0:01 It's Block Time and this is Michael Tidwell. 0:04 This is Paul Sztorc. 0:06 We're going to do a deep dive with Drivechains and do some frequently asked questions. 0:13 I've compiled about 30 or so questions for us. 0:17 We're excited to answer them because Drivechains, there's not a lot of people that really know the technicals of it, just the concepts. 0:25 They're new and haven't really been fully vetted in the public eye yet, I don't know. 0:34 We're going to get a little technical on the concepts and answer some questions, but just as a little bit of a background, 0:40 Drivechains is a technology that can implement sidechains that will essentially give more functionality to Bitcoin. 0:52 So if you see a cool project that you think is cool, maybe you think ring signatures with Monero or some kind of smart contracts with Ethereum, 1:01 then you can essentially make this part of the Bitcoin ecosystem, make it a sidechain on Bitcoin. 1:07 So you don't have to leave Bitcoin in order to utilize all this cool blockchain technology. 1:14 Paul, how's that for a quick summary? 1:16 That was pretty good. 1:17 Okay, so just a little bit of background. 1:23 Paul briefed me. 1:25 We had a pretty good briefing before this, so he taught me a lot. 1:29 But Drivechains will need a couple chips into the main chain, and then for each additional Drivechain, we'll need a soft fork. 1:45 Is that right, Paul? 1:47 Okay, perfect. 1:49 I feel like you taught me well. 1:51 So I think the style that we're going to go is a little weird. 1:55 I think we're going to do some question and answers, and then we have a whiteboard right here where we can maybe explain things in more detail. 2:01 There's a lot I don't know about Drivechains, so I'm going to default to you, Paul. 2:06 But I don't know one of these questions or the answers to one of these questions, so let's get going. 2:13 The first question that we have, and let's see. 2:28 I don't know if you can hear that. 2:30 Nope, I didn't hear. 2:32 Am I supposed to be hearing things? 2:34 I can't hear anything. 2:36 Oh, my chair is not going to work. 2:40 We'll just go all natural. 2:45 From Sean, a.k.a. King David. 2:48 I don't know if you know who that is. 2:50 Ask Paul. 2:52 We'll call this the Ask Paul section. 2:55 Okay. 2:57 But all these are Ask Pauls. 2:59 I'm going to butt in to try to answer one or two. 3:02 Ask Paul, are Drivechains just a type implementation of sidechains? 3:08 What's the clarification there? 3:14 So, if I can take a stab at this, I would just say I kind of went over this a little bit earlier. 3:20 It's just a technology that can implement sidechains, and sidechains is more of an abstract idea where there's multiple ways to implement one. 3:29 What would you say about that, Paul? 3:31 Yeah, I think that's correct. 3:33 Blockstream, or not really Blockstream really, but a bunch of people, some of which who later helped co-found Blockstream, 3:41 wrote a paper in October 2014 enabling Bitcoin innovation with paid sidechains that you can find easily online. 3:49 And there, that was kind of like a supermarket, whereas Drivechain is more like a recipe. 3:58 So, Drivechains do exactly this, but the original paper from October 2014 that popularized the term, 4:09 that was kind of just a big set of things you might do. 4:18 You might do this, you might do that, but not any real advice about what to do specifically. 4:22 He had a follow-up question, which was, what would it take or cost putting an existing cryptocurrency onto a Drivechain? 4:40 So, I'm guessing what he means is taking an existing UTXO set and making it a Drivechain, which I'm not sure is possible. 4:47 Have you thought about that? 4:49 No, I think you're right that that's some of what he's saying. 4:53 But I think what he's really saying is how, if I wanted to make the Monero sidechain, 4:58 how difficult would it be to take Monero, the altcoin, and transform it into Monero, the Drivechain? 5:08 Okay, and how hard would that be? 5:11 Would it be as easy as copying the code? 5:14 We have right now a blank version. 5:17 So, we have two forks of the code base of Bitcoin on GitHub, 5:24 and one is the modifications required to make Drivechain work with Bitcoin Core, 5:32 and the other instance on GitHub is basically a blank Drivechain itself. 5:43 In that sense, we already have that, so it wouldn't cost anything to create. 5:50 But if you wanted to create Monero, you'd have to basically merge the two in some way, 5:55 where you'd have to say, well, here's the Monero zone, and here is the blank side. 6:00 You'd have to insert the Monero code into our blank sidechain, is what you'd have to do. 6:06 And it would get even more complicated for things like, remember when it was written in Rust, and it's really weird. 6:13 So, that would be more difficult, unfortunately. 6:17 So, in other words, you'd probably have to rewrite a lot of it, 6:21 but using the same kind of functionality and concepts, would you rewrite it in C++? 6:26 Well, it depends. 6:28 What you might do for MimboWimbo or something is you could rewrite the stuff that we have in our blank Drivechain. 6:38 You could rewrite that in Rust, in MimboWimbo, and then make that sidechain that way. 6:44 But I think it would require a lot of, I would probably, I would say that it would probably require a good six months or more of work. 6:53 I don't want to understate that that is like a weird thing, but the point is that now there is actually a path. 6:59 Before, there was no clear pathway for an altcoin to like either be successful or not compete with Bitcoin. 7:09 So, there's a kind of confusing, what's the fate of the altcoin going to be? 7:12 But now there is at least a path that says eventually it will either fail because it's a bad idea, or it will succeed and become a sidechain of Bitcoin. 7:21 So, from an investing point of view, it doesn't actually matter because six months is a long time. 7:25 Six months is a long time. 7:27 You only invest on information about things, not the things themselves. 7:31 So, it has the same practical effect. 7:34 But it would take, it could take a very minimal amount of effort or it could take a really, like MimboWimbo, I don't know what it would take. 7:41 It would take a lot. 7:43 All right, the next question is, well actually about Monero. 7:48 So, is Monero possible to get onto a sidechain or a Drivechain? 7:53 Yes, everything is. 7:55 How do you lose anonymity when you go back and forth to Bitcoin? 7:59 Well, it depends on you. 8:01 The going back and forth is public to both chains. 8:05 Everything that happens on the Bitcoin blockchain is, on both blockchains is public. 8:10 But, you know what I mean? 8:12 So, it's not really. 8:14 Yeah, any reinsurance stuff you did gets denominized if you go to a Bitcoin address and then you get pegged to that Bitcoin address. 8:22 Well, you wouldn't get pegged to, it depends, it kind of really depends on what you actually, what everyone means by that. 8:30 Because everything that happens on both blockchains is public. 8:33 But the, and when you go back, you will be leaving the ring signature zone and you'll be going back to it. 8:43 Presumably, you can kind of go back however you like, but presumably you'd be going back to like a one address per person situation. 8:52 And then when you go back, you would be regressing to the Bitcoin level of privacy. 8:57 But if you already shuffled enough, it would be pretty private when you came back still. 9:02 Interesting. 9:04 So, would that somehow de-anonymize someone else when you leave Monero going to Bitcoin? 9:11 I don't think so. 9:13 I think it's a strict increase. 9:17 The very worst thing that could possibly happen would be that A and B have lost privacy on mainchain Bitcoin. 9:26 And then A and B both go to Monero and then they use a weird mixing thing and they both become private. 9:32 So, there's now question mark one and question mark two. 9:35 And then they come back to Bitcoin. 9:37 And so, now there's question mark one and there's address one and address two. 9:42 And someone would know that that is some mixture of A and B there. 9:48 And so, that you kind of, you can't like lose any more privacy than you gained in Monero. 9:54 So, the worst case is that nothing happened here. 9:58 But you can go to Monero and just stay over there. 9:59 But it would be, instead of being XMR, instead of being Monero as McAfee was stating, 10:08 instead of, you could just hang out over there and use Bitcoin rank signatures and that could be sidechain Bitcoin over there. 10:15 So, it's, but yeah, when you go back and forth, you are basically getting the minimum privacy, if that makes sense. 10:23 I mean, it depends on your definition of privacy, because if your privacy is just I want to throw off people enough, 10:30 then as soon as you've thrown them off, then you're home free. 10:35 I'm not sure, I guess it's not, we can't answer with enough clarity, I think. 10:43 Well, let's go to the next one. We got plenty to dive into it. 10:48 So, Zcash, Zcash, zk-SNARK, that's possible on a sidechain? I would say, yeah, it is. 10:57 Yes, everything. If it's possible on an altcoin, in general, anything that's true for an altcoin will probably be true for a sidechain. 11:05 So, the next question is about Dash and their masternodes, and I would say also possible. 11:11 Yeah, but there's no subsidy. That's important to keep in mind. 11:15 So, you can't like reward them with anything. 11:18 Yeah, so what would incentivize masternodes? 11:21 What you'd have to do is you'd have to have an extra second transaction fee in the sidechain that doesn't go to the miners, 11:30 but eventually goes to the masternodes, which you could easily do. 11:34 But yeah, there's no, you can't get blood from a stone, so to speak, and so you can't. 11:39 But that's a tribute. That doesn't matter because that's just a more honest restatement of what already happens in Dash. 11:46 Yeah, but real quick. Hey, Paul, can we whiteboard this? Because this is something I don't really understand. 11:52 So, if you have Bitcoin and you want to make a Dash Drivechain, a masternode kind of network Drivechain, let's do that example. 12:03 So, you have Bitcoin and let's have the Dash Drivechain. We'll call it, just call it Dash drive. 12:16 Okay. 12:18 Alright, so these are chained together. 12:21 Sure. 12:23 And just for the viewers, the way this works, I'm going to try to explain it, Paul. 12:31 Correct me if I'm wrong. 12:33 You'd need a soft fork to get this Drivechain live, so everyone would need to upgrade their code and see this as valid. 12:43 Only people who want to use it. 12:45 People who want to use it, yeah. 12:47 Because it's a soft fork, it's not a hard fork. 12:48 Yes, exactly. 12:50 And essentially, you can almost imagine it like there's boxes here, so let's say ... 12:57 There's like accounts. 12:59 Let's make Dash blue, since that's their color. 13:03 So, there can be multiple Drivechains, so Dash, let's say, is blue. 13:08 Yes. 13:09 So, every time you deposit Bitcoin into this box, there's some kind of rule where I'll get some kind of equivalent Dash. 13:21 So, let's say it's like a 1 to 10, let's just say the peg is 1 to 10, so I get 10 Dash over here. 13:27 And essentially, I get this part, Paul. 13:33 Yes. 13:34 So, what I'm trying to understand is how would you then do this masternode setup if you can't do inflation? 13:40 Or would that also be part of the rule with the soft fork? 13:43 Well, it depends on what you want the masternodes to do. 13:46 But my understanding is that what they do is they perform some weird coin join service where they collect some money and then spit it back out. 13:54 So, is that your understanding as well? 13:56 Because it's been a long time since I've looked into Dash. 13:58 So, when you mine a block on Dash, a very small percentage just goes straight to the masternodes. 14:05 Regardless, let's say the masternodes provide no service, okay? 14:09 For simplicity. 14:11 Just for what I'm asking. 14:13 Yes. 14:15 But you have a thousand Dash or so locked up. 14:18 You're given a little piece of the block reward for being a masternode. 14:25 How can you do that with a system that you can't control the issuance besides people just entering it in? 14:32 Yes, you can do it however you like. 14:35 But two ways that come to mind. 14:37 One that would probably preserve the analogy the most would be some kind of demurrage or something where you move over and you get 10 now. 14:46 But in the next block, your 10 will go down to like 99.99. 14:51 And then it will credit the masternodes the difference. 14:54 Okay, so you'll slowly lose money. 14:57 Yes. 14:59 That's like inflation and taxation almost accomplish the same thing, right? 15:08 That's what I was saying before. It's an inflation tax. 15:11 Psychologically different. 15:13 Because you have to watch your whole number, which is 10 is the most beautiful whole number. 15:18 And you have to watch it crumble into a weird string of nines. 15:21 So it's very frightening to you. 15:24 As an ape human, it's very frightening. 15:27 But in reality, it's exactly what's happening already. 15:30 It's the same functionality, but now I don't have 10 coins. 15:36 The second way that comes to mind is that you could just say on that chain over there, only some of the transaction fees go to the miners of that block. 15:46 Because of Blind Merged Mining are also the Bitcoin miners. 15:48 But if you just ignore that for a second, only some of the transaction fees go to miners and the other transaction fees go to the masternodes. 15:56 And in equilibrium, eventually Bitcoin will all be transaction fees anyway. 16:00 So this will also end up being like the same thing basically. 16:04 Yeah, but I mean, why can't you just make the soft fork for this Dash Drivechain say, okay, all the total Dash, that makes the new peg and then just make it inflationary. 16:18 No, the soft fork only adds the box. 16:23 It doesn't have any idea what the Dash is doing. 16:26 Okay, so what exactly creates the peg of the 1 Bitcoin to 10 Dash that I gave in my example? 16:34 So what happens there is that the soft fork is this box and main chain Bitcoin. 16:40 And you can put Bitcoin in and take Bitcoin out. 16:42 Now, if you do a 1 to 10 peg going in, then it has to be 10 to 1 coming out. 16:50 It has to be reversed. 16:52 So it has no practical significance at all. 16:54 So it's just like counting in inches instead of feet. 16:56 Yeah, but what I'm saying is, is it possible instead of making it 10 to 1 coming back out, now it's an inflated kind of thing. 17:06 Now it's 11 to 1 coming out. Is that possible? 17:08 Yes, but mathematically it's the same as just doing the demerge. 17:13 No, no, I understand what you're saying. I'm just wondering what's possible. 17:18 It is possible, yes. 17:20 So I would say that you could replicate what Dash is doing to a large extent. 17:29 Dash would have to do this weird calculation of doing 10 and keeping track of the total. 17:35 And then making sure that Dash would know how much was in the main chain Bitcoin block. 17:42 Excuse me, that made no sense. 17:44 In the little box you have there, the account, the Dash chain will know how much money is in there. 17:51 So it will always be able to divide and multiply over that number. 17:54 But all this stuff that you're talking about is just different versions of an inflation tax or some other weird tax. 18:00 It's all irrelevant. 18:02 But I agree that it is more unsettling to see a 10 go down to 9, 9, 9, 9, 9 than it is to see other things. 18:10 But that's only because of weird quirks, parochial quirks of the human eye and psychology. 18:17 There's no bearing on it. 18:19 Alright, let's keep moving. 18:20 So the next one is asking about Steam. 18:25 And I would say, so just a little bit of background. 18:30 Steam does all kinds of stuff with powering up, powering down, locking up your coins, and I'm guessing all that's possible. 18:36 Yeah. 18:38 Because we just talked about inflation. 18:40 You just cut the stuff out. 18:42 A lot of these cryptocurrencies, especially Steam, is very inflationary based. 18:46 So can you talk a little bit about inflationary based Drivechains and the consequences of those? 18:53 Because let's say you really want an inflationary one. 18:56 The units of money… 18:58 I know functionally what you're talking about doesn't make a difference. 19:00 But I'm just saying… 19:02 But it is ridiculous. 19:04 I'm saying, you're saying, on a Drivechain, can we count in inches instead of feet? 19:09 It's like on Mars. 19:11 If we go to Mars, can we count in meters instead of feet? 19:13 And then if we go to Venus, can we count in square kilometers instead of… 19:20 Not everyone is so rational, man. 19:23 Acres. 19:24 Not everyone is so rational. 19:25 It's like… 19:26 I mean, because without… 19:28 I know, but what am I supposed to say? 19:30 Yes. 19:32 No, but think of it like this. 19:34 So the next one after this is, is proof of stake possible that pretty much relies on inflation? 19:40 I would say kind of no, because in this case, what you're doing is you're inheriting the proof of work from the Blind Merged Mining anyway. 19:48 So you have proof of work. 19:50 You would put proof of stake also on top of that. 19:52 And this question came up also with the having a block time that was faster than 10 minutes where you could do some secondary thing inside, in between the space. 20:01 If you wanted it to be faster than 10 minutes, you could have once every four blocks be a regular block, but then in between be proof of work, a new proof of work, or a new proof of stake, or a new whatever. 20:13 And you could, but I mean… 20:15 But I think in this case, there is no proof of stake. 20:20 I mean, it doesn't really matter, because my point of view is that proof of stake is already totally pointless anyway. 20:24 So this whole thing is like a weird, like it's like we divided by zero like seven operations ago, and now you're asking me if it's a positive number or not. 20:33 And it's like, it's been undefined for the last four paragraphs. 20:37 So I'm not sure exactly even what, if the question has any meaning. 20:42 But yeah, what would you do? 20:45 I mean, what kind of, what would you, what it's like, what are these people trying to accomplish? 20:48 See, this is no, but you understand this, no, no, no, no, you understand this is the real problem. 20:51 No, all these questions have good answers. 20:54 Some of these might not be valid questions. 20:58 Yeah, but here's the thing though, is that when people talk about proof of stake, what they really want to do is they really want to trick people who don't know what's going on into thinking that they have an innovative project. 21:09 And so, so that, but you understand that's the actual goal. 21:13 These people have no, people who want proof of stake don't actually have like a design goal. 21:16 So it is dividing by zero. 21:19 You asked me, can I help them achieve this goal? 21:22 The goal is a fake goal to just trick people into thinking that they are doing an innovative thing when they're not. 21:27 So it's like, I don't know. 21:29 I guess, so the answer to the question cannot help you deceive people to take their money. 21:35 It's just your ability to deceive people is on you 100%. 21:39 So either you're good at that or you're not good at that. 21:41 You remind me, you remind me of that one video where the engineer is asked to make like a square with like three angles. 21:49 No, it's a red, yeah, can it be like a red balloon? 21:52 And they all have to be parallel with like two lines that are perpendicular. 21:56 You know what I'm saying? Like, Paul, are you reminding me of that? 21:59 Yeah, seven lines all perpendicular. 22:01 But some of them, two of them are green ink. 22:03 Yeah, and two of them are green ink. 22:05 That video is called The Expert and it's very funny. 22:09 I highly recommend it. 22:11 But hold on, hold on. 22:13 I know some of these questions, it's like you're the engineer and we're like the people in the conference room, but just humor us. 22:20 Even though, but don't, you know, just be like, even how ridiculous it sounds. 22:26 Let's talk about it a little bit. 22:28 Yeah, but you understand that in context that will be misconstrued as like some kind of deficiency in it. 22:33 This is like the engineer, he can't draw the lines in invisible ink, like that's the problem, you know. 22:39 And he can't draw one in the shape of a cat, which is another part of the video, which is funny. 22:44 Oh yeah, yeah, that was at the very end. 22:46 In context. 22:52 So that's a good point and I'm glad we brought that up. 22:55 But one interesting thing that we did just kind of talk about was, okay, which is perfect. 23:00 This is actually falling right in line, like this is really nice. 23:03 So decreased difficulty or faster blocks for the Drivechain. 23:07 Just for the viewers, typically how this works is every time a Bitcoin block is found, 23:13 then have the privilege of writing the Drivechain block. 23:20 Is that right, Paul? 23:22 Yes. 23:24 They can collect fees on these Drivechains and that gives the miners some incentive. 23:28 Even if there is no fee, they still can do it for free pretty much. 23:33 Yes, it doesn't cost them anything. 23:35 With the Blind Merged Mining, they don't even need to run the node. 23:38 So this is a very simple decision. 23:41 Would you prefer having more money, yes or no? 23:43 Very simple. 23:46 Okay, but the question is, it's a very important question. 23:50 Here it is over here. 23:53 So five minute on average block times for this Drivechain, how does that work? 23:58 Well, it is a little bit like the expert thing that we were just talking about, 24:05 because you could make that work, but the question is why. 24:11 But even more importantly, it's not clear how you would even interpret those blocks, 24:15 because, I mean, so if I'm running with the spirit of the question, 24:21 and saying that in between Bitcoin blocks, which hypothetically arrive exactly every 10 minutes, 24:25 so if we just assume that for simplicity, 24:28 what the person would want for some reason is some kind of security 24:33 to accumulate five minutes after the most recent block is found. 24:38 So they want to have like half security at the five minute mark 24:45 in between each of these 10 minute periods. 24:48 So if we run with the spirit of the question in that sense, 24:51 then you could in fact do something where you say, 24:55 the sidechain blocks are of two kinds, and they alternate. 24:59 And the normal kind you find every 10 minutes in the normal way, and then you do use some factor or some kind of division. 25:11 So in this case, five minutes, you'd have like even odd, you'd have one to two, where you'd say, okay, all the even ones are found every 10 minutes or what have you. 25:22 And then the odd ones are found with some kind of secondary proof of work, which was needed to delay, is needed to delay the... 25:32 Okay, and it would be like, otherwise everyone would find every other block. 25:37 Yeah, so it's, yeah, so it would be, so it'd be getting like half its blocks. So for this use case, it works out nice, where we can just talk about two. 25:46 It just finds one block in between each of the proof of work. Now, the interesting part comes in. 25:52 If there's two blocks found back to back very quickly, does that mean... 25:59 The secondary difficulty you have to adjust. But yeah, I have an even bigger question, which is that if we did it this way, wouldn't the miners just try to mine these intermediate blocks as well? 26:12 And then they could, because since they're going to control ultimately with the structure of the, I mean, it's like, I'm not really sure what's going on. But I think this would work. 26:22 No, it's okay. Yeah. Okay. I mean, pretty much. 26:27 But I think it would be silly to make the secondary 56. Or maybe you wouldn't. I don't know. 26:36 Yeah, that would be really weird. But that's also possible. I don't know why you would do that, but I think you could. 26:43 I mean, and then also that kind of goes back to the Dash situation where they're using X11. So if they want to do like really quick blocks, they could do like one block is Bitcoin, and then like the next like 10 blocks are like these random algorithms with low difficulty or something if they wanted to. 27:00 They could do that. And one interesting thing is that that would decrease, I think, the fees that are collected by the main chain Bitcoin miners. And I don't think it would really matter because they're getting this for free. So it's just a free net net. 27:19 But yeah, that would happen. 27:22 All right, let's go. 27:23 The final thought, which is that I'm not sure what would happen if you competed. Like, let's say you have a five-minute block situation, and then someone just did something that had twice as much block space, but had 10-minute blocks twice as long. And I'm not sure which of those networks you'd rather be on. 27:43 I think you'd have just a pointless overhead in the five-minute block case. So I'm not sure how it would compete with an equivalent system that had blocks every 10 minutes. 27:56 So, we have a question from Wayne. 27:59 Built in for no reason. Okay, yes. 28:04 We discussed this. 28:05 Sorry, your audio cut out. I didn't hear that. What was the question? 28:09 Oh, thanks. Yeah, if my audio cuts out, let me know. We have a question from Wayne. 28:14 Yes. 28:16 What did he say? 28:17 Wayne. 28:18 Proof of Wayne? Can we do Wayne Chain? Is that what he asked? 28:21 Yeah, time-traveling transactions. No. 28:24 Can that be supported? 28:25 His question was... 28:26 My understanding of physics is that it is possible to do time travel, but... 28:30 Can you read that? 28:32 ERC-20. 28:33 ERC-20. 28:35 Now looks like a queue. 28:36 So that's his question. And, like, what is it really going to take? 28:42 As Jenseth would say, will it pamp? 28:46 Yeah, well, this is a very exciting possibility. 28:48 I think of this as an ERC-20 sidechain or, like, a counterparty sidechain where you still have Bitcoin over there. 28:55 You still need Bitcoin to operate the chain. 28:58 You still need Bitcoin to broadcast messages. 29:01 You have to pay network transaction fees. 29:03 So it's very similar to counterparty in that respect. 29:06 So I think this is a very interesting possibility. 29:09 But the point is, on this chain, even though you're using Bitcoin to pay the miners and using Bitcoin to stop, like, flooding and weird other stuff, 29:16 you make, within each of these, you have many, many new assets, many, many new dimensions that fulfill this, you know, this basically... 29:25 I mean, all the modern ICOs are this kind of equity coin thing, which I don't really like at all, but that is what it is. 29:34 So we might as well, you know, we'll take whatever we can get, the stupid and, you know, the pristine or whatever the saying is. 29:44 But the point is, this would be designed in a very interesting way, where it would be very much like counterparty, 29:51 where you could have all these different tokens live on one sidechain, many different tokens, the ERC-20 tokens, basically, move all around. 29:59 And in order to send messages like buy and sell these, you would need Bitcoin to pay the message transaction fee. 30:06 You wouldn't really need this, but it would be the most organized way, most efficient way of doing it. 30:11 Where you'd have this kind of like little purse of Bitcoin over there, and you'd pay these fees to send messages around for your ERC-20 tokens, 30:20 to issue them, to buy them, to sell them, to trade them, and to do whatever with them, destroy them maybe. 30:27 But the thing is, this would contain, you know, the counterparty is the DEX, the decentralized exchange. 30:36 So like this would contain kind of like a little bit of like a mini Poloniex or something in here. 30:41 So I think that would be a really cool thing. 30:44 Almost like a, you're saying like an exchange, like a DEX on the Drivechain? 30:48 Yeah, basically, yes. 30:50 And as well as digital assets like, you know, like a PepeCash or like a Spells of Genesis or something. 30:57 Would you see this implemented with like some kind of like Drivechain to Ethereum, 31:03 and then the ERC-20 tokens just being done in the Ethereum Drivechain? 31:07 Well, you could. 31:08 This is another interesting question that the Ethereum root stock, whatever philosophy, 31:15 is to build a platform that's open-ended and just lets you do whatever smart contracts you want. 31:23 And I strongly disagree with that philosophy. 31:26 I think instead you should build the smart contract that you want, 31:29 which is like Monero's ring signatures or Namecoin's domain name, like registry thing, 31:36 and SiaCoin's hard drive rental thing. 31:41 You should build that thing specifically, and you should make the sidechain of that. 31:46 So I don't think you should have a sidechain of like an open-ended process. 31:49 I think you should wait and decide what you actually want to do. 31:52 Because of the consensus nature of blockchains is that everyone has to agree down to the last byte, 32:00 and there's no real reason for you to. 32:02 In Bitcoin, there is a reason for you to care about everyone's transactions 32:05 because you don't want to get double spent and you don't want inflation. 32:08 So there's a reason for you to care. 32:11 And similarly for the other things like the ERC-20 or Dash or whatever, the sidechain version, 32:19 you want to care that the functionality is working correctly, the new functionality. 32:25 So like if you're in a Monero sidechain, you want to know that the ring signatures are working correctly. 32:29 That's actually an especially important example because of all the mixing that's going on 32:35 and all the kind of weird stuff, the big anonymity set. 32:39 But even in a case like, I'm not sure what would be the best example, but maybe David Vorek's SiaCoin, 32:46 even if that were a sidechain, when that lets you kind of do like a storage thing, 32:53 you would want that contract, that code, you would want to be auditing that 33:02 because it affects you if that code stops working. 33:05 So these are cases where you actually care about what's going on. 33:10 But with Ethereum and Rootstock, there's a lot of other stuff going on that you really don't care about. 33:15 And this leads to, I think, tremendous inefficiency in the design. 33:19 You want to only kind of pick and choose, use the sidechains that you care about. 33:25 You don't want to be on the hook for some random thing that people can just create whenever they want. 33:29 And you can see that in the big size of the Ethereum, the growth of the Ethereum block size. 33:34 You can see that in these other. 33:36 I mean, even they agree, though, because their attempt to shard is, I mean, 33:40 there's very little difference between sharding and Drivechain. 33:44 Other than the fact that Drivechain is a real idea that will probably succeed 33:47 and sharding is a fake abstract concept that will probably not exist ever. 33:52 But other than that, there's the same general idea of splitting this stuff into different zones 33:59 that you're fully validated in the zone, but just kind of partially validated outside the zone. 34:06 And so this is very similar to that, but it's by category, which I think is better, 34:11 because you actually care about the people in your category, especially so with Monero and other things like that. 34:18 And in ERC20, it's like, who should be auditing all this stuff? 34:22 Well, I guess other people who want to do this ERC20 junk, right? 34:26 And it might even be modularized further, right? 34:29 You might be able to only, within the ERC20 chain, there might even be like a PepeCache SPV mode 34:35 that is like SPV mode of ERC20, and then it only validates all the PepeCache stuff or something. 34:44 There might be some better design, which there probably is. 34:47 So we want to minimize the amount of caring that you have to do about other people. 34:53 You only care about yourself. 34:54 That's more efficient because you already care about that. 34:57 You're not going to – however much you care about yourself, you're stuck with that. 35:02 I don't know. 35:04 I don't know if that helps. 35:05 But I think the Ethereum rootstock question is a bad design because it asks you to care about so much that you don't care about. 35:14 All right, Paul. 35:16 Yes. 35:17 Let's try not to go off tangent too much of the question. 35:20 All right. 35:21 Because I'm starting to – like when you go like five senses in, that's like as much as my investment can hold. 35:26 All right. 35:27 So after everything you said, after the first five senses, I'm out. 35:31 You should just interrupt me if you get really confused, I think. 35:34 Well, you know, you're on a roll. 35:36 Okay, all right. 35:37 I can be more of an asshole if you want. 35:39 But let me ask a quick question about this ERC20. 35:45 If someone did an ERC20 token on Ethereum, like Wayne, with a TNT token, 35:51 and wanted to move to a Drivechain because there was this Drivechain idea where this guy made a counterparty or ERC20 kind of idea, 36:01 what does that look like as far as a process of moving over? 36:06 Would it literally just be like a centralized service that kind of just facilitates that move over and then you're good once the move? 36:12 I think it's even easier than that. 36:14 You just issue a new token that happens to be issued to all the people who currently own the other token, and you just call it a day. 36:20 Okay. 36:22 And then to prove ownership of the TNT token, we're talking about like signing private messages? 36:27 No, because you already know. 36:29 Because you know the ERC – because you know the Ethereum blockchain, so you know the state of the ERC20. 36:34 You know which account owns which. 36:36 Do you understand? 36:39 You basically know the equivalent of the UTXO set of the ERC20. 36:45 This is funny. 36:46 Your head keeps moving around. 36:47 Your head is like moving around. 36:49 It's very funny. 36:50 You're like – your head is moving. 36:52 Am I moving around? 36:53 I didn't even notice. 36:54 It's fun. 36:55 I'm just saying it's funny. 36:56 I don't know if other people think it's funny, but I have you like on the – I have you like zoomed in, and so it's just – it's funny to me. 37:02 I don't know. 37:04 But the point is you know who owns – you don't know who literally. 37:08 You don't know their real world identity, but you know which key owns which ERC20 token for the entire length of time, for the entire history. 37:17 Because you know the blockchain, right? 37:20 Do you understand? 37:22 Yeah, but I'm thinking you'd use a service to issue those new tokens. 37:27 You don't even need a service. 37:29 You can't stop someone from doing it. 37:31 Someone could just say, look, you now – 37:33 That's true. 37:34 I'm some guy, and I just give you all the years you did the whatever crowd sale. 37:39 You did the EOS token sale or whatever. 37:43 I don't even know what they're doing. 37:44 There's so many. 37:45 It's like permission to use like an existing UTXO set. 37:48 You don't need anyone's permission. 37:49 Exactly. 37:50 You can't stop someone from doing it. 37:51 Okay. 37:52 Let's move on. 37:54 Let's do it. 37:55 All right. 37:56 So this is another one from Sean. 37:59 Our sidechain, the only real use case is hosting shitcoin testnets variants for features for Bitcoin. 38:08 Is there anything else there? 38:11 That's a good question. 38:12 So that's certainly the primary – 38:14 It's a little bit terse, but you know. 38:17 The primary case is to make sure that there's a pathway to copying features from altcoins into Bitcoin. 38:30 So if an altcoin ever invents something cool, which is a big if, which possibly will never happen at this point. 38:37 But, I mean, it has already happened in one sense. 38:39 You have Namecoin, Monero, and I think Scicoin, which are three examples of altcoins that basically are not scams. 38:47 And they actually have honest people who are trying to accomplish like an actual purpose. 38:52 So you have at least three examples of not shitcoins, right? 38:58 Like a real altcoin, like an actual alternative for some reason. 39:02 So the goal is to have some path for that to make it into Bitcoin. 39:08 And so to thus protect Bitcoin from competition. 39:10 But in a second sense, there's a completely different answer to Sean's question, which is that you have – 39:18 In some cases, you have stuff where not everyone will agree. 39:21 We have this right now with the scalability block size debate where people don't agree on what the qualities of the chain should be. 39:30 Which is unfortunate because Bitcoin is a consensus system that requires everyone to have consensus down to the last byte. 39:36 So the only way you can have – 39:39 The only way you can have – 39:41 Sorry, now I hear an echo. 39:44 Now I hear an echo. 39:46 Oh, you do? 39:47 Yeah, I do. 39:48 Echo, echo, echo. 39:50 Okay. 39:52 So the only way you can have the block – you know, what you want is to have – 39:56 I thought maybe Google Hangouts and YouTube could handle it, but I was wrong. Okay. 40:04 So the issue is – so the first category is there might actually be good ideas that make it on. 40:09 And so they would not necessarily need to be shitcoins nor testnets. 40:13 They could be actual altcoins that actually do actual things. 40:16 But the second thing is that some people may want a small block size. 40:20 Some people may want a large block size. 40:22 And right now, the way things work is you have to choose one or the other for everyone. 40:28 But with sidechains, you could just say, well, if you want a small one, you can just hang out in the small world, small block world. 40:37 And if you want a large block, you can just hang out in the large block world. 40:40 And it doesn't affect the 21 million coin limit, whereas it certainly does now. 40:45 Sure. I mean I think changing the block size is probably the easiest, simplest use case of a Drivechain. 40:55 I think you get the most bang for your buck like as far as stuff that users would actually want that we know that users want badly. 41:04 You can literally make like a 20 – I mean a 30 megabyte block size or whatever, right? 41:10 Yeah, you can. I wrote a little Bitcoin discuss email about like what you would aim for or what I thought you would aim for. 41:19 You can do whatever you want. 41:21 One issue is that if you screw it up too much, then you'll have no users. 41:25 It's kind of like you're free to start any business you want, but if that business doesn't meet some efficiency criteria and some customer criteria, it will just go out of business. 41:36 So you see the chain could just suck and no one could want to use it because it could just be constantly below the limit and never be used by anyone. 41:44 Paul, would you also say this would give an opportunity for a Drivechain with like that 30 megabytes in size for each block to be pruned every so often and that's just part of the rules? 41:56 Yes, those are our advantages. 42:00 It's like you could contain millions of transactions or whatever. 42:06 Every year you could just prune the old year's data and everything. 42:13 Correct. 42:14 Since the sidechain is in SPV security mode necessarily because this is part of the definition of a sidechain is that it requires SPV proofs, or as I prefer to call it, the hashrate escrow. 42:27 But since you're at that security level already, then you lose nothing further by discarding blocks that are more than six months old or more than a year old or something. 42:38 So you can already do that. 42:40 So there is actually some scalability gain just from using a sidechain. 42:47 Okay. 42:48 Paul, next question. 42:51 Can altcoins implement Drivechains? 42:54 Yes. 42:56 I mean, yeah, it makes sense. 42:58 So they could compete, I guess. 43:01 They could. 43:02 They could have a Bitcoin sidechain. 43:04 Bitcoin core sidechain. 43:06 They could. 43:07 So I guess this kind of question kind of hones in on what's the most secure core blockchain. 43:19 The networks would compete not on the basis of their technical feature set anymore because everyone would have the same technical feature set, sort of. 43:28 But they wouldn't compete on that because it would be the same. 43:31 So there would be no basis for distinguishing, one, Ethereum from Monero from Ripple from Bitcoin because they'd all have the same features, which would be all the features in this hypothetical world. 43:42 But they would compete on the basis of their monetary network and their monetary policy. 43:46 And so in that way, they would still just get run over by Bitcoin, which has a vastly superior monetary network because people actually use it as money and they recognize it as money. 43:54 And it has a monetary policy that's much more conducive to investing and holding money. 44:02 So that would attract economic agents in that way. 44:07 So it doesn't matter. 44:09 Bitcoin would win that competition. 44:11 The only competitors would be very, very recognizable people like Ethereum, which is the competition would be weak, and Ripple, like people, weird compromisers and doing weird stuff like that. 44:22 But in general, it would not be an issue of viability for Bitcoin. 44:27 This next question, this is a loaded question. 44:32 This is from Risho. 44:34 I think that's how you pronounce it. 44:37 He says, ask Paul about the fact that miners can steal the money out of a sidechain and how the game theory prevents that from happening. 44:48 So that's a very long explanation. 44:53 I can take a crack at it. 44:56 Okay, good, because my voice is... 44:59 Exactly. 45:02 All right, so I would say you have to talk about how they would steal the money in the first place. 45:12 You're trying to go back from a sidechain back to typically, if you want to make that quick, you could do that instantly with atomic swaps. 45:25 There's no danger of theft in those cases. 45:30 Exactly. 45:31 There's also this withdrawal feature, which Paul kind of described to me as like guardrails. 45:38 And this is essentially the same idea of like a payment channel. 45:42 If you have bad actors, well, you just wait until you take your money back or whatever. 45:48 They call it. 45:50 Yes. 45:51 Yeah, so there's like an escrow period. 45:54 So, yeah, the point is that you're tying stuff up in escrow. 45:57 It's a feature of the box. 45:59 So you have the blue box and the red box. 46:01 When you add the escrow, you add the software to add the Drivechain or the sidechain, that box tells you how long you need to wait before the money comes out. 46:09 Sure, and let's say it's three months. 46:12 So you have a very long time, yes. 46:15 Yeah, so let's say you're screwed and no one's willing to do atomic swaps with you. 46:22 There's like no liquidity on the sidechain. 46:24 Three months in order to get your Bitcoin back. 46:28 And then the question really comes from Rishu. 46:34 Rishu, I've been talking to you for a while on Telegram. 46:41 What's the game theory on why the miners wouldn't just steal that money? 46:47 So maybe, Paul, if you want to actually talk about this. 46:49 Okay, well, I do want to say one game theory thing first, which is that you're right. 46:52 So there's like a fast way where the exchange rate is variable, but then there's the slow withdrawal where it's fixed. 47:00 And what's required is really for not a single person to offer you a decent swap rate, the atomic swap or the lightning level. 47:10 So there's these atomic swaps that you can do and there's these lightning network swaps that you can do that are instant. 47:17 Well, they're instant or they're atomic, so they will happen or they just won't happen. 47:22 But the point is, there's just finality that's very fast. 47:28 You know, it's a normal Bitcoin transaction. 47:32 So there's that way. 47:34 And then there's this slow way where the exchange rate is fixed. 47:38 Now, the issue is, how can we, what guarantee can we, we want to have our cake and eat it too. 47:45 We want it to be fast and we want the exchange rate to be fixed. 47:48 And so in order for you to be unable to have your cake and eat it too, it really has to be just about every single person, no matter who they are or like what their circumstances. 48:01 These people really have to be all, like almost everyone on the sidechain has to be, I don't want to say irrational, 48:07 but because you have this option at the very end to say, screw you guys, I'm going to take the very slow three month trip back. 48:16 Because you have that option, you can kind of like iterate from there in a game theoretic sense and say, okay, everyone should be competing with you on improving that option. 48:27 And what I mean by that is they have money that they're, I'm not sure, maybe one good way to explain it is that there's sort of a presence of arbitrage where people can have like a bank CD. 48:39 Or they send the money over to the sidechain and they slowly walk it back. 48:44 But they get some yield from you in exchange for you moving your money across very quickly. 48:51 So the point is you leverage the fact that there's two things that are very different. 48:55 One is very fast, but has the potential to charge you a fee for convenience. 48:59 And the other is slow, but pays a fee to compensate. 49:04 Atomic swaps will be there for like for a slight premium. 49:13 It should be close to the peg. 49:15 Now, obviously. 49:16 It should always be there. 49:17 If the peg is like 1 to 10 and they're giving you 1 to 5 with atomic swap, well, I'll just wait the three months and get the 1 to 10 instead. 49:25 But the point is anyone could wait the three months. 49:27 Anyone could say, okay. 49:28 Yeah, so if I have a lot of money, I can just go, oh, you're willing to sell 1 to 5? 49:35 I'll just buy all of it up. 49:37 And let's say I'm a mining pool like Bitmain. 49:40 Well, I know I'm not going to screw myself over, so I'm just going to take that free money. 49:44 Exactly. 49:45 In particular, the miners should be always willing to offer good atomic swap rates. 49:49 Now, this is only all this rests on the premise that you would be able to defect at the last moment by taking the slow three-month. 49:59 movement back. So if that piece is gone, then the rest of the game theory collapses. And now there's no reason for anyone to pay anything for these coins because they may be trapped over there. There's no three-month. There's nothing back. So they might be worthless or they might have some weird value, some altcoin type I, something like that. So the thing is, though, that if this last piece is in place at all, you should always be willing to pay. 50:27 There should always be someone, there should be huge amounts of thickness in this market for atomic swaps and these other things. So all you need is for it to be there in the first place. And then you will be able to have your cake and eat it too, in theory. 50:41 So now we have to talk about, how do we get this last thing in place? We're safely moving it from the sidechain back to the main chain. And the answer is that you have to do a strength in numbers thing, first of all, where you put everyone's withdrawals into one big withdrawal. And you pool them all together. I was talking about these classes. So in class one, you're using... 51:08 I wrote down these classes. So if you want to go over them, when you're in class one... 51:14 You're doing normal... 51:15 You're pretty much... 51:16 You're just on the chain. You're not trying to withdraw yet. 51:20 Exactly. You're hanging out. 51:21 Class two is like you're... 51:23 Yes, it's as if you're... 51:24 Class two is like you went to the airport, and you haven't boarded the plane yet, but you're in the lobby. Everyone's in the terminal, and they're about to call you to... 51:35 Everyone's on standby or something. So class one is like if all the chains were different islands, and you're hanging out. In class one, you're hanging out at the beach. You're hanging out at the store. You're hanging out at the whatever, the resort. You're doing these different things. You're doing whatever you want to do on the sidechain. 51:53 Class two is you want to leave. So you go to the airport, and you can no longer do anything fun because you're waiting to leave, and you're not even sure if you'll make it on. 52:01 But then class three is when you're... 52:03 You're frozen. 52:04 Yes. So class three is like when they finally get people to board. They choose people to board the plane. They try to stack everyone in a period onto the plane. 52:13 Now, as I've previously mentioned, people can rearrange before all this happens with the atomic swaps and with these other things. So people can rearrange such that probably the total number of passengers, even if there's only one flight every three months, the total number of passengers probably could be very light. 52:32 It's not clear. It could be anything. But it could be very low because you could have people who specialize in buying up all the side coins at some discount, and then they're just one guy. 52:49 They just walk everything back in one. They're walking over to one destination on the main chain. 52:55 So potentially, there's almost an unlimited amount of throughput, even though it's just one transaction every three months, which is very slow. 53:06 But that's the other thing is that, first of all, we have strengthened numbers. We merge everyone's thing onto one plane, so to speak, and try to fly it back and land it. 53:16 But the second thing is we try not to overwhelm any of the third parties that we would complain to or that we would kind of – I'm not sure exactly. 53:28 There's like an interrelationship. Game theory is all about interrelationships between people. 53:33 So what you'd want to do is you'd want any theft from the sidechain to be representative of some greater crime that would have bad consequences for the miners. 53:48 So when I was describing it to you earlier today, we contrasted an example where it's like six blocks with one where it's like three months' worth of blocks. 53:56 So if the flight is very short and very frequent, where it can happen many times per day versus when the flight takes like a whole three months to go back. 54:08 I'm not sure if we're explaining it in the best order for the poor people in the audience. 54:13 So basically he's got those two boxes there. He's got this blue box and this red box. 54:17 And what you have to do is basically if you want to get the money out, a miner puts a note on the box saying where he's going to take the money out. 54:25 And then there's this slow acting process, acknowledgement, where you basically upvote or downvote the note. 54:31 And if the note accumulates enough upvotes, which will take at least three months or whatever the parameter is, it varies per box. 54:41 You can do however you like per box, but we're going to talk about why it's long momentarily. 54:46 If that accumulates enough X, then the box opens and the money can be taken out as defined by the note that you put on the box earlier. 54:55 So now why is this so slow? And part of the answer is because there's already a bunch of stuff that's fast. 55:01 The atomic swaps and lightning network stuff, that's super fast. 55:05 And that's what you should use instead if you want fast. 55:09 So there's no real loss. 55:11 What you really need is, in a game theoretical sense, is some option. 55:15 If everyone goes crazy at the same time and fails you, you need some recourse. 55:21 And as long as you have that recourse, people will be competing to add kind of convenience features to this. 55:27 I mean, in theory anyway. 55:28 They'll be competing to give you good rates on your atomic swaps so that you always be able to do this. 55:34 So the question is, why is it so long? What's the benefit? 55:38 Contrast two worlds where it's just very short and it's very long. 55:43 In a world where it's very short, like it's only six blocks or ten blocks long, the flight, 55:49 you can put the note on the box and say, we need to accumulate this. 55:53 And then you've accumulated it quickly. 55:55 You open the box and you take the money out. 55:57 And what that opens up is this kind of mosquito type situation where you're pestered with all this stuff all the time 56:05 that you really don't have the energy to deal with. 56:08 So what I'm imagining is it's like 4 a.m. on the eastern coast, 56:13 and you put a note on the box saying that you're going to withdraw 50 bitcoin and give it to Jihan Wu or something. 56:21 And then since it's at 4 a.m., ten blocks go by very quickly. 56:26 And maybe the whole thing is even done in secret. 56:29 It's like selfish mind or something, and it's done secretly. 56:32 So you have these weird, annoying situations where that happens, 56:38 and then there's no real penalty against the miners. 56:42 You want the miners to suffer for doing this. 56:44 But what they can do is they can say, we don't know who that was. 56:47 That was some weird miner. 56:49 That was some guy who just rented a bunch of mining equipment and did this weird thing. 56:52 So in order to avoid that, in order to force the entire world to see very clearly that this is, in fact, the miners' fault 57:02 and they're doing this on purpose because they're doing the wrong thing, you make this very, very, very long. 57:08 You make it very clear that the note on the box is compared to something that's on the sidechain. 57:14 And they're both these tiny, tiny little SHA-256 hashes. 57:19 So you're basically just looking at one thing and looking at another thing. 57:23 And you see that they're not the same thing. 57:25 And then this situation has to persist for like three months. 57:30 And that's just – it's very difficult for me to believe that that would happen without it. 57:35 That could happen. 57:36 Nothing in principle prevents it from happening cryptographically or anything like that. 57:41 But if it does happen, what it would probably just mean is that the sidechain experiment is not valuable. 57:48 I mean that's a tragedy, but that's just what it means is that no one cares about sidechains 57:54 and that no one wanted them around and that there's no significant – 57:58 like I would hope that the sidechain project would be valuable and that the price would crash 58:03 and that people would be full of outrage and that people would send assassins to China 58:08 to like fix this problem during the three months or whatever. 58:12 But that's – but I just don't think – 58:15 Paul, if I may. 58:17 First off, this isn't backwards to you because I see it backwards on my screen. 58:21 No, it looks forward. 58:23 All right, sorry. 58:25 It just freaks me out when I see it mirrored. 58:27 Okay. 58:28 So in other words, I think what you're saying I just want to illustrate here. 58:32 If they want to be a bad actor, and we're going back to the game theory, 58:37 if they want to come in and take literally all the money from what was supposed to go to the people 58:45 back in this – we're at like the class three. 58:48 They're actually being withdrawn. 58:53 Those going to the people that actually should get it, like let's say Jihan Wu or whoever, right? 58:58 We use Jihan Wu as like the secret agent or whatever. 59:00 Yeah, he's the great boogeyman. 59:01 Yeah, he's the boogeyman. 59:04 Regardless of what you think about it. 59:08 But essentially for what he was saying, like at 4 a.m. Eastern Standard Time or whatever, 59:14 he could just kind of – he somehow gets like these six blocks, 59:20 and then would he have to get these six blocks in a row, Paul, 59:23 or would he just get these six blocks in general? 59:26 What was that about? 59:27 It depends on the parameters. 59:28 So the parameters are just specifically there's a waiting period. 59:31 Once you put the note on, you have to let everyone look at the note. 59:34 It's a little bit like an eviction notice where it's like you have to let everyone look at the note for a while 59:38 before anything happens, which is good because that only disadvantages the attacker 59:43 because the attacker is always going to try a surprise attack. 59:46 But what happens when you have, let's say, one pool say that, yeah, I want to get all the money 59:55 versus this pool says, wait a minute, no, the normal people are supposed to get the money in the next block. 59:59 What happens then? 1:00:00 Then, see, that's the other thing is that there's ways. 1:00:03 It's easy. 1:00:04 You can, in fact, if you upvote, if there's multiple, okay, per sidechain, 1:00:08 there can only be one note on the box that is upvoted at a period of time. 1:00:14 So you can put another note on, and you can say, that's not what I want to do. 1:00:18 I want to do this other withdrawal. 1:00:19 Are you saying note, N-O-T-E? 1:00:21 You know what I mean? 1:00:22 It's like when you go up to the red box there. 1:00:26 So how do you invalidate that note? 1:00:29 If it doesn't get enough acknowledgment, it just goes away after a period of time. 1:00:34 It just dies. 1:00:35 Okay. 1:00:36 But let's, for this sake, because obviously if you made it one block, that's very dangerous. 1:00:42 Of course. 1:00:43 Then, yeah, you're inviting a giant transaction fee. 1:00:46 You have no time. 1:00:48 If you make it just one block to be able to withdraw, you have no time to refute someone just stealing. 1:00:54 Literally, that's like the best attack is making withdrawal one block. 1:00:58 That's actually a very good way of explaining it. 1:01:01 I think I would say if the note is only one block or zero blocks or whatever you're saying here, 1:01:06 then effectively the sidechain has regressed to become a hard fork of Bitcoin, 1:01:11 where everyone has to validate the whole thing as a validation rule. 1:01:17 And if they don't validate, then it's basically just a giant transaction fee. 1:01:21 All the deposits are just a giant transaction fee paid to one line or somewhere. 1:01:25 And your example with the three-month interval was, okay, yeah, someone's doing some screwy shit, 1:01:33 but, you know, over the course of like a day, it's going to be all over Reddit, all over Twitter, 1:01:37 and people are going to be like, what the heck's going on? 1:01:40 The price is going to plummet. 1:01:43 Some weird stuff is going to happen. 1:01:45 I think what is also kind of strange to think about is scare tactics, where they think they're going to steal everything, 1:01:54 make everyone short sell or like sell their coins for like half price, 1:01:58 and then they just use the standard way to get all the Bitcoin. 1:02:02 So what do you think will combat the scare tactics and making people sell their Drivechain coins for cheaper 1:02:10 than what they could get if they just waited the time period? 1:02:14 Well, it depends. 1:02:18 This might never happen because... 1:02:20 It may happen. 1:02:21 It's something I've thought about that may happen. 1:02:25 But here's the other thing is that so like what they might do is they might be like a scare tactic, 1:02:30 and then it might be like the price of the atomic swaps collapses to like 70 cents in the dollar 1:02:35 instead of like 99 cents in the dollar. 1:02:37 And in that way, there's kind of like a 30% tax for moving back. 1:02:42 But if the miners are going to steal, it's a little... 1:02:45 You see, at a certain point, it becomes qualitatively different. 1:02:48 Like the difference between one block and several thousand blocks, 1:02:52 it does eventually just take on a whole new quality in my opinion. 1:02:56 But in the same way, the threat to steal or to just be a jerk about how expensive it is to move the money back, 1:03:05 that is different from improperly moving it back I think categorically. 1:03:09 So like if you can... 1:03:12 So your recourse might be to just say, I'm going to stay on this sidechain forever. 1:03:17 I'm never moving the money back because they're playing all these games. 1:03:20 It's more like a blockade or something among the islands. 1:03:23 You can say, well, I don't care. 1:03:24 I'm just going to stay on this island because they wouldn't dare, which they may in fact dare. 1:03:28 I don't know if this would be the case. 1:03:30 But one could reason with some justification, I think, 1:03:34 that although they may want to shake people down when they're in the airport, 1:03:38 like the thugs may want to shake people down in the airport, 1:03:40 they wouldn't dare actually attack the island because then it would just ruin the entire archipelago economy 1:03:48 or whatever you would say, and that would be a basis for all their revenues decreasing, 1:03:53 the transaction fee as well as the exchange rate of Bitcoin. 1:03:56 But, yeah, it's not totally clear to me that this will have no problem whatsoever. 1:04:03 I also think that, you know, being a bad actor like this is very bad for reputation 1:04:14 and just being part of the ecosystem as far as being malicious for so long. 1:04:19 I just don't think that – what I think will happen is that there will be news about sidechains in general 1:04:27 that will cause the Bitcoin price to go up. 1:04:30 And after a certain point, there will be sidechains added that will have transaction fees on them, 1:04:37 and that will cause – all of this will cause minor revenues to go up, 1:04:41 which will eventually cause the difficulty to go up. 1:04:43 And so after a certain point, miners like literally won't be able to afford to – 1:04:48 Well, I mean, regardless of that, I think that given enough time with a decentralized network 1:04:55 that the downvoted test of this would also be possible. 1:05:00 See, that's the other thing that I forgot to mention is that you can put multiple notes on the little red box 1:05:05 and say I want to withdraw this, I want to withdraw that. 1:05:07 You can only upvote one at a time, but you can downvote all of them at a time, 1:05:11 or you can abstain from all of them at a time. 1:05:13 So it's actually a lot more – 1:05:15 It's free to downvote. 1:05:17 Yeah, so it's free to downvote, and the default is abstain. 1:05:21 So it's much easier to get the whole process to just fail and force it to start over. 1:05:26 So it would be very difficult to – you can set – 1:05:29 and so that's the thing is you can set the threshold however you like. 1:05:32 You can say I need – because notice that a downvote has twice the strength of an upvote in a way, 1:05:39 because if you start with a store score of zero and you need to get up to a score of 50, 1:05:44 and each upvote sends you up once, each abstention sends you sideways, 1:05:49 and each downvote sends you down. 1:05:51 So the bad guy goes up. 1:05:53 You can have 60% bad guys and 30% abstainers, and you'll go up two and down one. 1:06:00 But if your goal is to get to – I forgot even what I said. 1:06:03 What was the goal? 1:06:05 If your goal is to get to – let's say there's a 100-period waiting period – 1:06:11 sorry, 100 blocks of waiting and then 100 blocks of voting. 1:06:16 Now that's obviously too short for me. 1:06:18 I want multiple months. 1:06:19 But I'm just saying – 1:06:21 Let's say 144 one day. 1:06:24 Okay, fine. 1:06:25 So you have 144 of waiting where no one does anything. 1:06:29 You just have to get a look at the note. 1:06:31 And this is enough time really to at least put something on Reddit or whatever, 1:06:36 however you like to do, however you prefer your things. 1:06:38 I mean all the miners do know each other and they have their phone numbers at this point. 1:06:42 So I mean that's a sure matter of reality. 1:06:45 It's not that I'm relying on that. 1:06:47 Okay, but waiting period and then voting period. 1:06:50 So voting period, 144 blocks, we start at zero. 1:06:53 Now it's a parameter of the box, the red box there, 1:06:57 of what score you need to hit out of 144 in order for the box to open. 1:07:03 So if the score is like half of 144 is 72. 1:07:09 So let's say the score is 72. 1:07:12 That's half. 1:07:13 Now what may be clear to you is that if you have half the hash power on your side 1:07:21 and you have – and the other half doesn't care, 1:07:26 then you'll just barely hit it in time, right? 1:07:29 Because you'll have one upvote and then one abstention 1:07:32 and then one upvote and then one abstention. 1:07:34 So by the time you've gone 144 blocks, you'll have just barely cleared 72 1:07:38 and the box will just open in time. 1:07:40 Does that make sense to you? 1:07:44 Last part you said? 1:07:45 What was that? 1:07:46 Yeah, so I'm asking you if this makes sense. 1:07:48 So you have 144 blocks to vote and you have half the hash rate that wants to – 1:07:53 I want to ask questions about the voting process. 1:07:56 So is it if I mine a block? 1:07:59 Yes. 1:08:01 I mine a block, I vote. 1:08:03 You move the counter up or sideways? 1:08:08 And essentially the incentive to be a good actor 1:08:11 and all this stuff is you want to keep collecting fees from these sidechains. 1:08:14 So when you start being a bad actor, you forego that ability potentially. 1:08:19 Yeah, if you torpedo the chain, then no one will want to use it 1:08:21 and then the transaction fees will be gone. 1:08:23 And probably people will no longer want to use any sidechain. 1:08:29 So what is the likelihood that people don't agree with the sidechain 1:08:34 and they just downvote it every time? 1:08:37 Well, that's not – no, that's not exogenous. 1:08:42 That depends on what's happening in the world. 1:08:44 But that's what I was trying to demonstrate is that if you have 144 blocks of voting 1:08:51 and you need to hit 72 and half the miners are – they want to steal money 1:08:56 and they control half the hash rate, they find half those 144 blocks, 1:09:01 they will just barely succeed in time if the other miners are indifferent. 1:09:07 So you have 144 blocks that are going to be found. 1:09:10 You control half the hash rate. 1:09:14 You're saying if they're not voting at all, the other miners. 1:09:17 The other half, right. 1:09:18 But if a single one of them downvotes. 1:09:20 But if one of those miners vote downvote, 1:09:25 so as long as we have one block out of like the half or whatever. 1:09:30 No, no, no. 1:09:31 But you see this depends. 1:09:32 Because they have at least 50%. 1:09:33 No, but that's not always the case. 1:09:35 In this specific example. 1:09:36 But miners may – what? 1:09:40 It depends how the soft fork is implemented on the percentage. 1:09:45 Yes, it depends on the parameters that you put in. 1:09:47 You see, in this case we had parameters of 144 and 72. 1:09:53 Yes, okay. 1:09:55 I get what you're saying. 1:09:56 Wait, hold on. 1:09:57 Just make sure people understand this. 1:09:59 I mean, even though we're going through it, 1:10:04 I just want to make sure we kind of recap. 1:10:06 So essentially, let me kind of shoot this box up here. 1:10:10 So this essentially, the criteria when you make this, 1:10:15 we're talking about like voting and valid withdrawals and stuff. 1:10:21 If you had like your timeline be 144 blocks, 1:10:27 some Bitcoin blocks, 1:10:29 then you would need at least 50% – 1:10:34 like the rules of this is at least 50% acceptance upvotes need to be done 1:10:42 in order for it to be valid on who gets what when a withdrawal is done. 1:10:46 144 and 72. 1:10:48 You know, it's not quite like that. 1:10:50 I do it a slightly different way to save space. 1:10:52 But it's basically 144 and 72. 1:10:55 Anyways, all I'm trying to get at is the 144 blocks. 1:11:01 If just one of those people of the – 1:11:04 let's say the bad actor has got 72 votes or 72 of the 144. 1:11:10 These people are abstaining, the other groups of miners. 1:11:13 If just one of them downvotes, then it's voided out. 1:11:18 It's all for null, right? 1:11:20 Yes, but it's a little more complicated than that 1:11:22 because the miners could try to orphan each other strategically. 1:11:26 But, see, in order for them to do that, 1:11:28 there have to be some other weird things happening, 1:11:30 and they have to also care a lot more 1:11:32 because now they're not just doing some weird sidechain thing. 1:11:35 They're doing mainchain stuff, 1:11:37 and then we have to talk about spy mining and all these other things. 1:11:40 So it's a little more complicated than that. 1:11:42 The other thing is that this example, maybe they don't have more than 50, 1:11:46 or maybe they get lucky, or maybe they get unlucky. 1:11:49 Maybe they actually have 51. 1:11:51 So if they have 90% of the hash file, 1:11:53 then it doesn't matter if 90% vote for and 10% vote against, 1:11:56 it's still a net 80%, 1:11:58 which is more than enough to push it over the line in this case. 1:12:01 But it depends on which parameters you want to pick. 1:12:04 Yeah, I mean, you would be kind of crazy, though, 1:12:07 if you made it like 90% consensus 1:12:09 because you would have that one pool that's in America. 1:12:12 Yeah, you have two problems. 1:12:14 If you make it too high, then you could have a small pool downvote you 1:12:18 and just veto everything, and it would be like a Polish veto 1:12:20 where just nothing can ever get done because you can never get full consensus. 1:12:26 But you could do that if you want. 1:12:29 That's up to the people who design the sidechain 1:12:32 and who soft work in the new escrow, 1:12:34 so the new little box there, the blue and red box. 1:12:37 So it depends on that, but that's why I want it to be a very long, 1:12:41 nice healthy waiting period of like a week or two 1:12:44 because it should be very easy to tell if they're correct or not 1:12:47 because you just have to look at one little 32-byte hash 1:12:51 and another little 32-byte hash. 1:12:53 You can easily look at it with your human eyes, see if they're the same or not. 1:12:57 So it's very easy to figure that out. 1:12:59 And then there has to be this ongoing process of you can't just claim. 1:13:04 If you're a big miner, you can't just claim that your hands are clean 1:13:08 because you should at least be downvoting the mysterious thing, 1:13:12 even if you don't want to run a full node yourself 1:13:16 and figure out what's going on and what you should upvote. 1:13:18 You should just say, well, we've been getting a lot of complaints, 1:13:21 so we're just going to downvote this because it's going to affect 1:13:24 our other sidechain business or something that we actually do like. 1:13:27 So even if you have some weird sidechain, they're all kind of blurred together here. 1:13:31 So what you want is for anyone stealing from one sidechain 1:13:34 to kind of really bear the brunt of the wrath of stealing from all the sidechains, 1:13:39 which is exactly how regular Bitcoin works 1:13:41 by aggregating all the transactions into one blockchain. 1:13:44 So you can't just double spend one person. 1:13:46 You have to do the entire chain, which is kind of the secret sauce. 1:13:50 So I also want to point out, Paul, correct me if I'm wrong, 1:13:53 the way Rootstock gets around some of these issues is more of a service 1:13:59 where they charge 20%. 1:14:01 Yeah, they do some weird stuff. 1:14:03 So in particular, you can see they're essentially using a service, though, 1:14:07 to insure a peg, and they're insuring quicker withdrawals. 1:14:11 But essentially, you're using Rootstock, and they're charging a substantial fee. 1:14:16 Well, yeah, they do like a half-federated thing. 1:14:19 Then they do this other thing. 1:14:21 I'm just saying this requires like no kind of company centralized. 1:14:25 Yeah, I don't do any of this. 1:14:27 They have like a federated thing that has predefined identities that don't change, 1:14:32 which is like practically a definition of centralization for me. 1:14:37 I just want to make a distinction between this idea. 1:14:41 Yes, they do do some weird stuff. 1:14:43 In fact, there's a weird e-mail where I explain you can find it on Bitcoin Dev 1:14:49 right after I do the Drivechain follow-up on the request for discussion. 1:14:55 Sergio shows up sometime. 1:14:57 I was after consensus, so that was like May, June, so it was like June. 1:14:59 So if you want to find that, you can talk about how this thing is a little different. 1:15:04 Cool. All right. You ready to jump to the next question? 1:15:07 Let's do it. 1:15:09 All right. That was good. 1:15:11 That was a big question. 1:15:12 Well, someone asked to explain the game theory of the most important parts. 1:15:16 So hopefully, we'll probably end up skipping some of these questions, 1:15:22 because obviously, we've covered so much already. 1:15:25 But this is asking if sidechains can alter the heartbeat, like 20-minute block times. 1:15:39 I think we kind of already covered that. 1:15:41 But here's the interesting thing. 1:15:44 He said 20-minute block times. 1:15:46 So if you actually want a longer block time, how would you do that? 1:15:50 I haven't really given a lot of thought, but it must be easier. 1:15:53 I mean you must just say that every 10 minutes, you'd alternate the other way. 1:15:56 You'd just say you'd just block. 1:15:59 You'd have to go off block parity. 1:16:03 You'd just say this one is a null block. 1:16:05 This doesn't contain anything. 1:16:09 You wouldn't be able to collect fees on the null block. 1:16:12 Yeah, but that's what I mean. 1:16:13 You wouldn't have taken any effort to make either. 1:16:15 You'd just say like – 1:16:17 Wouldn't it be simple to – 1:16:19 The hash is always just a bunch of zeros. 1:16:22 Sorry? 1:16:23 The criteria of the chain to be like only on odd-numbered blocks you can write? 1:16:30 Well, that sounds annoying and complicated. 1:16:32 That would essentially be a – 1:16:36 No, but that's what I am saying. 1:16:38 Without doing that cumbersome requirement, 1:16:40 because we want to affect the main chain as little as possible always. 1:16:43 It's the guiding principle. 1:16:46 I think it would just be easier to say every other hash has to be just a bunch of zeros. 1:16:54 Next question. 1:16:56 Paul, can you replace the consensus mechanism on the sidechain to make it proof of stake? 1:17:02 We kind of covered that already. 1:17:05 Or an alternative version of proof of work. 1:17:08 So maybe we talked about this earlier. 1:17:11 There's no reason. 1:17:13 Because you already get all the free work you want. 1:17:17 Okay, so – 1:17:18 You get all the main chain's work. 1:17:19 Alternative proof of work, maybe that goes back to our shorter block times. 1:17:23 Well, that's the point. 1:17:25 If you had an actual problem there that you needed proof of work to solve. 1:17:28 Because otherwise, why would there be – 1:17:31 They would just find one block after another if there wasn't someone slowing it down. 1:17:34 So the – 1:17:36 This really hones in to the idea of this is a lot more simple 1:17:41 when you just go off the Bitcoin block time. 1:17:44 And when blocks are found there, also these things can be blind merge lines. 1:17:47 So just to emphasize that. 1:17:49 That's like – 1:17:50 Yeah, I think also it's like – 1:17:52 You're kind of going against the grain. 1:17:54 It's not even any of that. 1:17:55 It's just that people want these fake things so that they have a reason to pretend that their project is interesting or different. 1:18:03 But it's not – 1:18:04 Changing the block time from 10 minutes to some other number, that's just like stupid. 1:18:15 I mean it's not anything. 1:18:17 It's not an actual idea. 1:18:19 Because people don't know what the block time is for. 1:18:25 Some people don't know about our podcast either. 1:18:28 Yeah. 1:18:32 All right, so here's another question. 1:18:36 How has security changed if only 5% of the miners are merge mining? 1:18:40 Well, he said merge mining, which is different than Blind Merged Mining. 1:18:44 We can talk about that actually. 1:18:45 No, it's the same. 1:18:46 I mean it's – 1:18:47 For the purpose of the question, it's the same. 1:18:49 Okay, sure. 1:18:51 merge mining, and he says, what's the difference with security if 5% of the miners are merge mining versus 75% to 100%? 1:18:59 And I would say that as long as you have at least one substantial pool mining your sidechain, you're good. 1:19:08 Well, it's a little bit different actually. 1:19:11 I think it is a little bit different. 1:19:13 I think you're right. 1:19:14 I agree with you. 1:19:15 But I was thinking that with Blind Merged Mining, there's less of a reason. 1:19:19 So without Blind Merged Mining, or if only some miners – 1:19:24 like let's just say it's dogmatic, and we'll just say only 5% are mining this coin. 1:19:30 And we'll ignore the really important question of why. 1:19:35 Why are they ignoring this coin? 1:19:38 Why don't they want free money? 1:19:40 That's a more important question, but we'll ignore it temporarily. 1:19:44 And we'll just say only 5%, for some magical reason, are mining the sidechain. 1:19:52 And as a result, I would say that probably, therefore, the sidechain is only going to actually find a block once every whatever it would be, a factor of 20. 1:20:05 So once every 200 minutes instead of once every 10 minutes. 1:20:09 I can't wait until companies are saying, you know, I don't really want Drivechains. 1:20:16 I want the technology behind Drivechains, which is blind. 1:20:20 I can't wait for companies to start saying that. 1:20:23 Well, who knows? 1:20:24 They might say they want the technology behind Blind Merged Mining. 1:20:27 Whatever that means. 1:20:29 I want the technology behind SHA-256. 1:20:33 It's not really about multiplication, Michael Tidwell. 1:20:38 It's about the technology behind multiplication. 1:20:41 It's like, you know, there's technically no end to that abstraction. 1:20:45 Okay, but see, that we ignored a more important question, which is why would only 5% do that? 1:20:51 Because with Blind Merged Mining, you don't even need to run the full node. 1:20:54 So it's just free money. 1:20:56 And we have the example of Namecoin already, where you were handicapped by your requirement to run a full node in the past and still are today. 1:21:04 There was a lengthy amount of time that you had the Namecoin, you needed to run a full node. 1:21:10 And yet, even though this was very annoying, because the node would crash and would bring down all your mining equipment with it. 1:21:17 Because the Namecoin code was a little bit more buggy than the Bitcoin code. 1:21:21 Even though there was this albatross of, you know, this disadvantage, you still had this. 1:21:30 And even though the Bitcoin, each Bitcoin block was worth like thousands and thousands of dollars at this time. 1:21:35 But each Namecoin block was only worth $8 worth of coins, you know, priced in equivalent currency. 1:21:42 Even there was still a time when, for a very long time, more, and I think even today possibly, more than half of the Bitcoin hash rate, more than 50%. 1:21:52 Still merge mines Namecoin today, even though Namecoin contributes just a tiny, tiny sliver of cash. 1:21:59 And sometimes has all these problems with like crashing. 1:22:03 So in this, you don't even need to run the node, so the node can't crash with Blind Merged Mining. 1:22:07 The node can't crash and it doesn't even consume any extra resources of any kind of CPU bandwidth or whatever. 1:22:15 So I would, so I think it's actually an important question of why is that number at 5%. 1:22:20 But if we take the number literally at 5%, we say only one out of every 20 miners are merge mining the coin. 1:22:27 Then only one out of every blocks will find a block for the main chain and for this sidechain simultaneously. 1:22:35 So the effective block time of the sidechain will be lengthened by a factor of 20 for 1 over 5%. 1:22:43 And there will then be, instead of being 10 minutes, it would be 200 minutes. 1:22:48 So they have a very slow blocks and that sidechain will need to have a very large block size as a result. 1:22:55 But I don't think, I mean, if you wanted to have the same throughput of 1 megabyte for 10 minutes that we have now, 1:23:01 or 2.2 SegWit corrected, whatever you want to call that, but block weight or whatever. 1:23:09 But I think the more important question is why is it 5%? 1:23:13 Because it should really be 100%. 1:23:15 But that's, I think that was a good question though. 1:23:19 Next question, also from Risho. 1:23:24 Is it possible to sub blocks in to the sidechain such that you can get through weaker in between real Bitcoin blocks? 1:23:34 So I would say you kind of already answered that. 1:23:36 We did, yeah, I think we did. 1:23:38 Like you can essentially come up with your own version of producing blocks in between the tenant blocks. 1:23:44 It's up to interpretation of however you want to run your Drivechain. 1:23:48 You can do weird stuff to make them uneven or whatever weird stuff you want. 1:23:53 Let's see, ask Paul, how long do coins have to be locked up before you can access them on a sidechain? 1:24:00 And how long before you can get them back on Bitcoin? 1:24:04 Okay, we did touch on that a little bit. 1:24:07 Yeah, so the answer to this is when you go to the sidechain, it's like pretty quick. 1:24:11 It's like one block before you can start using it on the sidechain. 1:24:14 But to get it to come back. 1:24:17 Sorry, so I was going to say that it's recognized immediately, but for safety, we do have like a little 10 block kind of buffer. 1:24:26 Okay, so like up to the interpretation of the Drivechain. 1:24:33 But yeah, coming back depends. 1:24:35 Yeah, so you're free to scroll. 1:24:37 Or going to, going to would be the implementation of the... 1:24:40 Both are upsetted. 1:24:43 But in our fake template, this blank Drivechain example, we have a little buffer of 10 blocks when it's coming in, when we're watching this come in. 1:24:53 And we have it, I don't remember where we set it to, but it's something like three months or more going in the other direction. 1:24:59 But again, that is not actually, I mean, that's very important to understand analytically and to know. 1:25:07 But the user would not really ever need to do either of those because he may do an atomic swap, which is instant in one transaction. 1:25:17 Or, you know, it's as instant as anything can be. 1:25:20 Exactly. 1:25:22 So I'll lock them for... 1:25:24 Yeah. 1:25:25 Yeah, I mean... 1:25:26 You have a channel involved. 1:25:27 You know what we did talk about? 1:25:29 So we can lightning between a Drivechain and a main chain. 1:25:37 What did we talk about? 1:25:38 What did we not talk about? 1:25:39 Did you just say you could lightning between a Drivechain and the main chain? 1:25:44 So what's the difference between that and an atomic swap like in a payment chain? 1:25:47 Well, one is easier. 1:25:48 One takes more setup. 1:25:49 No, lightning takes much more setup. 1:25:51 You need to already own some coin on the sidechain. 1:25:58 You're breaking up on me. 1:25:59 Sorry. 1:26:00 Say it again. 1:26:01 You need to already own some... 1:26:03 I mean, it's my internet. 1:26:04 It's not you. 1:26:05 You know it's me. 1:26:06 You need to already own some coin on the sidechain. 1:26:09 So you can't do this with your first maneuver. 1:26:12 And you need to already own some coin on the main chain. 1:26:15 And you need to have channels open in both. 1:26:18 And then somehow those channels need to be. 1:26:20 I mean, in practice, this will be the easiest requirement. 1:26:23 But somehow those channels need to overlap with your counterparty. 1:26:27 The same needs to be true for your counterparty. 1:26:29 So both you and the person you're trying to trade with need to have some coins 1:26:34 on each of the chains. 1:26:36 And they need to have channels open. 1:26:37 And somehow those channels need to overlap. 1:26:39 Exactly. 1:26:40 But if you can do that, then that takes a lot of setup. 1:26:42 But if you can do that, 1:26:43 then this is no different than any other Lightning transaction within Bitcoin. 1:26:48 So it's very, very easy if you can pay the setup cost. 1:26:51 That is totally instantaneous and very cheap. 1:26:53 It does not involve anything hitting any chain anywhere. 1:26:56 So that's really cool stuff. 1:26:58 And, in fact, as long as I've demonstrated, I think that you can somewhere. 1:27:02 I don't remember where I put this. 1:27:04 But as long as you can do whatever smart contract thing you want to do on the 1:27:08 sidechain, 1:27:09 you can also be able to do that within the Lightning network. 1:27:12 I think it's possible to prove that just generally possible, 1:27:15 like no matter what it is. 1:27:17 So you can Lightning, as long as you have some coins on the sidechain, 1:27:20 you can Lightning some new coins from the main chain to the sidechain, 1:27:24 put them in some kind of smart contract over there, 1:27:27 and then whatever the outcome of that is supposed to be, 1:27:30 you're buying a hard drive space, you're making some kind of bet or something, 1:27:33 you can lend Lightning that back to the main chain after the fact. 1:27:39 So you can do all that stuff if you just have some coins over in the side 1:27:43 chain of a channel open somewhere. 1:27:45 So it's actually the potential, if you're willing to put up with the setup 1:27:49 cost, the potential is very high there. 1:27:54 And then you're not doing any of this slow stuff. 1:27:57 You're not doing any of the three-month stuff or the whatever stuff. 1:28:01 You got to remember, I have like a five-sentence maximum memory capacity. 1:28:07 All right. 1:28:09 All right. 1:28:10 This next question, Paul, we kind of already covered it. 1:28:13 I'm going to read it out anyways. 1:28:15 It's how long, and we kind of just talked about it, which is funny. 1:28:19 How long before you can access them on a sidechain, 1:28:22 and how long before you can get them back on Bitcoin? 1:28:25 Sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry. 1:28:27 We literally just answered that. 1:28:28 I meant to ask the next one. 1:28:29 Sorry, I'm delusional. 1:28:30 I'm delirious. 1:28:32 Paul, what does he think will happen with atomic swaps, 1:28:37 depending on how long the coins would need to be locked up before pegging 1:28:41 and unpegging? 1:28:43 I think that just means withdrawing. 1:28:45 I think we already covered that. 1:28:49 Yeah. 1:28:51 The prices could vary even though they are both Bitcoin. 1:28:54 Yes, I agree. 1:28:55 I don't know what he means when they say both Bitcoin, 1:28:57 but I think we already covered that. 1:28:59 No, no, no. 1:29:00 There's actually an important point to say. 1:29:01 The price here will vary, 1:29:03 but it will vary based on the inconvenience of the traveling back. 1:29:10 It will not be. 1:29:12 It will not be. 1:29:13 It's very different, and it's a very important difference. 1:29:15 Right now the price of Bitcoin differs from an altcoin for different reasons, 1:29:22 for reasons based on the speculation, the monetary policy of the altcoin, 1:29:27 the features of the altcoin, the marketing of the altcoin. 1:29:29 Those are features that cause the price of the Bitcoin altcoin price to vary. 1:29:36 But in this case, the only thing causing it to vary will be this one thing, 1:29:40 the inconvenience of moving it slowly back from side to main. 1:29:46 And that is important because that inconvenience is low, 1:29:49 and it's just basically static. 1:29:51 I mean it's not really static because it could be some kind of black swan event or something. 1:29:56 I mean there's a lot of nuance to that as well. 1:29:58 But the major difference between those two is that the price may not be one-to-one, 1:30:06 but the only reason it's not one-to-one is this one thing that's being priced in, 1:30:12 the inconvenience. 1:30:14 And that is very different from the altcoin case. 1:30:19 Okay. 1:30:23 Next question, Paul, is when a sidechain explodes, for instance, 1:30:30 a bug is found that allows someone to steal the money or – this is a kind of long question, 1:30:37 so we'll answer it in two parts. 1:30:39 So that first one. 1:30:43 Oh, what was the question? 1:30:44 If a sidechain explodes and a bug is found. 1:30:47 If a sidechain explodes or a bug is found, like what happens? 1:30:50 Okay, that's an important question. 1:30:52 So it depends on what is, in my opinion, 1:30:57 whatever the sidechain broadcasts back to the box is the note that should be placed on the box 1:31:03 and is the note that should be act and opened, right? 1:31:08 So if the person steals from the sidechain fair and square 1:31:13 and the sidechain continues forward in time, 1:31:17 and the person says they stole 700 bitcoin and they want to withdraw it, 1:31:22 they should be able to do that. 1:31:24 But that being the case, the sidechain is free to reorg. 1:31:30 So what the nodes, the sidechain nodes can do is they can say, 1:31:34 we just merge mine block three and then we merge the sidechain's block three, 1:31:42 sidechain's block four, sidechain's block five, sidechain's block six. 1:31:45 Now in the sidechain's block number seven, there is some kind of horrible problem. 1:31:50 Now what I think is allowed and should be allowed is that the people in the sidechain community, 1:31:57 specific to this sidechain and not bothering anyone else, 1:32:00 they should say we want to mine, and they can do this with Blind Merged Mining relatively easily, 1:32:05 they can say we don't want to actually mine block number eight on top of this block. 1:32:09 Block number seven is fucked up. 1:32:11 So what we're going to do instead is we're going to do more like what happened in bitcoin 1:32:17 where there was the integer overflow bug or something. 1:32:20 We're going to say, okay, we're going to mine block six again. 1:32:24 Let's go off the Ethereum DAO situation. 1:32:28 Right. 1:32:29 So what they would do is they'd say, well, you know, you've got to pick your poison. 1:32:34 So either you have – it depends on what the community chooses to do. 1:32:40 So what Vitalik chose to do was a weird – 1:32:44 but what we don't want is the contagion to spread past the limits of the sidechain. 1:32:49 So that's the guiding principle. 1:32:51 Yeah, they're modular. 1:32:52 Like I said, they're modular. 1:32:53 They can't affect each other, so it's contained within the sidechain. 1:32:57 It won't affect the mainchain. 1:32:58 So you can do one of two things. 1:32:59 You can say the DAO hacker gets to keep all of his bitcoin in this case 1:33:03 because he stole bitcoin in this parallel universe. 1:33:07 Yeah, so he stole all the bitcoin in the box. 1:33:09 Let's say there's some kind of bug. 1:33:10 He stole all the bitcoin in the box. 1:33:12 Well, that's interesting. 1:33:14 That's not quite similar, though, 1:33:16 because what I'm imagining is there's a sidechain of Ethereum 1:33:19 where he steals $150 worth of a $20 billion Ethereum sidechain. 1:33:25 It actually goes into the sidechain and steals stuff 1:33:28 and then tries to do a withdrawal. 1:33:30 Exactly. 1:33:31 So I'm saying if the chain moves forward 1:33:34 and he makes it into class 1, class 2, class 3, or whatever, 1:33:38 then there should be nothing. 1:33:40 He'd be willing to do the atomic swaps for half the price just to get the hell out of it. 1:33:43 He may. 1:33:44 That would be interesting. 1:33:46 If he steals all the money in the sidechain, I'll give you half of it back. 1:33:49 I just want to get my money and leave as fast as possible 1:33:52 before you all decide to do something weird and reverse the sidechain or something. 1:33:57 That's part of what made the DAO case so interesting 1:34:00 was that there was this forced 30-day lag, 1:34:02 which was almost like the perfectly terrible amount of time to screw it all up. 1:34:07 Because imagine, what if he could just steal it all, 1:34:09 and that's what you would do, right? 1:34:10 You'd take it immediately to Poloniex and try and cash a bunch of it out. 1:34:13 Maybe not all of it, 1:34:14 but you'd say, like, I want at least $10 million in this hour. 1:34:17 Like if you were the attacker. 1:34:19 Do you understand what I'm saying? 1:34:21 I don't know if I'll take it to Poloniex, but sure. 1:34:25 But I'm saying if you were the DAO hacker and you could get the money immediately, 1:34:28 you would want to cash it out of Ether right after attacking. 1:34:36 Do you understand? 1:34:38 You're breaking up a little bit, 1:34:40 but you're pretty much just saying, yeah, you want to cash out. 1:34:43 I'm saying you attack on Tuesday night when no one is paying attention, 1:34:46 or Thursday night when that's the case. 1:34:48 It's Thursday and it's 3 a.m. on the East Coast. 1:34:51 You attack, you steal the money, 1:34:53 and then what you want to do is you want to do it at 4 a.m. on Thursday, 1:34:57 or I think it was Friday morning or whatever. 1:35:00 But the point is right after stealing you want to try and cash a good chunk of that out 1:35:04 because you don't want what happened to happen. 1:35:08 It's Bitcoin really. 1:35:10 It speaks a little bit of volumes about that. 1:35:13 So that's what you want to do. 1:35:16 But the weird thing is there's this 30-day lag, 1:35:21 which kind of made an annoying conundrum on the Ethereum people 1:35:28 because they had basically just enough time to try to do what they did 1:35:32 in a justifiable way where they would only harm one individual, 1:35:36 who was the DAO hacker. 1:35:41 So that is an interesting point. 1:35:43 So that's an interesting case about the DAO. 1:35:46 So what they could do in that specific case is they could – 1:35:54 I'm not sure. 1:35:55 They would have to see this. 1:35:56 The other thing is that because the chain had progressed forward by many blocks, 1:36:01 days worth of blocks by the time they figured out really what was going on. 1:36:06 I mean, I'm not sure. 1:36:07 It's a really good question. 1:36:08 You could do a bunch of different things is the real answer. 1:36:11 But what you couldn't do is the way I have it set up, 1:36:16 you cannot easily hard fork the sidechain. 1:36:23 Because if you do, think about this, 1:36:25 if you do what's broadcast back in Class 3 over there, 1:36:29 it's not guaranteed to match. 1:36:31 But if you soft fork the sidechain with itself, 1:36:34 then always everyone will get the same Class 3 results, 1:36:37 and what should be withdrawn. 1:36:40 So you actually inherit the same protection of the soft fork. 1:36:44 So they would not really be able to hard fork in that case. 1:36:50 I'm not sure. 1:36:52 What they could do is, as I was saying, 1:36:53 is they could try to roll back the entire chain. 1:36:57 How would they go about rolling back the sidechain? 1:37:00 Well, that's what I was saying in that example I was giving. 1:37:02 The sidechain is mind block 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 1:37:05 In 7 there's the DAO hacker. 1:37:08 Then in mind block 8, 9, 10, 11. 1:37:14 Then mind block 8, 9, 10, 11. 1:37:15 And then what they would do is they'd go back and they'd mind block 6 again. 1:37:19 And then block 7 and 8, 9, 10. 1:37:22 And they'd try to just erase that history. 1:37:24 Now that has its own problems, of course. 1:37:27 All right, but if everyone agrees that this sidechain is going to start back 1:37:31 at block 4, is that okay? 1:37:35 Well, I mean it depends on if everyone actually agrees. 1:37:38 What might happen is that if someone tried to mind block 6, 1:37:43 it could just, again, try to roll back maybe like a 28 block rollback. 1:37:49 It may just trigger a horrible crisis where everyone doesn't know 1:37:53 what's going on in this sidechain. 1:37:55 They'll flee the sidechain and the sidechain explodes 1:37:57 and it dies in a horrible way. 1:37:59 I mean essentially- 1:38:00 Which is what you want, really. 1:38:01 You want it to just die completely. 1:38:04 sidechains, I mean it's kind of like the DAO example. 1:38:09 Don't put all your money into a sidechain until they're fully vetted 1:38:12 because you're not guaranteed to get it all back out or what? 1:38:19 I mean what would you say? 1:38:22 Well, I mean the question is what would happen. 1:38:24 What I would guess would be my honest answer about what I realistically expect 1:38:30 would be that people would say we could roll back the entire chain, 1:38:34 but we can't do that because it's too extreme, 1:38:36 and we can't hard fork because then that would lead to problems later. 1:38:39 So maybe what they might do is they might say we'll soft fork 1:38:43 and we'll just jam this person's money in there forever. 1:38:48 That's maybe what I would do. 1:38:51 I mean you just make it where they couldn't ever take the money out? 1:38:56 I honestly wouldn't do that because in particular the DAO had this ridiculous 1:39:01 clause that said explicitly that it's actually worth reading. 1:39:07 If you haven't read it, it's very funny. 1:39:09 It says something like to the extent that you think that any unintentional 1:39:14 behavior happens in this contract, you are wrong, 1:39:17 and to the extent that the operation of the code is different from your 1:39:23 interpretation of this document, then the code always prevails 1:39:27 and whatever, and this is the terms of the court. 1:39:30 I mean pretty much it was a DAO hacker's free pass to actually. 1:39:36 That phrase is so specific paragraph in the DAO contract. 1:39:40 It's in the DAO contract. 1:39:41 It's so specific about whatever this thing does is what we wanted to happen. 1:39:47 That is just like that really kind of crosses the line. 1:39:50 You know what? 1:39:51 We talked about this at TNABC. 1:39:53 Yeah. 1:39:55 And that is a big, I mean, but if there were, I think that's not really the spirit of the question because the person that you asked, when you repeated that person's question, they pretty much like, I mean, you understand, pretty much like if a bug's found in a port and the sidechain explodes, no, because you understand, that person asked, no, no, that person asked about a bug. So, but in my opinion, the DAO withdrawal was not a bug because it was explicitly a bug. 1:40:23 Okay, okay, okay. 1:40:25 It's not quite the same question. 1:40:27 But let's say I put one Bitcoin into a sidechain and the sidechain gets compromised. Is there anything that the sidechain people can do that's similar to the DAO, like proof of italic, where we can just come together and say, whoever stole it, we're just going to revert all the funds back to this block? 1:40:43 No, they can't. The nodes can attempt to blind merge money. 1:40:48 Which nodes? 1:40:49 At some risk to themselves. 1:40:50 An orphan on the chain, the sidechain nodes. 1:40:52 Which nodes? Okay, so the nodes hosting the sidechain? 1:40:56 The nodes that are running the sidechain software, the full nodes hosting, what does that mean? 1:41:00 Okay, so in other words, how, like, let's say this is all done with the miners writing new blocks, so the history prevails, I'm guessing, on the sidechain. So if you have nodes that say- 1:41:15 No, because if the miners are Blind Merged Mining, they won't care about whatever, they don't even know what blocks they're mining. So you can instruct them, there's some risk, because you're paying- 1:41:26 Okay, so if you actually incentivize the miners- 1:41:32 To roll it back. 1:41:33 So pretty much if the hacker, so the hacker could also incentivize the miners. 1:41:38 He could, yeah, he could to continue it. 1:41:40 That's a very good point, yes. 1:41:42 Versus all the people that want to protect the wealth of the sidechain. 1:41:47 Yeah, I can't see the attacker losing that battle, because he's got $150 million that he's willing to pay in transaction fees that he doesn't care about. That's other people's money. 1:42:00 So yeah, I think you're right. So yeah, I think if we're being, taking it realistically, even if the DAO hack was an actual bug, which it was clearly not, but if it was some bug- 1:42:10 That's why I get cut off from that right now. 1:42:13 Even if you could accidentally withdraw $150 million in something that was clearly a bug, I think you wouldn't in practice be able to roll it back, unless you got explicit help from the miners, which would be, I don't know why they would give you the time of day. 1:42:29 I kind of hoped that they wouldn't, but that would be up to them. You understand? It would be up to them. 1:42:33 If it were important enough, let's say there's a problem with the large block sidechain that the miners really like, then they could contribute to rolling it back and unfucking up the mistake, whatever it was. 1:42:45 So in a sense it's a good thing, because if the problems are severe enough, then people will just fix them. So that's kind of nice. 1:42:52 But in general, I think it's actually a very good state of whatever happens, happens, and this is immutable, and code is law type of thing that we want. 1:43:05 Because if it's not code that's law, it would be some other arbitrary thing that, I'm not sure how useful that would be, if that's the arbitrary thing it would be. 1:43:13 But yeah, that's a cool question. 1:43:16 I mean, that's probably something that we can actually talk about at a later date, too, as we think more about. 1:43:22 Maybe it'll happen. I'm sure it'll happen at some point, maybe if this comes to light. 1:43:27 A second part to that question, which was, or even more interesting, a bug in a high privacy fungible sidechain, which allows unexpected inflation. 1:43:44 Oh, that's funny. So as soon as that is detected, everyone will try to withdraw. 1:43:49 And here's the thing, the box only contains so much Bitcoin. 1:43:54 So once it's gone, there will be no way to include a valid transaction withdrawing, you can't get blood from a stone. 1:44:04 And so as soon as that happens, then I think that will just be, no one will ever be able to deposit to the sidechain now. 1:44:12 Because it'd be a bunch of people, you'd be the sucker who loses their money instantaneously. 1:44:18 And so that would just, in practice, just mean the death of that sidechain. 1:44:22 Which is as it should be, right? 1:44:24 Because if you fuck up your inflation, you should suffer, I think. 1:44:29 I guess the real thing is, if you fuck up that exploit, and it was a privacy sidechain, it was undetected, then you could essentially do atomic swaps out at a favorable rate and just keep doing it over and over and over and over. 1:44:48 Until people realize. 1:44:49 Until people are like, why is this guy giving me such a good deal? 1:44:54 I don't know. 1:44:55 It's almost like a red herring if you get too good of a deal. 1:45:01 Well, maybe. 1:45:02 It's like, if your deal's too good, then there's probably something really wrong with that sidechain. 1:45:08 Never offer a sucker, or even break, or whatever the saying is. 1:45:11 But yeah, notice that that's not different from the case it is now. 1:45:15 Zcash, you could still be doing that. 1:45:18 If there was some compromise there, it would be basically the same thing. 1:45:24 Because as soon as people realized that on Zcash, as the altcoin, what would happen there, right? 1:45:30 The entire scheme would collapse, and you'd have to be restarted. 1:45:33 So it's actually very similar. 1:45:35 It's the same thing. 1:45:37 It's called the altcoin equaling the sidechain. 1:45:40 Here's an interesting question that actually talks about what we just said. 1:45:44 But his caveat being, the bug that you find with inflation, can you swap to other Drivechains? 1:45:55 So can you do atomic swaps? 1:45:56 Not back to the... 1:45:57 Okay, you can do atomic swaps sidechain to sidechain. 1:46:00 You absolutely can. 1:46:01 I didn't know that. 1:46:03 Now, if you had a Drivechain of a Drivechain, you could go from... 1:46:09 ...grandchild Drivechain on the other side, or what? 1:46:12 Yes. 1:46:13 So the Lightning Network and the atomic swaps are all part of the same fabric. 1:46:17 Yeah, you're right. 1:46:18 It's all part of the same whiteboard on there. 1:46:21 So those are all instant, and those are all channels. 1:46:23 So if you've got channels, you can do whatever you like. 1:46:25 And those are all just hash-locked contracts. 1:46:27 So all that's instant. 1:46:28 But, of course, if you have a sidechain of a sidechain, then going from side to main, 1:46:32 and then going side to main again could take you, like, six months or whatever. 1:46:35 I mean, we're not interested in your Bitcoin payment channels. 1:46:38 We're interested in the technology behind your atomic swaps. 1:46:44 Yeah, yeah. 1:46:48 Anyways... 1:46:49 We're not interested in the Drivechains behind Drivechains. 1:46:53 Let's see. 1:46:54 Since they think they are getting money... 1:46:59 Let's skip that one. 1:47:02 We've already answered that just now. 1:47:07 Okay. 1:47:08 Oscar Lafarga has some questions for you, Paul. 1:47:16 This is coming off of the YouTube video we had two weeks ago. 1:47:22 He asks, 1:47:24 What is the fundamental difference between a Drivechain and an altcoin with a shared Bitcoin UTXO set? 1:47:31 Not very much. 1:47:35 Oh, I'm sorry. 1:47:36 You gave a weird caveat there, though, with a shared Bitcoin UTXO set. 1:47:42 Well, I call that a spinoff. 1:47:44 I don't call it an altcoin. 1:47:45 So let's talk about that. 1:47:46 If I wanted to take the Bitcoin UTXO set and make a Drivechain where everyone has access to coins on that Drivechain that had a Bitcoin, 1:47:56 what does that look like? 1:47:57 Because I don't deposit into a box because I don't have a shareholder or anything. 1:48:03 But the question is, you have this thing which is a spinoff, in my opinion, 1:48:08 where you have, at this one instant, you have a copy that would be a hard fork 1:48:15 if the old chain died. 1:48:16 But it's a hard fork of a new thing that's otherwise the same owners. 1:48:20 And the thing is that in the very instant that you copy it, it's the same as a Drivechain in practice. 1:48:26 But quickly thereafter, it will start diverging. 1:48:32 And then you have back in the altcoin case eventually. 1:48:35 So going back to just the difference between a Drivechain and an altcoin, 1:48:41 you would say like no difference, really? 1:48:42 No, they're very similar. 1:48:43 It's just one respects the 21 million coin limit globally. 1:48:51 The other does not. 1:48:53 All right, there's another question for you. 1:48:56 Would Drivechains be used as payment channels or is this considered a payment channel in and of itself? 1:49:04 I think they're very large block. 1:49:05 And I would say those are kind of two different things. 1:49:07 They are different things. 1:49:09 But in an abstract sense, a very large block chain is kind of like a giant payment channel open with everyone on it. 1:49:18 You know, because you kind of cash everything on there. 1:49:21 You can kind of cash everything on there. 1:49:24 Hello, can you hear me? 1:49:25 Okay. 1:49:26 Yeah, I can hear you. 1:49:28 You can kind of cash everything on the large block chain and then settle to the small block chain. 1:49:37 So in that way, it's kind of thematically like a big payment channel that everyone is on. 1:49:46 How would Lightning Network interact or relate to a particular Drivechain? 1:49:52 And I would say, like you said, these are low-level technologies like atomic swaps and Lightning Network, 1:49:57 and it would pretty much work across the board with any of these things, right? 1:50:01 It strongly helps, interacts with all them, does cool things. 1:50:05 What do you think would be more likely, people to do atomic swaps out of Drivechains or Lightning Network out of Drivechains? 1:50:14 Well, as I said, you can't do Lightning until you set it up. 1:50:18 So you have to first do an atomic swap, at least once. 1:50:22 And then, who knows? 1:50:23 Okay. 1:50:24 Depends on how people like Lightning. 1:50:27 I hope they like it a lot. 1:50:28 Yeah, I mean, there's like so many different ways. 1:50:31 So it really depends on the use case and what people come up with. 1:50:38 Could a Drivechain be used to profit by speculators? 1:50:43 Interesting question I had for you earlier, because I think there is a way, even though there isn't a way directly. 1:50:50 Hold on. 1:50:52 We're talking about, so for instance, this money token, and you know, ERC-20 tokens right now are all the rage because people are making money off of them. 1:51:02 But like if I want to make an ICO, would I do an ICO within the ERC-20 Drivechain or would I branch off and do an ICO? 1:51:12 No, within. 1:51:14 Because part of the functionality within the ERC-20 is that you pay a tiny Bitcoin transaction fee to send a message that says, create new ERC-20 with whatever parameters. 1:51:26 And then you give all those, you know. 1:51:28 And the ERC-20 sidechain, it might even have like built-in auction stuff or crowd sale stuff. 1:51:34 So again, I might have like a Poloniex and I might have like whatever stupid crap people use to do these ICO auctions. 1:51:43 And then you can make these ICOs, they're almost like gambling tools within the ERC-20 Drivechain. 1:51:52 Yeah, or just trading tools, whatever you want it to be. 1:51:56 I mean, because essentially you're like, my ERC-20 tool is for this business and we have this utility. 1:52:02 I mean, essentially it's the same use case for ICOs right now where you say, you know, X utility. 1:52:09 But that's not really a use of Drivechain. 1:52:12 That's not really a use of Drivechain. 1:52:14 That's a use of this specific altchain, which could be an altcoin like Ethereum or it could be a sidechain as you have described here. 1:52:23 So this is a functionality of the chain. 1:52:26 It's not really, I'm not sure what the person was asking about, but I think they may have been touching on this. 1:52:32 I mean, yeah, this is a specific implementation of the Drivechain, right? 1:52:38 Is that what you're saying? 1:52:40 No, that's not what I'm saying at all. 1:52:42 It's exactly the opposite of what I'm saying. 1:52:44 The altchain, this is a feature, that is a smart contract, the creation of the ERC-20. 1:52:50 So that is a smart contract. 1:52:53 But in this situation, are you talking about the ERC-20 tokens in the ICO? 1:52:59 Any Drivechain? 1:53:01 No, I'm talking about the creation of a new set of ERC-20 tokens. 1:53:06 On a hypothetical one? 1:53:08 Either. It doesn't matter. 1:53:11 Wait. 1:53:13 Drivechain is about the plane that's going back and forth between the islands. 1:53:18 But this is about something that's on the island. 1:53:20 It's like, come see our cool geyser or something. 1:53:23 So it's possible because you can make up the rules that you want. 1:53:27 It's possible on its own altcoin, which is the ERC-20 altcoin. 1:53:30 Or it's possible on Ethereum, the Ethereum altcoin. 1:53:33 Or it's possible on a sidechain, including a Bitcoin Drivechain. 1:53:39 Okay. 1:53:41 All right. 1:53:43 So the answer to that is yes. 1:53:46 You potentially can add a speculation idea. 1:53:50 You can have a chain that specializes in speculation, yes. 1:53:55 Maybe that was what they were asking, I don't know. 1:54:00 All right, so the next question, this is Oscar's last question. 1:54:05 Can Drivechains be destroyed? 1:54:07 And I want to also add in there, what is the best way to destroy a Drivechain? 1:54:13 If everyone came into agreement. 1:54:16 Yeah, have the Bitcoin miners just announced that they will no longer support this? 1:54:24 They have decided that it's in the best interest of their, bottom line, their revenues. 1:54:29 They no longer support this Drivechain. 1:54:31 Which may be because, again, it may be because you have weird smart contracts on this Drivechain 1:54:35 that attack other smart contracts that would produce revenue or something. 1:54:40 So there may be literal police officers or a kind of enforcement. 1:54:45 Are you saying a contract on this Drivechain affecting this Drivechain? 1:54:51 Yes, that's what I was saying. 1:54:53 But aren't these modular, like they can't affect each other? 1:54:56 They can't affect each other technically, but they can affect each other economically. 1:55:02 And I have a giant presentation about this. 1:55:05 Economically. Okay, I got you. Indirectly. 1:55:09 So like if someone's like stealing someone's brand or something, something weird like that. 1:55:13 Would be like a real little interlock. 1:55:15 Like you work really hard. You know the purpose of branding cattle? 1:55:18 Because it's hard to tell. 1:55:21 It's easy to tell who is raising their cattle in a healthy way, like when you look at the farm. 1:55:28 But it's hard when the cattle show up at the market to see which one was. 1:55:31 So there's all these rules that you can't like steal someone else's brand. 1:55:36 There's like trademark infringements and things. 1:55:38 So that's just one example of an indirect effect by copying. 1:55:43 Okay. 1:55:45 But you asked about destroying the chain and it's just for the miners to say, 1:55:48 look, you got six months to get the hell out of here and then we're just going to take everything. 1:55:54 You want to make sure that the time period to get out is at least the window 1:55:59 where everyone wants to get their full money back. 1:56:01 Yeah, that would be the most honorable thing to do. 1:56:04 Otherwise they're screwed because no one would trade with you because then they wouldn't be able to get their money out. 1:56:09 Yeah, but what should happen is they should say, if they make that long enough, as you suggest, 1:56:13 which is what they absolutely would really need to do in practice, I think, 1:56:17 then everyone should still be willing to trade because there will only be a few people who are actually taking this flight, 1:56:22 the last flight back. 1:56:24 Yeah. 1:56:26 I don't have time to explain how, but we've arranged things so that it's always possible 1:56:31 in one withdrawal, one plane ride back to withdraw all of the money on the sidechain. 1:56:38 And we did that for a couple of reasons. 1:56:40 One of them is this reason, but I don't have time to explain why we did that. 1:56:44 But, oh man, because when you do come back on that plane ride over, 1:56:49 you want to make sure you credit a bunch of people's Bitcoin addresses 1:56:53 or is it just a really easy way to pull back from the box? 1:56:58 Essentially, you can't have a transaction that has like a million outputs. 1:57:04 Right. 1:57:06 So, if you have like a million people put in, all the money on one transaction. 1:57:12 Or more importantly, a million inputs. 1:57:14 Well, yeah, but all I'm saying is with the BIPs on the main chain, 1:57:20 the two BIPs that you have, that will solve that kind of issue, right? 1:57:24 Yes, I don't have time to really explain how. 1:57:27 You could have unlimited, but you understand that no one has an incentive 1:57:31 to create an unlimited number of outputs in that case. 1:57:33 Yeah. 1:57:35 Only the inputs, because if anyone who has too many, 1:57:37 then they're just not getting on the plane. 1:57:39 So, everyone has an incentive to figure that out with atomic swaps 1:57:43 until they can all get out, which they always will be able to. 1:57:47 And just a side note, I don't know if we covered this, 1:57:51 but anyways, if you're trying to withdraw in the time period 1:57:54 and like that miner doesn't like mine the block, 1:57:58 it's just within that time period. 1:58:00 It's almost like the plane circling the airport 1:58:02 and then the next miner can bring you all in. 1:58:04 Isn't that right, Paul? 1:58:06 Yeah, when you're talking about when they're acting 1:58:08 and then it's accumulating the score. 1:58:10 Yes. 1:58:12 And like that one miner just doesn't recognize the sidechain. 1:58:14 Yes, you can have as many abstains as you want, 1:58:16 but if you have too many, it'll just time out and die. 1:58:18 But that's how it works. 1:58:20 Next question is, does each Drivechain that is implemented 1:58:25 require a soft fork? 1:58:27 Yes. 1:58:29 Or do we just need one soft fork to enable all of them? 1:58:31 All of them. 1:58:33 But yeah, the answer is yes. 1:58:35 Okay. 1:58:37 A little bit of both because you need the BIPs 1:58:40 to enable the idea of soft forks. 1:58:43 And thereafter, you need one per. 1:58:46 Yeah. 1:58:48 Jake? 1:58:50 This question is by Zero Pass. 1:58:52 Ask Paul, why is RSK not the sidechain you are looking for? 1:58:57 Yeah. 1:58:59 And I think the answer is- 1:59:01 Did we talk a little bit about that? 1:59:03 We covered a lot of stuff. 1:59:05 I don't want it to be open-ended. 1:59:07 I want it to be- 1:59:09 I mean, I think the simplest thing is it's just a different 1:59:11 kind of paradigm where they have more of a service 1:59:13 that charges 20% and you don't. 1:59:15 And they have- 1:59:16 They develop various things. 1:59:18 They have the federated model. 1:59:20 And- 1:59:22 Did we talk about it? 1:59:24 The idea of being able to withdraw quickly. 1:59:26 Well, yeah. 1:59:28 I'm not totally sure that he gets it, honestly. 1:59:30 But- 1:59:32 Like the idea of withdrawing quickly. 1:59:34 We explained it right here. 1:59:36 He wants it to be three per hour or something. 1:59:38 And I want it to be once per three months. 1:59:40 So I'm not even sure. 1:59:42 The whole point of it was- 1:59:44 Sometimes I wonder about that. 1:59:46 You have a question from Jonsef. 1:59:49 Oh. 1:59:51 Why is Blockstream not implementing Drivechains? 1:59:56 I don't know. 1:59:58 I think they're just busy. 2:00:00 Or wait, wait. 2:00:02 Ask Paul. 2:00:04 Is Blockstream implementing Drivechains? 2:00:06 Oh, that's different. 2:00:08 I guess no. 2:00:10 I get a lot of emotional support from Adam Beck. 2:00:12 Emotional support. 2:00:14 All right. 2:00:16 So Adam Beck's on board. 2:00:18 That's good. 2:00:20 He is a block supporter. 2:00:22 You have a question from Dante. 2:00:25 Oh, okay. 2:00:27 Is there incentive for alts to come over to the Drivechain? 2:00:33 I mean, I would say yes. 2:00:35 But I don't really know. 2:00:37 I mean, there's incentives both ways, right? 2:00:39 Because it's kind of like the scam incentive is very strong. 2:00:42 So- 2:00:44 Yeah, that's a big incentive. 2:00:48 And I'm not sure. 2:00:50 I would say that the real incentive is actually one clever- 2:00:54 I'm not sure. 2:00:56 It depends- 2:00:58 I'm not sure who has the incentive to do the work 2:01:00 to transform the altcoin into a Drivechain. 2:01:03 Because there's a little bit of a commons problem 2:01:05 where assume one person does that. 2:01:07 They really don't get compensated for it. 2:01:09 And then everyone, you know, gets the benefit. 2:01:11 So that's an interesting question. 2:01:13 I'm not sure who has the incentive to do it. 2:01:16 I mean, it would probably be something 2:01:18 that they would want to be on the Bitcoin platform 2:01:20 for some reason or another. 2:01:22 Yeah, maybe it could just be a core dev 2:01:24 with an axe to grind or something. 2:01:26 I don't know. 2:01:28 But yeah, that's an interesting question. 2:01:30 This is actually our last question. 2:01:32 Okay. 2:01:34 Thank God, because we've been doing so many. 2:01:36 This one's by Alred Thorsby. 2:01:38 Okay. 2:01:39 Is Bitcoin's plan to get Bitmain to accept 2:01:41 big blocks, a big block sidechain, 2:01:43 and is that a threat to Bcash? 2:01:46 I definitely think it's a threat to Bcash. 2:01:48 I think an unfortunate thing about Bcash 2:01:50 and SegWit2x is that the very fact 2:01:53 that I have this thing in the pipeline, 2:01:56 the idea of a large block sidechain, 2:01:58 greatly imperils their efforts 2:02:01 to create a viable large block soft fork. 2:02:04 Because soon it will be- 2:02:06 just as it would be difficult 2:02:08 for an altcoin to compete 2:02:10 with an equivalent sidechain, 2:02:12 it would be difficult for Bcash to compete with, 2:02:15 or Bitcoin Cash, 2:02:17 or however you prefer to describe it, 2:02:19 it would be difficult for that to compete 2:02:21 with a sidechain of Bitcoin 2:02:23 that has a six megabyte block. 2:02:25 So it's the exact same thing. 2:02:27 In fact, it's a little worse 2:02:29 because it's so much simpler 2:02:31 to create software code 2:02:33 that instead of re-implementing Ethereum 2:02:34 or hacking Ethereum to pieces 2:02:36 so you can put in this Drivechain stuff, 2:02:38 the code for the block size 2:02:40 is very easy to edit by comparison. 2:02:43 So in that way, 2:02:45 I think it does threaten those. 2:02:47 How will I convince Bitmain 2:02:49 to get a large block sidechain? 2:02:51 I don't know if that is facetious or not 2:02:53 because they want large block stuff 2:02:55 and so this should be easy for them to- 2:02:58 I mean, this is basically 2:03:00 giving them what they want 2:03:02 and it does it in a soft fork 2:03:04 even if developers don't like it, 2:03:06 even hypothetically. 2:03:08 That's one of the- 2:03:10 I mean, they could do extension blocks. 2:03:12 There's a lot to say about that 2:03:14 that we don't really have time for. 2:03:16 But I think Bitmain would really like this 2:03:18 because it gets them what they want 2:03:20 in a very fast way 2:03:22 and, you know, 2:03:24 I just don't see why they wouldn't like it. 2:03:26 More transaction fees, 2:03:28 probably a higher Bitcoin price, 2:03:30 good news for Bitcoin. 2:03:32 Reusing the same SHA-256 hardware 2:03:34 at no marginal cost 2:03:36 but more free money. 2:03:38 So I think it's an easy sell. 2:03:41 All right, man. 2:03:43 Well, it is- 2:03:45 Okay, cool. 2:03:47 Lots have been found, Paul. 2:03:49 I think the difficulty has adjusted. 2:03:51 Yeah, for this. 2:03:53 And we have been drive chained. 2:03:56 That's a lot of drive chaining. 2:03:59 So I think it's worked very well, though. 2:04:01 Let's see what happens with it. 2:04:02 So just real quick, 2:04:04 if people want to do a more in-depth 2:04:07 themselves, they can go to 2:04:09 drivechain.info. 2:04:11 Yes, drivechain.info. 2:04:13 And then GitHub will also take you to- 2:04:15 drivechain.info is like the home base, 2:04:17 like the portal. 2:04:19 And even if you click on GitHub there, 2:04:21 you kind of get also taken to like a little mini portal 2:04:23 that has the BIPs there. 2:04:25 There's just so much stuff 2:04:27 because you need more than one portal. 2:04:29 Even if you go to drivechain.info 2:04:30 you still get another portal. 2:04:32 And there's other stuff including presentations 2:04:34 and other things. 2:04:36 And he is- 2:04:38 Are you Truthcoin on Twitter? 2:04:40 Truthcoin on Twitter, yes. 2:04:42 All right. 2:04:44 I'm Mike21 spelled out with a one on the end. 2:04:46 And good luck finding that. 2:04:48 This is probably why we don't have any subscribers 2:04:50 to our channel. 2:04:52 Yeah, probably. 2:04:54 All right, everybody. 2:04:56 Thanks for propagating. 2:04:58 And I hope you learned something about Drivechains. 2:05:00 Bye-bye.