure if you'll
make it on.

643
00:52:01,673 --> 00:52:03,673
But then class three is when you're...

644
00:52:03,673 --> 00:52:04,673
You're frozen.

645
00:52:04,673 --> 00:52:13,673
Yes. So class three is like when they finally get people to board. They choose
people to board the plane. They try to stack everyone in a period onto the plane.

646
00:52:13,673 --> 00:52:32,673
Now, as I've previously mentioned, people can rearrange before all this happens with
the atomic swaps and with these other things. So people can rearrange such that
probably the total number of passengers, even if there's only one flight every three
months, the total number of passengers probably could be very light.

647
00:52:32,673 --> 00:52:49,673
It's not clear. It could be anything. But it could be very low because you could
have people who specialize in buying up all the side coins at some discount, and
then they're just one guy.

648
00:52:49,673 --> 00:52:54,673
They just walk everything back in one. They're walking over to one destination on
the main chain.

649
00:52:55,673 --> 00:53:06,673
So potentially, there's almost an unlimited amount of throughput, even though it's
just one transaction every three months, which is very slow.

650
00:53:06,673 --> 00:53:15,673
But that's the other thing is that, first of all, we have strengthened numbers. We
merge everyone's thing onto one plane, so to speak, and try to fly it back and land
it.

651
00:53:16,673 --> 00:53:27,673
But the second thing is we try not to overwhelm any of the third parties that we
would complain to or that we would kind of – I'm not sure exactly.

652
00:53:28,673 --> 00:53:33,673
There's like an interrelationship. Game theory is all about interrelationships
between people.

653
00:53:33,673 --> 00:53:48,673
So what you'd want to do is you'd want any theft from the sidechain to be
representative of some greater crime that would have bad consequences for the
miners.

654
00:53:48,673 --> 00:53:56,673
So when I was describing it to you earlier today, we contrasted an example where
it's like six blocks with one where it's like three months' worth of blocks.

655
00:53:56,673 --> 00:54:08,673
So if the flight is very short and very frequent, where it can happen many times per
day versus when the flight takes like a whole three months to go back.

656
00:54:08,673 --> 00:54:12,673
I'm not sure if we're explaining it in the best order for the poor people in the
audience.

657
00:54:13,673 --> 00:54:17,673
So basically he's got those two boxes there. He's got this blue box and this red
box.

658
00:54:17,673 --> 00:54:25,673
And what you have to do is basically if you want to get the money out, a miner puts
a note on the box saying where he's going to take the money out.

659
00:54:25,673 --> 00:54:31,673
And then there's this slow acting process, acknowledgement, where you basically
upvote or downvote the note.

660
00:54:31,673 --> 00:54:41,673
And if the note accumulates enough upvotes, which will take at least three months or
whatever the parameter is, it varies per box.

661
00:54:41,673 --> 00:54:46,673
You can do however you like per box, but we're going to talk about why it's long
momentarily.

662
00:54:46,673 --> 00:54:55,673
If that accumulates enough X, then the box opens and the money can be taken out as
defined by the note that you put on the box earlier.

663
00:54:55,673 --> 00:55:01,673
So now why is this so slow? And part of the answer is because there's already a
bunch of stuff that's fast.

664
00:55:01,673 --> 00:55:05,673
The atomic swaps and lightning network stuff, that's super fast.

665
00:55:05,673 --> 00:55:08,673
And that's what you should use instead if you want fast.

666
00:55:09,673 --> 00:55:11,673
So there's no real loss.

667
00:55:11,673 --> 00:55:15,673
What you really need is, in a game theoretical sense, is some option.

668
00:55:15,673 --> 00:55:21,673
If everyone goes crazy at the same time and fails you, you need some recourse.

669
00:55:21,673 --> 00:55:27,673
And as long as you have that recourse, people will be competing to add kind of
convenience features to this.

670
00:55:27,673 --> 00:55:28,673
I mean, in theory anyway.

671
00:55:28,673 --> 00:55:34,673
They'll be competing to give you good rates on your atomic swaps so that you always
be able to do this.

672
00:55:34,673 --> 00:55:38,673
So the question is, why is it so long? What's the benefit?

673
00:55:38,673 --> 00:55:43,673
Contrast two worlds where it's just very short and it's very long.

674
00:55:43,673 --> 00:55:49,673
In a world where it's very short, like it's only six blocks or ten blocks long, the
flight,

675
00:55:49,673 --> 00:55:53,673
you can put the note on the box and say, we need to accumulate this.

676
00:55:53,673 --> 00:55:55,673
And then you've accumulated it quickly.

677
00:55:55,673 --> 00:55:57,673
You open the box and you take the money out.

678
00:55:57,673 --> 00:56:05,673
And what that opens up is this kind of mosquito type situation where you're pestered
with all this stuff all the time

679
00:56:05,673 --> 00:56:08,673
that you really don't have the energy to deal with.

680
00:56:08,673 --> 00:56:13,673
So what I'm imagining is it's like 4 a.m. on the eastern coast,

681
00:56:13,673 --> 00:56:20,673
and you put a note on the box saying that you're going to withdraw 50 bitcoin and
give it to Jihan Wu or something.

682
00:56:21,673 --> 00:56:26,673
And then since it's at 4 a.m., ten blocks go by very quickly.

683
00:56:26,673 --> 00:56:29,673
And maybe the whole thing is even done in secret.

684
00:56:29,673 --> 00:56:32,673
It's like selfish mind or something, and it's done secretly.

685
00:56:32,673 --> 00:56:38,673
So you have these weird, annoying situations where that happens,

686
00:56:38,673 --> 00:56:42,673
and then there's no real penalty against the miners.

687
00:56:42,673 --> 00:56:44,673
You want the miners to suffer for doing this.

688
00:56:44,673 --> 00:56:47,673
But what they can do is they can say, we don't know who that was.

689
00:56:47,673 --> 00:56:49,673
That was some weird miner.

690
00:56:49,673 --> 00:56:52,673
That was some guy who just rented a bunch of mining equipment and did this weird
thing.

691
00:56:52,673 --> 00:57:02,673
So in order to avoid that, in order to force the entire world to see very clearly
that this is, in fact, the miners' fault

692
00:57:02,673 --> 00:57:08,673
and they're doing this on purpose because they're doing the wrong thing, you make
this very, very, very long.

693
00:57:08,673 --> 00:57:14,673
You make it very clear that the note on the box is compared to something that's on
the sidechain.

694
00:57:14,673 --> 00:57:19,673
And they're both these tiny, tiny little SHA-256 hashes.

695
00:57:19,673 --> 00:57:23,673
So you're basically just looking at one thing and looking at another thing.

696
00:57:23,673 --> 00:57:25,673
And you see that they're not the same thing.

697
00:57:25,673 --> 00:57:30,673
And then this situation has to persist for like three months.

698
00:57:30,673 --> 00:57:35,673
And that's just – it's very difficult for me to believe that that would happen
without it.

699
00:57:35,673 --> 00:57:36,673
That could happen.

700
00:57:36,673 --> 00:57:41,673
Nothing in principle prevents it from happening cryptographically or anything like
that.

701
00:57:41,673 --> 00:57:48,673
But if it does happen, what it would probably just mean is that the sidechain
experiment is not valuable.

702
00:57:48,673 --> 00:57:54,673
I mean that's a tragedy, but that's just what it means is that no one cares about
sidechains

703
00:57:54,673 --> 00:57:58,673
and that no one wanted them around and that there's no significant –

704
00:57:58,673 --> 00:58:03,673
like I would hope that the sidechain project would be valuable and that the price
would crash

705
00:58:03,673 --> 00:58:08,673
and that people would be full of outrage and that people would send assassins to
China

706
00:58:08,673 --> 00:58:12,673
to like fix this problem during the three months or whatever.

707
00:58:12,673 --> 00:58:15,673
But that's – but I just don't think –

708
00:58:15,673 --> 00:58:17,673
Paul, if I may.

709
00:58:17,673 --> 00:58:21,673
First off, this isn't backwards to you because I see it backwards on my screen.

710
00:58:21,673 --> 00:58:23,673
No, it looks forward.

711
00:58:23,673 --> 00:58:25,673
All right, sorry.

712
00:58:25,673 --> 00:58:27,673
It just freaks me out when I see it mirrored.

713
00:58:27,673 --> 00:58:28,673
Okay.

714
00:58:28,673 --> 00:58:32,673
So in other words, I think what you're saying I just want to illustrate here.

715
00:58:32,673 --> 00:58:37,673
If they want to be a bad actor, and we're going back to the game theory,

716
00:58:37,673 --> 00:58:45,673
if they want to come in and take literally all the money from what was supposed to
go to the people

717
00:58:45,673 --> 00:58:48,673
back in this – we're at like the class three.

718
00:58:48,673 --> 00:58:53,673
They're actually being withdrawn.

719
00:58:53,673 --> 00:58:58,673
Those going to the people that actually should get it, like let's say Jihan Wu or
whoever, right?

720
00:58:58,673 --> 00:59:00,673
We use Jihan Wu as like the secret agent or whatever.

721
00:59:00,673 --> 00:59:01,673
Yeah, he's the great boogeyman.

722
00:59:01,673 --> 00:59:03,673
Yeah, he's the boogeyman.

723
00:59:04,673 --> 00:59:08,673
Regardless of what you think about it.

724
00:59:08,673 --> 00:59:14,673
But essentially for what he was saying, like at 4 a.m. Eastern Standard Time or
whatever,

725
00:59:14,673 --> 00:59:20,673
he could just kind of – he somehow gets like these six blocks,

726
00:59:20,673 --> 00:59:23,673
and then would he have to get these six blocks in a row, Paul,

727
00:59:23,673 --> 00:59:26,673
or would he just get these six blocks in general?

728
00:59:26,673 --> 00:59:27,673
What was that about?

729
00:59:27,673 --> 00:59:28,673
It depends on the parameters.

730
00:59:28,673 --> 00:59:31,673
So the parameters are just specifically there's a waiting period.

731
00:59:31,673 --> 00:59:34,673
Once you put the note on, you have to let everyone look at the note.

732
00:59:34,673 --> 00:59:38,673
It's a little bit like an eviction notice where it's like you have to let everyone
look at the note for a while

733
00:59:38,673 --> 00:59:43,673
before anything happens, which is good because that only disadvantages the attacker

734
00:59:43,673 --> 00:59:46,673
because the attacker is always going to try a surprise attack.

735
00:59:46,673 --> 00:59:55,673
But what happens when you have, let's say, one pool say that, yeah, I want to get
all the money

736
00:59:55,673 --> 00:59:59,673
versus this pool says, wait a minute, no, the normal people are supposed to get the
money in the next block.

737
00:59:59,673 --> 01:00:00,673
What happens then?

738
01:00:00,673 --> 01:00:03,673
Then, see, that's the other thing is that there's ways.

739
01:00:03,673 --> 01:00:04,673
It's easy.

740
01:00:04,673 --> 01:00:08,673
You can, in fact, if you upvote, if there's multiple, okay, per sidechain,

741
01:00:08,673 --> 01:00:14,673
there can only be one note on the box that is upvoted at a period of time.

742
01:00:14,673 --> 01:00:18,673
So you can put another note on, and you can say, that's not what I want to do.

743
01:00:18,673 --> 01:00:19,673
I want to do this other withdrawal.

744
01:00:19,673 --> 01:00:21,673
Are you saying note, N-O-T-E?

745
01:00:21,673 --> 01:00:22,673
You know what I mean?

746
01:00:22,673 --> 01:00:26,673
It's like when you go up to the red box there.

747
01:00:26,673 --> 01:00:29,673
So how do you invalidate that note?

748
01:00:29,673 --> 01:00:34,673
If it doesn't get enough acknowledgment, it just goes away after a period of time.

749
01:00:34,673 --> 01:00:35,673
It just dies.

750
01:00:35,673 --> 01:00:36,673
Okay.

751
01:00:36,673 --> 01:00:42,673
But let's, for this sake, because obviously if you made it one block, that's very
dangerous.

752
01:00:42,673 --> 01:00:43,673
Of course.

753
01:00:43,673 --> 01:00:46,673
Then, yeah, you're inviting a giant transaction fee.

754
01:00:46,673 --> 01:00:48,673
You have no time.

755
01:00:48,673 --> 01:00:54,673
If you make it just one block to be able to withdraw, you have no time to refute
someone just stealing.

756
01:00:54,673 --> 01:00:58,673
Literally, that's like the best attack is making withdrawal one block.

757
01:00:58,673 --> 01:01:01,673
That's actually a very good way of explaining it.

758
01:01:01,673 --> 01:01:06,673
I think I would say if the note is only one block or zero blocks or whatever you're
saying here,

759
01:01:06,673 --> 01:01:11,673
then effectively the sidechain has regressed to become a hard fork of Bitcoin,

760
01:01:11,673 --> 01:01:17,673
where everyone has to validate the whole thing as a validation rule.

761
01:01:17,673 --> 01:01:21,673
And if they don't validate, then it's basically just a giant transaction fee.

762
01:01:21,673 --> 01:01:25,673
All the deposits are just a giant transaction fee paid to one line or somewhere.

763
01:01:25,673 --> 01:01:33,673
And your example with the three-month interval was, okay, yeah, someone's doing some
screwy shit,

764
01:01:33,673 --> 01:01:37,673
but, you know, over the course of like a day, it's going to be all over Reddit, all
over Twitter,

765
01:01:37,673 --> 01:01:40,673
and people are going to be like, what the heck's going on?

766
01:01:40,673 --> 01:01:43,673
The price is going to plummet.

767
01:01:43,673 --> 01:01:45,673
Some weird stuff is going to happen.

768
01:01:45,673 --> 01:01:54,673
I think what is also kind of strange to think about is scare tactics, where they
think they're going to steal everything,

769
01:01:54,673 --> 01:01:58,673
make everyone short sell or like sell their coins for like half price,

770
01:01:58,673 --> 01:02:02,673
and then they just use the standard way to get all the Bitcoin.

771
01:02:02,673 --> 01:02:10,673
So what do you think will combat the scare tactics and making people sell their
Drivechain coins for cheaper

772
01:02:10,673 --> 01:02:14,673
than what they could get if they just waited the time period?

773
01:02:14,673 --> 01:02:18,673
Well, it depends.

774
01:02:18,673 --> 01:02:20,673
This might never happen because...

775
01:02:20,673 --> 01:02:21,673
It may happen.

776
01:02:21,673 --> 01:02:25,673
It's something I've thought about that may happen.

777
01:02:25,673 --> 01:02:30,673
But here's the other thing is that so like what they might do is they might be like
a scare tactic,

778
01:02:30,673 --> 01:02:35,673
and then it might be like the price of the atomic swaps collapses to like 70 cents
in the dollar

779
01:02:35,673 --> 01:02:37,673
instead of like 99 cents in the dollar.

780
01:02:37,673 --> 01:02:42,673
And in that way, there's kind of like a 30% tax for moving back.

781
01:02:42,673 --> 01:02:45,673
But if the miners are going to steal, it's a little...

782
01:02:45,673 --> 01:02:48,673
You see, at a certain point, it becomes qualitatively different.

783
01:02:48,673 --> 01:02:52,673
Like the difference between one block and several thousand blocks,

784
01:02:52,673 --> 01:02:56,673
it does eventually just take on a whole new quality in my opinion.

785
01:02:56,673 --> 01:03:05,673
But in the same way, the threat to steal or to just be a jerk about how expensive it
is to move the money back,

786
01:03:05,673 --> 01:03:09,673
that is different from improperly moving it back I think categorically.

787
01:03:09,673 --> 01:03:12,673
So like if you can...

788
01:03:12,673 --> 01:03:17,673
So your recourse might be to just say, I'm going to stay on this sidechain forever.

789
01:03:17,673 --> 01:03:20,673
I'm never moving the money back because they're playing all these games.

790
01:03:20,673 --> 01:03:23,673
It's more like a blockade or something among the islands.

791
01:03:23,673 --> 01:03:24,673
You can say, well, I don't care.

792
01:03:24,673 --> 01:03:28,673
I'm just going to stay on this island because they wouldn't dare, which they may in
fact dare.

793
01:03:28,673 --> 01:03:30,673
I don't know if this would be the case.

794
01:03:30,673 --> 01:03:34,673
But one could reason with some justification, I think,

795
01:03:34,673 --> 01:03:38,673
that although they may want to shake people down when they're in the airport,

796
01:03:38,673 --> 01:03:40,673
like the thugs may want to shake people down in the airport,

797
01:03:40,673 --> 01:03:48,673
they wouldn't dare actually attack the island because then it would just ruin the
entire archipelago economy

798
01:03:48,673 --> 01:03:53,673
or whatever you would say, and that would be a basis for all their revenues
decreasing,

799
01:03:53,673 --> 01:03:56,673
the transaction fee as well as the exchange rate of Bitcoin.

800
01:03:56,673 --> 01:04:03,673
But, yeah, it's not totally clear to me that this will have no problem whatsoever.

801
01:04:03,673 --> 01:04:14,673
I also think that, you know, being a bad actor like this is very bad for reputation

802
01:04:14,673 --> 01:04:19,673
and just being part of the ecosystem as far as being malicious for so long.

803
01:04:19,673 --> 01:04:27,673
I just don't think that – what I think will happen is that there will be news about
sidechains in general

804
01:04:27,673 --> 01:04:30,673
that will cause the Bitcoin price to go up.

805
01:04:30,673 --> 01:04:37,673
And after a certain point, there will be sidechains added that will have
transaction fees on them,

806
01:04:37,673 --> 01:04:41,673
and that will cause – all of this will cause minor revenues to go up,

807
01:04:41,673 --> 01:04:43,673
which will eventually cause the difficulty to go up.

808
01:04:43,673 --> 01:04:48,673
And so after a certain point, miners like literally won't be able to afford to –

809
01:04:48,673 --> 01:04:55,673
Well, I mean, regardless of that, I think that given enough time with a
decentralized network

810
01:04:55,673 --> 01:05:00,673
that the downvoted test of this would also be possible.

811
01:05:00,673 --> 01:05:05,673
See, that's the other thing that I forgot to mention is that you can put multiple
notes on the little red box

812
01:05:05,673 --> 01:05:07,673
and say I want to withdraw this, I want to withdraw that.

813
01:05:07,673 --> 01:05:11,673
You can only upvote one at a time, but you can downvote all of them at a time,

814
01:05:11,673 --> 01:05:13,673
or you can abstain from all of them at a time.

815
01:05:13,673 --> 01:05:15,673
So it's actually a lot more –

816
01:05:15,673 --> 01:05:17,673
It's free to downvote.

817
01:05:17,673 --> 01:05:21,673
Yeah, so it's free to downvote, and the default is abstain.

818
01:05:21,673 --> 01:05:26,673
So it's much easier to get the whole process to just fail and force it to start
over.

819
01:05:26,673 --> 01:05:29,673
So it would be very difficult to – you can set –

820
01:05:29,673 --> 01:05:32,673
and so that's the thing is you can set the threshold however you like.

821
01:05:32,673 --> 01:05:39,673
You can say I need – because notice that a downvote has twice the strength of an
upvote in a way,

822
01:05:39,673 --> 01:05:44,673
because if you start with a store score of zero and you need to get up to a score of
50,

823
01:05:44,673 --> 01:05:48,673
and each upvote sends you up once, each abstention sends you sideways,

824
01:05:49,673 --> 01:05:51,673
and each downvote sends you down.

825
01:05:51,673 --> 01:05:53,673
So the bad guy goes up.

826
01:05:53,673 --> 01:06:00,673
You can have 60% bad guys and 30% abstainers, and you'll go up two and down one.

827
01:06:00,673 --> 01:06:03,673
But if your goal is to get to – I forgot even what I said.

828
01:06:03,673 --> 01:06:05,673
What was the goal?

829
01:06:05,673 --> 01:06:11,673
If your goal is to get to – let's say there's a 100-period waiting period –

830
01:06:11,673 --> 01:06:16,673
sorry, 100 blocks of waiting and then 100 blocks of voting.

831
01:06:16,673 --> 01:06:18,673
Now that's obviously too short for me.

832
01:06:18,673 --> 01:06:19,673
I want multiple months.

833
01:06:19,673 --> 01:06:21,673
But I'm just saying –

834
01:06:21,673 --> 01:06:24,673
Let's say 144 one day.

835
01:06:24,673 --> 01:06:25,673
Okay, fine.

836
01:06:25,673 --> 01:06:29,673
So you have 144 of waiting where no one does anything.

837
01:06:29,673 --> 01:06:31,673
You just have to get a look at the note.

838
01:06:31,673 --> 01:06:36,673
And this is enough time really to at least put something on Reddit or whatever,

839
01:06:36,673 --> 01:06:38,673
however you like to do, however you prefer your things.

840
01:06:38,673 --> 01:06:42,673
I mean all the miners do know each other and they have their phone numbers at this
point.

841
01:06:42,673 --> 01:06:45,673
So I mean that's a sure matter of reality.

842
01:06:45,673 --> 01:06:47,673
It's not that I'm relying on that.

843
01:06:47,673 --> 01:06:50,673
Okay, but waiting period and then voting period.

844
01:06:50,673 --> 01:06:53,673
So voting period, 144 blocks, we start at zero.

845
01:06:53,673 --> 01:06:57,673
Now it's a parameter of the box, the red box there,

846
01:06:57,673 --> 01:07:03,673
of what score you need to hit out of 144 in order for the box to open.

847
01:07:03,673 --> 01:07:09,673
So if the score is like half of 144 is 72.

848
01:07:09,673 --> 01:07:12,673
So let's say the score is 72.

849
01:07:12,673 --> 01:07:13,673
That's half.

850
01:07:13,673 --> 01:07:21,673
Now what may be clear to you is that if you have half the hash power on your side

851
01:07:21,673 --> 01:07:26,673
and you have – and the other half doesn't care,

852
01:07:26,673 --> 01:07:29,673
then you'll just barely hit it in time, right?

853
01:07:29,673 --> 01:07:32,673
Because you'll have one upvote and then one abstention

854
01:07:32,673 --> 01:07:34,673
and then one upvote and then one abstention.

855
01:07:34,673 --> 01:07:38,673
So by the time you've gone 144 blocks, you'll have just barely cleared 72

856
01:07:38,673 --> 01:07:40,673
and the box will just open in time.

857
01:07:40,673 --> 01:07:44,673
Does that make sense to you?

858
01:07:44,673 --> 01:07:45,673
Last part you said?

859
01:07:45,673 --> 01:07:46,673
What was that?

860
01:07:46,673 --> 01:07:48,673
Yeah, so I'm asking you if this makes sense.

861
01:07:48,673 --> 01:07:53,673
So you have 144 blocks to vote and you have half the hash rate that wants to –

862
01:07:53,673 --> 01:07:56,673
I want to ask questions about the voting process.

863
01:07:56,673 --> 01:07:59,673
So is it if I mine a block?

864
01:07:59,673 --> 01:08:01,673
Yes.

865
01:08:01,673 --> 01:08:03,673
I mine a block, I vote.

866
01:08:03,673 --> 01:08:08,673
You move the counter up or sideways?

867
01:08:08,673 --> 01:08:11,673
And essentially the incentive to be a good actor

868
01:08:11,673 --> 01:08:14,673
and all this stuff is you want to keep collecting fees from these sidechains.

869
01:08:14,673 --> 01:08:19,673
So when you start being a bad actor, you forego that ability potentially.

870
01:08:19,673 --> 01:08:21,673
Yeah, if you torpedo the chain, then no one will want to use it

871
01:08:21,673 --> 01:08:23,673
and then the transaction fees will be gone.

872
01:08:23,673 --> 01:08:29,673
And probably people will no longer want to use any sidechain.

873
01:08:29,673 --> 01:08:34,673
So what is the likelihood that people don't agree with the sidechain

874
01:08:34,673 --> 01:08:37,673
and they just downvote it every time?

875
01:08:37,673 --> 01:08:42,673
Well, that's not – no, that's not exogenous.

876
01:08:42,673 --> 01:08:44,673
That depends on what's happening in the world.

877
01:08:44,673 --> 01:08:51,673
But that's what I was trying to demonstrate is that if you have 144 blocks of voting

878
01:08:51,673 --> 01:08:56,673
and you need to hit 72 and half the miners are – they want to steal money

879
01:08:56,673 --> 01:09:01,673
and they control half the hash rate, they find half those 144 blocks,

880
01:09:01,673 --> 01:09:07,673
they will just barely succeed in time if the other miners are indifferent.

881
01:09:07,673 --> 01:09:10,673
So you have 144 blocks that are going to be found.

882
01:09:10,673 --> 01:09:14,673
You control half the hash rate.

883
01:09:14,673 --> 01:09:17,673
You're saying if they're not voting at all, the other miners.

884
01:09:17,673 --> 01:09:18,673
The other half, right.

885
01:09:18,673 --> 01:09:20,673
But if a single one of them downvotes.

886
01:09:20,673 --> 01:09:25,673
But if one of those miners vote downvote,

887
01:09:25,673 --> 01:09:30,673
so as long as we have one block out of like the half or whatever.

888
01:09:30,673 --> 01:09:31,673
No, no, no.

889
01:09:31,673 --> 01:09:32,673
But you see this depends.

890
01:09:32,673 --> 01:09:33,673
Because they have at least 50%.

891
01:09:33,673 --> 01:09:35,673
No, but that's not always the case.

892
01:09:35,673 --> 01:09:36,673
In this specific example.

893
01:09:36,673 --> 01:09:40,673
But miners may – what?

894
01:09:40,673 --> 01:09:45,673
It depends how the soft fork is implemented on the percentage.

895
01:09:45,673 --> 01:09:47,673
Yes, it depends on the parameters that you put in.

896
01:09:47,673 --> 01:09:53,673
You see, in this case we had parameters of 144 and 72.

897
01:09:53,673 --> 01:09:55,673
Yes, okay.

898
01:09:55,673 --> 01:09:56,673
I get what you're saying.

899
01:09:56,673 --> 01:09:57,673
Wait, hold on.

900
01:09:57,673 --> 01:09:59,673
Just make sure people understand this.

901
01:09:59,673 --> 01:10:04,673
I mean, even though we're going through it,

902
01:10:04,673 --> 01:10:06,673
I just want to make sure we kind of recap.

903
01:10:06,673 --> 01:10:10,673
So essentially, let me kind of shoot this box up here.

904
01:10:10,673 --> 01:10:15,673
So this essentially, the criteria when you make this,

905
01:10:15,673 --> 01:10:21,673
we're talking about like voting and valid withdrawals and stuff.

906
01:10:21,673 --> 01:10:26,673
If you had like your timeline be 144 blocks,

907
01:10:27,673 --> 01:10:29,673
some Bitcoin blocks,

908
01:10:29,673 --> 01:10:34,673
then you would need at least 50% –

909
01:10:34,673 --> 01:10:42,673
like the rules of this is at least 50% acceptance upvotes need to be done

910
01:10:42,673 --> 01:10:46,673
in order for it to be valid on who gets what when a withdrawal is done.

911
01:10:46,673 --> 01:10:48,673
144 and 72.

912
01:10:48,673 --> 01:10:50,673
You know, it's not quite like that.

913
01:10:50,673 --> 01:10:52,673
I do it a slightly different way to save space.

914
01:10:52,673 --> 01:10:55,673
But it's basically 144 and 72.

915
01:10:55,673 --> 01:11:01,673
Anyways, all I'm trying to get at is the 144 blocks.

916
01:11:01,673 --> 01:11:04,673
If just one of those people of the –

917
01:11:04,673 --> 01:11:10,673
let's say the bad actor has got 72 votes or 72 of the 144.

918
01:11:10,673 --> 01:11:13,673
These people are abstaining, the other groups of miners.

919
01:11:13,673 --> 01:11:18,673
If just one of them downvotes, then it's voided out.

920
01:11:18,673 --> 01:11:20,673
It's all for null, right?

921
01:11:20,673 --> 01:11:22,673
Yes, but it's a little more complicated than that

922
01:11:22,673 --> 01:11:26,673
because the miners could try to orphan each other strategically.

923
01:11:26,673 --> 01:11:28,673
But, see, in order for them to do that,

924
01:11:28,673 --> 01:11:30,673
there have to be some other weird things happening,

925
01:11:30,673 --> 01:11:32,673
and they have to also care a lot more

926
01:11:32,673 --> 01:11:35,673
because now they're not just doing some weird sidechain thing.

927
01:11:35,673 --> 01:11:37,673
They're doing mainchain stuff,

928
01:11:37,673 --> 01:11:40,673
and then we have to talk about spy mining and all these other things.

929
01:11:40,673 --> 01:11:42,673
So it's a little more complicated than that.

930
01:11:42,673 --> 01:11:46,673
The other thing is that this example, maybe they don't have more than 50,

931
01:11:46,673 --> 01:11:49,673
or maybe they get lucky, or maybe they get unlucky.

932
01:11:49,673 --> 01:11:51,673
Maybe they actually have 51.

933
01:11:51,673 --> 01:11:53,673
So if they have 90% of the hash file,

934
01:11:53,673 --> 01:11:56,673
then it doesn't matter if 90% vote for and 10% vote against,

935
01:11:56,673 --> 01:11:58,673
it's still a net 80%,

936
01:11:58,673 --> 01:12:01,673
which is more than enough to push it over the line in this case.

937
01:12:01,673 --> 01:12:04,673
But it depends on which parameters you want to pick.

938
01:12:04,673 --> 01:12:07,673
Yeah, I mean, you would be kind of crazy, though,

939
01:12:07,673 --> 01:12:09,673
if you made it like 90% consensus

940
01:12:09,673 --> 01:12:12,673
because you would have that one pool that's in America.

941
01:12:12,673 --> 01:12:14,673
Yeah, you have two problems.

942
01:12:14,673 --> 01:12:18,673
If you make it too high, then you could have a small pool downvote you

943
01:12:18,673 --> 01:12:20,673
and just veto everything, and it would be like a Polish veto

944
01:12:20,673 --> 01:12:26,673
where just nothing can ever get done because you can never get full consensus.

945
01:12:26,673 --> 01:12:29,673
But you could do that if you want.

946
01:12:29,673 --> 01:12:32,673
That's up to the people who design the sidechain

947
01:12:32,673 --> 01:12:34,673
and who soft work in the new escrow,

948
01:12:34,673 --> 01:12:37,673
so the new little box there, the blue and red box.

949
01:12:37,673 --> 01:12:41,673
So it depends on that, but that's why I want it to be a very long,

950
01:12:41,673 --> 01:12:44,673
nice healthy waiting period of like a week or two

951
01:12:44,673 --> 01:12:47,673
because it should be very easy to tell if they're correct or not

952
01:12:47,673 --> 01:12:51,673
because you just have to look at one little 32-byte hash

953
01:12:51,673 --> 01:12:53,673
and another little 32-byte hash.

954
01:12:53,673 --> 01:12:57,673
You can easily look at it with your human eyes, see if they're the same or not.

955
01:12:57,673 --> 01:12:59,673
So it's very easy to figure that out.

956
01:12:59,673 --> 01:13:04,673
And then there has to be this ongoing process of you can't just claim.

957
01:13:04,673 --> 01:13:08,673
If you're a big miner, you can't just claim that your hands are clean

958
01:13:08,673 --> 01:13:12,673
because you should at least be downvoting the mysterious thing,

959
01:13:12,673 --> 01:13:16,673
even if you don't want to run a full node yourself

960
01:13:16,673 --> 01:13:18,673
and figure out what's going on and what you should upvote.

961
01:13:18,673 --> 01:13:21,673
You should just say, well, we've been getting a lot of complaints,

962
01:13:21,673 --> 01:13:24,673
so we're just going to downvote this because it's going to affect

963
01:13:24,673 --> 01:13:27,673
our other sidechain business or something that we actually do like.

964
01:13:27,673 --> 01:13:31,673
So even if you have some weird sidechain, they're all kind of blurred together here.

965
01:13:31,673 --> 01:13:34,673
So what you want is for anyone stealing from one sidechain

966
01:13:34,673 --> 01:13:39,673
to kind of really bear the brunt of the wrath of stealing from all the sidechains,

967
01:13:39,673 --> 01:13:41,673
which is exactly how regular Bitcoin works

968
01:13:41,673 --> 01:13:44,673
by aggregating all the transactions into one blockchain.

969
01:13:44,673 --> 01:13:46,673
So you can't just double spend one person.

970
01:13:46,673 --> 01:13:50,673
You have to do the entire chain, which is kind of the secret sauce.

971
01:13:50,673 --> 01:13:53,673
So I also want to point out, Paul, correct me if I'm wrong,

972
01:13:53,673 --> 01:13:59,673
the way Rootstock gets around some of these issues is more of a service

973
01:13:59,673 --> 01:14:01,673
where they charge 20%.

974
01:14:01,673 --> 01:14:03,673
Yeah, they do some weird stuff.

975
01:14:03,673 --> 01:14:07,673
So in particular, you can see they're essentially using a service, though,

976
01:14:07,673 --> 01:14:11,673
to insure a peg, and they're insuring quicker withdrawals.

977
01:14:11,673 --> 01:14:16,673
But essentially, you're using Rootstock, and they're charging a substantial fee.

978
01:14:16,673 --> 01:14:19,673
Well, yeah, they do like a half-federated thing.

979
01:14:19,673 --> 01:14:21,673
Then they do this other thing.

980
01:14:21,673 --> 01:14:25,673
I'm just saying this requires like no kind of company centralized.

981
01:14:25,673 --> 01:14:27,673
Yeah, I don't do any of this.

982
01:14:27,673 --> 01:14:32,673
They have like a federated thing that has predefined identities that don't change,

983
01:14:32,673 --> 01:14:36,673
which is like practically a definition of centralization for me.

984
01:14:37,673 --> 01:14:41,673
I just want to make a distinction between this idea.

985
01:14:41,673 --> 01:14:43,673
Yes, they do do some weird stuff.

986
01:14:43,673 --> 01:14:49,673
In fact, there's a weird e-mail where I explain you can find it on Bitcoin Dev

987
01:14:49,673 --> 01:14:55,673
right after I do the Drivechain follow-up on the request for discussion.

988
01:14:55,673 --> 01:14:57,673
Sergio shows up sometime.

989
01:14:57,806 --> 01:14:59,806
I was after consensus, so that was like May, June, so it was like June.

990
01:14:59,806 --> 01:15:04,806
So if you want to find that, you can talk about how this thing is a little
different.

991
01:15:04,806 --> 01:15:07,806
Cool. All right. You ready to jump to the next question?

992
01:15:07,806 --> 01:15:09,806
Let's do it.

993
01:15:09,806 --> 01:15:11,806
All right. That was good.

994
01:15:11,806 --> 01:15:12,806
That was a big question.

995
01:15:12,806 --> 01:15:16,806
Well, someone asked to explain the game theory of the most important parts.

996
01:15:16,806 --> 01:15:21,806
So hopefully, we'll probably end up skipping some of these questions,

997
01:15:22,806 --> 01:15:25,806
because obviously, we've covered so much already.

998
01:15:25,806 --> 01:15:39,806
But this is asking if sidechains can alter the heartbeat, like 20-minute block
times.

999
01:15:39,806 --> 01:15:41,806
I think we kind of already covered that.

1000
01:15:41,806 --> 01:15:44,806
But here's the interesting thing.

1001
01:15:44,806 --> 01:15:46,806
He said 20-minute block times.

1002
01:15:46,806 --> 01:15:49,806
So if you actually want a longer block time, how would you do that?

1003
01:15:50,806 --> 01:15:53,806
I haven't really given a lot of thought, but it must be easier.

1004
01:15:53,806 --> 01:15:56,806
I mean you must just say that every 10 minutes, you'd alternate the other way.

1005
01:15:56,806 --> 01:15:59,806
You'd just say you'd just block.

1006
01:15:59,806 --> 01:16:03,806
You'd have to go off block parity.

1007
01:16:03,806 --> 01:16:05,806
You'd just say this one is a null block.

1008
01:16:05,806 --> 01:16:07,806
This doesn't contain anything.

1009
01:16:09,806 --> 01:16:12,806
You wouldn't be able to collect fees on the null block.

1010
01:16:12,806 --> 01:16:13,806
Yeah, but that's what I mean.

1011
01:16:13,806 --> 01:16:15,806
You wouldn't have taken any effort to make either.

1012
01:16:15,806 --> 01:16:17,806
You'd just say like –

1013
01:16:17,806 --> 01:16:19,806
Wouldn't it be simple to –

1014
01:16:19,806 --> 01:16:22,806
The hash is always just a bunch of zeros.

1015
01:16:22,806 --> 01:16:23,806
Sorry?

1016
01:16:23,806 --> 01:16:30,806
The criteria of the chain to be like only on odd-numbered blocks you can write?

1017
01:16:30,806 --> 01:16:32,806
Well, that sounds annoying and complicated.

1018
01:16:32,806 --> 01:16:36,806
That would essentially be a –

1019
01:16:36,806 --> 01:16:38,806
No, but that's what I am saying.

1020
01:16:38,806 --> 01:16:40,806
Without doing that cumbersome requirement,

1021
01:16:40,806 --> 01:16:43,806
because we want to affect the main chain as little as possible always.

1022
01:16:43,806 --> 01:16:45,806
It's the guiding principle.

1023
01:16:46,806 --> 01:16:50,806
I think it would just be easier to say every other hash has to be just a bunch of
zeros.

1024
01:16:54,806 --> 01:16:56,806
Next question.

1025
01:16:56,806 --> 01:17:02,806
Paul, can you replace the consensus mechanism on the sidechain to make it proof of
stake?

1026
01:17:02,806 --> 01:17:05,806
We kind of covered that already.

1027
01:17:05,806 --> 01:17:08,806
Or an alternative version of proof of work.

1028
01:17:08,806 --> 01:17:11,806
So maybe we talked about this earlier.

1029
01:17:11,806 --> 01:17:13,806
There's no reason.

1030
01:17:13,806 --> 01:17:15,806
Because you already get all the free work you want.

1031
01:17:17,806 --> 01:17:18,806
Okay, so –

1032
01:17:18,806 --> 01:17:19,806
You get all the main chain's work.

1033
01:17:19,806 --> 01:17:23,806
Alternative proof of work, maybe that goes back to our shorter block times.

1034
01:17:23,806 --> 01:17:25,806
Well, that's the point.

1035
01:17:25,806 --> 01:17:28,806
If you had an actual problem there that you needed proof of work to solve.

1036
01:17:28,806 --> 01:17:31,806
Because otherwise, why would there be –

1037
01:17:31,806 --> 01:17:34,806
They would just find one block after another if there wasn't someone slowing it
down.

1038
01:17:34,806 --> 01:17:36,806
So the –

1039
01:17:36,806 --> 01:17:41,806
This really hones in to the idea of this is a lot more simple

1040
01:17:41,806 --> 01:17:44,806
when you just go off the Bitcoin block time.

1041
01:17:44,806 --> 01:17:47,806
And when blocks are found there, also these things can be blind merge lines.

1042
01:17:47,806 --> 01:17:49,806
So just to emphasize that.

1043
01:17:49,806 --> 01:17:50,806
That's like –

1044
01:17:50,806 --> 01:17:52,806
Yeah, I think also it's like –

1045
01:17:52,806 --> 01:17:54,806
You're kind of going against the grain.

1046
01:17:54,806 --> 01:17:55,806
It's not even any of that.

1047
01:17:55,806 --> 01:18:03,806
It's just that people want these fake things so that they have a reason to pretend
that their project is interesting or different.

1048
01:18:03,806 --> 01:18:04,806
But it's not –

1049
01:18:04,806 --> 01:18:15,806
Changing the block time from 10 minutes to some other number, that's just like
stupid.

1050
01:18:15,806 --> 01:18:17,806
I mean it's not anything.

1051
01:18:17,806 --> 01:18:19,806
It's not an actual idea.

1052
01:18:19,806 --> 01:18:22,806
Because people don't know what the block time is for.

1053
01:18:25,806 --> 01:18:28,806
Some people don't know about our podcast either.

1054
01:18:28,806 --> 01:18:29,806
Yeah.

1055
01:18:32,806 --> 01:18:36,806
All right, so here's another question.

1056
01:18:36,806 --> 01:18:40,806
How has security changed if only 5% of the miners are merge mining?

1057
01:18:40,806 --> 01:18:44,806
Well, he said merge mining, which is different than Blind Merged Mining.

1058
01:18:44,806 --> 01:18:45,806
We can talk about that actually.

1059
01:18:45,806 --> 01:18:46,806
No, it's the same.

1060
01:18:46,806 --> 01:18:47,806
I mean it's –

1061
01:18:47,806 --> 01:18:49,806
For the purpose of the question, it's the same.

1062
01:18:49,806 --> 01:18:50,806
Okay, sure.

1063
01:18:51,806 --> 01:18:59,806
merge mining, and he says, what's the difference with security if 5% of the miners
are merge mining versus 75% to 100%?

1064
01:18:59,806 --> 01:19:08,806
And I would say that as long as you have at least one substantial pool mining your
sidechain, you're good.

1065
01:19:08,806 --> 01:19:11,806
Well, it's a little bit different actually.

1066
01:19:11,806 --> 01:19:13,806
I think it is a little bit different.

1067
01:19:13,806 --> 01:19:14,806
I think you're right.

1068
01:19:14,806 --> 01:19:15,806
I agree with you.

1069
01:19:15,806 --> 01:19:19,806
But I was thinking that with Blind Merged Mining, there's less of a reason.

1070
01:19:19,806 --> 01:19:24,806
So without Blind Merged Mining, or if only some miners –

1071
01:19:24,806 --> 01:19:30,806
like let's just say it's dogmatic, and we'll just say only 5% are mining this coin.

1072
01:19:30,806 --> 01:19:35,806
And we'll ignore the really important question of why.

1073
01:19:35,806 --> 01:19:38,806
Why are they ignoring this coin?

1074
01:19:38,806 --> 01:19:40,806
Why don't they want free money?

1075
01:19:40,806 --> 01:19:44,806
That's a more important question, but we'll ignore it temporarily.

1076
01:19:44,806 --> 01:19:52,806
And we'll just say only 5%, for some magical reason, are mining the sidechain.

1077
01:19:52,806 --> 01:20:05,806
And as a result, I would say that probably, therefore, the sidechain is only going
to actually find a block once every whatever it would be, a factor of 20.

1078
01:20:05,806 --> 01:20:08,806
So once every 200 minutes instead of once every 10 minutes.

1079
01:20:09,806 --> 01:20:16,806
I can't wait until companies are saying, you know, I don't really want Drivechains.

1080
01:20:16,806 --> 01:20:20,806
I want the technology behind Drivechains, which is blind.

1081
01:20:20,806 --> 01:20:23,806
I can't wait for companies to start saying that.

1082
01:20:23,806 --> 01:20:24,806
Well, who knows?

1083
01:20:24,806 --> 01:20:27,806
They might say they want the technology behind Blind Merged Mining.

1084
01:20:27,806 --> 01:20:29,806
Whatever that means.

1085
01:20:29,806 --> 01:20:32,806
I want the technology behind SHA-256.

1086
01:20:33,806 --> 01:20:38,806
It's not really about multiplication, Michael Tidwell.

1087
01:20:38,806 --> 01:20:41,806
It's about the technology behind multiplication.

1088
01:20:41,806 --> 01:20:45,806
It's like, you know, there's technically no end to that abstraction.

1089
01:20:45,806 --> 01:20:51,806
Okay, but see, that we ignored a more important question, which is why would only 5%
do that?

1090
01:20:51,806 --> 01:20:54,806
Because with Blind Merged Mining, you don't even need to run the full node.

1091
01:20:54,806 --> 01:20:56,806
So it's just free money.

1092
01:20:56,806 --> 01:21:04,806
And we have the example of Namecoin already, where you were handicapped by your
requirement to run a full node in the past and still are today.

1093
01:21:04,806 --> 01:21:10,806
There was a lengthy amount of time that you had the Namecoin, you needed to run a
full node.

1094
01:21:10,806 --> 01:21:17,806
And yet, even though this was very annoying, because the node would crash and would
bring down all your mining equipment with it.

1095
01:21:17,806 --> 01:21:21,806
Because the Namecoin code was a little bit more buggy than the Bitcoin code.

1096
01:21:21,806 --> 01:21:30,806
Even though there was this albatross of, you know, this disadvantage, you still had
this.

1097
01:21:30,806 --> 01:21:35,806
And even though the Bitcoin, each Bitcoin block was worth like thousands and
thousands of dollars at this time.

1098
01:21:35,806 --> 01:21:41,806
But each Namecoin block was only worth $8 worth of coins, you know, priced in
equivalent currency.

1099
01:21:42,806 --> 01:21:52,806
Even there was still a time when, for a very long time, more, and I think even today
possibly, more than half of the Bitcoin hash rate, more than 50%.

1100
01:21:52,806 --> 01:21:59,806
Still merge mines Namecoin today, even though Namecoin contributes just a tiny, tiny
sliver of cash.

1101
01:21:59,806 --> 01:22:03,806
And sometimes has all these problems with like crashing.

1102
01:22:03,806 --> 01:22:07,806
So in this, you don't even need to run the node, so the node can't crash with blind
merge mining.

1103
01:22:07,806 --> 01:22:15,806
The node can't crash and it doesn't even consume any extra resources of any kind of
CPU bandwidth or whatever.

1104
01:22:15,806 --> 01:22:20,806
So I would, so I think it's actually an important question of why is that number at
5%.

1105
01:22:20,806 --> 01:22:27,806
But if we take the number literally at 5%, we say only one out of every 20 miners
are merge mining the coin.

1106
01:22:27,806 --> 01:22:35,806
Then only one out of every blocks will find a block for the main chain and for this
sidechain simultaneously.

1107
01:22:35,806 --> 01:22:43,806
So the effective block time of the sidechain will be lengthened by a factor of 20
for 1 over 5%.

1108
01:22:43,806 --> 01:22:48,806
And there will then be, instead of being 10 minutes, it would be 200 minutes.

1109
01:22:48,806 --> 01:22:55,806
So they have a very slow blocks and that sidechain will need to have a very large
block size as a result.

1110
01:22:55,806 --> 01:23:01,806
But I don't think, I mean, if you wanted to have the same throughput of 1 megabyte
for 10 minutes that we have now,

1111
01:23:01,806 --> 01:23:09,806
or 2.2 SegWit corrected, whatever you want to call that, but block weight or
whatever.

1112
01:23:09,806 --> 01:23:13,806
But I think the more important question is why is it 5%?

1113
01:23:13,806 --> 01:23:15,806
Because it should really be 100%.

1114
01:23:15,806 --> 01:23:19,806
But that's, I think that was a good question though.

1115
01:23:19,806 --> 01:23:24,806
Next question, also from Risho.

1116
01:23:24,806 --> 01:23:34,806
Is it possible to sub blocks in to the sidechain such that you can get through
weaker in between real Bitcoin blocks?

1117
01:23:34,806 --> 01:23:36,806
So I would say you kind of already answered that.

1118
01:23:36,806 --> 01:23:38,806
We did, yeah, I think we did.

1119
01:23:38,806 --> 01:23:43,806
Like you can essentially come up with your own version of producing blocks in
between the tenant blocks.

1120
01:23:44,806 --> 01:23:48,806
It's up to interpretation of however you want to run your Drivechain.

1121
01:23:48,806 --> 01:23:53,806
You can do weird stuff to make them uneven or whatever weird stuff you want.

1122
01:23:53,806 --> 01:24:00,806
Let's see, ask Paul, how long do coins have to be locked up before you can access
them on a sidechain?

1123
01:24:00,806 --> 01:24:04,806
And how long before you can get them back on Bitcoin?

1124
01:24:04,806 --> 01:24:06,806
Okay, we did touch on that a little bit.

1125
01:24:07,806 --> 01:24:11,806
Yeah, so the answer to this is when you go to the sidechain, it's like pretty
quick.

1126
01:24:11,806 --> 01:24:14,806
It's like one block before you can start using it on the sidechain.

1127
01:24:14,806 --> 01:24:16,806
But to get it to come back.

1128
01:24:17,806 --> 01:24:25,806
Sorry, so I was going to say that it's recognized immediately, but for safety, we do
have like a little 10 block kind of buffer.

1129
01:24:26,806 --> 01:24:33,806
Okay, so like up to the interpretation of the Drivechain.

1130
01:24:33,806 --> 01:24:35,806
But yeah, coming back depends.

1131
01:24:35,806 --> 01:24:37,806
Yeah, so you're free to scroll.

1132
01:24:37,806 --> 01:24:40,806
Or going to, going to would be the implementation of the...

1133
01:24:40,806 --> 01:24:43,806
Both are upsetted.

1134
01:24:43,806 --> 01:24:53,806
But in our fake template, this blank Drivechain example, we have a little buffer of
10 blocks when it's coming in, when we're watching this come in.

1135
01:24:53,806 --> 01:24:59,806
And we have it, I don't remember where we set it to, but it's something like three
months or more going in the other direction.

1136
01:24:59,806 --> 01:25:07,806
But again, that is not actually, I mean, that's very important to understand
analytically and to know.

1137
01:25:07,806 --> 01:25:17,806
But the user would not really ever need to do either of those because he may do an
atomic swap, which is instant in one transaction.

1138
01:25:17,806 --> 01:25:20,806
Or, you know, it's as instant as anything can be.

1139
01:25:20,806 --> 01:25:21,806
Exactly.

1140
01:25:22,806 --> 01:25:24,806
So I'll lock them for...

1141
01:25:24,806 --> 01:25:25,806
Yeah.

1142
01:25:25,806 --> 01:25:26,806
Yeah, I mean...

1143
01:25:26,806 --> 01:25:27,806
You have a channel involved.

1144
01:25:27,806 --> 01:25:29,806
You know what we did talk about?

1145
01:25:29,806 --> 01:25:37,806
So we can lightning between a Drivechain and a main chain.

1146
01:25:37,806 --> 01:25:38,806
What did we talk about?

1147
01:25:38,806 --> 01:25:39,806
What did we not talk about?

1148
01:25:39,806 --> 01:25:44,806
Did you just say you could lightning between a Drivechain and the main chain?

1149
01:25:44,806 --> 01:25:47,806
So what's the difference between that and an atomic swap like in a payment chain?

1150
01:25:47,806 --> 01:25:48,806
Well, one is easier.

1151
01:25:48,806 --> 01:25:49,806
One takes more setup.

1152
01:25:49,806 --> 01:25:51,806
No, lightning takes much more setup.

1153
01:25:51,806 --> 01:25:58,806
You need to already own some coin on the sidechain.

1154
01:25:58,806 --> 01:25:59,806
You're breaking up on me.

1155
01:25:59,806 --> 01:26:00,806
Sorry.

1156
01:26:00,806 --> 01:26:01,806
Say it again.

1157
01:26:01,806 --> 01:26:03,806
You need to already own some...

1158
01:26:03,806 --> 01:26:04,806
I mean, it's my internet.

1159
01:26:04,806 --> 01:26:05,806
It's not you.

1160
01:26:05,806 --> 01:26:06,806
You know it's me.

1161
01:26:06,806 --> 01:26:09,806
You need to already own some coin on the sidechain.

1162
01:26:09,806 --> 01:26:12,806
So you can't do this with your first maneuver.

1163
01:26:12,806 --> 01:26:15,806
And you need to already own some coin on the main chain.

1164
01:26:15,806 --> 01:26:18,806
And you need to have channels open in both.

1165
01:26:18,806 --> 01:26:20,806
And then somehow those channels need to be.

1166
01:26:20,806 --> 01:26:23,806
I mean, in practice, this will be the easiest requirement.

1167
01:26:23,806 --> 01:26:27,806
But somehow those channels need to overlap with your counterparty.

1168
01:26:27,806 --> 01:26:29,806
The same needs to be true for your counterparty.

1169
01:26:29,806 --> 01:26:34,806
So both you and the person you're trying to trade with need to have some coins

1170
01:26:34,806 --> 01:26:36,806
on each of the chains.

1171
01:26:36,806 --> 01:26:37,806
And they need to have channels open.

1172
01:26:37,806 --> 01:26:39,806
And somehow those channels need to overlap.

1173
01:26:39,806 --> 01:26:40,806
Exactly.

1174
01:26:40,806 --> 01:26:42,806
But if you can do that, then that takes a lot of setup.

1175
01:26:42,806 --> 01:26:43,806
But if you can do that,

1176
01:26:43,806 --> 01:26:48,806
then this is no different than any other Lightning transaction within Bitcoin.

1177
01:26:48,806 --> 01:26:51,806
So it's very, very easy if you can pay the setup cost.

1178
01:26:51,806 --> 01:26:53,806
That is totally instantaneous and very cheap.

1179
01:26:53,806 --> 01:26:56,806
It does not involve anything hitting any chain anywhere.

1180
01:26:56,806 --> 01:26:58,806
So that's really cool stuff.

1181
01:26:58,806 --> 01:27:02,806
And, in fact, as long as I've demonstrated, I think that you can somewhere.

1182
01:27:02,806 --> 01:27:04,806
I don't remember where I put this.

1183
01:27:04,806 --> 01:27:08,806
But as long as you can do whatever smart contract thing you want to do on the

1184
01:27:08,806 --> 01:27:09,806
sidechain,

1185
01:27:09,806 --> 01:27:12,806
you can also be able to do that within the Lightning network.

1186
01:27:12,806 --> 01:27:15,806
I think it's possible to prove that just generally possible,

1187
01:27:15,806 --> 01:27:17,806
like no matter what it is.

1188
01:27:17,806 --> 01:27:20,806
So you can Lightning, as long as you have some coins on the sidechain,

1189
01:27:20,806 --> 01:27:24,806
you can Lightning some new coins from the main chain to the sidechain,

1190
01:27:24,806 --> 01:27:27,806
put them in some kind of smart contract over there,

1191
01:27:27,806 --> 01:27:30,806
and then whatever the outcome of that is supposed to be,

1192
01:27:30,806 --> 01:27:33,806
you're buying a hard drive space, you're making some kind of bet or something,

1193
01:27:33,806 --> 01:27:39,806
you can lend Lightning that back to the main chain after the fact.

1194
01:27:39,806 --> 01:27:43,806
So you can do all that stuff if you just have some coins over in the side

1195
01:27:43,806 --> 01:27:45,806
chain of a channel open somewhere.

1196
01:27:45,806 --> 01:27:49,806
So it's actually the potential, if you're willing to put up with the setup

1197
01:27:49,806 --> 01:27:54,806
cost, the potential is very high there.

1198
01:27:54,806 --> 01:27:57,806
And then you're not doing any of this slow stuff.

1199
01:27:57,806 --> 01:28:01,806
You're not doing any of the three-month stuff or the whatever stuff.

1200
01:28:01,806 --> 01:28:07,806
You got to remember, I have like a five-sentence maximum memory capacity.

1201
01:28:07,806 --> 01:28:09,806
All right.

1202
01:28:09,806 --> 01:28:10,806
All right.

1203
01:28:10,806 --> 01:28:13,806
This next question, Paul, we kind of already covered it.

1204
01:28:13,806 --> 01:28:15,806
I'm going to read it out anyways.

1205
01:28:15,806 --> 01:28:19,806
It's how long, and we kind of just talked about it, which is funny.

1206
01:28:19,806 --> 01:28:22,806
How long before you can access them on a sidechain,

1207
01:28:22,806 --> 01:28:25,806
and how long before you can get them back on Bitcoin?

1208
01:28:25,806 --> 01:28:27,806
Sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry.

1209
01:28:27,806 --> 01:28:28,806
We literally just answered that.

1210
01:28:28,806 --> 01:28:29,806
I meant to ask the next one.

1211
01:28:29,806 --> 01:28:30,806
Sorry, I'm delusional.

1212
01:28:30,806 --> 01:28:32,806
I'm delirious.

1213
01:28:32,806 --> 01:28:37,806
Paul, what does he think will happen with atomic swaps,

1214
01:28:37,806 --> 01:28:41,806
depending on how long the coins would need to be locked up before pegging

1215
01:28:41,806 --> 01:28:43,806
and unpegging?

1216
01:28:43,806 --> 01:28:45,806
I think that just means withdrawing.

1217
01:28:45,806 --> 01:28:49,806
I think we already covered that.

1218
01:28:49,806 --> 01:28:51,806
Yeah.

1219
01:28:51,806 --> 01:28:54,806
The prices could vary even though they are both Bitcoin.

1220
01:28:54,806 --> 01:28:55,806
Yes, I agree.

1221
01:28:55,806 --> 01:28:57,806
I don't know what he means when they say both Bitcoin,

1222
01:28:57,806 --> 01:28:59,806
but I think we already covered that.

1223
01:28:59,806 --> 01:29:00,806
No, no, no.

1224
01:29:00,806 --> 01:29:01,806
There's actually an important point to say.

1225
01:29:01,806 --> 01:29:03,806
The price here will vary,

1226
01:29:03,806 --> 01:29:10,806
but it will vary based on the inconvenience of the traveling back.

1227
01:29:10,806 --> 01:29:12,806
It will not be.

1228
01:29:12,806 --> 01:29:13,806
It will not be.

1229
01:29:13,806 --> 01:29:15,806
It's very different, and it's a very important difference.

1230
01:29:15,806 --> 01:29:22,806
Right now the price of Bitcoin differs from an altcoin for different reasons,

1231
01:29:22,806 --> 01:29:27,806
for reasons based on the speculation, the monetary policy of the altcoin,

1232
01:29:27,806 --> 01:29:29,806
the features of the altcoin, the marketing of the altcoin.

1233
01:29:29,806 --> 01:29:36,806
Those are features that cause the price of the Bitcoin altcoin price to vary.

1234
01:29:36,806 --> 01:29:40,806
But in this case, the only thing causing it to vary will be this one thing,

1235
01:29:40,806 --> 01:29:46,806
the inconvenience of moving it slowly back from side to main.

1236
01:29:46,806 --> 01:29:49,806
And that is important because that inconvenience is low,

1237
01:29:49,806 --> 01:29:51,806
and it's just basically static.

1238
01:29:51,806 --> 01:29:56,806
I mean it's not really static because it could be some kind of black swan event or
something.

1239
01:29:56,806 --> 01:29:58,806
I mean there's a lot of nuance to that as well.

1240
01:29:58,806 --> 01:30:06,806
But the major difference between those two is that the price may not be one-to-one,

1241
01:30:06,806 --> 01:30:12,806
but the only reason it's not one-to-one is this one thing that's being priced in,

1242
01:30:12,806 --> 01:30:14,806
the inconvenience.

1243
01:30:14,806 --> 01:30:19,806
And that is very different from the altcoin case.

1244
01:30:19,806 --> 01:30:23,806
Okay.

1245
01:30:23,806 --> 01:30:30,806
Next question, Paul, is when a sidechain explodes, for instance,

1246
01:30:30,806 --> 01:30:37,806
a bug is found that allows someone to steal the money or – this is a kind of long
question,

1247
01:30:37,806 --> 01:30:39,806
so we'll answer it in two parts.

1248
01:30:39,806 --> 01:30:43,806
So that first one.

1249
01:30:43,806 --> 01:30:44,806
Oh, what was the question?

1250
01:30:44,806 --> 01:30:46,806
If a sidechain explodes and a bug is found.

1251
01:30:47,806 --> 01:30:50,806
If a sidechain explodes or a bug is found, like what happens?

1252
01:30:50,806 --> 01:30:52,806
Okay, that's an important question.

1253
01:30:52,806 --> 01:30:57,806
So it depends on what is, in my opinion,

1254
01:30:57,806 --> 01:31:03,806
whatever the sidechain broadcasts back to the box is the note that should be placed
on the box

1255
01:31:03,806 --> 01:31:07,806
and is the note that should be act and opened, right?

1256
01:31:08,806 --> 01:31:13,806
So if the person steals from the sidechain fair and square

1257
01:31:13,806 --> 01:31:17,806
and the sidechain continues forward in time,

1258
01:31:17,806 --> 01:31:22,806
and the person says they stole 700 bitcoin and they want to withdraw it,

1259
01:31:22,806 --> 01:31:24,806
they should be able to do that.

1260
01:31:24,806 --> 01:31:30,806
But that being the case, the sidechain is free to reorg.

1261
01:31:30,806 --> 01:31:34,806
So what the nodes, the sidechain nodes can do is they can say,

1262
01:31:34,806 --> 01:31:42,806
we just merge mine block three and then we merge the sidechain's block three,

1263
01:31:42,806 --> 01:31:45,806
sidechain's block four, sidechain's block five, sidechain's block six.

1264
01:31:45,806 --> 01:31:50,806
Now in the sidechain's block number seven, there is some kind of horrible problem.

1265
01:31:50,806 --> 01:31:57,806
Now what I think is allowed and should be allowed is that the people in the
sidechain community,

1266
01:31:57,806 --> 01:32:00,806
specific to this sidechain and not bothering anyone else,

1267
01:32:00,806 --> 01:32:05,806
they should say we want to mine, and they can do this with Blind Merged Mining
relatively easily,

1268
01:32:05,806 --> 01:32:09,806
they can say we don't want to actually mine block number eight on top of this block.

1269
01:32:09,806 --> 01:32:11,806
Block number seven is fucked up.

1270
01:32:11,806 --> 01:32:17,806
So what we're going to do instead is we're going to do more like what happened in
bitcoin

1271
01:32:17,806 --> 01:32:20,806
where there was the integer overflow bug or something.

1272
01:32:20,806 --> 01:32:24,806
We're going to say, okay, we're going to mine block six again.

1273
01:32:24,806 --> 01:32:28,806
Let's go off the Ethereum DAO situation.

1274
01:32:28,806 --> 01:32:29,806
Right.

1275
01:32:29,806 --> 01:32:34,806
So what they would do is they'd say, well, you know, you've got to pick your poison.

1276
01:32:34,806 --> 01:32:40,806
So either you have – it depends on what the community chooses to do.

1277
01:32:40,806 --> 01:32:44,806
So what Vitalik chose to do was a weird –

1278
01:32:44,806 --> 01:32:49,806
but what we don't want is the contagion to spread past the limits of the sidechain.

1279
01:32:49,806 --> 01:32:51,806
So that's the guiding principle.

1280
01:32:51,806 --> 01:32:52,806
Yeah, they're modular.

1281
01:32:52,806 --> 01:32:53,806
Like I said, they're modular.

1282
01:32:53,806 --> 01:32:57,806
They can't affect each other, so it's contained within the sidechain.

1283
01:32:57,806 --> 01:32:58,806
It won't affect the mainchain.

1284
01:32:58,806 --> 01:32:59,806
So you can do one of two things.

1285
01:32:59,806 --> 01:33:03,806
You can say the DAO hacker gets to keep all of his bitcoin in this case

1286
01:33:03,806 --> 01:33:07,806
because he stole bitcoin in this parallel universe.

1287
01:33:07,806 --> 01:33:09,806
Yeah, so he stole all the bitcoin in the box.

1288
01:33:09,806 --> 01:33:10,806
Let's say there's some kind of bug.

1289
01:33:10,806 --> 01:33:12,806
He stole all the bitcoin in the box.

1290
01:33:12,806 --> 01:33:14,806
Well, that's interesting.

1291
01:33:14,806 --> 01:33:16,806
That's not quite similar, though,

1292
01:33:16,806 --> 01:33:18,806
because what I'm imagining is there's a sidechain of Ethereum

1293
01:33:19,806 --> 01:33:25,806
where he steals $150 worth of a $20 billion Ethereum sidechain.

1294
01:33:25,806 --> 01:33:28,806
It actually goes into the sidechain and steals stuff

1295
01:33:28,806 --> 01:33:30,806
and then tries to do a withdrawal.

1296
01:33:30,806 --> 01:33:31,806
Exactly.

1297
01:33:31,806 --> 01:33:34,806
So I'm saying if the chain moves forward

1298
01:33:34,806 --> 01:33:38,806
and he makes it into class 1, class 2, class 3, or whatever,

1299
01:33:38,806 --> 01:33:40,806
then there should be nothing.

1300
01:33:40,806 --> 01:33:43,806
He'd be willing to do the atomic swaps for half the price just to get the hell out
of it.

1301
01:33:43,806 --> 01:33:44,806
He may.

1302
01:33:44,806 --> 01:33:46,806
That would be interesting.

1303
01:33:46,806 --> 01:33:49,806
If he steals all the money in the sidechain, I'll give you half of it back.

1304
01:33:49,806 --> 01:33:52,806
I just want to get my money and leave as fast as possible

1305
01:33:52,806 --> 01:33:57,806
before you all decide to do something weird and reverse the sidechain or something.

1306
01:33:57,806 --> 01:34:00,806
That's part of what made the DAO case so interesting

1307
01:34:00,806 --> 01:34:02,806
was that there was this forced 30-day lag,

1308
01:34:02,806 --> 01:34:07,806
which was almost like the perfectly terrible amount of time to screw it all up.

1309
01:34:07,806 --> 01:34:09,806
Because imagine, what if he could just steal it all,

1310
01:34:09,806 --> 01:34:10,806
and that's what you would do, right?

1311
01:34:10,806 --> 01:34:13,806
You'd take it immediately to Poloniex and try and cash a bunch of it out.

1312
01:34:13,806 --> 01:34:14,806
Maybe not all of it,

1313
01:34:14,806 --> 01:34:17,806
but you'd say, like, I want at least $10 million in this hour.

1314
01:34:17,806 --> 01:34:19,806
Like if you were the attacker.

1315
01:34:19,806 --> 01:34:21,806
Do you understand what I'm saying?

1316
01:34:21,806 --> 01:34:25,806
I don't know if I'll take it to Poloniex, but sure.

1317
01:34:25,806 --> 01:34:28,806
But I'm saying if you were the DAO hacker and you could get the money immediately,

1318
01:34:28,806 --> 01:34:36,806
you would want to cash it out of Ether right after attacking.

1319
01:34:36,806 --> 01:34:38,806
Do you understand?

1320
01:34:38,806 --> 01:34:40,806
You're breaking up a little bit,

1321
01:34:40,806 --> 01:34:43,806
but you're pretty much just saying, yeah, you want to cash out.

1322
01:34:43,806 --> 01:34:46,806
I'm saying you attack on Tuesday night when no one is paying attention,

1323
01:34:46,806 --> 01:34:48,806
or Thursday night when that's the case.

1324
01:34:48,806 --> 01:34:51,806
It's Thursday and it's 3 a.m. on the East Coast.

1325
01:34:51,806 --> 01:34:53,806
You attack, you steal the money,

1326
01:34:53,806 --> 01:34:57,806
and then what you want to do is you want to do it at 4 a.m. on Thursday,

1327
01:34:57,806 --> 01:35:00,806
or I think it was Friday morning or whatever.

1328
01:35:00,806 --> 01:35:04,806
But the point is right after stealing you want to try and cash a good chunk of that
out

1329
01:35:04,806 --> 01:35:07,806
because you don't want what happened to happen.

1330
01:35:08,806 --> 01:35:10,806
It's Bitcoin really.

1331
01:35:10,806 --> 01:35:13,806
It speaks a little bit of volumes about that.

1332
01:35:13,806 --> 01:35:16,806
So that's what you want to do.

1333
01:35:16,806 --> 01:35:21,806
But the weird thing is there's this 30-day lag,

1334
01:35:21,806 --> 01:35:28,806
which kind of made an annoying conundrum on the Ethereum people

1335
01:35:28,806 --> 01:35:32,806
because they had basically just enough time to try to do what they did

1336
01:35:32,806 --> 01:35:36,806
in a justifiable way where they would only harm one individual,

1337
01:35:36,806 --> 01:35:41,806
who was the DAO hacker.

1338
01:35:41,806 --> 01:35:43,806
So that is an interesting point.

1339
01:35:43,806 --> 01:35:46,806
So that's an interesting case about the DAO.

1340
01:35:46,806 --> 01:35:54,806
So what they could do in that specific case is they could –

1341
01:35:54,806 --> 01:35:55,806
I'm not sure.

1342
01:35:55,806 --> 01:35:56,806
They would have to see this.

1343
01:35:56,806 --> 01:36:01,806
The other thing is that because the chain had progressed forward by many blocks,

1344
01:36:01,806 --> 01:36:06,806
days worth of blocks by the time they figured out really what was going on.

1345
01:36:06,806 --> 01:36:07,806
I mean, I'm not sure.

1346
01:36:07,806 --> 01:36:08,806
It's a really good question.

1347
01:36:08,806 --> 01:36:11,806
You could do a bunch of different things is the real answer.

1348
01:36:11,806 --> 01:36:16,806
But what you couldn't do is the way I have it set up,

1349
01:36:16,806 --> 01:36:23,806
you cannot easily hard fork the sidechain.

1350
01:36:23,806 --> 01:36:25,806
Because if you do, think about this,

1351
01:36:25,806 --> 01:36:29,806
if you do what's broadcast back in Class 3 over there,

1352
01:36:29,806 --> 01:36:31,806
it's not guaranteed to match.

1353
01:36:31,806 --> 01:36:34,806
But if you soft fork the sidechain with itself,

1354
01:36:34,806 --> 01:36:37,806
then always everyone will get the same Class 3 results,

1355
01:36:37,806 --> 01:36:40,806
and what should be withdrawn.

1356
01:36:40,806 --> 01:36:44,806
So you actually inherit the same protection of the soft fork.

1357
01:36:44,806 --> 01:36:50,806
So they would not really be able to hard fork in that case.

1358
01:36:50,806 --> 01:36:52,806
I'm not sure.

1359
01:36:52,806 --> 01:36:53,806
What they could do is, as I was saying,

1360
01:36:53,806 --> 01:36:56,806
is they could try to roll back the entire chain.

1361
01:36:57,806 --> 01:37:00,806
How would they go about rolling back the sidechain?

1362
01:37:00,806 --> 01:37:02,806
Well, that's what I was saying in that example I was giving.

1363
01:37:02,806 --> 01:37:05,806
The sidechain is mind block 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

1364
01:37:05,806 --> 01:37:08,806
In 7 there's the DAO hacker.

1365
01:37:08,806 --> 01:37:14,806
Then in mind block 8, 9, 10, 11.

1366
01:37:14,806 --> 01:37:15,806
Then mind block 8, 9, 10, 11.

1367
01:37:15,806 --> 01:37:19,806
And then what they would do is they'd go back and they'd mind block 6 again.

1368
01:37:19,806 --> 01:37:22,806
And then block 7 and 8, 9, 10.

1369
01:37:22,806 --> 01:37:24,806
And they'd try to just erase that history.

1370
01:37:24,806 --> 01:37:27,806
Now that has its own problems, of course.

1371
01:37:27,806 --> 01:37:31,806
All right, but if everyone agrees that this sidechain is going to start back

1372
01:37:31,806 --> 01:37:35,806
at block 4, is that okay?

1373
01:37:35,806 --> 01:37:38,806
Well, I mean it depends on if everyone actually agrees.

1374
01:37:38,806 --> 01:37:43,806
What might happen is that if someone tried to mind block 6,

1375
01:37:43,806 --> 01:37:49,806
it could just, again, try to roll back maybe like a 28 block rollback.

1376
01:37:49,806 --> 01:37:53,806
It may just trigger a horrible crisis where everyone doesn't know

1377
01:37:53,806 --> 01:37:55,806
what's going on in this sidechain.

1378
01:37:55,806 --> 01:37:57,806
They'll flee the sidechain and the sidechain explodes

1379
01:37:57,806 --> 01:37:59,806
and it dies in a horrible way.

1380
01:37:59,806 --> 01:38:00,806
I mean essentially-

1381
01:38:00,806 --> 01:38:01,806
Which is what you want, really.

1382
01:38:01,806 --> 01:38:04,806
You want it to just die completely.

1383
01:38:04,806 --> 01:38:09,806
sidechains, I mean it's kind of like the DAO example.

1384
01:38:09,806 --> 01:38:12,806
Don't put all your money into a sidechain until they're fully vetted

1385
01:38:12,806 --> 01:38:19,806
because you're not guaranteed to get it all back out or what?

1386
01:38:19,806 --> 01:38:21,806
I mean what would you say?

1387
01:38:22,806 --> 01:38:24,806
Well, I mean the question is what would happen.

1388
01:38:24,806 --> 01:38:30,806
What I would guess would be my honest answer about what I realistically expect

1389
01:38:30,806 --> 01:38:34,806
would be that people would say we could roll back the entire chain,

1390
01:38:34,806 --> 01:38:36,806
but we can't do that because it's too extreme,

1391
01:38:36,806 --> 01:38:39,806
and we can't hard fork because then that would lead to problems later.

1392
01:38:39,806 --> 01:38:43,806
So maybe what they might do is they might say we'll soft fork

1393
01:38:43,806 --> 01:38:48,806
and we'll just jam this person's money in there forever.

1394
01:38:48,806 --> 01:38:51,806
That's maybe what I would do.

1395
01:38:51,806 --> 01:38:56,806
I mean you just make it where they couldn't ever take the money out?

1396
01:38:56,806 --> 01:39:01,806
I honestly wouldn't do that because in particular the DAO had this ridiculous

1397
01:39:01,806 --> 01:39:07,806
clause that said explicitly that it's actually worth reading.

1398
01:39:07,806 --> 01:39:09,806
If you haven't read it, it's very funny.

1399
01:39:09,806 --> 01:39:14,806
It says something like to the extent that you think that any unintentional

1400
01:39:14,806 --> 01:39:17,806
behavior happens in this contract, you are wrong,

1401
01:39:17,806 --> 01:39:23,806
and to the extent that the operation of the code is different from your

1402
01:39:23,806 --> 01:39:27,806
interpretation of this document, then the code always prevails

1403
01:39:27,806 --> 01:39:30,806
and whatever, and this is the terms of the court.

1404
01:39:30,806 --> 01:39:36,806
I mean pretty much it was a DAO hacker's free pass to actually.

1405
01:39:36,806 --> 01:39:40,806
That phrase is so specific paragraph in the DAO contract.

1406
01:39:40,806 --> 01:39:41,806
It's in the DAO contract.

1407
01:39:41,806 --> 01:39:47,806
It's so specific about whatever this thing does is what we wanted to happen.

1408
01:39:47,806 --> 01:39:50,806
That is just like that really kind of crosses the line.

1409
01:39:50,806 --> 01:39:51,806
You know what?

1410
01:39:51,806 --> 01:39:53,806
We talked about this at TNABC.

1411
01:39:53,806 --> 01:39:54,806
Yeah.

1412
01:39:55,321 --> 01:40:22,321
And that is a big, I mean, but if there were, I think that's not really the spirit
of the question because the person that you asked, when you repeated that person's
question, they pretty much like, I mean, you understand, pretty much like if a bug's
found in a port and the sidechain explodes, no, because you understand, that person
asked, no, no, that person asked about a bug. So, but in my opinion, the DAO
withdrawal was not a bug because it was explicitly a bug.

1413
01:40:23,321 --> 01:40:25,321
Okay, okay, okay.

1414
01:40:25,321 --> 01:40:27,321
It's not quite the same question.

1415
01:40:27,321 --> 01:40:43,321
But let's say I put one Bitcoin into a sidechain and the sidechain gets compromised.
Is there anything that the sidechain people can do that's similar to the DAO, like
proof of italic, where we can just come together and say, whoever stole it, we're
just going to revert all the funds back to this block?

1416
01:40:43,321 --> 01:40:48,321
No, they can't. The nodes can attempt to blind merge money.

1417
01:40:48,321 --> 01:40:49,321
Which nodes?

1418
01:40:49,321 --> 01:40:50,321
At some risk to themselves.

1419
01:40:50,321 --> 01:40:52,321
An orphan on the chain, the sidechain nodes.

1420
01:40:52,321 --> 01:40:56,321
Which nodes? Okay, so the nodes hosting the sidechain?

1421
01:40:56,321 --> 01:41:00,321
The nodes that are running the sidechain software, the full nodes hosting, what does
that mean?

1422
01:41:00,321 --> 01:41:15,321
Okay, so in other words, how, like, let's say this is all done with the miners
writing new blocks, so the history prevails, I'm guessing, on the sidechain. So if
you have nodes that say-

1423
01:41:15,321 --> 01:41:26,321
No, because if the miners are Blind Merged Mining, they won't care about whatever,
they don't even know what blocks they're mining. So you can instruct them, there's
some risk, because you're paying-

1424
01:41:26,321 --> 01:41:32,321
Okay, so if you actually incentivize the miners-

1425
01:41:32,321 --> 01:41:33,321
To roll it back.

1426
01:41:33,321 --> 01:41:38,321
So pretty much if the hacker, so the hacker could also incentivize the miners.

1427
01:41:38,321 --> 01:41:40,321
He could, yeah, he could to continue it.

1428
01:41:40,321 --> 01:41:42,321
That's a very good point, yes.

1429
01:41:42,321 --> 01:41:47,321
Versus all the people that want to protect the wealth of the sidechain.

1430
01:41:47,321 --> 01:41:59,321
Yeah, I can't see the attacker losing that battle, because he's got $150 million
that he's willing to pay in transaction fees that he doesn't care about. That's
other people's money.

1431
01:42:00,321 --> 01:42:10,321
So yeah, I think you're right. So yeah, I think if we're being, taking it
realistically, even if the DAO hack was an actual bug, which it was clearly not, but
if it was some bug-

1432
01:42:10,321 --> 01:42:13,321
That's why I get cut off from that right now.

1433
01:42:13,321 --> 01:42:29,321
Even if you could accidentally withdraw $150 million in something that was clearly a
bug, I think you wouldn't in practice be able to roll it back, unless you got
explicit help from the miners, which would be, I don't know why they would give you
the time of day.

1434
01:42:29,321 --> 01:42:33,321
I kind of hoped that they wouldn't, but that would be up to them. You understand? It
would be up to them.

1435
01:42:33,321 --> 01:42:45,321
If it were important enough, let's say there's a problem with the large block
sidechain that the miners really like, then they could contribute to rolling it back
and unfucking up the mistake, whatever it was.

1436
01:42:45,321 --> 01:42:52,321
So in a sense it's a good thing, because if the problems are severe enough, then
people will just fix them. So that's kind of nice.

1437
01:42:52,321 --> 01:43:05,321
But in general, I think it's actually a very good state of whatever happens,
happens, and this is immutable, and code is law type of thing that we want.

1438
01:43:05,321 --> 01:43:13,321
Because if it's not code that's law, it would be some other arbitrary thing that,
I'm not sure how useful that would be, if that's the arbitrary thing it would be.

1439
01:43:13,321 --> 01:43:15,321
But yeah, that's a cool question.

1440
01:43:16,321 --> 01:43:22,321
I mean, that's probably something that we can actually talk about at a later date,
too, as we think more about.

1441
01:43:22,321 --> 01:43:27,321
Maybe it'll happen. I'm sure it'll happen at some point, maybe if this comes to
light.

1442
01:43:27,321 --> 01:43:43,321
A second part to that question, which was, or even more interesting, a bug in a high
privacy fungible sidechain, which allows unexpected inflation.

1443
01:43:44,321 --> 01:43:49,321
Oh, that's funny. So as soon as that is detected, everyone will try to withdraw.

1444
01:43:49,321 --> 01:43:54,321
And here's the thing, the box only contains so much Bitcoin.

1445
01:43:54,321 --> 01:44:03,321
So once it's gone, there will be no way to include a valid transaction withdrawing,
you can't get blood from a stone.

1446
01:44:04,321 --> 01:44:12,321
And so as soon as that happens, then I think that will just be, no one will ever be
able to deposit to the sidechain now.

1447
01:44:12,321 --> 01:44:18,321
Because it'd be a bunch of people, you'd be the sucker who loses their money
instantaneously.

1448
01:44:18,321 --> 01:44:22,321
And so that would just, in practice, just mean the death of that sidechain.

1449
01:44:22,321 --> 01:44:24,321
Which is as it should be, right?

1450
01:44:24,321 --> 01:44:28,321
Because if you fuck up your inflation, you should suffer, I think.

1451
01:44:29,321 --> 01:44:48,321
I guess the real thing is, if you fuck up that exploit, and it was a privacy
sidechain, it was undetected, then you could essentially do atomic swaps out at a
favorable rate and just keep doing it over and over and over and over.

1452
01:44:48,321 --> 01:44:49,321
Until people realize.

1453
01:44:49,321 --> 01:44:53,321
Until people are like, why is this guy giving me such a good deal?

1454
01:44:54,321 --> 01:44:55,321
I don't know.

1455
01:44:55,321 --> 01:45:01,321
It's almost like a red herring if you get too good of a deal.

1456
01:45:01,321 --> 01:45:02,321
Well, maybe.

1457
01:45:02,321 --> 01:45:08,321
It's like, if your deal's too good, then there's probably something really wrong
with that sidechain.

1458
01:45:08,321 --> 01:45:11,321
Never offer a sucker, or even break, or whatever the saying is.

1459
01:45:11,321 --> 01:45:15,321
But yeah, notice that that's not different from the case it is now.

1460
01:45:15,321 --> 01:45:17,321
Zcash, you could still be doing that.

1461
01:45:18,321 --> 01:45:24,321
If there was some compromise there, it would be basically the same thing.

1462
01:45:24,321 --> 01:45:30,321
Because as soon as people realized that on Zcash, as the altcoin, what would happen
there, right?

1463
01:45:30,321 --> 01:45:33,321
The entire scheme would collapse, and you'd have to be restarted.

1464
01:45:33,321 --> 01:45:35,321
So it's actually very similar.

1465
01:45:35,321 --> 01:45:37,321
It's the same thing.

1466
01:45:37,321 --> 01:45:39,321
It's called the altcoin equaling the sidechain.

1467
01:45:40,321 --> 01:45:44,321
Here's an interesting question that actually talks about what we just said.

1468
01:45:44,321 --> 01:45:55,321
But his caveat being, the bug that you find with inflation, can you swap to other
Drivechains?

1469
01:45:55,321 --> 01:45:56,321
So can you do atomic swaps?

1470
01:45:56,321 --> 01:45:57,321
Not back to the...

1471
01:45:57,321 --> 01:46:00,321
Okay, you can do atomic swaps sidechain to sidechain.

1472
01:46:00,321 --> 01:46:01,321
You absolutely can.

1473
01:46:01,321 --> 01:46:02,321
I didn't know that.

1474
01:46:03,321 --> 01:46:07,321
Now, if you had a Drivechain of a Drivechain, you could go from...

1475
01:46:09,321 --> 01:46:12,321
...grandchild Drivechain on the other side, or what?

1476
01:46:12,321 --> 01:46:13,321
Yes.

1477
01:46:13,321 --> 01:46:17,321
So the Lightning Network and the atomic swaps are all part of the same fabric.

1478
01:46:17,321 --> 01:46:18,321
Yeah, you're right.

1479
01:46:18,321 --> 01:46:21,321
It's all part of the same whiteboard on there.

1480
01:46:21,321 --> 01:46:23,321
So those are all instant, and those are all channels.

1481
01:46:23,321 --> 01:46:25,321
So if you've got channels, you can do whatever you like.

1482
01:46:25,321 --> 01:46:27,321
And those are all just hash-locked contracts.

1483
01:46:27,321 --> 01:46:28,321
So all that's instant.

1484
01:46:28,321 --> 01:46:32,321
But, of course, if you have a sidechain of a sidechain, then going from side to
main,

1485
01:46:32,321 --> 01:46:35,321
and then going side to main again could take you, like, six months or whatever.

1486
01:46:35,321 --> 01:46:38,321
I mean, we're not interested in your Bitcoin payment channels.

1487
01:46:38,321 --> 01:46:44,321
We're interested in the technology behind your atomic swaps.

1488
01:46:44,321 --> 01:46:46,321
Yeah, yeah.

1489
01:46:48,321 --> 01:46:49,321
Anyways...

1490
01:46:49,321 --> 01:46:51,321
We're not interested in the Drivechains behind Drivechains.

1491
01:46:53,321 --> 01:46:54,321
Let's see.

1492
01:46:54,321 --> 01:46:57,321
Since they think they are getting money...

1493
01:46:59,321 --> 01:47:00,321
Let's skip that one.

1494
01:47:02,321 --> 01:47:05,321
We've already answered that just now.

1495
01:47:07,321 --> 01:47:08,321
Okay.

1496
01:47:08,321 --> 01:47:13,321
Oscar Lafarga has some questions for you, Paul.

1497
01:47:16,321 --> 01:47:21,321
This is coming off of the YouTube video we had two weeks ago.

1498
01:47:22,321 --> 01:47:23,321
He asks,

1499
01:47:24,321 --> 01:47:31,321
What is the fundamental difference between a Drivechain and an altcoin with a shared
Bitcoin UTXO set?

1500
01:47:31,321 --> 01:47:32,321
Not very much.

1501
01:47:35,321 --> 01:47:36,321
Oh, I'm sorry.

1502
01:47:36,321 --> 01:47:40,321
You gave a weird caveat there, though, with a shared Bitcoin UTXO set.

1503
01:47:42,321 --> 01:47:44,321
Well, I call that a spinoff.

1504
01:47:44,321 --> 01:47:45,321
I don't call it an altcoin.

1505
01:47:45,321 --> 01:47:46,321
So let's talk about that.

1506
01:47:46,321 --> 01:47:54,321
If I wanted to take the Bitcoin UTXO set and make a Drivechain where everyone has
access to coins on that Drivechain that had a Bitcoin,

1507
01:47:56,321 --> 01:47:57,321
what does that look like?

1508
01:47:57,321 --> 01:48:03,321
Because I don't deposit into a box because I don't have a shareholder or anything.

1509
01:48:03,321 --> 01:48:07,321
But the question is, you have this thing which is a spinoff, in my opinion,

1510
01:48:08,321 --> 01:48:14,321
where you have, at this one instant, you have a copy that would be a hard fork

1511
01:48:15,321 --> 01:48:16,321
if the old chain died.

1512
01:48:16,321 --> 01:48:19,321
But it's a hard fork of a new thing that's otherwise the same owners.

1513
01:48:20,321 --> 01:48:26,321
And the thing is that in the very instant that you copy it, it's the same as a
Drivechain in practice.

1514
01:48:26,321 --> 01:48:29,321
But quickly thereafter, it will start diverging.

1515
01:48:32,321 --> 01:48:35,321
And then you have back in the altcoin case eventually.

1516
01:48:35,321 --> 01:48:39,321
So going back to just the difference between a Drivechain and an altcoin,

1517
01:48:41,321 --> 01:48:42,321
you would say like no difference, really?

1518
01:48:42,321 --> 01:48:43,321
No, they're very similar.

1519
01:48:43,321 --> 01:48:48,321
It's just one respects the 21 million coin limit globally.

1520
01:48:51,321 --> 01:48:52,321
The other does not.

1521
01:48:53,321 --> 01:48:55,321
All right, there's another question for you.

1522
01:48:56,321 --> 01:49:03,321
Would Drivechains be used as payment channels or is this considered a payment
channel in and of itself?

1523
01:49:04,321 --> 01:49:05,321
I think they're very large block.

1524
01:49:05,321 --> 01:49:07,321
And I would say those are kind of two different things.

1525
01:49:07,321 --> 01:49:08,321
They are different things.

1526
01:49:09,321 --> 01:49:17,321
But in an abstract sense, a very large block chain is kind of like a giant payment
channel open with everyone on it.

1527
01:49:18,321 --> 01:49:20,321
You know, because you kind of cash everything on there.

1528
01:49:21,321 --> 01:49:23,321
You can kind of cash everything on there.

1529
01:49:24,321 --> 01:49:25,321
Hello, can you hear me?

1530
01:49:25,321 --> 01:49:26,321
Okay.

1531
01:49:26,321 --> 01:49:27,321
Yeah, I can hear you.

1532
01:49:28,321 --> 01:49:36,321
You can kind of cash everything on the large block chain and then settle to the
small block chain.

1533
01:49:37,321 --> 01:49:43,321
So in that way, it's kind of thematically like a big payment channel that everyone
is on.

1534
01:49:46,321 --> 01:49:51,321
How would Lightning Network interact or relate to a particular Drivechain?

1535
01:49:52,321 --> 01:49:56,321
And I would say, like you said, these are low-level technologies like atomic swaps
and Lightning Network,

1536
01:49:57,321 --> 01:50:00,321
and it would pretty much work across the board with any of these things, right?

1537
01:50:01,321 --> 01:50:04,321
It strongly helps, interacts with all them, does cool things.

1538
01:50:05,321 --> 01:50:13,321
What do you think would be more likely, people to do atomic swaps out of Drivechains
or Lightning Network out of Drivechains?

1539
01:50:14,321 --> 01:50:17,321
Well, as I said, you can't do Lightning until you set it up.

1540
01:50:18,321 --> 01:50:21,321
So you have to first do an atomic swap, at least once.

1541
01:50:22,321 --> 01:50:23,321
And then, who knows?

1542
01:50:23,321 --> 01:50:24,321
Okay.

1543
01:50:24,321 --> 01:50:26,321
Depends on how people like Lightning.

1544
01:50:27,321 --> 01:50:28,321
I hope they like it a lot.

1545
01:50:28,321 --> 01:50:30,321
Yeah, I mean, there's like so many different ways.

1546
01:50:31,321 --> 01:50:35,321
So it really depends on the use case and what people come up with.

1547
01:50:38,321 --> 01:50:42,321
Could a Drivechain be used to profit by speculators?

1548
01:50:43,321 --> 01:50:50,321
Interesting question I had for you earlier, because I think there is a way, even
though there isn't a way directly.

1549
01:50:50,321 --> 01:50:51,321
Hold on.

1550
01:50:52,321 --> 01:51:01,321
We're talking about, so for instance, this money token, and you know, ERC-20 tokens
right now are all the rage because people are making money off of them.

1551
01:51:02,321 --> 01:51:10,321
But like if I want to make an ICO, would I do an ICO within the ERC-20 Drivechain or
would I branch off and do an ICO?

1552
01:51:12,321 --> 01:51:13,321
No, within.

1553
01:51:14,321 --> 01:51:25,321
Because part of the functionality within the ERC-20 is that you pay a tiny Bitcoin
transaction fee to send a message that says, create new ERC-20 with whatever
parameters.

1554
01:51:26,321 --> 01:51:27,321
And then you give all those, you know.

1555
01:51:28,321 --> 01:51:33,321
And the ERC-20 sidechain, it might even have like built-in auction stuff or crowd
sale stuff.

1556
01:51:34,321 --> 01:51:42,321
So again, I might have like a Poloniex and I might have like whatever stupid crap
people use to do these ICO auctions.

1557
01:51:43,321 --> 01:51:51,321
And then you can make these ICOs, they're almost like gambling tools within the
ERC-20 Drivechain.

1558
01:51:52,321 --> 01:51:55,321
Yeah, or just trading tools, whatever you want it to be.

1559
01:51:56,321 --> 01:52:01,321
I mean, because essentially you're like, my ERC-20 tool is for this business and we
have this utility.

1560
01:52:02,321 --> 01:52:08,321
I mean, essentially it's the same use case for ICOs right now where you say, you
know, X utility.

1561
01:52:09,321 --> 01:52:11,321
But that's not really a use of Drivechain.

1562
01:52:12,321 --> 01:52:13,321
That's not really a use of Drivechain.

1563
01:52:14,321 --> 01:52:23,321
That's a use of this specific altchain, which could be an altcoin like Ethereum or
it could be a sidechain as you have described here.

1564
01:52:23,321 --> 01:52:25,321
So this is a functionality of the chain.

1565
01:52:26,321 --> 01:52:31,321
It's not really, I'm not sure what the person was asking about, but I think they may
have been touching on this.

1566
01:52:32,321 --> 01:52:37,321
I mean, yeah, this is a specific implementation of the Drivechain, right?

1567
01:52:38,321 --> 01:52:39,321
Is that what you're saying?

1568
01:52:40,321 --> 01:52:41,321
No, that's not what I'm saying at all.

1569
01:52:42,321 --> 01:52:43,321
It's exactly the opposite of what I'm saying.

1570
01:52:44,321 --> 01:52:49,321
The altchain, this is a feature, that is a smart contract, the creation of the
ERC-20.

1571
01:52:50,321 --> 01:52:52,321
So that is a smart contract.

1572
01:52:53,321 --> 01:52:58,321
But in this situation, are you talking about the ERC-20 tokens in the ICO?

1573
01:52:59,321 --> 01:53:00,321
Any Drivechain?

1574
01:53:01,321 --> 01:53:05,321
No, I'm talking about the creation of a new set of ERC-20 tokens.

1575
01:53:06,321 --> 01:53:07,321
On a hypothetical one?

1576
01:53:08,321 --> 01:53:10,321
Either. It doesn't matter.

1577
01:53:11,321 --> 01:53:12,321
Wait.

1578
01:53:13,321 --> 01:53:17,321
Drivechain is about the plane that's going back and forth between the islands.

1579
01:53:18,321 --> 01:53:19,321
But this is about something that's on the island.

1580
01:53:20,321 --> 01:53:22,321
It's like, come see our cool geyser or something.

1581
01:53:23,321 --> 01:53:26,321
So it's possible because you can make up the rules that you want.

1582
01:53:27,321 --> 01:53:29,321
It's possible on its own altcoin, which is the ERC-20 altcoin.

1583
01:53:30,321 --> 01:53:32,321
Or it's possible on Ethereum, the Ethereum altcoin.

1584
01:53:33,321 --> 01:53:38,321
Or it's possible on a sidechain, including a Bitcoin Drivechain.

1585
01:53:39,321 --> 01:53:40,321
Okay.

1586
01:53:41,321 --> 01:53:42,321
All right.

1587
01:53:43,321 --> 01:53:44,321
So the answer to that is yes.

1588
01:53:46,321 --> 01:53:49,321
You potentially can add a speculation idea.

1589
01:53:50,321 --> 01:53:54,321
You can have a chain that specializes in speculation, yes.

1590
01:53:55,321 --> 01:53:57,321
Maybe that was what they were asking, I don't know.

1591
01:54:00,321 --> 01:54:04,321
All right, so the next question, this is Oscar's last question.

1592
01:54:05,321 --> 01:54:07,321
Can Drivechains be destroyed?

1593
01:54:07,321 --> 01:54:12,321
And I want to also add in there, what is the best way to destroy a Drivechain?

1594
01:54:13,321 --> 01:54:15,321
If everyone came into agreement.

1595
01:54:16,321 --> 01:54:23,321
Yeah, have the Bitcoin miners just announced that they will no longer support this?

1596
01:54:24,321 --> 01:54:28,321
They have decided that it's in the best interest of their, bottom line, their
revenues.

1597
01:54:29,321 --> 01:54:30,321
They no longer support this Drivechain.

1598
01:54:31,321 --> 01:54:35,321
Which may be because, again, it may be because you have weird smart contracts on
this Drivechain

1599
01:54:35,321 --> 01:54:39,321
that attack other smart contracts that would produce revenue or something.

1600
01:54:40,321 --> 01:54:44,321
So there may be literal police officers or a kind of enforcement.

1601
01:54:45,321 --> 01:54:50,321
Are you saying a contract on this Drivechain affecting this Drivechain?

1602
01:54:51,321 --> 01:54:52,321
Yes, that's what I was saying.

1603
01:54:53,321 --> 01:54:55,321
But aren't these modular, like they can't affect each other?

1604
01:54:56,321 --> 01:55:01,321
They can't affect each other technically, but they can affect each other
economically.

1605
01:55:02,321 --> 01:55:04,321
And I have a giant presentation about this.

1606
01:55:05,321 --> 01:55:08,321
Economically. Okay, I got you. Indirectly.

1607
01:55:09,321 --> 01:55:12,321
So like if someone's like stealing someone's brand or something, something weird
like that.

1608
01:55:13,321 --> 01:55:14,321
Would be like a real little interlock.

1609
01:55:15,321 --> 01:55:17,321
Like you work really hard. You know the purpose of branding cattle?

1610
01:55:18,321 --> 01:55:20,321
Because it's hard to tell.

1611
01:55:21,321 --> 01:55:27,321
It's easy to tell who is raising their cattle in a healthy way, like when you look
at the farm.

1612
01:55:28,321 --> 01:55:31,321
But it's hard when the cattle show up at the market to see which one was.

1613
01:55:31,321 --> 01:55:35,321
So there's all these rules that you can't like steal someone else's brand.

1614
01:55:36,321 --> 01:55:37,321
There's like trademark infringements and things.

1615
01:55:38,321 --> 01:55:42,321
So that's just one example of an indirect effect by copying.

1616
01:55:43,321 --> 01:55:44,321
Okay.

1617
01:55:45,321 --> 01:55:47,321
But you asked about destroying the chain and it's just for the miners to say,

1618
01:55:48,321 --> 01:55:53,321
look, you got six months to get the hell out of here and then we're just going to
take everything.

1619
01:55:54,321 --> 01:55:58,321
You want to make sure that the time period to get out is at least the window

1620
01:55:59,321 --> 01:56:00,321
where everyone wants to get their full money back.

1621
01:56:01,321 --> 01:56:03,321
Yeah, that would be the most honorable thing to do.

1622
01:56:04,321 --> 01:56:08,321
Otherwise they're screwed because no one would trade with you because then they
wouldn't be able to get their money out.

1623
01:56:09,321 --> 01:56:12,321
Yeah, but what should happen is they should say, if they make that long enough, as
you suggest,

1624
01:56:13,321 --> 01:56:16,321
which is what they absolutely would really need to do in practice, I think,

1625
01:56:17,321 --> 01:56:21,321
then everyone should still be willing to trade because there will only be a few
people who are actually taking this flight,

1626
01:56:22,321 --> 01:56:23,321
the last flight back.

1627
01:56:24,321 --> 01:56:25,321
Yeah.

1628
01:56:26,321 --> 01:56:30,321
I don't have time to explain how, but we've arranged things so that it's always
possible

1629
01:56:31,321 --> 01:56:37,321
in one withdrawal, one plane ride back to withdraw all of the money on the sidechain.

1630
01:56:38,321 --> 01:56:39,321
And we did that for a couple of reasons.

1631
01:56:40,321 --> 01:56:43,321
One of them is this reason, but I don't have time to explain why we did that.

1632
01:56:44,321 --> 01:56:48,321
But, oh man, because when you do come back on that plane ride over,

1633
01:56:49,321 --> 01:56:52,321
you want to make sure you credit a bunch of people's Bitcoin addresses

1634
01:56:53,321 --> 01:56:57,321
or is it just a really easy way to pull back from the box?

1635
01:56:58,321 --> 01:57:03,321
Essentially, you can't have a transaction that has like a million outputs.

1636
01:57:04,321 --> 01:57:05,321
Right.

1637
01:57:06,321 --> 01:57:11,321
So, if you have like a million people put in, all the money on one transaction.

1638
01:57:12,321 --> 01:57:13,321
Or more importantly, a million inputs.

1639
01:57:14,321 --> 01:57:19,321
Well, yeah, but all I'm saying is with the BIPs on the main chain,

1640
01:57:20,321 --> 01:57:24,321
the two BIPs that you have, that will solve that kind of issue, right?

1641
01:57:24,321 --> 01:57:26,321
Yes, I don't have time to really explain how.

1642
01:57:27,321 --> 01:57:30,321
You could have unlimited, but you understand that no one has an incentive

1643
01:57:31,321 --> 01:57:32,321
to create an unlimited number of outputs in that case.

1644
01:57:33,321 --> 01:57:34,321
Yeah.

1645
01:57:35,321 --> 01:57:36,321
Only the inputs, because if anyone who has too many,

1646
01:57:37,321 --> 01:57:38,321
then they're just not getting on the plane.

1647
01:57:39,321 --> 01:57:42,321
So, everyone has an incentive to figure that out with atomic swaps

1648
01:57:43,321 --> 01:57:46,321
until they can all get out, which they always will be able to.

1649
01:57:47,321 --> 01:57:50,321
And just a side note, I don't know if we covered this,

1650
01:57:51,321 --> 01:57:53,321
but anyways, if you're trying to withdraw in the time period

1651
01:57:54,321 --> 01:57:57,321
and like that miner doesn't like mine the block,

1652
01:57:58,321 --> 01:57:59,321
it's just within that time period.

1653
01:58:00,321 --> 01:58:01,321
It's almost like the plane circling the airport

1654
01:58:02,321 --> 01:58:03,321
and then the next miner can bring you all in.

1655
01:58:04,321 --> 01:58:05,321
Isn't that right, Paul?

1656
01:58:06,321 --> 01:58:07,321
Yeah, when you're talking about when they're acting

1657
01:58:08,321 --> 01:58:09,321
and then it's accumulating the score.

1658
01:58:10,321 --> 01:58:11,321
Yes.

1659
01:58:12,321 --> 01:58:13,321
And like that one miner just doesn't recognize the sidechain.

1660
01:58:14,321 --> 01:58:15,321
Yes, you can have as many abstains as you want,

1661
01:58:16,321 --> 01:58:18,321
but if you have too many, it'll just time out and die.

1662
01:58:18,321 --> 01:58:19,321
But that's how it works.

1663
01:58:20,321 --> 01:58:24,321
Next question is, does each Drivechain that is implemented

1664
01:58:25,321 --> 01:58:26,321
require a soft fork?

1665
01:58:27,321 --> 01:58:28,321
Yes.

1666
01:58:29,321 --> 01:58:30,321
Or do we just need one soft fork to enable all of them?

1667
01:58:31,321 --> 01:58:32,321
All of them.

1668
01:58:33,321 --> 01:58:34,321
But yeah, the answer is yes.

1669
01:58:35,321 --> 01:58:36,321
Okay.

1670
01:58:37,321 --> 01:58:39,321
A little bit of both because you need the BIPs

1671
01:58:40,321 --> 01:58:42,321
to enable the idea of soft forks.

1672
01:58:43,321 --> 01:58:45,321
And thereafter, you need one per.

1673
01:58:46,321 --> 01:58:47,321
Yeah.

1674
01:58:48,321 --> 01:58:49,321
Jake?

1675
01:58:50,321 --> 01:58:51,321
This question is by Zero Pass.

1676
01:58:52,321 --> 01:58:56,321
Ask Paul, why is RSK not the sidechain you are looking for?

1677
01:58:57,321 --> 01:58:58,321
Yeah.

1678
01:58:59,321 --> 01:59:00,321
And I think the answer is-

1679
01:59:01,321 --> 01:59:02,321
Did we talk a little bit about that?

1680
01:59:03,321 --> 01:59:04,321
We covered a lot of stuff.

1681
01:59:05,321 --> 01:59:06,321
I don't want it to be open-ended.

1682
01:59:07,321 --> 01:59:08,321
I want it to be-

1683
01:59:09,321 --> 01:59:10,321
I mean, I think the simplest thing is it's just a different

1684
01:59:11,321 --> 01:59:12,321
kind of paradigm where they have more of a service

1685
01:59:13,321 --> 01:59:14,321
that charges 20% and you don't.

1686
01:59:15,321 --> 01:59:16,321
And they have-

1687
01:59:16,321 --> 01:59:17,321
They develop various things.

1688
01:59:18,321 --> 01:59:19,321
They have the federated model.

1689
01:59:20,321 --> 01:59:21,321
And-

1690
01:59:22,321 --> 01:59:23,321
Did we talk about it?

1691
01:59:24,321 --> 01:59:25,321
The idea of being able to withdraw quickly.

1692
01:59:26,321 --> 01:59:27,321
Well, yeah.

1693
01:59:28,321 --> 01:59:29,321
I'm not totally sure that he gets it, honestly.

1694
01:59:30,321 --> 01:59:31,321
But-

1695
01:59:32,321 --> 01:59:33,321
Like the idea of withdrawing quickly.

1696
01:59:34,321 --> 01:59:35,321
We explained it right here.

1697
01:59:36,321 --> 01:59:37,321
He wants it to be three per hour or something.

1698
01:59:38,321 --> 01:59:39,321
And I want it to be once per three months.

1699
01:59:40,321 --> 01:59:41,321
So I'm not even sure.

1700
01:59:42,321 --> 01:59:43,321
The whole point of it was-

1701
01:59:44,321 --> 01:59:45,321
Sometimes I wonder about that.

1702
01:59:46,321 --> 01:59:48,321
You have a question from Jonsef.

1703
01:59:49,321 --> 01:59:50,321
Oh.

1704
01:59:51,321 --> 01:59:54,321
Why is Blockstream not implementing Drivechains?

1705
01:59:56,321 --> 01:59:57,321
I don't know.

1706
01:59:58,321 --> 01:59:59,321
I think they're just busy.

1707
02:00:00,321 --> 02:00:01,321
Or wait, wait.

1708
02:00:02,321 --> 02:00:03,321
Ask Paul.

1709
02:00:04,321 --> 02:00:05,321
Is Blockstream implementing Drivechains?

1710
02:00:06,321 --> 02:00:07,321
Oh, that's different.

1711
02:00:08,321 --> 02:00:09,321
I guess no.

1712
02:00:10,321 --> 02:00:11,321
I get a lot of emotional support from Adam Beck.

1713
02:00:12,321 --> 02:00:13,321
Emotional support.

1714
02:00:14,321 --> 02:00:15,321
All right.

1715
02:00:16,321 --> 02:00:17,321
So Adam Beck's on board.

1716
02:00:18,321 --> 02:00:19,321
That's good.

1717
02:00:20,321 --> 02:00:21,321
He is a block supporter.

1718
02:00:22,321 --> 02:00:24,321
You have a question from Dante.

1719
02:00:25,321 --> 02:00:26,321
Oh, okay.

1720
02:00:27,321 --> 02:00:31,321
Is there incentive for alts to come over to the Drivechain?

1721
02:00:33,321 --> 02:00:34,321
I mean, I would say yes.

1722
02:00:35,321 --> 02:00:36,321
But I don't really know.

1723
02:00:37,321 --> 02:00:38,321
I mean, there's incentives both ways, right?

1724
02:00:39,321 --> 02:00:41,321
Because it's kind of like the scam incentive is very strong.

1725
02:00:42,321 --> 02:00:43,321
So-

1726
02:00:44,321 --> 02:00:46,321
Yeah, that's a big incentive.

1727
02:00:48,321 --> 02:00:49,321
And I'm not sure.

1728
02:00:50,321 --> 02:00:53,321
I would say that the real incentive is actually one clever-

1729
02:00:54,321 --> 02:00:55,321
I'm not sure.

1730
02:00:56,321 --> 02:00:57,321
It depends-

1731
02:00:58,321 --> 02:00:59,321
I'm not sure who has the incentive to do the work

1732
02:01:00,321 --> 02:01:02,321
to transform the altcoin into a Drivechain.

1733
02:01:03,321 --> 02:01:04,321
Because there's a little bit of a commons problem

1734
02:01:05,321 --> 02:01:06,321
where assume one person does that.

1735
02:01:07,321 --> 02:01:08,321
They really don't get compensated for it.

1736
02:01:09,321 --> 02:01:11,321
And then everyone, you know, gets the benefit.

1737
02:01:11,321 --> 02:01:12,321
So that's an interesting question.

1738
02:01:13,321 --> 02:01:15,321
I'm not sure who has the incentive to do it.

1739
02:01:16,321 --> 02:01:17,321
I mean, it would probably be something

1740
02:01:18,321 --> 02:01:19,321
that they would want to be on the Bitcoin platform

1741
02:01:20,321 --> 02:01:21,321
for some reason or another.

1742
02:01:22,321 --> 02:01:23,321
Yeah, maybe it could just be a core dev

1743
02:01:24,321 --> 02:01:25,321
with an axe to grind or something.

1744
02:01:26,321 --> 02:01:27,321
I don't know.

1745
02:01:28,321 --> 02:01:29,321
But yeah, that's an interesting question.

1746
02:01:30,321 --> 02:01:31,321
This is actually our last question.

1747
02:01:32,321 --> 02:01:33,321
Okay.

1748
02:01:34,321 --> 02:01:35,321
Thank God, because we've been doing so many.

1749
02:01:36,321 --> 02:01:37,321
This one's by Alred Thorsby.

1750
02:01:38,321 --> 02:01:39,321
Okay.

1751
02:01:39,321 --> 02:01:40,321
Is Bitcoin's plan to get Bitmain to accept

1752
02:01:41,321 --> 02:01:42,321
big blocks, a big block sidechain,

1753
02:01:43,321 --> 02:01:45,321
and is that a threat to Bcash?

1754
02:01:46,321 --> 02:01:47,321
I definitely think it's a threat to Bcash.

1755
02:01:48,321 --> 02:01:49,321
I think an unfortunate thing about Bcash

1756
02:01:50,321 --> 02:01:52,321
and SegWit2x is that the very fact

1757
02:01:53,321 --> 02:01:55,321
that I have this thing in the pipeline,

1758
02:01:56,321 --> 02:01:57,321
the idea of a large block sidechain,

1759
02:01:58,321 --> 02:02:00,321
greatly imperils their efforts

1760
02:02:01,321 --> 02:02:03,321
to create a viable large block soft fork.

1761
02:02:04,321 --> 02:02:06,321
Because soon it will be-

1762
02:02:06,321 --> 02:02:07,321
just as it would be difficult

1763
02:02:08,321 --> 02:02:09,321
for an altcoin to compete

1764
02:02:10,321 --> 02:02:11,321
with an equivalent sidechain,

1765
02:02:12,321 --> 02:02:14,321
it would be difficult for Bcash to compete with,

1766
02:02:15,321 --> 02:02:16,321
or Bitcoin Cash,

1767
02:02:17,321 --> 02:02:18,321
or however you prefer to describe it,

1768
02:02:19,321 --> 02:02:20,321
it would be difficult for that to compete

1769
02:02:21,321 --> 02:02:22,321
with a sidechain of Bitcoin

1770
02:02:23,321 --> 02:02:24,321
that has a six megabyte block.

1771
02:02:25,321 --> 02:02:26,321
So it's the exact same thing.

1772
02:02:27,321 --> 02:02:28,321
In fact, it's a little worse

1773
02:02:29,321 --> 02:02:30,321
because it's so much simpler

1774
02:02:31,321 --> 02:02:32,321
to create software code

1775
02:02:33,321 --> 02:02:34,321
that instead of re-implementing Ethereum

1776
02:02:34,321 --> 02:02:35,321
or hacking Ethereum to pieces

1777
02:02:36,321 --> 02:02:37,321
so you can put in this Drivechain stuff,

1778
02:02:38,321 --> 02:02:39,321
the code for the block size

1779
02:02:40,321 --> 02:02:42,321
is very easy to edit by comparison.

1780
02:02:43,321 --> 02:02:44,321
So in that way,

1781
02:02:45,321 --> 02:02:46,321
I think it does threaten those.

1782
02:02:47,321 --> 02:02:48,321
How will I convince Bitmain

1783
02:02:49,321 --> 02:02:50,321
to get a large block sidechain?

1784
02:02:51,321 --> 02:02:52,321
I don't know if that is facetious or not

1785
02:02:53,321 --> 02:02:54,321
because they want large block stuff

1786
02:02:55,321 --> 02:02:57,321
and so this should be easy for them to-

1787
02:02:58,321 --> 02:02:59,321
I mean, this is basically

1788
02:03:00,321 --> 02:03:01,321
giving them what they want

1789
02:03:02,321 --> 02:03:03,321
and it does it in a soft fork

1790
02:03:04,321 --> 02:03:05,321
even if developers don't like it,

1791
02:03:06,321 --> 02:03:07,321
even hypothetically.

1792
02:03:08,321 --> 02:03:09,321
That's one of the-

1793
02:03:10,321 --> 02:03:11,321
I mean, they could do extension blocks.

1794
02:03:12,321 --> 02:03:13,321
There's a lot to say about that

1795
02:03:14,321 --> 02:03:15,321
that we don't really have time for.

1796
02:03:16,321 --> 02:03:17,321
But I think Bitmain would really like this

1797
02:03:18,321 --> 02:03:19,321
because it gets them what they want

1798
02:03:20,321 --> 02:03:21,321
in a very fast way

1799
02:03:22,321 --> 02:03:23,321
and, you know,

1800
02:03:24,321 --> 02:03:25,321
I just don't see why they wouldn't like it.

1801
02:03:26,321 --> 02:03:27,321
More transaction fees,

1802
02:03:28,321 --> 02:03:29,321
probably a higher Bitcoin price,

1803
02:03:30,321 --> 02:03:31,321
good news for Bitcoin.

1804
02:03:32,321 --> 02:03:33,321
Reusing the same SHA-256 hardware

1805
02:03:34,321 --> 02:03:35,321
at no marginal cost

1806
02:03:36,321 --> 02:03:37,321
but more free money.

1807
02:03:38,321 --> 02:03:39,321
So I think it's an easy sell.

1808
02:03:41,321 --> 02:03:42,321
All right, man.

1809
02:03:43,321 --> 02:03:44,321
Well, it is-

1810
02:03:45,321 --> 02:03:46,321
Okay, cool.

1811
02:03:47,321 --> 02:03:48,321
Lots have been found, Paul.

1812
02:03:49,321 --> 02:03:50,321
I think the difficulty has adjusted.

1813
02:03:51,321 --> 02:03:52,321
Yeah, for this.

1814
02:03:53,321 --> 02:03:55,321
And we have been drive chained.

1815
02:03:56,321 --> 02:03:58,321
That's a lot of drive chaining.

1816
02:03:59,321 --> 02:04:00,321
So I think it's worked very well, though.

1817
02:04:01,321 --> 02:04:02,321
Let's see what happens with it.

1818
02:04:02,321 --> 02:04:03,321
So just real quick,

1819
02:04:04,321 --> 02:04:06,321
if people want to do a more in-depth

1820
02:04:07,321 --> 02:04:08,321
themselves, they can go to

1821
02:04:09,321 --> 02:04:10,321
drivechain.info.

1822
02:04:11,321 --> 02:04:12,321
Yes, drivechain.info.

1823
02:04:13,321 --> 02:04:14,321
And then GitHub will also take you to-

1824
02:04:15,321 --> 02:04:16,321
drivechain.info is like the home base,

1825
02:04:17,321 --> 02:04:18,321
like the portal.

1826
02:04:19,321 --> 02:04:20,321
And even if you click on GitHub there,

1827
02:04:21,321 --> 02:04:22,321
you kind of get also taken to like a little mini portal

1828
02:04:23,321 --> 02:04:24,321
that has the BIPs there.

1829
02:04:25,321 --> 02:04:26,321
There's just so much stuff

1830
02:04:27,321 --> 02:04:28,321
because you need more than one portal.

1831
02:04:29,321 --> 02:04:30,321
Even if you go to drivechain.info

1832
02:04:30,321 --> 02:04:31,321
you still get another portal.

1833
02:04:32,321 --> 02:04:33,321
And there's other stuff including presentations

1834
02:04:34,321 --> 02:04:35,321
and other things.

1835
02:04:36,321 --> 02:04:37,321
And he is-

1836
02:04:38,321 --> 02:04:39,321
Are you Truthcoin on Twitter?

1837
02:04:40,321 --> 02:04:41,321
Truthcoin on Twitter, yes.

1838
02:04:42,321 --> 02:04:43,321
All right.

1839
02:04:44,321 --> 02:04:45,321
I'm Mike21 spelled out with a one on the end.

1840
02:04:46,321 --> 02:04:47,321
And good luck finding that.

1841
02:04:48,321 --> 02:04:49,321
This is probably why we don't have any subscribers

1842
02:04:50,321 --> 02:04:51,321
to our channel.

1843
02:04:52,321 --> 02:04:53,321
Yeah, probably.

1844
02:04:54,321 --> 02:04:55,321
All right, everybody.

1845
02:04:56,321 --> 02:04:57,321
Thanks for propagating.

1846
02:04:58,321 --> 02:04:59,321
And I hope you learned something about Drivechains.

1847
02:05:00,321 --> 02:05:01,321
Bye-bye.