0:00 Okay, it's two o'clock on Friday in the summer, and there is a USA World Cup game. 0:13 But instead, we're going to just do this, or won't we? 0:22 But yes, here it is. 0:23 It's the space. 0:25 I could make it on Wednesday. 0:27 There's lots of stuff to do. 0:31 And we've got a lot of stuff that we're working on. 0:34 Very excited about a lot of it. 0:38 But I just thought I would open the space, see if anyone has any questions. 0:44 You know, one thing I was thinking about doing was putting out this document about Free Samurai. 0:55 But it's not quite done yet, so I'll get to it later. 0:58 Let's see. 0:59 I think we should wait a little bit for... I just put out the link. 1:06 We'll see if we can get some more people in here. 1:14 And this document about Free Samurai is part of my strategy, because I've been a little 1:20 disappointed with the fact that we haven't freed them yet. 1:25 So I was like, oh, I have some idea. 1:26 Now, of course, the bug bounty is in its second week. 1:30 The first bug bounty went really well, and many bugs were found. 1:34 In fact, mostly the tech team has been fixing these bugs, and we haven't shipped as many 1:42 new things. 1:43 Although one new thing that we are shipping is that we are adding silent payments and 1:46 BIP-47, which I think people will like. 1:52 This is a pretty big deal, because really, we shouldn't have these addresses, you know? 1:57 You should just be able to chat with someone and then just send money directly to their 2:01 screen name. 2:04 And in Bitcoin, we tried to get rid of these addresses back in 2014. 2:09 All this stuff is very, very old. 2:11 But we still haven't succeeded in getting rid of these addresses, and we still have 2:21 them around. 2:22 It's kind of a waste of time. 2:31 I wanted to clarify something about the Solana token. 2:36 Someone told me like, oh, since you're only rewarding the top 15, but something like half 2:44 of that is owned by only 15 accounts. 2:47 Someone mentioned that to me. 2:49 But that doesn't matter. 2:50 You see, if they only own half, then they only get half. 2:53 So they have to buy, the top 15 have to buy from everyone else at the end. 2:59 So they still need as much as they can get. 3:05 So it still has value for people who are not in the top 15. 3:10 But people ask about that every other day. 3:14 And it's a little disappointing because I don't think it's really that complicated. 3:20 So if 50% of the market cap is owned by the top 15, then they only get 50% of the pool. 3:28 So each coin in the Solana coin has value, whether it's in the top 15 or not. 3:35 It's just the top 15 have to do that final step of actually redeeming. 3:41 But it doesn't at all mean that if you're outside, then the coin doesn't have any value. 3:45 So I don't know. 3:46 I thought that was all perfectly clear and logical, but okay. 3:51 Now, anyone want to come up and say anything? 3:57 Let me get Vlad up here as co-host. 4:08 And we only have a few people. 4:09 And of course, it is Friday afternoon in the summer. 4:15 So this space can be a bit more forward thinking in the sense that we spent the last month 4:22 or so talking, basically answering to people's questions. 4:26 But it would be interesting to talk about what's currently being planned and built for 4:30 people who are enthusiastic about BIP300 and the fact that it's coming on eCash. 4:36 And I think we have some very interesting action with the Elements Plus sidechain, which 4:42 is going to have UpCat and CTV and pretty much everything else that the builders need. 4:47 And this is much more than people need to make something even more advanced than the 4:53 stuff that's already on Ethereum. 4:55 And it's not a small deal. 4:58 For the first time ever, there's going to be incentives to build this stuff and people 5:02 can actually prove themselves. 5:05 And I do believe that if Bitcoin remains this deranged, but I'm starting to think that if 5:10 Saylor gets liquidated, which seems like a possible outcome, maybe that Bitcoin will 5:18 recover somehow and culturally rebuild. 5:20 But that can take years. 5:22 My point is that a lot of brain drain can happen to the Elements Plus sidechain and 5:29 to a lot of the stuff that's being built right now. 5:32 That's very interesting. 5:34 I know you've been part of the conversations and it would be very interesting to know what 5:39 you think about it and how you think, for example, it compares to Tunder, which is the 5:46 other sidechain, which is going to have high throughput. 5:52 Yeah, the worst thing to happen to eCash, I think eCash suffered the worst blow ever 6:00 with everyone suddenly realizing that Michael Saylor is an idiot, which is he's always been 6:05 an idiot, but people didn't realize before. 6:07 So now that people know that he is, there is a chance that BTC might be saved, which is 6:13 terrible for eCash, but maybe good for the world. 6:17 It's hard to tell. But as for Elements Plus, it's like Blockstream has this Elements 6:23 thing that they built a long time ago and it has quite a few things. 6:27 It has not only does it have OP_CAT, but it also has like their weird add-ons. 6:34 So it has like special tree signatures and all kinds of like special multi-sig stuff, 6:41 special opcodes have been re-enabled. 6:44 So as you probably know, and as people listening probably know, just with a tiny little opcode, 6:49 some of these people can do an awful lot of wizardry. 6:53 You have like a Robin Linus or Super Testnet or whatever, and sometimes they just need a 6:59 little bit like with Starkware, they just needed OP_CAT, which was just a tiny, tiny 7:06 little thing that was in the original Bitcoin client. 7:09 It's only 13 lines of code and it's whatever, it's tiny, opt-in, ignorable, soft fork, 7:14 reversible soft fork. 7:15 And it is this tiny, tiny, tiny thing. 7:18 But with it, you can do like this Merkle trees, you know, stuff. 7:22 So a lot of the builders tried very hard to, you know, like make stuff work on BTC. 7:32 And I think this will draw, because, you know, how is someone like a Super Testnet, how are 7:39 they going to react when there is, you know, something live with real money, which is this 7:47 Elements plus sidechain. 7:49 So the new L2 sidechain, this would be like number eight, basically, because it will 7:56 actually let them do things. 7:57 And I think, yeah, people will play around with that's what people really like is the 8:01 freedom. It's not about like people always think it's about how are you going to get 8:04 developers? Are you going to hire developers? 8:06 Are you going to, you know, that fundamentally misunderstands what kind of developers you 8:12 would get. If you hire developers, you get the really low quality, bad developers who 8:18 lie to you all the time about what's good or what's not. 8:22 The real developers just they want to make something and they just need a couple little 8:27 tools to build their their cool thing. 8:30 Now, how does it compare to Thunder? 8:32 Yeah, Thunder has a lot of stuff stripped out of it so that it can be as efficient as 8:36 possible and it could just make transfer payments. 8:40 It's interesting that recently there was a recent article from an Ethereum guy there. 8:46 I forget all their names. They'll send the same to me. 8:49 But he was like, why Ethereum sucks. 8:51 And I sold on my ETH or something. 8:53 And that came out this week. 8:55 And it was something like he was saying, well, actually, we built all this stuff like 8:59 friend tech and blah, blah, blah. 9:01 But the only thing people want to do is make payments. 9:03 So that guy was kind of saying the opposite of what the, you know, it's kind of funny. 9:10 We got a lot of people saying the opposite of each other. 9:12 You got like a Bitcoin cash people who are saying, oh, we added we added Schnorr and 9:18 we added we added like all this stuff like data processing stuff so that you can bring 9:24 DeFi over here. 9:25 And then the Ethereum people are like, oh, payments was the only important thing. 9:29 And then so it's like kind of a kaleidoscope. 9:33 But yeah, the point of the sidechain idea is that we'll try all these different things. 9:39 Some of them will find users who pay transaction fees and others will not. 9:44 And that's perfectly healthy. 9:46 And then the ones that don't will just die off. 9:49 So that's exactly what we want. 9:52 And of course, we want to be in a situation where whoever invests in the underlying coin, 9:58 you know, they will be able to you when all the rubble clears, they will be able to use. 10:04 You know, whichever the most useful stuff that ended up surviving. 10:09 So, yeah, I don't know how's that led to get anything out of that answer. 10:15 Well, it's funny because every chain wants what they don't have in the Bitcoin cash world, 10:20 they worked so much to build cash tokens and all of these they added these up codes to 10:27 enable them to be more like Ethereum. 10:29 And then Ethereum comes out saying, well, we wish we did payments better. 10:33 It's almost like everyone's trying to capture another slice of the market that they don't 10:37 have. And yeah, it's interesting because with Drivechains, you can have everything for 10:43 everyone on the same currency. 10:46 You don't really have to go from one coin to the other. 10:49 You only need to swap your coins across chains or wait for, I think it's 13000 blocks for 10:56 you to be able to withdraw and then just join whichever chain you think is more 11:01 interesting for whatever it is that you want to do. 11:06 But there is also a bit of an overlap, right, because some of them have some of the same 11:11 features, except that they have maybe different narratives. 11:15 There's nothing that's going to stop people from making a lot of transactions on the Z 11:18 sidechain, which has privacy and treating it just like Tunder, even if the fees get 11:25 high. Like if they really find value in the privacy that they're getting, I can imagine 11:31 that one having a high throughput also. 11:34 But I remember, I don't remember exactly the context, but you said something 11:40 interesting about the Namecoin sidechain, which I'm not remembering the name if it's 11:48 BitAssets or BitNames, I think it's BitNames. 11:52 And you could do some very cool stuff across multiple platforms and use that basically 11:58 as your. In the same way that Ethereum people are using Metamask, right, so that they can 12:06 connect to all sorts of applications and have access to stuff that's way beyond the 12:12 initial scope or what's really obvious about it, that you're just registering a domain. 12:17 And it also reminds me of the early 2010s, I think, when you could log in, for example, 12:24 you could create an account on Facebook with your Google account and all you had to do 12:29 was press one button that said log in with your Gmail or whatever. 12:33 And you want to turn this BitAssets into something similar, but across multiple 12:39 ecosystems. 12:41 Yeah, for BitNames, I mean, I think BitNames, the idea is you would only own one name and 12:46 the name would just do everything and everything else would be like a subsidiary of 12:51 that. So like it would be like you could you could log into Instagram or to TikTok or to 12:55 whatever with just the name and the name would, you know, you would be able to chat with 13:00 someone over a telegram or over a Wall Instant Messenger or whatever. 13:05 And then they would be able to like send and you'd also be able to send money. 13:12 I think this will actually change the Internet quite a bit. 13:15 Now, we've had some people joined and come up and then and then say connecting and then 13:22 drop down. So I'll just assume it's the excellent coding of this website. 13:28 Or I don't know why, but some people tried to come up and then they didn't. 13:32 But yeah, OK, so BitNames. 13:35 Yeah, because the idea is actually quite a few things go wrong when you have to like 13:40 you have people you have people being impersonated and then you have people having to 13:45 like list, oh, here's all my other identities. 13:50 Here's like my email and here's like my Twitter. 13:54 And then sometimes you can't get someone who's already taken it. 13:57 And so. So let's see. 14:01 OK, we got JK. 14:03 Let's see if you can come up without it crashing. 14:09 It is distracting to work the menu and then the menu has like terrible feedback. 14:12 But so, yeah, BitNames. 14:16 The idea is like you just be talking like this also is like the the the the the the 14:21 the idea is like you just be talking like this also is like then you have to request 14:24 the address from someone. 14:26 You have to say like, oh, OK, can you pay me $20? 14:29 OK, then you send the address and you got to paste it into something else. 14:32 I think instead with BitNames, you'd reunify everything. 14:36 So yeah, BitNames, I wrote a piece, I guess I guess I can post it. 14:43 I don't really remember how to summon the nest, but there's like a nest of tweets. 14:48 But I have a pretty some pretty ambitious plans for BitNames. 14:54 I don't know if they work. 14:55 This is like the third or fourth time that we tried to bring someone up and then. 15:00 It like didn't work, so I don't know how it. 15:07 I don't know. 15:10 You know, it seems to work if you can hear me. 15:14 Oh, nice, it worked. 15:15 OK, great. 15:17 OK, great. 15:18 I hear you, but it's funny you don't show up as a speaker. 15:21 Oh, wait, now you do. 15:22 I don't know. 15:24 Well, welcome. 15:33 You are now muted, though. 15:35 Yeah, I was wondering for the BitNames, so what do you think like a wallet looks like, 15:42 so what do you think like a wallet looks like, which actively has it integrated as part of it? 15:47 Like, is it just for the addresses or how about like selling them or sending them around or claiming them? 15:54 Is there any particular like workflow for that? 15:57 Yeah, it's very important that you bring that up, because actually what I was thinking was we have to productize this to make it so that some normal person who doesn't own any crypto, they could just like pay $20 for the credit card and we'll just set up everything for them. 16:11 We'll give them like the name, the private key or whatever. 16:15 And then and we'll leave them with like $10 worth of stuff so they can play around in. 16:20 And then what they would do ultimately when after they're comfortable with it is they would make their own wallet with like their own randomness. 16:29 Like people are going to laugh, but I'm in favor of this whole deck of cards thing. 16:32 Like you shuffle a deck of cards, you type in 30 cards and you then have a Bitcoin wallet. 16:37 So they make their own thing and then they would buy their name back from themselves, you know, for like $1 or whatever, you know, but you transfer the name kind of like a domain. 16:52 And so then this is how we onboard people quickly and we get them up and running. 16:57 If we just say normal people, we onboard them into this whole experience, you know, because I think actually people are very hungry for a new type of messenger. 17:05 So obviously people have adopted AOL instant messenger, they adopted texting, they adopted Gmail, they adopted all this stuff, they adopted WhatsApp, they adopted Telegram. 17:14 And I think people are now they now realize that, you know. 17:20 The world of spam, the world of impersonation, the world of all the messaging is a little too free. 17:26 The world where they can seize your account or they close your account down. 17:31 Nowadays, everyone has so many people have accounts that everyone kind of knows what it would be like, oh, they locked me out of my account. 17:39 Everyone is kind of, I think, out of all the billion people's billions of people in the world, people are kind of warming up to the idea that they want a property right to their account, which is exactly what the blockchain does. 17:53 So I think there is a solid opening for this. 17:58 I'm not sure about it, but I think it's clearly better than. 18:02 A lot of what we have today, and if you read my post, I talk about how to like how it would like merge with ICANN and sort of eventually replace it while respecting everyone's property rights to like the old ICANN names like Google.com or whatever. 18:17 So if people read that, I have a section about how that would maybe play out, you know, there's so one set of ideas, I suppose, proposed by Urbit, in which you can sort of like sell the namespace underneath your domain. I don't know if there's any way to like integrate that type of functionality into a bitnames. 18:39 Bitnames. 18:40 Well, the bitnames idea is kind of like it maps the human readable name to like this computer readable, unique, like scrambled codes and things and like nested JSON and like whatever. 18:51 So once you're over there, you can kind of you have a lot of flexibility where you can say, okay, when I look you up on bitnames, I'll find out, okay, I can look up like, you know, whatever, lab, whatever on bitnames, but then what comes back could basically be anything because it would be like all these, you know, like how the domain name system has all these like TXT records that are kind of arbitrary. 19:11 And it also has like the A records, which are so like, you could just have all these different record types and you just look it up, and it just anything can be there. 19:21 So you could be something that you sell or it could be. 19:26 But yeah, I don't know about that. I think I think the key problem is that you want, I want to have a right to a name that people can remember. 19:34 Because there's too many. You need something unique. You know what I mean? Like, there's only one Google, like google.com. 19:42 The other thing is, I think the, I'm not sure if people people think of this, but the whole explosion of the TLDs, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level 20:01 domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know, the top level domains, you know 20:31 Mohammed, you know, people have the same name. And it's just confused names are actually kind of tough. You want there to be a brand that you can invest in a brand. And then see also also with BitNames, we have like a phone number system where each name gets like a number like an arbitrary number. So not only do you get a human readable name, but they all automatically come with a number. So it's like, oh, you meet someone in a bar, you get their number. And you get the number is like a super number, because it just lets you 21:01 look up whatever about the person, but everything is gated with, you know, in order to make an intro to the person, you have to pay an introduction, you have to pay a fee to initiate the conversation. And then after that, you can just keep talking to them until they block you. And then you have to pay the fee again. But I think this is a much better, you know, in the modern world, attention is scarce in the in the old world, people were bored all the time. And 21:31 so getting a letter from a friend was like the highlight of your week, because you were just on the farm. And you didn't even have light, you know, he had to read the letter, he had to read the letter by sunlight before the sunset. But, but in the modern day, we're being flooded with information. So we actually want to gate the information. And so charging for the intro is even better charging for like a cold intro is even better. And then you're 21:59 so I guess this is somewhat related, but like if you have like attached to, and I suppose this is how it would be used, if you wanted to use your BitNames on another chain, like sidechain would be just in that a list or whatever you get back from the BitNames DMS service, that it would then have listed there like some public address on one of the sidechains. Is that roughly correct? 22:29 Yeah, it would have like basically a bit 47 address in the case of BTC, like your reusable payment code, or like your pay name, and it would have like the reusable Z address, all that stuff would be in BitNames, right? So it'll just be there. And, and I guess at a minimum level, like if this is like, I don't know, I suppose communication between chains are like, resolving some sort of state between 22:58 them. Is that, I suppose, like a good usage of this thing that you've talked about of like, when contracts attack, is that going further than BitNames? And where does it kind of go wrong? 23:11 Okay, yeah, this is a very important. So like the when contracts attack is when someone else uses the state created by something else in like a, because creating the state takes a lot of work. So if you're if people build something that rely on the state being correct in the future. So that the Oracle idea is that like the Oracle relies on, you know, when you're when you're betting and you're, you know, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you 23:41 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 24:11 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 24:41 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 25:11 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 25:41 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 26:11 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 26:41 when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, when you're, 27:11 kind of would like threaten to maybe kill all of them. 27:15 So the minors would might say, okay, listen, two through eight, aren't, 27:20 you're not allowed to be, or, you know, one through only five, 27:22 only number six is allowed to be, because it's kind of like how, like, um, 27:26 if you go to court, one thing that courts provide is just finality, you know, 27:32 where sure you can appeal sometimes, but like you go to small claims court, 27:36 you and your neighbor have been fighting over something, you know, he, 27:39 you think he tripped over your whatever lawn 27:44 Flamingo and broke it. And he says, he doesn't know what you're talking about. 27:47 And you think he's lying and you have like some pictures. 27:49 So you think you go to court and it's kind of like they decide, you know, 27:54 and it's like, then you just move on with your life. But then until then, 27:58 it's kind of an open question. Like, what should I do about this? 28:01 I feel I've been wronged. The other person thinks you're just harassing them. 28:06 So the courts provide that kind of finality. It's kind of like, uh, you know, 28:10 like, um, uh, a similar example, this is a famous, this, uh, excuse me, 28:14 a favorite example of Tom Schelling. He has this example about, 28:19 uh, people screwed up in a, you know, 28:21 the bunch of cars at an intersection have achieved gridlock and they they're 28:26 actually all trapped there and they can't get out because they're all surrounded 28:30 by other trapped cars. So now they don't know what to do. 28:33 The police officer shows up. Now, even if the police officer, 28:38 police officers, that's ordering people around, you move back, you go over here, 28:41 they undo the gridlock. 28:43 Now even if you're the last car to leave the gridlock, 28:48 you're still better off as a result of the police officer, 28:51 just overriding everyone starting ordering everyone around because in the gridlock 28:56 you're trapped there. And so not every situation is like this, 29:00 but I think it's, it's a similar example where it's kind of like, okay, 29:05 minor step in and they just say, listen, we're going to kill off all these. 29:07 So these are, you have interference among the chains. 29:10 So there is a one that would apply to bid names that they say, okay, 29:13 we're going to try to like, I see, you know, 29:15 we're going to try to half copy this one or something, 29:17 half copy 99% and then change it. And we're going to, 29:22 we're going to copy everything except google.com. 29:24 And then we're going to put all the money we saved into a marketing budget. 29:27 And then everyone might just be like, okay, 29:29 we're going to just shut all this off because it's annoying. 29:31 Yeah. I, I guess like if, if you have some way to like, 29:37 have a contract resolve that same dispute, 29:40 like before the miners need to, then I guess if it's like specifiable, 29:45 I don't know for the example of like domain names, 29:48 whether or not that is easily calculatable other than through maybe like a 29:53 market on Truthcoin, um, in order to have some contract, like on a, uh, 29:59 another chain rely on that. 30:01 But I guess that kind of runs into the same problem itself of, of that. 30:05 But, uh, I don't know if that explained anything, I guess. 30:09 Well, 30:09 one part of my argument was that if once this, 30:12 the system was set up so that it would 30:17 eventually kick off the parasitic chains, 30:21 part of the argument I made was that it, because of that fact, 30:25 maybe no one would ever bother making a parasitic chain or even, 30:30 you know, in the first place, maybe, I don't know. It's funny though. 30:33 I have these long theoretical arguments from like 2015, 30:36 but then a lot of them end up happening like in a theorem and stuff like, uh, 30:39 you know, they, we ended up seeing them play out and they, uh, well, 30:42 there's a quote from John Maynard came through about practical men who think 30:46 they're above theories are the slaves of some defunct economist or something, 30:50 which is, it's a funny quote. 30:52 It's a very Keynesian quote, but, uh, yeah, no, 30:56 I don't know if you could maybe solve it by having some sort of like, uh, 31:01 uh, I suppose, bond that you post, solve, solve the problem, 31:05 like which one should win. 31:10 Like, uh, that, well, I think it kind of solves itself. You are right though. 31:13 I think that quote is a classic cause Keynes would write these long run on 31:16 sentences. He was kind of a terrible writer, no offense. I mean, 31:19 he was this British style sometimes of these, like, 31:24 Oh my God, it's torturous to read. 31:26 John Maynard Keynes is really hard as I had to back in my 31:33 scholastic. Um, but yeah, he, uh, 31:37 he sure knew how to fill up a paragraph with like one sentence and the quote 31:43 is no exception. But, um, I think the idea is this, 31:47 the idea is the miners will, they want to decide, 31:50 they want to maximize their fee revenue. 31:51 So it's kind of like any other business or any other situation. 31:56 Like they kind of have an incentive. 31:59 They know how much money they're already getting all the time and 32:05 they know they have some idea of how much they're going to get. 32:08 Like they have some idea of like who the customers are and everyone's paying 32:11 these fees. 32:12 And so they would kind of have some idea, I would think. 32:17 You know, it's not like you'd start up two BitNames, 32:19 like at around exactly the same time. And it's like a, 32:22 it's like a shotgun start and then like a photo finish or not a shotgun start. 32:26 But you know what I mean? It's like, uh, uh, 32:29 so then it's like an exact tie for a period of like two or three weeks. 32:33 I don't think that's very likely. Right? No, I think like, okay, 32:37 there's one that people kind of like, and it was kind of here first. 32:41 And, um, but I, you know, there could be a lot of drama, you know, 32:45 as there often is in the real world, there will be these gray areas, 32:49 but that's what I was bringing up about the closure. It's kind of like, well, 32:51 they'll just decide. And then the one side will just fold and they'll say, 32:56 well, listen, and I think that's healthy in order to prevent that. 33:00 I don't know if there would be a way of paying minors in order to not allow 33:04 specific other sidechains to be created unless they pay a higher. 33:08 You don't need to, because they don't want, cause think about it. 33:11 If everyone just shows up and they decide all this bid names thing doesn't work 33:14 because there's eight different bid names, 33:16 then the transaction fee revenues will be falling automatically. 33:22 So the minors already have the incentive to proactively or reactively or 33:28 whatever, you know, they're just, they already, they, 33:31 the minors are already because of merge mining, they get all this money. 33:35 So they already want, they already want all the money. 33:37 They already want all the money they can get. 33:40 That's their goal is grab all the money. 33:42 So the last thing they want is when is for there to be like all these people 33:48 paying customers and then, you know, something interfering with that. 33:55 I see that there wouldn't be any necessary reason I suppose to have multiple 34:03 except when I suppose there is like some conflict at some point in the future, 34:07 maybe between like people trying to resolve their dispute, 34:11 which you know, 34:13 then I guess the idea that minors can resolve them I think is, 34:18 is reasonable assuming that it's, you know, 34:21 worth it for their time and you know, to generate it, 34:23 which the 301 makes it such that even if it's not, 34:27 they still get paid regardless, I guess. But yeah, 34:30 I don't necessarily see that there's an issue. I think more so if you, 34:34 I was thinking of emulating like something in which you intentionally wanted 34:40 multiple just so that people had their own like domain that they could control. 34:45 I don't know the names within it in a, 34:48 in a way that is also resolved by the minors in something other than DNS. 34:54 Like that's, I suppose what Urbit was trying to do. And I, I don't know. 34:58 And not that it's necessarily like the most important. 35:00 Yeah. We shouldn't necessarily follow the Urbit example too, 35:04 because it kind of didn't succeed. Although it was very interesting. 35:08 So I don't know if that, I don't know if that means that we should. 35:11 I know. I don't think it is for something like DNS. I think that's a failure. 35:14 I think the only possible time it could be useful is if you have some sort of a 35:22 very particular networking stack that you must pay people in order to run like 35:28 something like Tor, 35:29 then I think it's a good system for paying out distributions of two nodes that 35:37 way. But, um, 35:40 it requires this really clever way of getting Tor to work. 35:43 Like because the problem with Tor is that it's communist and everyone's just 35:48 doing it for free. And I wrote it all down on a piece of paper somewhere. 35:52 And I think I know the piece of paper is, I'm not sure, 35:56 but part of it was, uh, okay. You had to solve a couple of different things. 36:01 Like one of the idea was, um, 36:04 you could pay people, you would pay people to forward your traffic. 36:09 But one part of my idea was also that you would, you would, 36:12 you would test it by you would sending some packets to yourself and you could 36:18 audit them. And so in that way, 36:20 you could audit the people who are forwarding the packets since it's also a 36:26 anonymous, they don't know which packets are real. 36:29 And uh, that was like part of the solution. 36:33 I don't know what happens is the paper. 36:35 The first thing I suppose that I imagine is that people don't like paying for 36:39 traffic, which is obviously like, 36:42 I think what urbit started from that assessment and like looked at like 36:47 Facebook and all these things and then tried to build from there, 36:50 wherein the solution they decided is you just have like moderators effectively, 36:54 you know, who, who can cut off like more specifically, 37:00 this particular route is like a cause of like spam traffic. 37:04 I'm just going to like relegate it to that. 37:07 And then I don't know that it's yet to be seen if it would be successful. Um, 37:11 that type of description of a network and you know, 37:14 the spam on it because obviously paying for it is just the easiest way to get 37:19 around it. But regardless, I don't know, it's just something I was thinking of. 37:24 And I think the whole thing attaching it to Drivechains was just that if you 37:28 were able to pay a minor to say only allow X amount of chains that are similar 37:36 to this, that would be equivalent to, uh, 37:39 the stars or whatever they have an urbit where you, 37:42 you allocate a certain amount and then they control that. Um, 37:46 but I don't know that necessarily it's a bit of a tortured metaphor, but yeah. 37:54 Okay. Uh, Curtis is also up, 37:57 so I don't know if you want to ask or comment on anything, 38:03 but if you do feel free, 38:07 if not, then don't. Um, the only other idea, I don't know. 38:12 I think another thought, another part of this, the VPN thing was of like, okay, 38:17 everyone's a VPN basically. That's like the tour thing. 38:19 It's like everyone's a VPN and you would all collect. 38:21 It's like everyone would run it cause you would, everyone would earn money. 38:25 It's like you would just leave it on all day. You'd be part of the thing. 38:29 And you're, so that was another piece of the puzzle. 38:32 But I had all these puzzle pieces worked out somehow. 38:36 Would it have actually worked in practice? I don't know because, uh, 38:40 but yeah, I think, um, 38:44 it's a very neat, like, okay, obviously the way it has to work. Okay. 38:48 So the way it must work is cause you need it to be fast. 38:52 That's the problem with Tor and ITP and whatever. 38:57 So it has to be lightning fast. 38:59 So the only way to make that work is to make it cost some money. 39:05 And, uh, I had this thing worked out and you'd like pick, 39:08 you'd purchase like credits from people 39:13 and then you would redeem the credits for having your packets forwarded. 39:17 And then you forgot you could test if they were actually working. Uh, 39:23 so I don't remember all the, I got to find it somewhere. 39:26 No, I mean, I definitely think a network like that, 39:31 a network like that would probably function better in terms of like latency and 39:34 speed and actual forwarding of the packets. But a lot of times, 39:38 so yeah, you'd have to pay to use it, 39:39 but you'd be getting paid because you'd be getting paid if you go out, 39:42 you know, 39:43 back in the day I would, uh, pay for Tor, 39:48 uh, you know, back in 2011 and 12, it was so, 39:52 so slow and so, oh, it was just, it was, it was, 39:57 it was incredibly slow. So I can't, I'm sure there'd be a market, 40:02 uh, for that. I mean, 40:03 a lot of people would pay for to get a little bit of speed or, um, 40:08 uh, a little continuity or, you know, not dropping so much, 40:13 you know, so I don't know what it is today, 40:15 but I'm assuming it's still the same as it was in 2011. 40:19 Yeah. 40:22 And I, I would think that the type of people who there's a couple of people using Tor, right. 40:26 There's again, there's like this communist class of like people just kind of tinkering around and having fun. 40:30 And then there's like people who really, really need it, you know? 40:33 And it's like, Hey, of course they'll pay. 40:35 And it wouldn't, you know, it wouldn't really be that much. 40:37 It would just be like, you know, your, your home internet already costs like 50 to a hundred dollars a month. 40:43 And then this would be like, you'd have to offset it because when you're using it, you would pay. 40:48 But then when you're not using it, it would pay you, you would be, you would be out walking your dog and it would be like earning money for you because you're forwarding people's traffic. 40:58 So, so I don't know how much it would net the net cost would be, but it would be, you know, it wouldn't be that much, but the problem with Tor is that it doesn't cost. 41:06 Uh, anyway, uh, okay. 41:09 Yeah. 41:10 Any other questions or thoughts or, um, we can continue or Vlad, any other stuff, new stuff coming out? 41:18 There's lots of new stuff coming out. 41:19 So, but there's so much that we need Vlad to tell us what we should talk about. 41:25 I'll be selfish this time and just discuss this idea that I had last night. 41:29 I was talking to a friend of mine and he was like, you know, I don't know what you're talking about, but I don't know what you're talking about. 41:35 Talking to someone named rocket on telegram. 41:39 And he told me at first I was very skeptical. 41:41 I was like, Oh, it's so stupid. 41:43 It's just gimmicky, but it makes sense. 41:45 Right? 41:46 Right now, the largest IPO in the history of humankind is space X. 41:51 And maybe that since we have the technology to build a sidechain for everything out there, maybe we should make like a Mars sidechain, which serves the purpose of intermediating payments between Mars and the earth. 42:04 Of course, it's not very doable with the current block times, because depending on the distance between earth and Mars, sending a message from earth to Mars can take anywhere from, I think, eight to 22 minutes, depending on the distance at that moment. 42:20 So receiving a message can take just as much, which means that if you want to build something that's reasonably fast, need at least 30 minutes block times to be able to send and receive a message. 42:33 But can be very cool. 42:35 And this actually leads into the conversation of why would a Mars colony or whatever, once you use earth money, but I do believe that this can be like the settlement layer. 42:46 So Mars can have their own form of cash or whatever. 42:49 They can have instant finality on their planet, but on the other hand, they want to do commerce with earth and they want to pay for stuff. 42:58 Maybe content, maybe software, maybe something that can be transferred at some point with a future shipping or whatever. 43:07 So maybe we can have a sidechain that's called Mars or whatever, and can intermediate these payments between earth and Mars. 43:15 But what it requires is longer block times and maybe some features that might be desirable for this sort of settlement. 43:23 Of course, it's gimmicky. 43:24 It's very ahead of its time, but on the other hand, it's very forward thinking and proves that this is a long-term project and might also get the attention of Elon and also Dunks on Blockstream satellite. 43:37 Well, I think it is. 43:40 Okay. 43:40 If I could also propose another topic, something I was thinking of a while ago was... 43:46 Let me first talk about that though, because I think we can just do one at a time. 43:53 And it is fun, obviously, and I appreciate the creativity of it, but I think there's a temptation. 44:01 This is like when Ethereum was getting started up and they were like, oh yeah, we can have a smart contract for everything. 44:06 You can have a smart contract where you can pass a car on the highway. 44:11 And I don't know. 44:11 I just think so. 44:12 For example, you can increase the block time without a sidechain. 44:17 You can just say that you'll pay, for example, you broadcast the payment from, think about it like this, they want to buy bottles of water from Earth because there's not enough water on Mars. 44:37 So they would make the transaction and then they'd send it to you. 44:40 And then it takes 22 minutes to get here. 44:43 And then you say, okay, great. 44:44 And then it takes a long time, takes a day to get 144 confirmations. 44:50 And then next day you broadcast it back. 44:53 So it takes one day plus 22 minutes to go all the way back over there. 44:59 But then they get a message on Mars that says, oh, it has 144 confirmations. 45:06 So they know that it has a lot of confirmation. 45:11 So they kind of know it was received by Earth and included in a block. 45:16 And that works if they're buying or selling. 45:18 So, yeah, even though that is a fun idea, I think it's great that people have all these ideas. 45:23 I really do. But I do want to pour a little bit of cold water on, you know, you don't need a Drivechain for slower blocks or even you can just use the Bitcoin 10 minute blocks. 45:36 And you can just have more basically wait for more confirmations if you want to manually slow it down. 45:43 So I don't want everyone to lose their head and just start proposing like whatever a Drivechain for like. 45:50 Like that's what they have, like, you know, this is like what happened in the early Ethereum days. 45:55 They were like, oh, yeah, we could have like, you know, smart contracts for for the provenance of art or, you know, they had all these like half-baked ideas. 46:07 I think if we attract Elon's attention with that idea, he would not be impressed. 46:12 He would just think like, what are these people talking about? 46:14 Because it takes you know, it takes like a very long time for the stuff to I mean, you could maybe have something where someone on Earth pays someone on Mars to do something. 46:25 Where they say, OK, I'll pay I want you to pay, I'll pay you to pick up that rock over there and and take it with you. 46:34 And then we can and then bring it back to me on Earth. 46:38 But again, the fact that, you know, it would take it takes so long for the the rock to even come back, I mean, I don't know. 46:48 I'm not sure I just want to anyway, I just wanted to say that's a neat idea, but. 46:53 Probably not in the cards. 46:55 JK was going to say there were just one idea, I suppose, and then there's a second idea for like doing DeFi stuff. 47:02 But the main one that I just thought about quite a bit ago and then didn't really do anything with it because of the, I guess, lack of tooling and Bitcoin was that if you could have an auction where you have some rule enforced by a contract 47:20 that the highest bid always wins, then you can sort of like have some other person who bids on the result of the auction, kind of creating like a covered option type of thing. 47:39 Anyway, I don't know, I guess the idea of just like I assume most scripting languages would just be able to enforce that invariant that you could encode the result of an auction where the highest bidder always wins and then do something like that. 47:54 But I guess in general, I'm just asking about like scripting and do you think that the way that the whole crypto economy has revolved around smart contracts is sort of the correct way or do you think it should be more like each chain is specific to just one activity? 48:12 Well, I think a bigger problem is that the Ethereum people, I don't think they actually knew a lot about what they wanted to achieve. 48:22 Like that's, I brought up that example just a moment ago of like they were like, oh, yeah, in the future, everything will be a smart contract and you have a smart contract that will like, you'll be driving on the highway and your car will be able to make an Ethereum, whatever, and pay the other car. 48:36 Now, if you think about it, of course, you could actually have done that with Bitcoin also, you could have said like, or with Venmo or whatever, you know, they just, the cars could just need a way to talk to each other. 48:48 And then they could say, hey, listen, I'll tip you $5 if you just get out of the way, or whatever it is, it did none of that really had anything to do with Ethereum. 48:55 So I think overall, they were just really, really, really confused and naive in general. 49:01 And I don't think it had anything to do with like, because part of the premise of your question is like, oh, did they set it up the right way? 49:08 Or should it have been set up like version A or version B? 49:11 And it was kind of like, I think they just had no idea what they were doing overall. 49:14 And there's just wishful thinking. 49:15 The wishful thinking is the most powerful drug. 49:19 And unfortunately, the wishful thinking leads people to think, oh, we've got it all figured out over here. 49:25 And then people become complacent and overconfident. 49:27 And I think that's exactly what we have seen in just about every chain, especially BTC. 49:35 But yeah, people think, oh, this is the only thing we need. 49:37 And then they lose that hunger in them to, to just keep testing things against reality. 49:45 Where Ethereum did well is they, you know, they had a few things like ERC-20 and, you know, basically USDT payments. 49:56 So that was like what they kind of had. 49:59 So and they were interested in, they were interested in like, how can we get more transaction fees up to an extent? 50:09 So that was, so they had some things going for them. 50:14 But yeah, I think my guess is that when Ethereum piled everything into one system, that had a lot of disadvantages, which included that the fee rate, like some of the rates on Ethereum would crowd everything else out. 50:29 And then it encouraged like copycats, where you'd have like Solana or whatever, Avalanche, all this stuff was just like, it was just copy, it was just the same EVM. 50:40 But with more space, so then Ethereum had got into like a tug of war with those. 50:46 So yeah, I don't know. 50:47 But actually, my honest opinion is that overall, during all the years I saw Ethereum exist, I was never really impressed. 50:56 Like usually, if they had a good idea, it was they were like taking it from someone else, and they're not really understanding it. 51:01 And they were very young, and I don't think they were great designers or great like product market fit. 51:08 People are great, like user experience people, actually. 51:14 So that's my arrogant opinion, I guess. 51:16 But you know, they didn't, they didn't really have a great problem. 51:19 Yeah. 51:20 No, I just think that, yeah, you do allow yourself a lot more flexibility when the code you write is only like ran on a node and not on every user's device who wants to validate something. 51:37 Validate some aspect of the transaction. 51:43 One advantage of having them topical is that you can take more advantage of the state. 51:49 So like for BitNames, you could say, oh, hey, we have a giant list now of everyone's name. 51:54 And you can prevent double spending of the names, which you can't do if you put it on top. 52:01 So like if you made, if you wanted to do that with something like ordinals or counterparty or something, it would be rejected by the ordinals or counterparty node as a double name, but it would still make it into a Bitcoin as a Bitcoin transaction. 52:16 So then the state isn't as efficient, because you basically need the second state, because the states contradict. 52:24 And so that's an advantage of having the state be topical. 52:28 So that was always my suspicion is that the topical ones would win. 52:31 They have more efficient state. 52:33 And they just have like, you're in the, they kind of have a little network effect of their own where you're on the chain with the other people who care about whatever domains or they care about. 52:44 How do they contradict there? 52:45 I don't know if you could explain a little bit. 52:48 Well, because imagine that you do it two different ways. 52:51 One way is you build something where you go to the L2 and the L2 has one place where you can look up the names. 53:00 You can look them up like alphabetically, because there's like a UTXO, like a UTREXO, or like a rate, it's like a tree, you know, tree by name. 53:08 So you can look them up like alphabetically without having to look up the whole thing. 53:11 So if I wanted to look up Curtis, I could go to like C-U-R-T-I-S, and then I can look up the thing. 53:19 That's efficient. 53:21 Otherwise, I have to download the whole thing, which, you know, that could also be fine. 53:25 Now, that's option number one. 53:27 But then option number two is you do something that's a little more like counterparty. 53:32 And you say, okay, here's what we do. 53:35 When you make a Bitcoin transaction, and it has a zero-valued OP_RETURN, this already wastes eight bytes. 53:43 But then you have to do the OP_RETURN part. 53:45 Then you have to have the payload. 53:46 The payload will say, like, this is a counterparty message. 53:49 I am registering the name Curtis. 53:54 So this is all an OP_RETURN, which is ignored, ignored by BTC. 53:59 So that's the second way of doing it. 54:00 Now, that way actually has a lot of advantages. 54:02 One is you don't need like L2 Drivechain universe. 54:06 You could do that today for people who are doing that. 54:09 But one disadvantage is now you have the whole second counterparty node. 54:13 Now, you were talking about where does the state contradict? 54:16 Now, imagine someone then puts more OP_RETURN stuff. 54:20 They don't even realize they're putting new OP_RETURN messages in. 54:24 They don't even know anything about counterparty. 54:26 But it happens to be the case that their messages is also interpreted as, oh, I want to register. 54:32 This is a counterparty message, and I want to register Curtis. 54:36 It will be accepted by the BTC network. 54:39 So when you look up the UTXO set, it will be part of the state. 54:43 And when you look up which transactions have been included, it'd be part of the BTC state. 54:49 And when you look up the counterparty world, this is hypothetical. 54:54 I'm describing something that's kind of similar to counterparty, but not. 54:57 But the idea is there's an extra OP_RETURN. 55:00 When you look up that, this will be inside the counterparty universe, 55:05 but it'll say this was an attempted double spend of the name. 55:09 And so it will reject that. 55:10 But you don't know. 55:11 Now that you, when you can no longer do some kind of like SPV type thing, 55:16 because if someone just points to you, oh, I registered Curtis, 55:20 it could, you don't know if it's a true one or a fake one without downloading all of everything. 55:27 Because inclusion, mere inclusion in the BTC doesn't necessarily mean it was. 55:34 So you didn't pump out any counterparty information. 55:37 You didn't pump out any contradictions. 55:40 Okay. 55:40 So that would prevent you from using something like BTC or like 55:44 some other chain in order to enforce a rule set on your own system. 55:51 Yeah. 55:51 We want the rules enforced. 55:53 So the question is, because that's the whole reason we have the blockchain in the first place, 55:59 because you need a zone where they're all the double spends are forbidden. 56:02 So you have a zone where all the double spends are forbidden. 56:06 And that's kind of like saying, you know, it's like your refrigerator is a zone where 56:09 all of the hot molecules have been kicked out. 56:14 That's kind of an oversimplification, obviously. 56:16 Because, but you know what I mean? 56:18 And it's doing all this work to fight out all the double spends and the invalid transactions. 56:24 I suppose. 56:25 Can you maybe just, you don't need to, but like, just like that as being described as 56:30 that as being described as like state, it seems like maybe it's like some sort of data 56:36 or something like that. 56:37 Like, I don't know if it, it nevermind. 56:41 Yeah. 56:41 You know, like imagine the unspent transaction output, the UTXO set, you know, that there's 56:48 something that everything in that set has in common, which is that they're all unspent. 56:56 They're all outputs. 56:57 But actually that's not true for the OP_RETURN that are also like Namecoin, like counterparty 57:05 registrar. 57:07 That's not true. 57:08 You just see a bunch of op returns. 57:09 Some of them could contradict each other in some higher system, or maybe they all just 57:15 have no meaning or some could be invalid. 57:17 You know what I mean? 57:17 Because BTC doesn't know any of that. 57:19 So one could say, oh, I want to buy the name Curtis from you. 57:22 So now we're in an unfortunate situation where either we don't know what anything means. 57:26 And so it all means nothing. 57:28 Or we're kind of like going down the line to try to figure out, you know, see the whole 57:33 blockchain idea is kind of like you want to have a global state. 57:37 Yeah. 57:37 That's the whole point. 57:38 Yeah. 57:38 As I understand it, I suppose the state would describe how you want it sorted. 57:42 These particular, this particular data in some database, like, oh, which column does 57:47 it go into? 57:47 Which, you know, whatever, something like that. 57:50 Yeah. 57:51 If there's a double spend, which one comes first, thus making it real. 57:55 And the other one comes second, which is puts in a completely different category of being 57:59 not, not having, not having actually happened. 58:06 Hi, Paul and Vlad. 58:09 Yes, we got Justin here. 58:10 Chat with you guys. 58:11 Yes, always. 58:13 How's it going? 58:13 Hello. 58:14 Doing well? 58:15 It's going pretty well, you know, I think. 58:18 Summer in the Northern Hemisphere. 58:21 And congratulations on the eCash. 58:24 I didn't have a chance to tell you it over. 58:26 Thank you. 58:27 At least. 58:27 Yeah. 58:28 Very exciting stuff. 58:31 Yeah, there's a, there's a lot to unpack here. 58:34 Oh, well, welcome to the dark side. 58:36 I'll, I'll start with that. 58:37 Yeah, I know. 58:38 Yeah. 58:38 I'm glad you finally come, come over to the side of the, the, the, the S coiners. 58:46 Yeah. 58:47 The impatient maybe, or the, the high expect, the people with high standards. 58:53 Yes. 58:53 And I think a competitive mindset to win. 58:56 And actually something that I found, the, the, the thing that jumps out, I was looking at your 59:01 post about it, actually, that you have pinned, pinned to your profile. 59:05 Something that, that really, the merge mining. 59:09 So like the, the different Drivechain or the different L, you're referring to them L2s here, 59:13 right? 59:13 But they're, yeah, these, these different L2s. 59:17 Yeah, that's right. 59:18 Yeah. 59:18 These, these different L2s, if they merge mine, these different Drivechains, right? 59:22 If they merge mine, isn't that closer to sharding? 59:28 Like in, in, in a sense, because it's, because then it'll, and if that's enforced by the actual 59:34 L1 protocol in that case, and I suppose that, that, that's what I was wondering. 59:39 First of all, I thought that was very interesting. 59:41 Isn't it closer to what, I didn't hear what you said. 59:44 Well, I thought, is my audio okay? 59:46 Or, okay. 59:48 Oh, I just cut out that one part. 59:49 Oh, okay. 59:50 All good. 59:51 I was wondering if it was closer to sharding. 59:53 If they're all merge mining. 59:55 Yeah. 59:56 Like, is it, if it's, cause if, if the L1 hasn't been changed, then like, how is that enforced? 1:00:03 So, so what I was wondering is like, how closely is it, is the L2 linked to the L1? 1:00:10 Is it, is it enshrined as they would say in Ethereum land or based? 1:00:17 Well, um, so there is a thing for the, for, for BIP301, there are some ways that you, 1:00:28 you know, the L1 block would, would reject someone who's basically, they say that they're 1:00:34 merge mining something, but they're actually not. Um, the original merge mining is not, 1:00:39 you know, like there's nothing that this is a very counterintuitive fact about merge mining, 1:00:44 is that if Bitcoin wanted to stop Namecoin from being merge mined with Bitcoin, there's nothing 1:00:50 that Bitcoin could do about that. And Namecoin could just continue. Well, there's something that 1:00:55 the miners could do about it though, right? Um, the coordination ends up being the problem if 1:01:01 you have too many of them, right? It's true that the mine, but it's kind of, um, the miners are 1:01:08 the ones being paid extra. So it's a kind of, it's a, it's a kind of funny scenario because 1:01:13 usually in Bitcoin, people talk about like things that you could do, like a soft fork, 1:01:19 you could activate and then the miners would have to like conform to this new filtering or 1:01:25 something like that. But this, in this case, there is no thing that, yeah. And in the case of merge 1:01:30 mining as a whole, in this case, the merge Blind Merged Mining is just a kind of a variant of that 1:01:37 is very, very similar. The idea with merge mining of course is that they get more money. So they 1:01:42 don't really care. Right. There's the incentive. Um, I was wondering like, cause, cause in my 1:01:49 view, I think it's better if you tightly enshrine it, like tightly wind it into the L1 and then it 1:01:55 becomes, then it stops being an L2, like an enshrined rollup, right? I don't even consider 1:02:00 that an L2 anymore. That, that becomes like part of the L1, right? But you can't do that if you 1:02:06 can't touch the L1 code, right? Like that, that I don't understand that part of it. Well, yeah, 1:02:13 if you enshrine it, you have the data, the whole point of, I think keeping the block size small 1:02:20 is the data availability problem, which is that for all the data that in the chain, like all the 1:02:26 enshrined data, everyone has to store and, and save and process and validate and then serve it back. 1:02:36 So the whole point of the L2s to some extent, or a big major point is that some people don't want, 1:02:44 people want to do different things. So some people don't want, they wouldn't want the L2 to be 1:02:49 enshrined because then they're responsible for it. Right. But then you have things like admin keys 1:02:55 and then you, or the alternative is you're actually just subdividing a, what is already a small 1:03:02 security budget, right? Instead of just having one unified chain. I mean, this is the modular 1:03:08 versus monolithic debate 10 years later, right? Well, yeah, but I've always been in favor of the 1:03:15 merge mined L2s. So that does recombine it to some extent. So it's modular, but also recombined. 1:03:23 But that's what I mean, this, this reminds me of like an L2 enshrined blockchain, which I'll be 1:03:30 like, well, actually that's just sharding now, which is more monolithic. Like the, the snake is 1:03:35 eating its own tail or as you're correctly. Well, I don't know what, like when sharding came out, 1:03:40 sharding came out, like after I had published about Drivechain and I published Drivechain 1:03:45 in November, 2015, which was after Blockstream had published about sidechains. And so I was 1:03:51 never really sure like exactly what they were getting at with the sharding. It seemed as though 1:03:58 that if you wanted to do sharding the right way, then you would have to just do Drivechain, 1:04:03 basically, because there was no other sidechain idea around. So to me that Drivechain idea works 1:04:09 just fine. And then there's maybe a long list of vocab words that have like altered it slightly. 1:04:17 Not changing it anyway, like there's so many limitations now because of the L1, like you 1:04:23 could change it to a one minute block time and a 32 megabyte block size. I mean, 1:04:30 the chain would be so much more capable for it. And it helped the L2s too. 1:04:38 Well, I disagree with that. I think you really want to keep the L1 as similar to Bitcoin Core 1:04:43 as possible so that there's no comparison whatsoever between the two. And I don't think 1:04:49 it really limits it. If they're different, then it's two people arguing. One says, 1:04:58 oh, well, it's got this. And then one says, well, is that better or worse? And if they're 1:05:03 lay people, then they don't know. That's the thing about every change. Some of them are good, 1:05:08 some of them are bad. And it's hard to know in advance which is which. And then it's very hard 1:05:12 to keep explaining it. It's faster, cheaper with more capacity. Long runs means more fees, 1:05:18 which means more security, which means more decentralization, depending on your economic 1:05:24 design. I don't think the fast block times are better, personally. You don't? Yeah, I wouldn't 1:05:32 say so either. Really? There's certain use cases, such as a lot of things in DeFi. So like DEX 1:05:44 exchanges and PERP exchanges. And that's where like the majority of fees are coming from now. 1:05:50 Well, I suppose for like the DEXs, like in terms of speed, I don't think that there's 1:05:55 anything that will ever be faster than like a centralized exchange order book or something 1:05:59 like that. So I don't think you're necessarily competing and having like a comparative advantage 1:06:05 there. We're touching it. We're getting very close now. And there's ways to actually 1:06:14 have advantages over those markets as well, which is how we have billions of dollars of revenue 1:06:20 every year from these DEXs. And I feel like if you don't have speed, 1:06:29 those use cases don't become as attractive there. 1:06:33 I personally think that the fast block time is a kind of clumsy way of getting speed. 1:06:43 There are lots of other ways that I think are much better. For example, you could have a 1:06:50 situation where people basically stake. They stake and then they have to wait for like 1:06:57 an hour or so for it to be like fully confirmed. But then once it's all staked, 1:07:02 then they can just instantly update. I think that's way better. 1:07:08 That's better than a sub-second confirmation time? 1:07:12 No, it'll be sub-second after it's set up. But then you still have the benefits of the 1:07:18 10-minute block time. What's the benefit of a 10-minute block time? 1:07:23 Well, one is SPV is only four megabytes per year. Whereas with the much faster block time, 1:07:32 it becomes proportionally less efficient. So if you're going to hang all of your hopes on SPV, 1:07:41 then certainly you want the block time to be as slow as possible. 1:07:44 Okay. That's interesting. I haven't thought about that before. As in like SPV wallets, I assume. 1:07:51 Yeah, because SPV wallets need all the headers. So the headers are 80 bytes in BTC. 1:07:58 So it's 80 bytes and there's only 144 blocks a day or 1,000 blocks a week, 52,000 blocks a year. 1:08:08 So that's very, very manageable for like 10, 15 years of block history. 1:08:13 Wait, hold on. Four megabytes a year, did you say? I mean, it's not much, right? 1:08:20 Right. That's not much with 10-minute blocks. But if you scale it up to sub-second block times, 1:08:26 then you just scaled it up by like a factor of 600. 1:08:31 Is it not based on the number of transactions? It's based on the number of... Oh, 1:08:34 of course the block header is based on number of blocks. Okay, sure. 1:08:39 But there's a little bit more to it than that. 1:08:41 Like in the case of Bitcoin, that's why I said one minute, not sub-second, because the 1:08:45 architecture doesn't really allow for that. But I mean, there are other chains that have like 1:08:49 minute, two and a half minute block times. There isn't really any problems there. The amounts that 1:08:55 you're describing don't really seem that crazy for most modern phones and et cetera. And also 1:09:03 eventually you just prune it as well. An SPV wallet doesn't need to go through the entire history 1:09:10 itself. I think it would for the headers, 1:09:13 yes. Pruning is for the block contents, but everyone needs the headers. 1:09:19 But of the entire history? 1:09:23 Yeah, but the headers include zero transactions already. So the headers are just the starting 1:09:28 point. I suppose you could say something like, I only want the headers for the last year. 1:09:34 Exactly, that's what I mean. 1:09:37 How do you know that they are? Because think about it, when you download the software, 1:09:40 the software has basically the Genesis block with it. And then it says, this is how we go 1:09:46 into the future. So you could have like checkpointing and stuff. But I think there's a 1:09:50 bigger answer to the question of why not change Bitcoin Core, which is that overall, I would 1:09:57 prefer this project to be very agnostic on people's beliefs. So I would rather say, some 1:10:02 people say this X is better than Y. And I just as I can say, we have X and we also have Y. 1:10:08 So we can't have X if we change it from Bitcoin Core, because then it won't be Bitcoin Core 1:10:14 anymore. So the L1 has to be totally ironclad and rigid in its commitment to copying Bitcoin 1:10:22 Core, so that no one can ever say, well, hey, it's like Bitcoin Core, but it has this 1:10:26 change, which is a disadvantage. 1:10:28 Okay, why does it have to be like Bitcoin Core? Because Bitcoin Core, 1:10:32 from my perspective, is terrible. To be the opposite of Bitcoin Core, Paul, 1:10:37 isn't that the lesson of all of this history? 1:10:40 Because when I protect people's right to Bitcoin Core, that's the same as my protecting their 1:10:44 right to a large block size L2. I'm protecting people's right to form their own opinion. 1:10:53 I'm not debating your right to do what you want and the people that want to follow you 1:10:58 and doing what you want and to create this fork. They're going to be the last one. I'm 1:11:02 going to be the one that's going to defend your right on this one, Paul. 100%. I've been 1:11:07 there before a few times now. 1:11:11 Yeah, but you assert that the smaller block size is objectively better. 1:11:15 A smaller block time. 1:11:17 I say, oh yeah, right, exactly. A shorter interblock time. That's what I meant to say. 1:11:23 Yeah. 1:11:23 You assert that it's objectively better. And I say that this is like a menu and people 1:11:29 can order a la carte. If they want to order the escargot, then they can. If they want to 1:11:34 order vanilla ice cream, then they can order that too. I'm not going to turn the vanilla ice cream 1:11:39 to snails or something. 1:11:41 No, I also love the free market like you, but I think it's more about what you're 1:11:45 choosing to support and what you think is good. And it's also a funny thing if we're comparing 1:11:50 smaller, faster block times, and we're comparing that to the wanting to be like Core for a, 1:11:59 what do I describe that as? An ideological reason? 1:12:05 Well, I think it's a product that people have bought. I mean, Bitcoin Core is still number one 1:12:10 and it's more than four times bigger than Ethereum, the number two coin. So this is by 1:12:16 far and above, it's not like a weird, obscure, it's not like we're catering to some weird tastes. 1:12:24 This is the mainstream thing that most people want. 1:12:27 Well, but it's not where most of the usage is, right? It's not where most of the 1:12:30 value and revenue is in crypto. That's long since moved on, right? 1:12:37 Well, I think all the revenue is really small in my opinion. So there's more, 1:12:42 there's something like hundreds, in the hundreds of billions of dollars, so almost a trillion 1:12:48 dollars in transaction fee revenue across every payment mechanism. It's kind of hard 1:12:57 because some of them, it's really, really hard to add them up and standardize them 1:13:01 because they don't make any sense. Because WeChat Pay is inherently subsidized by 1:13:06 the Chinese Communist Party, like being able to know everything about you. So it's like a 1:13:12 sort of half free and then blah, blah, blah. But as long as the CCP remains there. 1:13:19 Unfortunately. Yeah. Well, I mean, you can be cheaper than WeChat Pay is free, but you pay, 1:13:24 you don't pay with money, you pay with your autonomy. So actually it is expensive. 1:13:29 In a way that when it would be more than 10 cents, yeah, you pay with your soul. 1:13:32 It's like that, the Rick and Morty episode, you don't pay with money. Oh, you pay with the curses. 1:13:38 But the point is that it's basically a trillion dollars per year, 1:13:43 if you do back of the envelope math. And so even Ethereum, which is like the leader, 1:13:50 this is like a millionth of a millionth of like a billionth of a percent. 1:13:55 Solana and Hyperliquid right now are really generating a lot. 1:13:59 Yeah. But yeah, you know what I mean is that, you know, we're not, 1:14:05 this is all early days for everything. So I think it's true that what happened was BTC 1:14:12 formed a weird irrational cult where they started hating on all users and then Ethereum found some 1:14:18 other users. And that's good. And we should also... And then Ethereum started to hate on users and 1:14:26 then they went to Solana and Hyperliquid. Precisely. Yes, I completely agree. That's 1:14:31 exactly what I think happened. Well, they didn't, they didn't, they recognized that there is, 1:14:37 the data availability problem is real. So they realized that it's a problem. 1:14:41 The more users comes with more costs. So they realized that actually we could kill off the whole 1:14:48 project if we let the users run rampant. So there's some logic to it. But the smart thing to 1:14:54 do was to partition all these into optional L2s so that they're all run like businesses or like 1:15:00 hedge funds where like they could fail and they would only affect the people. The failure would 1:15:04 only affect the people on them. So then you say, you know, the sky's the limit and you can make 1:15:08 your Solana chain or you can make your weird chain and your chain can have 10 second blocks, 1:15:13 or it can have 5,000 blocks every millionth of a second, or you can do whatever else you want to 1:15:18 do. From my perspective, we just watched that fail on Ethereum, right? I mean, 1:15:23 Vitalik even admitted it recently. It was like, yeah, this is a failure. It's been terrible. 1:15:32 That was a little vague. What specifically? The L2 scaling roadmap has been a failure. Now 1:15:37 they've pivoted over to the EVM roadmap, which in my opinion is terrible. Yeah. 1:15:43 But I don't know that anymore. I used to know. I used to know a lot more about 1:15:50 Ethereum's L2 picture like in 2016. And then I stopped paying attention. But this is kind of, 1:15:56 sometimes I find this has happened to me in my life a few times where I like write something down 1:16:01 and then people implement a terrible version of it. But they make all these changes, 1:16:05 but it still has the same name. And then they're like, then people come back to me and they say, 1:16:10 well, hey, how do you know this is going to work? And I was like, well, they didn't do what I wrote 1:16:14 down in the first place. This has happened to me multiple times in my life, actually. 1:16:21 I don't know what Ethereum did with the L2s, but hey, were they all set up so that one, 1:16:25 were they all merge mined so that the L1 Ethereum miners got paid all of the money, 1:16:32 all the transaction fees collected on, somehow I doubt it. I don't know if that's true or not. 1:16:36 Maybe you can tell me that it was. Which is why this is interesting, because they kind of said 1:16:43 the free market. You mean that I was correct that they did not do it? Yeah, that's right. 1:16:47 Can I just clarify? Yeah, right. So they didn't do it. They didn't do what I said. 1:16:52 And then they had to chaos as a result. Exactly. And they've been talking about doing it for like 1:16:57 the last 10 years and they think maybe they'll do it in five years from now or whatever, but like 1:17:01 it's yeah. So like this is what I think we should do the whole time. 1:17:06 Yeah, merge mining is a form. Satoshi invented merge mining. I had Blind Merged Mining, 1:17:10 and the advantage of Blind Merged Mining is that it preemptively addressed what later in Ethereum 1:17:16 was called MEV. I preemptively addressed all this in like 2016, 2015. I was like, 1:17:23 you want to make it so that when they mine the block, they're compensated for all forms, 1:17:28 and then the L1 miners don't have to see or know about anything happening on the L2. 1:17:33 And so I've kind of like separated all these concerns, like, you know, preemptively. And so 1:17:38 yeah, my claim is that Blind Merged Mining preemptively, which was invented in 20, like, 1:17:43 January 2017. This is and this is what people have said. Also, they said, actually, this is 1:17:48 they have something that they call proposer builder separation. But if you look at it, 1:17:53 it's basically just Blind Merged Mining. So and that's exactly what Blind Merged Mining is. It's 1:17:57 the whole point of it being blind is that the L1 miner is just grinding the SHA-256 hash, 1:18:03 and they are not looking at what they would call is the proposer, the proposer builder. So that's 1:18:09 what I called the, well, I had different words for it, but I actually came up with it all first. 1:18:14 And again, I came up with this whole Drivechain thing before sharding. 1:18:17 Well, the interesting thing about PBS proposer builder separation is as far as we've observed, 1:18:23 it seems to like, at scale, when there's a lot of usage, it seems to just occur organically, 1:18:29 the separation, and then it becomes better for the protocol itself to enshrine it, 1:18:34 to avoid things like MEV, which which can be, you know, exploitative in some circumstances. And 1:18:41 there's another word for that. Not let's just say not overall beneficial. 1:18:45 But you're talking about like the role, things like that, that would be using that, correct? 1:18:51 Sorry, can you just repeat the question? 1:18:52 You're talking about like roll ups and things like that, when you're talking about L2s, 1:18:55 that would be using it, correct? Yes. 1:18:59 Because I think that there might be some aspects of that design, which caused like problems itself. 1:19:07 No, no, like L2s are generally terrible, but actually the Ethereum itself and Solana 1:19:11 have also seen this happen actually at a massive scale, which is was very interesting to observe. 1:19:17 But actually, L2s are the worst, because they usually have a single sequencer. 1:19:21 And then yeah, the sequencer just gets to the side, right? 1:19:25 So yeah, good. 1:19:26 I suppose, yeah, this is another thing where it's like, okay, then Blockstream came up with 1:19:30 Liquid or whatever, where it was just like, all the fees, Liquid, like all the fee revenue goes 1:19:36 to Blockstream. And it's just like 15 keys, this multi-sig thing. So then I was kind of like, 1:19:42 none of this has anything to do with the original sidechain idea at all, which is that it's this 1:19:46 own blockchain. It's kind of like saying, yeah, we took the blockchain part and we deleted all 1:19:50 the blockchain parts. We deleted all the proof of work. We deleted all the, anyone can join and 1:19:58 leave the mining network anytime. We deleted all the full nodes where everyone's an equal 1:20:02 participant in the European network with fees and everything. 1:20:06 The fees go back to the L1 in this case? 1:20:08 I'm talking in Liquid, they didn't do this at all. Liquid is not merge mine, 1:20:11 because actually it's hard-coded in Liquid for, I'm talking about for Blockstream's Liquid. 1:20:16 They hard-coded it so that they... 1:20:18 I was wondering for these Drivechains, like the fees would still go to whoever creates the Drivechain, no? 1:20:24 Except for the incentive... 1:20:26 No, no, no, they go down to the L1. 1:20:29 All of it? 1:20:30 No, they go down to the L1 miners, yeah, 100%. 1:20:33 But then how is... 1:20:34 There is a tiny wiggle room. This is fully misunderstood. 1:20:37 But how is it informed? 1:20:39 Well, unfortunately, this is like misunderstood because there's like a tiny wiggle room parameter 1:20:46 and all kinds of people have misunderstood this for so long and it's really not that complicated. 1:20:52 But the wiggle room parameters basically accounts for what you might call negative MEV 1:20:56 because I just have the whole thing rolled up into one transaction. 1:20:59 So I say basically... 1:21:01 Okay, but the way Blind Merged Mining works, maybe you'll understand it, 1:21:06 is that there's like a slot on L1 in each block. 1:21:11 So like sidechain number three, you put like a hash there. 1:21:15 So like every block, there's like a special spot. 1:21:18 There's like a special real estate. 1:21:20 And so whatever hash you put there, that counts as being the L2 block that meets their version of the difficulty requirement. 1:21:28 It could be invalid. 1:21:30 It could be invalid on L2, but L1 doesn't care. 1:21:33 And then the idea is people on L2, they build the block paying themselves the transaction fee in the L2 coinbase. 1:21:43 But without the missing puzzle piece in L1, their block will never be valid. 1:21:50 So they also go on to L1 and they pay with L1 coins. 1:21:55 They pay them to make a special transaction. 1:21:57 This is BIP301. 1:21:59 They make a special transaction to the miner and they say, listen, I'll give you $5,000 worth of coins on L1 right now if you add this cash to the coinbase. 1:22:10 Okay, I got it. 1:22:12 And that includes all the transaction fee value on the L2. 1:22:17 And it also includes any MEV benefit on the L2. 1:22:22 I thought before you said it went back to the operator. 1:22:27 Who's the operator? 1:22:30 Sorry, I forgot the exact term you used. 1:22:33 There's a bunch of L2 nodes that are all equal and they each have different wallets. 1:22:40 So four or five of them would be out of 100 or maybe whatever. 1:22:45 They would each construct because everyone has the block, everyone has the mempool. 1:22:50 So they would each throw their hat in the ring. 1:22:53 They would make a block paying themselves the fees in the L2 coinbase. 1:22:58 But they would also get any MEV benefit. 1:23:02 Now, they would be bidding it up in L1. 1:23:04 These would be like bids. 1:23:05 So they say, I'll pay $5,005, I'll pay $5,006. 1:23:09 And only one of them makes it in. 1:23:11 Only one of them can be included on L1. 1:23:13 This is what VEV301 does. 1:23:15 Okay, but it sounds to me like you're describing like a separate bidding, kind of a fee market system, right? 1:23:23 In order to get in. 1:23:25 In a way, yeah. 1:23:26 Because they're in a different – 1:23:27 For the merge. 1:23:28 Sorry. 1:23:29 It rolls up. 1:23:30 It's kind of – to reuse the roll-up word. 1:23:32 It says all the L2 – each L2 transaction that comes in, that kind of increments the bid over in L1. 1:23:41 I mean it should in theory because – but now, of course, I included a thing where they could have like a little tip of money for themselves to compensate them for their trouble because if they get exactly zero, they – 1:23:53 But is that an argument from economic incentives or is it enforced within the protocol? 1:24:00 It's an argument from economic incentives because it's basically like this. 1:24:04 The L2 block is worth a certain amount to the people running the nodes. 1:24:09 Like they say, hey, if I find this block – see, here's the thing is because it's actually – economic incentives are way, way better than having it be enforced in some kind of math equation. 1:24:18 But it's based – we're going to have to now challenge the assumption because it's all based on the assumption then that – all based on the assumption that – sorry, I lost my train of thought right there. 1:24:31 Sorry. 1:24:32 Just go ahead. 1:24:35 Okay. 1:24:36 I will just continue with my train of thought, which luckily I can still remember, which is that the block – okay, the L2 block could be worth like $5,000 worth of transaction fees. 1:24:47 But it also may be worth a certain amount of MEV, like $300 worth of MEV. 1:24:52 But running the L2 node might be very expensive, so that might be – might want to subtract a little bit because it would say, hey, I hate that I have to keep running this L2 node every day. 1:25:02 So you may want to subtract a little, and then you might say, well, hey, listen, this block might be orphaned, or there might be a block maturity period. 1:25:07 So honestly, there's like a lot of factors that go into it, and they might – after they combine all these factors subjectively in their mind, they might say, you know what? 1:25:16 Okay, I'm only willing to bid $4,900 for this block on L1. 1:25:21 And so in a way, it's perfect because everything washes out perfectly in my conception of it, whereas people trying to equationify everything, they always end up being unable to get it. 1:25:34 I remember. And it's great because you actually just already gave the argument to what I was going to ask. 1:25:39 So I want to challenge the assumption that all of it will – all of the fees will go into the block for the miners. 1:25:46 That's exactly right. They may not. 1:25:49 But if they don't, it's because of some real reason. 1:25:52 Because it's open-ended, right? Because anyone can become one of those. 1:25:57 That's right. Exactly. 1:26:00 Would they use stake for that mechanism? 1:26:03 They need to have L1 coin to bid, and they collect L2 coins. 1:26:07 So if you call that staking, then yes, but I wouldn't call it staking per se, but you're right that they have to already have liquid cash. 1:26:15 They have to already have money to do it. 1:26:17 Interesting. Okay. That is staking. You can use it for different things though. Okay. 1:26:25 Because the L1 coin is slightly superior. L1 to L2 basically instantly and perfectly with no issues, but coming back from the L2 to L1 is inconvenient. 1:26:38 So in that sense, it's kind of like you have to have the better coin. 1:26:42 Yet another reason though is why you would not want it to be tightly coupled with the equation is that the L1 and the L2 coins, one might be worth like 99% of the other or some other percent. 1:26:53 So this actually works out great because whoever is most able to jump all the hurdles, they'll pay the L1 coins and the miners will just be thinking, 1:27:06 this is just one transaction we included in one L1 block, and we're getting like $5,000 for this every block or whatever it is. 1:27:15 But if someone were to say create an L2, and it'd be like that has some sort of Turing complete VM in there like EVM or SVM or move language or something like that. 1:27:33 They could just program that part of the fee revenue goes back to them, right? 1:27:39 And that is part of the bidding pool, so to speak, in order to send back to the… 1:27:49 Anything that's not part of the bidding pool. 1:27:52 Sorry? 1:27:54 So think about it like this. 1:27:56 The block is worth a certain amount, but this includes all the MEV, includes the transaction fees. 1:28:03 And then a block is also, it takes a certain amount of work to make. 1:28:07 You have to run the L2 node, you have to deal with the block maturity, 100 block block maturity period, and you have to maybe withdraw the coins from L2 to L1. 1:28:17 So it's a big combination of things. 1:28:20 Now, if you're saying that on the L2, someone is going to program something that makes the L2 block worth less, then either it's just worth less for everyone or it's only worth less for you, in which case your bid is not going to be as high. 1:28:34 If they're like a big perp exchange and they're making millions of dollars a day, right? 1:28:39 And then they're like, okay, we're going to program off to go part of the founding company. 1:28:43 And then they can help that to scale operations or whatever. 1:28:48 I mean, you could potentially program anything with these kind of value flows within those type of virtual machines, right? 1:28:56 Yeah. As I understand it, it just is dependent on the miners still generating enough in fee revenue to not just make a copy of it in which they are paid the full amount. 1:29:11 Yeah, we're not going to be able to stop people from competing with the blockchain itself. 1:29:20 So there could always be someone who says, hey, here is my fully custodial exchange. 1:29:27 I charge my own fees, which are low and I have instant everything. 1:29:32 We can't do anything about that. 1:29:37 So we wouldn't be able to stop those fees from getting leached off that way. 1:29:42 And I think this is part of the it's funny you bring that up, because I think this is part of the annoying thing with the MEV conversation is that these people in BTC have produced this unmeetable list of completely absurd criteria that it's almost laughable. 1:29:58 Like if you just write it all down, they want it to be like the perfect system doesn't leach any fees from L1, but it doesn't add any fees back either, because this is like effect quote affecting mining incentives on close quote. 1:30:11 But we are allowed to do all this merge mining and you're allowed to do like, you know, if you have like heating a swimming pool, then that's kind of allowed. 1:30:20 Or if you're drying the persimmons, that's sort of allowed. 1:30:25 So they've constructed this absurd list of what they consider to be like valid ways of paying miners more money or not. 1:30:36 And I think they have they have not even the faintest clue how absurd it really is. 1:30:41 But in certain things with this like demand, you're allowed to do these Texas demand management credits. 1:30:46 And of course, the difficulty is allowed to adjust up and down, which affects mining costs and profits enormously. 1:30:53 So it's so I think it's very funny that this is this reminds me of that because it's like, OK, well, what if people just stop using the what if people just stop using the L2 for whatever reason? 1:31:04 And it's like, we're really not responsible for that. 1:31:06 It's like all we're trying to say is anyone can get it out. 1:31:09 Right. And like if there's an incentive for them to be able to change the rules in that way, right, then that will happen. 1:31:16 And that that's what that's one of the lessons in Ethereum. Right. 1:31:19 It was the whole power crops and absolute power crops. Absolutely none. 1:31:23 Like like if you look at like the top 20, not a single one has removed their admin key. 1:31:29 Not one. Pretty wild. 1:31:32 Well, yeah, I think the admin key, the admin key is the a crazy advantage of the block chain system. 1:31:41 I don't even know. I have no idea if Satoshi foresaw this or if there's some kind of like inherent connection. 1:31:47 I don't really know how it works. But basically, the you can upgrade via the soft fork. 1:31:55 I'm not even sure if Satoshi realized this at the time or something, but this this fact and the fact that the Drivechain L2s, 1:32:01 they're also block chains and you could also upgrade them with soft fork. 1:32:05 I mean, I think you're honestly screwed because just about every other thing requires the admin key or something admin key like. 1:32:13 And like for the you know, the Stark verifier, you like can't change the version and the same for like RGB. 1:32:23 You are like stuck with it has to be like perfect and it includes no bugs, whereas in the block chain model where you can software, 1:32:30 you can usually just soft fork out any bug and just say that that type of thing is banned, henceforth. 1:32:36 And so it's really wild how completely overpowered the block chain model is. 1:32:42 And now the admin key, of course, the admin keys are terrible because they're decentralized. 1:32:48 These admin keys are only on L2s, right? Like the L1s, Ethereum, Solana, Hyperliquid, they don't have admin keys, right? 1:32:56 Because they are one they're based on a consensus just just like based on. 1:33:00 This is why I hate all these other people like what about these L2s over here? 1:33:04 But it's like if it's an admin key, then to me, it's not it's already fully custodial, in my opinion. 1:33:10 Yeah, it's like people don't treat them like fully custodial because people have their own keys and they can withdraw at any point, 1:33:17 but the catch is also they can steal all user funds at any point as well. 1:33:21 And through the sequencer, they can also censor to. 1:33:25 Yeah, so you see, but that's exactly what mining is supposed to prevent in Bitcoin. 1:33:31 But proof of stake is the same thing, right? We can agree on that, right, Paul? 1:33:37 Yeah, I'm saying that the reason why the Drivechain is the actual L2 is because it doesn't have any of those flaws. 1:33:50 Well, an L2 could be based on proof of stake, right? 1:33:56 You could have an L2 with a Drivechain, eCash L2 based on proof of stake, right? 1:34:02 I think it would make a lot of sense to do that. 1:34:05 Yes, you could have an L2 where the deposits and the withdrawals are BIP300. 1:34:12 And then the L2 is itself blind merge mine with BIP301. 1:34:17 So that's Blind Merged Mining. So that's not proof of stake. 1:34:19 But on that L2, you could have people's stake basically. 1:34:24 And now you have basically created like an L3 chain that that could be like perfectly proof of stake. 1:34:29 And that could have instant block times. And in fact, that could have all kinds of crazy things. 1:34:34 Why would it have to be the L3? Why can't you do that for the L2? I missed that. 1:34:39 Well, because you need to know. Well, I mean, I think you could technically, but I'm not sure if you would want to. 1:34:45 Because you need to know the deposit. You need some way of knowing the deposit and withdrawal. 1:34:51 Well, OK, sure. I think you need some way of knowing which coins have been deposited and withdrawn successfully. 1:34:58 And you need some way. It is possible to have a Drivechain that does not use Blind Merged Mining. 1:35:03 And that is itself 100 percent custodial. But I mean, you just kind of lose a lot of the benefits. 1:35:09 It's kind of like at that point, because you might as well just run a fully custodial. 1:35:13 If you're not using Blind Merged Mining to advance the blocks. Right. 1:35:17 Then it's kind of like, well, then how is it any different from just saying, send me all of your coins and then I'll send them back. 1:35:23 I promise. It's kind of like it's kind of like a little confusing at that point. 1:35:28 But people could do it. 1:35:31 You just replace the proof of stake with that. And you can still just send the rewards back to the L1. 1:35:38 You just have the L1, the L2 consensus is just based on proof of stake instead. In theory, I don't see any problem. 1:35:45 Well, another thing, though, is that the idea behind the Drivechain is that the miners on L1 will be very happy to have it around because they have all the fee revenue from merge mining that they are making. 1:35:58 So if there's absolutely zero merge mining revenue, then they would kind of that would not be a great position for it to be. 1:36:06 And I think this is all set up with the assumption that these are just giant magic money trees printing lots of money all the time for L1 miners. 1:36:15 And that's kind of what keeps everything aligned. 1:36:19 So, again, this is like the ethereumization of it. It's like changing, changing all these. 1:36:24 These are very kind of simple parts of the design. 1:36:27 People just saying, well, what if I gave all the fees to myself? And then it's like, well, something something bad would eventually happen and then no one would care. 1:36:34 One of the things we were talking about before is just how a lot of these other chains try to do everything and how in doing so you kind of limit yourself in certain ways. 1:36:44 Oh, no, I'm a big believer in what I'm calling the everything chain thesis. 1:36:50 So I'm very much on the side of Solana and Hyperliquid, maybe to a lesser extent, trying to do everything right now. 1:36:59 Do you think that you lose any sort of granularity in what you're trying to achieve if you appeal to, I suppose, the use cases of anything? 1:37:12 I think it's the opposite, at least from a technical perspective. 1:37:16 Because I think that the chain, if, for instance, if like a spot exchange and a perp exchange is what generates the most revenue for the chain, then, you know, security, decentralization, scarcity being tied to the economics and fees. 1:37:32 Right. That means, you know, it actually improves those qualities over time. 1:37:37 So I think there's like a beneficial relationship between all of these different aspects. 1:37:42 Something that's a bit of money is also a bit of store of value, I could say as well. 1:37:48 You suppose, as I understand it then, that the price going up somehow helps these functionalities and that doing everything increases the price? 1:37:58 Yes. Yes. That's one way to really – there's a bit more to it, but yes, absolutely. 1:38:05 Because I suppose in certain cases, I think that the price just increasing can cause, I suppose, like additional issues that you would see in like Bitcoin Core. 1:38:17 But hold on, that's not fair. That's not fair, right? Because my position is one of big blocks, speed, let's go build products and utility. I'm a value investor, right? 1:38:31 So my position, I went from Bitcoin to Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash to Ethereum to Solana today. So my position is more that, right? 1:38:44 So more, I suppose I would describe myself as anything that increases the fees necessarily being the thing which is a functionality worth adding to the chain or a sidechain or something like that. 1:38:57 And I don't know, this is somewhat vague. 1:39:00 To the chain specifically, I've also been very critical of L2s in the past. And so this conversation with Paul is I'm trying to figure out how tightly bound is it? 1:39:11 Because I like enshrined L2s. I don't like the type of L2s Ethereum did. 1:39:18 And I suppose like the functionality that I'm describing that, you know, like Ethereum is stuck with, for example, maybe this is like minutiae, but when they like create an account space model as opposed to UTXO, that has like consequences in terms of technically like what you're capable of doing. 1:39:37 I think that if you have the ability to just, you know, oh, we're not doing the accounts model, we're doing a UTXO and it's on its own chain attached through Drivechains, that gives you more functionality in the sense that, you know, the nonce or whatever of the account doesn't prevent you from paying fees in the own currency when you're sending a tether or something like that. 1:39:59 Like this is an obscure example, but like. 1:40:02 That is the type of, I suppose, like specificity I think you maybe lose out is like applications that just change depending on the protocol that as implemented that you don't seem to be limited at all through the method of Drivechains as a scaling method. 1:40:20 So I don't know, I suppose, what is the scaling method you see as being like superior in some ways? 1:40:26 Well, I think right now the winner is a kind of the pedal to the metal, what I would call like a pure parallelized approach to scaling. 1:40:37 So it's very focused on just parallelizing the workload as much as possible. And through that we're achieving 10 to 40,000 TPS. But it's actually a trade-off if you compare that to modern sharded systems, because sharded systems can achieve potentially even over a million TPS. 1:40:59 But the trade-off is speed. So a sharded system can maybe, you know, if there's multiple hops then there's actually a delay for each hop between, for inter-shard communication. In the case of something like Near at least, or otherwise they just need to keep the, so it's more limited, so say about 600 milliseconds. 1:41:17 So it turns out that actually the vast majority of usage is now on purely parallelized blockchains. And these have max capacities currently of like 10 to 40,000 TPS. But they're working on pushing that significantly in other ways, which is going to be interesting to see. 1:41:39 But there the cutting edge is going to be 400 milliseconds to about 200 milliseconds. And then the next generation we're going to see about 150. It's actually pushing beyond light speed globally, but that's because of multi-leader architectures. So that to me is the cutting edge today. 1:41:59 I suppose, yeah, this is the argument of like, is there a value to decentralization itself? Because I think at the, you know, limit, it just becomes sort of, you have like a Chowmian Mint or just like a centralized exchange. 1:42:12 But here's the thing. I would argue that Solana today is more decentralized than Bitcoin. And I can actually argue that across basically all metrics at this stage. 1:42:25 I suppose, regardless of if Solana is more decentralized, I suppose like in how it is operating, it's fundamentally just different architecturally. 1:42:36 Oh yeah, it's actually different for sure. 1:42:39 So I suppose, I think that you can further Solana just by making it even more decentralized, more centralized in whatever the spectrum is, wherever it falls. There is just a way in which it sort of like fails to seemingly like Eagle. There's something that just is like literally a server. 1:43:02 Sorry, I missed that last part. 1:43:04 Well, just I think like in terms of like the complexity of just like operating it, like, I think you lose out to just something that is just one server. Just like Solana loses out to that and is currently just sort of doing like regulatory arbitrage. 1:43:23 It's because people do value decentralization and neutrality and censorship resistance. But, you know, it would also be good if it's a far more competitive version of that. And that's what this is. And also the gap is not that big anymore. Hyperliquid is seriously competing with stock markets today on commodities. It's fascinating to watch. 1:43:47 I suppose, how much of that do you think… 1:43:49 I have a question actually. 1:43:50 Go for it. 1:43:53 Well, my question is about how you measure decentralization, because I was always very happy with the definition of how much it costs to spin up a new full node. And it is still easier to spin up a new full node of Bitcoin Core than Solana. I was always happy. This is the definition that I brought. 1:44:16 I think it's regulatory arbitrage is the definition. 1:44:22 Actually, I have a really interesting way to challenge that definition. Paul, what is more decentralized? 100 Raspberry Pis run out of hardcore cypherpunks' basements? Or 10,000 high-powered validators run out of data centers? What is more decentralized? 1:44:47 Well, I don't know, because when I wrote my essay measuring decentralization, I was trying to figure out what does it mean to have… Because, of course, there are many different ways of making something decentralized. And this is in a bad way, because it doesn't help us define the term. 1:45:05 But usually when people… When you say something is decentralized, they're talking about chess, because you can't just change the rules to chess. You could declare something, but chess is already out there and people can do it without you. 1:45:25 So they're going to just keep playing the old version of chess. And it's kind of like English language. Yeah, you could declare something. You could say looks maxing isn't a word. 1:45:35 Let's break it down a little bit. 1:45:37 One second. Can I try to answer it? Because I think that here the constraints actually are something that help further it. So even though, in your example, the 10,000 servers are going to be superior to the 100,000 Raspberry Pis, it's a lot more difficult to write the software, and it's better software, on the 10,000 Raspberry Pis than it is the 1,000 servers. 1:46:01 And I think that is the value you're kind of lacking, is just the quality of the code itself will probably be better if it's actually running on this network of 100,000 Pis. 1:46:14 Versus 10,000 professionals? High-powered professionals? 1:46:17 10,000 servers. I think it's like, let's say… 1:46:20 High-powered validators. That means like really, usually really big companies and organizations and professionals. 1:46:28 Right. It's a lot easier to run like bad software in that environment than it is on a Raspberry Pi. 1:46:35 It would be distributed, right? There'd be 10,000 individual validators, right? 1:46:40 Right. And it's really easy for them to just have a lot of like built-up nonsense and garbage, in my opinion, than it is if you have to like really care about the efficiency. 1:46:52 But what we see in like high-powered networks such as Solana, which has multiple clients competing with each other, is they really, really care about the bottom line, which is cutting out all the garbage is actually how you get 400 milliseconds. 1:47:05 But it's like not able to fail. Sorry, I didn't mean to over-talk you, but it's not able to fail. And that's not necessarily good, in my opinion. 1:47:14 Like you want anti-fragile systems, not necessarily like the best systems. And I think you lose some of that anti-fragility if you don't have the 100,000. 1:47:23 In my view, in the best system, you don't lose the anti-fragility, right? I'm not really arguing. That's the trade-off here. 1:47:30 And that's why maybe I would love to continue with Paul, this definition thing, the decentralization. 1:47:38 I agree. The semantics of it is kind of hilarious because, in my view, decentralization is like a spectrum, and it's actually a spectrum made up of like multiple factors, right? 1:47:49 It could be multidimensional. I agree. 1:47:53 Whenever we say decentralized or centralized, it's always an oversimplification. 1:48:00 Yeah, I always try to avoid using the whole decentralized-centralized thing because actually, Satoshi doesn't mention – it takes a long time for him to use the word decentralized. 1:48:15 He's comparing like Napster to like whatever, like BitTorrent or something. 1:48:21 So in that case, it's totally unambiguous, like what he's talking about. He's talking about like there's one – 1:48:28 But in the white paper and all the other stuff, he says peer-to-peer. 1:48:31 And that also has an unambiguous meaning, which is to say that all the – which is something you don't have in Solana necessarily, but maybe it doesn't matter. 1:48:41 But the point is, in Bitcoin, you run the node, and your node is exactly the same as Satoshi's node. They're indistinguishable. 1:48:49 So in that case, it was always totally clear. 1:48:51 Satoshi had a lot more mining power behind him, so he didn't answer. 1:48:56 The Bitcoin SV world. Yeah, because I think they're actually all very different things. 1:49:06 So to me – but yeah, I recognize that people have very different conceptions of how this all works. 1:49:13 My definition, my perspective. 1:49:14 Well, let me ask you this about the mining question. 1:49:17 Yeah. 1:49:18 Okay, we can go back. 1:49:19 Yeah, I think it's the distribution of power. 1:49:21 Okay, the mining thing. 1:49:22 How do you know how much hash rate a node has? 1:49:28 Because actually, the hash rate is something that is experienced over time. 1:49:32 And it's not like if you have a V8 engine, you have a certain amount of horsepower, or you could have a steam engine, like a certain number of – you have a kilowatt hour. 1:49:42 These are like inherent properties of something, but like an ASIC could have a certain amount of hash power. 1:49:50 But then you can point the ASIC at a different node, or you can point it at a node that's actually free-riding off someone else's node. 1:49:57 And then which node actually, quote, has, unquote, the hash power. 1:50:03 So I always thought the hash power thing was like a big red herring, and I thought it was unrelated to decentralization. 1:50:08 I agree with you, actually. 1:50:10 Because I think my definition, my perspective, to sum it up very simply, it's the measurement of the distribution of power, which is distribution of power. 1:50:18 That's how I would very simply define what is decentralization. 1:50:21 And I will say decentralization is important. 1:50:23 It is somewhat what defines crypto and why it's interesting. 1:50:28 And for me, I also very much view it as kind of an evolution of certain political ideas as well, right? 1:50:34 In terms of like – in many ways, an evolution of the separation of powers, right? 1:50:42 If you really think about it. 1:50:44 So I think there's a lot of benefits to that. 1:50:47 It's a shield against tyranny. 1:50:50 Yeah. 1:50:51 And I think there's – 1:50:52 In addition to being like – 1:50:55 Yeah. 1:50:56 Sorry. 1:50:57 So I agree, actually. 1:50:59 I like those definitions as well a lot. 1:51:01 So for me, the answer is it's 10,000 high-powered validators because that's more distributed, right? 1:51:08 And that's harder to take down, for some adversary to take down, I would argue. 1:51:14 But that's affected by like how I'm defining this. 1:51:18 But also like how we look at decentralization. 1:51:20 We can look at like the Nakamoto coefficient. 1:51:22 What is the weakest point of attack in terms of number of participants to collude in order to take down the system, right? 1:51:28 We can look at like governance. 1:51:30 We can look at like validator counts slash block producers in the context of proof of work, right? 1:51:35 We can look at all of these different things. 1:51:37 I don't really count node requirements because I actually think there's a balancing act between making the network useful so that people actually have a reason to run a node. 1:51:51 And what I think is more important, a validator. 1:51:56 Well, I definitely think that what you could do is you could break it down into sub-components. 1:52:02 So you and I could agree that there is something such as the cost of running a full node and that kind of like other things being equal, it would be better if it were lower. 1:52:11 If you could actually do the exact thing. 1:52:14 Yeah. 1:52:15 If you could actually process the same throughput and all the rest was the same. 1:52:19 So that would be kind of like, that was kind of like what I latched on to. 1:52:23 It's ironic that after doing that, I was like, okay, immediately after defining that, I could like, I basically came up with Drivechain and I was like, oh, you can have the small blockers and large blocks can just both get what they want. 1:52:36 But of course, as you know, perfectly well, Justin, some of these small blockers are just weirdo crazy people who just what they really wanted was to like run the project into the ground or just for their own benefit or something. 1:52:47 So they were like kind of bizarre. 1:52:48 And so they didn't placate them at all. 1:52:50 This idea that, oh, we just have the L2 be detached from the cost of running the L1 node. 1:52:55 And now it doesn't affect. 1:52:58 I still wonder to this day, I don't even know if certain people even like Peter Todd has like a bizarre view that it's like if any any minor anywhere could be tempted to run the L2 node for any reason, either because it produces so much money that it's the temptation to run the node is overwhelming, or that it costs so much that it would running the node would be like really, really inconvenient and put them out of business. 1:53:22 He he has this bizarre like view where it's like it doesn't even matter which of those two it is either in either way that proves that the L2 is bad. 1:53:31 It doesn't make any sense to me. 1:53:32 I can't make any sense of it at all. 1:53:34 I think it's just nonsensical. 1:53:37 So it's kind of neat that I came up with this version and then you could immediately invent Drivechain which supposedly worked for everyone. 1:53:45 Although not in practice, because people don't know what they want. 1:53:50 Yeah, there's this thing similarity you can you can draw off like altos in Ethereum because they do like bid for space of terms of block availability on their, their, their data availability layer that they built up out for that. 1:54:06 Alright, so I mean, I think that's a little bit comparable to what's happening here as well. 1:54:11 No. 1:54:13 At least on that aspect. 1:54:15 And I would also agree that like there's other ways like there's like a way of being physically decentralized. 1:54:21 It's like, you know, there's like the Pentagon. 1:54:23 There's like Washington DC and then there's like the Pentagon. 1:54:26 And then there's like the Kremlin and Moscow and then there's like the actual US Army is like spread out. 1:54:33 Yeah. 1:54:34 So these are like all kinds of way. 1:54:38 I think 40% of the validator power was like in a data center not not far from where I lived here for Solana, this was a few years ago but we were joking if someone bombed it. 1:54:48 It would be bad. 1:54:50 Someone told me in like 2022 they said there's actually only like three Solana nodes. 1:54:55 But to their credit, the Solana people, they put in a lot of hard work and hired a lot of like PhDs and they, they put in a lot of effort to make it easier to run a node. 1:55:07 And, you know, the technology improved. 1:55:09 And so now it only costs like $16,000. 1:55:12 This is not the metric that you even care about. 1:55:14 But now they got it down from like very, very high to like $16,000 a year or something to run the Solana node, which is I think that's very impressive. 1:55:22 Oh, yeah. 1:55:23 I think you're referring to Mithra, that implementation, right? 1:55:26 Is that Mithra? 1:55:29 I don't know the name. 1:55:32 Solana having three validators in 22, that's just completely incorrect. 1:55:36 I think it had around 3,000 around that day, maybe a bit less. 1:55:40 No, I was just saying like, I don't know if like having like PhDs be working on the L1 node is really what you want. 1:55:50 Which is not a good thing. 1:55:51 I actually agree with that 100%. 1:55:53 It's usually, in my experience, a terrible thing in crypto. 1:55:56 I was going to point it out, but I'm glad you did, JK. 1:55:59 I wasn't going to. 1:56:01 Ideally, you'd have those people or whatever money is being spent usually by some foundation go towards like uses, you know, like of users and things like that on a sidechain. 1:56:11 Or paying the developers to actually like do developers that can actually pull it off to go to go do it. 1:56:17 Or other organizations as well. 1:56:20 The cool thing is when you have multiple clients racing to all kind of do the cutting edge. 1:56:26 And these are usually not PhDs who are. 1:56:29 PhDs usually spend more time writing papers, right? 1:56:33 They do building things. 1:56:35 Well, competition is in favor of competition, so. 1:56:42 We only have three minutes left, unfortunately. 1:56:44 So I don't know if anyone had anything they really wanted to say. 1:56:47 Jump up now. 1:56:48 Quick. 1:56:49 I guess, you know, what type of defy are you hoping exists in this world? 1:56:55 Paul, anything in particular? 1:56:58 About me, I kind of think, OK, so obviously I like prediction markets. 1:57:03 I don't know. 1:57:04 I think the. 1:57:06 If it's really true that there are like. 1:57:10 Redeemable like you have the USDT. 1:57:13 And if it's really the case that people are making other kinds of redeemable stuff and there's this huge amounts of. 1:57:19 Trading volumes and that there's then then we should do it. 1:57:23 I'm most one of the cool things about prediction market is the product is information. 1:57:27 So it's kind of like you can actually settle it all on chain without like someone having to ship a giant container of gold or whatever, like ten thousand pounds of copper or whatever it is. 1:57:38 So that seems like a horrible complication that I would never want to like. 1:57:43 How does it involve with. 1:57:45 How does like. 1:57:46 Sorry. 1:57:47 How does like Truthcoin benefit from being like really well capitalized than like if it is successful? 1:57:55 Well, when you mean capitalized, like I would say there's OK, I think there's a lot of markets that, you know. 1:58:01 So first of all, I am in favor of other things, like I do think people should have like digital property. 1:58:05 I think it's not the worst thing that people have these these ordinals and these like stock digital stock and bonds. 1:58:12 I think it's not the worst thing in the world. 1:58:14 And of course, the names we already discussed owning a name. 1:58:17 But if for prediction markets, I do think there are a lot that have been totally, you know, I've been writing about this for like ten years. 1:58:23 Even calcium and Polymarket, they're not doing what I always suggested year after year, which is that you have these these hybrid conditional markets. 1:58:34 So you say, like, OK, if we who's going to win the World Cup, if they fire their head coach tomorrow. 1:58:41 And then you have like parallel realities. 1:58:44 And this is what I was always saying. 1:58:46 What if the Fed cuts rates? 1:58:47 What would inflation be? 1:58:48 You know, if we fired the CEO, what would the stock price be? 1:58:51 If this if we fight, if the Republicans lose power in twenty twenty eight. 1:58:56 What will GDP be? 1:58:58 So that's what I was always saying. 1:58:59 Everyone should do. 1:59:00 And people still haven't done it. 1:59:02 So I think that's a huge I think that's totally big. 1:59:05 And, you know, if you people can just look into what I've written about that and hopefully they get excited about it in a similar way that I am. 1:59:13 Do you see at all, like any aspects of like just like highly liquid trading markets or like the in defy that kind of emulate any of those same benefits? 1:59:26 Or is it like you think totally orthogonal? 1:59:29 Well, I don't want people to get discouraged. 1:59:33 And I am a pluralist. 1:59:34 And I think, you know, if if that's what floats your boat, then great. 1:59:39 But, yeah, I could never really see a lot of value in the Ethereum defy. 1:59:44 I liked that it was, you know, it was unconstructed. 1:59:47 Like it was kind of like ordinals where I was like, OK, I'm happy that people are doing it. 1:59:50 I'm happy that fees are being paid. 1:59:52 I'm happy that we have real users. 1:59:54 But ultimately, it is just like buying a dollar bill with a weird serial number. 2:00:00 And ultimately, it did kind of it wasn't like long lived. 2:00:04 I would rather have, you know, like stuff where you could eventually have like a whole industry of people whose full time job is to bet on, OK, if what, you know, this type of trade where, you know, it's very, very, very high information where it's kind of saying like, OK, if we. 2:00:20 If the, you know, Democratic Party takes power and there is higher than expected inflation and the Federal Reserve chair is replaced and they cut interest rates and the, you know, velocity of money is this, then what is GDP? 2:00:36 You have like this, like extremely complicated situation where any traders, they may or may not have PhDs and they may or may not write papers in their spare time. 2:00:48 But, you know, anyone, you know, that's well, that's part of the benefit of this prediction market thing is that anyone could then do what the, you know, the FOMC does. 2:00:57 They can just say like, OK, if we. 2:01:01 Well, I don't you can read about the details. 2:01:03 It's kind of like it's hard to explain. 2:01:05 And so it's 401. 2:01:06 So but yeah, I don't you know, the Ethereum stuff seemed like a solution in search of a problem to me. 2:01:12 And it seemed almost as like they were desperate to show, well, some stuff can happen over here in Ethereum, whereas Bitcoin just does payments. 2:01:20 But we talked earlier how it's like ironic that now everyone thinks the grass is greener. 2:01:25 So I don't know if that was a real answer. 2:01:27 There's some crazy activity happening. 2:01:29 I will check it out. 2:01:30 It was a real pleasure chatting with you, Paul, as always. 2:01:33 Thank you. 2:01:34 Yeah. 2:01:35 Yeah. 2:01:36 Nice talking to you as always. 2:01:37 Thank you very much for stopping by. 2:01:39 Goodbye. 2:01:40 And stop back again. 2:01:41 We try to hang out on Wednesdays usually. 2:01:43 Awesome. 2:01:44 But we'll see. 2:01:46 I'll see. 2:01:47 And so thanks, everyone. 2:01:49 Thank you. 2:01:50 Yeah. 2:01:51 Same here. 2:01:52 So we'll have to end it now. 2:01:54 As always, we end it just as it gets going. 2:01:57 But that's just how it is. 2:02:00 So I'll see everyone next week. 2:02:02 And thanks very much for joining. 2:02:04 And I hope you all enjoy listening to the recording and see you on YouTube and et cetera. 2:02:09 So until next time, goodbye.
