0:01 Hello, and welcome to Drivechain Twitter Spaces, 0:06 where we talk about Drivechain, which is BIP300 and BIP301. 0:10 Welcome to those who've joined. 0:13 Moon Settler, great to see you in the audience. 0:15 Feel free to raise your hand and come up to speak if you'd like. 0:21 Today should be a great conversation. 0:24 We might have Post Capone and Super Testnet and others join. 0:30 Some of those people I've chatted with about the possibility 0:34 of having a conversation about what do ordinals and inscriptions 0:41 mean for our understanding of Drivechain and its value proposition. 0:49 Welcome to the stage, Paul. 0:52 Thank you. I'm excited to learn more about Drivechain. 0:56 Oh, great. Great. 1:00 It's the talk of the town. 1:02 People are interested more than ever. 1:04 Definitely was in February. 1:06 I mean, hopefully we can continue that in March. 1:08 But it did seem like February 1:13 saw an enormous amount of increase in interest. 1:21 What do you think this ordinals and inscriptions episode 1:26 in Bitcoin history means? 1:29 In terms of our understanding of Drivechain. 1:33 Do you feel that it's... 1:34 Well, in general, what it means, a couple of different things. 1:38 One thing is there's a group that thinks that Bitcoin should not be used 1:43 and that it should only be store of value. 1:47 Historically, that group is contrasted with the people 1:49 who thought it should be a medium of exchange and it should be used. 1:53 And I, of course, I just think that both are very important. 1:56 It's like having heat in your house and air conditioning. 2:01 And I just think the better that each gets, the better. 2:03 But the issue is that there's a few dogmatic people 2:07 who just think that there's no reason to use Bitcoin at all 2:10 and that any use of the blockchain space 2:13 other than for transactions is illegitimate. 2:17 And those people have now been kind of shown up and frustrated 2:22 because the ordinals thing has taken off. 2:24 Because the ordinals thing has taken off 2:26 without them being able to do anything about it. 2:28 And then the other thing is that every cult is naturally an enemy of fun. 2:34 So a cult emphasizes conformity. 2:38 And of course, the current Bitcoin culture 2:40 has unfortunately some cult-like properties. 2:44 And so when they see anyone having fun, 2:46 then they know that we can't have that. 2:48 Everyone has to just be like a weird monk. 2:51 Those are some of the things. 2:53 Yeah. I think someone wrote on Twitter, 2:55 maybe it was you, that when there are two groups 2:58 and one of them is expending energy to enforce conformity of ideas, 3:03 then that group will underperform another 3:06 because of the energy that the one group 3:08 is expending towards just policing itself. 3:11 The group having fun will outperform. 3:16 That's certainly the case. I don't remember saying that, 3:18 but I would mostly agree with it. 3:20 The worst thing is that it's not even so much the energy used to police, 3:26 it is that innovation is the key to success 3:30 and conformity is a natural enemy of novelty, 3:35 whereas everything innovative must be novel. 3:37 So to me, the novelty is a bigger factor, 3:40 but that is also the case that you have to have all these people 3:44 spending their time on a self-inflicted handicap. 3:50 When you described Bitcoin being used versus just held, 3:55 it's an interesting distinction 3:57 because of course holding in economic theory is a form of using, 4:01 saving is an activity. 4:03 So the distinction some would draw is between Bitcoin as money 4:08 and Bitcoin as a platform 4:10 for a multitude of non-monetary applications. 4:14 And then the people would cite, perhaps simplistically, 4:17 the Oracle problem. 4:19 Well, indeed, but you see actually this is, I think, backwards 4:22 because money is a use, you're right, as savings is a use, 4:27 all that is correct. 4:28 But actually that just proves that the whole point 4:31 is that it has to be used for something. 4:32 So you make a list of uses and you can put at the top, 4:35 you could put savings or money, 4:39 but that just means that the reality of that list is undeniable. 4:43 And if the list contains money, 4:45 the reality of that list is undeniable. 4:47 And if the list contained nothing, then it would be useless. 4:50 So that's actually flipped around. 4:54 Bitcoin should be useful and the more useful, the better. 4:57 And if savings is one use, 4:59 but we should stack the list with everything we can find. 5:03 But when you say all that, are you focusing on the distinction 5:08 between economies that are on blockchain versus those that aren't? 5:14 Like, let's say all of Amazon were somehow more on the blockchain 5:19 versus just using Bitcoin as a payment system. 5:22 Isn't that the distinction? 5:24 There's another different thing, which is that Bitcoin, 5:27 there's 21 million coins, 5:29 but that has nothing to do with how much block space there is. 5:32 Block space is a completely different thing. 5:34 That is something that we also want the demand for to be high 5:37 because block space determines the security budget 5:42 and the 51% attack cost. 5:44 So they're related, but they're completely different goods. 5:47 They're just as different as oil and Netflix subscriptions. 5:57 Yes. Lately, I've been analogizing it to a store, 6:01 a store that just sells meat and milk and cereal 6:04 versus a store that sells those things plus candy and toys. 6:08 The one with candy and toys is being more permissive 6:13 in its value judgments about what to sell, 6:15 and it'll probably sell more products. 6:17 Right, and it can still sell meat, of course. 6:19 So you have someone who really wants candy, 6:22 and you're with a group, and you say, 6:24 well, if we go to the first store, then someone has to go away empty handed. 6:29 But if we all just go to the second store, then there's no issue. 6:34 So that would be, in terms of who can attract a group and network effects, 6:39 that would seem to be a pretty big advantage. 6:45 Yes. The discussion on block space is so important 6:49 and probably bodes well for drivechain understanding. 6:54 Since we've had a lot of discussion about the security budget recently 6:59 in the wake of this ordinals popularity and inscriptions popularity, 7:04 but many people were saying, 7:06 oh, well, the security budget will be solved 7:09 by those doing this ordinals and inscriptions. 7:11 But we haven't seen the fees rise very significantly. 7:16 We haven't seen fees over $2 per transaction. 7:19 We haven't seen total transaction fees per day over $1 million a day. 7:25 So we haven't seen a spike in fees rivaling prior spikes, 7:32 such as in 2017 or 2021. 7:35 Yeah, it's important to notice that Michael Saylor 7:38 seems to get this question wrong, 7:41 because he does not appreciate the difference 7:42 between the block space and the coins. 7:46 So because he'll make statements like, 7:49 well, it'll be with Bitcoin is $100 trillion asset, 7:51 then it'll be a 1% fee. 7:57 But that is not a legitimate argument, 7:59 because there's absolutely no relationship 8:01 between the two goods at all. 8:02 So there's no sense in which one would be a percentage of the other 8:09 any more than when you buy Netflix subscription, 8:12 it should be a certain percentage of the price of oil. 8:16 Yes. Everyone listening is welcome to raise their hand 8:20 and come on up to the stage if you have a question or a comment or a rant. 8:28 I think, yeah, this block space discussion is so important, 8:31 because it improves understanding and awareness of how Bitcoin works. 8:35 And the block space is a very interesting part 8:38 of the drivechain value proposition. 8:42 How surprised are you, Paul, at the evolution of ideas on drivechain 8:47 and how the security budget became a way of understanding 8:51 the value of drivechain, 8:53 since that wasn't part of the original inspiration? 8:55 Would you say that's a tremendously stunning development? 8:59 It seems that way to me personally. Do you feel that way? 9:03 I think it is interesting that drivechain already, 9:06 you know, when it designed it, it already solved 9:08 like three or four different huge problems. 9:12 So one of those being, of course, this idea, 9:14 this meta consensus idea that people disagree 9:16 over what the blockchain should contain. 9:19 So you can't have large blocks and small blocks. 9:22 You have to have one or the other, and whichever one you choose, 9:26 the other group will go away empty handed. 9:28 So that's one, but then just people wanting to be creative, 9:30 you know, the idea of Vitalik starting Ethereum, 9:33 but he can't really do it on Bitcoin, 9:35 because he wants a different design. 9:40 And make no comment on whether or not that's a good idea or not. 9:43 It's just the idea that people would want to try new things. 9:46 And that's the relentless march of progress. 9:49 So in addition to solving like block size, war, governance, 9:55 questions of like the blockchain going from being a one size 9:59 fits all to this full spectrum of things. 10:02 I think it just happens to be interesting 10:04 that it also solves the security budget problem 10:08 that people weren't even talking about back in 2015. 10:11 There was just a really vague question mark in people's heads 10:15 about bees replacing the block subsidy. 10:19 So I think that's a very interesting development. 10:23 I think unfortunately, the security budget question 10:26 is still completely misunderstood to the degree that makes it. 10:34 It just makes it more obvious to me that the community is in bad shape, 10:38 because you still have people who think that, 10:40 for example, a block size increase decreases fees 10:45 when there's really no evidence, 10:47 that all of the evidence points in the other direction. 10:49 And then you have people conflating fee rates and total fees, 10:53 which is the difference between saying $4 per gallon 10:57 is different than saying $4 per gallon 11:01 is comparable to like $20,000 or something. 11:04 One is per gallon and the other is just an amount of money. 11:06 So the fact that people would even compare those 11:09 shows how confused they are, unfortunately. 11:12 To be sure I heard you right, you said that a block size increase 11:17 would, in your view, increase total fees. 11:20 Is that correct? 11:21 Yeah, we really don't see. 11:23 There's a couple cases such as Bitcoin SV 11:26 where the fees are ultra low. 11:29 But in general, everyone is paying some tiny fee. 11:33 And so each transaction is giving a slightly right, 11:38 adding slightly to the end. 11:39 What we haven't seen is the fees stay up, right? 11:44 They sometimes go up when there's a big bubble or something temporarily. 11:49 But this is unreliable. They always fall back down. 11:52 And they just if you just look at the amounts 11:55 and just use a little common sense, 11:56 like they don't go up in the way that would be affected 12:00 by an increase in the block size. 12:02 So it's not as though they are $200 per transaction. 12:06 And then when we add and increase the blocks, 12:08 they just behave a very different way when the blocks are full 12:11 versus when they're even slightly empty. 12:13 When they're even slightly empty, then it's just this $30, 12:16 $0.30, $0.30 to $0.80 or less, $0.05 to $0.80 range, 12:23 which is just like the range that we get. 12:28 And then when they're full, they sometimes go up. 12:30 But when they go up, people react with their behavior. 12:34 They get annoyed and they transact less. 12:37 They batch the transactions. 12:38 They wait, they hold off on transacting 12:41 until the fees go back down, which they do. 12:44 Yes, I understand. That makes sense. 12:50 Some of the errors people make is they think 12:52 that if the fees aren't high enough for the miners, 12:55 then the block size could be reduced. 12:58 And that would increase total fees. And that's wrong. 13:00 And they also think that the miners could impose a minimum fee 13:05 that's higher than the current minimum fee. 13:08 And that's wrong. 13:10 It's wrong to think that either of those proposals 13:13 would increase the total fee rate paid to the miners, 13:16 which is what matters. 13:19 The minimum fee is like anyone can do that, right? 13:22 You could open a Burger King and you could say, 13:25 well, I'm not making enough money. 13:28 And you could say, well, instead of charging $5 per hamburger, 13:30 I'm going to charge $7,000 per hamburger. 13:32 I'm going to impose a minimum fee. 13:34 That's like stupid that idea is. But yeah, people say that. 13:38 Welcome to the stage, Super Testnet, 13:40 one of my favorite speakers on Twitter Spaces. 13:44 Thank you. Glad to be here. 13:46 I wonder if we'll get Post Capone today. 13:49 He was invited. Hopefully he'll join. 13:52 But maybe if either of you have to drop for any reason, no worries. 13:57 But I was wondering maybe we could have a combo between you two 14:02 about one of the things you've spoken about a lot, 14:06 Super Testnet, in your tweets, 14:08 which is the censoring of inscriptions or ordinals. 14:12 Is that something you'd be interested in talking with Paul about? 14:16 Yeah. Yeah, I'd love to. 14:18 Okay. That was sort of the intended topic for you and Post Capone 14:21 to perhaps debate. 14:23 And maybe Paul has a view that is somewhat aligned with Post's view. 14:28 He's anti-censoring. And then you have an interesting view 14:33 because you're someone who speaks very favorably about drivechain 14:37 and has written a great essay on it. 14:39 But I suspect Paul doesn't have the pro-censorship view that you have. 14:43 Maybe that's something you could summarize for him. 14:47 Sure. Sure. Well, it's gotten even more urgent recently. 14:50 Or if urgency is the right word for this. 14:54 There's even more people dumping ridiculous data on Bitcoin now 14:59 because of the new sovereign roll-ups protocol or idea from Bitkip. 15:05 Or not Bitkip. 15:06 I have to compliment you on that because it really has been disappointing. 15:10 As you may have saw me tweet recently, 15:12 like a lot of people, what a lot of people seem to think from the title 15:17 is that the roll-up thing is like some kind of Ethereum technology 15:22 that we Bitcoiners can now take advantage of or something. 15:27 When the reality is not. 15:30 But you're one of the few people who seem to have actually noticed that. 15:33 That is. But anyway, why don't you continue? 15:37 Yeah, well, I would say, actually, I would agree with those who say 15:41 it is an Ethereum technology that Bitcoiners can take advantage of. 15:45 But we've always been able to like run transactions through the EVM 15:50 and then and then dump the output to Bitcoin. 15:52 Like that's that's really what they're doing. 15:55 It's like it's not running the EVM on. 15:59 It's not running Bitcoin transactions through the EVM. 16:01 It's running these altcoin transactions through the EVM. 16:04 That's what I mean. 16:05 Dumping the output. Yeah. 16:09 Yeah. So because there's a lot more people dumping ridiculous data on Bitcoin, 16:14 using this taproot or not taproot, using this inscriptions, envelopes idea. 16:21 I think it's even more of a good idea to block them and just say, 16:25 yeah, sorry, you can't do that anymore. 16:29 Also, also the fact that Ethereum people are using it now 16:33 also makes that harder to do because they have a lot more tenacity 16:38 than I think the monkey JPEG people do. 16:41 And I think they would stick stick with it a lot longer 16:44 and try to overcome any attempts of ours to block it. 16:47 So that would be upsetting because I don't know who has more tenacity, 16:51 the Ethereum people or the Bitcoin people. 16:57 Yeah. So the basic idea is I don't think Bitcoin 17:00 is a good place to dump to use as a dumping ground. 17:04 I think there are much better places to do that. 17:06 And if someone starts using Bitcoin as a dumping ground, 17:09 like with inscriptions, I think it's a good idea 17:12 if it becomes popular to block it and restore Bitcoin to just being, 17:17 you know, just being money. That's that's my opinion. 17:24 Well, I kind of agree with some of that. 17:27 But really, I just think that the goal of the system 17:30 is for the miners to maximize their profits, 17:34 which includes all the cost minimization they do in the real world, 17:38 but revenue maximization with whatever they do 17:41 in the when they sell the block space. 17:44 So I see that whoever is going to pay the most for the block space 17:50 will be the owner. 17:52 And there's really nothing anyone's going to be able to do 17:56 to get around that reality. 18:01 I don't think that they will be able to because of the universality 18:04 of computation, anything that you try to, 18:07 if you try to block something that's formatted like that, 18:09 you can always you can always re-encode a JPEG as a PNG or something. 18:14 You know, it's just zeros and ones that are interpreted a certain way. 18:19 Isn't the solution that like you two might both agree with 18:23 to reduce the block size, 18:26 not for any reason related to security budget, 18:29 but exclusively for reasons related to making full nodes less expensive? 18:35 Well, the whole architecture needs to be fit for the task. 18:41 So if you have small layer one block size, 18:45 but you have layer two chains where people can do all this stuff 18:49 that they're interested in doing cheaply, 18:52 then they will do it over there. 18:54 They won't do it on layer one. Everyone's happy. 18:58 That's the basic situation. 19:01 Yeah, I think a much more feasible plan to stop inscriptions 19:05 would be to reduce the block size than to send soft fork them out. 19:10 Especially now that Ethereum people are doing it 19:12 and they wouldn't give up as easily as I think the NFP people would. 19:17 But yeah, I think campaigning for a block size reduction 19:21 is probably a better use of my time now 19:23 than campaigning for blocking inscriptions. 19:30 Yeah, I'm actually in favor of the block size reduction. 19:32 And it's interesting to figure out who is and is not, 19:35 because like for once, you know, I don't want to speak for Peter Todd. 19:41 Anyone can find him on Twitter and look it up. 19:42 But I remember and I talked to him, 19:44 I think I was either March 2017 or 2018. 19:48 Can't remember which one of those. 19:51 I was talking to him in person in Italy, I think it was 2017. 19:55 And… 19:57 I asked him, what did he think of the SegWit discount being a block size increase? 20:01 And he said, well, he said something like, and this is I'm just paraphrasing it from memory here, 20:05 and anyone can talk to him in person and figure out what his views are. 20:09 But he said something along the lines of, well, I think we really might need the space. 20:14 So he was worried about not having enough block space, which how about that? 20:18 So you never know who's going to endorse what position in this industry, you know, 20:23 because everyone is so quirky and independent. 20:27 So it'd be interesting to see who is still like, who's into what. 20:31 And then, of course, we have, I've told this story a bunch of times, but it's a good one, 20:35 because John Carvalho is saying he was all, he was on the warpath for SegWit. 20:40 And then it wasn't until, I think, 2019 or 2020 that he even admitted that he didn't, 20:45 he just learned that day, years later, that it was a block size increase. 20:50 So he didn't even know that it was. 20:52 Are you indifferent as to whether the block size is reduced before or after Drivechain is adopted? 20:59 Well, I think it's just a more, the whole, the system overall works better 21:04 if they, does happen around the same time. 21:07 But I think that the reasons for lowering the block size are mostly independent. 21:14 I mean, one of the reasons why I'm in favor of lowering the block size is because 21:18 of my confidence in the view that people can take advantage of sidechains. 21:23 So if that view were totally mistaken, then that would be, 21:26 I might need to reconsider all of my other views in that light. 21:37 Welcome to the stage, Alex and Post Capone. 21:42 Alex and Post Capone. 21:46 What are your thoughts on lowering the block size and adopting Drivechain and other matters? 21:55 Drivechain is a good idea. Lowering the block size is not a good idea. 22:02 Why would you say that? 22:05 Well, because lowering the block size essentially disables the Lightning Network 22:09 and the nodes are cheap enough at this point. 22:13 Well, that is another point that, unfortunately, a lot of people do not notice. 22:19 I tweeted about this recently, which is that I have a lot of familiarity with the Lightning Network 22:26 and I designed a couple of things, 2015, 2016, some clever Lightning-type things. 22:33 They require, it's a long story, but I won't get into it. 22:38 But the Lightning Network, in order to do lots of really cool things, 22:43 it must be possible to write the state, the intermediate state, to the Layer 1 blockchain 22:51 or to whatever the host blockchain is. 22:54 And so Lightning needs on-chain fees to be low. 22:58 And they did the math in this post, I did Lightning limitations. 23:03 The amount of marginal bytes, I mean, I should look it up, but it's quite a few. 23:07 To add in, you have to write the HTLC and then you have to spend it later. 23:12 So the total amount of bytes needed to write this output, if you get interrupted, 23:19 if you get interrupted in your Lightning payment and you say, 23:22 okay, the person went AWOL, I have to write it to the state, 23:25 I have to write this whole if branch, I have to write the HTLC, 23:28 I have to write what the hash should be, I have to write the preimage, 23:31 you have to select that as an input and then spend it to wherever, 23:34 whatever gets you your hamburger or whatever you were going to spend your money on. 23:39 That total thing is like, I don't remember exactly what it was, 23:43 but it was like 90 bytes or something, which is a lot 23:45 because that is basically as much as a normal to any other on-chain output. 23:51 So yes, Super Testnet. 23:54 So what I'm saying is if that costs a lot, if that costs like $8 per transaction, 24:00 you're really kind of up against the wall with respect to any Lightning payment 24:04 that's less than $8 because you'd rather not write it to the blockchain. 24:10 So you could say maybe we'll do trust or maybe we'll have tiny little, 24:15 this is the interledger idea, we'll have it stream pennies at a time 24:19 and we'll just hope that if it breaks, I'll find a different route. 24:24 But anyway, you have your hand up. 24:26 Yeah, I'd like to elaborate on that point. 24:30 I think having a small blockchain or a small block size, 24:34 I don't think it breaks the Lightning network. 24:36 I think it increases the minimum size of an HTLC. 24:39 You could have $100,000 fees on the blockchain 24:44 and still the Lightning network would work just for payments greater than $100,000. 24:50 And for other payments, you could put them on a drivechain. 24:55 You could say, all right, we're going to do micropayments on a drivechain 24:59 or you can put the Lightning network on a drivechain. 25:01 So that's a good way to think about it. 25:03 That is a little like payments less than $100,000, 25:05 that's kind of like the exception that proves the rule or whatever. 25:10 But yeah, I agree that I think the drivechain, 25:13 obviously, I think drivechain scaling is underappreciated. 25:17 I think the idea of Lightning on drivechain is underappreciated. 25:21 The big disadvantage with drivechain or anything merge-mined 25:24 is that it still relies on confirmations 25:26 and you get at most one confirmation every mainchain block. 25:30 So you need even more sidechain confirmations. 25:33 There's no block subsidy. 25:35 So basically, the confirmations are slower and worth less on the sidechain. 25:40 That's the big disadvantage. 25:41 But that's also why it would work just fine for like all these casual things, 25:44 coffee, whatever, these things where everyone's using Venmo 25:47 or using the fiat world or whatever. 25:49 So then when you go to a situation where those are slower 25:52 and the confirmations are more onerous to obtain, 25:56 well, that's also where you get all the benefits of Lightning 25:59 because you open the channel before you go to sleep 26:03 and then when you wake up, it has however many 50, 60, 70 confirmations, 26:07 you're ready to go for the next week or whatever. 26:11 And now in Lightning, the stuff is basically instant. 26:16 I don't know if we should turn this into the Lightning complain fest, 26:21 but I just saw Warren Togami I have a lot of mixed feelings about, 26:25 but I think he knows more about Tor than probably anyone I know. 26:29 And he had an interesting rant recently about Tor, 26:33 Lightning will not work over Tor. 26:36 And I don't know if we should try to unpack that, 26:39 but I thought it was very interesting 26:41 because he's squarely in the precious LN whatever camp, 26:47 but he's very experienced with Tor. 26:50 And without Tor, Lightning requires you to disclose your IP address 26:54 in order that people can find you and pay you, 26:57 which I would think is just a knife to the heart for privacy. 27:03 And it would tip the scales back into Lightning being less private than on-chain. 27:10 Could you post a link to that thread in which he talks about that? 27:13 Let's find it. I'm going to try to find it now. 27:17 Because I would say that although the Lightning protocol is currently designed 27:21 only supports Tor and Onion, 27:24 there's nothing stopping us from adding other data transport protocols to... 27:30 I think ITP is better with better performance than Tor. 27:34 So I don't know if that will ever happen, but... 27:39 I don't think it means if you lose Tor, 27:42 it doesn't mean you have to dox your IP address, 27:45 or at least maybe right now it does, but we could change that. 27:48 Now you have to only dox your I2P address or some other networking layer. 27:54 Well, I mean, that sounds like a lot of work, doesn't it? 27:58 Not only that, Paul, but like you pointed out, 28:01 Tor, I mean, the cost of running a node must also include 28:05 not just the physical cost of running a node, 28:08 but the permission to be online or to stay alive. 28:12 So if Tor doesn't work, 28:14 then basically the cost of running a node is essentially infinite. 28:23 I found this thing and I'm going to reply. 28:27 I don't know how to do spaces and stuff and make it show up in the thing, 28:30 but I will reply to the thing and maybe it will show up. 28:36 I don't know how it works. 28:38 Maybe Henry can do it. 28:40 It didn't show up in the nest, but I see it here, so that's useful. 28:46 In the comment box. 28:49 There it is. 28:52 I wish there were more people in Bitcoin who knew 28:55 as much about Tor as Porn Togami does. 29:00 I put it in the nest. 29:02 Okay, cool. 29:04 Maybe I'll delete it from the comments then. 29:06 Because maybe he'll deny it. 29:08 It's all right. 29:10 They will come in. 29:12 Anyway, Tor is one of those things that often I think people use as an excuse. 29:17 They don't do their own thinking. 29:19 They just think, oh, is it private? 29:21 And then they just think Tor. 29:23 They hold up a sign and they just like wave a magic wand. 29:25 I once spoke to Warren about half a year ago 29:28 in our Twitter spaces about Drivechain. 29:31 And I recall him saying that 29:33 something to the effect of 29:35 he wasn't convinced that 29:37 the Drivechain security budget marketing 29:41 is entirely convincing. 29:43 So he's not a 29:45 security budget alarmist. 29:47 Not security budget aligned. 29:49 Yeah, maybe he's optimistic about the security budget 29:51 more than most DriveChainers. 29:53 See, this is the other thing. 29:55 The security budget 29:57 argument 29:59 leads to a lack of focus. 30:01 People 30:03 kind of show up for different reasons 30:05 into the Drivechain group and then they leave 30:07 for different reasons. 30:09 Like if you're there because you want 30:11 a cool feature 30:13 then 30:15 you'll eventually just join the altcoin 30:17 that has that feature. 30:19 After you join Bitcoin, you wait around. 30:21 You're waiting for the feature. 30:23 Waiting for Godot. 30:25 It doesn't show up and then you just say, 30:27 join the Namecoin project. 30:33 Are you saying that people could show up to 30:35 Drivechain 30:37 because of a concern about the security budget 30:39 and then 30:41 join some other coin 30:43 because it doesn't seem to have 30:45 the same kind of problem? 30:47 In that example, they would join Ethereum or something. 30:49 Because it's doing inflation 30:51 and doesn't seem to have a problem with that? 30:54 Ethereum is not necessarily 30:56 doing inflation at all. 30:58 It just has more higher fees 31:00 and in fact 31:02 their ETH1000 31:04 is about 31:06 if they have enough fees 31:08 they will destroy coins. 31:10 But if they don't have enough fees then they inflate? 31:12 Then they will inflate. 31:14 Oh, the 1559. 31:18 So inflation is part of their 31:20 protocol just as a backup plan? 31:22 Yes. 31:24 The funny thing is 31:26 if you go the Peter Todd route 31:28 informally it is also part of 31:30 the Bitcoin backup plan 31:32 just denied. 31:34 I don't 31:36 agree that I think that 31:38 Peter Todd would find it impossible 31:40 to actually succeed 31:42 in 31:44 adding inflation to Bitcoin 31:46 and he may be engagement trolling 31:48 but 31:52 still it's a thing 31:54 that people say in Bitcoin. 31:56 Well a big question is 31:58 when will these concerns materialize? 32:00 Right? 32:02 We had concerns about selfish mining 32:04 that never became a big topic 32:06 in reality it was just a theoretical 32:08 concern from 10 years ago. 32:10 When will these security budget concerns 32:12 become a reality? 32:14 When will they manifest as a risk? 32:16 We haven't yet seen 32:18 a hostile or 32:20 greedy miner of any 32:22 substantial nature. 32:24 Correct? 32:26 Well 32:28 my own thoughts are that 32:30 first of all I never thought selfish mining 32:32 would be an issue. 32:34 I had like a little refutation of it 32:36 at the time but 32:38 with the 32:40 I think the adversaries of these coins 32:42 would have to get good at attacking 32:44 decentralized coins first. 32:46 They're going to warm up on that. 32:48 They're going to get really good 32:50 at whatever they have to do 32:52 to take down the centralized coin. 32:54 You know that only has a few people 32:56 running it. 32:58 What does that mean? 33:00 Well out of all the 33:02 coins that exist 33:04 there's an existing spectrum. 33:06 The Bitcoin SV 33:08 would be more centralized. 33:10 Ethereum would be more centralized 33:12 than PTC. 33:14 And the adversaries would warm up 33:16 on that. 33:18 And then once they warm up, once they have 33:20 that cold, then they know all we have to do 33:22 is attack the security budget and it will go 33:24 from being decentralized to centralized. 33:26 And then we can do it. 33:28 So it would be like a chess game 33:30 where they have to move on 33:32 a certain territory first. 33:34 Super, did you understand 33:36 that whole point he just made? 33:38 I didn't. 33:40 I was replying to someone 33:42 who was wrong on the internet so I didn't 33:44 actually listen. What was the point? 33:46 Paul, were you saying that 33:48 when the security budget problem materializes 33:50 if it does, it will first 33:52 materialize on BSV and BCH? 33:54 No. 33:56 The security budget 33:58 it only works 34:00 the only thing it accomplishes 34:02 strategically is it converts 34:04 a decentralized cryptocurrency 34:06 into a centralized one. Because people 34:08 immediately, once the attack starts 34:10 they'll look for some kind of 34:12 person to say what is the state 34:14 of the blockchain, like Coinbase or whatever. 34:16 Does that make sense? 34:18 Yes. 34:20 Yes, this is what... 34:22 This is the only thing it does. 34:24 It doesn't instantly kill the coin. 34:26 It will convert it 34:28 from decentralized to centralized. 34:30 Understood. 34:32 Sounds like an easy way to kill Bitcoin then. 34:34 Let's do it. 34:36 Exactly. But my point is that the adversaries 34:38 understand this industry so poorly 34:40 that they will, before they 34:42 realize what they can do 34:44 they will have to 34:46 learn about killing the centralized coins. 34:50 And there'll have to be a slang term for this 34:52 and there'll have to be examples of this. 34:54 This will have to enter the Overton 34:56 window, you know. This will be like a 34:58 mainstream thing first. 35:00 That's because you ask in practice. There's a difference 35:02 between practice and theory, of course. 35:04 That old joke that 35:06 in theory there's no difference between theory and practice 35:08 but in practice there is. 35:10 If I understood correctly, are you saying that 35:12 before Bitcoin is destroyed 35:14 by the security budget, if that were to happen 35:16 it would first happen to 35:18 BCH and BSV? 35:20 Oh, no, no. 35:22 I think you're saying 35:24 51% of the time. 35:26 Yeah, right. 35:28 Have you ever played a video game or something 35:30 where you have to 35:32 stun the boss first before you move in 35:34 with the Master Sword 35:36 and they don't glow red? 35:38 They don't glow red unless 35:40 you hit them at the right time. 35:42 I think another way to put it was 35:44 before they try it on Bitcoin 35:46 they'll practice it on BCH and BSV 35:48 and if it works there, then they'll 35:50 be like, hey, maybe we could do this to Bitcoin. 35:52 Well, right. 35:54 There's a whole spectrum. 35:56 So some are completely centralized 35:58 already. 36:00 So that would be like 36:02 something where 36:04 like, 36:06 I don't know, the best example would be 36:08 Solana, maybe, something like that. 36:10 Where they would just be like 36:12 compliant Solana 36:14 or whatever the attack is. 36:16 Or, you know, 36:18 people from the Mafia 36:20 find the Solana validators 36:22 or they find whoever it is, 36:24 a certain key person, 36:26 Vitalik or whatever, and they 36:28 broadcast messages. 36:30 I think I 36:32 interpret the 36:34 hypothetical optimal strategy 36:36 for a 36:38 large-scale attack very differently 36:40 than you. It's interesting. I'm hearing 36:42 what you're saying. Also, by the way, hey, Paul, 36:44 I have very much 36:46 enjoyed listening to you 36:48 rant, 36:50 I'll say, over the years. 36:52 It's been quite enjoyable 36:54 and nice work. I like your work. 36:56 I dig it. 36:58 So 37:00 I don't 37:02 think I see it 37:04 in actually the opposite 37:06 window. 37:08 If I were going 37:10 to hypothetically 37:12 detail 37:14 an ideal attack scenario, 37:16 I would say 37:18 that 37:20 attacking in any sort of 37:22 material or demonstrable way 37:24 a Solana or even an Ethereum 37:26 is like 37:28 this half step 37:30 that only hardens an industry that you'd 37:32 rather see go away. 37:34 As long as the 37:36 largest chain by market cap 37:38 exists, 37:40 then you don't really achieve 37:42 anything meaningful. 37:44 While you 37:46 may learn something 37:48 in practice, you may 37:50 learn some technical skill, 37:52 you don't achieve 37:54 any ends and you ultimately harden 37:56 the system. 37:58 I would think that 38:00 the optimal avenue 38:02 for attack would be to get 38:04 a chain that is easier 38:06 to attack to be the highest 38:08 chain by market cap and then proceed. 38:10 Yes. 38:12 I agree with you. 38:14 They're really two sides of the same thing. 38:16 You can imagine the decentralization 38:18 as being some kind of antibiotic resistance 38:20 or something. 38:22 The question is, if you poured 38:24 antibiotics into 38:26 a lake and you're just pouring 38:28 antibiotics into the lake, 38:30 then eventually the only bacteria that 38:32 are still in the lake will be 38:34 antibiotic resistant 38:36 bacteria. 38:38 Then maybe all of the 38:40 antibiotic 38:42 bacteria, maybe all of them 38:44 can be like, I don't know, I'm just making this up, 38:46 but they can be eaten by a certain kind of 38:48 algae or something. 38:50 You put the algae in. 38:52 You do all one and then you do all the other. 38:54 I totally agree with that. 38:56 I was just kind of saying 38:58 you have it the other way around 39:00 where it's kind of like 39:02 what they'll 39:04 probably do is they'll probably say 39:06 we have this algae that most of the bacteria 39:08 in this lake that we don't like. 39:10 It's kind of funny because 39:12 from the perspective 39:14 of certain people, 39:16 Bitcoin will be like the small fry 39:18 because there'll be so much more fraud 39:20 like FTX 39:22 and maybe Solana or whatever 39:24 and it'll be easier. 39:26 Maybe it'll be easier for them to understand 39:28 how... 39:30 You can do it either way. Either you can say 39:32 listen, we're going to make it 39:34 so that the bacteria 39:36 that dominate this lake 39:38 are all vulnerable 39:40 to antibiotics and then we'll just come in 39:42 and then 39:44 we'll shock it with 39:46 huge antibiotics and everything will die. 39:48 Or you do it the other way around 39:50 where you say... 39:51 We will make it so that the only bacteria in this lake are the antibiotic resistant ones 39:58 and then we'll do the opposite strategy. So the 51% attack the security budget is what 40:05 penalizes the antibiotic resistant bacteria. If this is making any sense at all. I mean, 40:09 analogies are not very persuasive, I think. Yeah, no, you are making sense. I think maybe 40:16 some of the endpoints where I see it becoming dramatically different aren't... Maybe they're 40:21 not packaged in the conversation well. So, okay, let's do this. Let's go back to what we were 40:30 talking about earlier where we said like, okay, an attack on the chain would result in a 40:34 centralization of the coin due to this perception sort of phenomena where people would rely on 40:41 a small subset of actors to inform them of the state of the chain, right? We'd all be like, 40:46 oh my God, all the nodes are saying different shit. What does Coinbase say the state of the 40:49 chain is, right? Is that a decent consumption of your point? Yes. All right. So I don't know 41:00 that this actually is the way that it plays out, but let's say that it is. If an attack 41:07 takes place, right? Let's go with the scenario of they make the chain larger, they get Ethereum 41:16 to flip Bitcoin, and then the treasury says validators can't attest to blocks containing 41:21 transactions, and they force Ethereum into a user-activated soft fork. Well, the system as 41:26 an aggregate, I mean, a lot of people, the technicals here will escape them as the industry 41:32 is made of goldfish. But for a lot of the system, it will become very apparent that this whole 41:38 like distributed infrastructure, node operators, network participants over market participants 41:43 kind of conversation space did have real meaning. And you would see an increase, I think you would 41:50 see a pretty dramatic increase in network participation as a percentage of market 41:56 participation. And especially considering the fact that a lot of the market participants 42:03 would probably flee, then that metric would probably skyrocket. And if that metric skyrockets, 42:09 then there becomes substantially less of a need for somebody to rely on a centralized perspective 42:15 because the percentage of network participants has skyrocketed, right? You have more perspectives 42:23 to share, right? Does that make sense? No, I'm a little, I guess. Okay. Yeah, I just see, 42:34 I see the evolution of it. And it's all, it's dealing in hypotheticals for sure. Like this is 42:39 all like game theory of like war room type stuff. So it plays out in a couple of different ways. 42:44 But I mean, you don't see, the point is consensus is very difficult. So people will want to know 42:50 what are other people going to use for consensus? And so it would naturally be like 42:55 Coinbase or like one person. I think the odds of it being a reliance on Coinbase would be 43:03 dramatically lower if an attack were to manifest somewhere else first. There's a great tweet from 43:09 Nick Szabo from a few years ago, where he wrote something to the effect of what Bitcoin does is 43:15 try to minimize the social coordination. And if there is a insufficiency, he doesn't say 43:23 this much elaboration, but he says basically that it wouldn't be good to have the plan B. 43:28 Well, if there is an attack because of low fees, insufficient economic security, then 43:33 we'll just coordinate to solve it. That wouldn't be good because that's not what Bitcoin does well. 43:41 That's what traditional finance does is people get together in a boardroom and make a decision. 43:46 Bitcoin tries to do the opposite. 43:49 Would it be fair to say that by increasing, if you see a dramatic increase in the number of 43:55 network participants as a percentage of market participants, 43:59 that you would avoid more of the coordination scenario? 44:09 Are you talking about network participants defined as full nodes? 44:12 Sure. Yep. 44:13 So if there's tons of full nodes out there, if everyone in the world who uses Bitcoin, 44:18 all 200 million Bitcoiners each has a full node, then if there is a low total fee rate 44:25 and low Coinbase, then a 51% hostile miner can still destroy the network by making it impossible 44:34 for anyone to send a transaction because they're reorging at every opportunity. 44:39 I'm not saying they can't. I'm specifically addressing this notion of becoming reliant 44:44 on a single perspective. I'm not trying to augment the nature of a 51% attack. 44:50 I'm just discussing the idea that we would become reliant on a central perspective. 44:58 Paul, what do you think of that? 45:00 I have a lot of real work to do, so I have to leave soon. 45:02 OK. 45:04 The idea is that the 51% attack makes it so that the nodes do not tell people what the 45:17 unique blockchain history is. So they will need to get that information from somewhere else. 45:25 I was being charitable. I was saying instead of just the network dying immediately to the 51% 45:29 attack, people will try something. They will tweet at Brian Armstrong 45:37 and say, my money is at Coinbase. I'm on liquidity or whatever. Whoever has the most liquidity 45:44 will just determine what it is until, you know, whatever. Brian Armstrong is, 45:50 heaven forbid, assassinated or whatever the heck happens in this weird scenario, 45:55 arrested or whatever. Anyway, I have a lot to do, unfortunately. 46:03 Thank you for your time here. 46:04 Yeah, I appreciate the time, Paul. It was a pleasure talking to you. 46:07 Yeah, likewise. 46:09 So, Post, what was your thought in response to that and kind of what I was saying, which is, 46:13 I think, the same thing, which is that if you have the hostile attacker reorging at every opportunity, 46:19 then the heaviest chain, the chain with most proof of work, is a chain with no transactions. 46:24 And if they're doing this forever, then things aren't working. Bitcoin would devalue. 46:29 Yeah. So, again, I don't want to augment any of the perceptions of a 51% attack. I guess I would 46:37 butt heads a little bit with the idea that it's sort of an insta-death thing. If you have a 46:42 substantial number of node operators, if there's some reasonable number of node operators, then 46:48 the node operators have to make some sort of decision, right? And this may result in some 46:55 social coordination that is less than desirable, but the node operators come to some decision where 47:00 they say, okay, we have to change the hashing algorithm or something, right? And just burn 47:07 all the ASICs to the ground or something to that effect, right? The node operators would have to 47:13 make some decision. And without a doubt, this would be an unbelievably traumatic scenario. I 47:19 mean, in the conversation about changing the hash rate, you're destroying good miners' chips. 47:25 But I feel like if you reread Paul's 2021 blog post on the security budget, the second of his two 47:34 lengthy essays on the security budget at truthcoin.info, what you'll see there 47:38 is the argument that I agree with, which is that if Bitcoin deviates from proof of work, 47:44 as you said, for example, viewing all of the ASICs as a sunk cost and pivoting to a new 47:51 hashing algorithm with a new kind of machine, then the problem there is that the security 47:57 budget problem once again exists. I don't disagree with that take. 48:03 Right. Okay. So we're on the same page fully then. So it's not good if the plan is, 48:08 well, if there aren't enough fees and the government can afford to just press this 48:12 button that turns off Bitcoin by doing some mining, then if Jason Lowery builds his hashing 48:20 force and then Janet Yellen orders him to make it mine empty blocks and reorg forever, then 48:27 we have to, the problem is the cost of trying to overcome that is still there. Even if we change 48:37 the algorithm, then we have to change again and again and again. And that's what Bitcoin becomes 48:42 is a constant cat and mouse game. Yes. I think what honest network participants 48:47 ultimately would sort of like be trying to fight for is the preservation of the state 48:55 at least up to the point in the attack or to some point at or beyond the start of the attack. 49:04 Right. Like that's what they would want to be preserving. And so there would be an enormous 49:11 amount of conversation space that would have to exist around how to preserve that state, 49:15 like how to move forward. But the more network participants there are, then the less I think 49:22 it becomes dependent on a central observer. So again, like I'm not, I'm not trying to say like, 49:28 oh, we can get through a 51% attack and it'll all be hunky dory. That's, that's not the point 49:32 at all. It is just very, very simply that I think that in any course of events, like any way in 49:40 which the narrative or scenario matures, that results in a higher percentage of network participants 49:47 as, you know, as compared to market participants, the less reliant you become 49:53 on the centralized perspective. That's, that's really the extent of the point. 50:02 Super. Please jump in with your thought and anyone else is also welcome to join the stage. 50:09 Yeah. One of the, one of the things that occurred to me during that 50:13 back and forth was that right now there's about a two year, or it seems to me that there's about, 50:18 we go about two years before we come out with new ASICs because it takes a certain amount of time 50:23 to design new chips and to get them to even smaller nanometer levels. And then it takes a 50:28 certain amount of time to get the contracts to get them built. But yeah, it seems like we have 50:33 about a two year turnaround. And so if you, if you disable the current ASICs, then it'll be about, 50:41 it'll buy you about two years of time at current levels before they come out with new ones that, 50:46 that hash, whatever your new algorithm is. But it's possible that in the future, 50:52 this, this timeframe, this time, this window of time will be greatly reduced. 50:56 Because one of the reasons it takes a lot of time is because there's not that many designers. 51:01 And another reason why it takes a lot of time is that there's, there's a lot of the companies 51:05 that manufacture chips for us have contracts with other companies that they prioritize first. 51:10 But should Bitcoin continue to grow as an industry, both of those things could easily change 51:14 and you could easily pump out, there could be, there could be, there's a possible future where 51:19 new ASICs come out every six months instead of every two years. And in that future, you don't, 51:25 changing the hash rate doesn't buy you a lot of time before you have the same problem again, 51:29 where like one big 51% attacker has all the ASICs again, because he can afford to buy them, 51:36 to buy it, to buy up all the contracts. And then it would come down to how either, 51:46 so it would come down to how aggressive the competition in the, the fabrication, 51:53 like the end point of the fabrication industry is, or it could potentially include other variables, 51:59 such as how controlled by the state, the fabrication process is right. So if, if 52:05 competition, if there's a low level of control over the fabrication process and the competition 52:10 for the end point of the fabrication supply line is high, then it's not a scenario where the attacker 52:16 gets all the chips. It's a scenario where a bunch of new miners get the chips, which is like more 52:21 along the lines of how we've seen the ASIC industry evolve thus far. Right. Or it's closer to that end 52:26 of the spectrum. So it's, it's not so much like, oh, well they'll just make the chips and then 52:32 attack you again. It's given these other set of variables, right? So what, you know, and those other 52:38 set of variables might be important to understand as you, as you navigate how to preserve the state, 52:44 like the conversation about how do we preserve the state may want to take into consideration, like, 52:49 you know, the chip fab industry is like, you know, basically strangleholded by the state. 52:54 And there's no chance of us changing the hashing algorithm and coming out of this with like 52:59 competitive bids on ASICs. So maybe that doesn't work. Right. But it's not, it's not a static 53:07 thing. Like there, there are variables at play. Right. Right. Yeah. There are more variables than 53:12 just time it takes to manufacture and time it takes to design. Yeah, that's a, that's a good 53:20 point. Thank you for bringing that up. So you want to argue again? That was, that was fun when 53:32 we did that last week. Yeah. I mean, so I was telling Henry that I think for like you and I 53:40 as individuals, like we've, we've spoken pretty extensively. I don't, I don't know how much more 53:45 we'd cover, but for the sake of it being a public conversation, I'm certainly down. And if we do 53:50 wind up covering new stuff, then great. Maybe one way to clarify the conversation in a slightly new 53:55 light would be to talk about, given your agreement, if I understand correctly, you both agree that 54:00 drivechain is a great idea. So given that, why does, why, why does it seem to you super to be 54:09 good to think about like censorship when the long run goal would be just smaller block size and, 54:22 you know, having things naturally move to a sidechain rather than try to force them out of layer 54:28 one through censorship? Well, some forks, some soft forks are easier than others. And I don't, 54:37 I don't want to remove one from the table just because there's another one that's out there as 54:41 well. However, I, since then a couple of things have changed and I'd like to let Post Malone know 54:47 that I think he's, he's basically, or circumstances have won me over to his side since our conversation 54:53 happened. In the new circumstances, these roll up things came out, the roll kit protocol came out, 54:59 which exacerbates the problem of using Bitcoin as a dumping ground even, even further, but introduces 55:06 a new set of players. Now it's not just monkey JPEG people who are dumping data on Bitcoin. 55:12 It's like these, these blockchain designers who have a vested financial interest in getting someone 55:18 else to host their data for them. And I think that while the NFT people didn't have a lot of, 55:27 or don't have a lot of, what's the word? I don't think they, they have stick-to-itiveness, 55:34 where if we started blocking them and censoring their transactions, I think they would give up 55:37 and move elsewhere pretty quickly. I don't think these Ethereum roll-up devs would. I think they 55:42 would fight more our attempts to block them and continue dumping data on Bitcoin through 55:52 means other than inscriptions. So I think that's a lost battle now. And I'm just going to advocate 55:59 for a soft fork to reduce the block size rather than a soft fork to specifically kick out 56:05 inscriptions, which is what you wanted, but you didn't want me to advocate for censoring 56:10 inscriptions all along. So congratulations. Now I'm more aligned with you. What do you think? 56:18 Well, you know, perhaps the answer is great, but I, I, my answer would really be that I, 56:26 like, I find it unfortunate that the alignment comes in the form of like erosion like this. 56:33 But the, the idea of roll-ups being something that existed within the use of this, 56:42 this right story, this right space, right? Like this. Okay. So the way, the way that Ethereum, 56:49 like it trajects its future for roll-ups is by leveraging blob space, right? Like they want, 56:55 they want to do this blob space thing and they want to write the roll-up state in the blob space. 57:00 And then they want to use smart contracts to settle to Ethereum, right? So what the envelope, 57:09 the inscription envelope is, is effectively a cheaper version of the blob space that Ethereum 57:14 already wants. And the people paying it, if you're, if you're paying really close attention 57:23 to the evolution of several different narratives in Bitcoin over the course of the past year and a 57:28 half, then the idea of roll-ups on Bitcoin was fairly apparent as far back as a year to a year 57:36 and a half ago. I like, I personally have been sort of like chomping at the bit, sweating in 57:44 anticipation of these roll-ups on Bitcoin. Now, in the case of this specific demonstration with 57:51 Rollkit, it is, it is a substantially less than desirable, like prototypical demonstration of 57:59 how you might start to go about the process. I personally, and this actually counts as a 58:08 little bit of a criticism for 300301 as well, I think that mechanism design that does not allow 58:18 for trustless deposit and withdrawal that is at the sort of like, let's say, let's call it 58:24 native speeds of the L1, right? Like it's slower than the L1 is expected to be. Ultimately results 58:30 in users being forced into LPs that facilitate these deposits and withdrawals. And those 58:38 processes become sort of like on-chain KYC AML injection services. Not to mention that the, the, 58:45 the absence of a trustless nature of deposit or withdrawals completely 58:50 weakens a lot of the arguments made by the base layer of like the way things ought to be. 58:55 So I'm not, I'm not super, I'm very excited about the conversation that Rollkit 59:01 creates, like the conversation space around that, I think is awesome. I think that the way that 59:06 that evolves, hopefully is into, you know, better executions than Rollkit is, right? 59:14 But as a broad generalization, like we all knew, we all knew the roll-ups were coming and we were 59:20 all pretty excited about it. And as I did with inscriptions, I would encourage you to try and 59:27 see that there, there, there is a lot to be done with it without compromising Bitcoin, like with, 59:34 with it without compromising Bitcoin, without dismissing what we intend Bitcoin to be, without 59:43 increasing block space, without 59:47 augmenting. all that data into witness data. 59:52 Well, yeah, using it as a data availability surface is the point though, right? And there, 59:57 there's a million amazing ways to use that. And it's not increasing block space. It's usual, 1:00:04 it's using the block space that was already there. And I, I think where you and I just like, 1:00:10 cannot come to merger is that you think that the block space should only be usable by some very 1:00:20 narrow terms. And I, I would say, I don't think it's really possible, like the, the timeframe 1:00:27 that we would have to wait for that block space to be used in like these very, like sort of 1:00:33 turbo primitive mechanisms that you see it as ought to be used for would be very long. 1:00:39 And by the time we get there, right? Like by the time we get to the point where the 1:00:42 block space is being used by that, then all the things that you don't like about this stuff are 1:00:46 going to be priced out anyway. No, like nobody's going to be printing fucking JPEGs for a half a 1:00:52 million dollars. Like it's not going to happen. I don't want to say it's not going to happen. 1:00:59 But I find it less than likely. Well, it could be less prevalent, 1:01:03 a smaller percentage, a smaller issue if it's price. Oh, right. Yeah. Using blob space to 1:01:11 facilitate other like, okay. So I don't know how familiar you are with like John light and 1:01:17 Dugan's research into validity roll-ups, but like that whole thing goes around this sort of like, 1:01:23 you know, you have, you have to write a proof, right. And like, according to Dugan, 1:01:30 if we take Dugan at his word, then with no like material changes to the Bitcoin protocol, 1:01:36 you could roll up a hundred thousand P2PKH transactions into a single block like today. 1:01:42 Right. And those wouldn't require, those wouldn't require like novel liquidity channels, 1:01:49 like a lightning that wouldn't, you know, there'd be a lot of improvements to the scalability of 1:01:54 Bitcoin and people's ability to use Bitcoin affordably for financial transactions. And 1:01:59 the other really great thing in my, in my mind, the thing that I really like about John's research 1:02:04 thus far is that he has been, you know, very forward about advancing the ways in which Bitcoin 1:02:12 would assert rules on the L2, like on the rollup. We're like, okay, you can only do this type of 1:02:18 shit. Right. And I think that that is a very good angle to approach this from, but that requires us 1:02:24 to write to this, like, we have to be able to use this blob space on Bitcoin to do that. And 1:02:29 interestingly, as it turns out, it's actually about one sixth the cost to write to Bitcoin 1:02:34 than it is, than it is to Ethereum. So the people that are developing these tools in other networks 1:02:39 are actually like, you know, deeply attracted to it now. Yeah. I mean, that's only until we have 1:02:47 a whole other conversation. ETH will probably get cheaper and better. 1:02:53 Say it again. Sorry. I say ETH will likely improve and cheapen. 1:02:58 Oh yeah, yeah, yeah. So like once, once ETH has matured, some other development initiatives, 1:03:03 like they're like, they're, they actually are sort of in this interesting dilemma where 1:03:08 like the current regime of ZK rollups may not actually even demonstrate any material 1:03:13 bandwidth improvement or throughput improvement, which is like kind of, it's like kind of an 1:03:18 interesting dilemma to be in. But for the time being, like there is a lot of interest around 1:03:25 the space. And I think that you don't like what I, I personally have no interest in seeing the 1:03:33 tokenize everything agenda migrate its way to Bitcoin. Like as far as I'm, as far as I'm 1:03:38 concerned, that, that mindset, that, that approach to the development process or the financing 1:03:43 process can sort of fuck off. Like it's all just, it's such a, it's such a horrendously stupid way 1:03:49 to do it for like a vast plurality of reasons. But the, there is a lot of engineering skill there. 1:03:57 And if that engineering skill can be motivated to, I'll use my own Twitter bio as a reference here. 1:04:03 If it can be motivated to plug into the second control report, then like, I think there's a lot 1:04:07 of good to be had in that. And I think super is sort of stuck in this world where, you know, 1:04:14 he, he wants, he wants it to just be these, these sort of like primitive expected Bitcoin transactions 1:04:19 that occur. And I think that there is to, to some degree, a failure to recognize that there are 1:04:28 very, very useful end points for this. And we can't get those end points without also having 1:04:34 the permission to write JPEGs, right? Like I, we, like you, Bitcoin is permissionless. If you 1:04:39 can write data, then you can write data. Right? So right now people are writing JPEGs. 1:04:43 Well, if the mentality was to block it, like the overwhelming BTC-ers, 1:04:51 then it, then it wouldn't be blocked. Is that accurate? 1:04:55 Well, that's definitely not, it's not an overwhelming majority of BTC-ers. 1:04:58 I didn't say it was, I said it was. 1:04:59 Yeah, it's just me. 1:05:00 I'm asking you if it's worth it. 1:05:03 So if the, if the social consensus, if the social consensus were that we should block it, 1:05:09 then I like, you know, I, I would probably still try and rationalize with them. 1:05:13 I'm just saying, what I'm saying, let's have, would it get, would it get blocked? 1:05:18 Let's have super, sorry to interject, but just quickly. 1:05:24 It would require a dramatic fork that changes a number of features over an eight year time period, 1:05:31 well, a seven year time period in order to fork it out. 1:05:35 It would be extraordinarily difficult to remove this. 1:05:40 Or, or if it wasn't these tenacious Ethereum people trying to do roll-ups on it, 1:05:47 then, and it was just the monkey JPEG people, I think they would quickly give up. 1:05:50 If without, it wouldn't take eight years, I think it would take like maybe one year 1:05:55 of soft forking out every attempt to take it in descriptions. 1:05:59 And you'd have to unwind, you'd have to unwind seven years of feature ads. 1:06:02 That's what I'm saying. 1:06:04 You, you would, you would have to go back to 2016 to get rid of this, man. 1:06:07 Like it, it would be rough. 1:06:10 I don't think you would though. 1:06:11 I think if you just, if you just banned, you know, the, the inscription envelope, 1:06:15 the op-if op or op false op-if construction. 1:06:18 No, because then I would just do op true op dump off false op-if. 1:06:22 Like I would just like, there's a million different ways you could write this. 1:06:26 Right. 1:06:26 I know, but I don't think they have the patience to keep on rewriting their software every, 1:06:30 every, you know, three months. 1:06:31 We already have 18 different ways we could do it. 1:06:34 You, you would have to undergo a new soft fork every single time to mitigate something 1:06:38 that takes 45 minutes to slap together. 1:06:41 It just won't work, dude. 1:06:42 I'm sorry. 1:06:43 I don't, I don't want to frame it in that way. 1:06:45 Cause it sounds like, it sounds like it's this like malicious attack when you do that. 1:06:48 Like, okay, remediate. 1:06:49 And I'll just tap it again, this other angle. 1:06:51 Like, I don't, I hate framing it that way, but we have to be pragmatic about it. 1:06:54 It would take the envelope authors 45 minutes to work around a soft fork that you organized. 1:07:02 And now, now you have to organize another soft fork and then they do 45 minutes for 1:07:06 the tinkering. 1:07:07 And then you have to organize another soft fork. 1:07:09 And then they do 45 minutes for the tinkering. 1:07:12 The network winds up like the end of this process is like, that's the step that kills 1:07:16 Bitcoin. 1:07:18 So I don't think it would take them just 45 minutes to, to do all this because here's 1:07:24 one thing that would happen that I think would happen is you've already got like 15 1:07:28 different projects on ordinals and each of them has to do this, do this process of changing 1:07:34 the inscriptions and any new developer who wants to make a new project has to support 1:07:39 all of them. 1:07:40 So they literally merge and update to one GitHub repo and then do a notification in 1:07:44 the discord server that's like, Hey, version 0.5.7 is released. 1:07:47 Download it. 1:07:52 Okay. 1:07:52 I'll put it this way. 1:07:53 It would take less effort than the soft fork. 1:07:55 And that's the problem, right? 1:07:57 That's the reason this doesn't work. 1:08:00 I don't, I don't think that's true though, because even although it takes less effort 1:08:05 in some sense, I think the NFT people aren't willing to put in that, that effort. 1:08:11 Like just, I'm imagining if I'm coming on and I want to make the next ord swap and I 1:08:15 look at the ord documentation and it's like, okay, first you have to support up if, then 1:08:19 you have to support up if, up not up if, then you have to put up true, up not up if, 1:08:23 then you have to do up true to up not if, and you have to support all these different 1:08:27 formats because we're in a fight with Bitcoiners. 1:08:29 I think that you guys would be like, how about we just not. 1:08:31 I think you're underestimating how enthusiastic people are about this. 1:08:34 I personally taught literal hundreds of people how to use CLI so that they could become node 1:08:41 operators. 1:08:43 People are ravenously, ravenously excited about this. 1:08:47 I like, you know, I, the only way, the only way for us to really know is to play the cat 1:08:51 and mouse game. 1:08:52 So I guess go and play it. 1:08:54 But I will tell you that I'm extraordinarily confident in the sort of like analysis that 1:09:00 the cat and mouse game would not work. 1:09:03 And that, that even if you were successful in organizing a dozen back-to-back soft forks, 1:09:09 you still would wind up with people writing envelopes. 1:09:12 Yeah, so I, a reminder, I do agree with you now, because I think that the roll kit thing 1:09:19 changes things and that I think those, those people who want to do roll ups have a lot 1:09:23 more stick-to-itiveness than the NFP people do. 1:09:26 And so they would, they would not give up as easily. 1:09:28 They would, they would fight us back-to-back and they wouldn't care about updating their 1:09:32 software frequently because they already do that. 1:09:34 So were you, were you present or tuned into any of the conversations about roll ups on 1:09:39 Bitcoin prior to this roll kit thing? 1:09:41 Because that conversation space has existed for a year and a half now. 1:09:45 Yeah, I mean, the first deep dive I made into roll ups was when John Light published his 1:09:53 paper on them. 1:09:55 So I guess that wasn't a year and a half ago, but it was like six months ago, I think. 1:10:00 So that was when I first started becoming interested in them. 1:10:03 Although, but even before then, when roll ups first came out on Ethereum, I thought 1:10:07 they were interesting and I heard all good things about them, but I didn't read about 1:10:11 them until, until John Light made his paper. 1:10:15 Yeah, the, the, the introduction of ZK roll ups is really what sort of like gravitated 1:10:19 me back to like doing a lot of research in that ecosystem, because I do, I do think that 1:10:23 there's a lot of extraordinarily interesting use for, you know, use cases for cryptography 1:10:29 are interesting in general, but that one in particular offers a lot for like this industry. 1:10:35 So I guess I would be curious, sans roll kit. 1:10:38 All right, like, let's, let's leave, I think roll kit is like this prototypical conversation 1:10:43 starter. 1:10:44 It's not what we should, like, it's, it's not where we should want to be. 1:10:47 But in the larger conversation, that is the idea of roll ups on Bitcoin, where do, where 1:10:51 would you say you stand? 1:10:53 Yeah, I'm in favor. 1:10:54 I look at them as a probably slightly better version of drivechain in that if you, when 1:11:00 I compare them analytically, I think both of them are trying to take a lot of, a bunch 1:11:06 of state on a separate blockchain, compress it into something small with, with what's 1:11:12 with the drivechain, they compress it into a hash with ZK proofs or with roll ups, they 1:11:17 compress it into a proof, a proof of what happened on the blockchain. 1:11:20 They put that proof or that hash on Bitcoin. 1:11:23 And that's all that nodes have to validate is that one small thing. 1:11:26 I think that, from my perspective, that's, that's really good. 1:11:29 Roll ups are probably even a little bit better than, than drivechain. 1:11:35 So that my general stance is, I'm in favor, but let's do them. 1:11:39 Let's put that whatever we can do to get to a peg. 1:11:42 Let's do. 1:11:43 But I think the, to bring it back to roll kit, I think there are particular things that 1:11:47 they don't, they don't do that. 1:11:53 They don't put just a proof of what happens on an off chain system on Bitcoin. 1:11:59 They put the entire state into witness data, like every single block, the entirety of the 1:12:03 block goes into witness data. 1:12:06 And that's just stupid. 1:12:07 It's like, and the only reason they're doing that is because they're like, we don't want 1:12:10 to run a node of this sidechain and no one else wants to run a node of this sidechain. 1:12:15 So we'll just dump all the blocks onto Bitcoin. 1:12:17 And that's that. 1:12:19 So the way that I thought it would, I'll share with you the way that I thought it would have 1:12:22 been more interesting. 1:12:23 And like, maybe I should have diverted my own time to focus on this and I'd be out in front 1:12:27 of the roll kit conversation. 1:12:28 I don't know. 1:12:29 But what I thought would be more interesting is to define a state transition function in 1:12:34 the initial envelope and then have some sort of, like you, you use some, you know, multi 1:12:40 sig lock channel lock, right? 1:12:44 And some number of participants run the state transition function and they re-envelope, 1:12:52 we really shouldn't call it inscription because they really like, they're running this sort 1:12:56 of other thing that uses the same technique, but it's not really an inscription. 1:13:01 So they write the state transition function and then following the state transition function, 1:13:06 they write, you know, compressed state updates or, you know, hash state updates or state 1:13:14 routes or whatever it is, right? 1:13:15 Like there's a lot of different ways you can go about that. 1:13:19 And I think that would have been like a lot more, that still would have been a prototype 1:13:23 and not necessarily like the way it should be done in the end, but it would have been 1:13:27 like perhaps more desirable than what we have. 1:13:29 I see roll kit as a conversation starter and in its capacity as a conversation starter, 1:13:35 I like it. 1:13:36 If a year from now, roll kit is like the way we're doing business, then I would probably 1:13:40 join you in some very deep criticisms. 1:13:45 Cool. 1:13:45 Well, I guess we'll just wait a year then and see. 1:13:48 Yeah. 1:13:49 I hope that it's, that it isn't the way that the Ethereum people start doing roll ups, 1:13:53 but yeah, I guess I think they don't really care in my estimation of them. 1:13:59 They don't really care where the, about using data efficiently. 1:14:03 They just care about them not having to store it. 1:14:07 They don't want to have to store all that data. 1:14:09 So if they can shove it onto Bitcoin, I think that I would not be, I will not be surprised 1:14:14 if they're happy to do that and then continue doing super inefficient things, but now just 1:14:19 shove it all on Bitcoin as the data availability later. 1:14:22 I think they want a product development surface. 1:14:33 I think if it meant them storing it, they would store it. 1:14:36 But I think that the sort of hype narrative that comes baked into this notion of roll 1:14:42 ups on Bitcoin, it could definitely mature into like extraordinarily rushed development. 1:14:48 We already see problems with rush development, right? 1:14:51 I think that the inscriptions market right now is in this sort of limbo period where 1:15:00 the lazy developers who are rushing production to be first to market are developing far less 1:15:05 than desirable products, while the people that want to see a more robust, trustless, 1:15:11 distributed infrastructure emerge are hammering away at keyboards, trying to get to the point 1:15:18 where they can demonstrate meaningfully, these are the lazy shits, right? 1:15:23 And that'll happen. 1:15:26 I'm working in that team. 1:15:27 I'm working on those things every day. 1:15:29 It will happen. 1:15:30 It's just a process. 1:15:33 I think the interpretation there for the roll kit thing is the people who do want to see 1:15:38 it mature better, the John Lights, the Dougans, the Yous, the Me's, you just got to hammer 1:15:44 at the keyboard, man. 1:15:45 You got to make the better shit. 1:15:47 The only way to beat that. 1:15:48 I'm doing my best. 1:15:49 I'm doing my best. 1:15:50 Most of it's in the drivechain space, but I see them as pretty much equivalent. 1:15:54 The only way to beat it is to outship, man. 1:15:56 That's the only way to do it. 1:15:59 Yeah. 1:16:00 Yeah, you're right. 1:16:01 I agree with that. 1:16:02 Outship them. 1:16:03 If you don't build the better thing, they'll build the worst thing, and then that'll get 1:16:06 popular. 1:16:11 Cool. 1:16:11 Well, we agree too much. 1:16:13 I thought we were going to have a lot of fun arguing, and we only got a minute of that. 1:16:16 So anyway, what were you going to ask? 1:16:26 I was going to try to perhaps summarize and reset where it sounds like we might be in 1:16:35 agreement about smaller blocks being good and drivechain being good, and that things 1:16:40 like ordinals and inscriptions would, if we adopt drivechain and perhaps also a smaller 1:16:46 block size on layer one, then there wouldn't be any inspiration for censorship, and instead 1:16:52 the activity of users of all kinds would flow to their natural place on a sidechain that 1:17:00 is designed to facilitate that use. 1:17:05 Yeah, except I would say it's still censorship. 1:17:10 If you add a soft fork that creates small blocks, you're still censoring out something. 1:17:14 You're specifically censoring out anything larger than data size X. 1:17:20 Any block that's larger than X is what you're censoring. 1:17:24 So that's still censorship. 1:17:25 It's just censorship of a different thing, and perhaps one that more Bitcoiners would 1:17:29 be inclined to say is okay to censor. 1:17:32 Well, not every limit is a censor, right? 1:17:37 The word censorship refers to the imposition of a value judgment on a constituent of a 1:17:46 set of activities or data, doesn't it? 1:17:50 So if I say in this room we're talking about drivechain and everyone's free to talk about 1:17:59 BIP-119 in a different room, then that's not censorship. 1:18:06 That's just something else, isn't it? 1:18:11 In my opinion, it is. 1:18:12 I would say you're imposing a value judgment, but the value judgment is not that talk about 1:18:21 BIP-118 is inherently bad, just that it's bad in this context, because here we're trying 1:18:26 to talk about something else. 1:18:28 If Twitter says there can only be three hosts per Twitter space, that's not censorship. 1:18:33 That's a design choice. 1:18:36 So if they increase to four or to two instead of three as the maximum number, that's not 1:18:45 censorship. 1:18:46 That's just a design choice designed to facilitate value creation. 1:18:54 I would say it is. 1:18:55 I really doubt that anyone here is interested in a philosophical analysis of what counts 1:19:02 as censorship or not. 1:19:03 Okay, fair enough. 1:19:04 I just feel like censorship isn't really part of drivechain or smaller block size. 1:19:10 It's about the design of the protocol to enable the most value creation. 1:19:19 So that's the trick, is that the protocol, like what Satoshi chose, it required a somewhat 1:19:26 centralized planning, right? 1:19:29 He chose the issuance schedule. 1:19:31 He chose the one megabyte block size limit. 1:19:34 He chose 21 million coins. 1:19:37 So he had to make certain choices based on his view of reality. Yeah. Post, please chime in. 1:19:46 Yeah. So those things, it's not really feasible to start a network. If we wanted to start our own 1:19:56 network right now, some more centralized set of decision-making would have to occur before a 1:20:04 decentralized set of decision-making could. So the way I like to think about it is, you know, 1:20:08 like every idea starts in one person's head. And then if other people like the idea, they adopt it 1:20:13 and potentially augment it moving forward. So I don't think there's an... Excuse me. Hold on. 1:20:22 God bless you. I think, yeah, I agree with that. And I also think that you can launch 1:20:30 without having a central... It's possible to launch stuff that has no central 1:20:35 point of control, even if, well, it's just an idea. Yeah. You can do whatever you want with it. 1:20:43 Like some person sits down and writes the initial code and then it gets launched. 1:20:47 And so I guess my point to that is like using that as the sort of... 1:20:54 I don't know. Words are failing me. But to using that as like the argument, I don't think... I do 1:21:01 think that being really sensitive to the design choices of that person when they wrote it is like 1:21:06 really important. Like why was this decision made and should this decision be upheld at Infineon? 1:21:14 Those conversations should absolutely exist. But it doesn't necessarily always make sense to me 1:21:21 to be like, this decision was made... So the peer discovery process, right? This would be a really 1:21:29 good example. The initial peer discovery process for Bitcoin was like, it was literal jank. It was 1:21:35 complete jank. It was connected to Satoshi's IRC server. Right, exactly. You read a list of IPs off 1:21:44 of an IRC channel and you connect it up to them. So that had to be evolved, right? Like that was 1:21:50 an initial decision that was made that we absolutely would be like in the dumbest of 1:21:55 positions if we had said, oh, we should never change this because this is the way Satoshi did 1:21:59 it or something to that effect. So there are a lot of things he did that I think should never be 1:22:04 changed, right? Like if we can never change the 21 million supply, we should not, right? 1:22:11 But I don't think... I don't know. I'm not necessarily even accusing Henry of doing this, 1:22:17 but I think that it is sort of unfortunately common that we do things like say, Satoshi 1:22:21 designed it this way and that should never be changed. I think that we owe it to ourselves 1:22:25 to have better conversation about what should or should not change. I think I am sometimes 1:22:30 tempted to do that. And I wouldn't be surprised if Henry is sometimes the siren song of just 1:22:35 saying, well, Satoshi did it this way because everyone respects him. Satoshi agreed with me on 1:22:40 this. Therefore, you should agree with me too. But of course, Henry knows as well as anyone else 1:22:45 that Satoshi was wrong sometimes. So that's not a sufficient argument. The appeal to Satoshi's 1:22:53 authority is not sufficient, but there's nothing wrong with saying Satoshi agrees with this too. 1:23:00 Yeah, from a historical perspective, what Satoshi thought is a valid inquiry. We can, 1:23:05 as a historical matter, discuss scientifically what did he say based on the evidence of the 1:23:10 record of his public statements and messages. So that's interesting. But of course, what he said 1:23:16 isn't necessarily the truth. He failed to invent the two-way peg for sidechains. So he thought 1:23:26 in the BitDNS thread that every blockchain would be a merged mined altcoin of Bitcoin. He didn't 1:23:33 think of a two-way peg for a sidechain, which is a superior economic design because then instead of 1:23:39 merely sharing fees, every blockchain also shares the same unit of account. So the synthetic Bitcoin 1:23:47 on the sidechains trades one for one with the Bitcoin on layer one because of the two-way peg. 1:23:53 He failed to invent that. That's DriveChainBit300. So he also was like incorrect about a few other 1:24:00 things, like his understanding of network security wasn't the same as ours because he didn't conceive 1:24:06 of a hostile perpetual miner. And therefore he said, perhaps in the future, people will be able 1:24:11 to process fees for free, which wasn't quite right, this idea of relying on ideological mining. 1:24:19 And also he said that we wouldn't care how big the nodes get in the future. It wouldn't matter. 1:24:25 So he wasn't cognizant of our, he didn't have our sense of cheap nodes as being important. So that's 1:24:31 why the big blockers, they focus on those few sentences where he said that we, he effectively 1:24:38 said we'll have just huge blocks and it won't matter that people, ordinary people won't run nodes. 1:24:43 Today, we have a different view, at least within Drivechain, that small blocks and perhaps smaller 1:24:48 blocks is ideal and let the big blocks be opt-in, not mandatory. 1:24:57 I also, Sochi also changed his mind sometimes, and that's important to keep, or that's worth 1:25:03 noting. It's like sometimes he'll say one thing and then later he'll change his mind about it. 1:25:09 Or he'll have like a nuanced take where like there's two conflicting things that he, 1:25:13 nevermind. Yeah, I forget. I had something else and I forget what it was. 1:25:23 Another thing that I disagree with Satoshi about was his Rothbardian 1:25:29 notion that fractional reserve banking isn't good. 1:25:36 Oh yeah, I remember what it was. He didn't, he may not have come up with the two APEG 1:25:41 in that one post where he was discussing merged mining, but he did in the white paper, he talks 1:25:48 about escrow, which it seems that he conceived of as essentially a two of three multi-sig. 1:25:55 And in other posts, he talked about a two of two multi-sig as another way of doing escrow without 1:25:59 a third, without a trusted third party. And I suspect you can make a two way peg out of that. 1:26:05 So he may have thought of the tools we need to do a two way peg without inventing the concept. 1:26:12 But that's not a peer to peer two way peg. And I should have used that more extensive description 1:26:18 of what I was talking about. So BIP300 aspires to be a peer to peer two way peg. Whereas 1:26:27 what Satoshi was talking about in his escrow conversations, and he did seem very excited 1:26:32 about them, is he was interested in having like me send you an order for a box of shoes and you 1:26:39 send me the money, but you're not going to want to send me the money until the box of shoes arrives 1:26:45 in the mail. And therefore the plan would be that you send your money, your payment to the escrow 1:26:50 account. And then I see that it's there. So I know you're good for the money. And then I released 1:26:54 the shipment to you. And then when you get the shipment, you release the payment to me. 1:26:58 And that is Satoshi's arrangement for like escrow without a third party. That was the thing 1:27:04 that he was very excited about is that kind of anarchic voluntarist kind of Silk Road style, 1:27:13 you know, payment system where there's there's minimal reliance on trust. It's not perfect, 1:27:19 but it's trust minimized because I don't have to trust that you have the money. You've proven you 1:27:22 have the money. And then you send me the shoes. And then when you get them, you release the money 1:27:27 to me. So there is a worst case scenario where you spike me and you get the shoes and then don't 1:27:32 release the money. But at least you can't get the money back ever. So that was what he was talking 1:27:37 about, not a two way peg between blockchains. Right. But I think just as Liquid uses a 1:27:45 a large, what is it, 12, 11 of 15 multisig to do a two way peg, I think you can also use 1:27:56 a small, you know, two of two peg or two of two escrow to do a two way peg and then not have 1:28:05 the problems of like having of needing to trust the 11 of 13 people, to be honest. 1:28:14 Wait, can you explain how are how aren't the people being trusted who are running the 1:28:19 federated multisig? Those people are. If you get rid of them and do instead of instead of doing 1:28:27 that model of escrow, you do the two of two escrow that Satoshi talked about. Then if you do that 1:28:33 instead, then I don't think you have to trust the other people. I don't understand. I think that 1:28:41 like I gave you the shoes example where someone's buying shoes from someone else. 1:28:46 And then I talked about how that reduces trust because of the existence of an on chain verifiable 1:28:52 publicly visible escrow account where you send your payment as like an intermediate stop before 1:28:58 it gets to the goods seller. I don't see how that's related to what Liquid does. 1:29:11 Do you hear me? 1:29:22 Super, can you hear me or post? Are you there? 1:29:29 Yeah, I am here. I got distracted for a minute. No problem. Other related nonsense going on. 1:29:35 Sorry, maybe we lost super. But what I was saying is basically, oh, he's back. Okay. 1:29:43 Super, you're. Are you there now? Can you hear me? 1:29:52 Oh. Okay, great. Yeah, my app crashed. Yeah, I don't know. But basically, we've we've touched 1:30:01 on this before. But the basic fundamental idea in my mind is that, like in drivechain, 1:30:06 the two way peg is peer to peer. And like, that's how I see it. I think that's how Paul sees it. 1:30:12 I think that's how Adam Back sees it. Like, it's peer to peer because anyone can get involved in 1:30:18 mining. You don't need anybody's permission. And therefore you can it's peer to peer. You don't 1:30:22 need privileges to become a miner and participate in controlling the hash rate escrow. But in 1:30:29 liquid, all the money in the world might not be enough to get you control of that federated 1:30:35 multisig. So it's not peer to peer. It's not there's there's more than an economic barrier. 1:30:39 There's a social barrier to entry to participate in this in the role of a functionary on liquid. 1:30:47 So it's not peer to peer. That's the difference. That's what blockchain is all about. The whole 1:30:52 space is all about peer to peer protocols. That's like the most important narrative of any in my 1:30:57 personal understanding, which is probably wrong. But let me know your thought. 1:31:01 Yeah, I'm saying if you if each individual who pegged into the sidechain did so through a two 1:31:05 of two multisig and not through an 11 or 15, then I think you get you can get rid of 1:31:10 the get rid of the Federation and still have the two way peg. 1:31:21 I just don't know what that means. But I appreciate you sharing it. 1:31:25 It's not fully worked out yet. So I've got to do some more thinking about it. 1:31:28 And maybe it's just a dumb idea. I mean, are you saying that like billions of people would be 1:31:34 each participating in a two of two multisig? And that would be a user experience that's viable? 1:31:43 Yes, except probably not billions. I think sidechains are probably only get millions of 1:31:47 users each. But yeah, that's that's the basic idea. If if if the pegging operation involves 1:31:53 creating a two of two multisig, then I think you could do it without needing to trust a 1:31:57 without needing to trust anyone but yourself. 1:32:06 Interesting. Well, thank you very much for all of the conversation today. This has been another 1:32:14 drivechain Twitter spaces we've rebranded as drivechain talk, or Bitcoin drivechain talk 1:32:21 is the title here. So we tried that out today. I thought it would maybe be a smash hit. We got 1:32:28 a number of people in the audience and people on stage. Thank you super imposed for being here. I 1:32:34 really appreciate it. I really love listening to both of you speak. I hope that you'll always come 1:32:40 back anytime you'd like to share ideas or listen or chat. So we run these spaces every Monday and 1:32:46 Thursday, usually at 930am pacific time, although we're flexible to have different times. If either 1:32:53 of you would like to do like a debate or a talk about anything in the future, please don't hesitate 1:33:00 to let me know. Henry at LayerTwo Labs like I would love to schedule something around your time 1:33:06 or because both of you are people who I think understand drivechain very well and have all 1:33:13 kinds of exciting other ideas to talk about. So you're welcome to come back whenever you want and 1:33:17 as much as you want. So maybe I'll see you on Thursday or any other time. And our goal here is 1:33:24 to promote understanding of drivechain. I think that we have the truth on our side. So with enough 1:33:29 talk of drivechain in the community, we can incite more support for it and maybe get it to be part of 1:33:36 Bitcoin. Thanks for your time and for hosting. I'm going to I'm going to head out so I can go get 1:33:44 some lunch. See you later. Adios. Thank you for being here and post. Do you have any closing 1:33:50 thoughts? No, I was just going to say thanks and have a good one. That's it. Thank you very much. 1:33:55 Have a great day.
