0:01 I see that I may have been muted for a period there. 0:05 There may have been a glitch. 0:07 I'm not sure how much everyone heard. 0:10 Could I get a thumbs up if you've been hearing me speak for a long time? 0:18 And... a thumbs down if you haven't. 0:21 I think there may have been a glitch there. 0:22 Okay, great. So it was just momentary. 0:24 Somehow the mic got muted on my end. 0:27 So what I was saying there is that there are two objections 0:33 to Drivechain that... 0:36 Alright. 0:40 I'm getting some interesting indications from the audience. 0:44 you have been hearing me speak for a number of minutes and only recently had it go on 0:50 mute, could I get a thumbs up? 0:58 Alright, no thumbs up. 1:01 I wonder if the entire introduction that I gave was missed. 1:08 Okay, so it was. 1:10 The whole thing was missed. 1:12 Ah, I see. 1:15 Alright, let's just 1:16 start over from the beginning. 1:20 I did this whole introduction and it was missed. 1:25 why don't one of you come on up and... 1:31 thanks Ryan and others for commenting. 1:33 So let's start over. 1:34 It gives me a chance to start over. 1:35 know, in life it's 1:36 very good sometimes to have a second chance to do things, because you can do them 1:41 better. 1:43 So let me be succinct. 1:44 I have thrown up in the nest a bunch of quotes that I think are interesting. 1:49 You can scroll through them. 1:50 There are four or five of them there. 1:53 One of them is my own essay on what 1:56 Drivechain's about, and you can read it. 1:59 There's a link to it. 2:01 And the other tweets are from some great accounts that have mentioned Drivechain. 2:10 Everyone in the audience is welcome to come on up and share a thought or comment. 2:14 Please do not hesitate to 2:16 raise your and ask to come up to stage. 2:20 will bring you up and chat with you and hear your question or comment 2:26 about Drivechain. 2:29 I encourage people who are critical or skeptical of Drivechain to come to this space 2:34 and share their thoughts, 2:36 well as those who are fans and would like to express how Drivechain interests you. 2:44 There are some interesting intellectual adventures that you can have when contemplating 2:49 and learning about the objections that some people have raised to Drivechain. 2:55 Some people think 2:55 that the drivechains won't accrue much value because the miners, 3:00 these skeptics think, may steal from the hash rate escrow. 3:07 Other people are skeptical about drivechain because they think that the drivechains 3:11 will become so large that the fee revenue to the miners 3:15 will result in undue 3:20 centralization of Bitcoin miners. 3:26 These concerns are mutually exclusive. 3:30 A person can't simultaneously think that the miners will rob from the hashrate 3:35 escrow and that the fee revenue from merged mined 3:41 sidechains will be so large as to negatively distort Bitcoin mining. 3:49 So it's important to recognize that the two leading concerns about Drivechain are 3:55 mutually exclusive. 4:01 think that one of the concerns is especially poor. 4:07 It's the first one I mentioned, which is probably the larger, the more popular concern. 4:14 This 4:15 This concern says that the miners will steal from the hashrate escrow. 4:21 unfortunately, it is always better to give consumers the choice than to make the 4:26 decision for them. 4:27 So even if one person thinks that the miners will steal from the hash rate escrow, 4:34 it 4:34 is still certainly the case that Bitcoiners are better off if they have the option to 4:40 experiment by using the hashrate escrow. 4:44 Because in the event that this concern is shown to be unfounded, 4:50 if the optimists are vindicated and the hashrate eskros are not 4:54 stolen from and are never stolen from. 4:59 Then the cause of experimentation will have been serviced. 5:09 The principle of giving consumers choice, like Milton Friedman used to often 5:14 say that will have been served, that principle. 5:17 it's good if Bitcoin is designed in a way that gives the Bitcoin user the option to use 5:23 Drivechain sidechains. 5:29 So with that in mind, I think we can dispense with the notion that 5:34 the concern about stealing from hashrate escrow is valid. 5:40 even if it's a valid, even if it's a compelling concern, we should still allow for the 5:46 possibility that it could be wrong and therefore we should give users the option to 5:50 experiment. And of course, I do not believe it's likely that they will be stolen from. 5:53 Instead, 5:54 Instead, think the evidence shows, because of the experimentation on other 6:00 blockchains has already shown, the Drivechain design and designs like 6:06 it have been successful so far. 6:08 And there has not been widespread problems of the kind that these critics are 6:14 The other concern about Drivechain is this concern that 6:19 increase in merged mining that Drivechain would foster 6:23 will lead to undue centralization in the mining 6:29 network. 6:32 This is 6:33 also not a compelling concern. 6:36 It is a more sophisticated concern, however, and therefore it is the resort of 6:42 some Drivechain critics who know that it is unwise to merely 6:47 claim that the Drivechain hashrate escrow will be stolen from. 6:52 So these more 6:53 sophisticated thinkers know in my view this is just me assuming or 6:59 presuming I think some sophisticated people know that if they say well the hash rate 7:04 escrowers may be stolen from by the miners they know that this will quickly this will 7:09 quickly lead to drivechain advocates saying well you should give, 7:13 you should want to give the Bitcoin users the option. 7:17 In other words, if you think it's insecure, don't use it. 7:21 But give others the option rather than having them feel that they have to go to 7:25 altcoins to get this kind of extensibility. 7:30 So these more sophisticated critics don't 7:33 say that the hashrate escrow is insecure. 7:36 In fact, some of them say, I can think of one person in particular who says that 7:41 perhaps the sidechains will grow extremely large if Drivechain is adopted. 7:47 So this person is conceding that Drivechain would be very successful by that measure. 7:52 But 7:53 but this critic then says, all that merged mining will result in 7:59 undue centralization of the mining network. 8:05 Meaning I assume this person would say, this means that only larger miners and 8:10 therefore fewer miners would be involved 8:13 in Bitcoin mining. 8:15 as a result, Bitcoin would be less secure because the so -called 8:20 decentralization of the miners would have decreased as a result of this 8:26 activity. 8:28 So I think this is completely wrong, but it is a 8:32 a more complex topic. 8:35 It's a conversation that takes longer to have. 8:38 And therefore, some critics who are sophisticated and clever at debate prefer it 8:43 because they know that it's a complicated conversation. 8:48 Basically, 8:50 what these critics are doing though, 8:53 when they say that there would undue centralization as a result 8:59 of increased merge mining, these critics, when they say that, 9:05 they also say, to their credit, to be consistent, also say that merge mining is in 9:11 general bad. and 9:12 And they don't like any kind of merge mining, whether it's BIP301 merge mining or the 9:18 ordinary merge mining we have today. 9:24 In fact, these critics, know that Drivechain advocates 9:30 or just advocates for merge mining in general can point 9:32 to the fact that Satoshi himself discovered merge mining and recommended it. 9:38 He countenanced it, meaning he spoke about it favorably and acknowledged it 9:44 as a positive thing in the bit DNS thread of August 2010 9:49 on the forum where he spoke publicly in 10:00 So, what these critics of merge mining say is that Drivechain would facilitate more 10:05 merged mining and therefore Drivechain is no good because they don't like merged mining 10:10 at all. And 10:12 as I've described these critics know that they have to confront the fact that Satoshi 10:17 himself liked it so then these critics say well Satoshi wasn't right about everything 10:22 and one of the things one of the things he was wrong about these critics say is that 10:28 he shouldn't have expressed approval for merged mining 10:35 of course I would not say that Satoshi was necessarily right on everything, 10:42 and therefore I would not appeal to his authority as a means of 10:47 defending merge mining, although I certainly think it's a notable 10:51 historical fact that he was in favor of it, and not in favor of for just any old 10:57 reason, precisely because merge mining increases miner revenue, 11:03 it increases on -chain miner revenue for for -profit 11:09 miners, and 11:11 thus increases the network strength of Bitcoin, and helps avoid the need for inflation. 11:18 There is increasing talk of tail emission or inflation for Bitcoin, 11:24 and Drivechain is one of the ways that potentially we can completely avoid that 11:29 problem. 11:32 Whether it's a problem or not, the community has yet to 11:37 reach an unambiguous decision on. 11:41 I would say most Bitcoiners will tell you there will never be more than 21 million 11:45 Bitcoin. I certainly hope so, that there will never be more. 11:50 But 11:51 in the event that fees stay low forever, 11:56 think a lot of optimists will realize that they were wrong in their expectations about 12:01 the fee market growing. 12:05 I feel that over time, one of the ways we can see greater interest in Drivechain is 12:10 through greater interest 12:11 in merge mining. 12:12 great. have someone requesting to speak. 12:15 Welcome to the stage. 12:17 Mr. Eon BTC. 12:21 Thanks for joining. 12:24 Go ahead with your comment or question. 12:31 Aeon, BTC, you're welcome to speak if you'd like to. 12:35 Oh, sorry I was on mute. 12:37 I'll start over in good fashion. 12:42 Yeah, thanks for inviting me. 12:43 It's a good overview. 12:44 I'm still learning about Drivechains, but for what I've heard so far, I'm definitely 12:49 interested and intrigued. 12:52 I wanted to jump in about the comment on fees and the subsidy. 12:58 think you're saying some people think that adding 13:03 a daily mission subsidy to Bitcoin is a good idea. 13:08 a few people have pointed out 13:10 out that subsidy actually does not add to the security of Bitcoin in an 13:16 adversarial sense because in a 51 % attack, the 13:21 subsidy is pretty much free launch for the attacker who's either censoring the chain or 13:27 orphaning blocks or whatever. 13:29 The determining factor 13:30 is actually the fees. 13:32 people willing to pay fees on transactions that are trying to be censored by presumably 13:38 the state because the state is really the only entity that logically 13:43 can carry out, can economically carry out an attack on Bitcoin. 13:49 But the 13:50 subsidy does not add any security because to the attacker they get the subsidy So it's 13:55 not that doesn't add to the security at all. 13:57 So I don't know why people think it does 14:03 Thanks for sharing those ideas, I think you're mistaken if 14:08 a party wishes to to 14:10 deploy 51 % of Bitcoin's hashrate tomorrow, 14:17 order to censor all transactions, 14:23 in order to try to reestablish fiat money and stop the use of 14:29 Bitcoin, 14:32 that party would have to assemble billions of dollars worth 14:38 of or seize them in order to 14:44 deploy 51 % of hashrate to that end. 14:50 And the reason why it would be expensive is that 14:55 there is 50 times more value received by 15:01 the miners right now from the Coinbase 15:06 than from the fees. 15:10 if your analysis were right, cost to control 51 15:15 % of the hashrate would be about 2 15:19 % of what it actually is. 15:22 In other words, what you said, if I heard you correctly, and please jump in to rephrase 15:28 if you'd like, but 15:29 but if I heard you correctly, you think that all of transaction finality, 15:36 all of economic security, all of hostile mining prevention arises from the fees and not the Coinbase at all. 15:49 This is in direct conflict with what Satoshi wrote and with my own understanding, separate entirely from what Satoshi wrote. 15:58 Why do you think he included the Coinbase at all? 16:03 Do you believe it was only for purposes of distribution and not security? 16:08 Because I think since the beginning of Bitcoin, people have correctly understood it to have a dual purpose. 16:15 It was not merely to distribute Bitcoin into the hands of people from the protocol, 16:24 but instead was also to create an economic incentive to secure the network by mining. 16:35 Does that make sense or do you see how that's in conflict with what you've said or do you want to elaborate? 16:42 No, I agree. I think it definitely was a mechanism to distribute and also a mechanism to incentivize new participants to mine. 16:51 But the point I'm trying to make is that in the event of a 51% attack, that majority miner is still going to get the subsidy. 17:03 They're going to get the majority of the subsidy because they're doing the most work and therefore to push out that 51% attacker, 17:13 the fee pressure on fees that are being censored is what incentivizes the, let's call them rational miners, to overtake the censor. 17:24 I like to call them white market and black market miners because the threat model really is the state. 17:31 The state is the only one that has the resources to, one, legislate or regulate or license miners in their jurisdiction to enforce a certain blacklist. 17:43 So I don't see them censoring all transactions. I see them censoring transactions that they deem illegal or terrorist financing or whatever. 17:54 And so I don't see them amassing a bunch of money. I see them essentially co-opting the mega farms that are already in the United States and Canada and parts of Europe. 18:06 And in that scenario, the mechanism to push out that majority hasher who's censoring is the fee market because the fees have to incentivize the rational miners, 18:20 the white black market miners who mine, who disobey the regulations and aren't enforcing blacklist to push out that censor. Does that make sense? 18:29 I understand what you're saying. 18:31 Would it be all right with you if we speak first about the highest class of attacker, which is precisely one that controls a majority of hash rate and intends to make impossible all transactions by other users? 18:58 Of the network for the purpose of trying to devalue all Bitcoin. 19:04 So to be clear, I'm not talking about a miner as you have, which is censoring some users. 19:12 I'm talking about someone who wants to halt the ability for anyone to use Bitcoin. 19:20 And the way that this party is trying to halt the ability for anyone to use Bitcoin is by reorging at every opportunity. 19:29 Thus blocking everyone from transacting, which in the long run would devalue all Bitcoin to zero. 19:42 So are you OK with us discussing only that and then only later talking about the lesser class of a hostile attacker? 19:52 Because when I say hostile attacker, I'm talking about. 19:57 The most hostile kind of attacker, and I think it's totally reasonable to. 20:05 Speak about this because historical experience shows us that the last time there was free market money, it became prohibited and confiscated. 20:17 So they weren't just saying that some people couldn't transact with gold. 20:22 They were saying no one could use gold as money in America. 20:27 And that lasted for decades, I think. 20:31 So I mean, they were still using banks, were still using money and countries were still using it. 20:38 It was just the general public was banned. 20:40 But I'm fine with that scenario because I think the solution is still the fee pressure, even if they're censoring all transactions. 20:50 How does the subsidy incentivize miners to overtake? 20:56 You know, that attacker. 21:00 Well, I do believe with one part of what you just said, which is you said the solution is fee pressure. 21:05 I mean, I completely agree that in the long run, higher fees are very important and necessary for maintaining a high security spending for Bitcoin, meaning a high rate of miner on-chain income for for-profit miners. 21:21 So we agree that fees are important. 21:23 That's one thing you and I have in common is we think that fee pressure is important. 21:29 Another way of saying that is making the block space more valuable is important. 21:36 So the block space value is equal to the transaction fee rate, the total transaction fee rate. 21:45 It's kind of like a person's salary. 21:48 Like the more you get paid in total per unit of time, that is your total salary rate. 21:55 Similarly, for Bitcoin miners, the fee rate varies. 21:59 But over any reasonable stretch of time, like a day or a month, we can speak of their total transaction fee rate and speak of that as being the value of the block space. 22:11 So we agree that that's important because the Coinbase goes down over time algorithmically towards zero over the next hundred years. 22:19 But it sounds like we speak a little bit differently about whether or not the value of the Coinbase, which is almost all of miner income right now. 22:29 You and I speak differently about whether the value of the Coinbase is material in an understanding of whether it is expensive or not to become a 51 percent hostile miner, hostile meaning trying to block all transactions. 22:48 Censor everyone. 22:50 So in your view, if I understand right, you think that the Coinbase doesn't matter. 22:57 It doesn't matter because the miner is going to get the Coinbase. 23:05 So the fact that he has to assemble billions of dollars of mining equipment because of the Coinbase, because that's why the mining industry is large right now, it's because of the Coinbase. 23:16 Right. You know that. I know that. 23:19 That of like ninety nine percent some days of the miner income is the subsidy. 23:25 Right. It's like nine hundred bitcoin a day from the subsidy or the I like to say Coinbase. 23:32 It's less triggering to some people. 23:34 It's nine hundred. They're synonyms. 23:37 Right. Coinbase, subsidy and inflation. 23:39 They're all synonyms in Bitcoin. 23:40 They mean the same thing. So nine hundred bitcoin a day from from Coinbase. 23:45 And about half a million dollars a day in Bitcoin from fees. 23:52 So the vast majority is from Coinbase. 23:55 In your view that your view is that, well, the Coinbase doesn't matter because the attacker gets the Coinbase. 24:03 But you're you're missing the fact that it's very important that there be a high barrier to becoming that 51 percent attacker. 24:16 Let's say hypothetically that at present the income to the miners was extraordinarily high. 24:28 Let's just say that the hash rate were much higher than it is today, hypothetically. 24:32 And let's say hypothetically that instead of being thirty five billion dollars. 24:41 Instead of the cost to attack Bitcoin being thirty five billion dollars, according to that Web site that shows these numbers, let's say it costs 10 trillion. 24:51 Do you not agree that in that extreme hypothetical, your point that, oh, well, it doesn't, you know, your view is that, well, it doesn't. 25:03 And correct me if I'm wrong, but your view seems to be that, well, it wouldn't matter that it's 10 trillion dollars of cost. 25:09 Because once you get that money together and you buy all the mining machines necessary or you seize them, then you would receive the on chain income of the Coinbase. 25:20 Or you would be paid back for all that expense of electricity and machines. 25:26 You see, like you're ignoring, in my view, respectfully, let me know if you see it differently. 25:31 But you're ignoring the fact that there is an enormously high barrier to becoming the majority of hash rate. 25:39 And the reason for that economic barrier is that the Coinbase is present today in Bitcoin and it enormously augments the miner income. 25:50 And the higher the miner income, the larger the mining industry grows. 25:54 And the larger it grows, the more hash rate comes online and the more expensive it becomes to be that 51 percent attacker. 26:05 I see where you're coming from. 26:06 I think my nuance is that I pretty much always consider the attacker the state. 26:16 So the state has the ability to use force to, I mean, there's already around 50 percent mining in Western countries, United States, Canada, Europe. 26:27 And they already work together with treaties and financial crimes and all that and money laundering and terror trying to prevent all those financial crimes. 26:38 And so in my hypothetical, the state does not need to garner $10 billion or $10 trillion to buy mining equipment. 26:48 They simply go to the miners and say, you need to enforce this blacklist or we're seizing your equipment for terrorist financing and money laundering. 26:59 Are the mega mines going to refuse or are they going to say, OK? 27:05 And then the government says, yeah, you can mine these transactions that are waitlisted in KYC. 27:11 You can still get the subsidy, but you need to blacklist these transactions. 27:15 And so that's how I see the scenario most likely to play out, because I don't think the state, you know, the central banking, the legacy monetary system will necessarily try to destroy all of Bitcoin or censor all transactions. 27:32 I think censoring all transactions is actually better because that creates even more fee pressure, because then whoever is trying to censor all the transactions is not getting any fees. 27:45 They're getting zero fees. They're only getting the subsidy. 27:47 Meanwhile, black market miners would say, all right, there's a subsidy. 27:51 Plus there's 100 Bitcoin or whatever in fees that are just sitting there. 27:56 And so the scenario where you're saying every transaction being censored, I think is a more desirable scenario because there's even more fee pressure. 28:05 But the idea about the Coinbase, I don't see how that, I mean, any attacker is still going to get the Coinbase and anyone trying to push out the attacker is going to get the Coinbase. 28:20 And so what I see is where the rubber meets the road is the fee. 28:24 That's what it's the delta between the fees on the transactions that are being censored and the fees that are not being or transactions that are not being censored. 28:34 I understand what you're saying, which is, although I don't agree. 28:38 Ultimately, I understand what you're saying, which is that you're I think you're correct when you talk about there being a different set of incentives with respect to the on-chain income from fees than from Coinbase. 28:53 Where the attacker who in our hypothetical is censoring all transactions by re-orging, by re-orging at every opportunity, that attacker is not accepting and is not pursuing the transaction fees from the honest transactors, the honest users. 29:15 Because he's trying to make impossible their transactions. 29:20 So you're right that there would be an accrual of those transaction fees and this would grow over time. 29:28 So you're thinking that there would be a kind of like incentives based kind of rebalancing of incentives on Bitcoin to help promote the incentives for honest miners to behave correctly and not to participate in the attack. 29:49 Your hypothetical, however, simultaneously speaks about miners being coerced by the government. 29:58 And you spoke about how easy that would be in your view. 30:02 And then you also are speaking about honest miners behaving honestly for profit. 30:10 So your thought experiment involves at once the government controlling mining and then as a solution, the government not controlling mining. 30:20 Well, it would be a difference between the mining. 30:25 Just to make sure we try to make progress in our discussion, which I'm enjoying very much. 30:31 I want to see if you can unambiguously confirm that in our prior discussion just now, you agreed that if the barrier to become a 51 percent hostile miner is higher, that is a material component of Bitcoin's defense against such an attack. 30:54 In other words, if the cost to be a 51 percent attacker means that one must control 10 trillion dollars of hashing power, of hashing equipment and resources, that is very different than if one has to only control 100 dollars of such resources. 31:14 You do agree, right, that let's just say hypothetically the Coinbase is worth an enormous amount of money and the fees are very small. 31:25 Let's just assume today there's an extraordinary value to the Coinbase and there's a very small amount of fees. 31:32 You have been saying, if I've heard you correctly, you've been saying, well, the only part of that situation that is important in terms of preventing a hostile attack is the fees, not the Coinbase. 31:44 And I'm telling you, no, you're wrong. 31:46 The reason why Bitcoin does in fact have high security today is because the Coinbase is substantial. 31:53 I see what you're saying. 31:55 You're saying that the Coinbase has incentivized miners to the point that it has pushed hash rates so high that it makes it more expensive. 32:04 Yeah, I'm saying that right now on-chain income is very substantial because of the Coinbase and that's good and that's fine. 32:12 I agree. 32:13 My argument comes in regarding who the miners are and where the miners are located and their threat model and their risk assessment because a lot of miners are centralizing and becoming mega miners in regulated jurisdictions. 32:33 And the really only thing that protects that hash power, I made a point once where I said white market mining is a security risk because white market miners are regulated, they're incorporated, they have CEOs, they have addresses, they have ability to be located by the state very easily. 32:59 And so in that sense, they're not going to disobey the state because they get imprisoned for money laundering and terrorist financing. 33:09 So they're likely to opt into censoring whatever blacklist they have and saying this is to protect the children, this is for terrorist financing. 33:20 You can mine all these transactions and you can get the subsidy, but if you mine these transactions or build on these blocks that have those transactions, we're going to seize your equipment and put you in jail for so-and-so-and-so. 33:33 And so I see white market mining and black market mining as really dividing line where I agree that the hash rate being high sets a barrier to entry, but if that barrier to entry is all white market mining that's easily located and easily co-opted, it doesn't provide much challenge for the state to get a hold of it. 33:56 Understood. 33:58 Yeah, I think that with respect to that whole part of your view, we're probably in agreement that the jurisdiction where a miner operates and whether the miner is registered and having to hold licenses or not, those are important factors. 34:18 But the whole first part of our conversation, I feel that we've now kind of reached like an agreement point because what we discussed in tweets a day or two ago, I'm looking at it now, I feel like we've kind of improved our understanding. 34:34 It sounds like you no longer believe what you wrote, which was that in response to Peter Todd's tweet, you wrote, in an adversarial environment, subsidy does nothing for security. 34:45 To a 51% attacker, subsidy is a free lunch for censoring the chain. 34:51 So you no longer believe that and you now understand… 34:54 No, I still believe that. 34:56 Yeah, but what we understood though is that if the cost to become a 51% attacker is prohibitively high… 35:07 But the cost is dependent on where the hash rate is and how… 35:12 the attacker can access that hash rate. If it's just some random attacker who's trying to put in a short on Bitcoin and crash the price and short sell it, I don't think that's viable. 35:26 I don't think that's economically viable for anyone but the state to mount an attack against Bitcoin. 35:32 In all my scenarios, the state is always the attacker because that's the only one that could get free tax money and also use force to coerce miners. 35:45 Okay, so it sounds like in your view, you actually don't appreciate any discussion of economic security because in your view, the attacker has unlimited resources. 35:58 And therefore, if it does cost $10 trillion to have the resources necessary, then it's really, in your view, entirely a question of legal matters. 36:10 So the state would merely confiscate the energy and machines needed to be the attacker. So you're mainly interested in those other factors. 36:22 It's more like they wouldn't need to confiscate it. They would approach the mining, the white market miners who are already registered and possibly licensed and say, 36:33 you need to start enforcing this or we're going to seize your equipment. And they'll likely say, okay, we'll enforce this and stay in business. 36:44 And the only people that will not obey that is our black market miners who are idealistic about the function of Bitcoin and the censorship resistance of it. 36:57 And so to really defend against that, we need a larger portion of the mine to be decentralized in the hands of people that are willing to break the law. 37:06 If it becomes a problem where the government puts out some regulation that says that even if you're a home miner, you need to abide by this regulation or else you're financing terrorists and all this other fear mongering they'll put on it. 37:23 I see. So I think that what we have is just a view, which is like we don't really have as much of a disagreement. 37:30 I don't think we have as much of a disagreement as the fact that you're someone who thinks that it's very important. 37:36 And I think I probably agree with you that it's very important that there be widespread education throughout humanity about the importance of having a free market in transactions and a principle of volunteerism, 37:49 where if people want to transact freely, they should be able to. And therefore, that is what's going to prevent us from devolving into a situation where there's lots of censorship on how to transact. 38:05 So I felt like when you originally responded to Peter Todd, you were responding in a way that was wrong. 38:13 But I feel that now I see that what you're really trying to say or what I should have read you to have been saying was that you just aren't very focused on this economics of, you know, as the subs, as the coinbase declines, the fees must rise. 38:29 Like that's that's Peter's view in my in my understanding when he wrote his tweet on February 19 yesterday, the one beginning with more evidence that we can't rely on fees, dot, dot, dot. 38:41 So he's he's tweeting there that as the coinbase is halved every four years and the fees are not apparently rising at a high rate. 38:53 In his view, this fosters a reasonable question about whether it would it might be good to consider so-called tail emission hard fork, meaning like higher inflation forever for Bitcoin. 39:10 So, yeah. 39:11 I still don't think that it's useful because the tail, the emission is is always included in the block. 39:22 The thing that is not guaranteed are the fees because you're an entity trying to censor. 39:28 So you're the state trying to censor your only guaranteed fees of whitelisted transactions. 39:35 The subsidy you're always going to get. 39:36 And so having more subsidy is great for them, because if the network relied only on fees, then it creates even a higher fee pressure because I can go out and get one of my UTXOs blacklisted by sending it to a mixer. 39:51 And then I could participate in raising the fee and increasing fee pressure by using RBF or child base for a parent. 39:58 And so every user has the ability to increase that fee pressure against the censor and to incentivize black market miners. 40:07 Meanwhile, the subsidy is not doing anything to incentivize or it's it's rewarding the censor even for censoring essentially. 40:18 Yeah, I understand what you're saying now. 40:20 Another thing that threw me off in your tweets was when you wrote the following. 40:25 You wrote the only viable attack on Bitcoin is a state sponsored one that aims to censor transactions it deems illegal. 40:35 And you had you finished that sentence with and to orphan blocks that attempt to include said transactions. 40:41 But that was quite a strong statement, which implies that you don't think it's viable that the state would censor all transactions. 40:50 No, because I think they just want to control economic activity. 40:59 Why do you think it's not viable or not reasonably possible that the state would want to censor all transactions? 41:09 It's definitely possible. It's definitely a route. 41:11 I think if they took that route, it'd be good for us because then it creates even more fee pressure on our part. 41:17 And so I would see that scenario as actually a plus, but it's definitely possible. 41:21 I don't want to say that it's not possible. 41:23 Right. I mean, they confiscated gold from all citizens, right? 41:28 Why wouldn't they just get Bitcoin completely in a worst case scenario? 41:34 They confiscated it from people who are willing to follow the law, essentially. 41:38 And so Bitcoiners that weren't going to follow the law are still going to try and participate. 41:43 And if all the transactions are being censored, the power that a Bitcoiner, a non-miner has is to apply fee pressure. 41:53 And so each individual has power at their home to incentivize miners somewhere in the world to set up some kind of operation to overtake that censor who's orphaning any block with a transaction in it to overcome them and then mine those fees and get those fees. 42:13 And that's why I see the fees as more important. 42:17 Yeah, I think we're on the same page then. 42:21 So you. 42:24 I mean, in my view, we're on the same page, I think where we disagree is maybe nuance in the style of attack or the threat model, but. 42:33 Well, your view, your view is that the economics are distinct from the legal considerations. 42:41 In my view, they're somewhat like those things are somewhat linked to those dimensions of the attack. 42:46 Like if the government has to seize one trillion dollars worth of Bitcoin mining hardware, that is a lot different than if the government only has to seize five hundred dollars worth of such hardware. 42:59 So if the government has to seize a lot of valuable things and then, you know, then it's more costly for the government in a sense of political cost, like the political risks. 43:14 So in my view, if the Bitcoin market, as we kind of originally agreed to some extent, you seem to agree to some extent that if. 43:23 If the value of the Coinbase is so large that the Bitcoin mining industry is enormous, then the amount of coordinated political confiscation and. 43:34 Intervention required by state or or states across the world to become a 51 percent consortium of censors is larger. 43:44 It requires more effort. So the Coinbase has an important role, not just in distributing coins, but in incentivizing the transaction finality, the economic security of Bitcoin. 43:57 But I understand what you're saying, which is that because the censor doesn't receive the transaction fees paid by the users who are trying to transact. 44:08 There is a. 44:12 There's a, quote unquote, free lunch that the attacker still gets the Coinbase as you view it, so therefore it doesn't matter if the Coinbase is valuable or not. 44:20 I understand what you're saying. I think I don't agree because my view is that. 44:26 The the the fact that the right now it's 900 Bitcoin per day, that's. 44:31 That's like 900 times wherever Bitcoin is now. 44:35 Twenty thousand dollars of coin comes out to many millions of dollars and the net present value of that of that future cash flow of all of the Coinbase is in the future. 44:47 Discounted to the present. 44:49 That's why the mining industry is so large. 44:52 The current present Bitcoin mining industry globally is equal to the net present value of all future revenues they will receive, which is the on chain Coinbase, the on chain transaction fees. 45:06 And then thirdly, any ideological mining that's going on, that's also boosting hash rates slightly, as well as the non financial rewards other than ideology, such as mining purely for non KYC Bitcoin. 45:22 And then fourthly or fifthly, there's the category of non or off chain revenue from relationships with energy producers and other kinds of off chain income. 45:36 Like if the mining company has a merchandise store and sells T-shirts there, let's say Henry's Mining Company on it and people pay a high rate for those. 45:46 Then the mining company gets those to all those things contribute to the hash rate. 45:51 So the higher the hash rate goes, the more expensive it would be for someone to be a 51 percent attacker. 45:57 Now, your response on if I understood it correctly, is that, well, talking about things in a purely economic sense is wrong because the attacker is going to be a state. 46:08 For whom the economics isn't so simple, the state can just seize things so it doesn't have to expend money in the marketplace because it isn't the market, the government, they can just take. 46:21 And therefore, if they need half a trillion dollars worth of machinery, instead of having to go out and buy it with taxpayer money, they can just seize it and therefore it's cheap for them. 46:36 So to some extent, you're kind of like dismissing the economic view, which is probably smart because the government isn't purely economic. 46:45 It can seize things, which is not an economic act so much as a act of politics. 46:51 And so I think we agree that it's complicated and we certainly agree that the transaction fees aren't received by the attacker censoring all transactions. 47:03 So I think we're on the same page. I was just thrown by some of the things you wrote. 47:08 Like it seemed like you were saying that there couldn't possibly be an attack on all transactions, only some transactions. 47:15 I think that's kind of like something that's too strong a claim. So things like that threw me in your written tweets. 47:22 Yeah, it was a bit of an absolute. But I think, like I was saying, it's more viable and beneficial on our part if they do try and censor all transactions because, again, there's more fee pressure. 47:35 But let's do another hypothetical real quick. Let's fast forward, pretend we're at the point where there's no more Bitcoin subsidy. 47:43 The subsidy is all gone. It's all fees. And a 51 percent attack happens. 47:50 There's someone who's censoring transactions and orphaning blocks. And Peter Todd comes along and says, let's add the subsidy. 47:59 What does adding that subsidy do to incentivize? I mean, to the attacker, it's like, oh, all right, that's great. I'll just get more revenue now. 48:10 And to black market miners, yeah, they have a little more incentive and revenue, but ultimately it's the fees that are building up on those censored transactions. 48:21 I shouldn't say the subsidy is nothing, but the subsidy is a very minuscule part in the scenario where there is no more subsidy, essentially, and it's all fees. 48:37 Were you saying that in that hypothetical, were you saying that the attacker was censoring all transactions? 48:46 No, my theory is that it's more likely that they'll censor some transactions and not all of them. 48:52 OK, I wasn't sure if I heard you right, because if the attacker is censoring all transactions, then the subsidy is of no value because the subsidy is not being spent ever. 49:05 So let's return again to what I. 49:09 That's a good point. 49:10 Let's return. Thanks. I mean, you've made many good points, so I appreciate this conversation. 49:16 The the let's return again to my claim and let's see if you disagree with it. 49:21 My claim originally is that the highest class of attacker is a perpetual hostile attacker censoring all transactions forever. 49:31 Do you agree with that? 49:35 Do I agree that that's the highest form of attack? 49:38 The highest class of attack. 49:40 Yeah. The most devastating attack when we're talking about hostile mining is a perpetual hostile miner that has a majority of hash rate and reorgs at every opportunity to make to block the transactions of all others. 49:57 I agree that it's the most damaging attack to the network, but I don't agree that it's the most economically rational. 50:04 I think it's the most economically irrational thing to censor all transactions, and it's far more likely that the state would censor some, which would keep white market miners being able to get fees from white market transactions. 50:21 Why? 50:22 I agree that it's centering all transactions is the most damaging to the network. 50:28 So I'm curious about your claim that it would be it would be economically not rational to do that. 50:34 I do think that the most valuable and profitable thing in the universe is to print money. 50:41 So if the government has the power to turn off Bitcoin in order to try to reestablish the supremacy of fiat money, then the government would have… 50:55 Let me restate. It would be rational for the state, economically rational for the state for those reasons you just said, but economically irrational for any market participant. Put it that way. 51:10 Okay, so we're agreeing that the best game in town is money printing and that Bitcoin, whether it's being used in a unfettered manner or whether it's being used in a censored manner, but only partially censored, means that people are opting out of the fiat system. 51:28 So if the government wants to try to stifle use of Bitcoin in order to encourage use of the fiat money, then the government would perhaps try to censor all transactions. 51:40 Yeah, because that's the most rational thing for them to do if they're trying to retain that monopoly on senior agent money printing. 51:50 Yeah. I mean, I get your view. Your view is that, if I understand it correctly, you think that it's unlikely the government will censor everything. They'll probably just censor what they think are the criminals. 52:03 And that way, if they're the 51% majority and they're reorging only to block the criminals, then the addresses they think are criminal, then the result is the government gets the subsidy, the coinbase, and the government can spend it. 52:25 So therefore, they're not mining for nothing. Because, of course, the party that would mine for nothing, to censor everybody, they would probably short it in the market first, to be clever. So they'd short in the derivatives market, and then they would start hashing as a hostile perpetual miner. 52:44 And I feel like we've gone pretty far down this road. It's been pretty great. I feel like we've arrived at a good sort of agreement about, you're very interested in the jurisdiction of the miners, and the ideology in society of supporting mining. I'm sympathetic to that. I'm a radical liberal parent. 53:10 I definitely am sympathetic to those notions. I mean, I was telling you about how the government might be pretty hostile to Bitcoin in the future, perhaps, with, I mentioned, 1933, 1971. So I think that Bitcoin, here's where we could move the conversation forward. 53:26 Some people think Bitcoin shouldn't grow quickly. They think it's sort of too frighteningly disruptive, too much winning, if Bitcoin grows too fast, because things can get out of hand. I believe that Fiatjaf is right. Fiatjaf, the creator of Nostr, wrote in a tweet not long ago, maybe just a week or two ago, he wrote that he would like to see Bitcoin grow as fast as possible. 53:50 And I'm not quoting verbatim, so I hope I don't paraphrase inaccurately. But he said that he would like to see Bitcoin growing as fast as possible, so that adoption of Bitcoin grows faster than the growth of the regulations that over time could stifle Bitcoin and hinder its full development. 54:13 So I think it's important how fast Bitcoin grows, and that's why I like Drivechain. I think that Drivechain is something that potentially could greatly enhance the speed of Bitcoin adoption. 54:26 Right now we have a whole lot of developers working on other blockchains, and I think it'd be great if all those ideas and development were in Bitcoin instead. So if it were possible to create other blockchains that were attached to Bitcoin through hashrate escrow and blind merged mining, then many altcoins might instead be existing as Bitcoin sidechains. 54:56 So right now, all Bitcoin sidechains are federated. All of them. 55:02 Yeah, that's horrible. 55:03 Yeah, that's by necessity, in the sense that there's no better option available. It's either a federated sidechain or you... 55:13 go to an altcoin. Now, there are probably some in the audience way more sophisticated than me. I'm just a lawyer 55:20 who can tell me about how there's other ways of doing things that are arguably very interesting and worthwhile to understand. 55:27 But in my understanding, just reading Bitcoin magazine articles, like I read Shinobi's excellent five-part essay on sidechains from last year, 55:38 and he wrote there that all Bitcoin sidechains are federated. And that struck me because I agreed with it and I thought it was well put. 55:47 So if we had drivechain, then there could be a different kind of sidechain that I think the market would correctly find to be superior 55:56 and would be adopted in broad usage. So let's say hypothetically, instead of Monero and Zcash being altcoin communities, 56:04 they could instead be Bitcoin sidechain communities. And the native token of their drivechain would be a synthetic Bitcoin, 56:12 meaning that the token they're moving around using their privacy software, a token only created when people lock up Bitcoin in the 56:22 hash rate escrow of the sidechain. And this mechanism, this arrangement basically means that when people are demanding the synthetic 56:31 Bitcoin on the sidechain, they're creating indirectly demand for Bitcoin. So this boosts Bitcoin's value, which is great. 56:40 Like right now, there's $4 billion of value in wrapped Bitcoin. It's my understanding that this is managed by BitGo using a federated 56:49 multi-sig at a company. So it's the same thing as using Coinbase. Now, I'm sure someone from BitGo might come up from the audience and 56:56 tell me that I'm totally wrong, and they have a very elaborate and impressive way of managing this situation. But still. 57:05 Yeah, I think it's just a multi-sig. 57:07 Yeah, they probably have like a 100-page document explaining how impressive that multi-sig is. And maybe they do. I'm sure they're trying 57:17 very hard to do it right. I mean, $4 billion, right? You're not going to want to have that just lost in an oopsie-daisy. 57:22 Someone dropped their keys in a drain they can't get out. 57:28 Can I ask a quick question about drivechains? 57:30 Please, go ahead. 57:32 So the incentive for miners, are they getting fees on the drivechain? And that incentivizes them to merge mine it? And they're also 57:41 participating in Bitcoin? 57:43 Yes. 57:45 Okay. And then, so the drivechain is pretty much producing blocks like Bitcoin. And is it producing it, can the blocks be faster or 57:58 slower at the same rate of Bitcoin? Or is it just dependent on the chain that is made? 58:06 I think we would expect that the blocks would be the same rate as Bitcoin. There might be a highly technical answer that is 58:13 different than the one I'm giving. But I think you're going to see the rates at the same rate always. Because the way that these 58:19 drivechains will be designed will be based on what's best for the user. And there actually isn't, in the view of quite a few Bitcoin 58:29 thinkers, any reason to make the block time faster or slower. That the altcoins that did that did it mainly as a marketing bullet 58:39 point. And there isn't actually a benefit. Although I cannot, to be clear, I can't provide that argument, you know, any more 58:48 comprehensively than I am. So it's, it's like, something that I want to learn more about. But also, I want to clarify one thing I just 58:56 said earlier, where you asked if the, let me just rephrase, you asked if the security budget of the, let me rephrase it, if you 59:04 asked effectively, if the security budget of the drivechain is the fees, and that's correct, there's no sub, there's no coinbase on 59:12 the drivechain, it would be the fees alone, which is important in terms of transaction finality. And there is extensive writing 59:20 about how this is going to be a incentive compatible and sustainable system on drivechain.info and other websites. There's also 59:30 videos about these about the details. So anyone who's interested in like the details of this and whether it would be viable, can read all 59:36 about it and learn all about it. There's videos and writings that are very interesting. And the other thing you asked is whether there 59:43 would be an incentive for the miners to, to merge mine the sidechain. Let me just clarify because I said yes to your question. But the 59:53 way you phrased it suggested that the miners might be able to opt out. Well, if Bitcoin upgrades to BIP301, then Bitcoin miners are 1:00:03 getting the transaction fees from all of the drivechains without doing anything new. So if you have a miner at home, like me, you have your 1:00:16 ASIC, if you run your own node, and you're directly operating on the Bitcoin network as an independent network node miner, you would, if you 1:00:27 upgrade your software to the latest version of Bitcoin Core, if drivechain is adopted in the future, then you will receive the fee income from 1:00:39 the drivechain sidechains without running this, the node of any of those sidechains. So that's what blind merge mining means, with respect to 1:00:51 blind, blind, because you don't have to, you can, you can and some miners might, especially if the sidechain happens to be like a defy sidechain, like 1:01:03 Ethereum, where you can make a little bit more money, if you're running the node. So you can do fancy games with the flashbots and the nev, you can make some 1:01:13 extra money. 1:01:16 Sorry, are the fees paid in Bitcoin? Or are they paid in the coin that in the in the blind mining scenario? Are the miners getting paid in fees in 1:01:27 Bitcoin or the merge mine coin or the synthetic I should say? 1:01:31 Bitcoin? 1:01:32 That is a great, great question. In ordinary merge mining today, the Bitcoin miners receive the altcoin that's used on the sidechain. In blind merge 1:01:43 mining, the Bitcoin miners receive layer one Bitcoin. So pretty much the pay in pay out fees. It's a pretty cool upgrade, isn't it? Because there's 1:01:56 Yeah, that sounds, let's, let's, let's do it. 1:01:58 Yeah, I know. I know. Like, when I heard that, I was like, damn, like, whoever designed that is pretty fucking smart. Like, how did they work that 1:02:09 out? How did they make it so that the Bitcoin layer one miners don't have to run the node of the sidechain. And they get the fees from the 1:02:17 sidechain in Bitcoin, not in the altcoin. Like that is pretty cool. Yeah, drivechain is pretty cool. 1:02:27 Yeah, that would have to be it. Because that's the only way I feel like, 1:02:31 like, I, I got into drivechain, not really understanding who else was interested in it. I got interested in it all by myself. And only after I got 1:02:40 quite interested, did I discover that Adam Back thinks it's cool. He's actually used to 1:02:48 Yeah, I just saw that tweet that you posted of his. Yeah, I didn't realize that he was 1:02:52 I didn't, I had no idea who else was into it. I heard Paul Sztorc talk about drivechain. A year ago on Nick Carter's podcast, I didn't know that 1:03:01 Adam Back was into it. And I discovered he was into it. I was like, Whoa, this has like, some serious people. And then I more recently 1:03:09 discovered that Fiatjaf, the creator of Nostr is into it. He's into it, like, heavy duty. Like he writes, like, if we don't do drivechain, 1:03:19 everything will be lost, like, it'll be the end of the world. So, um, yeah, like, a lot of people who are very sophisticated, think this is a cool 1:03:30 idea. It has, I think we're at the cusp right now, where drivechain is going to in the next few months, I believe, just maybe, maybe I'm just like 1:03:39 dreaming. But I believe we might see in just the next few months, a very significant increase in the level of acknowledgement and understanding of this 1:03:50 idea. Like, we've got Adam Back tweeting about it. Like every now and then he tweets about it, like favorably, without without exception, it's always like 1:04:00 drivechains pretty cool. Or most recently, he wrote, we probably will need it. Like, you know, 1:04:06 yeah, he's realizing that sidechains like liquid are just a non starter. Like, people don't realize people say I'll use liquid and I go on and I paste the 1:04:17 section from their document from their knowledge base. And it says, unless you're a federated member, in order to peg out of lightning, you need a third 1:04:26 party, a trusted third party. I'm like, what is this? It's pointless. It's a non starter. So what the idea of a sidechain that requires a trusted third 1:04:35 party shouldn't even be called sidechain to get in and out, you know, 1:04:39 that that's something that some of the drivechain, you know, designers and thinkers agree with you on completely that the word sidechain in the 1:04:49 future, once if drivechain is adopted, people will not say the word sidechain, unless they're referring to a drivechain. Because if you're saying the word 1:04:57 sidechain, but really, the security model is identical to that of Coinbase. Is it really a sidechain? Like it's kind of having said that, I want to be totally 1:05:08 clear that I think the people who work on Blockstream's liquid are outstanding. They have some of the smartest people in the world at Blockstream, and really cool, smart 1:05:19 people. I think that it's those kinds of people who have devoted their careers to Bitcoin, who will benefit on a personal level greatly, if drivechain is adopted and is 1:05:31 successful, because it will cause Bitcoin focused career professionals, like the people at Blockstream, and other companies, many other companies in the Bitcoin 1:05:43 space to be elevated, because the project that they have spent a whole decade or really 13 years on, will will survive and prosper and remain the number one chain. So what 1:05:56 drivechain is all about for anyone who's not too familiar with it in the audience, you know, it's about returning Bitcoin to 100% dominance, or at least trying to 1:06:05 increase it, at least trying to get Bitcoin back up to where it's the dominant player in the whole space, because in a protocol wars, you want to be the bigger one, you 1:06:15 want to have the biggest blockchain, you want to have the most users with the most value, with the most economic security, you want to be the biggest, because when 1:06:24 you have competing protocols, network effects is very important. Money, especially, is a network effect dominated market. In money. If you're not the biggest 1:06:35 game, you know, you're, you're fighting an uphill battle. So now, yeah, so Bitcoin, of course, has attributes that make it distinct from other monies like the 1:06:46 dollar, even though the dollar is much bigger. So of course, Bitcoin is better, and therefore can overcome its, its relatively smaller network effect, you know, momentum. 1:06:58 But I mean, even, even the recent inscriptions and ordinal things shows that there's demand for, you know, more use cases for Bitcoin. And drivechains just fills that 1:07:10 demand. I mean, people know that Bitcoin is the most secure and most decentralized. And that's why there was a huge, and still demand to, you know, do inscriptions and all this stuff on it. But the 1:07:24 drivechains thing is just like a, like an open field of people to build on and create incentive and for people to build value and bring in new users. So what are the major contentions with people 1:07:43 who are against BIP301? 1:07:46 BIP301 specifically, or BIP301? 1:07:50 Or just drivechains in general? I mean, I pretty much sold on 301. I don't think BIP300 is, would be as useful as 301. But just drivechains in general, what is people's argument or contention? 1:08:05 Sure. So regarding drivechains generally, the criticisms, I've been spending months, you know, learning about them. They're interesting. And I'm, I think I'm familiar, without a doubt with what I would describe as the top two, top, top two criticisms. The first is people who say that the miners will steal from the 1:08:27 hashrate escrow. So this is a view that drivechain will be not successful, because miners, instead of allowing the hashrate escrows to exist in an honest manner, the miners will see them growing and then take the Bitcoin from them, robbing the sidechain users. And this would, of course, cause there to be an overwhelming chilling effect on the use of the hashrate escrow. It's like, why 1:08:56 would you, why would you, you know, buy a house in a neighborhood where there's a high crime rate, right? Like, you wouldn't want to go there. So why would you use a sidechain when the miners are controlling it, and they can steal the money out of it. So that's the view of some people, they think that drivechain won't work. Because Bitcoin miners can't be trusted. So this is a, a mentality that is perhaps partly a result of the historical experience, and the 1:09:26 interpretation of experience, which some people have, regarding Bitcoin and the role of the miners, that they don't always do the right thing, that they're greedy, yada, yada, yada. 1:09:38 Would it have to be a 51% type scenario for them to steal the pegged funds? 1:09:44 Yes, it would have to be a majority of the hashrate deployed for months. And 1:09:49 isn't there like a 2000 block or 1:09:52 yeah, the 20,000 block collusion? 1:09:55 Right at the very beginning, the moment that the Malthusian mining were to begin, that moment, it would be publicly known that it is going on. So it's like a bank robbery that takes half a year to happen. And it's happening in slow motion for six months. So I think that it would never occur ever. And that these critics are 1:10:18 mistaken. So what's really interesting is that the other criticism of drivechain isn't that the miners will steal, it's actually the opposite criticism, which is that drivechain will be so successful, that it'll become so large, that it will have distorting effects on Bitcoin layer 1:10:39 one. In other words, that so the first criticism is that drivechain won't work because the miners will take the money from the users when they when the miners aren't supposed to. In other words, people are arguing in the first in the first criticism, that the miners will act in their short run interest and rob the hashrate escrow rather than their long run economic interest, which is to allow drivechains, a multitude of drivechains, a multitude of these BIP300 and 301 side 1:11:09 chains to grow very large so that Bitcoin fees can flow forever to the miners. It's like, it's like saying that a restaurateur will perhaps rob all of his patrons, even though they'll never come back, just because in that one off robbery, he gets all their money in their pockets. I don't think that's going to happen. Like what restaurant ever does that? 1:11:33 So once people see that miners are colluding to steal this nice drive train, are people still able to withdraw from that drivechain before that 20,000 block limit? 1:11:46 I think the answer to that is no. 1:11:49 Okay, I think it'd be kind of like frozen. Yeah, that long. 1:11:53 Right. Yeah, I think that I think that they wouldn't be able to get their money out to avoid the malfeasance miner. However, there is actually a reason why drivechain was created this way. It is actually a good thing in some situations for the miners to have control over the hashrate escrow. 1:12:17 If, for example, there is a problematic drivechain, that is a sidechain that uses the drivechain tech, which is causing a problem for other drivechains, or for layer one Bitcoin, such as a drivechain that is somehow so despicable that it's lowering the value of Bitcoin. 1:12:39 Then it is good that the community of Bitcoin users has an ability to express their will through the miners to discontinue that specific drivechain. 1:12:53 So the idea that the miners will rob any drivechain they can, that's the allegation, but what it ignores is that the miners having the ability to terminate one or more drivechains could be the act of the community expressing its will through the miners. 1:13:13 So it's actually good, arguably, that the miners have the power that they do in drivechain. 1:13:21 The whole purpose of drivechain is to enable peer-to-peer peg of a sidechain instead of a federated peg. 1:13:31 That's the critical dichotomy, is peer-to-peer versus federated. 1:13:35 So in peer-to-peer, you have the Bitcoin arrangement of everything being peer-to-peer. 1:13:40 That was the beginning of the white paper. 1:13:42 The very first words in the entire white paper in the title are a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 1:13:48 So the fact that drivechain uses peer-to-peer technology, I like to think of it this way. 1:13:56 Bitcoin is peer-to-peer, therefore, Bitcoin mining is peer-to-peer. 1:14:01 Therefore, a miner-controlled peg of Bitcoin for a sidechain is peer-to-peer. 1:14:07 And in that sense, it's peer-to-peer. 1:14:10 And if you read Adam Back's tweets on drivechain, you see that he refers to them as peer-to-peer sidechains, which is cool, because that's exactly right. 1:14:20 Some people refer to them as trustless sidechains. 1:14:23 I try to stay away from the word trustless, because it's triggering to some people who might even rightly say that Bitcoin itself isn't trustless. 1:14:30 There could always be a 51% hostile miner or something like that. 1:14:34 Trust is minimized, I like to use. 1:14:36 Yes. 1:14:38 Yeah. 1:14:38 So just to wrap up, like the two, I mean, my answer, and then please ask more if you'd like, and other people are welcome to join the stage, raise your hand and come on up. 1:14:46 This is an open discussion. 1:14:47 We run these every Monday and Thursday, forever. 1:14:51 This is LayerTwo Labs. 1:14:53 Until it's, you know, merged into Bitcoin. 1:14:57 Right. 1:14:58 Yeah, exactly. 1:14:59 We're not going to give up. 1:15:01 We'll just keep on going. 1:15:02 You know, I was doing this before I even worked for Layer 2. 1:15:05 I would just host my own drivechain Twitter spaces. 1:15:08 Sometimes I would call them the Paul Sztorc fan club. 1:15:10 People would join and just chat. 1:15:13 So no matter what happens, I'll just keep on going forever, because I know I'm right. 1:15:18 Like, either drivechain gets adopted and then it'll do well. And then all the drivechain fans 1:15:24 and Bitcoiners who like drivechain, they're all vindicated. Or in the worst case, unfortunately, 1:15:31 sadly, it is my sincere belief that without drivechain, there is a chance that's, in my 1:15:38 personal opinion, for what it's worth, a really real chance, a really serious chance that without 1:15:46 drivechain, Bitcoin is significantly less viable in the long run. So less viable to maintain, 1:15:55 you know, the market cap crown that it currently has, less viable to maintain sufficient on-chain 1:16:02 income, to foster sufficient economic security such that value accrual continues to the network. 1:16:13 It's been 14 years and the mempool still is usually empty outside of bull markets. 1:16:19 And that's right. That's right. 1:16:23 There's no backstop. And at this point, there should be. And it's crazy that it's been that 1:16:29 long and there's still no sidechain that works peer-to-peer, like you're saying. 1:16:36 Yeah. 1:16:36 Any sidechain on Bitcoin requires some federated peg or some, you know, federated member to peg 1:16:41 out for you or some trusted third party. And, you know, Ethereum has sidechains where you just, 1:16:47 it's just, there's no trusted third party. It's just a contract. And, you know, you swap in and 1:16:53 out. And so the fact that Bitcoin doesn't have that is really a travesty, you know. 1:17:00 So given your level of sophistication, which is probably higher than mine on a lot of these 1:17:05 technical points, I want to point out a few caveats just in case we have anyone listening 1:17:10 who is like taking notes on the things that I say that are wrong. I just want to make sure we 1:17:15 clarify because one of my goals in these spaces is to be completely like accurate and honest, 1:17:21 of course. So when we say like a few of the things you just said, like there aren't peer-to-peer 1:17:29 sidechains, I want to make sure that we acknowledge that the problem is not a lack of 1:17:35 peer-to-peer sidechains in every sense, because some people would say, well, there are one-way 1:17:41 peg sidechains that are peer-to-peer. Meaning you could have, I think you could have like a 1:17:48 merged mind sidechain where there's no way to ever get your Bitcoin back and it's burned forever 1:17:55 when you enter the sidechain. But then with the sidechain token, you know, which could fluctuate 1:18:02 in value way below the value of Bitcoin because there's no peg out mechanism, like you can do 1:18:08 stuff and that might be, I'm not sure if it's called a soft chain or a space chain or a spook 1:18:14 chain. Those are all different ideas by Reuben Thompson, Jeremy Rubin, and other very smart people. 1:18:20 But those might be, in some cases, those might be peer-to-peer technically, but I would, I think what 1:18:27 you meant and also what I would agree with, of course, is that when we're talking about sidechains, 1:18:31 what we mean is a two-way peg sidechain because otherwise you're not dealing with a Bitcoin 1:18:36 unit of account, you're dealing with some other thing that's fluctuating in value, possibly 1:18:41 far below the value of Bitcoin all the time or lots of the time. So yeah, it's like we want a 1:18:47 peer-to-peer, two-way peg sidechain. That's the full sentence that we want to have. 1:18:54 Yeah, I mean, Liquid has the one-way peg. You can peg into Liquid with just a Bitcoin full node and a 1:18:59 Liquid node, but there's no way out. You know, it's Hotel California. 1:19:04 Pay it out. Exactly. 1:19:07 That's really, you know, it doesn't fulfill. And like you said, that creates a fluctuation 1:19:14 in whatever that, you know, LBTC or whatever the asset is on that sidechain. 1:19:19 And then what I hear from the opponents of drivechain is this very disappointing rhetoric 1:19:25 that I wonder, is it really genuine? They say things, some of them, like, 1:19:30 hey, if you want to do something you can't do on Bitcoin, just do an altcoin. But then those 1:19:35 same people, most of them, I hear them saying things like altcoins are shitcoins, altcoins are 1:19:42 scams. So it doesn't make sense. Which is it? Should Bitcoiners who want to do software that's 1:19:49 not available on Bitcoin go to altcoins? Or should we say that altcoins are worthless and going to 1:19:55 zero? Because you can't have your cake and eat it too. You can't have both arguments at the same 1:19:59 time. So what we want is drivechain so that we can have all of those protocols that have value, 1:20:07 that are currently altcoins, to be copied into drivechains. And a person might ask, well, 1:20:14 what are these technologies that aren't Bitcoin but have value as blockchains? 1:20:20 Well, they include large block versions of Bitcoin. So the whole, like, you know, 1:20:26 large block community that left Bitcoin. Now people could say, well, those don't have much 1:20:31 value today. Between Bitcoin Cash and BSV, we're only talking about, what, one or two or three 1:20:37 billion dollars of value. So what's the point? Well, it's still a lot of people. And also, 1:20:43 a lot of those same people probably are now in Ethereum. So we shouldn't look at 1:20:49 the market values of specific altcoins as, well, I'm just saying it's complicated. 1:20:55 But basically, one technology is large blocks. Another valid technology is privacy technology, 1:21:01 like ring signatures available on Monero and Liquid. And another technology is Oracle networks, 1:21:09 such as Chainlink, or even better, far better, Hivemind, which is the peer-to-peer Oracle network 1:21:20 designed by drivechain BIP co-author Paul Sztorc. So the drivechain co-author has a specific 1:21:30 sidechain he would like to implement as a drivechain and has been waiting seven years to do 1:21:35 so. So that's one of the ones. So in addition to large blocks and privacy networks, there's also 1:21:41 Oracle networks. And then there's other ones like a sidechain devoted exclusively to DNS, 1:21:47 which is Satoshi's altcoin. So Satoshi himself countenanced one altcoin, which is BitDNS. 1:21:56 And he wrote in favor of merged mining, he wrote in August 2010 on the forum that every network 1:22:03 in the world would be merge-mined with Bitcoin. So Satoshi was saying things very harmonious with 1:22:11 drivechain, harmonious with the notion that every blockchain would be a merged-mined 1:22:18 blockchain of Bitcoin. So he thought there'd be a whole multitude of blockchains out there, 1:22:23 a whole multitude of protocols, because every sidechain is a protocol, every blockchain is a 1:22:27 protocol. Please jump in, Aeon, what were you going to say? I had a question about pegging into 1:22:34 drivechains. Are you able to tell by looking at the network or just blockchain what sidechain I'm 1:22:43 pegging into? So let's say I'm paying into the Monero drivechain. Can that be identified 1:22:50 through the blockchain that I'm paying into that from Bitcoin, or is it obfuscated in some way? 1:23:03 Well, we have one very sophisticated listener in the audience, among others, CryptAxe. Maybe he can 1:23:10 give a thumbs up to indicate if he expects that the drivechain users would be observable 1:23:22 in terms of like, if a person is pegging into a specific drivechain, maybe give us a thumbs up if 1:23:28 that would be, yeah. So he gave a thumbs up. So yeah, when you're on Bitcoin layer one, there 1:23:34 isn't absolute privacy, as you know, Aeon BTC. So if you send your Bitcoin to Liquid, or you send 1:23:41 your Bitcoin to Rootstock, or you send your Bitcoin to a drivechain, that is something which 1:23:46 might be observable unless you conduct your activities on Bitcoin in a completely anonymous 1:23:51 manner. Now, of course, there could be upgrades to layer one in the distant future that could 1:23:57 mix everything together, like cross-input signature aggregation or something else, 1:24:02 possibly. One of the cool things about drivechain is that it possibly is like a laboratory where 1:24:10 it could accelerate the best ideas coming down to layer one Bitcoin because they would first 1:24:16 be used in a sidechain. And if that sidechain were to grow very large, then it would be a signal 1:24:26 to the market that Bitcoin users really like, really like that specific drivechain. And then 1:24:34 there could be a movement to bring that software down to layer one. I'm not saying that's something 1:24:39 that should happen or would happen, but it is theoretically possible, like in 50 years from now, 1:24:46 let's say one drivechain is enormously huge. Maybe after like a decade of decades of flawless 1:24:54 operation, they could just make that like the layer one. So there's this cool way of like 1:24:59 improving layer one privacy where we can first test it on the drivechain. I think I heard Paul 1:25:05 Sztorc say in a podcast or Twitter spaces that Taproot could have come faster to Bitcoin, perhaps, 1:25:13 if it wouldn't have taken a whole five years if we had first done it on a drivechain. So that's 1:25:20 one cool thing about drivechain is it allows Bitcoin development to to have more competition 1:25:28 instead of just the liberation, meaning that we can like if people want if there's like five 1:25:33 cool ideas to do on Bitcoin, well, we can do all five of them in drivechains and then see which 1:25:38 ones work well rather than having to just think about it all in the abstract and then, you know, 1:25:45 eventually just kind of choose one. So drivechain is a upgrade for Bitcoin that might enable 1:25:53 ossification, meaning it might greatly increase the degree to which Bitcoin can be conservative, 1:26:01 meaning if there's all these ideas people want to do, rather than saying, hey, we've got to 1:26:06 change Bitcoin this way, we've got to change Bitcoin that way. Instead, people people can 1:26:10 just do a drivechain and get everything they want in the drivechain. And therefore, layer one can be 1:26:19 stable and permanent. So it's complicated to say it's kind of paradoxical, but it's a change for 1:26:25 Bitcoin, which might be a way to not change Bitcoin after we do this change. So that's one 1:26:33 of the interesting parts about drivechain. It's a change which opens the door to 1:26:41 virtually unlimited changes on the second layer, enabling the base layer to become ossified. And 1:26:48 if there were to be any more changes, the drivechain designers, I think, have a favorable 1:26:53 view of shrinking the mainchain block size. So either before or after doing drivechain, 1:27:00 doesn't matter which order you do it in. I think they're within the camp of thinkers that 1:27:05 include others that have a favorable attitude regarding making layer one Bitcoin 1:27:12 even more decentralized, smaller block, which means decentralized in the sense that it becomes 1:27:18 cheaper for an ordinary person to validate the entire layer one blockchain if the blocks are 1:27:24 very small, because then it means that you can have a node perhaps on your smartphone instead 1:27:30 of on a laptop. So it's actually cheaper for some poor person to use Bitcoin that way. 1:27:36 How much space do drivechains take up on the base layer blocks? 1:27:44 Very little. It's near zero. The actual technical load created by the code 1:27:53 and the data involved in running the drivechain is very small, because as you described initially 1:28:01 in our conversation, there's a counting mechanism where the hash rate is counted per block for a 1:28:09 long period of time, for months, and that counting software is not too complicated. 1:28:15 So the actual burden on the nodes is small. 1:28:21 The architecture of drivechain, its actual technical structure is not terribly burdensome 1:28:30 at all. It's very lightweight compared to the enormous economic value accrual that could result 1:28:39 from it. So this is something which we can contrast. We can contrast that architecture 1:28:47 to rollups. So zero-knowledge rollups, like a very big topic in blockchain tech these days, 1:28:57 they involve extremely sophisticated mathematics that are relatively new in nature, 1:29:03 whereas drivechain is much more Bitcoin-y in that it involves things that aren't terribly 1:29:11 esoteric. To understand how drivechain works doesn't require that you get a PhD in mathematics. 1:29:18 So the number of people in the world who have a very strong understanding of how rollups work 1:29:24 is quite small. I've got a friend who does that at a venture capital firm. They hired him 1:29:30 to analyze their rollup-related investments, and he has a PhD in computer science focusing 1:29:36 on complexity theory. It's very advanced stuff, whereas it's like working in a nuclear engineering 1:29:46 plant. Whereas what drivechain involves, it's concepts like counting that aren't 1:29:53 terribly complicated. So it's not like we need lots of software and lots of sophisticated 1:29:59 analysis to understand how it all works. It's pretty basic and ingenious in its simplicity. 1:30:07 So in that way, it's harmonious with the ethos of Bitcoin, which is to have a protocol that is 1:30:13 comprehensible to ordinary advanced thinkers rather than a small elite of academics. 1:30:21 Therefore, it's more reliable because it's not relying on complex mathematics. It's not something 1:30:26 which can have a flaw that nobody would see. It's been around for seven years. It's been 1:30:31 studied extensively. I remember hearing about it back in the day and just keep hearing about it. 1:30:38 Finally, it seems like it's getting a lot more traction. A lot of the cognitive dissonance with 1:30:45 Bitcoiners concerning Fedimint, and everyone's all hyped about Fedimint, and it's just another 1:30:52 custodial, unauditable, essentially shitcoin. Fedimint is our shitcoin in my opinion. 1:31:01 But it's weird that people are so resistant to drivechains after learning all this about it. 1:31:10 Well, it's been great to chat. If anyone's interested in learning more about drivechain, 1:31:16 the place to go, among others, is drivechain.info. That is the website of the drivechain authors, 1:31:27 the BIP authors, and they have a lot of great content on there. 1:31:32 You can also go to the YouTube channel of LayerTwo Labs, and you can also go to Reddit, 1:31:40 the subreddit called drivechains. You can also go to the GitHub for drivechain, 1:31:46 and there's a bunch of other cool places you can go. I'm not going to go through all of them, 1:31:52 but there's a bunch of other cool places you can go to learn more about drivechains. 1:31:58 I like fiatjaf.com, where you click on Bitcoin and then click on drivechain, 1:32:09 and that's a great essay by the creator of Nostr, who loves drivechain. So fiatjaf.com. 1:32:22 I hope I'm not shilling him too much. I hope it doesn't bother him 1:32:26 that I talk about it all the time. 1:32:32 If anyone has any questions, they're welcome to come up to the stage, or we can wrap for the 1:32:37 night. So anybody in the audience, come on up. Don't be shy. If not, we'll call it a night, 1:32:46 and we'll reconvene on Thursday. Hopefully, we'll be a few days closer to the drivechainization of 1:32:53 Bitcoin. The overall goal here is to have all valuable altcoin technology on top of Bitcoin, 1:33:01 so that the users and developers and investors can all be on Bitcoin instead of having to go 1:33:08 to altcoins. So we have to dispense with the incorrect idea that all altcoin technology is 1:33:15 worthless. The fact is, some altcoin technology is valuable, and therefore, it would be good 1:33:25 if it could be cloned into peer-to-peer Bitcoin sidechains. So there is two dimensions of benefit 1:33:40 from this drivechainization. One benefit is that the value of those altcoins would come to Bitcoin, 1:33:47 potentially. The other dimension of benefit, though, is narratives. 1:33:53 Bitcoin would no longer suffer. If drivechain is adopted, Bitcoin would no longer suffer 1:34:00 from the narrative that altcoins currently enjoy. Altcoins, as we know from reading the Ethereum 1:34:08 white paper, altcoins like to say that it is hard or impossible to build on Bitcoin. 1:34:16 In the Ethereum white paper, it is written that it is hard or impossible to build on Bitcoin. 1:34:21 Vitalik went on for like a page and a half about that. At the very beginning of the paper, 1:34:26 that's the main thing he says. If drivechain had been adopted back then, if it had been around 1:34:34 forever, then that wouldn't have been written that way. So drivechain enables Bitcoin to be 1:34:39 stronger both economically, potentially, as well as in terms of narratives. The narrative that 1:34:46 Bitcoin strengthens through drivechain is the narrative that people can build anything on 1:34:53 Bitcoin. Building on Bitcoin is easy and unlimited when drivechain is adopted. That'll be the narrative, 1:35:00 I believe. So Bitcoin will be seen as a technology platform, not just as a narrow monetary network. 1:35:14 An economic project to have a strong narrative. Narratives are important. Humans operate in the 1:35:20 realm of emotion. Emotion, fantasy, and belief, whether rational or irrational, are important 1:35:30 factors in the psychological realm. For those reasons, it's critical that Bitcoin 1:35:37 express a strong mystique of technological innovation. It's important that Bitcoin have 1:35:47 cool projects on it. Like the way that Adam Back says the drivechain is cool, it would be valuable 1:35:55 for Bitcoin to be cool. Now, of course, many Bitcoiners think it's very cool already. But in 1:36:01 the eyes of the average person, it's valuable if there are extra cool things. For example, 1:36:10 I spoke about this recently to some friends, or maybe it was the last Twitter spaces. Most car 1:36:15 companies have a sports car that they sell to just a few people. Like the Ford GT40. It costs 1:36:23 like a quarter million dollars, goes very fast. Very fancy car. Almost no one has one. 1:36:31 There are probably 10,000 or 100,000 more people who have a Ford Taurus than a Ford GT40. But 1:36:39 nevertheless, the Ford brand finds it valuable to sell that supercar because they know 1:36:49 that when the ordinary guy goes to buy a Taurus, in his mind somewhere, he's thinking a little bit 1:36:56 about the fact that the Ford brand is cool because of the existence of the GT40. 1:37:07 So in a similar way, if Bitcoin had these very cool drivechains attached to it, 1:37:15 even if the drivechains never become very large economically, they could add a lot of coolness 1:37:23 to Bitcoin. Bitcoin would be seen as a place where cool projects are possible, 1:37:30 rather than a layer one that has nothing else going on except lightning and fetiment. 1:37:41 Now those are cool things. I'm not anti-lightning, I'm not anti-fetiment, 1:37:44 but I do believe that sidechains are the future for Bitcoin. I think they should be and can be. 1:37:50 It's only if the community embraces it. Everyone here can help with that. 1:38:00 Well, Aeon, why don't you have the last word and then we'll wrap for the night. 1:38:08 Well, I mean, I just want to thank you. You're great explaining it. You should 1:38:12 be the spokesman, in my opinion. But yeah, a lot of the things you say make perfect sense because, 1:38:24 unlike what we spoke about early on with the fee pressure, that's a hugely important thing. 1:38:29 And likely people are not going to want to increase the supply and have a tail emission, 1:38:35 even if it does help security or not. It's very unlikely that the majority of Bitcoiners would 1:38:41 want that anyway. So whatever raises the fees, like I was for inscriptions and ordinals just 1:38:48 because it creates fee pressure. And if people are paying the fee, it's fine. But 1:38:56 fetiment, I mean, I'm not a fan of fetiment because it's not auditable. It's 1:39:01 not very well substantiated in terms of its operations. And Drivechain seems like a great 1:39:09 solution to just have a testing ground and also to create incentive and demand and for people to 1:39:15 build value and people to find value in that. So thanks for your hard work. And I'll come by 1:39:22 and I'll see you next time. 1:39:31 I'll come by every once in a while and I'll definitely help spread the word now that I know a lot more about it. 1:39:47 Cool. I put in the nest a tweet which lists a bunch of links. So everyone is free to 1:39:58 check out these links. They're all pretty awesome. I like the videos link. Check out that videos link 1:40:06 and there's a bunch of other essays and resources. I hope you find it useful. 1:40:14 I guess with that, we will call it a night. Thanks for listening. This is a recorded space. 1:40:21 You can listen on demand at your convenience afterwards and we'll be back every Monday and 1:40:26 Thursday. In the meantime, be sure to follow LayerTwo Labs, your host, and also I recommend 1:40:35 following the speaker of tonight, Mr. AeonBTC. For those listening, it is spelled A-E-O-N-B-T-C. 1:40:43 Once again, A-E-O-N-B-T-C. Thanks for being a part of the conversation and please come back again. 1:40:52 In the future, anyone who's been listening, please feel free to think of questions and you can DM 1:40:58 them to me or just bring them to the next conversation. In the meantime, please feel 1:41:04 free to join our Telegram group. We have over 700 Bitcoiners in the Drivechain Telegram group. 1:41:14 The conversations there are going on all the time. They're lots of fun. You can easily find it by 1:41:20 going to drivechain.info. That's drivechain.info and then click on Telegram on that website and 1:41:28 you'll be taken to the Telegram group. The Drivechain BIP authors frequently are in the 1:41:37 Telegram group chatting with people who have questions and people who just like to chat 1:41:43 about Bitcoin. It's a great place to hang out and learn more about Bitcoin. 1:41:48 There is Bitcoin orthodoxy and there is Bitcoin heterodoxy. The orthodoxy in Bitcoin 1:41:56 is the movement of thinkers that are the establishment. 1:42:01 However, among intellectuals, there is a greater presence of heterodox thinkers, 1:42:07 that is thinkers with their own projects and their own personal perspective on Bitcoin, 1:42:11 perspectives that do not fully align with the mainstream understanding. 1:42:16 And over time, Bitcoin will evolve and it will evolve because of the heterodox thinkers, 1:42:22 the innovators, the visionaries, the builders and creators. Those are the people who have new 1:42:28 ideas and see things with an individualist mindset rather than just the echo chamber. 1:42:35 So when we have conversations like these, in my view, we're participating in that heterodoxy, 1:42:42 that original thinking mindset. And that's a view of a possible future. We could be wrong and the 1:42:48 future could be different than what we envision. Although, as I said earlier, it's my personal 1:42:53 outlook at this moment that either Bitcoin does drivechain and benefits from it or doesn't do 1:42:59 drivechain and maybe that could be a consequential negative. So I'm very optimistic that the right 1:43:07 thing will be done and we have growing support. So it's an exciting time. It's not too late. 1:43:15 Bitcoin is still number one. So if we adopt drivechain now, then I think that the Bitcoiners will 1:43:24 send their money, their Bitcoin into the drivechains. Maybe like 5% of all Bitcoin will go into 1:43:30 the drivechains in the first year. That's billions of dollars right there. Like 5% of 400 1:43:42 billion. It's a lot of money. So right there we have drivechains that would be larger 1:43:50 than most altcoins. So those altcoins, let's say a privacy drivechain, just hypothetically, 1:43:55 let's just run through an experiment real quick. Let's say Bitcoin launches a privacy drivechain 1:44:01 that has the same security, sorry, the same privacy as Monero or Zcash. So in the Monero 1:44:09 and Zcash privacy communities, those altcoins together have a market cap of something like, 1:44:15 one or two or $3 billion. So let's say Bitcoin, let's just say Bitcoin has 1:44:27 a privacy drivechain that 2% of Bitcoiners send their Bitcoin to. Well, 2% of Bitcoin is $8 billion. 1:44:37 Right. So that means Bitcoin's privacy protocol has $8 billion. That is the drivechain has $8 1:44:45 billion of market cap. Meanwhile, these altcoins, Monero and Zcash have $1 to $3 billion. 1:44:53 So which do you think an ordinary privacy blockchain user is going to want to use? 1:45:00 The $8 billion privacy blockchain or the $1 to $3 billion privacy blockchain? 1:45:06 In other words, what I'm telling you is that Bitcoin is going to absorb the market cap and 1:45:11 the fees of these altcoins. If it adopts drivechain, in the hypothetical I've described, 1:45:20 the Bitcoin version of these softwares will be so much bigger and stronger, I believe, that 1:45:28 all of the users will come over with the value. So the altcoins go to zero as a result because 1:45:35 their software has been copied, which is fair game. It's all open source. Anything can be copied. 1:45:41 So it's copied over and then the altcoin goes to zero. Bitcoin grows in value as a result of that 1:45:48 because as we described earlier, demand for synthetic Bitcoin on the drivechains is demand 1:45:54 for layer one Bitcoin indirectly. So Bitcoin gets higher value and higher dominance because the 1:46:00 altcoins went down while Bitcoin went up. And there's a domino effect where one by one every 1:46:08 altcoin with legit tech, that tech is cloned onto a drivechain and then the value comes 1:46:13 over to Bitcoin, as do the users and developers and all those narratives. And then Bitcoin's 1:46:21 dominance and value are higher. So Bitcoin is climbing back one by one with a domino effect, 1:46:27 getting all the privacy users, the Oracle network users, 1:46:32 the DNS, and then finally the scalability and also the smart contracting. 1:46:40 All those blockchain applications will be on top of Bitcoin. It's pretty exciting. 1:46:46 Maybe it'll even work out that way. Who knows? There's only one way to find out. So 1:46:52 let's talk on Thursday and bring all of your questions and complaints. 1:46:58 Catch you then everybody. Thanks again for joining.
