0:00 Do we have some intro music, maybe? 0:07 That's what other people do, people who are much more interesting. 0:13 Anyway, here we are. 0:20 It's a new Friday. 0:24 Sidechain extravaganza. 0:25 I hope everyone's app works. 0:28 Mine certainly doesn't. 0:29 I always have to join a space like two or three times before I can even see anyone's 0:34 image. 0:36 And then after that, it sometimes works and then I get kicked out. 0:45 So Elon, don't fire everyone at Twitter. 0:49 Keep at least one. 0:53 Hi, everyone. 0:54 Can you hear me? 0:55 Yes, I can hear you. 0:56 Okay, great. 0:57 Here we are. 0:58 So I think we must wait for Spider-Man. 0:59 Yeah. 1:01 I can hear you. 1:01 great. 1:06 Here we are. 1:08 So I think we must wait for Spider -Man. 1:15 Yeah. 1:30 Damn. 1:43 I can ping him on Telegram. 1:50 Good idea. 2:23 It's a good one now, Spider, for Halloween. 2:28 Some people have this, I want to get a gigantic, absolutely absurd 2:33 sized inflatable spider for Halloween, just inflated 2:38 against my house. 2:40 and just like troll everyone and just be a crazy person but 2:47 I would integrate you know it's a good one. 2:52 here we go nice and now here we all are. 2:56 Happy Friday to everyone. 3:02 was some big, not sidechain news, but L2 news. 3:07 Just broke. 3:10 Sort of. I actually haven't really looked into it, but apparently this enlightening 3:14 channel jamming thing is I remember seeing 3:20 someone give a talk at MIT this year, but apparently 3:26 it's worse. mean, kind of always thought the, 3:30 where lightning really starts to run into problems is when you go through people, know, 3:35 the bidirectional payment channels are sort of fine 3:39 enough, but when you have to route them through third parties, 3:44 that is when it really requires a lot of effort to keep it working. 3:51 this is the new thing, like I mentioned this many years ago about channel risk, about 3:55 like if you open the channel with the wrong person, you may regret 3:59 it. But I don't know if we want to touch on this, it's so new. 4:03 I haven't really had a chance to look into it at all. 4:06 We already have too many new things. 4:08 BitVM is already too new. 4:12 I've just, uh, haven't heard of it, if you could link it, Happy Friday by the way. 4:17 Can you hear me? 4:18 Yes, 4:19 can hear you. 4:21 Link it, yes. 4:22 Let's put it, we'll put the link in. 4:24 Let's get that link. 4:26 Yeah, I'm quoting this person. 4:28 They made this public post. 4:33 The public post is from Antoni Riard and they have like 4:39 a very salacious sentence. 4:41 It's just, they're very serious in their conviction. 4:44 So I quoted it. 4:47 Hopefully it's not too impolite. 4:52 anyway, there it is. 4:58 but you never know. 5:02 Lightning already has, I'm not sure we should even go into it because Lightning already 5:05 has many unfixable problems in my opinion. 5:10 And there's really nothing wrong with Lightning per se. 5:12 It's not, you know, if I can just maybe give a little bit of a take here. 5:18 It has nothing to do with the people 5:19 working on lightning and there's nothing to do with the lightning design. 5:21 It is the people in the audience who are the lightning fanboys who 5:26 basically have turned the idea into a 5:32 weapon against Bitcoin success. 5:35 As they turn into scaling Messiah and then it's just like, 5:39 the idea you can't criticize and then it's just warps everything and then you have 5:44 people who really don't, 5:47 the non -technical people just get fed a version that is completely false and then they 5:52 make a, they make the former worldview around 5:58 that mistaken 5:59 idea. 6:03 So, there you go. 6:05 But that's hot news. 6:06 But maybe we'll return to it no one, if people haven't looked. 6:10 I haven't looked into it. 6:12 But William hasn't looked into it. 6:14 I haven't. I think in general, coming back to Lightning, 6:19 think the base protocol seems fairly easy, as with anything, the devil is always 6:25 in the details and implementation. 6:29 so I think that's something generally for any sidechain really. 6:33 even an idea is Lightning, some hash, time locks, and two out 6:38 of two multisigs. 6:41 Even an idea as simple as that eventually becomes very, very difficult and a lot of 6:45 different effect factors. 6:47 So I think something generally we need to be aware of. 6:52 Indeed. Okay, so what should we do here exactly? 6:54 My guess is that most people listening to this either now or with the recording 6:58 later, will probably like be... 7:02 my guess is those people are all like pretty confused about 7:07 BitVM and maybe SpiderChain, they know Drivechain a little bit better 7:13 because we do the space every Friday. 7:17 Maybe not though. 7:19 I'm not sure. 7:21 should we just do the song and dance where we explain our 7:27 idea again? I think probably a lot of people would want to get out of this is if we 7:30 compare and contrast the ideas somewhat. 7:34 mean, like BitVM is like you and I would sit 7:38 down and we want to bet half a Bitcoin on a chess game. 7:43 This is, I'm going to give you my sort of take on it. 7:47 And we sit down and I compute all the possible moves that I could make as white 7:53 right now. And then if I do anything else or if I don't make one of those moves, 7:59 have constructed something where you can, you know, the chess opponent, like Robin 8:05 and I are going to play chess. 8:08 And if I either don't move at all within the amount of time, or if I make some kind of 8:12 illegal move, the, 8:17 my 8:18 money is slashed from me and goes to Robin. 8:23 And so then I move pawn to e4 and then we recompute it again and we do it again. 8:30 Except Robin has to reply in time. 8:33 And then at the end it says if someone is in a checkmated state or whatever, 8:38 the other person wins and if there's a stalemate, I guess there's a refund or 8:42 something. that a good way to think about it or 8:45 what do you think? 8:49 kind of. But you do the calculation only once at the end in the case of a 8:55 game. Like in the case of a game, have two phases. 8:59 First phase is we do our moves, and then we get to a stage where 9:04 one party says, okay, the game is over. 9:08 And then we evaluate the shortcut given the inputs, which are the moves that we 9:14 made. 9:15 And then the shortcut evaluates to 9:18 either true or false. 9:19 And if it evaluates to true, then it means you won. 9:22 If it evaluates to false, I won. 9:25 Of course, it could also a draw. 9:26 But isn't there time right before the game starts where we have to both agree to like 9:31 how much money is, don't we fund the transaction first? 9:37 that thing don't we have to do what do we what exactly is that's the part that 9:43 I don't think I don't get really it's like what on L1 where I'm putting this into some 9:49 kind of what is it being put into an L1 the two of two like we just create a joint 9:55 output where both our money is 9:57 in. then we do this challenge response game, or 10:03 we prepare the challenge response game for that output. 10:09 then at the end, one of 10:14 us could run that challenge response game with the other 10:17 one. Yeah, but surely you can't compute like, isn't it has to be something the way I 10:23 said, we agree to play chess, but we can't 10:26 possibly... How do know whether or you've broken 10:32 the rules on the first... 10:38 like we sit down and we pay two of two, and then it will 10:43 like leak the other person's key if they, if the circuit. 10:51 I still don't really get like, you can't, okay, I'm getting confused is, You can't pre 10:57 -compute all the chess moves possible because there's far too many. 11:02 Yeah. But we have to do something. 11:05 When we fund the transaction, then there has to be something. 11:09 So we fund the transaction and then the next step. 11:13 How do I know that we're playing chess and not checkers? 11:15 Basically. Yeah. 11:17 we do commit to a program that can evaluate a chess position and say, if you want, 11:23 if I want. 11:25 Yeah, but it's okay. 11:29 So, but this is like, I think this is also like the right way to just think about it in 11:33 general, right? Because it is 11:37 like people cannot really join or leave this as I understand it. 11:41 So it is a like a bunch of people get together and play a game of some kind. 11:45 Yeah. It's probably like the most like 11:51 easy way for most people to understand it. 11:54 Yeah. And you don't like have 11:56 a global state, there's no blockchain. 11:59 There's no... Right, because a blockchain is kind of 12:04 like... can generate it in the privacy of your own 12:10 home with all the blinds drawn and all the windows closed. 12:17 You can generate as many keys as you want and then start sending coins to those. 12:22 So it's like the blockchain has this like ability to add new people in all the time. 12:29 But this does not, This is like people already exist. 12:33 Well, I'm not sure, maybe it does. 12:35 don't know. Maybe there's some kind of 12:36 CTV thing. 12:39 That the main drawback of the BitVM that it is limited to this 12:45 prover -verifier setting. 12:47 What you can do is that you have multiple verifiers. 12:51 That is interesting, for example, for a two -way pack. 12:54 You could have a prover that 12:56 facilitates a two -way pack between two chains. 13:01 And then you could have many verifiers, let's say 100 verifiers. 13:07 And each of them can challenge them in parallel. 13:09 And if one of them gets to the end or disproves the prover, then they 13:15 can punish 13:16 the prover. 13:23 But, so like, maybe we do an example with like, with like 13:29 actual numbers, like you have like 100. 13:32 Well, how does it work if there's like 10? 13:36 like, how would it work in the parallel case where someone wants to 13:41 like, we're all here, we all are. 13:47 opens BitVM, they want to make a new like extension block or like some kind 13:53 of zone, like a roll up zone or 13:56 like a payments zone. 14:00 And so we're doing the two -way peg. 14:03 So what do they do next? 14:08 Yeah, there would be the prover that first has to put up some deposit 14:13 to keep them, 14:17 incentivize them to stay honest. 14:20 And then they could pack BTC to the other chain, or people could just send money 14:26 to the prover's address. 14:28 That's how they pack in. 14:30 And the pack out is just the prover sending the money to someone else. 14:34 and 14:36 And the verifiers, they would verify that this someone else is actually someone 14:41 who packed out in the sidechain. 14:45 Would that, with the prover address that you just mentioned, is that a separate address 14:51 or is that address where the BitVM is deployed? 14:55 would be a 14:55 separate address. So you need introspection basically. 15:01 Yes, exactly. Essentially it's introspection. 15:04 You use the BitVM to do introspection on the transactions that the prover does, on the 15:10 packout transactions that the prover does. 15:14 then that 15:15 works. think, yeah, the only limitation is then the size of the stake of the 15:21 prover, so to speak. 15:25 The prover probably has more money than is locked in the sidechain. 15:30 In that simple case, maybe you can optimize it, but like in the simple idea, 15:35 would be just, if there is one BTC in the sidechain, then the prover would have to put 15:39 up 1.5 BTC or something to hold him accountable. 15:48 That's pretty interesting. 15:53 Yeah, I don't know. 15:54 A lot of these have this 15:55 interesting feature of people putting up the L1 coins or they put up some kind of coins 16:00 that will be slashed later if they do the wrong thing. 16:06 It's interesting that the regular real world operates often in almost a reverse 16:11 way, not saying that that's good or bad. 16:15 It's 16:15 probably bad in fact, but it's just noteworthy that the real world has like credit, 16:20 know, where it's like, no one has anything up. 16:23 They just say, I will pay you. 16:27 We will do this the right way. 16:29 And then if I don't, then I will pay you $10,000. 16:33 no one really, often, no 16:35 one puts up anything. 16:36 Although of course sometimes they do. 16:38 put escrow. often they don't. 16:42 So that's a neat idea. 16:45 Okay, cool. think we should probably, we'll turn to spider chain, but I think probably 16:50 the best thing of all would be if the audience would ask 16:55 questions. 16:56 Because I don't know if the three of us talk to each other. 16:59 I'm not sure if anyone will get anything out of that. 17:02 mean, I hope they do. 17:04 could each compare and contrast the three the way we see it, I suppose. 17:10 okay, well, let's go to SpiderChain. 17:12 My understanding is SpiderChain is something 17:15 where there's lots of -sig outputs, then there's something like on top, kind of like a, 17:21 kind of reminds me of Counterparty, but it's not really like that at all, it's like, 17:25 there's next, so things like Bitcoin Core, Bitcoin Core Plus, you know, Spidr version 17:30 into the Spidrverse, and it is keeping track 17:34 of who has staked coins, 17:37 kind of like a BitVM. 17:39 Like people have staked coins and in return they are allowed to spend away other 17:45 coins that are in the multisig. 17:49 either someone's following the rules or in the case where they are 17:54 breaking someone is breaking rules and it's doing the wrong thing, or if enough of 17:58 them, all each conspired to all break the rules. 18:01 But it's a, it's kind of a similar idea where you have to have lots of different people 18:05 involved and it's very easy for them to coordinate on the truth because that's all just 18:10 automatic. but to get them all to steal 18:15 they would have to coordinate amongst themselves first, which is harder to do. 18:21 I'm not sure if that is how you would explain it. 18:23 But I'm thinking of like there's many, many UTXOs in the spider chain world. 18:29 time people are making new, when they deposit, they make new multisig UTXOs that are 18:34 all 18:34 like partly controlled by this big group, the whole web 18:40 thing. 18:42 Yeah. Yeah, that's the way to see it. 18:45 I don't really think that's going to be an issue, amount of UTXO, because in the end, 18:51 it's all on Bitcoin that you can see it as well. 18:55 The best way to, I think, explain the Spyder chain is you basically have a bunch of 19:01 decentralized multisigs that are controlled by the 19:07 Stakerset. So for example, you have 10,000 different Stakers. 19:10 Here's the output, a certain amount of Bitcoin 19:14 in those decentralized multisex. 19:18 And that basically secures a second layer or EVM. 19:24 And then there's a second very interesting part of spider chain is that it asks for 19:28 word security. So basically even if you have two thirds, you lose control 19:34 of two -thirds majority of the Stakers' hat, they can still not 19:40 steal any Bitcoin. 19:44 I hope that explains it a little bit. 19:46 In the sense, in general, sidechains, I always think you have two big parts. 19:50 One part is how do you lock the assets, and then the 19:54 second part is the consensus. 19:56 Basically, how do you build the blocks in the second part of the chain? 20:00 Compare that to Drivechain, have BIP300 for the asset locking 20:05 mechanism, and then you have merge mining for the second part. 20:11 then BitVM is actually, I think, it's more a 20:14 lower level, yeah, basically 20:19 circuit that allows you build different types of sidechains. 20:24 So for example, in the spider chain, when we say decentralized multi -six, what it 20:29 actually is, it's like a small BitVM in the sense that we 20:33 build a Boolean circuit in every multi -sig wallet that 20:39 basically holds that Bitcoin. 20:43 that basically acts very similar to the model or optimistic proof 20:49 that we see in BitVM. 20:51 I think BitVM 20:53 kind of enables way more types of sidechains. 20:57 I think it eventually becomes very compatible. 21:03 And then maybe the last thing I would say is in this pirate chain we actually optimized 21:07 for fully decentralization and liveness. 21:10 Since everyone will be able to run a full node, they 21:13 exit and entrance of new node runners becomes very easy. 21:19 basically you can have an unlimited amount of people running the sidechain and 21:25 verifying the sidechain. 21:28 Letting a short summary. 21:31 Yeah, that's pretty interesting. 21:33 you go over again that part about even if you lose two thirds? 21:39 guess maybe, should we all just say, like, what would be like the worst case scenario 21:44 for our thing? 21:44 I don't know. 21:45 Probably not, but yeah, you said about if you lose control of two thirds, 21:50 you said, still, that's not 21:53 enough. I thought I was reading Jameson Lop's summary of it. 21:57 And he was saying something like, if you have enough of the steak, you can start just 22:03 emptying it and giving it to yourself. 22:05 I thought maybe, did you think he had like a fair summary or no? 22:11 Usually Jameson Lop's pretty good. 22:13 He's got a very good summary. 22:15 He very quickly understood it. 22:17 But he doesn't say that exactly what the attack factor basically is. 22:21 Anyone with two -thirds majority of the stake can hold the sidechain. 22:26 So basically the sidechain will stop producing new blocks. 22:30 However, they will not be able to 22:33 steal any Bitcoin. 22:35 that's basically what we call forward security. 22:38 Comes from forward secrecy and encryption. 22:41 Basically because we have sequential multisig generating over time. 22:46 That means that older multisig wallets are basically controlled 22:51 by 22:53 established stakers. 22:56 So at a certain point in time, if you lose control of two thirds of the 23:01 orchestrators, all the previous multi -sigs are actually still secure. 23:06 So only the future multi -sigs that are being created from that point onwards 23:11 are 23:13 insecure, so to speak. 23:16 So the older Bitcoin is still secure. 23:20 yeah, the worst case scenario, I'm happy to talk about that. 23:23 think in our cases, that's very clear. 23:26 Basically, you lose two thirds majority of the Staker set. 23:32 And 23:32 And then the chain holds that crowds out any people. 23:36 then basically, the chain is that. 23:39 know everyone will still be able to get their Bitcoin back. 23:45 yeah, the chain is basically halted. 23:48 it's no longer useful. 23:51 I think that's probably the worst 23:52 case scenario. 23:55 Well, that's not so bad. 23:58 But I still don't understand what's happening on L1 when you say they get their coins 24:01 back. to me, it's like you deposit the coins into something else. 24:06 Then something else is happening. 24:08 got was deposited to SpiderChain. 24:10 Then I bet them on, you 24:12 an NFL game. 24:15 now maybe I won, I lost. 24:17 seems like, would you say, in that scenario, it's not desirable for me 24:23 to always be able to get my money back. 24:25 Because if I lose to bet in the smart contract, in the spider chain, then I just say, 24:31 oh, I get my money back 24:32 not sure what name of 24:38 the 24:40 is, 24:50 I'm not what the the Bitcoin 24:52 back. mean, like, and if the new owner who wins the bet on L2, they can always get 24:57 their money back on L1, even if everything goes away. 25:02 Yeah, we'll have to be coordinated by the orchestrators. 25:06 There's actually an opportunity to improve that part later on where you can 25:09 unilaterally 25:11 get 25:12 Get Bitcoin back. 25:16 If you build like a Boolean circuit with a BitVM, that's definitely possible. 25:20 So I think longer term, there might be an opportunity to do that. 25:23 In the short term, basically once the chain is taken over, you can coordinate 25:27 with the orchestrators to 25:32 distribute everybody's L2 Bitcoin to L1 Bitcoin. 25:36 Very easily just send out all transactions. 25:44 But that's the worst case scenario for the spider chain. 25:47 How it's designed at the moment. 25:49 Maybe you could go over again like 25:52 the different groups, the orchestrators, 25:57 the regular user deposits. 25:58 So if I want to deposit a SpiderChain, 26:02 I go to whatever, spiderchain.com or something. 26:05 I download some software and then I send BTC to Multisig on L1. 26:10 And the 26:11 multisig is between me, 26:18 I assume, me and someone from the orchestrator set, right? 26:23 So what's the L1 multisig? 26:25 Yeah, 26:28 very good question. 26:29 basically, how it looks like is very 26:31 similar to Arbitrum if people have used that on Ethereum. 26:35 You just go to the Botanix Bridge website, connect 26:41 your Ethereum address, your EBM address. 26:44 From that we will generate a certain Bitcoin address that has this step 26:50 root circuit 26:51 or step root tree behind it that connects your EVM address to 26:57 that specific Bitcoin address. 26:59 And that is a multi -sick address that is shared between a random subset of all 27:05 the orchestrators. 27:08 So, for example, 100 orchestrators randomly chosen out of 10 27:11 ,000 stickers. 27:14 that basically, that transaction once confirmed will give you back 27:20 Bitcoin on the second layer. 27:23 Now the actual Bitcoin on the LayerOne is then secured in that single multi -sake with 27:29 the put -free unit. 27:31 And the idea is those people could take the L1 coins, but if 27:37 they do, I will get reimbursed or they will get punished by the other 27:43 orchestrators, something like that. 27:46 Yeah, correct. It's similar to what we've discussed on the BitVM 2 effect we talked 27:51 about 27:51 earlier. The moment that happens, all the orchestrators, their stakes get 27:57 slashed. 28:00 Every orchestrator. That is part of that maliciously signed, 28:06 a malicious transaction. 28:07 Yeah, it's only the ones who did the wrong thing. 28:09 Yeah, of course. 28:12 And so they get slashed and their funds go to the other orchestrators or to miners 28:18 or where do they go? 28:21 The slash goes to the one who reported it. 28:25 Oh, that's cool. 28:28 100 % of it or... 28:32 Yeah, idea right now is 100 % that makes the economics the most sense. 28:38 Basically, if you remember Jameson Lott's he talks about capital efficiency. 28:42 And it's the same issue we basically discussed earlier with the BitVM. 28:47 If the orchestrator or the staker only has a stake 28:50 of 1.5 Bitcoin and basically can only really secure 1 Bitcoin. 28:57 Now if you suddenly have 100 stakers that, for example, stake 1 Bitcoin, then you can 29:02 have at max stake 100 Bitcoin there, right? 29:07 Because now there's 100 different stakers that all stake 1 29:10 Bitcoin. 29:12 But now if actually there's an incentive for all the rest of the people to actually 29:17 report malicious behavior, they can get all the staking rewards. 29:22 So anyone who reports could possibly get up to 99 Bitcoin of all the rest of the 29:28 malicious stakers, so to speak. 29:30 I 29:30 Robin has had some similar ideas on that in the case of one -to 29:36 -n multi -party system. 29:39 It makes your capital efficiency of all the stakers way higher basically. 29:48 but so I want to 29:50 use SpiderChain. They give me the address. 29:54 turns out Flavor is the guy who's supposed to be watching my 29:59 coins, and he will get slashed if he does the wrong thing. 30:05 But what if he does the wrong thing, and then he reports it also? 30:10 he gets the money just going from one pocket to another, it seems. 30:16 Yeah, exactly. depends if other malicious people join as well. 30:23 So if other stakers also maliciously signed that same transaction, 30:29 then 30:30 he lured some people in. 30:32 But of course you'll always pay transaction fees, et cetera. 30:37 And he'll booted from, well, he'll have to exit. 30:41 So it's a game where there's zero things to win. 30:44 It doesn't hurt the system, but yeah, it's possible. 30:49 Well, I thought it was 30:50 something like, like if you have two thirds of the Staker set are all the same person, 30:55 then can't they just basically take all the quote deposits 31:00 and then report themselves and then just collect the deposits and they collect the 31:06 slash from themselves. 31:10 that would seem to be the losers would be the last third who weren't in on it. 31:16 So now you have to differentiate between the whole network and a single multisig. 31:21 It's a different game theory. 31:24 A single multisig versus the whole network where you could have two -thirds majority. 31:30 For the whole network, let's say you have two -thirds majority of the whole network. 31:37 You don't have two -thirds majority of every single multisig. 31:42 You don't any previously generated 31:48 multisig. 31:50 basically the only thing you can do is try to convince all the others to join you. 31:57 then basically you're - sure, that's a slightly different setup. 32:01 what if I'm the first, I put all of the money, the spider chain has started and I put 32:06 all of the money in. 32:07 I have 100 % so 32:09 far. put 100 Bitcoin in and then someone puts whatever it would take 32:15 to make that number work out. 32:18 I guess they put 50 or they put 49 in. 32:22 The next person puts 49 in. 32:24 have two thirds and I have the oldest two thirds. 32:28 I know 32:29 it's kind of implausible, I suppose, but in that scenario, I can take all the 32:35 deposits 32:37 and the... do I also take the 49 that are the latest? 32:41 not. 32:43 I'm not sure. 32:45 Yeah. now you're, yeah, initially in the first phases, like when 32:49 when there's zero Bitcoin staked, yes, you're very vulnerable to that. 32:54 But yeah, comes way more secure once you grow the system. 32:58 It's basically you will start off as a federation as well. 33:02 Basically a permissioned staking federation where people can stake with 33:07 federation partners 33:09 until you have enough Bitcoin staked and then you can become fully permissioned. 33:15 And then if you try it again, then it becomes very costly. 33:20 Cool. think probably some people that I know, 33:26 they will want to ask about what 33:29 happens if 51 % L1 miners try to interfere with your thing? 33:34 Because of course in Drivechain it's not very good. 33:37 They can interfere by just taking everything basically. 33:41 seems also that this, I had like a conjecture many years ago that this is kind of 33:46 always true for anything, which has been kind of 33:49 born out by the Lightning Network. 33:53 In BitVM, think also applies where if they... 33:58 Somehow, if you're playing the game against 51 % miners, the game of chess 34:04 or whatever, they also know what 34:09 message to refuse to allow in, and they can time it out, 34:14 take the funds, which I think is must be universal, but maybe not, I don't know. 34:21 I don't know, maybe that's not a very interesting question, I'm not sure. 34:27 So what would 51 34:29 % do exactly? 34:31 I think in the case of the spider chain, can halt the doubts, 34:37 can halt the finality. 34:40 Basically, would only get finality after like, I don't know, whenever you post a 34:46 root back to Bitcoin. 34:48 But since 34:48 we'll probably do a weak delay for Stakers to exit, they would have to 34:54 hold for a week in order to make the long range attack possible. 34:58 So I don't think really there's an attack factor there. 35:03 Yeah, there probably isn't. 35:04 think you're right. 35:04 it's an L1, it's just a bunch of multisek. 35:11 So you can hold them hostage, of course. 35:15 mean, 51 % hashrate can always hold something hostage, but anything with those timeouts, 35:22 the hostage situation is much worse. 35:24 But there are none, and in SpiderChain, there's no like, you must 35:28 do this by this time or else, you know, like an 35:34 HTLC, right? There's no, is there any equivalent of an HTLC in Spider Chain? 35:41 No, not really. 35:42 And even if you lose 51 % of the miners, then whenever 35:48 transaction gets confirmed by the other 49%, like, you're so fine. 35:53 yeah, I don't think the Spark trainings will be vulnerable to the 51 % the Yeah, 35:58 probably not. 36:00 Robin had a weird connecting thing, and then he's dropped down. 36:04 He'll probably be back up soon. 36:10 This app is very buggy, honestly. 36:12 The spaces. 36:14 I mean, it is for me. 36:15 Other people seem to have no problems with it. 36:17 Got a brand new phone and it still doesn't work. 36:21 also have a flavor. 36:23 He's up here. 36:24 I think it's good. 36:24 should have the audience. 36:25 We should have to get the audience people up here. 36:27 breathe 36:28 some more life into the conversation. 36:32 Hello. 36:35 Can you hear me? 36:40 I wanted to ask questions that were a little moving away from the technical side and 36:43 just get more of a background on Willem and his kind of experience 36:48 in Bitcoin and the inspiration behind Spiderchain? 36:54 As a bonus question, Drivechains inspire Spiderchains at all? 37:00 had that question for both Willem and Robin. 37:07 I 37:08 think can go first. 37:11 yeah, background. Grew up in Belgium. 37:14 lived most of my life there actually. 37:17 I have a mathematics background. 37:20 came to the international mathematics competition. 37:23 That's actually where the name Botanix comes from. 37:25 As a prize, I got this book 37:27 about mathematics in nature. 37:31 Very big prize, all about like trees and basically all the 37:36 fractals and etc. 37:39 in nature where you see the Kubernetes sequence. 37:42 Then ended up doing electrical engineering, then in the master's focused on 37:46 cryptography. So I broke 37:47 some authenticated encryption algorithms, where I broke one of the 37:53 algorithms by breaking the forward secrecy, which is basically the forward security 37:58 used in encryption, so that came into play in the spider chain. 38:02 That ended up doing something completely different, went into chemicals, moved to Saudi 38:06 Arabia, 38:07 and basically only really saw the Bitcoin micro picture. 38:12 When I went to Lebanon, saw hyperinflation happening, put everything together very 38:17 quickly, 38:19 and then basically became a very big Bitcoiner. 38:23 Then moved to the US, 38:27 Boston, now recently last two weeks, moved to New York, missed you yesterday, 38:35 basically like year and a half ago, tried to figure out how to basically 38:40 build sidechains on Bitcoin because I started to realize, okay, now you have Bitcoin, 38:46 it's going to take over the 38:47 world. 38:49 How is the world looking that fully runs on Bitcoin? 38:53 Basically means our whole financial system needs to run on Bitcoin. 38:56 That means all the stock markets, trades, yeah, insurance, whatsoever, supply 39:02 chains will run on Bitcoin. 39:04 How does that look like and what do you need for that? 39:05 And so at the same 39:07 basically, off trying get the 39:13 Bitcoin, I started to think about how to Bitcoin, get how to get the 39:18 Bitcoin, 39:21 how the how the Bitcoin, dollars of applications created on an EVM. 39:28 basically when I started off trying to design the spider chain, that boxed me 39:34 in in the sense that I wanted to be able to run an EVM and I wanted it to be able 39:40 to decentralized. I think one of the big issues that I'll typically always have with 39:44 Optimistic or other type of roll 39:47 -ups or sovereign roll -ups is that it's always one party. 39:50 So I wanted it be fully decentralized, I wanted it to be able to run on EVM, and I 39:54 wanted it to be able to run on current Bitcoin core. 39:59 And that's where Drivechains came in. 40:01 I realized that Bitcoin is falsifying more and more. 40:05 It's very hard to make changes. 40:08 And I did get some inspiration from Drivechains. 40:11 I think Drivechains showed me that you need two big things in any sidechain. 40:16 You need an asset locking mechanism, and you need a consensus or a sequence for 40:22 deciding the blocks on your side 40:26 sidechain. 40:29 that drove me like, what if we don't do proof of work? 40:33 And what happens if we change to proof of stake? 40:37 And how can we decentralize the multisig in order asset locking mechanism? 40:41 And that basically was the basis of the spider chain. 40:54 I'm working on 41:00 Zeroesync, is applying zero knowledge proofs to Bitcoin. 41:04 Essentially, we are 41:06 lot of things 41:08 to 41:21 do. We We We of We of We have a lot of to have 41:26 super cool to have a CKB Verifier on the main layer. 41:30 as William already mentioned, it's hard to change Bitcoin. 41:34 So we didn't really hope for some kind of soft fork. 41:40 Or I mean, we did at some point or still, we hope for simplicity. 41:46 If there 41:46 was simplicity, would basically be a byproduct to implement the ZKP verifier. 41:52 stuff like an OBS -ZKP verify, is probably... 41:58 That will not happen anytime soon because the proof systems are not mature yet and 42:04 it will end essentially 42:06 in endless bike shedding to agree on some kind of OBS -CKP verifier. 42:12 yeah, 42:15 Miami, Bitcoin Miami this year, I met Supertestnet and also Sam Parker and 42:22 we were hanging out at the Nostr beach and 42:26 we were talking about if there is not some way to hack a ZKP verifier into Bitcoin 42:31 script as it is right now. 42:34 And starting from there, we created the Telegram group that was titled Hack 42:40 a ZKP Verifier into Bitcoin. 42:42 And yeah, we have been bouncing off 42:45 ideas of each other for like half a year now. 42:49 And yeah, shared all kinds of different approaches that might lead somewhere. 42:55 And then at some point I read about Matt, Merkelize, all the things. 43:02 And then it became kind of obvious that something like that should 43:05 be somehow possible by hacking it into Tabroot. 43:10 That's how the BitVM was created. 43:13 And yeah, was I inspired by Drivechains? 43:14 Yeah, well, to some degree, of course. 43:18 In general, I've been working on ideas, 43:24 in general, on sidechain 43:25 ideas since like I think I started 2019 to 2020. 43:30 I published my first paper where I wrote about like a Bitcoin backed proof of stake, 43:34 which is essentially a consensus mechanism that allows you to stake Bitcoins in the 43:38 Bitcoin chain. And then you can vote on sidechain blocks. 43:42 And if you ever actually vocate and I vote on two conflicting blocks, 43:45 then you lose your Bitcoin in the Bitcoin chain. 43:48 And that is a to leverage Bitcoin's proof of work to 43:52 gain sidechain consensus. 43:57 And yeah, I think these consensus mechanisms, there are quite a few interesting 44:02 consensus mechanisms. There's Bitcoin back proof of stake that I just 44:05 just mentioned, there's BIP301, is blind merge mining as Ruben Somson proposed it, 44:11 there is merge mining of course, there are quite a few proposals and they are already, 44:17 some of them are already possible today, though like not ideally, like, or sorry, not 44:23 in an ideal way, but in 44:25 some way it's already possible. 44:27 what's really interesting is the pack. 44:30 yeah, the two -way pack was the main reason to invent the BitVM. 44:36 yeah, now we have that solution that is a bit better than what we had before, 44:42 yeah, it's essentially like a 44:45 but the trust model is reduced in the sense that you have to trust that there's at 44:50 least one honest party. 44:51 don't have to trust that some majority is honest, you only have to trust that there is 44:55 one honest party in the federation, and then the peg is secure. 44:59 So, you know. 45:04 All right, those are 45:05 are really insightful answers thank you so what was that oh those 45:11 are really insightful answers thank you I guess I have more 45:16 questions if nobody else wants to come up 45:20 so I'm saying again this is a question kind of 45:25 for both of you, but I guess also for Paul, if he wants to answer. 45:31 After having discussed the worst case scenario, does the best case scenario look like 45:36 for either of your ideas in terms of adoption, use cases, 45:43 and what kind of roadblocks do 45:45 you see moving forward for your ideas? 45:52 I start? 45:55 if nobody else is starting... 45:58 mean, wrong one. 46:00 we go. The idea of outcome is that we have a 46:05 free market of sidechains. 46:07 everybody can create their own sidechain and compete with the other sidechains. 46:12 Paul just changed his mind. 46:16 thumbs down, no free market of sidechains. 46:21 So then I hit the wrong button. 46:25 Right, thumbs up. 46:26 So yeah, that would be great for Bitcoin if we essentially get all 46:32 the innovations to them and have everybody who 46:37 has great ideas trying it out on Bitcoin and no 46:43 shitcoin 46:44 new thingy around it, like, at least it would be great if there would be no 46:48 justification to create shitcoins. 46:51 then investors won't buy it, hopefully, if the market is as efficient as we would like 46:55 it to be. 46:56 yeah, then we would have a free market of sidechains and people could 47:02 just try out ideas for scalability, 47:04 privacy, utility. 47:08 That would be my idea. 47:10 And the biggest roadblock that I see is generalizing the BitVM bridge 47:15 to more verifiers because in the model as it is right now, you could maybe have 100 47:21 verifiers, maybe even a thousand if 47:24 then, can a 47:25 of 47:35 stuff like lot of like like like lot of 47:41 And then, can 47:44 be really awesome if we could essentially have a million verifiers, and if 47:49 one of them is honest, then the bridge works. 47:52 That would be like the dream. 47:54 currently it is limited by the number of verifiers, which is the biggest roadblock so 47:58 far. 48:01 to add to that, maybe Robin, 48:05 I've been thinking about this a lot. 48:08 you can basically, if you limit to 100, but you create multiple, exactly the same 48:13 BIPMs, then there's no real reason why you cannot go beyond that. 48:19 Like if you take the model of the spider chain, you can have 10,000 stickers, but every 48:23 multi -stick is 48:23 secured by 100 people. 48:26 could do the same thing, where every bit.vm is basically 48:30 a different subset of 100 people out of 10,000. 48:36 then basically you can keep creating new bit.vm space that run exactly 48:42 the same 48:44 circuit. 48:47 Yeah, I agree on that. 48:48 But that requires more deposit, I think. 48:50 I think in general, is that trade off between how much setup do you or 48:56 like how computationally expensive can the setup be? 48:59 That is one dimension. 49:00 The next dimension is how much deposits shall the 49:03 prover put up. 49:08 The more you accept setup costs and more you accept deposit costs, 49:14 the more verifiers you can have. 49:18 Yeah, but your provers can be different people as well. 49:34 then basically you can scale and you have the same capital efficiency that you have 49:39 that you see in this BIP300 basically. 49:41 But it might cost happiness again. 49:44 if the pack is facilitated by like let's say three people, then all 49:49 three of them have to agree, otherwise 49:51 it stops working. 49:55 The funds get frozen. 49:58 And in the current setting, what we have is that we really have this one -off -end 50:01 assumption, and if just one party is honest, then you have both lifeness and safety, 50:05 which is quite strong. 50:11 What do you do prover always has to be on online, right? 50:16 Yeah, of course, like you can slash them if they go offline. 50:19 Yeah, exactly. 50:23 You don't need all parties, just need some of the verifiers to be online. 50:29 Same as in the spider chain really, you only need 50:31 need one of the people to not collaborate and report any malicious behavior. 50:38 Which can be even more trust -mism, minimized with BitVM of course. 50:42 I do see that you can do, like you get that one -of -n assumption if you have a n 50:48 -of -n multi -sig. 50:52 But that has the problem that you sacrifice liveness as soon as one person is offline. 51:04 Say again, like in N N, BitVM? 51:07 We have a 7 of 7. 51:10 then 51:11 we can be certain if one person is honest of that seven people, then 51:16 nobody will ever steal that money. 51:19 However, the problem is if only one of these seven people is offline, then the money 51:24 cannot be moved at all. 51:26 So we sacrifice lifeness. 51:31 And then can have a threshold, small to say, a threshold signature. 51:37 Then you weaken the other assumption. 51:41 Let's say we have a 5 out of 7. 51:44 Then that means there have to be at least 3 honest people, right? 51:49 Correct. It's a trade -off. 51:51 Yeah, it's a trade -off. 51:52 And a trade -off you don't have a BitVM in the simple setting where 51:57 one honest verifier is sufficient for both lifeness and safety. 52:05 Yeah, no, assume more in general referencing to creating multiple 52:10 BitVMs with multiple provers that put 52:16 in different stakes that basically can increase your capital efficiency and solve 52:22 that problem. Plus can solve the prover -lifeness problem. 52:29 I can see 52:30 a spider chain world where basically every multisig is actually 52:34 a BitVM instead of a multisig. 52:40 That would make sense to me. 52:43 That you solve the capital efficiency, you solve the liveness. 52:47 I still have to think more about like what you actually put in the BitVM. 52:51 yeah, kind of way. 52:57 Also there is another way that you could like cascade the validators or the verifiers. 53:03 So you could have 100 verifiers who verify the prover, but if the prover does something 53:08 and the verifiers 53:09 don't act, they just do nothing or they ask stupid 53:15 questions, quote unquote, questions that don't reveal the fraud of the prover, 53:21 then other verifiers can slash the verifiers. 53:27 So the first stage 53:29 verifiers, the verifiers who are connected to the prover, they could set up circles 53:33 with other verifiers that verify themselves. 53:36 So you could have like this cascade of verifiers and you could help hold 53:42 the verifiers accountable with other verifiers. 53:46 Yeah, exactly. And then like maybe your first one can add 53:49 on one out of an assumption where you only need one on the certifiers, but basically 53:55 for the second layer of cascaded certifiers, can do a threshold. 54:01 to speak. It makes a lot of sense. 54:03 then once you have a threshold, you can probably use like a rose to swap in and out new 54:09 or old participants, if people want to change. 54:13 Oh, and another important point is that in general about two 54:19 -way packs, have that thing, if that two -way pack just works somehow, even if it's very 54:24 slow and if it's cumbersome to use it, it still is of 54:29 great value because then you can use it to pack BTC to the sidechain. 54:35 regular users, can just use atomic swaps between the sidechain and the mainchain. 54:40 So, they do not have to use the pack actually. 54:44 liquidity providers or like some, like a very small subset of the 54:49 sidechain users would actually use the two -way pack. 54:52 And all the other users, they just use atomic swaps. 54:57 So for them, it's instant. 54:59 And only if you use the real bridge, then it's slower 55:04 and more cumbersome. 55:06 And you need a bigger amount to pack out and stuff like that. 55:10 But it's a great trade -off. 55:14 It's in general a great property of two -way packs that as long as they work 55:20 somehow, they are good enough to work really well in practice because the atomic 55:25 swaps for the wind. 55:27 Yeah, exactly. 55:28 for 55:43 the win. 55:48 that they want it now, They want to swap out quickly and they understand that they pay 55:53 a fee for that. 55:55 That's what most regular people want. 55:57 You hire a plumber or something. 55:59 You pay, but you get what you want, and you don't have to do anything. 56:03 But you do Uber Eats. 56:05 You get your food, you pay, but you get 56:08 what you want. 56:09 And it's better to just split it into like an employees only section where the people 56:15 swap, the people are swapping slowly and they're the ones that actually care about the 56:18 minutia of each sidechain and whether or not it has ZK proofs or whether or not it's 56:24 like Zcash where there might be hidden inflation bugs. 56:27 They all care about 56:28 this, and they make the market on the instant swap outs, but most regular people 56:33 don't do it, except in the case where someone is handy around the house, they fix their 56:39 own pipes, or they change the oil in their own car, or something like that. 56:45 It's just better to split them up. 56:51 Cool, have a Satoshi and Delirious here. 56:54 He's now a wizard, congratulations. 56:58 Thanks. 57:00 Thank you. Hey, what's up, guys? 57:02 I'm not as familiar with the flow yet for the Prover and Verifier of BitVM, 57:08 But I have a question. 57:09 Does the verifier have anything at stake? 57:12 Yes. 57:15 You want to disincentivize the verifier from starting baseless 57:20 disputes. if the prover was honest. 57:24 Does it cost anything for the prover? 57:26 Like if it's a baseless dispute, 57:28 is it really that costly for them to just disprove it real quick? 57:33 Yeah, like they have to participate in this challenge response protocol, right? 57:38 And they must do some, you know, a few transactions back and forth. 57:44 And the loser should pay all the transaction fees. 57:46 I 57:47 the way I was thinking of is to solve the 100 verifier thing, maybe you would 57:53 have a verifier where the public key is known for other people, but it seems like you 57:59 can grief it. 58:02 you can ask quote unquote stupid questions. 58:04 can ask questions that don't reveal what... 58:07 Does it cost anything to ask? 58:10 that an on -chain transaction? 58:11 Yes. 58:13 In the worst case, I mean, you can always do everything off -chain as long as both 58:17 parties participate. if both parties collaborate, 58:22 But, yeah, one of the parties is lying, then they will try 58:27 to drag it out as much as possible, of course. 58:32 Is there any way to have a verifier that cannot do on -chain? 58:36 They can only do off -chain. 58:37 This way you can make that, you know, known, that public key. 58:40 And then if there is a dispute, you know, some potential, then other verifiers would be 58:45 like, oh, okay, you know, and 58:46 then they'll do it on chain. 58:51 Not really. mean, 58:55 these hash commitments definitely allow you to do all the steps of chain. 58:59 But the problem here is that in the very worst case, the prover just stops responding. 59:05 They don't answer anything. 59:07 And then you have to force them to give you a response. 59:12 But then you're still somebody that's to take it on chain. 59:15 Yes. 59:17 Okay, thank you. 59:19 The best thing you can... 59:21 You said you are not that familiar with the internals of the BitVM, and I have not 59:26 explained 59:26 them publicly that well. 59:29 These ideas of having low -level circuits, but on the other hand, having actually a 59:34 virtual machine and then you can commit to state transitions of that virtual machine 59:40 and then you use the circuits only to disprove an incorrect state transition of that 59:44 machine. 59:46 is the current idea how to build all that. 59:51 And yeah, that search and that state transitions, would be just like 59:57 a state is just the marker root of the memory of the machine. 1:00:03 So that's essentially a hash that you commit to. 1:00:06 And the Barifay would have to do a binary search in the state 1:00:12 commitments of the prover. 1:00:14 Like the prover just, he commits and says, yeah, state one led to state two, and state 1:00:18 two led to state three, and so on and so on and so on. 1:00:22 And then the Barifay has to do binary search over 1:00:26 these states to find the first faulty state to disprove it. 1:00:29 in particular the first thing that binary search, it's quite deterministic. 1:00:34 it is at every step, it is clear what the verifier would have to ask. 1:00:41 That's why you could have a verifier, 1:00:45 like 1:00:45 everybody could be the verifier in that case. 1:00:48 And if they ask a stupid question, you can slash them for that. 1:00:52 Like you can prove that this question was not the most efficient question that they 1:00:55 could have asked. 1:00:56 And yeah, you can punish them for that. 1:00:58 It adds more complexity, but it seems possible. 1:01:03 And the verifiers can be 1:01:05 like a dynamic federation of newer ones coming in, previous ones being removed and 1:01:10 things like this? 1:01:12 The idea behind this is that everybody could be a verifier and that they don't have to 1:01:16 sign up at all in the first place. 1:01:19 could just like come in later and say, I will do one step of the protocol now. 1:01:24 And I put up this deposit. 1:01:27 I do my one step, and then there is a timeout phase where other people could challenge 1:01:31 them and be like, hey, the question that you asked is not the most efficient question 1:01:34 that you could have asked, so you get punished for it. 1:01:37 This way, it might become open, that might solve the main pain point, and that 1:01:43 might allow everybody to be 1:01:45 a verifier, which is kind of like the body. 1:01:47 in that case, if a person does have enough funds, they can ask their 1:01:53 stupid question and then other verifiers that they control can say that it's fine as 1:01:58 long as they have enough funds to attack it this way? 1:02:01 Sure. Hmm. 1:02:04 Yeah. 1:02:05 Yeah. 1:02:08 Okay. Yeah, so making it all symbol resistant is important, right? 1:02:13 maybe the funds might be enough of a detractor, but still, it can 1:02:19 get annoying if somebody really wants to attack. 1:02:21 Yeah. Another basic question is, 1:02:25 with these type of sidechains, I assume you can have merge mining and blind merge 1:02:29 mining as well, right? 1:02:34 I'm also asking if need make proof of stake. 1:02:37 think Bitcoin back proof of stake can be very nice and it can be better than merge 1:02:41 mining because the settlement velocity 1:02:44 is much quicker with proof of stake because in proof of work type of things, 1:02:50 usually have that the cost of block production equals the cost of attacking the chain. 1:02:57 So it is just the same price of attacking the chain and being honest. 1:03:02 But in a proof of stake algorithm, you 1:03:04 can have a huge asymmetry because the cost of producing the chain is just the time 1:03:10 value of the Bitcoins that are at stake. 1:03:13 the cost of the chain is like the actual value of the Bitcoins, which is what I saw. 1:03:18 But if it's not contributing to the base layer security, do you see that as an issue? 1:03:27 You mean like if they are not paying enough fees? 1:03:31 I'm saying if you have the sidechain running its own of stake consensus and you know 1:03:36 this proof of stake consensus would be like bitcoins staked in Bitcoin in the Bitcoin 1:03:41 blockchain. Right, who's earning the 1:03:44 fees from this? 1:03:47 Yeah, if it's open for anybody, then it's not the miners. 1:03:50 And if it's not the miners, then it's not going to, you know, base layer security, Yes, 1:03:56 that's true. That's a drawback. 1:03:58 Definitely. 1:04:00 So that being said, do you still think the proof of stake 1:04:04 is better? wouldn't it be better to add to LayerOne security instead? 1:04:11 Yeah, I mean, it would be definitely ideal if these go to the Bitcoin miners and 1:04:17 then you add to the base layer security. 1:04:20 That would be ideal, definitely. 1:04:24 think... 1:04:25 I'll try to in here, because I've had a lot of those discussions about if you 1:04:31 have all LayerTwo and all the feeds end up being generated on LayerTwo, what does 1:04:37 that leave to the miners on LayerOne? 1:04:41 I actually don't think that 1:04:43 will be an issue because there's a very big incentive for anyone who is running 1:04:47 LayerTwo protocols or sidechains to have sufficient security to go 1:04:53 back to LayerOne. 1:04:55 So there's multiple ways to accrue more of the fees generated on LayerTwo 1:05:01 to let that accrue back to LayerOne. 1:05:04 And it's in the incentive of the LayerOne sidechain node runners to basically do 1:05:09 that. 1:05:11 I think that's trying to come up with a very interesting incentive model that's way 1:05:17 down the line. 1:05:18 I think generally that will not be the initial. 1:05:22 But what do 1:05:37 It's like a volunteer, you know? 1:05:39 You're just like voluntarily giving up money. 1:05:41 But maybe you have some... 1:05:42 I can think of a scenario, if you have this LayerTwo that is proof of stake or 1:05:46 whatever, if it needs to anchor to L1 anyways, the miners can say, well, if you want to 1:05:51 anchor to L1, here's the fee, right? 1:05:56 Exactly. 1:05:58 Oh, yeah, that could be a good idea. 1:06:00 of course, 1:06:04 it give them an, you know, how many, the question is, like, are the bytes fungible or 1:06:10 not? 1:06:12 And it seems like they sort of must be to some extent. 1:06:16 mean, maybe not because, I mean, what I'm getting at is they have this way of anchoring 1:06:21 the L1, the picture is something like this. 1:06:24 The L2 is making $50 million a day in fees. 1:06:29 It's collecting 50 million a day for fees. 1:06:31 And then they decided, well, we want to give some of this to the L1 1:06:35 miners, 1:06:37 but there's a rival L2 that is also collecting 50 million a day in fees. 1:06:44 so then the miners, from the miners point of view, they're to say something like, 1:06:48 listen, 1:06:50 we know that you guys anchor into L1 like here and 1:06:54 here. So if you want that block space, we're charging you, you know, 25 million a day 1:07:00 or whatever it is. 1:07:04 And then it seems like the L2 can just innovate, excuse me, a different 1:07:09 way of anchoring and it's kind of cat and mouse. 1:07:13 Or it seems that 1:07:14 one of the L2s is at a disadvantage because it will voluntarily be paying for L1. 1:07:19 This is the collective action problem I mentioned before. 1:07:22 will voluntarily be paying an L1 and the benefit will go to both L2s. 1:07:28 it's just kind of you get the same amount regardless of how much you, everyone gets the 1:07:32 same amount regardless 1:07:33 of how much you individually pay, which probably won't 1:07:39 work. Well, in this case, if there's infinite amount of ways that they can anchor, 1:07:45 well, then you can't stop them and you can't force them to merge mine no matter what 1:07:49 anyways then, right? 1:07:50 Well, 1:07:55 idea being the way 301 was designed was 1:08:00 imagine they wanted to like vertically integrate but specialize. 1:08:07 How would they accomplish that the best way for them all? 1:08:10 what the idea of 301, 1:08:12 because what they could do is they could just try to say, we said, we hold this hostage 1:08:17 and we censor everything of this shape or something like that, which may destroy a 1:08:21 bunch of legitimate L1 use cases. 1:08:24 But I think it doesn't matter, like whether they can or they can't, 1:08:30 if they can't stop, 1:08:32 if they can't hold the L2 hostage, then you have the collective action problem and the 1:08:37 fees don't go to L1. 1:08:39 But if you can hold it hostage, then you have a conflict between L1 and 1:08:44 L2 because L2 has all the money and L1 can hold it hostage. 1:08:49 So I think the problem kind of appears either way 1:08:51 you go around that mountain. 1:08:59 Yeah, I think in general it's very hard to predict how this will play out. 1:09:03 There is, though, a very big incentive. 1:09:05 If the fees are too high, two people will just go back to I think that's 1:09:10 one thing I'll think we'll see play out. 1:09:12 second thing is something we have already seen play out, that's what's been happening 1:09:17 on Liquid. So when you think about how Liquid is implemented, they put 1:09:22 their transaction fees on Bitcoin main layer way higher 1:09:27 than anyone 1:09:30 else just to make sure that is confirmed. 1:09:32 One of the big risks of any two -way pack is that you have to calculate somehow the 1:09:38 transaction fees for your bag out. 1:09:40 And if you calculate that too low, basically your 1:09:46 whole sidechain will get stuck. 1:09:48 So you need to put 1:09:49 those transaction fees high enough, which will create automatically way higher fees for 1:09:55 the LayerOne. We've already seen that play out because of Liquid, and we'll probably 1:09:59 end up implementing it very similarly, because you don't want to have the risk that 1:10:04 basically your sidechain has two low fees 1:10:08 and then that locks your pegouts and then you 1:10:14 end up in very niche scenarios that you don't want to end up in. 1:10:20 And since it's the end user that is bridging back, is paying for fees, basically 1:10:25 you will calculate high 1:10:44 it is a collective action problem. 1:10:46 I see that but there's also a collective incentive to really make 1:10:51 sure the security of the LayerTwo is guaranteed. 1:10:55 one of the ways to do that is have high enough fees on the base layer. 1:11:01 Yeah but the withdrawal fees are 1:11:04 I think, I don't know why this is so common, but people often 1:11:09 use the word fees to refer to two completely different things, which is obviously 1:11:15 not good from the perspective of having a normal conversation about it because I use 1:11:20 fee rates for like the dollar per transaction 1:11:23 going rate, and then fees is like the total revenue of the block 1:11:29 collected. I don't know, that's just what I prefer to use, I think that the, 1:11:35 it's all the withdrawals, those are all going to be L1 transactions. 1:11:39 So they will pay the L1 rate. 1:11:41 They may play L1 1:11:43 plus a buffer, as you were saying. 1:11:47 so that's certainly true. 1:11:50 The idea that, you know, it's it's collective action problem, but there's 1:11:56 and it's we don't want to suffer from the problem. 1:11:59 That's that's true of every collective action problem. 1:12:03 The first thing you said, I don't remember what it was, but I remember thinking that 1:12:06 that's not all this is the fee versus fee rates. 1:12:08 Yeah, you're saying if L2 fees, if L2 fee rates go up, that encourages people to go to 1:12:12 L1 but that's not what I'm saying. 1:12:15 I'm saying it's quite possible that the L2 is collecting huge amounts of total fee. 1:12:19 but the fee rates will be lower because of a higher quantity of transactions. 1:12:24 So they could have 10 million times more transactions each by half as much fees as on 1:12:29 L1, but then you still have this conflict between L1 and L2 where L1 is saying, 1:12:34 listen, L1 is like whatever, Boromir from 1:12:39 Lord of the Rings. 1:12:41 He's like, we're doing all the work over here, stopping the works from invading. 1:12:47 And we don't get any 1:12:49 credit, know, and the L2 people can get 100X or 1000X or 10 1:12:55 ,000X times more. 1:12:56 so I either say there will be a conflict between L1 and L2, or there'll be the 1:13:01 collective action problem. 1:13:03 Or maybe nothing will 1:13:04 happen because maybe it won't be a big deal. 1:13:10 But I guess, I think it will be a big deal in the future because it'll be a ton, we're 1:13:14 talking about a ton of money and then people will start and they won't like say it 1:13:18 overtly. they 1:13:19 They won't be like, 1:13:21 we are doing such and such because we want the fees. 1:13:27 They'll just start like little nonsense, 1:13:29 Twitter psyops and they'll say whatever sucks or 1:13:33 miners will drop every, every fifth multi-sig or something. I don't know, 1:13:39 but I think, um, it might be a, you know, 1:13:43 a rough seas. 1:13:48 Oh, here's even more of an odd ball. Um, Alex, uh, 1:13:51 Kravitz was talking about it last week where, uh, 1:13:54 in a potential world that we have a trust minimize or a trustless two-way peg. 1:14:00 Um, most likely one of the first things will happen is, uh, uh, 1:14:03 a wrapped on, on, on Ethereum for, for an actual, um, 1:14:07 trustless or trust minimize peg. And now Ethereum has a credible, um, uh, 1:14:12 Bitcoin asset. And then, um, it gives more credibility to the Ethereum EVM. 1:14:17 Uh, their fees go up because they have the network effect. Um, you know, 1:14:21 that continues to, uh, legitimize or solidify their, um, 1:14:25 network effect to continue to grow because of, uh, a two-way peg. Now that, 1:14:29 that works for, for, for Bitcoin to Ethereum. 1:14:33 What do you guys think about this? 1:14:36 I'm happy to go here. Um, 1:14:38 because a lot of people always told me over last month that I should use the 1:14:43 spider chain to build the bridge to Ethereum. 1:14:46 Now how I think about it is why would you ever use a bridge if you can just send 1:14:53 Bitcoin to a centralized exchange by Ethereum, 1:14:59 send it to Ethereum main net, and then by wrap Bitcoin, 1:15:04 like I have zero risks there. 1:15:07 And we've seen 80% of the hacks are on bridges. 1:15:11 Well, wrap Bitcoin has that centralization risk of, you know, 1:15:14 the custodial Bitco. 1:15:16 Yeah. But, um, 1:15:18 there is a big difference between security and centralization. 1:15:23 Like Liquid is probably one of the most secure things out there. 1:15:27 So security like centralized solutions can be way more secure than 1:15:31 decentralized solutions because it's, it's often trustless. 1:15:33 But the thing with Liquid is doesn't have the network effect of, you know, 1:15:37 all the, uh, 1:15:38 the DeFi protocols that Ethereum has with their TVL and, you know, 1:15:42 lock collateral in all of their whatever contracts. Right. 1:15:47 So the incentive will be for Ethereum to have, you know, sure, 1:15:51 wrap Bitcoin works fine, 1:15:53 but if they can have a better wrap Bitcoin that is actually more trustless, 1:15:57 right now that would benefit them and their whole ecosystem. 1:16:03 If you can convince the market that it's more trustless, one trustless, 1:16:07 two way packs, we haven't seen it yet. And two, 1:16:10 all the hacks I've always been happening on bridges. Um, 1:16:15 I don't know. So it's an interesting question. 1:16:18 I actually think the easiest way to maybe implement the bridges, 1:16:24 um, go on, uh, 1:16:26 go on a second layer EVM on Bitcoin and then build an EVM EVM 1:16:31 bridge, um, instead of, uh, a Bitcoin Ethereum bridge. 1:16:35 But generally I think, um, um, 1:16:39 I'm not really afraid of the decades for, 1:16:42 for the bridges taking the network packs to Ethereum. 1:16:45 I think it should, it's the opposite. Like with an EVM, um, Bitcoin, 1:16:50 I think Ethereum should be more scared that all the activity 1:16:54 will go back to Bitcoin. 1:16:57 I agree as well, because I think it still doesn't solve their whole, you know, 1:17:00 consensus problems on that side of like USDC centralization or, 1:17:05 or things like that, if they had a fork or whatever. Um, so yeah, I, 1:17:09 I think as well, if you have, um, a Bitcoin side EVM, uh, 1:17:14 eventually over time the liquidity would grow and then you're really just 1:17:18 fighting the monetary asset of Bitcoin versus Ethereum, 1:17:21 where most likely Bitcoin will continue to grow. 1:17:24 Most likely Bitcoin will continue to continue to win there. 1:17:30 That would be my hope too, but I think your concern is valid. 1:17:36 I would think if all the, um, if they all have equal features, 1:17:43 it does just put so much of a premium on the number one coin and it just 1:17:47 stigmatize everything else is my thought. So I don't know, 1:17:52 like, uh, anything that, 1:17:55 because the thing about the story you have to tell if you want Ethereum to flip 1:17:59 in BTC, the story has to be something like 1:18:04 if we at Ethereum did such and such, we have turned complete scripts. 1:18:07 We have state, we have a freedom to develop. 1:18:11 And this turned out to be more important than Bitcoin's conservatism. 1:18:17 That's like the story you have to tell, right? Like, why did it, 1:18:19 why did it flip and why should people join Ethereum as the number one coin? 1:18:24 Cause you know, you could flip, it could flip flop, you know, right. 1:18:26 Flip back and forth. So people would say, Hey, 1:18:30 the number two coin sometimes becomes number one. 1:18:33 So the story they have to tell has to be something like we have these features 1:18:36 that these properties that Bitcoin doesn't have and it's permanent. 1:18:41 But in a world where Bitcoin has just gained the ability to like where they 1:18:46 each gain each other's features, 1:18:48 then I think that's, it's not good for the number two coin. 1:18:55 But it's about the network effects. 1:18:56 And I think like Ethereum is number one when it comes to the network effects of 1:19:00 like casinos. 1:19:02 Yeah. 1:19:03 We can see also a similar example that happened when AVAX was incentivizing and 1:19:08 bribing people to move over to them during last cycle. 1:19:12 And you know, the fees were much lower arguably about, you know, 1:19:15 their decentralization and their consensus is different. 1:19:19 But eventually like there was a moment that, you know, 1:19:21 there was decent amount of liquidity growing over there, 1:19:23 but then eventually it evaporated. 1:19:25 And I assume it's because the network effect of Ethereum was just so much 1:19:29 stronger and greater that you might temporarily bribe people to move on to your, 1:19:33 you know, whatever, faster, cheaper, better network. 1:19:35 But if it doesn't have that stickiness of the, 1:19:39 of the liquidity then eventually a dry up. 1:19:41 But I don't think this will be a problem for Bitcoin because here the monetary 1:19:44 asset has more of a network effect, 1:19:48 even if it's not in the casino aspect, 1:19:49 the fact that it's a better network effect for money might be enough for 1:19:54 liquidity to eventually grow and actually be sticky over the longer term. 1:20:00 Well, I mean, we all hope so, but it is true that, you know, 1:20:05 Ethereum has a lot of users, has a lot of fee paying users, 1:20:09 has a lot of activity. 1:20:11 It has a lot going forward in terms of not like a top down 1:20:17 intelligentsia, but it has a lot of actual, 1:20:20 it just has a lot of actual people who are, who are excited about it. 1:20:23 And of course Bitcoin obviously does as well. But the problem is, 1:20:28 in Bitcoin we have, you know, sort of been lying to ourselves. 1:20:33 I mean, this is the BIP300 or drivechain. 1:20:36 It really would have been a much better idea back in 2015 when I first proposed 1:20:40 it. When Ethereum was still a complete, complete pile of junk, 1:20:45 that would have been much better. We would have had all this stuff on Bitcoin, 1:20:49 you know, a long time ago, 1:20:50 and there probably wouldn't have been a big Ethereum network effect. 1:20:54 And now as Ethereum gets better, we just have more sour grapes, 1:20:59 I think, where we just say, Oh, we never wanted that. Anyway, 1:21:01 we have the Jock Mozuka slide or whatever. We say, 1:21:07 every other idea is not good. And, 1:21:11 and so I'm not sure. I think our culture is much weaker, 1:21:17 I think actually than the Ethereum culture, believe it or not. 1:21:24 Yeah, but I'm not really, 1:21:28 I don't really believe that all these things will play out long term. 1:21:34 And you just have to look at the market cap numbers. 1:21:38 Bitcoin has $600 billion of market cap and almost no utility in applications. 1:21:46 And so even though Ethereum has the strongest network effects, 1:21:50 both in switching costs, in culture, 1:21:54 network effects and liquidity, longer term, 1:21:57 there's a massive incentive to move to Bitcoin because in Bitcoin, 1:22:02 you have all the capital that is not being used in any applications. 1:22:07 So if I'm a dev and I'm looking for customers, 1:22:11 there's $600 billion of potential customers. Why wouldn't I move over? 1:22:16 And so it's a question of time before, 1:22:18 basically, yeah, 1:22:21 the whole ecosystem network effects start on Bitcoin. 1:22:25 If you build the argument around the market cap though, 1:22:28 then it's something of a circular reasoning really, because 1:22:34 I mean, I've seen those market cap numbers change quite a bit. 1:22:37 I remember when Ethereum had the, you know, one 10,000th the market cap of BTC. 1:22:42 So I've seen those numbers change enormously over the last, whatever, 10 years, 1:22:47 more. So, you know, 1:22:51 and once the day of the Dow hack or whatever Ethereum fell like 66% or something 1:22:56 like that. So, 1:22:57 so I hope that everyone is right about all this and that none of it matters. 1:23:03 I gave you a little speech just a moment ago about how if they all have equal 1:23:07 features, I think that stigmatizes the number two coin, 1:23:09 makes it really difficult for it to succeed. So I certainly believe that. 1:23:14 Certainly hope it won't be an issue, 1:23:16 but I wouldn't build it all on the market cap because the market 1:23:21 cap, I have seen the Bitcoin market cap get cut in half in a 1:23:25 day, several times. 1:23:28 I've seen Ethereum fall by two thirds in a day at one time. 1:23:33 I've seen quite a bit of stuff happen. And the market, 1:23:37 the market cap is mostly it's circular reasoning itself, 1:23:40 because I think it's a people speculating on future ability to 1:23:45 spend the coin future utility of the coin. 1:23:48 So it's inherently very speculative. 1:23:50 And so the people's expectations of the future can change like in an 1:23:55 instant. 1:24:00 As far as like Bitcoin's culture being weaker than, 1:24:04 than Ethereum's, I think that maybe in utility and like casino wise, 1:24:09 Ethereum might have like a stronger culture or utility and whatever. 1:24:13 But as far as like a base layer money I think Bitcoin's culture is, 1:24:17 you know, probably way stronger. But like, like you said, 1:24:21 who knows what the future will hold, but, but you know, 1:24:23 I think Ethereum's culture is terrible, 1:24:26 but I think that Bitcoin's has gone from being okay 1:24:30 to even worse. We, I think we really 1:24:36 you know, what, 1:24:36 what made Ethereum's culture bad was when it was talking about being world 1:24:39 computer and, and blah, blah, blah, saving the planet. 1:24:43 It said all this, this, this big stuff. 1:24:47 So it's the big cock and not being serious about getting things done. 1:24:51 But now we are the ones who do the big talk. 1:24:54 We have this grandiose nonsense that 1:24:58 we're lying to ourselves about the details don't add up yet, 1:25:03 but they're very close, but not yet. 1:25:06 Not until B300 activates, then it'll all be, 1:25:09 then it'll go back to being perfect. 1:25:16 It's about the self deception though, just to be clear. That's what it is. 1:25:22 Cause once you have, once people can't be honest, 1:25:25 then there's no recovery. So, 1:25:31 and it was very different 2012, 2014, it was very different people, you know, 1:25:36 it was just, 1:25:37 you go back and read bitcointalk.org and just read what it was like in 2012, 1:25:43 2014, that type of a thing 10 years ago. And it was, uh, 1:25:49 and I think the Twitter algorithm is also screwing us to some extent. 1:25:54 Anyway, we have some other people up here. They are. Hello. 1:25:58 Crypto conversion. 1:26:01 Yeah. Um, I just wanted to, um, just on this discussion of, 1:26:05 of the culture and you know, market cap versus, um, fee, 1:26:10 fees paid and things like that. I, I do think, um, you know, I, 1:26:13 I just, I agree that, uh, market cap isn't a good indicator and that, 1:26:17 and that's, that's, that's a, that's a, that's a good indicator. 1:26:20 I agree that a market cap isn't a good indicator and that, um, 1:26:24 people aren't building, uh, again, the culture of Bitcoin. There's so, 1:26:28 I think so much of that market cap is people who are, you know, 1:26:32 never going to spend any other Bitcoin, right. That's, that is the, um, I, 1:26:37 maybe the predominant Bitcoin culture is, um, you know, hold your keys, 1:26:41 hold your crypto, uh, or whatever, hold, hold your Bitcoin cold storage, um, 1:26:46 you know, save it for the rest of your life and then, you know, you'll, 1:26:49 you'll be rich. Right. And so I, I think we definitely need to see, um, you know, 1:26:53 the start of a culture shift, um, that we are willing to pay fees. 1:26:58 We are willing to use applications and then all those applications will be 1:27:02 built and then we'll have, um, you know, 1:27:04 we'll we have to have that kind of culture shift before we, um, 1:27:07 can overtake a theory of whose culture is, um, 1:27:10 I'm using apps whether or not to make money or, you know, 1:27:13 identity apps or things like that. But, um, you know, I am, 1:27:17 I have a theorem so that I can use it. Um, 1:27:22 I completely agree that if you had gone back in time to the 2012, 1:27:28 2014 era, I think this is all because of the scale, the scaling war, 1:27:33 split the medium of exchange and store value groups. 1:27:38 Previously they were absolutely the same group and people imagined. 1:27:41 I guess is that people would have actually imagined something that is much more 1:27:45 like bit VM. If you went back to 2012, 1:27:50 everyone would think, wow, this is going to be crazy. 1:27:52 I'm going to go online and I'm not going to, 1:27:54 I'm going to be in the anonymous internet and I'm going to pay for like my VPN 1:27:57 with Bitcoin and I'm going to pay for like my whatever, you know, 1:28:00 my drugs or something with Bitcoin and my prostitutes and I'm going to have 1:28:04 magic encrypted files on the internet and I'm going to play against, 1:28:08 I'm going to play chess against someone and cryptography is going to guarantee 1:28:14 that the winner of the chess game gets something and we can have people, 1:28:17 we'll have people meet. 1:28:19 It'd be like the fast and the furious where they all meet on the one road to 1:28:23 race and they were like, 1:28:24 we'll have like cryptographic like chat rooms and stuff and like there'll be a 1:28:29 spam resistant email. People were talking a lot about using it a lot. 1:28:34 And we had bit pay. We were like, Oh, bit pay. 1:28:38 It's exactly like a credit card except much cheaper. 1:28:41 It's a better deal for the merchant, the user, you know, the customer, 1:28:44 they get cash the next day. Bit pay was big. 1:28:48 It was a big idea and just to have this cool little logo and it was just like a 1:28:51 visa. You could like have a little sticker at your, 1:28:55 at your store and it was really about using it as much as it was about people 1:29:02 talking about, Hey, this, the properties of money are way better. 1:29:05 We have 21 million coins only. There's no inflation. 1:29:07 There's totally predictable monetary policy. There's no ambiguity. You, 1:29:12 you always know exactly. Unlike gold, 1:29:14 you always know exactly how much Bitcoin you have. 1:29:17 So people talked about the store of value stuff, of course, 1:29:21 but they also talked about the medium of exchange. And this is why I, 1:29:25 I repeat this a lot, 1:29:26 but I really believe it that the scaling war screwed everything up in Bitcoin 1:29:31 because 1:29:32 now we, we get to a point where people would, there are people who will say, 1:29:39 um, you know, they'll say, we don't even want to use Bitcoin. 1:29:44 Using Bitcoin is bad. And, uh, in fact, if we, if we use it too much, it might, 1:29:48 it might, you know, 1:29:49 it might make it harder for BlackRock to get the ETF or something. 1:29:52 And if you had said that in, in 2012, 1:29:56 person's head would have just exploded. They would have said, 1:29:58 who fucking cares about that? And, uh, so, I mean, yeah, 1:30:03 it's important. Adoption is good. Investment is good. 1:30:06 High market cap is good. BlackRock ETF. That's, that's good. 1:30:11 But I just don't, I just don't get it. You know, really there would be, 1:30:15 you know, the cypherpunk future has departed almost completely. 1:30:20 Cause the cypherpunk future was like, you know, 1:30:23 magic file storage and stuff like that. 1:30:25 So now it's considered very fashionable to reject all of that and say, 1:30:31 we don't want application. 1:30:33 That part of this is the sour grapes that I mentioned before. 1:30:35 This is a really sad thing is that it's because other coins like Ethereum and 1:30:40 other stuff, Filecoin or whatever, 1:30:44 because they have moved into that territory. 1:30:46 Now the Bitcoin culture has to say, is forced to say, 1:30:49 we're holding a gun to ourselves. And we're not going to let that happen. 1:30:53 We're holding a gun to ourselves and we say, well, 1:30:57 we never really wanted that anyway. That's just, um, that's just a scam. 1:31:03 And, uh, yeah, that's not good. That's why it's a big problem. 1:31:07 Yeah. I, but I, 1:31:09 I do think there's something in addition to just a medium of exchange, um, 1:31:13 that we have to get in people's mind, right on Ethereum. Um, you know, 1:31:17 it's not that people think ether is, uh, a good money or, you know, 1:31:23 it's something that they want to maximize. 1:31:25 There are plenty of people on Ethereum who, you know, it's simply the gas. 1:31:30 It's simply the, you know, um, it's, it's the, 1:31:33 the means to get what they want. They hold a little bit of ether, but they're, 1:31:36 you know, they're in tokens, they're in NFTs, they're, um, you know, 1:31:40 they're doing identity stuff with ENS and they're, you know, 1:31:44 more about that and building that out. And then, um, you know, the ether, right. 1:31:49 I could imagine if lightning scaled perfectly in Bitcoin was used as, 1:31:54 you know, a store of value and a medium of exchange. It's still, 1:31:57 unless people can wrap their heads around it being, you know, gas and, 1:32:02 and having, um, I, I don't know if this makes sense, 1:32:06 or maybe it is simply a medium of exchange and they're paying the fee to do 1:32:10 these things. But, um, I, I don't know, I, in my head, 1:32:12 it seems like it's an additional property of this like utility in order to 1:32:17 access these things. I have to have and use, um, Bitcoin to do so. 1:32:24 Yes. This is a very important point that people often claim that ordinals spam 1:32:30 the blockchain. 1:32:32 I just want to say I don't own any ordinals at all or inscriptions or whatever, 1:32:36 but I'm going to defend them slightly because they say that there's no, 1:32:41 it takes a block space that should instead be used for transactions, 1:32:46 but that's not true because the ordinals inscription thing is a transaction. 1:32:51 It is, it pays the transaction fee to the miner and it is a, 1:32:56 it is a transaction. So it's not the transaction you want, 1:33:02 but it is something. And as a result, 1:33:06 it, uh, they bid for the block space they pay the most. 1:33:10 So they're the rightful owner. And yeah, it just goes to this, 1:33:15 like this, but I think this is the scaling thing about how, um, 1:33:19 payments was de-emphasized. 1:33:21 It was originally a big emphasis was payments and now it's been de-emphasized. 1:33:26 So it used to be like removing, we thought, I can't believe we have to compete 1:33:31 with Western union, which is like charges 15% or something. 1:33:35 It charges a fortune. We were just like, we're going to, 1:33:39 this is going to be no problem. And, you know, payment, 1:33:42 we all make payments multiple times a day, but yeah, 1:33:47 this was a, 1:33:48 the scaling war really through a giant wrench in all of this. Not because, 1:33:53 you know, the correct side one, but that's not the point. 1:33:58 We're really both sides lost because the community split and then each side 1:34:03 became obsessed with only it's one thing 1:34:05 when both were, or both are needed or really what's really needed is just the, 1:34:10 the ability to be honest with yourself about things that you want. 1:34:17 So like in Bitcoin, we actually, we want payments, we want scalability, 1:34:21 we want a smart contracts, but we were often, 1:34:24 often we lie to ourselves about, about that fact. 1:34:27 You know, I think, I think there was another thing as well that, 1:34:31 that contributed, not just the scaling war. Um, 1:34:34 and from my experience early on, there was, 1:34:35 it was a pro exploration and a pro innovation and like it was a pro learn about 1:34:41 the other protocols and try them out and, you know, understand them. 1:34:44 And if they are good, you know, Bitcoin will eventually adopt it. 1:34:47 I remember that, that culture early on. Um, 1:34:49 but then there was also the, the Hal Finney's that would say, you know, 1:34:52 the base layer really doesn't scale on, you know, in its current form. Right. 1:34:56 With his famous post saying that it's going to be as rare today in the future 1:35:01 as, as a Bitcoin transaction today. Right. 1:35:03 So he already saw that, um, the, the, the scaling limitations and, um, you know, 1:35:08 other layers that would actually be doing the medium of exchange and things like 1:35:11 that. But I, I think that the, the, what really ha what, 1:35:14 another thing that happened is during maybe, um, you know, 1:35:17 old coin booms or ICO booms and things like this, it was, 1:35:20 there was a defense mechanism where Bitcoiners would try to protect newcomers 1:35:24 because obviously during new cycles, there is an influx of new people. 1:35:28 And the new people, 1:35:29 they don't really understand the actual inner workings of the protocols and 1:35:33 they're very prone to getting scammed. 1:35:35 So it was a lot easier to protect them by just calling everything a scam 1:35:38 outright. Right. And like, because, you know, 1:35:41 obviously you're protecting them from 99.99% that are scams. 1:35:44 And I feel like it was because of this defense mechanism that was shunning 1:35:48 everybody away from everything else to protect them rightfully so. 1:35:52 But at the same time, it eventually became too strong where, you know, 1:35:55 it lost the idea of actually explored. You don't have to invest in it. 1:35:58 You don't have to buy it. Don't fall for the marketing, 1:36:00 but explore it and learn about it. 1:36:02 And I think that that part kind of got lost, you know, 1:36:05 over the years because of the defense mechanism. 1:36:11 I definitely agree with the history, you know, tracking where we lost this. 1:36:15 Um, but then Paul, I liked that you mentioned, um, ordinals. 1:36:18 I do think that is hopeful for the future that it seemed like when that came 1:36:23 out, you know, even though whatever, you know, 1:36:26 maybe they were inefficient and expensive. Um, just the number, 1:36:29 the fact that so many of those things got minted, it pulled, um, you know, 1:36:33 a number of people from Ethereum, they have a back into Bitcoin, um, 1:36:38 you know, that they, uh, so, so definitely I am hopeful for, um, 1:36:42 one of these scaling solutions, one of these side, sidechain solutions. Um, 1:36:47 I I'm hopeful that one of them can, you know, lead us to, to, uh, 1:36:52 you know, take more of that, um, more of what Ethereum has right now. Um, 1:36:57 and, and, you know, maybe one day make it obsolete. Um, and so anyway, that, 1:37:02 that's it for me. Just wanted to talk about that debate. Thanks guys. 1:37:06 Yeah, no, absolutely. I agree. I think I'll be, be more optimistic. 1:37:11 I think what's next for Bitcoin is minimum of exchange. 1:37:16 I think I really believe in, 1:37:18 there was this one chart called the evolution of Bitcoin that said it would go 1:37:22 from a digital collectible to store of value to medium of exchange 1:37:27 to a unit of account. Um, 1:37:30 I just posted on my Twitter as well, 1:37:33 if you want to see which graph I'm talking about, 1:37:36 but I think during the scaling war, um, 1:37:38 you've optimized for store of value. I think last bull run, 1:37:43 we've seen everyone in the world talk about digital gold, 1:37:46 like it achieved that status in people's minds. 1:37:49 And I think what's going to happen next bull run, 1:37:52 we'll have a botanics with a, uh, 1:37:56 with a sidechain, there will be a bunch of different sections. 1:37:58 And I actually think we'll see a massive increase of adoption of depths, uh, 1:38:03 back on Bitcoin. And that's, I think where, uh, 1:38:06 Bitcoin as a medium of exchange, um, starts to play way more role. 1:38:11 Um, and that's, I think in the, in the depth world of things, 1:38:14 but also in the macroeconomic, uh, type of things, 1:38:18 countries will start transacting way more in, uh, in Bitcoin. 1:38:22 Like the more people get thrown off Swift, the more, um, 1:38:26 Bitcoin rails will, will be used. And so I think the minimum of exchange, 1:38:31 we haven't seen it play out yet, but I think it will, uh, 1:38:35 come way faster than we all expect. Um, just to give everyone a, 1:38:40 um, an expectation here. 1:38:42 Once you have an EVM that's fully equivalent on Bitcoin, 1:38:46 it takes you a day to copy any application that you have on Ethereum and 1:38:53 deploy it on Bitcoin. Um, 1:38:55 and so I think the changeover will be way faster than a lot of people expect. 1:39:02 Yeah. 1:39:02 Initially it will go slow because you have the massive liquidity effects. 1:39:05 But after that, I think, uh, um, a lot more people will, uh, 1:39:10 will come back and the battles will be, um, 1:39:13 between different sidechains and basically you'll see an explosion of side 1:39:17 chains. I think as, as Robin mentioned, 1:39:19 like the tools are being laid out right now. Um, and over the next years, 1:39:24 I think, um, 1:39:25 development on sidechains and on Bitcoin main later and applications will just 1:39:30 explode. Um, and then explore them. 1:39:33 Okay. 1:39:41 Paul, can I ask a question? 1:39:44 Yes, of course. 1:39:47 Uh, first, uh, just a quick comment with respect to ordinals. 1:39:50 It reminds me a lot of, uh, 1:39:52 I don't know if you remember when Satoshi dice was popular, 1:39:55 people were making the same arguments that Satoshi dice was spamming the 1:39:59 blockchain. 1:40:03 Okay. 1:40:04 Um, my other question, I've been following you for a long, long time, like over a decade. 1:40:13 Um, and I sort of, um, I don't know, sort of checked out of the community for a while. 1:40:19 Um, and I just wanted to know what your thoughts are. You don't have to answer the question if you've covered it elsewhere, if you've covered it today, but there seems to be like, you know, the small block or argument and then, or the hell Finney argument. 1:40:32 Or the hell Finney position versus the Satoshi position where Satoshi, uh, said that, you know, Bitcoin never hit, hit a scaling ceiling. 1:40:41 He mentioned that, uh, nodes and miners were the same thing and that there would be large server farms. 1:40:48 Um, so he, he, or she, or they, or whatever envisioned Bitcoin scaling on chain. 1:40:56 And from what I'm hearing from you is you don't feel that way. 1:41:01 Is that right? 1:41:02 And if so, why not? 1:41:03 Thank you. 1:41:05 Sure. 1:41:06 Yes. 1:41:07 They said that about Satoshi dice. 1:41:08 Um, but what they didn't say as loudly, but Eric Voorhees replied, Eric Voorhees was like the inventor of Satoshi dice or whatever. 1:41:17 And that was the place where we could, you would send a Bitcoin somewhere. 1:41:21 And then if you based on the source of randomness, that was like the block cast or something. 1:41:27 You could win money and they send the coins back to you and it was all happening on chain and it involved a lot of spam on the blockchain. 1:41:36 But Satoshi dice had actually paid more fees total, not only per each transaction, you know, not enough, not only enough to outbid, but Satoshi dice, the entity had paid at one point more transaction fees total than had been paid in the entire history of Bitcoin. 1:41:58 So that was a very interesting, um, phenomenon, but, uh, yeah, so this question has been, has come up many, many, many times. 1:42:09 So if you, if you really want to know in depth, my view, I wrote in September, 2015, this post measuring decentralization, where I say that it is problematic. 1:42:20 The more expensive a full note is, but I have a giant essay about that. 1:42:25 And then I wrote an essay called a thunder, which is about scaling with sidechains. 1:42:29 It's a little joke of mine. 1:42:31 And I explained in detail why, uh, this is different from naive L1 large block ism. 1:42:41 And it allows us to basically have our cake and eat it too, which is to say you could get large blocks and use them for payments if you want. 1:42:51 But the entire network doesn't have to come along with you enough to risk the entire L1 on that. 1:42:59 And we don't, um, it's only optional to utilize the extra box space. 1:43:07 But yeah, Satoshi seemed to really think that it didn't matter very much that the, uh, he thought that full node costs my, he thought that every miner had to run a full node. 1:43:17 This is, I think where I would probably disagree with him. 1:43:21 Really miners never run a full node. 1:43:23 So I think that the irony though, is that there seems to be like, if you can draw like a grid and there's like four different groups that all seem to believe different things. 1:43:35 So I think original Satoshi, he thought that miners always had to run nodes and that's like the Bitcoin SV position now. 1:43:47 And then, um, there's other people who say that, I mean, I say miners never need to run nodes, but that running nodes is the important thing. 1:43:57 Other people will say that it's, it doesn't matter. 1:44:00 There is no such thing as running a node without being a miner. 1:44:02 So that's where this, but it's kind of a bizarre, um, little, uh, it's a bizarre little grid of, of who thinks what, but my answer is it doesn't really matter because we can have both of the two options. 1:44:18 It was small block L1, large block L2 optional. 1:44:22 Now, anyone who wanted L2, they could do that. 1:44:25 Anyone who wanted L1, um, they do that. 1:44:29 And so, uh, so it's a moot point really, but it's clearly, clearly Satoshi began as a large blocker and then it's like an infinite block size blocker. 1:44:44 And then he, he was the one who himself inserted the one megabyte block size limit. 1:44:49 I think it was in July, 2010, something like that. 1:44:52 Um, so he, he did that and then he left without, he described it. 1:44:59 We could phase it out later, but even though he had things that phased out, like he had difficulty adjustment and he had the, um, the having every four years, he didn't put any of that in. 1:45:14 He kind of knew that he had kind of left it that way. 1:45:18 So he, so he put that in, so he had become kind of a small blocker. 1:45:24 I think the original design I think was, was unlimited block size. 1:45:29 I think, you know, like, I'm not sure, but he's, cause he seemed to be obsessed with like the Merkle tree and it had like log two and like log N, um, it had like log N SPV properties. 1:45:42 And he thought that if miners can't mine a block, they won't know whose block is valid or not unless they run a node. 1:45:51 Hopefully this is answering some of your question. 1:45:54 Just when you said that anyone who wants a large L1 can have that. 1:45:58 Do you mean, uh, by using, 1:46:02 Yeah, he used large rock L2 by using a sidechain, sidechain and Bitcoin. 1:46:06 And in terms of like, I find that people talk about decentralization a lot, but I, you know, decentralization is merely a means to an end and the end is actually censorship, censorship resistance. 1:46:24 And for me, it becomes like an economic question as to how many nodes or how much decentralization do you need? 1:46:32 But it's not the quantity of nodes. 1:46:34 I talk about this in the essay measuring decentralization and it's not the quantity of nodes. 1:46:40 It is the, how expensive it is to spin up a new node. 1:46:44 This is the cost of the cell dividing basically. 1:46:47 If the, how, how easily can we get all the nodes back or start up a new node and look into the blockchain ourselves. 1:46:55 And so that cost must be low. 1:46:56 But I mean, I, apparently like Tron is decentralized enough to supporting an enormous number of USDT payments or whatever. 1:47:05 So apparently we already know where the line is and it's slightly different for each person in each particular. 1:47:12 It's an economic question of allocation of scarce resources. 1:47:17 And the way I see it is that the block size cap is, you know, it's sort of like central planning. 1:47:25 It's devs or the community or whoever saying that we know that we need more decentralization. 1:47:34 Well, I don't think that's correct. 1:47:37 Well, you're not allowing the market to discover the right block size to balance the medium of exchange utility of Bitcoin with while maintaining censorship resistance. 1:47:50 And you're choosing or whoever is choosing to forego that medium of exchange utility, which is why you're seeing the things that you're seeing. 1:47:59 In terms of stagnation of development of BTC as a medium of exchange. 1:48:07 Well, I think it's not correct. 1:48:09 I mean, well, there's a part of it. 1:48:11 There's some truth to it, but not enough. 1:48:15 But the but what's true about the block size limit, the one megabyte static block size limit is it's unclear exactly how we are supposed to recover from the limit not being met. 1:48:28 Not being correct. 1:48:31 So, you know, like if we if the limit is an error, how do we recover from it? 1:48:37 And that's similarly, as you say, if in the free market, you know, usually if there's someone is opening a restaurant and they do something wrong every single time, people love the restaurant. 1:48:50 The prices are just too high. 1:48:52 Or the dishes aren't clean or something, then someone can open a new restaurant next to it, do the thing, do it the right way. 1:49:02 And it's just a question of barrier sentry and stuff like that. 1:49:06 So the free market usually has ways of correcting mistakes. 1:49:11 If someone if someone's wage is wrong or the price or something is wrong or, you know, something's not being constructed the right way, technically. 1:49:20 And a static one megabyte block size limit, it doesn't really have that feature because it's sort of unclear how are we supposed to get out from under it? 1:49:28 You know, do we launch a different coin? 1:49:31 Do we hard fork Bitcoin? 1:49:32 I think that's what a hard fork is. 1:49:34 A hard fork is the market taking, you know, taking the issue into its own hands. 1:49:42 Would you why would you say that, though? 1:49:44 Because it was reliably hard because a group of people, some people wanted small blocks, some people wanted unbounded blocks. 1:49:52 And so the community forked. 1:49:54 And now, you know, we have an obvious split, though. 1:49:57 It doesn't split the 80 percent of people maybe were indifferent or something, but they all stay on BTC. 1:50:03 I wish the hard fork enabled competition. 1:50:06 The hard fork is kind of like the restaurant scenario where it's very, very, very, very difficult to you have very high barriers to entry. 1:50:14 So the hard fork is feeble as a competitor is not able to compete. 1:50:20 I wish that it would. 1:50:21 If it was, then it wouldn't. 1:50:23 It would be a moot point, right? 1:50:24 Because it would say, well, no one would complain because you would. 1:50:29 Let me let me explain to you what I mean when I say, like, if the hard fork was. 1:50:35 A good way of inspiring competition. 1:50:39 Then what would always happen would be whenever anyone hard forked, the market cap would be divided into into two equal portions for some tiny amount of time. 1:50:50 And both of the new projects would get like a new name and like a new ticker symbol, completely new. 1:50:56 So it really would split from one thing into two different things. 1:51:01 But that's just not what the hard fork does. 1:51:03 The hard fork is too weak. 1:51:04 The hard fork is just. 1:51:06 A shit coin. 1:51:08 I mean. 1:51:10 Yeah, well, I think, you know, I think of the the hard fork as sort of a vestigial organ almost. 1:51:20 And when the right economic conditions present themselves, that it may have the right, quote, unquote, genetic makeup so that it'll flourish in the future. 1:51:31 And I think with ordinals, you know, and fees, you know, going really high, I think it woke some people up in terms of how, you know, some people were stacking sats and had very small amounts of sats. 1:51:46 Maybe were priced out of ever accessing their on chain sats because fees were too high. 1:51:52 And it may be in the future. 1:51:54 Look, hypothetically, if you think of some type of thought experiment where BTC fees rise up, you know, a hundred fold, a thousand fold, then all of a sudden these shit coins start to have utility. 1:52:11 Well, I think also that what gives them utility is that we in Bitcoin, we don't have an answer. 1:52:15 When someone comes to us, when someone comes and says, listen, I really want to do ring signatures for extra privacy. 1:52:22 We in Bitcoin, we we have to turn them away. 1:52:25 We don't give them anything that they can use. 1:52:28 And as a result, they must launch Monero or whatever. 1:52:34 So what are we supposed to tell them? 1:52:36 You know, the developers are going to make something. 1:52:38 Yeah. What are we supposed to do? 1:52:39 Jeremy makes CTV and the community drags its feet for five years. 1:52:45 And so it's either either you just do nothing. 1:52:49 You're supposed to do nothing with your idea or you have to launch an alt. 1:52:53 And then we don't we don't. 1:52:55 It's a similar concept to the what I was telling you about what I was explaining in my point of view about the one megabyte static block is where it's kind of like it's unclear. 1:53:04 Exactly. How is it that we're supposed to get out from under this if it's a mistake? 1:53:10 If we say no ring signatures on Bitcoin, is that a mistake or not? 1:53:17 And we say, well, if it is, how do we escape from it? 1:53:22 I think I think it takes a crisis. 1:53:25 That's all. 1:53:28 Cool. 1:53:29 Sorry to interrupt you guys, but I have to say goodbye here. 1:53:32 Unfortunately, I have another appointment now. 1:53:36 Yeah. 1:53:37 Thanks. 1:53:42 Yeah. 1:53:43 Check out BitVM.org. 1:53:45 Read the white paper. 1:53:46 Give us feedback. 1:53:47 Try to break it. 1:53:49 And yeah. 1:53:52 Have a great day. 1:53:53 Bye. 1:53:54 Cool. 1:53:55 See you. 1:53:56 I'm also going to sort of turn off my mic. 1:53:59 Thanks, Paul, for everything you do. 1:54:02 Yeah. 1:54:03 Paul is awesome. 1:54:04 Activate BIP300. 1:54:10 Thanks, guys. 1:54:13 Let's see if we want any more questions from the audience that are new or about anything. 1:54:24 In the meantime, I can maybe chime in on what we just discussed on Monero. 1:54:32 Yeah, do it. 1:54:33 I start to get this theory that how I see it is that any more or less successful layer one that we've seen, like Monero and others, 1:54:45 basically always reach some kind of or have some property that reach product market fit in the market. 1:54:51 And privacy basically is one of those properties. 1:54:55 And it shows that there is demand or blockchain demand for something. 1:54:59 And that's privacy. 1:55:01 Same for Ethereum. 1:55:02 It shows that there's demand for a virtual machine in a blockchain. 1:55:05 Same for Solana. 1:55:06 It shows that there is demand for fast, for high speed transactions, for gaming, et cetera. 1:55:13 And Bitcoin is, of course, the most secure decentralized money. 1:55:20 And I think all of those will be true. 1:55:22 But for money, it matters most that what Bitcoin has. 1:55:28 But you can have all those properties on second layers or on sidechains. 1:55:34 So I fully believe at some point we'll see a Monero fully running on Bitcoin as a sidechain. 1:55:40 Or Solana will be a very fast sidechain. 1:55:44 Or, yeah, the EVM, of course, makes so much sense. 1:55:48 But that's basically what I've been thinking. 1:55:50 Yeah, I mean, I hope so. 1:55:51 But I mean, like, I've been waiting for like eight years. 1:55:54 I mean, not that I've only focused on this. 1:55:59 But yeah, I think that that's the idea is that eventually it would. 1:56:04 But, you know, weirdly, this is why I mentioned the culture, 1:56:08 where the scenario with the culture is like that people have decided that they don't really even want these things. 1:56:19 So there'll be hostility to those hostilities like 119 or something. 1:56:23 So I don't know. I mean, I hope so. 1:56:24 But I think that is going to be kind of a concerning development of like, do people even want there to be EVM on Bitcoin or something? 1:56:39 It'll be an interesting thing to see it play out. 1:56:43 Well, I guess we'll see very soon because it's happening. 1:56:48 But yeah, I think there will definitely be a lot of hate. 1:56:51 But in the end, if it gains adoption, then the market basically tells us they were wrong in that sense. 1:57:05 Cool. Great. Yeah, I agree. 1:57:08 Yeah, I agree. 1:57:09 You know, if you're not going to be one of the ones using this, then, you know, it's kind of annoying when people. 1:57:16 It should be a relationship between the software developer and their users and not like random other people who don't know what to, you know, comment and they don't know what they're talking about. 1:57:29 Anyway, Flavor, did you have something? 1:57:33 Oh, I just want to ask, I guess, a little more straightforward of a question. 1:57:38 It kind of ties into the first question I asked, which is that it does seem a little bit like, too bad that Robin left, but that BitVM and SpiderChain are almost answers to the issues that Drivechain has faced with the bureaucracy and the idea that Drivechain needs permission, whereas BitVM and SpiderChain don't. 1:58:04 And so I guess that's kind of why I was asking that question, and I wanted to hear Willem speak to that, I guess, and speak, I guess, a little bit, share your thoughts on what you've seen Drivechain go through on a political level. 1:58:20 Well, you know, I've never actually released, you know, I never had a pull request and I never released client software that miners could run to activate. 1:58:30 So, but yeah, I did. 1:58:33 So that's it's possible. 1:58:36 But yeah, I do think that in general, the soft fork idea kind of died in after SegWit, because sure, we had Taproot, but that's all we've had. 1:58:47 And so that makes us going from like 2015, December, until the present with only those two. 1:58:55 And people are just awkward, they don't want to every time this, this activation logic pops up. 1:59:04 People get annoyed, and that is because they're all of them have mistaken views, I think, honestly, we could clean them all up by just saying, we had this thing, BIP-9, and it required 95% hashing, hash rate to activate soft forks, but then miners use that to hold the soft fork hostage. 1:59:28 And that had nothing to do with the soft fork, though, that everything to do with other things, other mistakes that have been made by overlapping groups of people. 1:59:42 So it's true, though, but yeah, I don't understand why the bigger question is, why aren't? 1:59:49 Why didn't people work on drivechain? 1:59:52 Like, why didn't they just switch to working on drivechain after problems with the lightning network emerged in like 2017, 2018? 2:00:01 And why didn't they pursue sidechains in general? I think, honestly, a lot of it is just because of Liquid, where everyone thought Blockstream was working on it, and then people didn't really realize that they had abandoned it. 2:00:14 That's my guess. It's hard to say. I think now it's very weird, because, as I've said, as the altcoins have gotten stronger, the prevailing attitude among Bitcoiners is to just deny that there's anything good happening over there. So that's not really constructive. But I don't know, it's a very weird situation. 2:00:41 I think the idea of not needing a soft fork, that is, of course, touted as an advantage of BitVM and spiderchain, over drivechain. But in my view, this is just a symptom of a disease. There's no reason to have a prejudice against the soft fork. 2:01:03 The reason why people failed with the soft fork was because the relationship between developers and miners was one of distrust. So people had failed already to do the right thing, which was communicate their ideas effectively on both sides. 2:01:23 So they had failed already, and then they doubled down on their failure by blaming the soft fork, when all the soft fork did was hold up a mirror to their own lack of virtue and lack of leadership and just overall inability to achieve success. 2:01:41 So they blamed the mirror, which is a soft fork. I'll explain what I mean by that, which is we make all kinds of code changes all the time in Bitcoin, any of which could be like a assert zero bug that crashes the node or which has some kind of key logger or do something else that's terrible. 2:02:03 Matt Corral inadvertently, I don't want to blame him, but he was just trying to speed up something by like half a millisecond. And he inadvertently introduced an inflation bug. That has nothing to do with whether or not it's a hard or soft fork intended. 2:02:19 So this is such a notable case, because that one in particular was found by a Bitcoin Cash developer and then reported to BTC. So I'm just saying, weird stuff is totally possible when you are not, it has nothing to do with hard soft fork, hard fork, no fork, whatever. 2:02:39 If we want to be pro ossification, we should just not change, there should be no code changes at all, no refactoring, no nothing, just don't change the code. If we are, if we wisely say, well, that idea is probably never going to work, because you have things like dependencies and CVE, right, critical vulnerabilities. 2:03:03 Just anything about the hardware changes, the software, the operating systems change. Do you have something on a phone? Do you have something on a tablet? These things change over time. So the ossification is probably not happening just because of dependencies alone. 2:03:21 So what I'm getting at is, why do we care so much about the soft fork? What it does is, again, is the soft fork is the mirror. It's, we look into the mirror and we see something really ugly. And we say, and what it says is we can't soft fork. But it's, you know, it's not the mirror's fault, it's our fault. 2:03:43 We are bad at doing, we're bad at communicating ideas to the community, the miners are bad at taking responsibility for both their past mistake, and also they're bad at taking responsibility for the future of Bitcoin. They say, I have invested all this money in mining equipment, we will do, you know, soft forks again. 2:04:05 Developers have decided that they, they, developers have decided to become spineless, basically, they've said, I don't want to take responsibility for soft fork, because as what happened with Jeremy Rubin and myself, you get blamed, you get a lot of unwanted attention from, you know, people have no idea what they're talking about. And the developers all look the other way, which makes them kind of complicit, really. 2:04:30 They are the, you know, first they came for the such and such. But the, so this is all what it is, it's a very ugly situation. And everyone is determined to just say, just evade the issue, which is on one sense is very rational, because they will just evade the issue because we don't need a soft fork. 2:04:55 But I think that we make all these changes already, every single version, there's numerous, numerous changes that are, you know, they're not good. Or I mean, they're harmless. That's not what I mean. What I mean is we make all these changes, but they don't get treated with the same, like this might destroy Bitcoin attitude. 2:05:16 So it's just pointless, completely pointless. And yeah, the reason why it's a symptom of something much worse, is that it just speaks to how little any of these words mean anything. You know what I mean? Like you time travel 100 years in the future and say, I use Bitcoin today. And Bitcoin is something controlled by the Fed in the United States, and it has an unlimited supply, and it has no privacy, but people call it Bitcoin. 2:05:47 100 years from now, because we've already started to do this with like custodial lightning, for example. 2:05:53 So if the words stop meaning anything, as soon as we lose, you know, the honesty, and the self criticism, then it's all it will all go away. And so that's what I'm trying to say about this whole thing about needing a soft fork, like it's, it's ridiculous. It's not anything. It just shows how we no longer are able to think about ideas correctly. 2:06:19 I would say, to add on here, Paul, I would say there is something that speaks for ossification. And when you think about all technologies, and even science and mathematics, you always form a certain basis. And as an example, you have the internet, could there have been a better TCP IP? Could there have been better? I don't know, low level designs, probably. 2:06:47 But there is something that enables further development once the basis no longer changes a lot. And I think, like, do I believe Bitcoin will ossify at some point? Yes. And I think it probably should, because you can make development of building on Bitcoin way more predictable. 2:07:10 And so I would also argue a little bit, because you talked about that we're constantly making changes to Bitcoin, I think there's a dependent, there's a difference between fixing small issues and bugs and opening up new, new possibilities. That said, I'm playing the advocate of the devil here, because I would love to see more soft forks happening. 2:07:34 You're 100% correct. 2:07:41 You're 100 % correct, 2:07:43 but the soft fork already is the ossified, you know what I mean? 2:07:47 this, the hard fork that breaks the ossification, it's the soft fork if it's already 2:07:51 backwards compatible. So that's why I say it's no different than any other code change. 2:07:56 They say we change the way 2:08:05 And it's a hard fork, or it's a soft fork. So you know what I mean? If someone refactors, they change how a matrix is multiplied, and they save half a second, that is a soft fork, really. 2:08:15 Version 25 is a soft fork of version 24, Bitcoin Core. 2:08:19 So a soft fork really, I mean, I guess if you wanted to really make the definition mean something, it would just be has 51% of the miners run the latest version. 2:08:34 Or 51%. But so but you can do an awful lot with that. I mean, TCP IP, of course, it was general enough to have the whole internet built on top of it. 2:08:45 So if is that true of Bitcoin today, I certainly think we should have 119 300 and up vault. I think I think up vault should be on L1 or something like it should be some kind of vaulting thing should be on L1. 2:09:06 I mean, if we don't, the other thing, though, is that the TCP IP, if you how am I going to put this what I'm trying to articulate is that they were really I'm trying to articulate the point that we all as you move up the stack, 2:09:32 the barriers to entry are lower, like it's very easy to launch an altcoin, right? Relatively speaking, but then if you would have time traveled to the past, how easy would it have been to launch a different like, you know, a different TCP IP that that would work and get get people to adopt that would have been pretty difficult. 2:09:57 So there's more competition. So I think that speaks to more competition there is, the more you have to worry about being replaced. And it's kind of like TCP IP. I'm sure fortunes were made and lost, you know, when that was chosen, so to speak. 2:10:15 But it won't be like this with Bitcoin, where you have a lot of people involved who don't know anything, you know, TCP IP, probably most of the people involved were had more direct knowledge of. So that's, whereas today, you have a lot of people who just invest and they just think this is, you know, future money or something. 2:10:31 I'm not sure how it's a bigger, bigger topic. So I'm not sure. But I agree with you that it should also buy Bitcoin can and will also fight to some extent. It's, it can never also fight completely, because of like dependencies and like hardware and things. But it will just be removing the, it'll be re emulating the same exact same thing. 2:10:57 same thing. 2:10:59 So I think that that's the case. 2:11:00 I don't see it... 2:11:04 You should only do that when you actually have the ability 2:11:09 to, first of all, meet the It's a minimum that we would 2:11:15 be able to meet the planetary scale. 2:11:18 Like TCPIP scales to 8 billion people. 2:11:23 So if you can't do that, then you should just be crossed off the list. 2:11:27 So we'll see about what types of L2s work for that. 2:11:33 yeah, I don't know. 2:11:34 I think it's not quite the same. 2:11:35 I think there's a lot of truth to what you're saying. 2:11:53 Well, hey, this has been a fun, I don't know if we should please come up if you have 2:11:57 questions. Otherwise, could have a shorter one today at only 2:12:02 two hours a little. 2:12:13 It doesn't seem like anyone wants to come up at the moment. 2:12:23 So, I think we can end it. 2:12:24 People can listen to the 2:12:25 recording. hope someone got something useful out of all this. 2:12:34 Yeah, I can maybe end up on the last note. 2:12:39 I think a lot of what we've been talking about will 2:12:45 change over the coming months. 2:12:48 Like we'll soon see. 2:12:52 So I've seen the testnet run a few times from Botanix, first version of a 2:12:57 centralized node with an EVM, and so it becomes very easy. 2:13:01 to start deploying and I think it will be groundbreaking and mind -blowing for a people 2:13:06 to really see it work so I think that will change a lot of perception over the coming 2:13:12 months once you see it like people are visual people they love to see things so 2:13:17 definitely stay in touch make 2:13:20 make sure to follow the next account. 2:13:24 And very soon we'll see that testnet. 2:13:29 then, yeah, can... 2:13:32 Every time I use it, it's quite incredible to see. 2:13:36 So I think a lot of the discussions will 2:13:39 soon very quickly change. 2:13:42 Cool. Yeah, that's always nice when people can run the software and actually 2:13:48 experience it. That's usually better for learning about things. 2:13:55 Okay, great. hey, thanks everyone. 2:13:59 Hope you enjoyed this, got a good time. 2:14:02 We usually hang out every week, every Friday afternoon. 2:14:07 So, thanks a lot. 2:14:09 Awesome, thank you, Thank you. 2:14:14 Bye, everyone.
