0:00 Okay, now it is 2 o'clock and I'd just like to remind anyone who is watching the recording 0:10 to just skip in because normally this is a very slow start and then it ends much better. 0:19 But I'll just start talking about the mobile wallet is out. 0:23 New mobile wallet is out and eCash.com wallet. 0:30 So that's exciting. 0:31 And then I said I would do this free samurai thing, but I didn't do it yet. 0:36 And there's really no reason for it because basically I finished it. 0:39 But sometimes when I finish writing something, I want to see like digest it a little bit 0:43 and think like, should I change any of this, but I haven't changed any of this fine. 0:49 So I think tomorrow at 9 a.m. or 7 a.m., a publisher, I was thinking about that. 0:56 I'm sorry for the delay. 0:58 There's really no reason other than I was doing a lot of jogging and it makes me very 1:03 tired to go jogging in the sun to sleep, but okay. 1:13 And I wanted to comment on the comparative advantage tweet I made this week. 1:23 It's very simple. 1:24 Unless anyone wants to come up, if you want to come up and ask a question, please feel 1:30 free to do so. 1:34 Otherwise I'll just run through my list of events of the week primarily for the benefit 1:40 of anyone listening to the recording. 1:44 Because otherwise there'll just be a bunch of blank space. 1:47 But over the past week, I compared, okay, I retweeted a bunch of stuff that I tweeted 1:52 about microstrategy a long time ago. 1:55 One of them was I asked a simple question, what is microstrategy comparative advantage? 2:00 And then we had to listen to this wacky answer from Lynn Alden to say something about some 2:09 nonsense answer. 2:10 I don't even remember it. 2:11 Like I don't even remember what it was, but I just like to go over why that it's such 2:16 an important, if something is a comparative advantage, for example, Elon Tesla can make 2:23 electric cars better than I can. 2:29 So if it's a comparative advantage, that means it's good for them to make the cars and it's 2:34 good for me to invest the money. 2:37 It's good for both of us, two out of two people it's good for. 2:41 If you go to the bakery, you have the bakery to get some bread. 2:46 If they're really good at baking the bread, maybe they break it all at once in a big oven. 2:51 They have economies of scale, they have expertise, they're specialists. 2:58 It's good for them to bake as much bread as they can. 3:01 It's good for me to buy it there instead of making it myself. 3:04 So again, two out of two, two out of two people it's good for. 3:11 The idea of comparative advantage means there's always a gain from the trade for both sides 3:17 of the trade. 3:19 Now for microstrategy, what on earth is the gain from the trade supposed to be? 3:25 If there's no comparative advantage, it means that someone is benefiting at the expense 3:29 of someone else and that is in fact the case because now microstrategy is in this situation 3:37 where they're either going to screw over Peter to pay Paul, so to speak, except not me because 3:44 I didn't buy any of this junk, but metaphorically you have a certain amount of money, a certain 3:52 pool of money and you have the preferreds, you have the common stock and you have convertible 3:56 debt and you have the assets and these assets are just going to go to someone, someone will 4:04 get these. 4:05 If you're just re-slicing up the pizza pie in different ways, then some people are benefiting 4:09 at the expense of other people. 4:10 When you have comparative advantage, it grows the pie, you grow the pie. 4:14 This is what it's all about, it's growing the pie because growing the pie, it's more 4:21 pie for everyone. 4:24 If instead we just fight each other, then it's just life is nasty, brutish and short 4:29 and nature is red in tooth and claw and all that's very depressing and sad, whereas if 4:34 we grow the pie, eventually everyone will have a solution to every problem that they 4:40 could ever have had in their entire life. 4:42 Eventually it would be better health, better entertainment, we'll be bringing people back 4:47 to life, we'll be restarting the universe, free entropy and blah, blah, blah. 4:54 Free energy, I mean, meant to say, but the point is comparative advantage is where it's 5:00 all at. 5:02 That's what micro-strategy needs to have, but how could they have one because they're 5:07 just buying Bitcoin, which you could do themselves and you got to pay for their lawyers and accounts. 5:13 Now again, if you want to ask or comment on anything, hop on up, and Vlad is here as 5:20 the co-host, so Vlad, if you have anything you want to comment on, but again, mobile 5:25 wallet is out, free samurai thing will be, that'll be tomorrow at 7am, hopefully, God 5:29 willing, I mean, I delayed it pointlessly for no reason for like a whole week, but it 5:36 is what it is. 5:37 I wanted to comment on BitNames and how much better it is, in the future it will be, which 5:44 is to say, I was thinking about earlier this week, I got an email from a utility company 5:53 that was saying, pay this bill, and I was like, oh, okay. 5:58 In it, you have to click the link, then the link brings you to the login page, you have 6:04 to type in your email and password again, now of course, whatever, a million passwords 6:09 everyone is always going to forget. 6:11 Then once you're in there, you got to type in all this stuff. 6:15 What is the point of that? 6:16 In the BitNames universe, it's just the message is already, you know, once they send you a 6:21 message and say, hi, you still owe me $20, you say, okay, you pay, right in the thing. 6:29 That's what it should be like. 6:31 That's what a nightmare it's like instead. 6:35 But of course, people have tried to do that for years, Apple and whatever. 6:39 Presumably, I don't know that this is the case, but presumably it's because of all the 6:44 financial regulations and stuff that they cannot easily do that, and they're worried 6:49 about a whole list of other things, fraud, et cetera, banking, whatever. 6:57 Anyway, so that's one thing. 7:01 What's another thing? 7:02 Let's see what else I see on my list. 7:03 Oh, this happened yesterday. 7:04 Okay. 7:05 I don't know if anyone will be interested in this at all, but I see Joe is here. 7:11 But this guy, Fred K., and I don't remember where this guy got his start. 7:16 He's apparently a Stanford PhD, but he's got some wacky views on when to bring up confidence 7:25 intervals. 7:27 First of all, so he has this funny tweet, I don't know, I could barely even wrap my 7:33 head around it. 7:34 It's quite embarrassing. 7:35 But he's saying that he ran a poll, and the poll was something like 54% to 46%, and because 7:44 it had a high enough N, high enough number of respondents, he's saying, basically he's 7:49 saying we can reject the hypothesis that it's a 50-50 or something. 7:54 It's really bizarre because the criterion he's using is, so this is something that you're 8:01 taught in statistics class, and a lot of people don't understand it very well, including this 8:05 guy. 8:06 I don't even know where to wrap my head around how silly it is, but basically he's saying 8:11 that if he reran the poll, and it was 50.001% versus 49.999%, but you had like a billion, 8:20 N equals a billion respondents. 8:22 The confidence is, you know, the so-called P-value go down, you become even more confident 8:30 that it was more than 50%. 8:33 But I mean, what the heck is the point? 8:37 So I don't know. 8:38 The guy is an interesting character, and there's this thing, structural equation. 8:44 Probably no one cares about this at all, but this guy, but it's just, it's wild for someone 8:49 with a Stanford PhD to just be rambling on about such a ridiculous criterion. 8:55 I mean, he's literally, imagine you go down to the street, you got another, this is a 8:58 more relatable example, and you survey like five people who live near you. 9:03 No, hey, what do you think about cutting taxes? 9:07 And then all four out of five say that, and then you just say, oh, that's 80%. 9:12 That's a number for like the whole, that's a number for the whole. 9:17 That's a reliable estimate of like the pop of the world's population is thoughts on tax. 9:23 So it's just bizarre, but whatever. 9:25 We've got a lot of wacky people in Bitcoin, but this is like a leading light of 110. 9:31 So I don't know. 9:32 No one's going to care about that. 9:33 But I thought I would mention it to fill the time until someone comes up and asks a real 9:39 question. 9:40 We've got Hunter Beast here, I added him as a speaker, but oh, here we go. 9:48 Hey guys, thanks for adding me. 9:51 Yeah, I've got lots of questions. 9:53 So honestly, I haven't looked into eCash enough, at least, first of all, why the name? 10:01 Because it's a little confusing, right? 10:02 Like it's, there's a lot of things named that before, and so just curious about that decision 10:10 first. 10:11 Yeah, it's a generic name. 10:15 But it's a pretty good name because it's two syllables and it's easy to spell. 10:20 And eCash.com was available, actually many domains, I was very surprised myself. 10:26 I would never have done it if there wasn't, if we didn't find out that all these domains 10:33 were available, but many,.com,.com with a dash,.net, like a bunch of misspelled versions, 10:39 a bunch of like weird. 10:42 So it was, as far as I'm concerned, the domain, you know, the.com is mostly the name. 10:48 Interesting. 10:49 Yeah. 10:50 Well, it's funny about when you originally announced the eCash hard fork for Bitcoin, 10:58 that there was like a community note that said that like there was some like shitcoin 11:06 like from 2021 named that. 11:09 And I had pointed out that it was like originally coined as a term in the 1980s, like Charmini 11:16 Cash. 11:18 And my community note, I still cannot produce community notes now due to that. 11:25 Me pointing out, like, it's like the only time I've ever used community notes was like, 11:29 oh, I can speak to this. 11:31 And the shitcoiners basically reported my note because I had not acknowledged their 11:38 random shitcoin by the same name that essentially like was completely irrelevant to the discussion 11:46 of the name eCash, which I thought was kind of funny. 11:51 Well, there's a lot of literature that refers to eCash. 11:54 I think there's an article from The Economist dating back to the late 80s or early 90s 12:01 where they were trying to describe eCash. 12:03 And I also believe it's on the blog of some Dutch guy who has been researching Bitcoin 12:10 and has been archiving stuff. 12:12 And one of the earliest allegedly versions of the Bitcoin white paper was actually called 12:18 eCash.pdf. 12:19 And the title of it before it was Bitcoin was not Bitcoin, a peer to peer electronic 12:24 cash system. 12:25 It was electronic cash without a trusted third party or something along these lines. 12:30 So it's been like this long term cypherpunk quest to be able to create decentralized eCash. 12:37 Of course, Bitcoin is not really decentralized eCash because it doesn't have the privacy 12:42 aspect of it, which the Chami and eCash had. 12:45 But it is decentralized with Game Theory and all the cool stuff that Satoshi came up with 12:52 by stitching together elements that were researched prior to his emergence. 12:57 So eCash is sort of like a precursor to Bitcoin and the fact that this hard fork of 13:04 Bitcoin is going to have a privacy sidechain and basically it will be able to fulfill a 13:11 lot of the ideas that were being discussed for eCash generically gives it a bit more 13:18 legitimacy. Whereas in the case of the fork of Bitcoin cash, which is called XCC or eCash, 13:28 that one just adds the avalanche pre consensus, which makes it like a hybrid of proof of 13:34 work and proof of stake. 13:35 But it doesn't have privacy. 13:37 It doesn't have anything very interesting outside of that. 13:41 That is so funny. 13:42 So they added avalanche consensus to a fork of Bitcoin cash and they called it eCash. 13:49 Yeah, I didn't even really know that this was I didn't even like I was just like what I 13:54 thought was because I kind of glanced at it when I was researching the eCash.com and I 13:59 just thought that, oh, someone bought like some tiny domain and that this is like some 14:05 complete fly by night operation that's just run by 15 people with like a botnet, which it 14:10 basically is. But that's I kind of just thought someone just bought the thing and just did 14:15 some kind of because it's very, very low coin market cap and it has only like 100 14:21 million. The total market cap, which is like super, super inflated because it's like it 14:28 turns out that the XCC is like a fork of a fork of Bitcoin cash or something like that, 14:35 Bitcoin cash itself forked a few times. 14:38 So like most of the UTXOs are totally dormant. 14:42 So and like the trading, everything is like super, super small, much smaller than so. 14:47 Yeah, that is kind of unfortunate that I hate to step on anyone's toes. 14:51 But of course, there are many, many things named have been named eCash over the years. 14:55 And of course, it's kind of a generic idea. 14:57 Like, you know, you have email, e-scooter, whatever, a million things named e, you know, 15:03 like e-ink, like there's like a trillion things. 15:07 So it's like I didn't really like the thing that comes to my mind, like the question that 15:11 comes to my mind is like if you're using avalanche consensus and also proof of work 15:18 somehow, then that's confusing to me as a protocol engineer because you have multiple 15:23 sources of truth for one. 15:25 But then also what's confusing to me is why do you call it eCash if we're thinking like 15:31 like when I think when somebody says eCash, maybe I'm wrong to think this. 15:34 But when somebody says eCash, I think of Chowmian eCash, which, you know, has a system 15:38 of Chowmian mints that, you know, they have some kind of collateral and they have some 15:44 kind of proof of reserves or some proof of liabilities. 15:47 And they have, you know, like, you know, like issuance against those reserves. 15:52 And then those eCash notes, those tokens, those notes or whatever you call them, those 15:58 are then transferable as bare instruments off chain. 16:02 Right. And so like you have perfect privacy in that scenario. 16:06 But what's weird about that is how the fuck do you involve avalanche consensus when 16:14 you're making like I don't understand. 16:18 Like so it doesn't matter. 16:19 I wouldn't worry about it. The thing is, though, they pay the they have a thing set up 16:24 where they have like a dev tax that pays one person. 16:28 And I'm pretty sure, you know, it's like kind of obvious, like that person has purchased 16:32 a bunch of like Twitter bots. 16:34 So that is how you. 16:36 So it just is what it is, and obviously they're not going to be happy and there's 16:41 nothing we can do to. 16:44 Bring them any joy in life, so it's just it is what it is, it's just going to have to 16:48 like, I mean, I would have thought, but yeah, like with doing very, very little, the 16:53 project is already much like even at the the sales already, the level of sales and 17:01 the like, you can look at the Solana meme token market cap and it's already like this 17:05 project is already like 10 times larger than it has even gotten started yet. 17:10 So it's just like whatever it is, it is what it is. 17:13 Do we want to move to a second? 17:17 I just had a question in regards to like stable coins, and I don't know if you were 17:21 sorry, I interrupted you. 17:23 No, please ask the question. 17:25 Yeah, just in regards to stable coins. 17:27 Like, so you have a strategy for sort of BitNames, like how to like compete with ICANN. 17:33 I don't know if there's like any equivalent strategy for like kind of like competing with 17:36 like major stable coins or if there's an advantage to using stable coins like within 17:42 the ecosystem of Drivechain in particular. 17:44 I don't know if you caught this. 17:45 This question has come up before, but you can have like a stable coin of a stable coin. 17:51 So I was either thinking, OK, because here's what I'm thinking. 17:53 This is how I think about it. 17:56 Tether is like the most profitable business model like in the universe. 18:01 I think that is not even an exaggeration to say, I think it's literally the case, like 18:06 profit per employee is like huge. 18:08 So they just have printing money hand over foot. 18:13 And so why would they if they're either going to team up with us and continue to make 18:19 huge amounts of money or they're going to not do that, if they don't, someone can just 18:25 make it like a tether, like a USDT, D, a Drivechain, USDT, and where it's redeemable 18:36 for USDT. And now it's completely programmatic. 18:40 You don't need to have a bank account. 18:41 Like Tether needs to have a bank account and he sells stuff. 18:44 And you wouldn't need you just publish the amount of USDT you hold somehow, right? 18:50 And the other thing is you can stake if you just have USDT on Kraken or whatever, you can get 18:55 like a free yield on it, which is just the same thing that other people do is they have all 18:59 their actual real fiat, dirty fiat USDT. 19:04 They have that in earning some yield somewhere, which is why they make so much money doing 19:10 nothing. And so, yeah, basically, if you would just be a new tether. 19:16 So since all this is like unbelievably viable business model, to say the least, I kind of 19:22 don't worry about it that much. 19:24 That's my that's my thought on that. 19:26 That's like my strategy. 19:29 OK, cool. If I can like one question, why the decision of setting the difficulty to 19:40 one? Because like I expect a lot of people like trying to reorg each other. 19:46 And one second question, there will be just one official pool or will be the code like of 19:52 the reference pool public and everyone can run his own pool? 19:57 Yeah, those are really good questions. 19:59 First of all, the the pool will be open source. 20:03 Anyone can run will anyone will be able to run a pool. 20:07 And I'm afraid the whole thing about setting the difficulty to one, 20:11 you know, that's maybe me taking a little bit of artistic license and explaining 20:16 what I meant was it will be very low in the battle between setting it too high 20:22 and too low and I intentionally set it too low. 20:26 And so it won't literally be the lowest 20:28 possible value, but it will kind of look around, 20:31 figure out what do we think the difficulty should be? 20:35 Then divide that by like 200 20:39 or something. 20:41 So the point is, it will be too low. 20:44 You know, then skyrocket up by a factor 20:47 of four several times since four is the maximum difficulty adjustment. 20:51 But it'll just go up by four and then go up by four again. 20:54 So to go for 16, et cetera, 20:58 and it will just go up and up and it will eventually hit. 21:01 So that's that is the launch trajectory. 21:03 So it won't literally go to the lowest difficulty. 21:08 I was just trying to make it clear using a few words as possible that it will be. 21:15 We're going to be undershooting it on purpose. 21:19 OK, thank you. 21:20 Just last question, pool wise, like at the launch, 21:25 we will have just one pool or like the code of the pool will be public 21:30 like a month before the launch of UKish. 21:33 Yeah, I know the pool will be it already is this simple pool is open source, 21:38 it's not that good yet, but it's getting better all the time. 21:43 And 21:44 people can also we really only need there to be two of them, 21:48 if you think about it, because you can either point or it will it will cash you 21:52 out. The way it will eventually work, hopefully, 21:56 you know, sometime very soon, like talking like next week or so, 22:00 but you never know with software, it always takes longer than you think. 22:04 So it should be paying you out on thunder very, very quickly. 22:09 So 22:10 you should be able to just point your hash rate to the pool. 22:14 But these are kind of difficult, 22:17 complicated, complicated details to iron out. 22:20 But yeah, and of course, even if it's not at launch, 22:24 the whole the end goal is that there will be open source pool software. 22:30 That works with open source node 22:33 and to the point where anyone can easily leave a pool and start their own, 22:39 and that will massively increase pool competitiveness. 22:43 So I think we have pulled that drivechain.info. 22:46 If you want more technical details, 22:51 those are there. 22:55 I think 22:58 is where it is living for now, but we'll have to 23:02 continue after that. 23:07 Sorry, I was asking him if he was in the telegram, didn't mean to cut you off. 23:10 Sorry. All right. 23:12 OK, no problem. 23:18 So I saw you talking about Tether and USDT 23:22 and 23:25 one of the use cases we know, and I said this before, that is huge today, 23:29 is stable coin payments, right? 23:31 But 23:33 as far as I understand, you could not do like USDT token on thunder, right? 23:39 So where would where would it be like, 23:43 because we have elements and that can handle assets, but it doesn't scale, right? 23:49 It's not meant to scale too much. 23:52 So if that ever becomes like the expected to be a new chain. 23:57 Yeah, of course, we have this thing, 23:59 BitAssets, which is supposed to be set up for that. 24:02 Now, OK, this is a question that people have asked many times about. 24:08 To what extent should they be? 24:11 Should the sidechains be topic specific, 24:15 like should they be like a Swiss army knife or should they be like 24:19 or should they just be like different block sizes? 24:21 So some people say that Thunder and BitAssets should merge. 24:26 Merge, yeah. Some say that. 24:28 Yeah, I don't know. Maybe they should. 24:30 I think it could be either way. 24:32 It could be good. It could be a good idea. 24:35 The thing is 24:39 what happens in other stuff like, let's say, 24:41 Ethereum, is that you can mint in the in the base chain 24:46 and then you transport it to other chains. 24:49 We cannot do this in the case of eCash. 24:53 Well, I well, actually, we could. 24:56 Yeah, we could. 24:57 We could do like organelles and stuff and then you but then wouldn't you need to do 25:02 another soft work for that to work so that you can transport the assets and then 25:07 the the miners understand it? 25:10 I don't I don't know, but I don't it depends on how you do it. 25:13 I don't think so, though. 25:14 Yeah, I think you could. 25:16 The same way that you have USDT. 25:20 On both eCash and Solana, you could have it on both BitAssets and 25:26 Thunder also, I think. 25:27 I don't see why you wouldn't be able to. 25:29 It depends on how people set it up. 25:31 Yeah, 25:33 that would be the case for like if someone wants to wrap it, right? 25:38 Yeah, so you could you can always go the other way where you say, 25:41 so, for example, everyone has to run an L1 node at first, 25:46 then they run the L2 node on top of it. 25:49 So they run BitAssets. 25:50 And then you could someone could theoretically have something where they 25:53 must run L1, Thunder and BitAssets and they've plus a fourth thing. 26:00 And so you can then, like, have some some bigger things. 26:03 You can always go the other way. 26:06 So I think that it should work out just fine, I think, I would think. 26:10 That's my guess. 26:12 For USDT, it could, I think. 26:16 But then. 26:20 The thing is, what I'm imagining is that on launch, 26:25 someone could do like wrap the USDT on, let's say, elements, right? 26:30 And then they will also have to do it on BitAssets. 26:33 But then I'm not sure because like elements, you could theoretically do like 26:40 DeFi stuff and on BitAssets, you could do like, well, everyday payments. 26:47 It's separate liquidity, right? 26:50 And I don't know, just just just rambling, 26:53 because we know how big of a of a use case that is. 26:57 So I wanted an answer for that. 26:58 So. 27:01 Well, I think this is the important thing 27:03 that we're trying to get to is the new the first dry run, 27:07 which is to say we currently have Signet, we have had different versions of stuff 27:11 that was called like Forknet and RegTestMode, we have various test coins. 27:15 This will be a new like public test as if the eCash fork happened 27:22 yesterday or something like that. 27:24 So that will give us all an opportunity to see all the chaos unfold 27:31 as if it was the real eCash. 27:33 But with it being understood that this is a test net 27:37 with like coins that are not supposed to be worth 27:40 money because the new eCash will replace it. 27:44 And we plan to do a few of these. 27:47 So when we do that, then many of these 27:49 theoretical questions will be brought to an abrupt end because it will just be like, 27:54 oh, people will have an actual thing and then you'll be able to see for yourself. 27:58 Hey, did it work? 27:59 And if it works there, it will work on the real eCash. 28:02 So not that I think of it. 28:04 Maybe it's not a big problem, especially because this thing will start small. 28:08 Right. 28:08 So let's say 28:11 we start getting users like one year in or something. 28:14 So 28:15 we can, if we see actually a large influx of users, we can, for one, 28:22 we can make a new Drivechain if there is actual demand. 28:25 But also I think I saw something about, does Thunder have a growing block size? 28:31 Is it a fixed block size? 28:33 What is it? 28:34 It does grow. 28:35 Yes. 28:37 I haven't seen the details of like how does it grow? 28:40 Like if demand comes. 28:43 I can't exactly remember myself. 28:45 It's been so many years, but it's something like starts at eight megabytes 28:48 and then it goes to eight hundred megabytes. 28:50 It's something like that. 28:51 Geometrically growing over like ten years or something. 28:54 So that it's I don't remember if that's what it is, but it's something like that. 28:57 The point is, it would be much more than 29:00 and then if that one runs out, you just have Thunder two. 29:05 So you have lots of options. 29:07 You see what I mean? 29:08 So you have it's great because you just have one that's set in stone. 29:13 Then if that one really fills up and there's absolutely no space, 29:16 you can just do Thunder two. 29:17 Now, Thunder two could have a fresh eight going to eight hundred or it could have 29:23 whatever, it could just start with 60 megabytes and go to whatever, 29:26 six terabytes or something over five years. 29:28 So you have a completely different each each time. 29:31 You can kind of right size it and kind of, you know, whatever. 29:35 Well, one thing I think about is like it's a bit like sharding, but in a different way. 29:42 So 29:43 you know how these chains have the concept of sharding and Drivechain is a is a kind 29:49 of a different way of doing it. 29:52 Everyone, the sidechain community, myself, 29:55 we invented all this long before there even was an Ethereum. 29:58 They stole the sharding word and idea from us. 30:02 Except this is worse. 30:04 I know it doesn't make any sense. 30:05 Yeah. Welcome to my world. 30:09 This this BitAssets also grow the block size. 30:14 Yes, it does. 30:16 But I also can't remember what it is. 30:17 But you see, this is something we can easily tinker with like at the last minute, 30:21 like before a month before you decide it's a good question, 30:25 because I think with assets, you're much more going for like the degen 30:29 pumped out fun ordinals. 30:32 Yeah, that's the idea. 30:34 But yeah, there's a bunch of legitimate 30:36 there's a bunch of totally legitimate uses of these these assets. 30:41 But not to say that the other things are not. 30:42 But they're kind of those are like frivolities. 30:46 And yeah, this I list I have a big piece of writing about this 30:51 called BitAssets that people can read like, OK, yeah, all this stuff about like 30:55 there's what they call the the proportional goods. 30:59 So like anything with like a we have stocks and bonds, 31:04 anything where it matters, you know, 31:06 with the stock, it matters what percent of the company you own. 31:09 So digital scarcity is very important. 31:12 Anything with collectibles. 31:14 So I have it written out there for anyone who cares to 31:21 read about that. 31:23 I just wanted to say that I think you're you're going to ban most of your users 31:29 or potential users, rather, via complexity. 31:33 Download this run node one, node two, whatever. 31:38 I'm sorry, man. 31:39 You're you're like every time I hear you say something like that, I'm like, OK, 31:45 there's 10 more percent of your potential user base gone. 31:48 Well, let me ask you this, have you run our software? 31:51 No, but I probably won't just because it sounds very, very complex. 31:56 I should just be able to install everything. 31:59 Sounds complex. 32:01 Everything sounds complex when the first day, you know, like to a child. 32:06 That's why Harry Potter is so successful. 32:08 The first miners on the Bitcoin network, 32:10 it was a fucking download and install associated with the Bitcoin network. 32:15 It was a fucking download and install associate and go. 32:20 Yeah, but that's what it is with us, too. 32:21 That's why it's that's why I asked you just down the window. 32:24 It's like a button like the description. 32:28 I'm just saying it's adversarial here. 32:30 I was just saying that. 32:32 Well, yeah, we have to he's asking like a 32:37 a question about the long run equilibrium of like these two different. 32:41 So it's a little bit of a different type. 32:43 But what the user sees is they just see 32:45 their window and then there's a sidechains tab and then there's a button for 32:49 BitAssets because download, it's it's less complicated than trying 32:53 to play the, you know, Halo Master Chief collection or something like that. 32:58 OK, well, I'm your desktop computer. 33:02 Do you have a block size limit? 33:07 With each different chain has its own block size limit, 33:11 but over all the chains, since there can be an unlimited number 33:15 of chains and each chain could have a very high limit, 33:18 it's sort of the best of both worlds where in practice there kind of is no limit. 33:22 Well, you couldn't you kind of get around 33:25 the necessity for having multiple chains if you just had like no limit on. 33:29 Well, yes, of course. 33:30 But that's that's not a desirable thing at all. 33:33 The limit is what keeps the node costs down. 33:36 Now, the limit is what keeps the use down. 33:40 And because like the the the more limited 33:43 the space related all it is and the more expensive it is. 33:47 I mean, I see value in having a load, no cost, but it's separately. 33:52 I was just wondering, I don't know that the software exists 33:55 currently for like auditing bundles that like each sidechain where you like, 33:59 if you're a miner or just somebody who runs a sidechain to be able to validate 34:04 that all submitted bundles are kind of like accurate, like just visually. 34:09 I don't know. 34:09 I mean, that would be something that I guess I would make. 34:12 I cared more about this in the we had 34:15 the QT version of the software, which was super, super good. 34:18 So I really, really liked and it has that. 34:21 But I'm just going to kind of go over. 34:23 This is an interesting topic. 34:24 It was the full node will always compute the correct bundle hash, 34:28 which is to say it summarizes everything over the past several months into one hash. 34:34 And 34:36 so every full node always knows what these are. 34:38 But it also puts the hash, which is the same. 34:40 It's an unchanged hash for like three months. 34:42 It puts them in each header. 34:44 So if you just run an SPV mode, each of the chains, you have a very, 34:50 very, very reliable glimpse into what the hashes should be. 34:55 And this is even without doing any L2 full nodes 34:59 because they have to lie in a very complicated way. 35:02 They have to like lie and then mine the L2 blocks containing 35:08 the invalid hash, which all of the L2, the entire L2 network will immediately 35:12 reject even before it downloads any of those blocks. 35:16 So these are that's sort of the. 35:20 I didn't quite follow. 35:21 How how does it immediately reject it on the sidechain? 35:24 OK, we're talking remember the L2. 35:26 Maybe an interesting way of thinking about it is you imagine that you're playing some 35:30 kind of game and I don't know what kind of game this would be. 35:34 Trying to imagine like, 35:37 you know, I don't want to go too weird with these metaphors, but like, 35:40 you know, Warcraft three, some of the units are invisible and some 35:43 of the units have true sight, they can see the invisible units by other units can't. 35:47 And so it's kind of like the full nodes. 35:50 They they have to they have the burden of processing all the data. 35:57 This is the thing that CREF 23 doesn't care about at all. 36:00 This the cost of processing and serving, retaining all the data. 36:05 But so they're like this expensive, 36:08 slow moving unit, but they know immediately once any single thing, 36:13 if one byte is wrong somewhere, if one transaction is wrong 36:17 and especially they know of the bundle, the bundle is wrong or the bundle hash is 36:22 wrong. OK, does that make sense so far? 36:25 So the L2, they know everything. 36:26 Yeah. Now, 36:29 separately, you have the L1 people who only see 36:32 the bundle hash and how much mining work is on it. 36:38 They don't see the they don't know. 36:41 So they're trying to guess. 36:43 But the issue is. 36:46 It's very hard for the for you to get anything about merely proposing the wrong 36:52 bundle hash or even giving it a lot of work, because it's not until you give it 36:56 the full three months of work that it pays out, the attack pays out for you. 37:01 So you have to worry about not only how 37:03 attentive our people are now, but how might they react if they 37:07 suspect that something is up and they can look into it at any time, 37:11 whereas regular time they're just lazily doing nothing and expecting it to work. 37:15 And it does work. So you have your cake and eat it, too. 37:18 But then they think like, oh, so this is like, OK, so that's the setup. 37:23 Now, when I say the sidechain headers, 37:26 the blockchain is made basically of this link of hashes. 37:30 But the hashes are not of the blocks themselves. 37:33 In Bitcoin, as you may know, 37:36 in Bitcoin, you have these heads, 80 byte headers, each header contains like 37:40 conversion number hash of the previous block, hash of the Merkle root of this 37:46 block, you know, and some other stuff, timestamp, nonce, whatever. 37:50 So it's this tiny, tiny 80 byte header, 37:53 very small, and there's only four point four megabytes per year. 37:58 And so they're very easy for everyone to download. 38:01 And 38:03 they have the Merkle root, 38:05 they have basically the hash of the transactions of the block. 38:08 Basically, I'm skipping over some details. 38:11 OK, so the L2 nodes have this as well, 38:14 but in their header is the hash of the bundle. 38:19 Now, 38:21 if you already, before all this happened, if you had already downloaded. 38:27 SPV L2 node, this is again, this is like a four point, 38:31 this is not quite, but it's basically four point four megabytes per year. 38:36 The bundle is included in what? 38:38 It's in the header, the sidechain header. 38:42 OK, right. 38:44 So if you already have your SPV, we already we already established a long 38:49 time ago, the nodes know instantly that something whenever anything goes wrong. 38:54 But if you download SPV sidechain node, 38:59 it will also 39:01 it will know if the bundle in L1 doesn't match the bundle in the header. 39:06 So it will know that those two things are inconsistent. 39:09 It won't necessarily know which one is 39:11 wrong, because if you think about it, it could go either way. 39:14 It could be that someone has just straight 39:16 up lying flagrantly in the L1 about what the bundle is and that the SPV 39:23 header is the true header. 39:27 Or it could be that the the the liar has decided to 39:36 lie about what the header is and they are mining fake SPV blocks and that is the 39:41 other one, because what will really happen at the end of the day is there will really 39:44 be like two headers, two bundle hashes in L1 that are kind of like duking it out. 39:50 And so there will always be 39:52 spending again. 39:55 Not talking exactly, I don't think about that, but if you do so, yeah, you think it would just be very difficult to to create like a false header, in essence, that because it's being committed to on L2. 40:08 Yeah, if you want to precisely the headers are very, very easy to check against the so first of all, all the L2 nodes immediately also know if any of the headers are fake. 40:19 But faking the header requires effectively paying the security budget. It's not exactly the same as the thermodynamic budget on L1, but it's almost the same because you have to pay the Blind Merged Mining, you have to basically outspend every total amount of fees on each L2 block to make a competing header. 40:40 Yeah, I guess I didn't appreciate how important it is to include the bundle hash in the sidechain headers. 40:48 Yeah, the header is very expensive to fake. You can fake it, but it's expensive because the whole like if the sidechain is pulling in $10,000 in fees every 10 minutes, then you have to spend like $10,005 to fake the header because the header is like occupying the critical real estate in L1. 41:07 Paul, it sounds like you've created a wonderful attack surface for the Federal Reserve, but thank you very much. I wish you the best of luck and you should listen to Coin Metal or I mean the DShift rather. Thank you. Bye. 41:21 Okay, thanks. Great. The first of many strange critics we'll see on the space today, I'm sure. But so yeah, the header is difficult to fake and it's expensive to fake and it's super easy to download and check. So this is just a huge asymmetry and it's so that's very helpful. 41:47 Is that still something you would recommend somebody to build just like to visually be able to validate, I suppose, like headers? 41:53 Yeah, absolutely. I mean, in particular, there's no SPV L2 nodes or wallets yet, but certainly the mobile wallet will become that over the next two or three or four weeks. The eCash.com wallet will do that. So then other people will be able to do it as well. 42:12 And, you know, people could have like, you know, they could do whatever they want with it. It could be like an infura. That's another thing is that I'm not sure where the comparative advantage lies in terms of like, this is a good idea, but it also raises the specter of like free riding. 42:36 But yeah, there could definitely be a service where that person just runs all the full nodes. And then they just, this is like what people were asking about last week about, can I just have API access? 42:49 Don't you think this will end up happening with chains like Thunder since they have a big block size? 42:53 Yes, of course. It will. That's exactly right. Like anything with a node cost is very inexpensive. There's no reason to do it. So no one will do it. But when other people will push the envelope, there will be like a Solana. 43:08 People will keep pushing the envelope until it breaks, I think. So there are people eventually be proposing bizarre sidechains that have like 10 terabyte blocks and stuff that that will probably just not stop work. They'll probably stop working at some point. But while they or maybe even completely centralized chains, we kind of already have that. That's kind of like basically a lot of what we already have with like stuff like base and whatever. 43:33 The whole point of the sidechain idea is that all these weird experiments would have been Bitcoin experiments. Of course, now there'll be eCash experiments instead of Bitcoin. But yeah, this is just a huge cultural derangement in BTC to reject this sidechain idea, which is like a very, very important idea. And we'll just let everyone just do whatever they want. 43:55 And it would all be Bitcoin projects paying Bitcoin fees. And so unfortunately, we're not going to get that in BTC anytime soon. Instead, we're going to get crazy conversations about 110 and whatever, whatever else. But anyway, we got a hunter beast with a hand up. So yes, Mr. Beast. 44:17 Paul, I just got to say, I love it when you talk about Bitcoin, the way you talk about the header. You understand it so well, and you explain it in such concise language. It really is beautiful to hear. Honestly, I would probably pay good sats for like, almost ASMR like Paul Sztorc. 44:43 Explaining Bitcoin just for hours, you know, just in your, the way you have like such a soft, calm, confident demeanor. It is like, just so cool. 45:00 Well, thank you. Hey, there is a YouTube. If you go to drivechain.info, there's like a huge YouTube playlist. It's like 36 hours long. So I don't know. 45:11 That is so cool. Thank you for that. Regardless, I, the question I have is, it's interesting that you're like hard forking the UTXO set, you'll have a chain split, and you'll have basically probably a lot of inactive UTXOs. 45:34 And I'm wondering, like, is this just like a moat to sort of build a ecosystem where you have like kind of full control, and then you can return to the CUSF? Or have you walked away from Bitcoin software consensus entirely? 45:56 I think it's unfortunately, the two are related. So it's kind of like a pincer movement, where you have to come at them from the left and the right at the same time and crush them like a vice. 46:09 Which is to say, if we didn't, if we didn't pursue CUSF, and we didn't pursue honorable soft fork activation in BTC, that would weaken the legitimacy of the hard fork, because we would say, oh, well, they say, why are we doing this when there's the better way? 46:29 But similarly, if we didn't do the hard fork, I don't think anyone would actually care enough to look into it, they would never, they would just keep kicking the can down the road on the soft fork to CUSF. So I think that would also be useless. 46:43 So it's kind of like when you grip something with a hand with an opposable thumb and the four fingers, and it's like, which is more important, the thumb or the four fingers? And it's like, well, really, both are important. And it's also important that they kind of oppose each other. Because that is where you get the grip from, actually. So I think it's really, we really need both ingredients. Although I admit, it's a bizarre explanation. 47:06 You're always welcome to grip my chain, Paul. You just have such beautiful language when you talk about all these things. Regardless, so then you're basically going to do both, like a hard fork for eCash and also CUSF? 47:28 No, the CUSF is not a hard fork. CUSF is just, that's just out there right now. People go to BIP300QSYF.com. They can. We have one for OP_CAT. And I think we have one for CTV also. I'm not sure. I think so. So these are just different ways of activating a soft fork on Bitcoin that only uses 51. It's the Core Untouched Soft Fork. So you don't change any lines of code in Bitcoin. You just need 51% hash rate. 47:57 And the fact that even these cannot succeed just proves how crazy everyone is in BTC. And that it's basically kind of doomed over in BTC. 48:11 Oh, sorry. I guess I don't understand yet. Have you given up on Bitcoin or not? 48:19 Well, personally, I think that the chances of Bitcoin waking up and saying that we should do all these soft forks is very low. Because they've been around for a while. They've been useful for a while. They've been harmless for a while. 48:39 You got all these projects that are really good. And there's been no progress towards any of them except for 1.10, which is like one of the least useful. It's interesting that people are actually doing something. But I think it's very unlikely to work and doesn't really help. 49:00 I don't know if I want to go into your space and talk 1.10 without your permission, but I'd be happy to present the Steelman case for it if you'd be interested. 49:10 Yeah, we can talk about 1.10. That's perfectly fine. Let's talk about it. 49:13 Okay, sure. So I think my strongest argument for 1.10 is that there is a game theoretic advantage you get whenever you tighten protocol consensus in such a way that makes the protocol more defensible. 49:32 Unfortunately, the 1.10 people, they're talking a lot about arbitrary data. But what's so ironic about OutReturn is that it is the least computationally intensive. 49:47 Yeah, exactly. Putting JPEGs on the blockchain actually reduces the spam, so to speak. 49:53 Yeah, well, at least in OutReturn, because it's not discounted, right? And also it's easily printable and it's unspendable. You can safely ignore it. That's like the whole point. And that's cool, right? 50:05 But there is also, it's funny, by restricting the script pubkey to 34 bytes, that really does help mitigate a larger class of attacks around structured data that could be used to construct a quadratic signature verification attack, also known as a poison block attack or PBA. 50:29 And I'd be curious of your thoughts on, like, if you understand, you know, or if you've heard about this kind of attack, and if that might be sort of like a good steel man case for like, if you tighten protocol consensus in such a way that makes the chain more defensible against all sorts of attacks, including ones that could knock your node offline for 25 minutes while it's crunching on these legacies of data. 51:00 Like, you know, I'm curious, like, could that be a steelman argument for activation of 110? Like, essentially being like a, a, basically capitalizing on a game theoretic advantage for sort of the more defensible chain is the one that is more likely to survive. 51:26 Yeah, okay. So first of all, the quadratic hashing problem, this was around a long time ago. And in fact, one of the motivations for SegWit was trying to address it, in fact, and there was even a block in, I think, like 2014 or something that where someone consolidated a bunch of small UTXOs when the network wasn't being used. 51:52 And they just passively created a block that took a very long time. I don't remember how long, maybe 15 seconds. It wasn't so bad. But it's kind of like accidentally happened a few times that people have made blocks that are very, very hard to validate. 52:06 I think we really want to, it would be much easier if we were going to, you know, you've done a good job steelmanning the argument. But in this case, steelmanning is almost like, this is what Luke has been saying, is that it's this non-monetary stuff on the chain that will destroy Bitcoin and make it like an altcoin like Ethereum or whatever, blah, blah, blah. 52:34 They're not saying like, okay, we're doing this to keep the node costs down. Because as you and I already said, actually, the JPEGs keep the node costs further down than the real transactions do. 52:46 As long as they're in OP_RETURN. If they're abusing the witness, then that's a different story. 52:50 But this is exactly why people were encouraged to use OP_RETURN because it's prunable and everything. And that's why they said, oh, put your extra data here instead of using it in like extra bare multisig. 53:04 There are other arguments around that. But in a way, I feel like that's like a Bailey and the Mott is more like structured data, not arbitrary data. 53:13 Well, I think so. But it's a very important point about the OP_RETURN because it speaks to this case where it says, okay, people said it's already possible for people to embed this data in the bare multisig, for example. 53:30 So we'll encourage them to use OP_RETURN. And that's better for everyone involved because it's better for the nodes. So it's a case of meeting a problem and trying to do the best thing for everyone. 53:47 And now we have Luke and whatever they're doing, they're going backwards. They're saying, well, we're going to take everything by force. And if you don't agree with us, then you're… 53:55 I totally get that. I just think the OP_RETURN is a straw man and the steel man is structured data. Like structured data attacks, like quadratic signature verification and poison block attacks, essentially. 54:08 Yeah, but it's an interesting point. But if Luke and Mechanic and those people were talking about that, I think it would be a completely different conversation. They would be just saying, this is about stopping node denial of service attack. 54:24 I know. I'm trying to get them to talk about that because I think that they should absolutely be talking about that. 54:29 It's a much stronger argument. But the thing is, we don't live in a world where people denial of service attack the network that way. We don't see these blocks. And one reason is because if you really wanted to do that attack, you'd kind of have to mind the block yourself. 54:50 And then you'd have to do something else. But the attack doesn't really do very much. So it's like you've mined a block and you put all these transactions into it and it takes a long time for people to validate it. But then… 55:03 Just what is the block size? 55:06 Yeah. Yes, we have a J25. So yeah, the problem is that what they want is what they're not going to get. They want to keep JPEGs off the blockchain, but people will still be able to put JPEGs on the blockchain. 55:29 They want to protect the node costs from spam transactions, but they're also still going to get those spam transactions. So that's part of why it's deranged. I think it's important. If I could just finish my thought. 55:43 I think it's quite relevant that they don't seem to have any idea that their actions won't get them what they want. So let's say someone is saying, oh, I need to make it to the post office before it closes because I have to send my letter or whatever. This is a fake example. 56:00 And then they decide to park their car and run away from the post office. Well, you would just be thinking like, well, these people are just crazy. And that's kind of more important at the end of the day than whether or not it also can stop certain types of denial of service attack against a node. 56:23 So I think that it actually is relevant that they're so crazy and they're so bad at getting what they want. 56:54 I think there might be a way to do a sort of like archival format based on stream verification and remote proof of possession to essentially create like decentralized storage markets that quantify replication factor. 57:10 And regardless of that, I just wanted to create like kind of a decentralized storage network for storage markets that would like be able to allow Bitcoin node runners to sort of strategically capitalize on their spare storage capacity and essentially allow people to store data for other people. 57:37 And either in a mutual aid scenario where you just swap storage for no monetary value and you just mutually confirm each other's data so that you have multiple copies. Or you also just like kind of like pay for it over time. And that sort of like creates a... 57:57 Well, there have been these ideas. I'm not sure whatever became of them. But there was Filecoin. That was pretty big. I think that was it was like... 58:11 Yeah, I thought Filecoin was like the biggest, but it was also the worst or something. I don't know. 58:16 It's so bad. You needed a GPU to accelerate your SNARK proofs along with multiple petabytes of HDDs and also like terabytes of SSDs because they have a terrible write amplification for embedding the SNARK proofs inside of like BLS signatures that you're interleaved into the car files for the various aspects of... 58:43 It's been about five years since I worked on the protocol. But back when I was working on it, they had basically proof of stake that was gated by what they called proof of replication and proof of space time. And essentially it was probably like a Peewee Herman's breakfast machine of a blockchain, if I'm being honest. It was like a Rube Goldberg machine. 59:07 Yeah, this is exactly what we don't want. Instead, we want to say, listen, we'll take care of the bridge, the sidechain part, because we'll have 300 sidechains. Then you being the sidechain developer, we'll take care of finding blocks and deposits withdrawals. You just do whatever new thing you want and don't reinvent the wheel with all this other stuff. 59:30 So in other words, I think this would be a phenomenal candidate for L2 drivechain. And then again, once it's built, once it will work with any BIP300 chain. So it would work on eCash, it would work on BTC. 59:47 I always thought this idea was really neat. I really like David Vorek a lot, and he did SIA, and he had this cool thing where you could just type in 12 words and it would theoretically recover your whole file system. 1:00:01 So it was a fantastic, fantastic idea. 1:00:04 That's a good idea. 1:00:05 He had it and got it to work at some point, which is my understanding. 1:00:10 Yeah, SIA was interesting. I was kind of quibbled with their implementation, but not more their design. 1:00:16 Storage is also weird in other ways, but yeah. 1:00:20 Yeah, it was trying to be a DAO or something. 1:00:24 But really what I wanted was just to give people an easy way to sort of avoid putting data on chain because it's cheaper and probably more durable and could scale better and all of that. 1:00:38 So what I did was I basically forked ORD. 1:00:41 And I want to have like a RPC-compatible API with, well, REST and CLI compatible with existing users of ORD, 1:00:52 except it goes into my Carbonado decentralized storage format and the V2 version of it, which is much harder. 1:01:01 And then there's also probably layering on maybe an RGB evolution based on RGB12. 1:01:08 So it's like chasing after the ideal, essentially, of off-chain storage and transfer that essentially scales whatever people are using ORDNLs for. 1:01:20 And I would love to also support BIP300 because I love the idea around... 1:01:25 I like how elegantly Drivechain solves the problem of bridging in ways that BitVM is such nonsense. 1:01:36 I would literally rather use a hard fork. 1:01:39 Damn, it's a hard fork though. 1:01:41 But regardless, I prefer it. 1:01:44 I prefer that approach than BitVM. 1:01:47 Okay, well, hey, thanks very much. 1:01:48 And of course, Robin Linus, creator of BitVM, he also said that he only invented this as a hacky workaround because we didn't have BIP300. 1:01:57 And then he's expressed the opinion many times that BIP300 is better than BitVM. 1:02:04 But now it's time to move to the next because it's already 3.03. 1:02:09 So let's see if we could get... we had J25 came up. 1:02:14 So let's see if he has anything to say. 1:02:17 Thank you for your time. 1:02:18 Hey, no, great convo. 1:02:20 Yeah, yeah. 1:02:22 Way, way more Debbie talk than I can partake in. 1:02:27 But interesting to learn. 1:02:28 I don't think J25 was able to join. 1:02:31 He requested like twice and I approved. 1:02:34 And then I don't know exactly what happened. 1:02:37 It appeared as if... 1:02:38 He's talking now. 1:02:39 He's good. 1:02:40 Oh, can you hear me? 1:02:41 I can come back real quick if you can't hear me. 1:02:43 I hear you. 1:02:44 I hear you. 1:02:45 Oh, interesting. 1:02:46 That's funny. 1:02:47 I don't think I blocked that. 1:02:48 Yeah, X glitched out and I had to come back up or something. 1:02:50 All right, great. 1:02:51 Thank you. 1:02:52 But yeah, just comments on the 1.10, which is whatever. 1:02:57 If we're moving on, that's fine. 1:02:59 But I just find it a little funny that Luke has put his own arbitrary data just because they're Bible verses. 1:03:06 They're still arbitrary data. 1:03:07 And then the Genesis block literally has arbitrary data. 1:03:12 So if Satoshi didn't want arbitrary data, then why did he put it in there? 1:03:16 Yeah, there is a counter argument to that, that I don't buy at all. 1:03:22 Although it's technically true. 1:03:23 It misses the point. 1:03:24 And who even cares? 1:03:26 It's all nonsense. 1:03:27 But there's actually part... 1:03:28 Okay, part of some of the block must be arbitrary data. 1:03:34 This is a weird way of summarizing it. 1:03:36 But basically that data was going to be arbitrary no matter what. 1:03:39 And it just was like a quirk of... 1:03:44 So it was like since it was arbitrary and it wasn't being used for anything, it wasn't any extra arbitrary to set it to something else. 1:03:55 And that's what happened with the original Genesis block. 1:03:59 So, like, for example, as we were talking about headers earlier, each block has to have the hash of the previous block. 1:04:07 But this is just as an example so you could see what I'm kind of getting at. 1:04:12 The first block doesn't have a previous block. 1:04:14 So that could have been anything. 1:04:16 It could just be a bunch of zeros or it could have been whatever. 1:04:19 So I'm just trying to let you know there's these things, the nonce field and stuff, where it's kind of somewhat arbitrary what it is. 1:04:28 And I'm pretty sure that Luke would say, aha, I only put the prayer verses in. 1:04:32 Those already arbitrary parts, I don't even know if that's true. 1:04:37 It may not be. 1:04:39 I think the whole thing is totally irrelevant anyway because as far as I'm concerned, whoever pays for the block space is the owner. 1:04:47 And we should only gate things that consume the node resources, which this reduces the node resource. 1:04:54 So really you should get a discount on your fees if you put operatron jpegs in the ideal world. 1:05:00 But I'm happy if these people are willing to pay full price. 1:05:04 They are the rightful owner, and it's much better that they do this rather than stitch together a bunch of bare multisig and all sorts of stuff. 1:05:14 But they're just letting you know there is a counter argument. 1:05:17 Luke will have that counter argument ready to go if you come at him with that. 1:05:21 He's going to pull a quick draw. 1:05:25 Anyway, we've got a new person. We have a Mark Alpenblick. 1:05:31 That's cool. Hi there, Paul. 1:05:34 Hello. Just a quick question regarding SegWit. 1:05:39 I mean, obviously, you're reducing the block size. 1:05:42 So the layer one will be transactions only, which I think is great. 1:05:51 But what will happen to the SegWit part of Bitcoin? 1:05:56 Maybe you could kind of concisely explain. 1:06:02 Yeah, we're not like cutting off. So SegWit is a very bizarre upgrade. 1:06:06 So actually, there's like a whole new. 1:06:12 This is really hard to explain, but it's like before SegWit. 1:06:15 There's just one block and then they block hashes. 1:06:18 You hash the transactions in it in this Merkle tree and you end up with one hash that covers all of the transactions in a block. 1:06:25 And that goes into the header. 1:06:28 But after SegWit, there's really like three blockchains like in parallel. 1:06:32 There's like the old version. There's one only of witnesses. 1:06:35 And then there's one of like. 1:06:38 This is not exactly what happens, but I'm just trying to paint a picture that maybe people understand. 1:06:43 So there's kind of like three and there's a one to one correspondence between each of the three. 1:06:50 So if you're on like block 900,000 A, you could get to 900,000 B or 900,000 C. 1:06:56 You kind of like go between the three of them. 1:06:59 And the whole reason that SegWit worked as a soft fork is because it was like you would hash. 1:07:07 The old version just wouldn't see the signatures. 1:07:11 And it was like possible to. 1:07:14 So the old version looks exactly the same. 1:07:18 As. 1:07:21 Someone who hasn't upgraded will just see a version of these transactions where there are no signatures. 1:07:26 But it's kind of like the new if you run a new SegWit node and you request this block, it will ask, oh, is this a post SegWit node or pre SegWit node? 1:07:36 And actually, then it will give you a completely different block. 1:07:40 And in this way, I actually believe that if you really think about it, SegWit was actually the first. 1:07:47 Either mandatory hard fork or even a mandatory extension block or what some people used to call an evil fork. 1:07:57 This is ironic. This is kind of like arcane and weird, but I don't know if anyone cares about any of this. 1:08:03 But since it was a mandatory four megabyte upgrade, it's like super, super, super unusual. 1:08:09 And I wrote about this somewhere on my blog. 1:08:12 You know, you can find truth going that info. 1:08:15 Anyone cares you can find about how SegWit is, because I write about the terminology of hard fork for a soft fork and stuff like that. 1:08:22 So what I assume the question you were asking is about, oh, if you shrink the block size, what will happen to say? 1:08:27 But actually nothing will happen because it'll all be shrunk proportionally. 1:08:30 So it's not like we're chopping off. 1:08:33 Like only the SegWit part or I don't know if that's what you even meant. 1:08:37 Maybe I misunderstood what you were asking about. 1:08:40 I just wondered, would it be like a redundant kind of. 1:08:47 Stump. Oh, well, yeah, I haven't. 1:08:51 Well, as you just heard, I have kind of a low opinion of. 1:08:56 Oh, yes, so do I think is kind of super, super, super complicated. 1:09:01 It was all designed SegWit and taproot are all designed around supporting lightning, 1:09:05 even though you can make a bullet point list of other things that they do. 1:09:08 And in fact, earlier in this space, we mentioned about quadratic caching. 1:09:12 And and of course, one of the purposes of SegWit was to increase the block size. 1:09:17 It was sort of a compromise. But what I ask is because I believe you're keeping SegWit in. 1:09:24 Right. Yeah. Keep everything. I mean, is that just because it's easier. 1:09:31 Then all the controversy and everything, if you just got rid of it. 1:09:35 Well, yeah, actually taking it out would be much more work than leaving it in, leaving it undisturbed. 1:09:41 And in fact, the key key feature of the eCash L1 is that it just is Bitcoin Core. 1:09:50 It's like a with a very minimal number of changes that are very, very, very, very small and very like tight. 1:09:59 So that that means that, you know, after the fork point actually happens in August, 1:10:05 there really won't need to be any development work on an ongoing basis. 1:10:09 Of course, there still will be. But for the L1, it's just going to be copying Bitcoin Core. 1:10:14 This idea is anyone who likes Bitcoin Core. Here's this thing. 1:10:17 It's just a copy of it. And if Bitcoin Core invents new features, we'll just copy them over. 1:10:24 So we won't have to lift a finger. We won't have to do any work. 1:10:27 We just we just want to keep you just want to copy Bitcoin Core test for the L1 and then copy the altcoin tests for the L2. 1:10:36 And in that way, you know, you can do an enormous amount of work. 1:10:41 But I mean, excuse me, you can get all you can get the benefit of everyone else's work without doing any work yourself. 1:10:47 And that that is much better than trying to roll your own thing. 1:10:50 You know what I mean? Like what if you started up like a hotel and you're like, oh, I'm going to also. 1:10:55 I'm going to make my own copper for the for the wires and for the plumbing in my hotel. 1:11:01 You're like smelting copper in the middle of the day. Sure. 1:11:05 I like it. That's so good. But do so. 1:11:08 I mean, currently, does the our transaction stored either on SegWit or on the block or basically is it more that SegWit is kind of references to transactions? 1:11:23 Are they both equal? So I guess my question is, will any transaction be stored on the SegWit storage or will they all just be stored in the core storage for you? 1:11:36 Well, presumably. Oh, sorry. You cut out a little. 1:11:40 But I think I understood what you said, which is OK. 1:11:43 So what I mean is the SegWit when you see the SegWit part, when people make a SegWit transaction, 1:11:50 it's kind of like when you go on an airplane and you most of the transaction sits in the chair or something. 1:12:00 But about what your luggage gets thrown, it gets stacked and thrown in the bottom of the plane. 1:12:07 You know, so it's all the stuff that you checked, checked bags and you get a discount on the signature. 1:12:13 So the signatures go in a mandatory extension block that holds all the signatures. 1:12:19 So when you make a SegWit transaction, it's like half are in here. 1:12:22 You know, the person's on the plane and they have luggage that they check to check the bag. 1:12:27 If you make a pre SegWit transaction that does not use SegWit, which is still allowed. 1:12:33 That's like you just take the plane and you carry on your bag. 1:12:36 You have to pay more, maybe, but the whole bag is with you in the front. 1:12:42 And so. In both cases, the transactions are in the regular block. 1:12:48 It's just SegWit transactions and some of the stuff stored in the SegWit extension block, 1:12:54 which will be exactly the same situation in the L1 of eCash and the L1 of Bitcoin Core, 1:13:02 because they will be effectively the same software. 1:13:07 So they won't be any SegWit transactions with eCash? 1:13:11 No, there would be. There would be. It would be the same situation. 1:13:14 Same as. So you're scaling down to take account of the extra space that SegWit gave, but you're just scaling. 1:13:24 The whole thing. The whole plane is shrinks. 1:13:29 OK, thanks for your patience. Answer my questions there. 1:13:34 You explained it quite well. OK, thank you. Thanks for your question. 1:13:42 I'm kind of curious, how do you have all of these really nuanced analogies? 1:13:49 I just make them up as I go. OK, I'm trying. 1:13:53 I just figured maybe that one, although that one I had so much that you know that one there, 1:13:58 that one I had help because to delegitimize this was back in the block size war. 1:14:04 And I'm pretty sure we got Bitcoin debates listening with a hijacking Bitcoin cover. 1:14:10 So they know. So during the block size war, the large blockers thought that the long story short, 1:14:16 they made this Web site that had like a Bitcoin versus BCH and had like people waiting in line at a bus stop. 1:14:23 And they had the graphic of people leaving their luggage in the SegWit transaction. 1:14:29 So that one I had stole that one, although they used a bus. 1:14:33 But I thought that's no good because if I use a bus, I think it was called the TX street dot something. 1:14:41 And maybe Vlad knows what it was called. But if I use a bus and I can't use the phrase check a bag, 1:14:46 whereas people actually know what that means on a plane. So I changed it at the last minute. 1:14:50 So I had help on that one. I had help on that one from this bus metaphor where they leave the stuff in like a like they leave the suitcases and they don't. 1:15:00 And I was like, oh, that is clever. And I'm pretty sure someone said it at the time. 1:15:04 But yeah, I don't know what happened to that street. The point of the site was that they eventually wanted to show long lines for BTC, 1:15:16 but BCH working just great. But what actually happened was everyone stopped using BTC. 1:15:22 The block size war transitioned everyone away from being users and it made everyone back into speculators. 1:15:29 So they said, well, this is an unanswered question, so I'm just going to invest and wait. 1:15:33 So this is the origin of buy and hold is the block size war and the resulting whatever ongoing calamities and drama. 1:15:44 I'm just always amazed that the random analogies that I hear, like every time I come in here, they're always amazing. 1:15:51 But yeah, I think just, you know, with BIP300 and the block size wars and Metallic leaving to do Ethereum and all of the, you know, 1:16:01 developer flight of Bitcoin over time just seems like a systematic thing that's happened over and over again. 1:16:08 And I'm kind of hoping that whether it's BIP-110, eCash, a combination thereof, like real conversations just continue to move that forward 1:16:19 because we could have a completely different landscape, you know, if those circumstances wouldn't have happened in the past. 1:16:27 Yeah, you're absolutely right. Like, for example, we have Milton Friedman has this analogy about like their idea manufacturers and distributors and whatever. 1:16:36 But we have my point is we have these people who are like a Roger Ver or like a safety in Amuse or whatever. 1:16:40 They're more of like a marketing person. If we had sidechains the whole time, you know, I firmly believe that safety in Amuse and all these people, 1:16:48 they would be talking about how great Vitalik Buterin is because he's a great smart contract developer on BTC because there never would have been an Ethereum. 1:16:56 And everyone would have been talking about, oh, Nick Szabo, he theorized smart contracts and now they're on BTC. 1:17:02 So everyone would have been like pro-privacy, pro-smart contract, pro-experimentation and all this stuff. 1:17:08 It would be a completely different universe if we had sidechains from the beginning. 1:17:14 And then all of these cryptos, as quote unquote, right, would be connected to Bitcoin rather than the only way you can ever sell your Bitcoin is somebody on the street with cash or you hope that an exchange gives you your money. 1:17:28 Yeah, exactly. I think we don't. Well, let me think about what was I going to say? 1:17:38 There was. I can't remember, but hopefully I will. 1:17:43 But, yeah, I think, yeah, the idea of the sidechain is that all these things are Bitcoin transactions, they're all merged mind. 1:17:48 They're all, you know, every time you pay a transaction fee, it goes to the same group of miners who are getting richer and richer. 1:17:55 Oh, I remember what I was going to say now. OK, the other thing I was going to say was we've lived through a long period where people have been selling this idea of the just buy and hold number go up. 1:18:05 And if those people are right, then I'm wrong and I'm wasting everyone's time with all this hard work because all we need to do is buy and hold and we'll all get super, super rich. 1:18:18 And so why do anything with a lot of effort that takes like technical complexity or, you know, organizing people or whatever, when instead we should all just buy and hold BTC. 1:18:28 So it's a conflict of visions. And the thing is, though, I'm really convinced that they are wrong. 1:18:36 And so far, the price, you know, has not the price in the buy and hold era, which is like the last. 1:18:43 Really, the last I would say 2018 until now, so like this is like a long era, like a seven year era. 1:18:51 But, yeah, the price over the last seven years has only gone up like 10x, whereas previously it went up literally like 10,000x or something crazy like that because it would go from like 10 cents to like $10,000. 1:19:07 Well, I think this is and I'll give it to the hands after this and shut up. But I think this is one big thing. And I think it is a problem for a decade down the road. 1:19:14 But we live in this honeymoon period where free Bitcoin is being printed regularly, like bit one tenors, the small blockers, whatever it may be. 1:19:23 They have no ideas on how you make fees take over the subsidy. That will be a dramatic issue, let alone with quantum and everything else, AI hacking and yada yada. 1:19:35 So I just think it's very short sighted to not want activity on your chain. 1:19:40 Yeah, so do I. And the merge mining solution is right there in front of us the whole time. It's just ripe. It's just there for the taking. 1:19:50 And it just automatically addresses this problem. It just means that whatever network people transact on, it all automatically goes. 1:19:58 So it's just baffling to me why people don't care about it more. But let's go to the next hand. 1:20:06 Which maybe is Shomari. I don't know. It could be. 1:20:10 Yeah, thanks. Thanks, Paul. I am trying to I just learned how to actually raise my hand. So that's 1:20:16 actually still trying to figure out how to lower it. OK, there we go. I appreciate you always 1:20:22 providing the access to directly to you each week so that we could kind of just stay on track 1:20:29 with this this launch. So I've been working really on just getting as familiar as I can 1:20:37 with the process of what's going to happen at launch because I'm just I guess I'm anxious. 1:20:45 One of the things that I do plan to do is perhaps launch a sidechain, like a generic sidechain 1:20:54 with some novel, I would say, concepts, specifically the idea that even Vitalik had 1:21:05 recently of converting the entire virtual machine of Ethereum into a RISC-V virtual machine, 1:21:14 which would really make it just more of a turn complete system capable of a lot of the things 1:21:22 that they have to do programmatically with hard forks. They could then do much easier with just 1:21:32 programming new smart contracts. So the idea of RISC-V has been, I guess, bounced around the 1:21:39 Ethereum world and even on the UTXO side, Peter Rison also had some ideas with regards to that. 1:21:48 So I thought it would be an interesting project to create a RISC-V sidechain for eCash. 1:21:57 So I did propose that several times, and I think I've talked to you about this over the past few 1:22:04 weeks, and the Bitwindow does have an interface for proposing a new Drivechain, which I would 1:22:14 imagine it would, but it doesn't actually work. So I've been trying to figure out why that is. 1:22:22 Yes, did we talk about this last time? 1:22:25 We did, but I didn't know why, and I figured out why now, because I've actually gone, 1:22:30 after we spoke, I went through really intensely through the source to just walk through the 1:22:36 whole process. Once I hit submit, what is happening? So I really determined that there is no 1:22:45 current, there's really nothing that is decided yet on how the Bitwindow is going to submit 1:22:57 a proposal to the miners for them to include it into a M1 coinbase transaction. 1:23:06 If you actually go to the code, the Bitwindow code, it specifically, there's a comment that 1:23:11 just says TBD to be determined. So you mentioned earlier in the space that you guys 1:23:19 plan on doing several Fortnets to simulate the launch day, and I'm just 1:23:27 trying to understand how that's supposed to work when the code is technically not even 1:23:32 finished to even launch a new drivechain. So I kind of wanted to start there and just 1:23:38 understand how that's supposed to happen. 1:23:43 It is finished already, basically, but the thing is, on Signet, it doesn't 1:23:48 quite matter. So the idea is this, unless you have a majority of hash rate, 1:23:57 the sidechain won't even be secure at all. So there's no reason to even 1:24:01 create it in the first place, or there's no reason to propose it or whatever. 1:24:08 So you kind of have to get the 51% hash rate first. The process would be 1:24:17 to discuss it with miners before even doing the M1, and it would be if you 1:24:24 can't get their attention to use CoinNews or something, if we're in the super decentralized 1:24:30 world where everyone is living in a bunker and the government is trying to hunt us all down and 1:24:35 kill us, you would use CoinNews to get everyone's attention, then you would discuss, 1:24:44 and then if the miners were like, oh yeah, this is definitely worth the slot, they would do it. 1:24:48 Now, a lot of the graphical user interface stuff is designed, as it should be, 1:24:57 is designed for the actual proof of work where anyone can find a block, anyone could mine a 1:25:05 block at any time, including you. So that's kind of like what it was set up for. Signet is unusual 1:25:12 because it's just one server mines 100% of the blocks with 100% certainty, so it will not make 1:25:18 any sense. So what you should really do is you should just control by you, you're the only 1:25:23 miner for Signet. I realize if I want to be on Signet, I have to 1:25:30 speak directly to LayerTwo Labs, but why would that be the case with the main net? 1:25:37 Why would it be so permissioned? That's my question. Well, on the main net, it won't, 1:25:43 because anyone can find a block, so it will be a completely different night and day. But practically 1:25:48 speaking, if I want to submit my proposal, I have to mine my own block. That's how the software 1:25:56 works, based on the code. Yes, but think about it like this. If you are so small that it is hard for 1:26:02 you to mine a block, then the proposal will never succeed anyway. So that's what I'm trying to 1:26:10 understand. So this is basically, you have to know, you have to be large enough to attract 1:26:17 like miners or mining pools before you even propose a direction. I'm just saying that the timeline 1:26:23 would be different. The timeline is different, as I said. The timeline is, you don't have to be 1:26:30 big at all, if the idea is good. You just need to put the idea out there, make a little website 1:26:37 that says like, this is my idea for a sidechain number eight, and I think it should be called this, 1:26:41 and this is what it should do, and here's my source code. So you can do that with no mining power, 1:26:48 but the point is, the miners would decide first that they want it, and then they would 1:26:53 ratify it. That's the process. Maybe just propose an alternative, because 1:27:01 based on what I thought, I had a completely different idea, if I can just share that with you. 1:27:06 We talked a few weeks ago, maybe very early on, when I joined the spaces, about how you would 1:27:10 kind of have to bribe the miners to include the M1. So that's been in my head. So I've 1:27:16 been like, okay, so maybe a hundred dollars or five hundred thousand dollars, and that will 1:27:20 be sufficient to get my proposal accepted by a miner, whoever decides to include it. 1:27:26 Well, for the M1, I was just thinking that would crowd out some of the block space, 1:27:30 so that instead of paying transactions, instead of including like one or two extra transactions, 1:27:35 you would have to do that. So that was what I was thinking for M1, crowding out. So that would be, 1:27:41 currently the fee rates are super, super low, but even if it was like five dollars per transaction, 1:27:45 it would be like a ten dollar bribe or something. For sure. But I still consider it like a bribe, 1:27:52 in the sense that you want your proposal, and you're willing to pay for someone to include it. 1:27:59 And so a premium, whatever it would be, there's no nominal specific amount, but just a premium, 1:28:07 so that it would be attractive to a miner. But the issue is that with the Coinbase requirement, 1:28:12 no one, I mean, unless you're a miner, can actually propose the M1 in terms of it getting 1:28:19 to the actual L1. Right, the M1, right, yes. 1:28:28 So just, I mean, specifically what I was going to suggest is, would you consider 1:28:34 changing the requirement of the M1 from a Coinbase transaction to a regular 1:28:40 transaction that anyone, any person could put into the mempool? And then with the sufficient fee, 1:28:47 the OP_RETURN obviously would have all the information, but with the sufficient fee on top 1:28:50 of that, it would be an attractive incentive for the miner. And the reason I say that is because 1:28:56 even if you do coordinate with a miner through the CoinNews, there's still no way to guarantee 1:29:03 that the miner is going to do what you want them to do when you pay them, or if you incentivize 1:29:09 them, as opposed to if you were to do it on the L1 with a bribe, then the only way they 1:29:15 could accept that bribe, that fee, would be to include the block. So I felt like it was just a better 1:29:21 alignment of, in terms of permissionless and trustless, a way to add a new Drivechain, 1:29:30 as opposed to having to talk to the miners directly. It could just be done all on chain. 1:29:36 And the only thing you would have to do is adjust the spec, the 300 spec, to change 1:29:43 the M1 from a Coinbase to a regular transaction, which you do for some of the other M's, 1:29:47 like I think M5 and M6 are regular transactions. So M2, M3, M4 would stay Coinbase, and then M1 1:29:55 would just switch. And then that's the entire idea that I had, in terms of just making that process 1:30:01 more permissionless and trustless. Well, it's a very interesting idea, but I'm afraid that it would 1:30:06 not achieve any of its objectives, and it would actually be worse. So first of all, the M2 has to 1:30:12 be in a Coinbase, obviously, because this is ratifying the proposal. But if that's the case, 1:30:20 then you see what I mean? It's all hinging on Coinbases anyway. But the M1 news, just the M1 1:30:28 being a regular transaction. I know, but that's exactly my point, is what difference does it make? 1:30:31 It has to be followed by all these M2s. So what's one more M1? But at least it gets in, 1:30:38 like the actual proposal gets in. But this is why it will die. If the miners aren't set up to 1:30:46 act on the M1, it will die very quickly, because as you know, it immediately needs to be 1:30:52 act. So it's again, the miners have decided already, before the M1, the miners decide that 1:30:59 they want the sidechain. So I mean, you pointed out, so this is exactly what CoinNews is. CoinNews 1:31:06 is a regular transaction that pays a high fee that gets everyone's attention. And you could easily, 1:31:12 in the CoinNews, first of all, you could link out to a site, you could say, go to this site. 1:31:16 Or you could just put all the information of the sidechain in the CoinNews thing itself, 1:31:23 which I don't think you would want to do. I think you'd want to link to GitHub in practice 1:31:26 or something. You'd want to say this thing. Now, you sort of say, well, hey, what if the miner 1:31:31 wants some changes made? But the thing is, if they want those changes made, they're going to get what 1:31:39 they want. And you aren't. The sidechain developer is kind of suggesting, and of course, they have 1:31:51 knowledge and they have prestige and they have expertise. But ultimately, the miners are the 1:31:56 ones who would either turn it on or off. So if they'd say, well, hey, I don't want this, 1:32:00 then you could just throw up your hands and walk away. And maybe you would be right. 1:32:06 But if they want changes, they'll probably get them. Or they could say, why is this here? And 1:32:12 they have a whole conversation about it. But I don't see the value in forcing the miners to 1:32:18 adopt a very specific variant of one chain, right? I just don't see the... 1:32:24 Well, I wouldn't suggest that you would force any specific miner, but I think it would be... 1:32:29 But if it's consensual, then what difference does it make? 1:32:32 Well, in terms of just being decentralized. So I wouldn't have... 1:32:34 But the CoinNews part is already... 1:32:37 Okay. But what I mean is that you still... I guess what I want to see is, like you mentioned, 1:32:43 the actual Fortinet. You guys are planning to do, you said, a few trial runs, because I just 1:32:51 want to kind of see how that in reality plays out with... 1:32:56 Yeah, I think it would be very helpful for everyone, including me. Well, I would go as 1:33:01 far as to say... I think I mentioned this last week, maybe, which is I would go as far as to 1:33:06 say that if we cannot do... We should be able to do one or two trial runs where nothing breaks, 1:33:16 where everything kind of goes sort of, I don't want to say smoothly, but... So we should be able 1:33:20 to get two of those, and then we should... Maybe then we should schedule the real hard fork even. 1:33:27 So I don't know. So far, it seems like... 1:33:29 I mean, what I'm hearing from you is that the process is really hinging on like CoinNews. 1:33:35 That's kind of what I'm taking from this. To actually get your Drivechain in, you should... 1:33:40 Yeah, I think you're right. You know, it's funny, because I had CoinNews kind of around the same 1:33:44 time and independently. But in my head, I imagine it does hinge on CoinNews, because you have to 1:33:53 imagine the decentralized world where you can't just assume that there's going to be like a 1:33:59 foundry phone number that you can like... Exactly. And that was... 1:34:02 Yeah, I completely agree. I completely agree. 1:34:04 If you don't have the contacts, but you have a great idea, how does that work? But I mean, 1:34:10 I do see how CoinNews can be very effective in communicating, because I've used it, and it's 1:34:18 really cool, actually. I plan on using it some more in terms of... 1:34:22 Yeah, it was fun. It's a fun idea. 1:34:24 Because I thought it was just a broadcast, but you can actually respond. You know, there are 1:34:28 replies, too. So it's really two-way communication. It's pretty... 1:34:32 I'm a little worried about the replies making it too complex, but for now, I'm staying open-minded. 1:34:39 So the replies, they weren't my idea. So you know how people feel about it. 1:34:43 I like the replies. 1:34:44 I'm sticking with the idea, but I think I'm staying open-minded to it for now. 1:34:50 I'm staying open-minded to it for now. 1:34:52 And then the other thing is, I just, in general, I spoke to you last week about just submitting 1:34:58 some issues and not, you know, unfortunately, being available in Telegram. Have you actually... 1:35:06 I know, I didn't see. So you put them on GitHub? 1:35:11 Well, the thing is, your team has been interacting with the issues, 1:35:15 but not the way that I thought they would. So I was just wondering where that... 1:35:20 Oh, what did they do? 1:35:21 Well, I spoke with, not spoke with, but I communicated with, I think, Jacob. 1:35:27 Jacob, he's working on the eCash wallet. And just, I submitted a few, what should I say, 1:35:33 feature requests. So he acknowledged them and it was very well-received. So that was fine. 1:35:40 But then when I submitted a few others that haven't really, I don't know if they've been 1:35:44 acknowledged, and then one was actually closed without comments. So I'm just kind of wondering 1:35:48 where things are with those issues, because one in particular, I would say I was a little 1:35:54 disappointed that it didn't get published in the week two. It was a tier two issue. 1:36:02 The enforcer crashed. And I took as much information as I could, screenshots, 1:36:11 logs, and things like that. And I submitted a pretty detailed report. And I thought, 1:36:18 considering that it was a tier two issue, it would have maybe been possibly in the week two 1:36:27 contenders. But I don't know if it was even acknowledged because I... 1:36:31 I didn't even see it because I... But yeah, it would have been it. 1:36:37 Well, specific, I can just tell you what it was. The error was that if a second transaction 1:36:43 enters the mempool somehow, and this only ever happened once. So I was happy I was able to 1:36:49 actually capture it. But a second transaction entered the mempool and, sorry, a duplicate 1:36:55 transaction entered the mempool and it crashes the enforcer. So that's even why I asked you in 1:37:01 X if you have the list of all the bugs that have been submitted, because I wasn't sure if you guys 1:37:06 were aware of this. Maybe it was submitted in week one or whatever. But definitely the crash, 1:37:13 that your bit window UI turns red. So it's definitely a... And then the logs show 1:37:21 crash. It doesn't... It's not recoverable. So I thought that was pretty kind of stupid. 1:37:27 Yeah, no, that's not a good... 1:37:29 Yeah, but that's about it. And then, as I said, I'm looking forward to the 1:37:33 Fortinet trials. And if you could take a look at my Drivechain proposal, it's in the issues as well. 1:37:42 And I would like to perhaps do this RISC-V drivechain. And I think it would be just 1:37:54 novel. I think there's only two other RISC-V blockchains in existence. So I think it's 1:38:00 something that would be possibly valuable to the community as a whole to see how this could work. 1:38:06 Absolutely. This is exactly what we need to, which is that we need people who are not part of the 1:38:11 existing BTC monoculture. Because I think a lot of this stuff is played out. And I consider myself 1:38:20 to be inside the monoculture. We need people who are kind of in frontiers and kind of like in 1:38:27 cross-pot, like between fields and like weird other stuff where stuff is... There's more novelty. 1:38:34 So that is exactly what we need. Okay, we only have 21 minutes left. So we have a Marcus. 1:38:41 And why don't we go to that? Yeah, so one thing I was thinking here is that in some senses, 1:38:51 I feel like normal merge mining is a bit better than Blind Merged Mining. 1:38:58 So you know how Rootstock already exists, right? And it's a normal merge mine. So 1:39:04 we have today's Bitcoin miners doing their Rootstock mining. So the thing is, 1:39:13 there is a first mover advantage here, where if you are a miner and between normal merge mining 1:39:20 and Blind Merged Mining, you get more money than the other miners who aren't doing the normal 1:39:28 merge mining, right? So you have this first mover advantage, right? So you have an incentive 1:39:34 to start doing this thing. Whereas with Blind Merged Mining, it's like every miner 1:39:41 earns those fees, right? Without having to do anything. So isn't it a bit better that 1:39:47 they have an incentive to do it first? Well, that's an interesting question. I think 1:39:57 so the question is, Blind Merged Mining, and just everyone does it automatically, 1:40:03 with no running of the L2 node. But you're saying in normal merge mining, 1:40:09 it's a good thing that it nudges them into running a node. Is that what you're saying? 1:40:14 Yeah, yeah. 1:40:15 One more node in the world. Well, Blind Merged Mining needs someone to run a node in order... 1:40:20 So it's the same like number of nodes overall. 1:40:23 Yeah, that's not what I mean exactly. What I mean is that, 1:40:29 imagine there's a new sidechain proposal, right? Actually, the first question before that is, 1:40:36 what happens if I try to deposit to a slot of a sidechain that is not yet being used? 1:40:43 What happens? Do the coins get frozen? What happens exactly there? 1:40:47 I think the coins... That's a good question. I don't know. I think it's invalid if the slot 1:40:56 is not used. I think a more interesting question is, let's say someone activates slot number 17, 1:41:03 then the sidechain gets used for 20 years, then everyone abandons it and it has zero coins and 1:41:08 it has no full node software and it has no website anymore. And it's just a ghost town 1:41:12 and there's nothing there and then you deposit it. I think if you, instead in your first version 1:41:18 of the question you asked, I think it will just be... Because we reject a lot of stuff as invalid 1:41:24 if anything weird happens. So I think it will just say, you can't deposit to that. It's invalid 1:41:30 under BIP300 because no one has used it. But that's why I was trying to follow it up with the 1:41:36 second question, which is you can have a parallel scenario that you could have 1:41:45 where you deposit it but there is no full node software. In which case, no one knows what the 1:41:50 correct bundle hash is and you could take your pick as to whether or not you want to regard 1:41:56 them all as being thefts or all as being legitimate. I think. I don't know. Does that help at all? 1:42:04 What I'm trying to get to is that for... This was because I was thinking about what 1:42:13 Shomaru was saying about the... And you went to say about coin use and stuff. What I think, 1:42:20 one way this could work is that if the coins are considered frozen, right? So what could happen 1:42:29 is that it could, at first, work a bit as a space chain, one-way peg kind of thing. And then 1:42:37 you can test the waters, right? You can start using it already while knowing that the coins 1:42:43 for now are frozen, right? And then there will be actually fees going to this chain, right? 1:42:52 That can be collected by normal merge mining instead of Blind Merged Mining. And so what 1:42:58 would happen is that the miner, what he would need to do is that he would need to either run 1:43:04 his own node software of this L2 or maybe have someone else run it, whatever. But the point is, 1:43:12 this is normal merge mining. So only those miners who do run something, they actually earn this 1:43:18 money. So this would be one kind of permissionless way to make new Drivechains into existence 1:43:26 without this need to be proposing stuff. You could actually test the waters first. 1:43:35 Well, it's an interesting idea. I think it's kind of like you could have a completely 1:43:41 permissioned chain that is totally ruled by one person. This is what Liquid is, 1:43:48 and all the transaction fees just go to one hard-coded address versus the Drivechain is 1:43:53 fully open in a way. And then you could blend it in between to your heart's content. 1:44:01 But I don't know if people would like the centralized version as much. If users were 1:44:09 like, maybe they would. I don't know. I have no idea. Apparently, Liquid has like five users now, 1:44:13 so that's up 500% from what they had before, which was zero. But I don't know. Does that 1:44:21 answer your question at all? Maybe I'm not following what you're saying. I think the issue 1:44:27 is you can already do stuff that is not 100% open. So that's what I'm getting at, 1:44:37 if that makes any sense. I don't know. Yeah, but I was talking about Rootstock, 1:44:45 so what Rootstock has is they do have normal merge mining, and they also have their 1:44:52 federation. So I think this is kind of the blend you're trying to get to. But then again, 1:44:59 there is no way to upgrade. Yeah, exactly. Why blend good and bad when you could just have good? 1:45:06 You could filter out, de-blend, anti-blend that. But I agree that people should try 1:45:15 different combinations of things. I don't know. And then they have Rootstock. They were in here 1:45:24 complaining a few weeks ago. They were like, we don't even know our own private keys, so we can't 1:45:29 get them. Which is kind of like, well, that just sounds strange. A lot of what people do is 1:45:38 strange. I don't necessarily want to be handcuffed to their choices. But do you still think that 1:45:49 normal merge mining is sometimes better than Blind Merged Mining? I really think they're mostly 1:45:54 the same. Yeah, that's the thing. That's one of the reasons, right? Because you're nudging, 1:46:04 as you said, you're nudging the miners to go and run this. Because if they don't run this, 1:46:09 they will lose in competition to the other miners, right? So you're constantly nudging 1:46:14 every miner to go and actually do this merge mining. There's also the liquidity thing, 1:46:22 because in Blind Merged Mining, someone needs to fund the money on L1, whereas in normal merge 1:46:29 mining, they don't. Which I haven't thought too much economically about this, but it feels 1:46:38 better to not need liquidity. Yeah, well, it's interesting you bring up your first point about, 1:46:46 oh, it encourages miners to compete fiercely so that some can have an edge over the others. 1:46:51 This was the whole complaint about, oh, sorry, hang on one second. The whole original reason 1:47:03 was that people were worried about this thing of affecting mining incentives. Now, 1:47:10 this was back in 2015 when I didn't know any better, and I was actually taking everyone 1:47:14 seriously. And I didn't realize how insane and stupid all these people were and how everything 1:47:18 is poorly thought out and nothing makes any sense. None of their complaints make any sense. 1:47:23 So what actually happened was I was just kind of like, sure, and then I invented this thing 1:47:29 that would just solve their problem. But I kind of wish that I just said, oh, well, 1:47:36 it's just another dimension in which miners will compete. And you have to notice that I still even 1:47:41 get it today where people say, oh, this is going to damage mining incentives because some people 1:47:44 will compete. So you just can't win with these people. They're just like, they complain about 1:47:49 something being anti-competitive. They complain about something not being. 1:47:54 So I just wanted to point out that it's ironic from my point of view that you bring this up. 1:48:00 This was like the whole point of Blind Merged Mining was that people, they were like, oh, 1:48:02 we don't want miners to compete on some things. We want there to be like a level playing field 1:48:07 or whatever. Really, all these people are just like Marxist weirdos. And I don't know, 1:48:13 like they don't. So I kind of probably should have ignored them the whole time and not even 1:48:18 invented. But Blind Merged Mining does, as we mentioned last week, it does do this proposal 1:48:23 builder separation. It does eliminate all MEV. And that's one of the things that it does. 1:48:29 So since you're getting paid in L2 coins, but you have to pay L1 coins, you don't have to pay the 1:48:36 same amount. So it's just like a feedback loop to account for that. So that's one thing that I'm not 1:48:42 worried about, because if it's a very onerous, like if the L1 coins are so much more precious 1:48:49 than the L2 coins, then you'll just pay fewer of them. You pay fewer L1 coins for the same, 1:48:58 you pay 80 L1 coins for 100 L2 coins. So that should work itself out. Don't worry about that 1:49:04 part. Yeah, that's why my main thing is this first mover advantage kind of thing. Because like, 1:49:14 as you said, you don't know what happens if you try to deposit to a sidechain that is not yet 1:49:20 activated. I think it should freeze the coins, right? Because then we could actually try this 1:49:26 experiment out in the wild, the one I'm talking about, right? Of like first sending the coins to 1:49:32 the slot, and then actually have it go, you know. Yeah, people have proposed this also, 1:49:38 about like, oh, what could I, one person had an interesting idea, where they said, 1:49:42 how can I make it so that if I wanted to put up 100 coins, as like a sacrificial thing, 1:49:49 and it would be like 50 would be paid out over the first year, 25 over the next year, 1:49:54 it'd be like having like a halving or like a quartering. And someone had that idea a long 1:49:59 time ago. And they were like, I want to be able to put it all out there in advance so that the 1:50:06 miners know I'm really going to do it. I think, though, it's not that much of a difference. 1:50:12 Because no matter what, you need to have the software written first. So that's a big upfront 1:50:17 cost. So you got to have all the software out, then you got to have 100 coins. I think what 1:50:22 you would just do is you would just sign, you would sign up some kind of message on L1 that 1:50:27 said like, you will deposit the coins, and then the miners would have the transaction. And then 1:50:31 you could like check lock time, verify, you could do like an HTLC on L1. So I think you could do it, 1:50:37 you could make that work somehow. So it's kind of a wacky idea. 1:50:46 All right, we got a Shomari hand again. Only nine, eight and a half minutes. 1:50:52 Yeah, I just wanted to follow up on your advice with the CoinNews being the preferred medium for 1:51:02 you know, communicating with the miners. I just submitted my proposal. And it's already been 1:51:08 mined. So it's it's even showing up in the eCash wallet right now. So I just want to say 1:51:17 there's no excuse, Paul. I want to be in, let me in. 1:51:21 That's exactly how it should work. Because that's exactly how because of course, 1:51:25 we all understand that people's attention is limited. So people can't be attentive to every 1:51:32 thing on the internet. But then this is exactly a way of saying, hey, listen, we know that you 1:51:36 all saw this. That's like the game changer idea of CoinNews. It's kind of like a smoke signal, 1:51:44 like in Native America. It's like, everyone can see it. Everyone can see that everyone else 1:51:47 saw it. So it's a quite, I think it's cool. That's exactly how it should work. So. 1:51:58 Okay, great. Any final question? 1:52:05 Yeah, if I may just briefly. 1:52:07 Yeah, please. 1:52:09 Can I just respond to something Shomari raised earlier about the RISC-V architecture? If I'm 1:52:16 not mistaken, in the context of Ethereum, it's being discussed as, you know, a better VM for 1:52:23 creating like ZK proofs of it. It's like more easily provable than the EVM. So like that, 1:52:29 that could be one maybe one motivation. Another related motivation, unrelated motivation, I should 1:52:34 say, is RISC-V, you can actually get Doom running on there, the classic video game Doom, which means 1:52:40 like there could be a BIP300 Drivechain that plays Doom, maybe. That could be fun. 1:52:48 But just, you know, that the, I mean, the use case is that I would say the most valuable use 1:52:56 case I see is that as a builder, you know, most, I'd say most Ethereum people are using Solidity, 1:53:04 which is a JavaScript-based language. It is Turing-complete, but it has so many limitations, 1:53:10 and I hit them all the time, you know, over the years. With RISC-V, there's almost no limitations. 1:53:19 It's, it's, it's, yeah, yeah, certainly you could use any language that could compile. 1:53:23 Yeah, you could use Rust, you know, C, anything. It's just, it's just, it just, it removes the 1:53:29 barrier. And so let me just, just also say that I understand why RISC-V wasn't used yet, 1:53:35 because it's, it's too open, and it would be too dangerous. Well, it also wasn't very mature. 1:53:42 It wasn't very mature at the time Ethereum came out. Sure, sure. Exactly, exactly. So like now that they've really 1:53:48 proven, you know, how everything should work, I think they can be a little more aggressive with, 1:53:53 you know, providing developers with more freedom than they would have been comfortable, you know, 1:53:58 in the past. So I think it's just a good time, the evolution of, you know, blockchain technology, 1:54:03 where, because I'm seeing a lot of that happening with like Bitcoin Cash, 1:54:07 their last upgrade, where they've just removed so many limitations that just were ridiculous, 1:54:11 absolutely ridiculous. So like, I feel like we're entering that era now where things are going to 1:54:16 get really practical in terms of like, it's not going to be blockchain development, it's just 1:54:20 going to be, you know, development technology, but we're going to utilize blockchain without 1:54:25 worrying about what are the limits, you know, what are the rules. The rules will just be 1:54:31 what you do in software development. It'll be the same, you know, applications. So like you said, 1:54:36 like, I would love to see Doom on the sidechain. That would be awesome. Actually, interesting, 1:54:42 you brought up Bitcoin Cash, and just coming back to the conversation earlier about like the 1:54:48 difficulty adjustment or readjustment in eCash. Paul, if you recall, Bitcoin Cash had a modified 1:54:59 difficulty adjustment mechanism where if there was no blocks produced for like a long period, 1:55:04 it would drop the difficulty like very, very aggressively, right? I'm not sure if that was 1:55:10 still in, if it's still in there now. But is that something that like, you know, you might consider 1:55:14 for eCash, because it could, you know, if there's like a rapid drop in hash rate, for whatever 1:55:19 reason, right? You know, you may not see blocks for a long, long time, right? Yes, I have looked 1:55:28 into this and it's a very important question, because especially when you don't know what the 1:55:31 difficulty is, it will be skyrocketing up and up and up and up. And it'd be very easy to overshoot, 1:55:37 for example. I think what Bitcoin Cash did really did not help because they had to scramble to do 1:55:44 another hard fork. I think it severely undermined their credibility. And then when you say a long 1:55:52 time, I think there was six hours. So if it was hours without finding a block, it would like 1:55:57 slash the difficulty by some amount, large amount. And as a result, miners started triggering it on 1:56:04 purpose, I think. They would just say, well, we'll just, why would we find a block here when we can 1:56:09 just wait for the six hours and then it'll be open season, find a bunch of blocks. So I think, 1:56:17 I think what they did kind of didn't really work. Now, of course, everyone's free to clip the audio 1:56:22 here and play that. You can play that for me in late August. And look at Paul, it's also not 1:56:27 working for him. What did he know? But then they called it the Emergency Difficulty Adjustment, 1:56:32 EDA, which kind of has a very negative vibe if you think about it. So my preferences are to first, 1:56:41 let's just, let's just see what happens. Maybe it'll be fine. And come what may, there could be 1:56:46 a giant disaster, but we could just work through it, you know, let's just see. Cross that bridge 1:56:51 when we come with it to some extent, although also paranoid prepared. Now, today, these days, 1:56:58 it is actually much easier today. Very, very difficult in the past. But these days, 1:57:05 it's very easy to rent hash rates. So in addition to getting a bunch of hash, buying a bunch and 1:57:10 whatever, you could go on and you can just rent. And there's many services that do this. So either 1:57:16 the coin will be so small, low market cap, not very impressive, but still alive and ready to go. 1:57:27 It'll either be so low that it won't cost that much money to rent a lot of, you know, 1:57:34 maybe like we're talking like in the tens or hundreds of thousands, 1:57:40 to rent like enough hash rate to get it to its next difficulty adjustment, no problem. 1:57:45 So that's pretty small in the grand scheme of things, like, because it'll probably be fine. 1:57:49 There'll be lots and lots of blocks, difficulty will be too low. Then one time, 1:57:54 difficulty will be too high, rent a little bit of hash, get to the next 2016th block. 1:58:02 Difficulty falls again, then you're back on your feet. So either it'll be small, 1:58:08 in which case it won't be a big deal, or, you know, will be really big. You know what I mean? 1:58:14 Our difficulty will be very high, which is really only possible if the block reward is worth a lot, 1:58:21 which is really only possible if the coin is like skyrocketed into like the top five 1:58:28 on coin market cap, in which case that's already like a huge, it's a great first week or whatever. 1:58:38 Now, of course, it's possible that we're in like a Goldilocks situation, except in reverse, 1:58:43 a terrible situation of like a bad where it's like really big, but not big enough to be like 1:58:52 super successful, but like whatever. It's kind of hard. You have to take out a pen and paper 1:58:56 or Microsoft Excel and see like where the unfortunate region is. So hopefully you follow 1:59:03 my argument so far. So the argument is this, either everything will be fine, or if things are 1:59:08 not fine, the price will either be low, medium, or high. If it's low, you can rent hash rate, 1:59:14 it's probably fine. If it's high, then you had a great success. So the fact that you had a really 1:59:20 dramatic success and then one unclear difficulty, or we can kind of be in the middle. So in that 1:59:31 case, I think one thing that would be an improvement over the Bitcoin Cash EDA is to 1:59:38 just release a new version of the software that just one time shifts the difficulty back down by 1:59:46 30% just that one time. That's it. Just hard code in this block or whatever it is. 1:59:52 I think that's better than adopting the EDA as a kind of ongoing principle, because 2:00:01 I just don't think you want to tinker with the difficulty adjustment. It's very, 2:00:06 very important. It's very basic. It's very crucial. The way I see it, if you really want to 2:00:14 have the difficulty on the network near the value of the price, the way I see it, 2:00:21 the problem is just that you can't predict what the price will be easily in advance, 2:00:26 especially because it'll be a kind of a chaotic time where a lot of people be making up their 2:00:31 mind. And even if you have a lot of success, like you could have some moderate success, 2:00:36 price could be like $200 a coin, then you could have more success. And then the mining, 2:00:42 just the way the mining works is that you could have way more mining and the difficulty could 2:00:46 shoot up by a lot. It's hard for the difficulty to shoot up by a factor of four unless the price 2:00:56 is also four times higher than it just was recently. That's what I'm getting at, 2:01:03 is there's this connection between difficulty going up and the market price skyrocketing. 2:01:10 So it's kind of like, hopefully, I realize this is kind of a confusing point, but I'm trying to 2:01:15 say like, well, it's hard for you to have that problem without also having like crazy price 2:01:21 appreciation. Also, it's just kind of like good news. So it's kind of like, maybe just kind of 2:01:26 just wait and just see, see what happens. If you get into trouble, you can always reset the 2:01:31 difficulty down. Because basically if you get into trouble, it's just saying that the current market 2:01:37 price is just a little low, just a little bit beneath where the difficulty kind of thinks it is. 2:01:42 So just move the difficulty down. Of course, you can't move the price up. That would be nice, 2:01:46 but you can't. So just move the difficulty down. And then it should be mostly, now, of course, 2:01:54 there's no guarantees, but there should be some people mining on each network. And as long as the 2:02:04 difficulty is so low, on BTC, the difficulty is lower than the market price. And as long as it's 2:02:11 the same. On eCash, you should be able to have them both. So I think that's my thoughts on that. 2:02:18 But yeah, I do think that that is a big, anyone who wants to do a hard fork of Bitcoin has to 2:02:23 somehow figure out what to do about what the initial difficulty should be. And we've said 2:02:29 we're going to set it very low, but then it will skyrocket up. And so it may just 2:02:34 automatically overshoot. And so, yeah, those are some of my thoughts. 2:02:40 It's a complex issue. I don't think the Bitcoin Cash thing helped them. That's my opinion. 2:02:49 It did not, actually. I concur. It did not. It's just silly, but whatever. 2:02:56 Okay, great. Well, hey, on that note, we'll have to call it here for today, but next week we'll be 2:03:03 back. So hopefully everyone enjoys this. Listen to the recording. Send if you want me to talk 2:03:10 about anything in particular. Send it to me on Twitter. And thanks very much, everyone. See you 2:03:18 everyone later.
