0:00 Thank you for joining us. 0:30 Oh my gosh, I can't see anything. Can anyone hear any of me? Did Elon Musk change the software again? 0:38 Hmm. I can see the things that I normally see, but I can't see any people. 0:43 Maybe I should leave and rejoin. 0:46 I don't know. 0:48 What is happening? It says $8, but I don't see anything at all. 0:52 Elon. 0:54 Okay, I'm gonna leave and rejoin. 1:00 Okay. 1:18 All right, we got Moon Settler. 1:20 He's been waiting all week for this. 1:23 I've been waiting all week for this. You've been waiting all week for this. 1:28 This is 1:30 as good as it gets. There's no Bitcoin signal 1:35 higher than this signal. 1:38 I was here in 1:40 Berlin, I still am, and I saw this replica of this giant dome that Hitler wanted to build. 1:47 Biggest dome ever made. 1:50 That's a perfect analogy for what this is. This is the biggest dome. 1:55 Although it's not a great analogy, because Hitler was never able to build that dome on account of 2:03 being distracted by losing the war and then dying. But other than that, 2:11 I mean, definitely made a lot of mistakes, but 2:15 very ambitious person. 2:26 All right, Moon Settler, are we doing this? 2:31 Yeah, maybe. 2:33 Yes. 2:35 So, before that, 2:39 there was like two things I wanted to say. 2:47 One was that 2:49 I actually would like to see 2:52 blind merge mining being used. 2:57 Basically, there are like half a dozen ways you could do it, so I'm confident that 3:06 in some form it will happen. 3:12 So, I'm kind of interested in the outcome of that 3:18 of that 3:23 I don't know how to say it, objection or whatever, but before we get into that, if 3:30 I'm not on a train this time, I'm in a quiet 3:34 luxury hotel room 3:36 that might have been on fire yesterday. 3:40 It's unclear. 3:41 The fire alarm went off. All the people being German, they all left, so I had to also leave. 3:48 I didn't see any fires, but 3:51 excellent fire alarm, I'll give them that. 3:54 Anyway, so we're doing this thing about whether or not 4:00 there is a marginal cost advantage 4:06 in non-linear in hash rate, that being our x variable. 4:11 Yeah, in hash rate share. 4:13 The growing hash rate share. 4:16 Yeah, so the original quote 4:19 that 4:21 that I tried to summarize the critiques of 4:25 drivechain from this angle 4:27 and this is all for those that don't know the context, this is all related to the 4:33 realization that since sidechains 4:37 reorg independently 4:40 for that reason, the main chain bid for a sidechain block 4:48 reference, let's say. So sidechain block reference, 4:52 when it gets bidded, then it's not atomic. 4:55 So the reward that the searcher or block assembler of the sidechain gets on the sidechain 5:01 is not atomically tied with his expense. 5:04 And that is why it has been theorized that 5:07 and I'm going to quote, 5:10 read the quote, so blind merge mining bid is inherently risky, growing pool size and not bidding in the main pool 5:17 risks the blind merge mining, thus it introduces different economy of scale and centralization dynamics. 5:23 So that's kind of what is being claimed about blind merge mining and 5:29 and 5:30 before we talk about that and why you think that is not true, 5:34 can we play a little game? 5:37 So we can, but I also have a game I wanted to play before we played it out, which is I wanted you to admit 5:43 six different things that would each make it completely irrelevant if this were even true or not. 5:48 That's exactly what I wanted. What can be done? So let's pretend it's true for just 5:56 argument's sake and what can be done exactly. Okay, this is interesting because this is a blind list backwards. 6:02 I was going from the most likely thing to the most worst case scenario thing, but now you're saying 6:08 let's just say the worst has happened 6:10 and we'll go, so we'll go through my list backwards, which is the last thing on my list 6:15 one, two, three, four, 6:17 five 6:19 is 6:20 if we have efficient pool hopping, then nothing matters because as long as you have a way of holding the pool to account 6:27 it doesn't matter. You just have 6:30 25% pools 6:33 or even you could have two 50% pools 6:36 and they would hop and I can explain why you would never have a 51% 49% 6:41 pool if you're interested. I explained it long ago in 2016 6:45 but I can explain it again. 6:47 But that's number five on my list is that as long as you have a way of monitoring the pool 6:52 shoving the work of running any node onto the pool 6:55 and monitoring them for misbehavior and then switching 6:58 then nothing matters at all. So because just whatever the pool does, it doesn't matter what the pool is doing. 7:04 So that's number five. So I was curious what your take, what is your take on that? 7:09 Yeah, so this is basically an argument on that even if pools like grow 7:16 to a size that is probably uncomfortable to most Bitcoiners who do not 7:21 Even if they don't have fixed costs 7:24 Even that you are saying even that would work just fine. Yeah, if there were two 50% pools 7:31 but they each of them had to behave 7:34 perfectly 7:35 because if they made any mistake 7:37 someone would switch pools or they would start a new pool. You know what I mean? You have some kind of automatic pool replacement 7:44 thing, which is quite easy to do. The only reason there hasn't been any creativity 7:49 innovation 7:50 entrepreneurship in this direction is because the pools are all very well behaved. They're already on a very short leash 7:55 but even if they weren't 7:58 you could have something where 8:00 there's two 50% pools and if as soon as an error is made an error would be 8:06 censoring a transaction 8:08 or doing some kind of reorg or whatever anything bad 8:12 As soon as that mistake was made if there would be the death of that pool and there would be a new 8:18 second pool 8:20 Temporarily one pool would have maybe 100% the next pool would spin up and then quickly get the other 50% 8:26 You could have and I've explained this in the past one such way would be 8:31 You blacklist any pool that ever makes a mistake and then you switch pools randomly 8:36 And then if you ever find a situation where 100% of the hashrate is in one pool, everyone just flips a coin 8:42 They they fork the pool and if everyone ran the identical piece of software like some kind of like optimal pool 8:48 Which I sometimes in my head I call it stratum v3. It's like a kind of joke 8:53 But if everyone ran the exact same software 8:55 It could do this could do all the pooling for us and it could all be optimized 8:58 Of course in practice there are many pools for many different reasons 9:01 Sometimes brand sometimes hash, you know ant pool marathon 9:05 sometimes 9:06 There's different pools because of the different paper last and shares people have different preferences on that type of thing 9:13 Right, that's my first thought 9:15 so last time 9:17 we mentioned that 9:19 There is a an incentive for increasing the pools, which is a lower variance and then you said there is a disincentive 9:26 Uh for pools to go too big, but you were breaking up around that part and they did not really catch 9:32 Well, that's unfortunate there's something called that was originally called the block withholding attack 9:37 Unfortunately, that phrase has been used for several different things 9:40 and also unfortunately google 9:43 is terrible now, it used to be great, of course, but 9:47 Now it's awful 9:47 But you can find the original which I think is by it all or you can search and find on truthcoin 9:52 You can find the miner equilibrium analysis miner threat model and equilibrium analysis and I cite it there and not only do I cite it 9:59 But I replicated their findings in the microsoft excel 10:02 For anyone cares, but the big it's there's a way of attacking a pool profitably 10:08 Where you join the pool? 10:10 And then you don't you submit when you find a share you submit that but when you find a block you do not 10:16 Do that and this actually is a more effective attack 10:20 When your enemy has a higher hash rate and you can in fact attack every pool at once 10:26 And it is the most effective of all 10:28 and i'm not sure if there's some kind of second order effect that 10:31 prevents this from happening or if it's just the usual story of just 10:35 No one wanting to start a dispute that has no. Yeah, I mean 10:41 Try trying to fuck with the pool that pays you 10:44 And custody is the funds until you get paid is kind of like 10:49 an interesting choice 10:51 Yes, but it's not um 10:53 What you do is you behave honorably and then it just looks always like you have bad luck 10:58 Because you are finding shares so they can tell that you're really doing the hashing but then you never submit the block 11:05 and this what this does is it 11:08 It it does a combined thing is by first of all, you're leeching the enemy pool of cash because other people are still submitting 11:15 shares 11:16 and then you are also 11:20 Uh, you are lowering the difficulty by discarding you're lowering the work 11:25 The the proof of work of the network decreases in the whole amount of the work that is 11:33 Sorry, I just stepped on something my pen, um, it decreases the proof of work of the whole network 11:41 Um decreases 11:43 You're knocking out the entire 11:46 You're punching above your weight when you when you discard the block 11:50 So it looks as though the whole network difficulty decreases 11:54 Actually, I shouldn't really not even talk about it because I can't quite fully remember it all because it was a very long time 11:59 ago when I made this spreadsheet, but 12:01 Spreadsheet is still there is my point. Just gotta but that's a big one 12:07 It's also the case of course that no one wants to become too big of a pool because it's actually too ominous 12:16 It's too unstable to have 51 12:19 Because the other 49 will get nervous 12:22 They think we're powerless so the 49 will be very eager to cut a deal 12:27 with two percent out of the 51 12:29 And no one really wants all this 12:31 deal cutting 12:33 It's not in anyone's interest 12:35 It costs basically nothing for a 60 person miner to pretend. He is a 320 person miner 12:41 So as far as i'm aware, it doesn't cost him anything 12:45 And as you know perfectly well 12:46 There are also other economies of scale in that the the share rate and the fees have to be set 12:53 a certain way given the size 12:56 And also it's just annoying to have to interact with more people 13:00 So and the as you said 13:02 when I was on the train 13:04 correctly 13:05 the 13:06 Gain from joining a pool 13:09 has diminishing returns 13:11 Um, and so I think this is why we have different size pools, but of course we never really know 13:17 We just know the pool self-report. It's just there they volunteer this information 13:23 But that's my number five on my list where if that 13:29 Happened then nothing would matter 13:36 And 13:38 Do you think we can go through the list but um, yeah, let's go 13:44 Okay 13:45 okay, well i'm going to now switch to go back in the list like an order because when I wrote it down it is like 13:51 It has like a temporal 13:54 Order somewhat. So the first thing on the list is that the node costs 13:58 They won't be that large anyway 14:01 for a variety of reasons 14:03 One is as I constantly repeat 14:05 Regular end user of the sidechain has to be able to run a node and they're a zero percent hasher 14:11 basically 14:13 So this is kind of a natural ceiling on the cost of the node 14:17 but the second sub bullet point is 14:22 Um, you know these miners they're spending like unbelievable amounts of money like, you know millions and millions of dollars 14:29 they're buying 14:32 Asics by the 40-foot marine 14:34 container 14:35 And they put them on an 18 wheeler 14:38 You know, it's like the amounts we're talking here 14:41 Are utterly enormous and I calculated even a one gigabyte node, which is 14:47 blown way into fantasy land of what 14:51 I think would even be 14:54 Would even possibly be you know producing block space that anyone could even consume 15:01 I've already calculated that as like being like whatever like a two 15:04 Two thousand and change to set up and then like a couple like four hundred dollars ish a month 15:09 Which is like very very very liberal assumptions. These calculations are in my 15:14 blog posts called 15:16 Thunder the large box sidechain. There's an appendix 15:19 at the bottom and probably honestly the costs are even lower if you properly adjust for inflation because I wrote that before the 15:27 covid bite inflation or whatever, so 15:30 I think honestly it's even cheaper. So 15:33 Uh, so the idea that something that we're talking like amortized 15:37 like 15:39 Fewer than ten thousand dollars total over like three years 15:44 Ten thousand dollars over three years versus 15:47 What anyone of a mining operation of any plausible? I mean, I looked up like what an s19 s9 s29, whatever 15:55 You know those things are selling for like four or five six thousand dollars 15:58 Just to buy one without even plugging it in 16:01 So it's kind of like the node cost just can't be that large 16:04 Just right off the bat like at all 16:06 I agree. I agree. The node cost is probably 16:10 Like only a sidechain is only useful if the node cost is affordable to the users or a large enough set of the users 16:17 I believe I think people imagine that the searchers costs will be several several magnitudes higher 16:24 Yes 16:25 Uh, well, I agree but again this searcher thing is I think the point in dispute because it seems like there's some like big 16:31 huge miscommunication 16:34 Persistently happening. So that's probably the meat of it 16:37 but then I have some other points i'm not even sure they matter since you agreed to the one in five and either any 16:42 one of them would 16:44 kind of tank the whole thing, but 16:46 But two is that if the costs are large 16:49 The miners will shirk the costs somehow. So even if there is no bip three or one 16:54 They will just if the cost somehow became so big that they were significant 17:00 Which I already don't think happened 17:03 But they would just do some kind of partnership like all the miners would partner with one node 17:08 Now I have to stress 17:10 Lest I'd be misunderstood 17:12 That i'm fully aware that that would be a terrible situation if there's only one node 17:17 But the point is it's terrible for 17:19 The users of the sidechain it does not affect the users of L1 or users of any other sidechain it's um 17:27 It's really just a decision the user makes how much decentralization they want 17:34 They have um 17:36 That choice and there's plenty of things they could use 17:40 WeChat pay venmo or whatever 17:42 So the number two point is that the miners are going to shirk the cost because they don't it's not literally the case 17:48 That one node will run out if a certain number of hashes 17:52 You know what? I mean? It's not like once you do 10 million hashes 17:56 per second 17:57 You need a second node 17:58 That's not the case. So it is theoretically possible for one single node somewhere to service 100 18:05 of the miners 18:07 Which is a BIP301 thing 18:09 Even if it's not happening with BIP301, it's the same type of thing 18:13 So it'd be like an infura thing maybe like some kind of subscription 18:16 Or they'd have some kind of like handshake 18:18 Deal or whatever it is and it's sort of a thing. Yeah 18:22 I believe I believe shinobi specifically was ranting about this. He believes this would be a very bad thing for bitcoin and 18:31 The miners dependence on such a super node would be very bad for bitcoin. He argues that 18:38 It leads directly to my third point though, which is very related to the second point 18:42 Which is that something like liquid that shinobi supports or presumably supports 18:49 That is an example of the node cost being infinite 18:53 Because no matter how much I pay i'll never be able to actually 18:57 join the liquid 15, you know sat there and run the 19:01 so people seem to have some kind of problem with 19:04 They don't they obviously don't care if the node costs are zero 19:08 But then they seem to care if the node costs rise, but then at some point 19:12 It does a u-turn because before it gets to infinity people stop caring 19:16 but uh the node cost 19:18 I I just read your articles about this the node cost was in relation to knowing that you got paid 19:26 So to to run a liquid node that tells you that you got paid 19:31 the cost of that is is 19:33 Barely anything because there are only two transactions happening in a liquid node 19:38 Well, I gotta tell you that's a very astute of you but in this context, I think we're referring to something slightly different than 19:46 what you were referring to is 19:49 Because in a way you don't know if whether or not you can withdraw 19:53 What in this context I think what it means is it's a mining technology that allows you to collect the transaction fee 19:59 So in liquid all the fees are collected by swatching basically 20:03 And so even though people may observe 20:06 That their transactions have been validated in liquid 20:10 They don't the miners cannot use that information to collect a fee. So we have a slightly different meaning in this case 20:18 Yeah, not not all nodes are medical. Yeah 20:22 So in this case of being a miner fee generation technology shinobi has to equivocate he tries to have it both ways 20:31 and in one sense he says 20:33 It's it's very bad 20:35 if 20:36 You know, and once when he just gets to the t-shirt argument, he flips it around he says that's different because t-shirts require 20:43 factories and people 20:46 and then he flips it back around when it comes to the liquid argument where he says 20:51 that 20:52 it's good because for some reason I don't both of them are incoherent in my point of view, but 20:58 the liquid I think I think he may have said something like when 21:02 The 21:03 The miners don't get paid, right? 21:05 like last time we talked the the 21:07 Tommy or the disagreement seems to be on the sidechain technologies on whether the miners should get paid or not get paid the fees 21:14 and and that basically seems to be in some people's head like a dividing line between 21:21 the sidechain 21:23 Economic activity being able to influence or distort the mining incentives whatsoever for some reason 21:30 So they assume if the miners don't get paid if the sidechain validators or whatever keep all the fees and all the MEV and everything 21:37 Then it obviously will like not affect the the layer one miners. I'm not sure about that, but that's kind of the 21:44 idea 21:46 You should be able to be sure about it because it's just one is just equal to the sum of the others 21:51 for example 21:53 I could start up my own liquid 21:55 And it could be identical to blockstream where I control these keys and I collect all the fees 22:00 And then after starting up my own liquid I could say that i'm going to randomly donate some of the money to the miners 22:07 And then it just becomes the exact same thing 22:11 Well, I could give all the money to the miners every 10 minutes, you know what I mean 22:13 then it just becomes the exact same thing so what so that's my point number three is that 22:19 There's no parallel complaint about liquid or really even about any other 22:24 Thing that makes money that could partner with miners that they 22:28 It's like again, they have no problem if it's completely separated no problem if it happens 22:34 Like in liquid no problem with the current L1 fees where it's completely 22:39 tightly bound up 22:41 It's all mandatorily linked 22:44 And then they seem to have 22:47 Only a problem in like weird 22:50 middle regions 22:52 I think there is 22:53 I think there is one more aspect to this whole thing like 22:57 A lot of the critics that are worried about these weird 23:03 Perverse or adverse effects are actually very bullish on drivechains 23:08 So they think people would use them a lot more there would be a lot more economic activity on them 23:15 Uh 23:16 Then then the current alternatives that are possible now, so that's what I noticed that 23:22 That they think they think drivechains would be much more successful than what I would be, you know 23:29 betting on 23:30 basically 23:32 Yeah, or even I will even what I would say in like the short term because of course like with anything 23:37 the only way it will actually work is 23:40 At first it will be created then 23:42 A bunch of people are going to send like 20 25 23:46 into the sidechain and they'll kind of test it out to be like the 23:50 The early explorer type people and then it'll get like a little bit of a reputation 23:55 for working and then 23:58 people will continue to 24:00 Push the envelope as far as it can be pushed. So certainly it at first it will not have 24:06 I think they are afraid of of some 24:08 Some most misunderstanding creating like a gold rush like frenzy kind of what we saw with 24:17 I don't know what example to say 24:20 Like inscriptions, right? 24:22 So you you get this this, uh, it's frenzy this craziness a lot of uneducated people overestimating 24:29 Um the security assumptions or whatever and being really careless and creating these is weird 24:35 Situations, I think that's kind of the idea the underlying fear or I don't know how to say that 24:45 So you seem to mostly agreed with numbers one two three and five on my list 24:51 The fourth one is pretty lame though. It just basically says 24:55 It says well, it's sort of hard to say it basically what i'm getting at in this last one is 25:02 There's a difference between the u.s 25:04 Dollar value of the it's it should be purchasing power equality 25:09 So basically if bib 301 works, then it also doesn't matter but that's 25:13 That's uh, if the u.s dollar value 25:17 Of the of the block is equal more or less equal to what is paid on L1 then 25:25 You can separate 25:27 Division 25:29 Division of labor and then um 25:32 My no miner is paying miners are free riding off of the existing 25:37 sidechain full nodes miners never need 25:41 to run a sidechain node and they 25:44 free ride off of the other people who are running nodes and therefore they're never affected by 25:50 What whatever the sidechain is doing including mev including searchers including whatever 25:56 Yeah, that's the ideal outcome right so so that would be 26:06 Uh, right 26:07 so 26:09 Now we should get into this thing 26:11 That I have apparently struggled to convey. Did you have an opportunity to look at my little pictures with the smiley faces? 26:18 or no 26:20 If not, I could probably find them we could probably put them 26:23 in the nest 26:26 I know I I looked at them, but I could not find them again 26:30 um 26:32 Okay, i'll find them now what the hell is happening 26:45 Okay, i'm gonna try to get him I know they're in my highlights and they go to tidwell's answer find them 26:56 Um, it's not easy to find everything 27:02 Let's see 27:06 Can you hear me now by the way because my headset needs some things yeah, I think we can hear you just fine 27:12 I think I can hear you 27:18 Okay, so if you put something in the nest then I I can't see it again 27:26 Okay, i'm getting it I found him now 27:31 I just have to because I found it on my laptop and i'm on my phone 27:36 I have to move them away. Here we go. Copy link. So 27:44 From what I remember by the way, it was something like, uh, something like, uh, 27:52 An assumption that 27:55 That uh the layer 2 sidechain fees 27:59 That mev would be expressed on the layer 2 sidechain fees and that's why it doesn't matter 28:03 that's what I remember, but 28:05 We will see 28:07 That's not an assumption. Okay. Hang on. I apologize that this has taken so long, but I think I figured it out 28:14 Here we go. Paste reply 28:17 Okay, I replied with it 28:21 Send now 28:24 Okay, I got it and I also have uh, let me see if you go into this and you find the quote 28:30 and there's one where I 28:34 Let's see where this thing is. Yeah, I see 28:39 Okay 28:45 Find this here 28:46 I'm trying to find i'm also going to post the one the the thread that has all the ones about mbv 28:52 All eight all three, I think sorry, there's four links actually 28:56 But while you glance at those 29:00 I will 29:01 Find this thing. Where is it? 29:08 Okay, here we go 29:16 Okay, almost 29:18 Okay 29:20 Okay 29:22 All right. Now i'm posting this other link that is like the 29:26 breaking off point 29:28 Where has all the mev links also 29:32 Um 29:36 That's a refresh 29:39 It's weird that it doesn't 29:41 It's weird if I listen live or make an infinite loop. I don't want to do that 29:45 I don't want any infinite loops around here. Okay, i'm going to reply to the post with this 29:53 Hopefully this will 29:55 work 29:56 All right. So these are for number eight. So hopefully you can see that now possibly but the key thing is these little images here 30:05 so I don't know if this is making any sense or not, but 30:07 The person the point i'm trying to say is the bmm searcher 30:12 They are the person who will bid up 30:14 on L1 30:16 There's nothing to do with what the L1 miner wants so they won't be affected 30:25 Yeah, uh and uh 30:32 So you see it's all completely something that happens in the sidechain world inside that little 30:38 uh 30:40 You know inside the little box the layer two rounded corners box 30:50 All right, so so in in the case right in in the ideal case where uh 30:56 where you have uh searchers that are not vertically integrated and have competition between each other 31:04 and uh, they are actually like, uh bidding in the map 31:09 It doesn't quite matter if they have to be competition because remember in the liquid case 31:14 There's just a monopolist to collect all the fees. Yeah 31:17 yeah, yeah, but what i'm trying to get at uh, I think the idea is that 31:23 if the searchers do not have 31:25 competition if there is a monopoly there then that monopoly will retain like every surplus value and 31:33 And only try to pay for like 31:35 You could bid the whole thing that's true 31:39 so they won't won't be the whole thing and and uh, and that incentivizes 31:44 Uh, maybe the better capitalized miners to actually go after it themselves. Oh, but that's 31:51 That's true. And it's very clever, but that contradicts the whole monopoly thing. So it's it's either a monopoly or it's not 31:57 right, right, right, so 31:59 It's a very dynamic game so these things like like shift and bounce off of each other these 32:06 assumptions or I don't know what to call them these these these states, uh of these networks because 32:12 immediately that the the 32:14 the miners get the sense that they are 32:17 they are 32:19 being uh withheld from 32:21 then 32:22 They they will become curious 32:25 Uh to to create an alternative or a competition to the search I believe 32:32 Well, okay, but um 32:34 in fact, they can completely screw that searcher over because uh 32:39 like we discussed the they kind of have the power to they kind of have the power to 32:45 to 32:46 You know reorder the sidechain box and take away the sidechain rewards and and include their own, uh hashes 32:52 And uh, whatever but I don't want to like rush ahead with all this, um, right because that's a separate thing 32:59 I think there's a different misconception. Yeah 33:01 Yeah, because my view on that even though we'll get to it is that 33:05 That is what I was talking about about the u.s. Dollar value is the same even if the coin amount is different 33:12 so like if there's if there's this is a chain where there's 50 of the blocks are 33:17 orphaned 33:18 The equilibrium bid value will fall 33:21 Like half but it'll be the same u.s. Dollar it'll be a fall for everyone since no one knows if they're going to be reorg 33:27 Main or side and so then it's the same u.s. Dollar value in the bid. That's 301. So that was 33:32 But that's a very complex point so we could get to that later 33:36 But you see in order to get to your point you have to you have to believe a lot of weird things 33:40 So first of all, yeah 33:41 The four or five things that you already said you agreed 33:44 We jettison those and then you have to have a monopoly. You have to have like a half monopoly 33:49 And then you also have to discard the fact that like right now the miners aren't collecting any of these fees 33:54 So that you might think the mev person is getting all the fees 33:58 But in our today world with no BIP300 301 at all or even in the hypothetical future 34:06 Arc world or whatever spider chain world 34:09 They're not getting any of the fees 34:11 so 34:12 There's no like parallel belief. You know what I mean? 34:14 Even if it's all custodial lightning 34:16 Like there's no parallel belief that says oh the miners feel cut out 34:20 So now they have an incentive to like become a custodial lightning node and take all the money 34:25 You know what? I mean? No one makes a parallel argument at all 34:29 They just kind of only trot it out for this bizarrely specific 34:32 Set of circumstances so they either think 34:38 I just wanted to say I was very frustrated with this four weeks because 34:43 I just couldn't get a clear picture of like the motivations and 34:48 and the 34:50 incentives and the actions of of how 34:53 some people imagine this to like 34:57 Like almost certainly lead to full vertical integration and larger pool dominance. So 35:04 I 35:05 I really struggled with this and I told a lot 35:08 with people in 35:10 dms and 35:12 And try to try to get like like like a sense of how this could possibly happen how this makes sense whatsoever 35:20 and 35:20 That's why I said that I I finally 35:23 Thought I I had something like like there was a plausible 35:29 uh 35:30 Scenario, uh painted that I could say. All right. All right. Let's see then what paul says about that 35:39 Well, sure and 35:41 But we I have to like if i'm really being a hundred percent honest with the audience 35:49 I know that all this is not none of this is really real. This is like 35:53 People critics of drivechain 35:56 They've moved the goalposts so many times already and now they're just searching for any possible thing that they could say 36:04 something and in shinobi's case, it doesn't even matter if the 36:08 If the costs are very large like 36:12 And when they're infinite with liquid or if they're small 36:16 With cheap drivechain or if they're they involve t-shirts 36:21 It just doesn't matter just try to come up with something to say 36:24 And that is the true 36:27 Explanation of why these complaints appear it is not because people are worried about 36:31 I don't think don't think he's trying to hide this. So he really really dislikes bandwidth mining 36:37 uh, and and he 36:40 He thinks that the the hash rate escrow actually makes it somehow worse 36:45 So somehow it would be more popular and powerful if it was combined with hash rate escrow. That's what he believes 36:54 You know so well that he otherwise he runs straight into the 36:59 the 37:00 the death now for his argument, which is that already 37:03 We do merge mining with namecoin and it's totally unpreventable and it was invented by satoshi and we've been doing it for 10 years 37:10 And we still do it every day. So 37:12 He knows that he has to come up with he can't just say merge mining is bad. He has to say 37:18 By me improving it i'm making it bad 37:22 He is trying to find uh 37:25 points of attack on it, but I 37:27 Don't think that's a huge problem for bitcoin and uh, it may be very inconvenient for you, but 37:34 Actually might on the long run actually like help. I don't know 37:38 well, of course, I mean like in one sense, this is a healthy peer review, but in another sense, it's not because 37:45 We should 37:46 Search whenever we have a theory we should try to find all the reasons. It might be false 37:52 But we should also find out search for all the reasons it might be true because those two things are actually the same thing 37:58 there's no way of 38:00 You know what? I mean? Like it either has purchased on the truth or falsehood or it's irrelevant. So yes, it's kind of 38:06 obviously 38:08 you know, I mean you could go down the list and you could say 38:11 well bitcoin 38:13 sure, it works, but 38:15 you could like I had an example about like, um 38:18 If the two different times like you could divide all the land in 38:24 You could divide all the land in a country up into the boroughs 38:27 But what are you going to do about the line between the two boroughs and you could say, okay 38:31 We'll put the boroughs on rivers and then you say well, what if what about when a boat? 38:37 crosses the line and 38:39 You could just keep like, you know splitting hairs and find it like focusing on 38:43 Extremely irrelevant things when it's really just does this theory 38:47 Do the work that we wanted to do but now let's turn to the uh, the case of the reorg whether or not the 38:56 Whether or not the legitimate hashers like the shot 256d people 39:02 If they have a huge advantage over the lbmm people and if that even matters at all 39:09 because I think that they don't I think 39:12 all that matters is 39:15 So before we get into that, um, can we play that little game that I I was uh, 39:23 Okay, sure 39:25 so so if we if if you take it like, uh, they're button and um, 39:30 And assume that when we somehow should try to solve this issue of um, 39:37 atomicity 39:39 um 39:41 Do you think there could be done something about that and um 39:46 More specifically I I see kind of like two possibilities for this immediately 39:52 one is 39:53 very simple and actually it would be like a sidechain consensus thing which says 39:59 Instead of you know being freely reorgable 40:03 You are saying that only only 40:06 Only bad 40:08 Invalid blocks can be reorg. Otherwise, they have to be reorg on L1 40:12 But of course this this is a fatal flaw that that you already mentioned 40:17 And I don't really know what to do with the block withholding attack 40:21 So yes 40:24 Block withholding is is would kill that idea 40:29 Right, you just put on the block 40:31 Yeah 40:33 Yeah, because if it's obviously like trolling if it's obviously a bad hash or it's a bad block 40:38 Then the sidechain nodes can safely ignore it and you don't have this whole weak, uh subjectivity problem 40:45 But the moment they can't tell if that hash so you would have to prove a negative basically and that's impossible 40:51 It's sort of the attacker just lands two blocks 40:54 One is valid one is invalid and it just withholds them both and you don't know which is which and you can't 41:01 build on either and 41:03 They just they just wait 41:06 It's really sad because it would actually maximize the value of the sidechain for the for the users because the value is in 41:14 in in large part in blockchains is in the 41:17 the immutability 41:19 immutability and uh, and uh the finality, uh of of these uh things and uh, if you 41:27 Know 41:28 Actually, which you can say do a counterparty did and say each basically each transaction is its own 41:35 It's like its own block or something like that 41:38 where 41:40 Then they're all in L1, but then you get no extra block space so that also kind of ruins it 41:48 Yeah, so so like I said, I I really like that first one but somehow would need to find 41:55 And probably has no clean and easy solution, uh to to try to deal with the block withholding attack because 42:02 Someone would actually need to so one way to deal with it 42:05 If it happens infrequently, then of course the sidechain could uh, like soft fork 42:12 uh that uh block is invalid, but 42:15 This is a huge problem and a very bad ux and if it happens frequently because someone is trolling with it 42:20 Then it will ruin everyone's day. So that's it. And the other way to do it would be to 42:26 uh 42:27 try to pay the miners on the sidechain and I 42:31 Faintly remember that shirobi suggested something like this that an spv proof would be presented to the miners that they got paid on the sidechain 42:39 or maybe some weird scheme where 42:41 the side 42:44 This is what he didn't understand is the u.s dollar value equality versus the coin 42:50 He was saying something like make it be required on L1 42:54 to show 42:56 The and this idea has lots of problems 42:58 But he's saying show the whole merkle path into L2 into the L2 coinbase on L1 43:06 So that you can prove that you're not being screwed over 43:10 but this idea has like a 10 000 disadvantages one is every L2 must be organized in the way that 43:17 Uh that L1 can understand which is already 43:21 Horrible, but the other thing is it doesn't account for any of the mev 43:24 Of course the uh the stuff that is about other value 43:29 In the sidechain block that's unrelated to payouts in the coinbase 43:32 So this is also terrible 43:34 but the most important reason of all is that he doesn't take they must float in fact because 43:40 A sidechain newly minted sidechain coins are not equal 43:44 They have their own block maturity and then they have to be withdrawn so they're not equal in value 43:50 To like just because the sidechain's coinbase has 109 btc 43:54 That does not mean that 43:56 You should pay 43:57 109 it may be much less 44:00 Objectively much less for everyone. So it has to float. It has to be like an auction system 44:05 And it has to be the little delta there 44:09 I have no one knows exactly what it is even 44:12 so 44:13 So I I think that just shows 44:16 That he didn't understand it 44:17 Because he was going further in the wrong direction 44:20 He's saying like we must prove but the true value of the sidechain block could be in excess of like 109 44:26 coins because there could have been 44:28 Theoretically, there could be any amount of mbv 3 000 coins worth of mbv 44:32 Yeah, so then it should really be 3 109 paid on L1 or 3 108 44:38 But that just shows you 44:41 This would only work if the mbv comes from like some layer 3 and it 44:45 Expressed as fees on layer 2 and then it could possibly work, but you are right 44:50 I did I think it's interesting to look at these starter exercises like a little side note that 44:57 All right, blind match mining has these these properties 45:02 The the user experience wise like the the finality 45:07 That that results in this that that they reorg rather easily they are basically secured by 45:14 the the 45:15 the fees paid on the on the 45:19 Yeah, and and uh, and uh on the miner side the blind merge mining side you have this property that 45:25 It seems to me that you just can't make 45:28 The the L1 bit and the add to payout atomic like it's not it doesn't seem 45:34 You see 45:35 the competition 45:38 Is the best way of 45:39 Of dealing with that because it automatically takes into account every single difference 45:44 You know what? I mean? It takes into account the inconvenience 45:47 Avoiding the L2 maturity period and then the withdrawal period 45:51 So it discounts the fees, but it would also automatically take it into account the mbv. So it's just automatically 45:59 Resetting everything and the miners benefit because just like with any competition 46:04 Not everyone is exactly an equal human being they may be equal, you know peers on the peer-to-peer network 46:11 But the individual people are different. So some are more confident 46:15 Or more patient they're more confident and be able to do the L2 to L1 withdrawal 46:20 They're more patient 46:22 For whatever reason because of their own circumstance 46:25 Uh, or they are better at getting mev those people will naturally bid the most 46:30 Though those people who are already running a sidechain node, maybe for some other reason 46:34 Maybe they have a website where they have a block explorer 46:37 They sell ads there. So they already have a node. They already do merchant whatever whatever it is 46:42 They already have the node. So to them the marginal cost of 46:46 The node is free 46:48 And they may be so they so the miners on L1 they'll automatically be getting the best the two best bids 46:54 In the whole world of which only take one 46:57 And this is a far superior 47:00 method of 47:01 aligning the incentives between the two 47:04 parties 47:05 this simple act of competition is does far more than any convoluted thing where you spv prove the 47:12 the actual number in the coinbase 47:14 You what you are saying is basically that you believe the market would price it 47:20 adequately 47:22 Like find find a way to price it again. It's not no market the dynamics are anyone 47:28 It's a simple auction, you know, everyone bids 47:32 The only one bid will win the miners will pick the highest bid 47:37 And those are very, you know, those are very straightforward ingredients, I think 47:42 You know what I mean so like what else could happen 47:45 Yeah, I I understand. Uh 47:47 What you are trying to say? I I think 47:50 I think it's not 47:53 It's not going through 47:55 I'm, pretty sure it's not going through 47:57 The the way you are saying it. I think a lot of people don't understand why 48:03 why this is necessarily happening and 48:08 And why wouldn't the miners try to play selfish games because for example, um, when you have 48:16 so let's say 48:18 Finding the the best mev is like 48:22 Really a high specialization high capital investment game. Let's say this is the assumption 48:29 So it's not sure it's even worth talking about if if close to the maximum fees can be extracted by simply running the sidechain 48:36 No, i'm not sure. It's the whole thing is worth discussing because 48:41 in that world 48:44 I'm pretty sure that that 48:47 These others 48:50 Imagined outcomes just just won't happen but 48:54 uh, if if you if you think that 48:57 Someone can indeed by just doing this whole thing best and putting a lot of money into it 49:03 and that can include like subsidizing it, so 49:06 if 49:08 people like 49:09 keep 49:10 Keep bidding and then keep getting reward and not getting rewards and then this in this game 49:17 It's entirely possible that someone better capitalized for a short period of time taking huge losses 49:23 They can win like a five-year period when they are the undisputed king of the hill and that's kind of another 49:29 Approach to this whole thing that the people might not just be interested in in their profit 49:35 Profitability for like the next block, but they might actually want to secure like a long period of very high profitability 49:43 For taking a temporary loss that that's also I believe part of the the field people are just very bad at uh, like 49:51 Describing this whole thing clearly, I think 49:57 Right, but would you fair to say is it fair for me to say that 50:01 I mean you believe me when I say that 50:04 They're 50:07 I mean like what do you think of 50:09 The situation now having listened to what I have to say 50:14 I 50:15 I honestly 50:16 Uh, like don't know for the reason that I don't know enough about what is going on at realm 50:24 like how 50:25 How copter intensive is finding mev there? What is the state of the competition and centralization there? 50:33 And and with the searchers and and stuff like that 50:37 I I don't understand that whole world and um that that kind of gets in the way of of trying to 50:44 Imagine this how it could play out in in the drivechain context 50:49 because uh 50:51 people are 50:53 Seem very 50:54 Very, you know set in their ways and and their base assumptions and that's another thing about drivechains 51:00 So people coming at it from 51:03 Assumptions basically on how people will behave 51:07 uh in the future 51:08 Uh or in general will come to entirely different conclusion if they look at the same rule set. That's another thing 51:16 um 51:17 So I I don't find what you are saying implausible, but I don't find what they are saying implausible either totally 51:26 Uh, well sure, but I mean didn't you just agree with me about 51:30 All five of those five 51:34 Things any of which would have made it 51:38 A moot point what the mev was 51:50 Uh 51:54 No, because I again lost my headset 51:57 So 51:59 Um, yes, I guess you would say maybe the first one 52:03 The node costs won't be large 52:05 Maybe the searcher cost will be large 52:08 Yeah, yeah 52:09 so so I I don't think the the the net net net node cost in that sense that 52:15 The node that everyone can run the node software 52:18 I don't think that will be expensive and I don't think that will be prohibitive in any way 52:22 I think a sidechain that is too expensive node is kind of a failure and kind of pointless, but that's my personal opinion 52:31 All right might as well 52:33 But I don't know how high the cost for math searchers can get because that entirely depends on what 52:39 Insane casinos people build on these sidechains 52:42 maybe alex can uh, if he is up for it, maybe he can 52:46 Uh tell us about what he sees because he's is much more 52:50 Worse than the ethersphere than than I am. I i'm generally not interested in defy and and stuff like this 52:57 and yeah, but did you not look at my 53:00 the uh 53:01 The pictures I sent about the searcher is the person who would bid and so then you have their weird 53:06 You have to have your weird quasi monopoly 53:10 scenario 53:11 You just need to you need there to be you see why wouldn't there be two searchers because the searchers are making money in 53:16 return for doing nothing 53:18 You know what? I mean? 53:19 If they keep a premium then that means someone else could do what they do 53:24 And charge less of a premium 53:27 They make a bid that is slightly higher. Yeah, so 53:30 Since anyone can bid in three or one there really can't be a monopoly 53:34 If one searcher has like a hundred million dollar and another searcher has like a five billion dollar to secure the next 53:41 and years of dominance 53:44 then 53:45 I think the assumption is that the one with the five million dollars will 53:50 uh will win he will be able to outbid the other and the other will 53:54 Be disgusted with no returns on his activity and capital investments and and and just give up and leave 54:02 That's kind of the assumption 54:04 and also the assumption 54:05 Anything that one searcher does another searcher could do and if it's if one of them 54:10 Requires 100 million dollars worth of capital then they pay opportunity costs equal to that 54:16 capital investment 54:18 and so if they 54:19 that's just as likely to be a disadvantage as it is to be an advantage if you didn't spend 100 million dollars on 54:26 Bitcoin or on whatever iBonds, but instead you spent it on this 54:31 Yeah, so basically the the better capitalized searcher can just spend 200 million dollars on 54:38 on 54:39 crowding the other one out of the market and the other assumption regarding this is 54:44 that if someone 54:45 uh 54:46 or like a either a miner that pretends to be like multiple pools because we established that you don't actually know how many uh, 54:54 how many pools are 54:55 but what portion of the hash rate is controlled by one person or 54:58 Or what pools are controlled by one person or one coalition or one cartel or whatever you want to say 55:04 so if a significant chunk of the hash rate actually 55:09 like tries to actively make 55:13 External searchers unprofitable then they have pretty good equipment 55:18 They are well positioned to do that as well. And again, this might absolutely not make sense 55:23 So I I can 55:31 This is like 55:33 This could be fun to talk about of course, but it's you know, yeah, I think 55:37 So it does does not yeah, I think I can add 55:41 Just quickly, um, but I don't know if it's that relevant. Uh, I think that there's some game theoretical for the 55:48 searchers where they can grief any other searcher and uh 55:53 Like if somebody's uh attempting to do mev they can say hey listen 55:57 You either join us or we will make sure you're we will 56:01 Outbid your mev and just give that money over to you know, the validators instead of us 56:05 This way everybody's forced to join one coalition of of mev. I think that something like that goes on on ethereum 56:13 I don't remember 56:14 Even that though is I think that that's plausible because I think first of all that's because of ethereum has a bad design 56:19 where you have to pay fees even for things that 56:23 Don't go through and I I don't see that 56:26 Having a future just because it's a terrible idea. This is for the user. So I think people will 56:31 eventually replicate the 56:34 Ethereum ideas that are good on their own sidechains that just don't have any gas fee 56:40 At all, but that's a complete separate point 56:42 Interestingly, even if that is the case that it's winner take all 56:46 It still doesn't necessarily mean that there's no competition. It just makes it more unstable 56:53 Because let's say you're the winner and you extract a huge premium 56:56 And you expect the premium every 12 seconds or whatever it is every day 57:02 Uh, so you're getting a lot of money this is like a magic money tree for you of like eight 57:07 Million dollars a day or whatever. I don't know. I'm just making it up 57:11 The thing is that you know 57:13 The laws of economics can still accommodate competition in that scenario because someone just they just need to go to a bank and say listen 57:20 I'll give you this this these people are making eight million 57:24 We can crowd them out and take all the eight million for ourselves 57:29 Will be the new number one and i'll give you the bank 57:33 Six million dollars a day and I only want two million dollars a day 57:37 And the bank says, oh, okay. Sure take all the money you need. Well, I think and then 57:41 It's not like i'm doing is they're making sure that nobody will profit unless they join them 57:47 And at their own detriment 57:48 So it's like if there's a hundred dollars to be made on mev and somebody else tries to compete 57:53 They will make sure that 99 of that or full the full hundred will instead go to validators 57:59 Unless people join that their pool and do math to be them and then they'll share the profits. So so it's like 58:05 Yeah, but that's not the point though 58:09 Yeah, that's well, yeah during the period in which the two compete 58:13 Maybe they're maybe neither of them get it 58:15 But that's the point is the point is you just have to outlast the other person 58:18 You see what I mean? It's just kind of an assumption that just says someone will be number one 58:22 So the point that's the point where you go to the bank you say listen we can outlast them you just give us 58:28 You don't you go to whatever goldman sachs and you tell them you guys don't have any good ideas around here 58:33 For investments, but i've got one for you calculate the interest rate 58:37 And then you go to them and you say this is the plan 58:40 And then they say okay, we'll fund it and then you're the number one guy so 58:45 there's no like 58:47 I that's true that this is like what you might call friction, but it's not you know, and I think even it's just 58:53 This is only because of uh 58:57 Badly designed ethereum 58:59 Stuff that this scenario even rises and right now that miners are not getting any of this transaction fee because BIP300 is itself censored 59:07 Yeah, so you're very correct 59:09 Very correctly said that the the game there when there is there is a competition and with 59:15 With such a reward that you might actually be the dominant searcher for the next four or five years 59:22 Possibly that's your goal that that is huge amount of money 59:25 You will be able to take short-term losses if you are well capitalized 59:30 If if you have a business plan for this or we have the funding for this and then 59:34 We have the funding for this and again, there is a part of the argument 59:39 I think it ties back to that that if someone controls a very significant chunk of the hash shape then 59:45 They have more control over the outcome and then they might be able to take 59:51 Short-term losses better on or smaller short-term losses for for trying to achieve this long-term dominance. I just wanted this to 59:58 to explain 1:00:01 How it could possibly 1:00:03 Get into that situation whatsoever that we are talking about like full vertical integration and 1:00:10 and and the large 1:00:13 Poor dominance 1:00:15 I'm trying my best to to argue for that a little bit or or make it plausible so that we can discuss it 1:00:22 You 1:00:26 Yeah, but basically at this point what it has assumed is it has saying assume that we 1:00:32 write something 1:00:34 Into existence that has this exact property that it rewards 1:00:41 the 1:00:42 larger hashers 1:00:45 That's kind of like well, okay 1:00:49 In that scenario then I guess it would 1:00:52 um, but 1:00:55 Then we are we are we are at the point I guess where you tell us why that is wrong 1:01:02 Uh, well, yeah, I don't think that that is 1:01:09 The 1:01:12 At this point it's sort of getting a little too 1:01:16 Um 1:01:19 Like we have gone like down this road of like 1:01:22 No one cares about scalability privacy 1:01:26 No one cares about smart contracts. They have a use 1:01:29 We're like this is like the thing. This is like the point where we say we divide the country into 1:01:34 Into zones and then what do we do with the you know, this is like extreme 1:01:41 Hunting down to like some some tiny detail that is cannot possibly have any relevance 1:01:49 Because just because if if someone has an 1:01:53 Advantage, this is the same thing as before is if you have an advantage because your hash rate is large 1:01:58 Then it could just this ends up being the two pools of 50 1:02:03 Scenario that already doesn't make any difference because of the pool hopping 1:02:07 Yeah, so the problem with this the problem with this all is 1:02:12 I don't think 1:02:14 Think 1:02:16 If you if you try to sell that 1:02:19 I don't think uh 1:02:21 People will be very receptive. So I I think the general I know I agree that that's that's horrible 1:02:29 Yeah, but that's also because 1:02:31 people believe a lot of false things right now and I don't know it's just like 1:02:35 I don't think that they because what they think is 1:02:39 It's it's very ironic that the people who worry about large pools are the same people who would say 1:02:46 in 2017 1:02:47 we proved to the world that 1:02:50 you know, like miners are 1:02:53 Uh 1:02:55 Subordinate to nodes or whatever 1:02:57 so 1:03:02 Right, so ironically they'd be sort of wrong both times 1:03:06 negatively like diagonally because 1:03:08 The reason that it doesn't matter if all the hash rate is in 1:03:11 two pools 1:03:13 is because the the only thing the pool can do is censor transaction or do some kind of reorg or some other 1:03:20 kind of mischief 1:03:22 and 1:03:23 That is exactly what won't happen if there is vigilance on the pools. So that's why the quantity of pools has never mattered 1:03:31 But but again, this is because this is the searching for your car keys under the lamp light or whatever issue where 1:03:39 The data on pools is available 1:03:42 The hash rate is estimable 1:03:45 So people can make a pie chart 1:03:47 so they just decided to make a pie chart and everyone is in their head everyone is thinking about like 1:03:52 A corporation, uh boardroom or like a succession or something 1:03:56 they're thinking that 1:03:59 You know once it's 51 percent or 50 percent then we're all doomed and so 1:04:06 unfortunately, even though these people know the talking points about 1:04:10 Miners not really having a lot of power 1:04:12 they 1:04:14 Don't really understand the talking points. So that's too bad 1:04:17 but I agree with you that it wouldn't be a persuasive if I said that type of thing, but 1:04:22 yeah, i'm not sure I mentioned because I wanted to say like two things at the beginning and 1:04:28 I think I only I said the the second one the first one just occurred to me is 1:04:34 Basically the way I came to look at the drivechain 1:04:38 situation 1:04:40 and all the restringing and worrying and 1:04:44 Debating if this is the best thing we could do or whatever 1:04:48 So I came to the conclusion that if it can't be demonstrated 1:04:53 That 1:04:54 It will harm 1:04:56 Or make the outcome worse for those people who do not explicitly opt in 1:05:01 Then I believe there is no moral ground for opposing it 1:05:04 That's kind of the conclusion I came to 1:05:07 And that is why I kind of focus on these things, you know, I try to to work. Uh around these these uh, 1:05:15 Yeah, I know but haven't I beaten you down yet? I mean we didn't we haven't we just exhausted it all now you can now fully 1:05:22 Sit back in your chair and you can sign off on this 1:05:25 Thumbs off. I am I am 1:05:28 I am satisfied with how this turned out. I will listen back make notes think about it 1:05:33 We can talk about something guys if you want 1:05:36 Okay, great 1:05:38 Okay, great flavor has his hand up at this exact time. So 1:05:43 Um, hey paul. I was just wondering if you could uh, 1:05:47 Speak a little bit to the article that came out yesterday in bitcoin magazine. Um, oh my gosh 1:05:53 I thought it was so bad. What was that? This is like some kind of i'm being drugged or something. Is this candid camera? 1:05:59 I just don't get it at all. It seemed like it really 1:06:03 um 1:06:04 Uh, well, you know, the whole thing is based on miners the those three authors 1:06:11 They I don't think they understand 1:06:14 What BIP300 asks miners to do 1:06:18 which is 1:06:20 Like I think that they think that they are supposed to be getting involved like this vote word. I think is unfortunate now 1:06:27 Because when I wrote BIP300 reddit was very big and I was just thinking upvote downvote 1:06:33 That's kind of what it really was, um, but instead I think 1:06:37 The idea of like miners voting on the fate of each sidechain is like they'll be petitioned people will 1:06:43 people will go to them and say 1:06:46 Vote for my withdrawal, please. Here's why 1:06:49 Then someone will say no vote for my withdrawal 1:06:51 That's not what happens at all in the slightest the software automatically computes 1:06:57 The single withdrawal for every single person 1:07:00 It's the same hash for everyone in the sidechain 1:07:04 in each three month 1:07:06 Epoch, and this is what actually does make me think we really should we have testnet software now, but we should probably have 1:07:13 we should probably activate BIP300 on some chain because 1:07:19 If we had it working in the wild people would at least know, you know, they would at least see 1:07:24 The basics of how it works, you know, and it's just not the same if people read the bib text 1:07:28 I think they just don't get it 1:07:30 But I don't know. This is a rambling answer. But yeah 1:07:33 I'm wondering like if you were to play the devil's advocate for for the argument about regulatory 1:07:40 pressure 1:07:42 imagine a hypothetical scenario where 1:07:45 one of these people is running a drivechain and 1:07:48 They're experiencing some kind of regulatory pressure. What what does that look like for them? And I think that 1:07:54 This question is misconceived 1:07:56 So this is the type of thing that makes me wish we had bitcoin uncensored back because they would have just laughed 1:08:01 I I this this type of thing came up 1:08:04 where someone said 1:08:05 Oh, they'll only do 1:08:08 With like white listed UTXOs they read the news and then they both just laughed and they said they'd have no idea what mining is 1:08:15 for 1:08:15 and then they practically just moved on to the next topic because 1:08:19 People in that era were very well educated on bitcoin. And so they knew better 1:08:24 which is 1:08:25 If bitcoin has to compete bitcoin, there's just a cold this does not has nothing to do with what anyone wants or prefers 1:08:31 about the law or about justice or about 1:08:35 Morality or power or whatever if bitcoin does not have 1:08:39 A a private angle a politically subversive 1:08:43 edge 1:08:45 It will go to zero and that's absolutely true 1:08:50 Um, and the reason why is if it fully competes 1:08:55 In on being compliant 1:08:58 It will lose to venmo wechat pay etc 1:09:01 Also the tech will lose the tech is also not as good 1:09:05 the tech 1:09:06 Because the tech used by wechat pay or whatever is just going to be some mysql database or something 1:09:12 and the blockchain technology is much more 1:09:16 It's much more awkward and it only works because it is existing in an environment 1:09:21 Where the entire engineering design for bitcoin is that it will have its own independent existence 1:09:27 Will have its own independent existence and that's why it won't go the way that liberty reserve went where there's one server 1:09:33 And it was also just shut off. So that's the entire story of bitcoin 1:09:37 is that 1:09:39 the 1:09:40 it will have achieved censorship resistance by 1:09:44 Shirking or even uh 1:09:47 denying 1:09:48 regulatory 1:09:50 Influence 1:09:51 so the regulatory influence is basically just those people are asking them to censor and 1:09:56 They either 1:09:57 conform 1:09:58 and they lose out on money and someone else gets the transaction fees or they 1:10:03 defy 1:10:04 but the argument that 1:10:06 Bitcoin must be compliant is just you know 1:10:10 It's kind of a dirty 1:10:12 trick because most people 1:10:14 refuse to be 1:10:17 Totally honest about about this because it sounds so shady 1:10:21 And so it's actually it's just a horrible thing. It's a very unbitcoin thing 1:10:25 It's basically the equivalent of you know, craig s writes suing people 1:10:29 because it forces people to kind of talk a little bit more openly about 1:10:32 Things that that most people are too cowardly to speak openly about or they want to be more evasive about 1:10:38 But just the logic of bitcoin is just that it's something that works in the darknet market use cases and all the lightnet 1:10:44 market use cases and that's why it will eventually take over via network effect 1:10:50 And that's the 1:10:52 That's the whole 1:10:53 premise of bitcoin 1:10:54 So the whole premise of bitcoin is that it will hit the darknet markets and that that is the edge it has over 1:10:59 WeChat pay or cbdc 1:11:02 And so the fact that that person doesn't know that and the fact that they highlighted in an article and the fact they critique me 1:11:08 In completely the wrong way. I mean this used to be the thing that would just get you laughed out of a bitcoin conversation 1:11:14 so 1:11:15 I think it 1:11:17 It should not be 1:11:19 Steel-manned at all. It should not be 1:11:21 Set aside lightly. It should be 1:11:24 thrust aside with 1:11:26 extreme force 1:11:28 It's a terrible thing to even bring up and it's uh, it's it just speaks to the person's total inability to comprehend bitcoin 1:11:36 And so you're saying not only would drivechains drivechains wouldn't 1:11:41 Increase attack vectors or create more regulatory pressure any more than there would be 1:11:46 Already and that if they did even if they did 1:11:50 You really wouldn't have an option but to try 1:11:54 in fact because 1:11:56 It's possible that something like the zcash sidechain might 1:11:59 um, but that would be a good thing in fact, this would be what would decentralize mining so to speak because 1:12:05 Uh some any miner with like a mailing address is like registered. They would not want to touch the fees 1:12:12 Excuse me, they would not want to touch the fees 1:12:15 From this thing and as a result, it would it would be the anti 1:12:19 Like registration effect would be the zcash sidechain and its economic activity. That's possible. I mean, sorry. I have to sneeze again 1:12:29 Ah my gosh, excuse me 1:12:31 anyway, um 1:12:33 so it's possible that 1:12:36 It wouldn't be drivechain itself. It would be you know, the fact that creativity had been unleashed and people could do subversive things 1:12:44 It's really zcash itself. That is the truly 1:12:47 Innovative and subversive 1:12:49 Direction that this would take 1:12:50 Is the zk-snark privacy technology? 1:12:54 Now that if if that happened, that would be a good thing 1:12:57 that guy talking about you know, if your senator is on the phone or something like 1:13:01 If the senator is on the phone with anyone influential in bitcoin 1:13:06 then 1:13:08 The coin, you know, it doesn't have a future 1:13:11 And again, this is not it has nothing to do with what anyone prefers this is a simple calculation 1:13:17 of 1:13:18 comparative advantage among the different 1:13:21 coins and payment networks because 1:13:24 If you think the network effect is all that matters 1:13:27 then 1:13:29 The us dollar is going to win easily. It's going to crush everything in its path 1:13:33 And bitcoin will lose 1:13:35 And if you think that only features matter then we'll have an altcoin universe because 1:13:40 people keep inventing new features 1:13:43 And we'll have multi-coin pluralism 1:13:46 Um, but that's not true network effects do matter so there's some mix 1:13:52 and in bitcoin's case the the edge that it has is in the 1:13:56 Privacy darknet market smart contracts, you know by smart contract. I mean something that the senator calls and the senator can't get 1:14:06 You know rewritten or whatever. That's what makes it smart, you know 1:14:10 That no one can it has nothing to do with the senator. No one can has its own independent existence 1:14:15 so the whole thing is like what was just horribly misconceived and just very disappointing and it honestly just speaks to 1:14:22 How far the community has fallen I think unfortunately 1:14:29 And so you're saying that it is it is possible maybe not likely but 1:14:34 It's a roadblock or it's like an impasse that the bitcoin is going to have to go through if it wants to become 1:14:41 What people say it should be? 1:14:44 uh 1:14:46 Yeah, I mean our options are we stay very niche and we don't really bother anyone 1:14:52 and 1:14:54 I think that's that leads to death that leads to uh 1:14:57 Being worth zero dollars per coin eventually 1:15:01 Or we get really big 1:15:03 I mean a lot of people wanted so certainly I think what the large blockers had in mind 1:15:09 Was a sort of uber like strategy 1:15:12 That you know as far as anyone knows it might have worked at this point. I don't know everyone people didn't like it at the time 1:15:18 but 1:15:19 What they had in mind was like we'll just get so big so quick 1:15:23 It will be too difficult for every government in the world to ban us all at the same time 1:15:27 And we'll just grow grow grow 1:15:30 And it would be like uber and like, you know draft kings and fan duel where it's technically illegal when it started 1:15:37 but then it just 1:15:39 captured the 1:15:42 The hearts and minds of the people 1:15:45 Which um, you know, I think that was certainly a viable 1:15:49 That was you know, that's certainly one strategy that might have worked 1:15:53 But we certainly didn't go in that direction 1:15:56 Uh 1:15:58 Anyway 1:15:59 um, yeah, I do think that it's kind of like 1:16:04 The 1:16:08 What exactly is their plan to 1:16:13 Only write software that is 1:16:17 Approved by the like us congress because then again it loses its independence 1:16:22 so this is why this is why I say these people are equal to 1:16:26 the 1:16:28 They're basically completely equivalent to the infinite size 1:16:31 large blocker L1 people in the block size war where they said 1:16:35 well the 1:16:36 Instead of hanging on to the properties of bitcoin and make it unique 1:16:42 And make it special and which make it valuable. We will sacrifice those 1:16:47 For some kind of like temporary quick fix quick convenience 1:16:53 So, yeah, I thought the regulatory angle was very bad and I thought the angle about 1:16:58 Miners don't want to get involved 1:17:00 All right, that was silly in so many ways. I think they just didn't understand at all how it worked and they also 1:17:06 they failed to put two and two together when they said stuff like 1:17:09 sure, maybe we'll get 1:17:11 much much much more revenue by doing this, but 1:17:14 on the other hand, we might have to do a little bit of work and it's like 1:17:18 Okay, how about you subtract, you know the revenue from the costs and then 1:17:22 And then decide 1:17:25 So I was disappointed by that 1:17:27 I'm wondering, uh, so then have you had conversations with miners? Uh, could you share anecdotes? 1:17:35 No, I have lots of um 1:17:37 Yeah, I have uh, i'm in 1:17:39 Chat rooms with miners. I have talked to miners 1:17:43 I talked to my zoom miners 1:17:47 So I think 1:17:50 Many of the miners, you know are 1:17:53 Uh, they don't you know want to 1:17:58 Get involved with something 1:18:00 Like this that is contentious just for the same reason that anyone wouldn't but also we have many miners who 1:18:07 Are supportive publicly some and we have 1:18:14 Uh, I think you know, I think it's a matter of time like, um have other 1:18:20 You know like meetings with miners lined up 1:18:23 So I think it is just I I'd only started talking to miners like in july 25th 1:18:30 And then a lot of this crazy stuff happened and then i've been very busy recently 1:18:35 um 1:18:36 and so 1:18:38 uh, i'm 1:18:39 I've been really busy talking because we've gotten a lot of attention ever since miners first found out about it 1:18:46 late july 1:18:48 july august 1:18:49 And then we had a kind of crazy september as we all know this idea 1:18:55 really went from being 1:18:57 Kind of a not that talked about but then in september it started to get very very talked about and so that's 1:19:04 That month has only just ended and now i'm here for 1:19:08 Bitcoin amsterdam and for other things. So so, uh, it's kind of just started but um 1:19:16 Yeah, it's very weird some of the miners who are 1:19:20 Uh against are very very close also like, uh, I don't want to like name everything but like 1:19:27 some of the miners want 1:19:30 Uh 1:19:31 To basically have sidechains, but they i'm not sure if they want to activate BIP300. So 1:19:37 Some of them are in like a weird 1:19:39 position of being kind of close 1:19:42 I don't know how much I can share or should say 1:19:45 but um 1:19:47 Do you think miners understand? 1:19:49 Right chains. Do you think they understand? 1:19:52 I think they don't understand them as well as you do moon settler, but I think that 1:19:58 they 1:20:00 I think what really happened was they were very surprised by the arguments against like for example, I did show them 1:20:07 the blockstream paper the mining centralization 1:20:10 three section 3.4 or 4.3 1:20:14 One of those 1:20:16 And in it, it basically just says that some miners have an advantage over other miners and they'll push the other miners out 1:20:22 and they they people couldn't believe that that was 1:20:26 That was the whole case against 1:20:28 Sidechains and why blockstream abandoned them and then I was showing them the math on 1:20:33 the fee revenues they could earn 1:20:36 which is 1:20:37 Much much more than they currently earn total 1:20:42 So and they had already gotten a taste of additional fee revenues from ordinals 1:20:47 So that was like those were like 1:20:49 Some things that were there like okay 1:20:52 And yeah, I think that weirdly what's on their mind is of course the having coming up 1:20:58 They're all thinking about that. You know, they're all thinking my revenue is going to get cut in half. So what should I do? 1:21:03 if anything 1:21:05 so I think that that 1:21:07 I think that this is uh, I think a lot of them think that probably 1:21:12 That would be around the time 1:21:14 to 1:21:16 They all have this uh, this uh survivalist mindset know that that they 1:21:22 They need to survive the worst case scenario in their 1:21:26 Business plans that that's what they are focusing on. I imagine pretty much right now 1:21:33 Yeah, I mean I think some of them if I had to guess also I think some of them are 1:21:41 Some of them would say something along the lines of 1:21:44 We miners have never done anything wrong and we have invested 1:21:48 We have all this money at stake. So 1:21:52 Why is it the case that people doubt? 1:21:56 Us which is a very good question, I think 1:22:00 This is all blown. This is all stuff from the scaling war that it's like 1:22:04 Taking out new and bizarre dimensions for no reason 1:22:08 yeah, I mean 1:22:10 the way I remember there were 1:22:12 some very 1:22:14 Very big boats made by the big bookers or people on the big booker camp 1:22:20 That I kind of suspect the loudest most obnoxious ones were the ones that ended up on bse 1:22:27 Not even bch. Um, so those people 1:22:32 said stuff like 1:22:34 you know 1:22:35 Miners will obviously come to us and you will go into that spiral and you have no say in it and you can 1:22:42 Screw your node and whatever so that that was the general sentiment 1:22:47 Around the time as I remember and uh, and uh, I think a lot of people got like 1:22:54 really 1:22:55 Angry and resentful about all that imagery 1:23:00 Well, yes, certainly we can go over 1:23:03 all the long many details of that history, but mainly involving 1:23:09 A bitcoin unlimited being signaled with nine percent after scaling three thus preventing SegWit from activating via bip nine 1:23:16 Which set off this whole miners versus developers? 1:23:21 War in 2017 1:23:23 and 1:23:25 You know how level-headed and and forgiving 1:23:29 The top developers are 1:23:36 Um, everyone is it all ended up happily ever after 1:23:42 So just to put a put a cap on what you were saying about, uh, 1:23:46 The article it's just that it's it's actually the concern about 1:23:50 regulatory pressure 1:23:52 Uh doesn't have that much merit and it's kind of missing the point 1:23:55 altogether 1:23:56 It may be a concern for certain miners who have made the mistake 1:24:01 Again, quite parallel to the large walker case where they they they may have set things up a certain way 1:24:08 Banking on 1:24:10 Banking on 1:24:12 Maybe they are set up for something. They can only get if they are registered, but that's their mistake other miners 1:24:20 Can and will put them out of business if they rely on that type of thing. So we want miners to compete 1:24:27 against the right people 1:24:29 in the right ways 1:24:31 for the right reasons 1:24:33 So that is what we want any kind of competition can can turn 1:24:37 ugly, you know what I mean like 1:24:40 Two people can be competing over a girl and it can be honorable or they could end up like killing each other or you know 1:24:45 What I mean, or you could compete in a business 1:24:47 You could open two bakeries across the street 1:24:51 And it can be an honorable competition 1:24:54 Or it can be horrible. You know what I mean? You have on one hand you have 1:24:59 Like whatever margaret thatcher and and then if the competition goes a different way you have like adolf hitler, you know, it's like 1:25:07 Both are examples of 1:25:10 People trying to like compete with like a vision. So the miners we want the miners to be 1:25:16 We don't want the miners to compete on who can 1:25:19 placate 1:25:20 some random 1:25:22 Government official of a completely random country. That's not what we want them to compete on. We in fact we want them to compete on 1:25:29 Putting as many transactions 1:25:32 Into the blocks they mine as possible 1:25:34 Including all the merged mine blocks 1:25:37 so 1:25:38 if 1:25:39 Somebody was asking you let's say there's somebody who's on the fence about drivechain and they're concerned about 1:25:45 The livelihood of their business in the event that they signal support for drivechain 1:25:49 I mean, what what could you tell them besides you know, this is what you signed up for you have to deal with it 1:25:56 What can you be more specific 1:25:58 As far as like if there's somebody worried about regulatory pressure like was put forward in that 1:26:02 That article but somebody was more favorable to you and they're asking for advice like well 1:26:06 How should I navigate, you know this situation if it's going to invite? 1:26:10 If i'm going to be, you know making more money and getting regulatory pressure. I mean, is there any way for people to navigate that? 1:26:17 More smartly miners. Yes 1:26:19 I thought I put that in my response to the article. I had like one sentence about so what you can do is with 1:26:26 Mining you don't need to run 1:26:29 the any sidechain node at all 1:26:32 So you don't have to run the z-side node or any nodes 1:26:36 You don't want you still collect the fee revenues. You're not 1:26:40 at a disadvantage now you have to 1:26:43 mine 1:26:45 the 1:26:46 The middleman transaction that connects them. So there's someone who's paying you 1:26:50 All the z-side 1:26:53 All the z-side 1:26:55 Money is coming in 1:26:58 And maybe that sidechain slot number six and maybe it pays 1:27:02 two bitcoin every 10 minutes 1:27:04 And you're getting the L1 transaction base, whatever 1.999 1:27:09 You have to mind that one but then you just I think what you would do is you would just organize a defense around 1:27:15 about around independence and decentralization and you just you would tell 1:27:19 Whoever it is or whatever and the senator calls and you'd say listen 1:27:24 If I if I don't mind this the only thing that's going to happen is 1:27:28 I'm, i'm going to lose out on two bitcoin 1:27:31 every 10 minutes 1:27:33 Someone else will mind the block 10 minutes later. So it won't achieve anything 1:27:38 And the only thing you're going to do is put me out of business 1:27:42 Eventually if I keep losing this to btc 1:27:45 so 1:27:46 I think that's just what you say and uh, that's the truth 1:27:50 um 1:27:51 I think you would also 1:27:54 If a business person could easily just say, oh, well i'm going to weigh the advantages I get 1:27:59 for being 1:28:01 compliant with whatever 1:28:03 the government of any whatever country because you know what I mean, we say we 1:28:07 Because framing it with the u.s congressperson makes it sound very different than if we say 1:28:12 go 1:28:13 president xi 1:28:15 in china 1:28:17 Said he would murder my entire family and make me disappear 1:28:21 If I didn't do such and such or whatever vladimir putin's government, so it's like someone somewhere 1:28:27 Tells you that they want you to do something 1:28:30 um 1:28:31 you know 1:28:32 You don't automatically it's not automatically a respectable thing 1:28:35 It sounds a lot more respectable when you say u.s congressperson, of course, but so whoever it is they say 1:28:41 You don't mind the z cash sidechain and then you just you have to weigh whatever advantages you get with your relationship with this person 1:28:50 against what you lose by 1:28:53 Complying that would be my advice I suppose 1:28:57 that 1:28:58 It's possible that the north american miners pretty much made up their mind 1:29:02 Especially the publicly traded company miners. They made up their mind about that. They will comply with whatever is thrown at them 1:29:09 And in that sense they they kind of might have the that feeling that they actually could in a drivechain, uh, 1:29:17 in a successful drivechain, but 1:29:19 become disadvantaged 1:29:21 Economically, I would say this would be a very honorable way to have drivechain like not activate. You know what I mean? 1:29:28 I would say actually 1:29:30 Paul came up with this idea 1:29:33 but because 1:29:34 The bitcoin miners wanted to stay compliant and they did not want to have any risk of a z cash sidechain 1:29:42 It didn't activate on bitcoin. I would just I would stand and sort of applaud in an ironic way because I would say 1:29:49 This just proves that you know 1:29:52 Clearly the fault wasn't mine 1:29:57 You know, it's just I would just say I would just get a big kick out of that 1:30:00 I 1:30:02 Don't know it would be very weird and the that entire article was 1:30:08 To me a disappointment. I I did not 1:30:12 expect to read that, uh, but uh 1:30:17 Just thinking about what their motivation could be they they might actually not want like a 1:30:24 foreign miners, uh 1:30:26 Miners in other countries other jurisdictions to have like more bucks per terahash that that is basically 1:30:34 Economically rational if they expect they would have to comply anyhow, no 1:30:48 Okay, rio 1:30:50 Oh, hey. Hey paul. Thanks for having me up. Um, great combo and such 1:30:56 Always learning. Um, I wanted to touch back on a couple of things that were brought up agree with you on the regulatory thing 1:31:03 Uh, I I think the next hash war 1:31:06 Is not a chain split. It's compliant hash non-compliant hash and it's uh, 1:31:12 Sovereign hash versus non-sovereign hash either explicit sovereign hash 1:31:16 Uh, like, you know volcanoes from el salvador in the dream world 1:31:21 Uh, or again sovereign hash and that texas hash is compliant 1:31:26 So it's as good as sovereign hash and that's the next hash war 1:31:29 So your points are taken if people are prepared for that or aware or in denial that it's an adversarial 1:31:37 Uh environment to the standard system when you're trying to make a competitive product like bitcoin again 1:31:44 Go back and read the white paper start over do not pass go do not collect any dollars 1:31:49 Just a public service announcement the the compliant hash 1:31:53 Is all of that is a complete waste that is useless proof of work 1:31:57 because if it's all coming from 1:31:59 congress anyway, then 1:32:01 It doesn't even matter none of the proof of all the proof of work stuff is a complete 1:32:05 Energy as I can so they will simply yes 1:32:08 subsidize it to say we'll 1:32:09 Make it economical for you to not include that because we'll give you the subsidy in a different way through energy subsidy 1:32:13 Which is only further proving that the sovereigns will bend the knee to the bitcoin and math will win in the end 1:32:20 So again, it's just a sign of a positive thing in the long run 1:32:22 But again, it is coming the next hash war is sovereign hash or compliant hash purposely not being economical and me to your point 1:32:29 Not doing what you would expect a truly selfish player to do and and that will be the next hash war which is why 1:32:35 Uh, a zero knowledge proof or a z chain sidechain thing is is certainly one of the use cases and one of the things 1:32:41 that would potentially push that hash war to a different level or 1:32:45 Or make it even more moot for them to attempt it 1:32:48 but then the regulatory pressures that are spoken of in the 1:32:51 Article, I think we need to look at wrapped btc is our only 1:32:56 Scaled example all due respect to lightning again wrapped bitcoin has more tbl 1:33:01 But you do look at a federated model and the pressure put there was put 1:33:04 But you know that wrapped btc contract on ethereum does not have locks unlike most stable coins 1:33:10 They only have regulatory pressure that can put on the externals of the claim outs 1:33:14 You can still put wrap btc into a ave and get eth back out 1:33:18 They have to have the compliant people track that through 1:33:21 They can't stop it in v2 1:33:23 Which is still can't be undeployed 1:33:25 Etc. So there's you know 1:33:27 Things that make it challenging you also think about dusting that's shown to be very adversarial to oh you want to stay compliant 1:33:33 Okay, well dust point zero zero zero one eth and like all these celebrities wallet 1:33:37 So you have to block all of them too if you want to stay compliant those type of things will also occur. So 1:33:44 leaning in and allowing that to occur to show the 1:33:48 futility 1:33:49 of compliance or to either 1:33:52 Because bitcoin change or others is beneficial in my view the concerns I do have is 1:33:58 That I I do think the critiques on miner 1:34:03 power struggles 1:34:04 and miner 1:34:06 and sidechain operator collusions 1:34:09 Are newly introduced and also point to potential regulatory? 1:34:15 As tack vectors. I still think it isolates to only affect those users on the sidechain, but I do think that 1:34:21 People saying sidechain bitcoin is just as good as layer one bitcoin 1:34:25 Which would I don't believe to be true and i'm not saying people are advocating that here 1:34:28 But would be a narrative that these sidechain people would be running if we enabled it 1:34:32 Could be dangerous if people don't understand 1:34:36 How they come back. I also think that people 1:34:39 We agreed to have taproot and SegWit which was lower cost vb block space. This is the antithesis 1:34:45 This is premium costed block space slot one slot two 1:34:49 It's a premium cost because only one person can occupy that slot one here 1:34:54 Uh, so, you know if we think about we can go one direction with taproot and have discounted block space reserved or created 1:35:00 Uh, what is the problem with going the other way for premium, especially I can understand the miners saying 1:35:06 You maybe not get my full money to increase my block instead of increasing block at standard rate block wars 1:35:11 Now I want to say, okay, let's do that. But let's have some reserved area. Now. That's a premium 1:35:15 Now you don't want to go that way you were willing to go the discount route 1:35:18 Why can't go the other route is a valid point, especially into a halving 1:35:22 The last point and then i'll love to hear any responses back is the bmms the node operators 1:35:26 They're going back and forth do become the dominant people that will need the withdrawals 1:35:30 They have a natural need to they take their revenue on the sidechain 1:35:33 They pay their costs on the L1 today will be the dominant people requesting the withdrawals that is centralized withdrawals 1:35:39 Versus potentially centralized pools template operators and the people running the nodes are probably the people also 1:35:45 Pushing the L2 chain and the new features this this 1:35:48 It does provide centralization and collusion issues. I don't think it's a fault of the protocol 1:35:52 It's a fault of humanity, but that's the whole point of not putting in protocols 1:35:55 That can't be manipulated by humanity, which is the bitcoin thing 1:35:57 So I you know i'm still on the fence on the whole 300 1:36:01 But that's just a few points i'd like to cut out and i'd love any you know on any of those points any 1:36:05 Rationales or further stuff so I can continue to learn 1:36:10 Okay, well, um 1:36:13 at the end like why do you say that it's centralized withdrawals if 1:36:18 The withdrawals are concentrated in one person 1:36:22 you know what I mean because 1:36:24 What the one person could it could actually be only one person withdrawing every three months, right? 1:36:29 But there could be 1:36:32 By turning it off and not piss off the rest of the ecosystem 1:36:35 so that one person 1:36:37 Is is a centralized person that has to bribe the miner to get out because they're the only one damaged if the miners 1:36:42 Decide not to do it for you 1:36:44 Oh, well, they're the only political victim 1:36:46 but you see that's also not really the case because 1:36:48 What the what in this scenario where there's only one person withdrawing? 1:36:52 I would imagine that there's many people who want to withdraw 1:36:55 But this one person is buying up all their L2 coins and they pay in L1 coins 1:37:04 With bmm and then they want to withdraw so they're collecting all the L2 coin bases 1:37:09 They buy up everyone's L2 coins. So as you say they have a giant pile of L2 coins 1:37:13 And then they withdraw but they are providing a service for all the they themselves have 1:37:19 Maybe have tens of thousands of customers. So if this person is screwed over 1:37:24 Then 1:37:25 They they won't be able to offer the service to anyone else. And so everyone else is indirectly 1:37:30 Getting screw over even if they don't literally withdraw 1:37:33 so the 1:37:34 the withdrawal thing is kind of like 1:37:38 the BIP300 part 1:37:40 the withdrawal is only half of the withdrawal picture because 1:37:44 There is also 1:37:45 It's really just who wants to do the slow with finance that person buying up 1:37:48 Everybody's L2s and then binance is the one taking those three withdrawals 1:37:52 It sees he's in control there 1:37:54 And then he has to basically bribe the miners to say let my withdrawals go through or let's otc make a deal 1:38:00 You can get them after I bridge them through here next but they don't need any particular bribe. They just use the BIP300 1:38:06 You know what? I mean? They pay 1:38:09 L2 transaction fee they pay the L1 transaction fee same as anyone else 1:38:14 They may want to put a hefty if they're the only one they managed to shrink it down to 43 bytes on L1 1:38:21 So they might say well instead of paying the prevailing 1:38:25 What I think is the prevailing 90th percentile fee of like four dollars and 50 cents since this one withdrawal is moving 1:38:32 10 000 coins 1:38:33 i'll pay 1:38:35 You know 500 1:38:37 dollar per 1:38:39 Uh, i'll pay what is the equivalent of right, you know $500 per 220 1:38:44 The miners love it. So I shouldn't describe it as a bribe. It is 1:38:47 aggregating and maximizing 1:38:51 You know the withdrawals pay a transaction fee on each 1:38:55 Because they're cross-chain they must pay the sidechain transaction fee to qualify as a withdrawal in the sidechain and then 1:39:02 when 1:39:03 the sidechain software 1:39:05 Constructs the withdrawal transaction automatically and hashes it. This is that hash that's so important 1:39:12 When that transaction is included in L1 1:39:15 Then it must pay a transaction fee also so it has to be included in 1:39:21 Spot as well. It can't just be anywhere now when it has to be in the slot spot, right? 1:39:26 And if somebody else wants to take that yes, the withdrawals are per slot 1:39:30 No, the withdrawals are per slot and the withdrawals are global they're globally unique for everyone so whatever the withdrawal is 1:39:38 Each three months is only one withdrawal and it may it could pay out up to like 20 000 people 1:39:43 but it 1:39:44 Just needs to make it into any block 1:39:47 But that is the point then a sidechain can be attacked by a person saying on L1 1:39:51 I will always pay the most to blank out that reserve slot one so that a real slot one can never get there now 1:39:57 Again have to perpetually pay but it's about this actually cannot happen 1:40:02 I'm happy to explain this because I think it's quite interesting, but this doesn't happen 1:40:06 What happens is that L2 is what constructs? 1:40:10 This thing that will pay out 1:40:12 on L1 so the way it works is 1:40:16 There's basically each withdrawal is kind of as if there was some kind of like train or spaceship leaving a planet or train leaving 1:40:22 a train station 1:40:24 And the train takes three months to go from wherever it is, you know, new york to la 1:40:30 And uh 1:40:32 And everyone else is the next train can't leave until the first one is finished going so 1:40:37 the 1:40:38 Because you can only pull the train L1 is like pulling the train closer each time 1:40:42 We have this bucket metaphor if you watch the whiteboard video on uh on layer2labs.com 1:40:48 They're being pulled to L1 1:40:51 Like the spaceship is being pulled in like a tractor beam into the the next planet or something 1:40:56 And 1:40:58 You can only pull one at a time so they pull when they're done pulling the one over 1:41:02 The on L2 the L2 loads the next people onto the train 1:41:06 Ah, they can't buy they can't buy up all the tickets on the train all at once each car each they can 1:41:12 They'd have to buy all the let me 1:41:14 Very close. Yes 1:41:16 So what you do is when you when you want to make a withdrawal on L2 1:41:19 you're on you're in the L2 world and you make the what you you click you set the 1:41:24 Sidechain transaction fee as always 1:41:27 Because every side every L2 message in the sidechain needs to pay that fee 1:41:33 And then you also set your L1 fee 1:41:35 And each withdrawal is going to be an output on L1 that takes 43 vbytes 1:41:40 So they're all exactly the same 1:41:43 Size because you just pay out to your L1 address, whatever it is 1:41:47 And so you you you click on L2 you say I want to withdraw and what that does is your money basically then visits the 1:41:54 Train station it goes instead of being on the planet and doing whatever it's doing over there circulating 1:42:00 Being used it goes to the uh, you know, the spaceport or the train station or whatever you want to call it 1:42:05 And then it waits in line based on which how high its L1 fee 1:42:11 Is is being paid so there's 20 000 places in line and it waits in line 1:42:16 Places in line and in order for someone to buy all those up they have to they have to buy basically all 20 000 tickets 1:42:23 But then their work isn't done 1:42:25 Because they have to pay the same fee right for all those and then if anyone outbids that rate 1:42:30 so it's a factor of 20 000 advantage to the 1:42:34 So if anyone outbids that then they cut in line. So the first it's like first class or something. So 1:42:39 So you can always cut in line and you can always make a deal with anyone who has a ticket 1:42:44 So if you if you show up and the line is 25 000 people 1:42:48 It's 5 000 people out the door 1:42:50 You could go to someone you can find someone in the first 20 000 1:42:55 and say 1:42:56 Listen, you're withdrawing your this that person maybe is withdrawing. Let's say they pay a very high fee. They pay a whole one bitcoin 1:43:04 in main chain fee layer one fee 1:43:07 So they they're withdrawing 1:43:09 28 bitcoin, but they pay one bitcoin in fee and you want to withdraw your 1:43:13 0.5 btc 1:43:16 You tell them you cut a deal with them you say listen 1:43:20 Edit your withdrawal so that i'll give you my 0.5 1:43:25 And then you can withdraw 1:43:27 28.5 btc and pay one bitcoin in L1 fee. So you put 1:43:33 I'll give you my coins since you're already in line 1:43:36 And you pay me on L1 you pay me like 0.49 btc on L1 instantly 1:43:42 So then you don't even have to take the train 1:43:44 So you can cut a side deal with any of these people 1:43:47 They can charge you like a fee 1:43:49 But so you have two options you always you can either outbid them on L1 main chain fee and again 1:43:55 Or you can just swap out instantly at any time 1:43:58 you can just say 1:44:00 and but the swap out thing never hits the ceiling because 1:44:04 As people gather more coins, they just they merge them with a kind of coin join 1:44:09 Type thing on L2 and then they withdraw them. So, you know what I mean? Like I can't they could have like 1:44:14 50 million inputs on L2 and you merge them into one withdrawal of 1:44:19 58 btc 1:44:21 And then you have one space in line that is one for 58 going to bitcoin address one c7 j8, whatever 1:44:29 So I have to you just said you're just that one guy. I don't have to buy out 1:44:32 Three months I have to buy out constantly 1:44:34 So it's not once every three months. I have to buy out the train if I want to blank it and just 1:44:39 Right. That's the other thing is you have to keep doing it. You have to keep doing it the next block 1:44:43 once this train leaves 1:44:45 Well, it's the next train so you can wait three months if you successfully block out the whole withdrawal 1:44:49 So then if i'm if i'm a state, you don't have to do it for three months, but you have to do it again 1:44:53 Right. I'm a state-based attacker hating this the drivechain z chain and i'm saying 1:44:58 I'm buying all the tickets on the train every withdrawal so that you can't get off the sidechain to kill the zSide 1:45:03 Chain because i'm a state-based attacker 1:45:04 but again 1:45:05 I may have misexplained it in that point because you're not really buying 1:45:09 The tech what you are is you pay a certain L1 fee rate. So you say i'll pay 1:45:14 Yeah, you say that what they're doing is they'll say I withdraw at this rate, which is I say I pay 1:45:19 50 dollars 1:45:21 Per with 50 dollar L1 fee 20 000 instances of that and since 50 is the highest so far 1:45:29 you have you temporarily have all of the 1:45:33 Places in line number one through twenty thousand 1:45:37 But 1:45:39 If anyone pays 51 1:45:41 at any time before the train leaves 1:45:44 Then they jump to spot number one 1:45:46 And that guy can can that guy can single-handedly withdraw everyone else's coins, right? 1:45:51 Once he's got a spot in line, he can edit it. I see so it makes it 1:45:55 Have to burn a lot so then the person then you have to then the the bad guy has to decide 1:46:01 Okay, they just paid 51 so am I going to do 52 for all 20 000 spots 1:46:07 And now they think uh, you know now this then okay, so that's why I say it's a huge advantage. Yeah 1:46:12 Yeah, it's a 20 000 to one 1:46:15 To really stop it. So again unless you're talking about, you know, russia level sanctions where yeah 1:46:21 The government will burn money to ridiculous degrees north korea level sanctions 1:46:24 They're not going to bring that much pain to bear and take that much economic loss 1:46:28 Yeah, it's only a sovereign that could 1:46:31 Infinitely print and again that only helps bitcoin in the long run as we all know because the printer never stops 1:46:36 Okay. Okay. No, you got it. Just walking through the stuff and learning the mechanics. Thank you for all that. It's very helpful 1:46:40 Okay, so that's the withdrawal and then uh taproot SegWit 1:46:45 uh 1:46:46 It that temporarily made block space 1:46:48 Slightly more abundant because it was a mandatory block size increase that that additional size of the discount in cost as well 1:46:54 Right because it's temporary. It's it's right 1:46:58 It could be temporary 1:47:00 It has nothing to do with 1:47:03 It has nothing to do with the feature it's just we made this extension block for witnesses 1:47:10 And so that is why it 1:47:13 Made those types of transactions cheaper 1:47:16 this the being in slot one versus slot two 1:47:19 You when you deposit you're on L1 so you could use a taproot, you know, you could spend from a taproot output 1:47:28 And go into slot one or slot two 1:47:30 It's completely unrelated 1:47:32 so 1:47:33 the 1:47:36 Uh, i'm not sure what you were trying to get out with that slot one 1:47:39 Is it right to believe each of the sidechain slots that can accept a hash that is representative of a merkle or a block? 1:47:45 Or whatever is necessary for validation on the sidechain that's receiving a hash in slot one 1:47:49 Is is it appropriate to treat that as a premium area of block space because people will pay higher 1:47:54 Than the other areas of the block because they want to be the person that wins all the fees on L2 1:47:58 So they're paying that one. No, I don't think so. I think so what happens is 1:48:03 When you pay when you deposit 1:48:05 There's each each sidechain slot 1:48:08 So like let's say we're talking about sidechain number five and sidechain number five is like the ethereum sidechain or whatever 1:48:13 And it has like 20 000 btc 1:48:15 Total that has been deposited into it 1:48:18 If that's the case 1:48:20 Then on L1 somewhere 1:48:23 There is a UTXO that is spent with like a BIP300 script op drivechain op not five 1:48:29 Script that has 20 000 btc 1:48:32 In it somewhere and when you deposit to it, you select that one. You select your own like let's say you have like a 5 btc 1:48:40 UTXO 1:48:42 And you spend it and you give yourself 1:48:44 three bitcoin and change 1:48:47 and you pay a transaction fee of 1:48:49 0.01 1:48:51 And so then you pay 1:48:53 1.99 1:48:55 Into the sidechain, so then it will be a new output that has 1:48:58 20 000 1:49:00 Whatever I said 20 000 1.99 1:49:04 And so 1:49:05 That's the L1 picture and then what it really is is the more abundant block space on L2 1:49:11 That is not as valuable. So I would say that actually you make a more abundant block space, but 1:49:16 it's less valuable so you have a 1:49:19 Lower demand by a much higher supply and as a result the block space would probably be cheap 1:49:26 For the end user agreed but from the L1 perspective of 1:49:30 The miner and the block space value to me, which is what i'm selling i'm selling block space be included in the block space 1:49:38 I'm a miner right i'll include you in my block space 1:49:41 I'm always going to take the extractable highest one. So people give me the most fees 1:49:45 But the the I can't have more than one 1:49:49 Block for the sidechain go in because I only have one slot slot five. I can't take two sidechain five blocks into one 1:49:57 Normally, I could take two inscriptions. I can take two transactions, right? 1:50:00 So because it is further scarce block space than others 1:50:04 It will demand a premium and that's what you're saying 1:50:06 You're just going to increase fees for the minus right in the very first part of that 1:50:09 You can't you can do two inscriptions, but you couldn't do something you can't you can't put two sidechain blocks 1:50:14 in the same 1:50:15 Layer one block, right? There's only one slot five only one 1:50:20 Hash is going to go in there. So that is by nature a more scarce area of my block on L1 1:50:25 Premium area. This is a slightly different thing. Yes, right 1:50:29 Yes, uh, but that's a slightly different thing. Okay, this is where you're right 1:50:34 Yes, but but let me explain that 1:50:37 It's because if there's a finite space for the merge mine hash 1:50:43 Which would be like whatever this certain 32 byte region 1:50:47 That is the thing that in BIP301 is auctioned off. So whatever let's say you have the evm chain is in slot five 1:50:54 Let's say that one pays 1:50:56 total transaction fees 1:50:58 Of a certain block that is eight 1:51:01 Btc and so in the layer two coinbase 1:51:05 Whoever created that block 1:51:08 They're getting eight btc 1:51:11 and in each transaction, you know, there's a 1:51:13 each transaction 1:51:15 Pays a small fee and it all sums up to eight btc. So you're following me so far the L2 block is worth eight btc 1:51:26 So what is happening now in blind merge mining is there's a middleman 1:51:31 Who constructs the block paying themselves the 8 btc? 1:51:35 and then in L1 1:51:38 They make a transaction that says they make a bid they say i'll pay 7.99 1:51:45 To anyone 1:51:47 It's up for grabs as long as 1:51:50 The special 32 byte region according to corresponding to a drivechain slot number five 1:51:56 Has this exact hash in it? 1:51:59 If that's the case, then you can take my 7.99 1:52:03 L1 btc 1:52:04 But if not, then you cannot include this transaction in a block 1:52:08 So you're right. It makes a premium only for those 32 bytes not for the rest of the block 1:52:13 So what you would really see on L1 is you would see 1:52:16 Some kind of normal distribution, you know by normal. I don't mean gaussian. I mean like some kind of as expected 1:52:23 Exactly 1:52:24 some some regularly shaped thing that would have been the case before there was any BIP300 or 301 and then there will be 1:52:33 over in the block interspersed 1:52:36 For each sidechain, there will be this huge 1:52:39 skyscraper like 1:52:41 Pins, you know these huge spikes 1:52:44 That one transaction will just pay 1:52:46 7.99 1:52:48 in fee 1:52:50 7.99 btc in total in fees 1:52:52 so some of these may pay more than the entire rest of the block in one single transaction, but this is not because 1:52:59 That person really wanted to get into L1. It's because they really wanted to set 1:53:03 the 1:53:04 The sidechain block contents and this is only if they use BIP301 if BIP301 is not used then this just won't happen 1:53:12 But if it is then you would see that and that is the sense in which they're scarce 1:53:17 And then your first thing was something about uh 1:53:21 Oh, yeah, the damage is isolated to the sidechain. Yes, if the whole point of sidechains as I see it 1:53:27 Is a proper accountability 1:53:30 proper blame 1:53:32 so 1:53:33 we have a situation where 1:53:36 If the sidechain developer does something stupid that attracts the wrong kind of attention 1:53:41 if the sidechain developer 1:53:43 Screws up and loses everyone's coins 1:53:46 They are blamed and I think 1:53:48 putting blame in the right spot 1:53:50 that is really the difference between you know, like capitalism and communism, you know, like like hell on earth and 1:53:57 prosperity 1:53:59 And or at least doing the best we can with what we have so 1:54:04 We don't want so this is what we want. You know, we we just want we just need the right people to get the right blame 1:54:12 That's the that's the key ingredient 1:54:15 so as you as you say, it's possible to design some kind of sidechain that like just draws the wrath of 1:54:22 Any number of people, you know, of course like for example, uh silk road. There was a senator was the 1:54:28 I think was it um, was it chuck schumer someone there's a documentary with amir taki and amir taki plays on his laptop 1:54:36 a video of chuck schumer saying 1:54:38 That he wants his website taken off 1:54:41 the internet 1:54:42 So by the way, that's how I learned about bitcoin from that. I mean too. Yeah, not from that documentary but from the silk road 1:54:49 like 1:54:50 like 1:54:51 drama 1:54:52 And he he has it and then what does he do satoshi enjoyer? 1:54:55 He pauses it and then he turns to the camera and he says 1:54:58 Do you remember? 1:54:59 um, I don't remember that but I remember he goes step by step and how to use silk road how to use tour, um, 1:55:05 how to get uh that there's this bitcoin currency literally step by step exactly like 1:55:09 how to use it and then that that drove me into 1:55:12 Um doing more research about it, of course 1:55:14 I remember he's a little uh hazy myself 1:55:15 but he says something along the lines of he looks at the camera and he just says that was a year and a half ago 1:55:20 And the site is still up 1:55:22 So, yeah, but yeah, I agree the whole point of sidechains is that uh people take their own risks 1:55:29 And they take they suffer the consequences be they good 1:55:33 or bad 1:55:34 Now, I think we had a a tryptonomic and a moonsettler hand 1:55:39 so 1:55:40 I just quickly would like to 1:55:43 Just one thing I want to say 1:55:45 Way way before someone mentioned that 1:55:48 Zcash sidechain might be such a breaking point. I totally don't think so. So in a in an ideal, uh, 1:55:57 successful ride chain 1:55:58 world if 1:56:00 DeFi 1:56:01 Comes and built on top of bitcoin. I think we will be talking about tens or hundreds of millions of dollars 1:56:08 in uh in revenue 1:56:11 fee 1:56:12 revenue for the miners, uh from that 1:56:15 I think that's what ethereum and the other stuff is showing us roughly 1:56:20 And that could grow to god knows what 1:56:23 over time but but that's kind of like a 1:56:27 Over the timeline that this can play out that that seems realistic to me 1:56:31 And for something like a zcash side, I would see like hundreds or thousands of dollars of fee revenue collected 1:56:38 so that's that's 1:56:40 That's such a non-issue that's a total non-issue the entire thing would probably boil down to to 1:56:46 uh DeFi and of course the entire point of DeFi is to avoid regulators and 1:56:52 regulators will be pretty uh prissy about that and 1:56:56 That that is much more likely to be the breaking point in my opinion 1:57:00 Um 1:57:08 Make sense should we do tryptonomic? 1:57:15 Sure, hi, uh, by the way, the term is bow the knee not bends the knee 1:57:22 Uh, anyway, uh, so I have an answer to the question you had last week 1:57:27 on 1:57:29 quantum error correction and like 1:57:31 decoherence, I actually was on a space this week and 1:57:35 Charles hodgkinson's was on and 1:57:38 I got to speak with him for a little while and he brought up the same 1:57:42 issues, however, I found the answer is 1:57:46 found when 1:57:47 The entanglements of the when whatever particles are being entangled 1:57:52 um 1:57:53 as long some particles are heavier than others and so 1:57:57 if 1:57:58 You're doing calculations on with whatever qubits you have assuming that they're stable 1:58:04 um 1:58:05 The entanglement is a lot more stable when the particles are less dense and they're they're not as heavy. So 1:58:12 that helps with 1:58:14 you know quantum error correction and 1:58:17 decoherence as well as like, uh 1:58:20 gate errors and so 1:58:22 ibm for instance went from you know, one qubit to 50 qubit chip to 1:58:27 Now there's they have a a qubit chip a chip 1:58:32 with more than 1 000 qubits 1:58:35 and so these 1:58:36 entanglements are are very stable and so 1:58:42 Um, we have a thousand qubits that can be used 1:58:46 but did we get an answer to the question about 1:58:48 It only affects the signatures and not hashes though 1:58:51 So 1:58:54 Sure because I mean even if even even if a cubic, um, you know 1:58:59 Hashes it's a 256 bit hash it I mean 1:59:03 It would still be I guess the same number it wouldn't be calculated with bits, of course 1:59:08 But it would still be the same size of a number 1:59:11 So yeah 1:59:17 Well interesting 1:59:20 Wow, that's very cool 1:59:24 Yeah, I think it was much faster than I thought I mean 1:59:26 I know they were struggling to get two qubits and then they were struggling to get four 1:59:31 And then someone got six somewhere and then that was like that was all that had happened in like 10 years 1:59:36 No, that was that was decades ago. Um right now, I mean 1:59:41 It's outperforming moore's law. I mean more moore's law doesn't really apply here as as much but I mean 1:59:47 It was 50 and then 100 and even if you have a 50 qubit chip 1:59:52 And and you have these entanglements that are that are with with really dense, uh, really 1:59:57 uh 1:59:58 with particles that are less dense than 2:00:01 Other particles and like I said depends on the particles you use but if the particles aren't very dense 2:00:07 Then, you know 50 qubits can outperform 2:00:10 um a modern supercomputer assuming that you know, you've adjusted for 2:00:15 that, you know, you don't have any errors and there isn't errors with the gates and the hardware is there but ibm has a 2:00:22 You know an over 1 000 2:00:24 qubit chip 2:00:27 And so 2:00:28 you know for the era of one and two qubits and 50 that was 2:00:32 during uh, you know research and development and 2:00:35 Really trying to uh, you know configure the hardware as well. I mean the hardware is more than half of the problem 2:00:44 Because the the quantum mechanics are available everywhere they're essentially infinite it's just about 2:00:50 configuring a hardware environment around them to stabilize them and 2:00:54 um, or to help them remain stable depending on like what's what state of density the particles have so 2:01:01 Yeah, 1 000 qubits wow, it's a lot it's a lot it's interesting. Yes 2:01:06 What do you mean by density? Well, I don't know if we should maybe it's too much off topic really but but I thought i'm sorry 2:01:11 Don't think you normally use photons. And of course a photon has no 2:01:15 mass 2:01:16 It only has momentum 2:01:19 As i'm sure we all remember from 2:01:22 Whatever physics class we took or at least that's what I remember. Although these things are certainly 2:01:27 Contradictory to say the least 2:01:29 But uh, I don't know what you mean by dense. You mean like there are many photons like in one area. What does that mean? 2:01:44 Well 2:01:48 Well, it's a tricky subject anyway, maybe we should see if anyone has a 2:01:56 BIP300 2:01:59 Comment your question 2:02:01 Then maybe we can come back 2:02:05 Yeah, I couldn't actually hear you until now 2:02:09 Um, I think your question was like what how do you measure density and particles or something like that 2:02:17 Um 2:02:21 It refers to the like like 2:02:24 Like if you have a molecule how many particles are in that in that molecule or how many particles are in a certain 2:02:35 Yeah, it's a particle 2:02:38 Yeah, I don't really have the answer like I said, I don't have the answer all I know is that 2:02:42 All I know is that you can measure the density 2:02:47 The dense you can measure the density of uh 2:02:50 One particle versus another and some are 2:02:54 are essentially larger heavier in some way and so 2:02:58 Um, that's all I had there. I don't i'm not a i'm not exactly sure 2:03:03 how the quantum states are changed in ibm's quantum teams computers, but 2:03:09 um 2:03:10 whatever state 2:03:11 Their quantum computer whatever quantum states their computer is changing 2:03:15 Um, they ensure that those states are less dense than ours are as um, 2:03:21 or as uh 2:03:22 You know as least dense as possible 2:03:29 It also casts your calculations and processing of the yeah cool. All right. Thanks 2:03:38 Okay, thanks 2:03:41 Bit green aka a bitcoin penguin 2:03:47 Is on stage now. Hello 2:03:50 Got a question about um kind of incentivized trying a 51 percent attack 2:03:57 So usually you could only essentially times two your coins 2:04:02 um 2:04:03 on L1 2:04:04 but with drive change you could 2:04:07 Get a lot more than what you've got now 2:04:10 I suppose this is the same with lightning that you could get a lot more than you've got but 2:04:15 What's your view on incentivizing? 2:04:18 Doing a 51 percent attack. I know it's super hard because you're gonna have to do it for three months, but exactly 2:04:24 That's exactly it which is to say 2:04:27 the three month time period is supposed to 2:04:30 try to offset 2:04:32 the fact that 2:04:34 The attack is more profitable 2:04:37 so that's exactly it it 2:04:41 it is um 2:04:42 So with certain things like reorging L1 or holding UTXO hostage or emptying the lightning channel 2:04:49 It is actually very easy to 2:04:51 Do it sort of quickly 2:04:53 uh with this it's 2:04:56 Uh, the idea is that making it longer makes it much harder one one way in particular is that the miners will have to 2:05:05 Construct the transaction paying themselves the loot, you know the plunder 2:05:11 Uh, and then hash that and then put that hash in everyone will know immediately that the hash is wrong 2:05:17 And the what will happen in that scenario is 2:05:24 Over the next three months the hash rate can change like the hash distribution can change no one knows exactly who is 2:05:32 Who has joined the network who has left who is getting very lucky who's getting very unlucky 2:05:37 So that is one additional stumbling block 2:05:39 This is why to make it so long and of course with with 51 it's not three months. It's actually six months 2:05:46 You need a hundred percent 2:05:50 Cooperating can do it all in three months 2:05:52 But with 51 you barely eke it out 2:05:55 Over six months where the hash rate distribution might change even more 2:06:00 Uh, of course we have to keep in mind that even though the pools are stable this is slightly misleading because 2:06:09 The 2:06:11 Uh, the pools and their main asset is their brand which they 2:06:17 Which is also their main liability, which is if they screw anything up. They are screwed 2:06:21 And this hides what must be an enormous amount of dynamism 2:06:26 Under the hood, you know of the actual sha256 2:06:30 hashers 2:06:31 So they are the ones who ultimately will 2:06:34 Be responsible for executing this 51 percent attack and they have much more dynamism than the pools 2:06:41 So that's my my thought on that 2:06:42 Which is that the the length of time is and and not only the length of time 2:06:46 But also pigeonholing it all into one event that is globally observed and that is very easy to ascribe 2:06:52 Blame for because the sidechain node will tell everyone what the true withdrawal hash should be 2:06:59 And everyone will know on day one 2:07:01 That the 51 attack one is wrong. It's completely wrong and that it is 2:07:06 It has no relationship to the truth at all. It's not like some kind of mistake or fluke 2:07:11 So that is the idea behind since since they can take more coins. We have to make it harder and 2:07:17 We have to make it harder and 2:07:20 uh 2:07:22 That is part of the logic 2:07:23 The other part of the logic is of course that making it longer doesn't really inconvenience too many normal users 2:07:30 Now I think the key thing to always keep in mind with the 51 percent attack is what is the consequence going to be 2:07:35 in in the drivechain case the consequences they steal all the coins, but they have almost certainly destroyed the 2:07:42 transaction fee revenue from all the drivechains probably 2:07:46 And I have done some math on that 2:07:50 Uh, anyone can do it just go to cryptofees.info 2:07:53 Look up what the what ethereum is paying in fees each day. It's just a kind of 2:08:00 Empirical glimpse of today's data 2:08:03 And just taking that present value of that 2:08:05 And you'll and then divide that by the price of bitcoin and you'll see if we had drivechain today about how many coins 2:08:11 Could safely fit in there. We're a greedy miner 2:08:15 Would find it more 2:08:17 greedy to 2:08:19 Not steal via the 51 percent attack. So those are my thoughts 2:08:24 On that but that is the crucial question if the sidechain if the drivechain BIP300 chain is not 2:08:31 Generating fees or if it doesn't have some kind of plausible 2:08:35 Story about why it will generate fees 2:08:39 Then it will not be secure. That is the whole 2:08:42 basis of this idea 2:08:45 Unfortunately from ethereum we have you know, some like, you know just from 2:08:50 we have 2:08:51 We we see that it's at least possible 2:08:54 for something to generate fees that are so large they 2:08:59 They dwarf even bitcoin's fees 2:09:03 Anyway alex, hello nice to see you again 2:09:07 Is the feepocalypse? 2:09:08 When is the feepocalypse alex? Is it tomorrow? 2:09:12 Hi guys, uh 2:09:15 I'm still a proponent of the feepocalypse and on that front there's been a few new developments. There's basically two funded 2:09:23 Uh roll-up companies one of which is doing sovereign roll-ups on bitcoin and the other one is doing 2:09:30 With evm evm capability and the other one is doing some other kind of roll-up on bitcoin without evm maybe with stark net 2:09:38 But I wanted just to remark on something about because there's been a lot of talk about miner incentives and regulation 2:09:46 And today we have something that's probably more offensive than any sidechain could possibly be for example 2:09:54 If wiki leaks did its disclosures today, there would be no better place for them to disclose then 2:10:01 to inscribe a whole collection of leaks in 2:10:04 Hierarchical inscriptions which have the same 2:10:08 Censorship resistance and immutability as bitcoin itself, right? 2:10:13 and that would be more offensive than any kind of 2:10:16 You know small potatoes financial movements on a z sidechains 2:10:21 And then the question will be well should the miners censor? 2:10:25 those inscriptions, well, of course they cannot because 2:10:28 They're basically, you know 2:10:31 In other words 2:10:33 The arguments about some sidechain or drivechain being offensive and for miners being forced to censor it 2:10:40 are moot relative to the possibility of simply dumping 2:10:44 you know highly highly classified, you know alien disclosure stuff or abuses by the 2:10:52 You know u.s proxies around the world 2:10:55 You know black sites, whatever it is that got wiki leaks people into big trouble 2:11:00 Can trivially be embedded immutably into bitcoin blockchain for 2:11:04 pennies essentially today and that would be much more offensive to the powers that be than 2:11:10 You know a few thousand nerds 2:11:12 Trying to mix their coins on 2:11:14 z sidechains 2:11:17 Yeah, that's a very good point 2:11:18 And yeah, just you know, I do feel a lot of it is like concern trolling and none of it is really real 2:11:24 there was a famous case in early in bitcoin where people put 2:11:28 Hyperlinks to 2:11:30 the dreaded 2:11:31 cp 2:11:33 and then uh that people said that would be the end of bitcoin and then someone actually somehow put 2:11:38 some of it actually 2:11:40 on the blockchain somehow and then again people said 2:11:44 This is the end of bitcoin, but of course 2:11:47 Nothing happened at all. Um, because why would it and all data has to be interpreted. Anyway, you could 2:11:55 Every everything is encrypted when it's digital in some way, you know what I mean? 2:11:59 Like because you know if you have to know if it's a jpeg or a png 2:12:04 So, well, yeah 2:12:06 You know, there's been a couple of new developments in the world of inscriptions that are highly promising as far as amplifying the fee pressure 2:12:14 Recently 2:12:15 They introduced what they call recursive 2:12:18 recursiveness of inscriptions which is to say that 2:12:21 Inscriptions which is to say that 2:12:23 you can now have whole websites with hundreds of 2:12:27 Elements all referring to each other as separate inscriptions inscribed and you can essentially launch 2:12:33 You know websites inside inscriptions 2:12:36 Where a single, you know html inscription refers to others 2:12:41 so that they call that recursiveness where you basically can have content assembling itself from 2:12:48 referring to 2:12:49 also, you have um 2:12:51 a situation where there is like public good inscriptions, for example, like there's been over 50 2:12:58 Popular javascript libraries that got inscribed and those can now be embedded inside websites 2:13:06 That are published inside inscriptions 2:13:09 What's interesting about those websites is that one of those websites? 2:13:13 Has decentralized naming like their domain names cannot be taken down 2:13:18 And the websites themselves are uncensorable completely 2:13:21 And the best part for the creators of these websites is that they pay upfront one-time fee 2:13:28 And they get essentially eternal storage and uncensorability 2:13:32 of their content inside bitcoin blockchain, which 2:13:36 Internal hosting which basically blows away amazon or filecoin or all these other 2:13:42 Things because once you pay the fee once 2:13:46 Today 2:13:48 uh, especially with this recursivity like for example, the publishers of nfts used to 2:13:53 Now they can dynamically draw images in 2:13:57 You know, they used to publish collections of let's say 1 000 2:14:01 Modifications of a bear right the bear would be wearing this hat or that t-shirt 2:14:06 Right now because of recursivity all they need is to publish 10 or 20 2:14:11 Uh 2:14:12 Things and then start combining them in arbitrary ways. So that's like a 99 2:14:18 a price cut on publishing a collection of 1000 bear images and because of jevon's paradox what you're going to see is that 2:14:26 um, there's going to be much more usage because you know, they just added a thousand new lines to the 2:14:31 Highway where you can basically publish millions of pieces of of 2:14:36 rendered visible content while paying 2:14:39 You know only one tenth of one percent of the fees 2:14:43 So that's the recursivity 2:14:45 I like it. I mean, I love the creativity of it, you know, and I love the 2:14:49 It's like it just speaks to how when people get annoyed at something new. They really are very short-sighted 2:14:56 It's a whole new internet if you think about it 2:14:58 This is like a whole new layer on top of the internet because you can now have 2:15:03 Websites 2:15:04 With domain names that are decentralized, you know, they have these dot sats names and dot whatever 2:15:10 And these websites are published once and they can refer to shared javascript 2:15:16 Uh libraries that are published by somebody else's public goods as other inscriptions 2:15:21 and these are completely dynamic websites that will just appear and 2:15:24 Uh, you know blockchain explorers and and they will be interactive as well 2:15:29 Right, they're not just static brochure websites. They will you know, they will be able to embed games like you can go to these 2:15:34 uh ordinals 2:15:36 portals right now and play like hundreds of 2:15:39 Video games that are essentially published to bitcoin paid for once for twenty dollars or whatever and then they remain hosted forever 2:15:47 And completely uncensorable and there's nothing that china or us or anybody else can do, right? 2:15:53 So there's this explosion of of essentially 2:15:56 The cheapest publishing decentralized medium for websites that's because of recursivity 2:16:01 then there is this 2:16:03 Additional feature that was added called re-inscriptions 2:16:07 Which is basically an ability to publish multiple inscriptions on a single satoshi 2:16:12 which allows you to have 2:16:15 You know, you can now essentially hold bags of inscriptions on a single, you know satoshi and move them around 2:16:22 Wholesale, right? You can trade wholesale bags. You can stash wholesale bags 2:16:27 But and the third most important I think addition is what's what they call provenance or hierarchical inscriptions 2:16:34 Where basically now you have a capability to create an inscription that represents your identity 2:16:40 Let's call it id inscription, you know, so like I would create an alex kravitz inscription 2:16:46 Then underneath that I could create a hierarchical file system of all my creative work like I could say 2:16:53 Collections and then inside each collection. I would create 2:16:56 A bunch of collections that hierarchically trustlessly contain 2:17:01 inscriptions 2:17:02 And the best part is that the artist can now seal the collections by burning 2:17:08 Like the root inscription and therefore provably making it impossible to print any more of that particular collection 2:17:16 so you now have basically like 2:17:18 the best of all possible worlds nft 2:17:22 And file system storage. So for example, you can take 2:17:25 um 2:17:26 a whole library of source code 2:17:29 Or or a bunch of doc, you know, baby pictures that you want to back up 2:17:33 and completely trustlessly 2:17:36 Associated with your own identity inscription that only you can control and all those things will have 2:17:42 Perfect trustless uncensorable provenance to your identity inscription 2:17:48 Well, that's pretty neat. I think that's also hope part of like what I would hope to have achieved 2:17:55 With sidechains where we have already resurrected the Namecoin sidechain 2:18:00 and I think 2:18:02 Not that they compete 2:18:04 I think that this just speaks though to how annoying it is that 2:18:08 You know 2:18:10 People compare things to gold 2:18:13 which they should 2:18:14 but of course gold has many alternative uses and many of them were discovered, you know, like 2:18:20 Gold was first discovered and then it was made into jewelry. And and then later it was made 2:18:25 You know like hundreds of years later. It was made into coins 2:18:28 And then it was used in teeth and then it was used in electricity and then whatever 2:18:32 I don't know when the japanese used it for that roof 2:18:35 that they made that one time but 2:18:38 It's not all at the same time is my point 2:18:40 And of course, it's much better 2:18:42 if you have something that 2:18:46 Um has many different 2:18:50 Like fallback use cases that makes it much better as money because when you have something like that 2:18:54 Now that that is something where you could it's basically a store where you can only pay in gold 2:18:58 You know and you convert it into like a tooth filling 2:19:01 And so groat is probably an example of something. You could only spend btc there 2:19:06 And that that you know 2:19:08 None of bitcoin made any sense to me until that website was created. So 2:19:13 I think we should do everything we can to encourage austrians used to argue about this remainder theorem or whatever which 2:19:19 You know a commodity must have some kind of 2:19:23 Regression, sorry regression. Yeah, it's not 2:19:26 Why don't you refuse? 2:19:28 But you can say now that before like, uh, the one demonstrative use case was to pay fees to transfer bitcoin 2:19:35 And now you can pay a fee to publish 2:19:38 You know a thousand page website forever and never pay hosting again and then have that website be 2:19:44 Unsensible immutable and interactive at the same time 2:19:49 And that you need to use bitcoin to pay those fees, right? 2:19:52 The tragedy of this old. Yeah. No, I think all that's great. I mean the problem with the 2:19:57 regression theorem is that 2:20:00 It's it's designed to just critique 2:20:03 Government money and it doesn't really do that because it it says that you need to have the money used needs to have alternate employments 2:20:10 First something needs to be used for something else before it can be money 2:20:14 But that but that's never defined at all 2:20:18 So it could just be people acquiring just because they like they like to look at it 2:20:22 And it ignores the fact that the fiat currency also has 2:20:26 Yeah, it ignores the fact that money because credit is also money 2:20:30 Right 2:20:31 Pretends that money all money is a commodity of some kind 2:20:35 it must be a physical object or something which 2:20:38 but that would no reciprocity would make any sense like people being invited to a dinner party and then 2:20:43 I'll have you over for my birthday and then we'll go over to your house for your none of that would make any sense 2:20:48 if 2:20:50 I'll marry off my daughter to your son, you know in exchange for 2:20:54 You making me a high priest of the clan or whatever 2:20:59 Right, so unfortunately is not that mises is best even though it is mises is one of the greats 2:21:07 we all love von mises, but 2:21:10 that theorem 2:21:12 It has no content because he doesn't say what he means about in whatever has to be used for first 2:21:17 So it could just be anything it could just be that they like looking at it or in the the fiat case 2:21:21 It could just be that they like 2:21:22 Supporting the government or it could be that they like paying taxes or being able to pay taxes 2:21:26 You know, it's like none of it doesn't actually mean it it fails at its task, which is supposed to lead to 2:21:32 Sort things into what could be money and what could not it doesn't actually do that. So 2:21:37 but 2:21:39 Von mises if you're listening 2:21:41 I just wanted to add something that inscriptions do provide competition to potential drivechains like for example 2:21:48 um 2:21:49 the name chain drivechain 2:21:51 Yeah, I think that's the case people are gonna and the Namecoin is going to prefer that 2:21:58 Everyone use the same phone book so they will have strong network effects. So whoever whoever's name thing takes off first will probably 2:22:05 win 2:22:06 It's that 2:22:08 Sidechains while being more scalable than roll-ups or encrypt or inscriptions because they're not limited by the data availability of bitcoin, right? 2:22:16 At the same time they need to develop their own 2:22:19 They need to achieve their own 2:22:21 escape velocity in order to become 2:22:23 uh 2:22:24 secure enough to be to be trusted right whereas 2:22:28 Both inscriptions and sovereign roll-ups on bitcoin automatically inherit immutability and double spend resistance of bitcoin 2:22:37 Uh, and you know in this regime of low fees, right? 2:22:40 Which we're still in right now, although, you know, we haven't had a block 2:22:45 a mempool clearing in like since april 23rd, which is 2:22:49 Amazing in a bear market. Just wait till the bull market hits, right? 2:22:53 um 2:22:54 Once the basically I I see I see such compelling 2:23:00 That I think the Namecoin one will but you're right you're 100 correct the trade-off will be this it will be 2:23:07 Being on L1 has many advantages such as immortality 2:23:12 And 2:23:13 That's pretty cool. But the L1 has the same problem. It's always had which is the limited block space cannot support critical mass of 2:23:21 end users 2:23:23 It can support luxury users, right? And those are the ones that pay the fees, right? 2:23:28 So in other words, it's the fact that if bitcoin transactions go to fifty dollars per transaction 2:23:35 and bitcoin remains only for 2:23:37 Essentially whales and institutions that will not stop 2:23:40 Luxury inscribed wars 2:23:43 From inscribing all of their baby pictures for a couple hundred bucks and making the whole thing a legacy. That's true kids and grandkids, right? 2:23:51 so we 2:23:56 It's a kind of a judgment call I agree with you 2:23:59 and it's a judgment call and i'm certainly not saying that I 2:24:02 am 2:24:03 I don't so i'm not very confident. But if I just if you look around the world and you see 2:24:08 The wealthy people of the world they use the same iphone that 2:24:11 many of the 2:24:12 relatively poorer people have same 2:24:15 same iphone and it's just like walmart versus 2:24:19 you compare walmart to like 2:24:22 I don't know 2:24:23 Rolex, you know, but the but the poor people in india or whatever they get those androids for 10 to 20 dollars 2:24:31 The chinese android clones and they also get fifty to a hundred dollar older 2:24:36 iphone models 2:24:37 So there's like a trickle down effect that once the high end is full 2:24:42 Then there is a trickle down to lower levels that you see you see this exactly this waterfall kind of multi-level fountain effect 2:24:48 In ethereum world where ethereum is like a luxury evm chain 2:24:53 That people, you know people who are whales or institutions don't care about paying fifty dollars to invoke a smart contract 2:25:00 If they're moving a few million dollars worth of liquidity 2:25:03 But this high level of fees is what creates 2:25:06 high level of security double spend resistance and immutability that then allows 2:25:11 L2 ecosystem to 2:25:13 Flourish and then you can perform a million transactions for the same amount on some highly scalable ethereum L2 2:25:20 So you basically have like this hybrid situation where you'll have both 2:25:24 You'll have a luxury L1 2:25:26 With high fees, but then you'll have 2:25:29 L2s and l3s with like ridiculously cheap fees 2:25:33 But so it'll be it'll be the same outcome on bitcoin 2:25:37 I think you will have basically large institutions in whales 2:25:40 and luxury, you know baby photo pictures 2:25:44 and whatever 2:25:45 Luxury nfts inscribed on bitcoin and you know 2:25:48 The artists will pay a hundred dollars to inscribe a single nft if it will then sell for ten thousand 2:25:54 On a luxury market. I mean after all 2:25:57 Fine art market today is 27 trillion dollars. It's larger than gold 2:26:01 I can't see a reason why fine 2:26:05 Immortal digital object market, which is what inscriptions are 2:26:09 They're like the ultimate form of nfts, right? 2:26:12 Why that can't get to a few trillion dollars and become? 2:26:15 a driver 2:26:16 of incredible fee pressure 2:26:21 Okay, so what's the fee 2:26:26 No, no, no my apocalypse rests on the existence of the fee market, right 2:26:30 And you you should not disagree with the following statement that the fee market only begins 2:26:36 on the last day that the mempool clears 2:26:39 Prior to that time the fee market cannot be said to exist because there is no equilibrium between supply and demand 2:26:46 So maybe we are in the fee market regime now because the fee market the mempool has not cleared since 2:26:51 Since april 23rd and my hunch is it will never clear again because of all these new developments 2:26:58 But we are finally at that point 2:27:00 That ethereum was in in 2019 when their when their mempool stopped clearing too 2:27:06 Right. So we are now just entering the fee market the first real fee market 2:27:14 Uh, but that's not quite the point though, I I would say 2:27:18 I would say like 2:27:20 cost per transaction like us dollars per 2:27:24 220 bytes or something like that 2:27:27 But that's not very high right now, so it has to be like five times ten times what a credit card would 2:27:36 Charge in that equivalent situation, you know what I mean has to be like well 2:27:40 It has to be high now, but you know that it has a non-linear response to demand because absolutely. Yes 2:27:46 we know that's the key between the small empty blocks and 2:27:50 I would really say that actually it's not so much that the mempool doesn't clear. It's like 2:27:55 When there is 2:27:57 Less space or just the right amount 2:28:00 It kind of doesn't matter 2:28:02 But as soon as there is 2:28:04 Scarcity i'm saying like going back and looking at the charts of fees of you know 2:28:08 Since the launch of bitcoin until now, I think is meaningless. The only charts that are meaningful are the charts that begin 2:28:15 Hopefully april 23rd this year and when I talk about non-linear response 2:28:21 The way I think about it is roughly 2:28:25 All in you have about 100 gigabytes worth of block space produced by bitcoin per year 2:28:31 So you can now think about 100 gigabytes of immortal data storage space 2:28:37 Produced for all of the unknown unknown applications yet. I mean a single sovereign roll-up that's about to be launched, right? 2:28:44 Could create could easily fill up that much with data storage, right? 2:28:49 You have luxury ordinals you have conventional bitcoin transactions everything, right? 2:28:54 And when I say non-linear response, what i'm talking about is simply ongoing adoption of bitcoin and ongoing adoption of 2:29:01 Inscriptions, etc, etc are hitting this immovable wall of 100 gigabytes per year 2:29:08 And once that once it hits that wall 2:29:11 You will quickly have the separation of bitcoin into this luxury 2:29:16 L1 chain the same thing we already saw happen in ethereum, right? 2:29:18 Like once it hit the wall and the blocks and the mempool stopped clearing but adoption continued 2:29:25 This is when the feepocalypse already happened in ethereum. And this is why 2:29:29 Ethereum is now scaling through L2s and has enough fee revenue to pay the yield, etc, etc 2:29:36 So there's no escaping 100 gigabytes per year 2:29:40 And I honestly can back up that much of my own data 2:29:44 And and leave it all encrypted in there, you know 2:29:47 easily, right 2:29:49 Uh, I agree with that. I mean it may be isn't it? 2:29:52 1008 blocks per week 2:29:54 52 weeks per year. So it is 52 000 ish 2:29:59 Uh blocks per year, so if you use the whole four megabytes 2:30:03 You can actually get the whole four megabytes to get to 200 gigabytes 2:30:07 But because of because the financial transactions do not use 2:30:11 They're not discounted if you assume the mix between financial and non-financial transactions in some kind of equilibrium you have to divide by two 2:30:20 Right because financial transactions only use 50 like if all transactions were financial 2:30:25 The actual block space would peak at 50 gigabytes per year 2:30:28 So i'm just assuming some kind of equilibrium between financial and non-financial transactions at 100 gigabytes per year 2:30:36 because if every transaction was 2:30:38 You know an inscription, oh by the way another interesting development is because of this recursivity 2:30:43 You can now inscribe a terabyte size inscription 2:30:47 in multiple transactions 2:30:49 That assembles itself from four megabyte pieces 2:30:52 So there's actually not even a four megabyte limit anymore. You can actually put a terabyte size 2:30:58 Well, I mean that'll take a few years. Well, that was obviously any of us who remember the days of winrar 2:31:05 That would be intuitive already 2:31:07 Exactly but but now it's like it's going to be on all these inscription, uh, you know, uh 2:31:13 Explorers where you basically, you know, you have a little button in there called upload inscription 2:31:17 And it used to be that that button would say 2:31:20 Uh, well only upload up to 400 kilobytes because the others are non-standard 2:31:24 But now these explorers have basically agreements with with pools that allow them to upload 2:31:30 four megabyte 2:31:32 Inscriptions and pay out of band 2:31:34 But the latest development is I want to upload a gigabyte size file 2:31:38 And okay, no problem. We'll chop it up and we'll use recursion 2:31:42 to reassemble the file 2:31:44 dynamically 2:31:45 You know from whatever 200 2:31:48 Subinscriptions that are all referred to by a parent inscription as parts. So it's a multi-part world, too 2:31:58 Okay moonsettler and rio have had their hands up for a while 2:32:02 Just a comment a little bit about oh, go ahead you first 2:32:06 I'll save this 2:32:15 Okay, okay, um, i'm just gonna say 2:32:17 a couple of things 2:32:19 Hypothetically SegWit that is not perpetual and immutable. It is allowed to be pruned 2:32:24 Will that ever really happen in practice? Probably not at this point given the popularity of inscriptions, but I do 2:32:30 Just want to clarify SegWit data is not 2:32:34 officially 2:32:36 Part of the bitcoin requirement for nodes to hold they are entitled to prune it. We could have assumed value 2:32:42 This is why SegWit was a soft fork in practice that is 2:32:45 Almost never done and probably given the value of holding it. But when we say these are perpetual 2:32:52 And the data on the inscriptions that is under the presumption 2:32:55 That they will not be pruning that becomes very very popular or even if it is perpetual 2:32:59 It may load slower than one would think because there's only certain nodes that maintain SegWit witness data from 2:33:06 Two decades ago and aren't pruning 2:33:09 I doubt because of technology improvements that that would ever be a concern for storage 2:33:13 But if we are the old school small blockers that want extreme decentralization and nodes a pruned node is easier to run than a non-pruned node 2:33:21 Just putting it out there love recursions 2:33:24 on inscriptions 2:33:25 love code 2:33:27 base and storage and 2:33:29 Witness data as a use case and a fee utility. I myself have put javascript 2:33:35 html that renders dynamic svgs on an inscription 2:33:39 That's my pfp on chain pepe 2:33:41 Just a pixel pepe where you can turn on and off laser eyes or bubble gum 2:33:46 And you can change the colors all on an inscription like the gentleman saying with the code there a dynamic 2:33:52 piece of art where you can change the traits or change the colors like a 2:33:56 Nft people do when you think about a trait based nft 2:34:01 very much there with recursion enabling that 2:34:04 all all all positive to what the 2:34:06 The gentleman said but the other thing I just want to talk about is the centralization of the indexer and the sequencer on ordinals 2:34:13 When we talk about immutable permissionless and unsensible with regard to the website 2:34:17 I think that's a little out of ourselves if I may critique giving the centralization of the sequencer index 2:34:24 Not that I don't love ordinals and what's happening there 2:34:25 But I just want to make sure we try to be as complete with what isn't isn't fully trustless fully decentralized and as hard as bitcoin 2:34:33 If I could if I could respond 2:34:35 that the reason why it's not an issue as far as prunability of SegWit data is because 2:34:41 We're talking about data availability not data storage 2:34:45 So the fact that uh an inscription when published will be propagated and made available 2:34:50 That's kind of what the best you can hope for and there will always be nodes that are archiving every node every block 2:34:56 Especially like you said because we're talking about 200 gigabytes of data per year 2:35:01 uh linearly increasing when we now have like, you know, uh 2:35:05 A tiny flash cards that can store, you know, 4 to 16 terabytes 2:35:10 So that's not going to be an issue. There's always going to be hundreds of archival nodes 2:35:14 That will just feed you every block even if 99 of nodes 2:35:17 Uh prune all the blocks or just the SegWit data 2:35:21 The other thing about centralization of indexes, there is no barrier to entry right into that business. Anybody can launch 2:35:27 an indexer website 2:35:29 And just like you have hundreds of block explorers you'll have 2:35:33 Or you can run your own node right you can simply run your own bitcoin node and see all the artwork 2:35:39 so so 2:35:40 I mean the fact that certain 2:35:43 Indexers are popular. I don't see as a sort of like an inherent centralization pressure because 2:35:48 It is though. I don't like casey's arbitrary block height. I run my own independent indexers now my pointers go differently 2:35:56 So do you build on casey's ecosystem of ordinal recursions or mine if I run an independent? 2:36:01 I don't like it 2:36:03 Right, it's like forking and and bitcoin right you will you will have incompatibility but at the same time 2:36:09 there's like huge pressure to 2:36:11 to reach consensus on the protocol 2:36:14 and I think casey's case's protocol will probably 2:36:18 Uh win out because casey's at this point casey's like satoshi in the early years and he hasn't quit the project yet 2:36:23 But he probably will 2:36:25 Uh in a year or two, right like once the protocol stabilizes 2:36:29 Um the ordinal's protocol with all these, you know, three mega features, which is one is recursiveness 2:36:35 Recursiveness of inscriptions and I think even a bigger one is this whole 2:36:39 provenance or nestedness 2:36:41 Of inscriptions because i'm actually tempted to create my own identity for the first time on bitcoin 2:36:47 and have that identity actually be 2:36:50 like the root of my all of my 2:36:53 stuff that I want 2:36:55 Because that's the first time that you can publish something in a completely, you know 2:37:00 Immutable immortal uncensorable way and then have it all provenance back to you trustlessly, right? 2:37:08 Yeah, I agree 2:37:09 Hierarchical aspects and the recursion is definitely the case and I agree it requires 2:37:14 the social consensus to a single protocol 2:37:17 in terms of curse numbers 2:37:19 And and how to handle the reinscriptions that's probably likely been made and I do hope everything you 2:37:24 Said comes comes to pass. I also agree. I think it will but I just 2:37:28 pointed out the the critiques 2:37:30 We're just in like the year 2009 2:37:32 We're just in the year 2009 or 2010 2:37:36 Once casey quits and you know and leaves the project fatherless 2:37:40 Which probably will happen once the protocol stabilizes at that point you can say well, you know ossification started to set in for inscriptions, right? 2:37:50 Yeah, you make 2:37:55 Because 2:37:56 It's true that you could 2:37:58 I guess it would always be cat and mouse like it'd be like stamps would just be where it would go 2:38:06 I guess it's it's interesting how whether or not it's really immortal 2:38:11 It sort of is 2:38:14 Publication, right? Yeah. Sorry 2:38:17 Go ahead 2:38:18 Yeah, I wanted us and you kind of answered my second question, which was about 2:38:24 What what do you guys think about the possibility that bitcoiners in response will go to like a pruning network? 2:38:32 just to like 2:38:34 Be able to use the bitcoin block space for financial transactions and like completely demolish any notion of of 2:38:42 Of 2:38:44 permanence 2:38:45 For exogenous data storage and in theory with this zero sync 2:38:52 development and 2:38:54 and heavy pruning 2:38:56 you could like really really reduce the 2:39:00 The significance and the number of the fully archiving nodes enough that 2:39:04 basically is not 2:39:06 Really winning out against cloud storage, uh for the redundancy and data availability you get 2:39:13 for the price impact the economic 2:39:18 Monsanto i'm not worried about it because remember bitcoin today has a single honest peer assumption where somebody needs to give you the heaviest chain 2:39:25 even if 99% of your peers are sponsored by 2:39:29 Chinese communist party. So this archival of data is the same thing. You need to find one 2:39:35 Archiving node that's actually not pruning and once you have found a peer 2:39:41 Well in the future, right once you such once you found one archiving peer 2:39:45 That peer does not 2:39:47 you know the data that comes from that peer does not need to be trusted right and then you can 2:39:52 Recreate the archive locally by running your own node. So the same kind of people have to that's my point 2:39:59 People don't have to but as long as some people will 2:40:03 The data is immortal still right because you you would simply need to find a single archiving peer 2:40:08 Just like today you need to find a single honest peer that gives you the heaviest chain. It's the same kind of assumption 2:40:15 With zero sync you don't actually have to because uh, you are just getting zero knowledge proofs of uh first the header chain 2:40:23 as soon as 2:40:30 But I know you don't have to but if it costs you less than a dollar to archive everything because you know 2:40:35 10 years from now entire bitcoin blockchain will cost one penny to store 2:40:40 uh, you know on non-volatile storage, you will have plenty of these archiving column, you know, and it's true that 2:40:49 The zero sync does let you shortcut but you cannot 2:40:54 Not everyone can use zero sync. There has to be someone who stores 2:40:58 Right 2:41:01 And uh, and that would that that could be reduced to like uh miners uh large 2:41:06 uh financial nodes and uh 2:41:09 and uh 2:41:10 Block explorer providers 2:41:15 Yeah, i'm not saying i'm not saying there is a possibility that it goes away i'm saying that the current level of 2:41:22 replication of the bitcoin blockchain the current 2:41:25 uh perception of of 2:41:27 complete permissionlessness and immutability 2:41:31 might might be on purpose given up just for that, uh, you know, the bitcoin users can actually 2:41:37 Like use the block space. This would be like one direction. It can go the other direction 2:41:43 Uh, it can go is is like really creating less desirable block spaces 2:41:49 Just for their endness so so that they are not unique not single 2:41:54 so any sidechain type thing 2:41:57 Must by default be less desirable for the luxury use case and and the financial transactions can be more competitive there, I guess 2:42:06 and 2:42:07 and 2:42:08 I I really really hated this idea before to be honest, but 2:42:13 actually 2:42:14 it might be possible that 2:42:17 That to further restrict and discourage this sort of use the the bitcoin users might actually agree on a block size reduction 2:42:24 On the main chain. So the what do you think about that? 2:42:30 Uh, I think the time of everything will has ended there will be nothing everything will be contentious from now on I think 2:42:40 Well also reducing the block size essentially kills 2:42:44 all the lightning style L2s including arc and lightning etc, because those depend on 2:42:50 Ability to appeal to the chain inexpensively, right? So reducing the block size essentially, you know kills 2:42:59 all all non-custodial lightning and it probably destroys arc and other coin pools and other protocols that 2:43:05 Still need to use a lot 2:43:08 Yeah, so that will not go over easy 2:43:11 but um, imagine the precedent of somebody essentially stealing, you know, wiki leaks like treasure trove of 2:43:19 Of highly embarrassing information and publishing it 2:43:22 under 2:43:23 you know 2:43:24 High provenance root as a giant collection of data into inscriptions, right? 2:43:29 Anonymously today that would be more infuriating to the u.s. Government, but because the government will be helpless about it 2:43:36 This will not be pursued or publicized right? 2:43:39 Because they will pretend, you know, like it hasn't happened. Like for example, there's plenty of highly offensive inscriptions to 2:43:45 Chinese government today 2:43:47 But they're not trying to censor bitcoin blocks through the great firewall of china as far as I know 2:43:54 Does china block ipfs today and the firewall blocks ipfs? 2:44:00 Interplanetary file storage 2:44:02 Ipfs is a failure because well, yeah, we're blocking. It's not even worth blocking 2:44:10 Okay, because yeah, you can't get a standard we have to have an explorer this that 2:44:15 Well, it's not that it's just that it's not incentive compatible 2:44:18 Essentially, it's prone to spam if you run your own node 2:44:20 Then your node will be overrun with child porn from other people 2:44:24 And you get more benefit for running a node 2:44:27 so there is like more incentive compatible like even even um, 2:44:32 even uh file coin is not truly incentive compatible because it doesn't guarantee like 2:44:37 eternal retrievability like 2:44:39 There was this other I forgot what it's called. Uh 2:44:42 Yeah, you have to write i'm pinning it's not there's no incentive to keep it perpetual similar to an archive 2:44:48 with 2:44:49 Very strong points. How can you how can you compete today with paying ten dollars worth of bitcoin? 2:44:55 And then having a website hosted forever like that's not that's nothing competes with that 2:45:01 Right and hosted forever in one place that we know that hundred years from now will still be 2:45:06 Available hosted forever if casey wins and I believe casey's protocol becomes a decentralized standard 2:45:13 But but but yeah 2:45:15 I mean like i'm more sure that that my website published in inscriptions today will be around 2:45:21 Then i'm sure that google will be around 100 years from now. I'll tell you the truth. That's fair 2:45:26 A better bet that that will figure this out and get to a consensus on ordinals in the next two years 2:45:30 Or then google will be well, I mean what's strong? What's the controversy? 2:45:33 What's the controversy there the the cursed inscription numbers I thought casey 2:45:37 Yeah on renumbering right like so that's already off the table 2:45:40 But anybody that already did a previous anybody that already did a previous cursed 2:45:44 Inscription recursion is cut off. He basically said you shouldn't have done cursed inscriptions before 2:45:48 I told you the block height where i'm going to honor cursed inscriptions 2:45:51 Some people are going to put an indexer that doesn't if they went cursed inscriptions before will it probably die out 2:45:57 As a as a side competitor and there will be this 2:46:00 One indexer like, you know, yes a large fraction of satoshi's bitcoins are sending 2:46:06 to 2:46:06 No longer standard addresses, right? 2:46:09 That's kind of like a historical artifact, but nobody cares about it now, you know 2:46:14 Exactly. So we have to forego the data that was put in cursed inscriptions prior to the 2:46:19 Recognization of cursed inscriptions at stated block height casey is about to announce 2:46:23 so 2:46:24 But then yeah, then the data any data from that point forward including cursed once they're recognized would meet your standard so 2:46:31 Uh, I I think we're gonna get where you're saying. I'm just saying it's not without I mean 2:46:35 This is like such a miner such a miner controversy, right compared to the stuff that no that's not controversial like 2:46:43 recursion and provenance, uh nesting and 2:46:46 You know the uh inscriptions 2:46:49 I mean all that stuff is like hugely like the fact when he launched inscriptions 2:46:52 I'm like i'm not doing anything with putting my data in there until provenance nesting is there because 2:46:58 I do want to you know 2:46:59 create a single inscription that then I can 2:47:02 Leave the private key for to my kids and then it's like 2:47:06 Right. Yeah 2:47:09 It's like your definitive artist signature if you're doing an art use case opposed to a data use case 2:47:15 It is very cool 2:47:17 Highly underestimated use case of provenance is that the artist? 2:47:22 Can burn the root inscription? 2:47:25 and provably 2:47:26 Terminate any possibility of anybody including himself adding to that collection, right? 2:47:31 It's like motley cruel guaranteeing. This is the last tour. We're signing 2:47:37 That's okay, I think 2:47:39 You could do that with any programming language 2:47:42 If van gogh no longer needs to die in order for his paintings to become valuable. He can just provably 2:47:47 Terminate his ability to add to that style of paintings 2:47:51 Right because the artist can just burn that root description and one thousand I mean you can 2:47:57 Apes will be will become possible to add. I mean you could just 2:48:04 Anything can be made unspendable, but that's fine. I mean, this is very interesting, but we should 2:48:09 see if anyone wants 2:48:12 Anyone else in the audience wants to bring us slightly more 2:48:16 More 2:48:18 Anything slightly more on topic per se I do think that's fascinating though 2:48:22 In the meantime one more question about this. Is there any chance like any chance whatsoever? 2:48:28 You think alex that this could go to like another blockchain? 2:48:34 Instead of bitcoin mainchain even a sidechain or like an altcoin. So like why why don't inscribers? 2:48:42 Prefer like vcash which just uh because 2:48:46 Well, they're adoptive block size 2:48:49 There's zero chance of that. I would I would I would not I mean if you're hoping for that, you know abandon all hope 2:48:55 Who hope for that? 2:48:57 and the reason for that is precisely what makes bitcoin so 2:49:01 You know so hard to change 2:49:03 in combination with this highly highly desirable protocol that was developed by casey which 2:49:09 Creates true immutable digital artifacts, right? 2:49:12 And they both have to go together in order to make inscriptions 2:49:16 As attractive as they are because every any other sidechain or even if you take casey's protocol and you launch it on a sidechain of bitcoin 2:49:25 The fact that sidechain, you know, if it's a drivechain, its survival is not really guaranteed 2:49:31 So it's like the everybody wants to be in one place 2:49:35 So there's zero chance that this will go anywhere else that's my short answer basically 2:49:40 The one proper competitor is doge and all's but again, you'd have to believe that dogecoin is going to be perpetual as much as bitcoin 2:49:47 So no, it's not it's not zero. I get 2:49:50 I understand why you would say zero, but I think 2:49:55 That's not right because 2:49:59 You have network you have network effects and you have the ability to customize 2:50:04 The new location chain in new ways 2:50:08 and you have unlimited 2:50:09 uh block space so 2:50:12 So those three are those are very powerful ingredients. I'm not saying that there's not a lot of truth 2:50:17 You're forgetting you're forgetting the veblen good dynamic, right? 2:50:20 Like the fact that these inscriptions will be expensive the fact that it will cost 2:50:25 You know a thousand dollars to put a monkey in there in a year or two 2:50:29 That will make that monkey more valuable it's kind of like a proof of work for rich people 2:50:34 The fact that there's no cheap way to mint them is is a is what makes them attractive 2:50:40 The fact that you would pay in a one dollar fee or one cent fee on polygon 2:50:44 You know, the whole veblen good dynamic is incredibly strong with with luxury ordinals and luxury inscriptions. This is underestimated 2:50:53 Yeah, I think it's underestimated but I also think it's overestimated 2:50:58 Because 2:50:59 what you're saying is that there is 2:51:00 I think we're just in early days and the only thing that people think that this could be used for 2:51:05 Is some kind of like frivolous 2:51:08 Digital art thing and I think that actually there will be many more 2:51:14 Things that are useful, um that are not like that. I mean so like, you know something like rolex 2:51:21 Is not worth as much as walmart it's like, you know, like the whole brand is worth like one 2:51:26 Thousand as much 2:51:28 Or more. It's true that you might have a bigger nft market on polygon in in aggregate 2:51:34 but my my only claim is that 2:51:37 You will have a big enough 2:51:40 inscription market on bitcoin 2:51:42 To to catalyze the apocalypse and by if apocalypse, I mean fees going to ten or twenty dollars 2:51:47 per financial transaction and staying there permanently and the reason that's apocalypse is because that essentially neutralizes 2:51:55 Non-custodial lightning or arc and it sort of immobilizes global south bitcoin savings as they stand today, right? 2:52:02 Because somebody in nigeria who has the dust. Yeah 2:52:08 Right, yeah, so somebody in nigeria who has five hundred dollars worth of bitcoin savings will not want to pay fifty dollar fee to move them 2:52:15 So you essentially you this is the point at which bitcoin 2:52:19 L1 becomes whales and institutions only and I guarantee you that this time next year 2:52:25 You know the the laser eyed priest will just tell the faithful just buy some blackrock etf to get exposure 2:52:31 and don't worry about 2:52:32 you know multi-sig setups and you know worrying about 2:52:37 Right, that will be that will be I mean i'm predicting 2:52:43 That'll be very bad 2:52:44 But that will be for bitcoin the official but it will 2:52:48 But you know what else it would be, uh, you know phenomenal for our big 300 2:52:51 of course, which would be the last lifeboat leaving the titanic in that scenario basically because 2:52:56 The L1 well, I mean and all the existing L2s 2:52:59 The feep apocalypse is good for all L2s, right including drivechains because the apocalypse causes the plebs to 2:53:06 To rebel against the priests of laser eye cult and the plebs will scrape scale bitcoin now, right? 2:53:12 Which will force some kind of L2 scaling which is not available in bitcoin today because there's no trust minimized 2:53:18 Way to move bitcoin to any kind of L2 right now 2:53:22 so both drivechains roll-ups sovereign or 2:53:26 or 2:53:27 Or non-sovereign the uh, what do they call the the the roll-ups with the with the bridge, right? 2:53:34 all kinds of 2:53:36 Yeah, not optimistic but uh 2:53:39 The other kind of provable validity roll-ups zk a validity roll-up. So validity roll-ups sovereign roll-ups 2:53:45 Uh 2:53:46 drivechains 2:53:47 Spider chain, right? 2:53:49 like you guys have heard the spider chain is out there now and 2:53:52 all kinds of L2s will finally be free because you know 2:53:55 There will be a common soft fork. There will be all these soft forks because the priests will be shown to be bankrupt in there 2:54:02 you know in their ideology of 2:54:04 Claiming that bitcoin is for the global south billions while the fees of perma high at 20 to 50 bucks 2:54:11 I 2:54:14 Would just count that the global south currently works in the us dollar with 40 wire fees 2:54:19 Which is a travesty and does lock them out and why a majority of the global south don't have access to it 2:54:23 But I will say that the the current use case does not provide them a better alternative 2:54:28 Than 40 transactions. That's the problem bitcoins 2:54:31 Try not to solve trying to solve not be the same as your point is extremely well taken one other thing though 2:54:39 Uh, I will say I do think paul made a spectacular point providence luxury good fully granted 2:54:45 If I believe script hash 2:54:48 And script mining and dogecoin is not going anywhere and I just want to have a permissionless website where I want to put javascript packages 2:54:55 Doginals is a legitimate threat to ordinals from a recursion standpoint because it is copyable and they don't have the controversy of kc 2:55:01 that's that I only think that's for the use case of technical immutable websites and javascript open source publishing 2:55:08 And I don't need it to be prominent 2:55:10 I functionally need it in combination with the doge being lower fees to do that 2:55:14 I do think there is a challenge to inscriptions utility use case by doginals 2:55:19 as ridiculous as of course a shitcoin is 2:55:22 but 2:55:24 If i'm a programmer and i'm like we said in nigeria and I want to make my immutable website 2:55:29 I'm, not putting it on inscriptions. I'm putting it on doginals as crazy as it sounds right because of what you speak of 2:55:34 of the cost prohibitiveness 2:55:37 I 2:55:47 Mean yeah, the cost is of course a double-edged sword 2:55:50 It's a double-edged sword, but those journals will I don't see them being any more over threat than than bitcoin 2:55:56 Satoshi vision is to bitcoin, right? You can have an unlimited amount of block space out there 2:56:02 But you know, you can have 10 million copies of the mona lisa, but they're not mona lisa 2:56:07 It's it's the same story all over again, right? Yeah, the prominence and luxury cases is there it's only about 2:56:14 decentralized permissionless storage that 2:56:17 people will claim 2:56:18 And my claim is actually weaker than it may appear because i'm not claiming that the market for luxury 2:56:24 Ordinals will be trillions of dollars. All i'm claiming is that it will be large enough 2:56:28 To raise the fees to 10 20 for financial transactions and keep them there forever 2:56:34 So essentially it's large enough to to cause a 2:56:37 Fipocalypse of the plebs and the uprising to scale bitcoin. That's that my only claim is that i'm not claiming that 2:56:44 The market will be the largest market in the world 2:56:47 so 2:56:48 I think it's a very strong claim. Yeah, I would agree you think there's going to be 2:56:52 three to four hundred thousand 2:56:55 Of those created every year 2:56:58 on 2:56:59 24-7 365 2:57:02 Well, you didn't watch that right you saw sats the brc 20s where it just didn't stop and they minted 21 quadrillion 2:57:09 Sat well, there's 38 million 2:57:12 Inscriptions already right since january. All right, and just remember 2:57:16 Once once you once you overflow 100 gigabytes per year 2:57:21 The fee response is non-linear 2:57:23 Like in other words the fees will spike exponentially once the demand exceeds 100 gigabytes per year 2:57:29 That's the block space available I can tell you that somebody will want to put a movie in there 2:57:34 at five gigabytes 2:57:36 It's not that expensive today and given recursive recursion 2:57:41 You can you know assemble it from parts 2:57:43 So why not back up valuable hollywood movies in there or corporate documents or whales? 2:57:49 Why not use like on our dogecoin where you have the space and it costs you? 2:57:53 A fraction of that if you're looking for eternal storage because of the same reason because of the same reason that people don't use 2:58:00 You know people if the only place where eternity can be found is bitcoin. It's not in 2:58:05 bitcoin 2:58:09 We hope uh, but I think to alex's point 2:58:13 as he says if it switches 2:58:16 if 2:58:17 the dynamics could switch to something that looks a little bit more like 2:58:21 Instead of what it looks like now when the blocks are near empty 2:58:25 and we pay 2:58:26 Whatever it is 2:58:27 You know a 20 cents per bitcoin transaction for 220 bytes 2:58:32 um 2:58:34 They could switch to something like what is the average income of 2:58:38 an upper middle class 2:58:41 resident of the united states like 2:58:43 percentage of that because if it switches to some kind of 2:58:47 signaling or attention-based 2:58:50 economy 2:58:51 Thing where people are just bidding against themselves 2:58:55 It could plausibly, you know take on a completely different form 2:59:00 and 2:59:01 You know 2:59:02 So they could be the feepocalypse 2:59:05 For example right now there is no tool out there that will allow you to upload the file system into inscriptions 2:59:11 Even though the protocol supports it as far as I know. No indexer has a button that says pick a folder 2:59:18 And hierarchically upload all of its contents 2:59:21 But the protocol already supports that right? 2:59:24 So it's just a question of some ui is popping up and people are like, oh, wait a second. It will cost me 500 2:59:31 To put my will and all the related, you know addendums and all the corporate documentation. That's super valuable 2:59:38 encrypted 2:59:39 As a as a kind of a giant zip archive or a bunch of folders and then I can hand the keys 2:59:46 That are backed up on on steel or paper to my heirs 2:59:50 And then I can decrypt this data. There's just no tool to do that. But the protocol supports it, right? You can see 2:59:55 that 2:59:56 You know all the all the wealthy individuals in the world are competing for 100 gigabytes per year worth of this block space, right? 3:00:04 You can see how high the fees can go, right 3:00:09 Yeah, encrypted backups will be one thing that bitcoiners might actually consider doing 3:00:18 I mean 3:00:19 I would want to put my encrypted will in there and then take the decryption keys on steel and hand it 3:00:25 To my you know attorney or to my heirs. I guess i'd have to understand why you think that 3:00:31 people would pay 3:00:33 a premium when they're able to get the same function for 3:00:37 A thousand it's not the same function. It's absolutely because there's 3:00:42 Because if you're saying there's going to be 3:00:45 What you're saying is there's ample we'll see whoever story alex's poor gentleman has a litecoin right in his name 3:00:54 But alex you do think that 3:00:57 We agree alex that bitcoin is sort of an immortality thing, but do you if you actually head to beth? 3:01:03 Like we time travel 10 years into the future 3:01:06 Do you think litecoin is like just like? 3:01:09 completely no 3:01:11 Because all old chains don't go away. They just become zombified, right? Like I mean, well, that's sort of what he's saying 3:01:18 But i'll let him make his point is there will be sufficient demand for forever storage 3:01:23 And if you have the ability to but only but only at that one Schelling point, right? 3:01:27 There has to be like for example 3:01:30 There's plenty of places in new york city where you can tell people to meet 3:01:34 But there's only one place they can figure out to meet with each other without coordinating. That's the grand central station, right? 3:01:40 So bitcoin is a Schelling point 3:01:42 For immortality, right? Like the fact that you could meet in new york, you know at the statue of liberty for example, or other well-known landmarks 3:01:51 Actually, this experiment has been conducted, right? 3:01:53 You know give give a hundred students an assignment 3:01:56 To meet each other without ever coordinating a single message in new york city 3:02:00 And 50 of them or more will show up at the clock. Of course 3:02:04 It was tom shelling himself who did the experiment and in the actual data is in his book the strategy of conflict 3:02:10 Which is one of my favorite bitcoin is such a shell 3:02:13 It's not litecoin 3:02:15 It's it's it's not litecoin. I mean litecoin will not be gone. I'm not claiming that litecoin data will be inaccessible 3:02:22 I'm, just it's just obscure. It's just like 3:02:25 But don't what do you think you're going to be you're going to see a front like a business is going to come to you 3:02:29 And say hey, i'm I have a way I can store your data 3:02:33 Forever will help you encrypt the keys blah blah. You're not even as a customer 3:02:37 You're not going to know what you're getting put up, you know 3:02:39 You're not going to know is it on bitcoin or is it on litecoin? 3:02:41 You're just going to pay a fee and someone's going to handle it for you, right? 3:02:45 You know a lot of things because I mean you see, you know 3:02:48 No, no because this is valuable data you people burning their nfts that they paid up, you know 10 000 for an ethereum 3:02:55 To teleport them to inscriptions, right? 3:02:58 People are burning their ethereum nfts today to teleport them. You're talking about people in the crypto 3:03:04 You just told me there's like 3:03:08 This is the whale sphere 3:03:10 This is not even a this is a whale sphere, right? This is a whale crypto sphere 3:03:15 Like what i'm saying is that 1 000 crypto whales is enough to get the great perma high fees 3:03:22 It's the one percent of the one percent like you don't even need 3:03:25 The crypto people or regular normies doing this 3:03:30 You just need 3:03:31 Like michael saylor said that he would like to store valuable corporate documents in inscriptions 3:03:37 I mean he realizes the use case. He hasn't done it yet, but 3:03:41 Wait till he comes out a few months from now and says oh we put you know 3:03:45 Encrypted versions or clear text versions of our legal, you know corporate formation documents and 3:03:51 you know our 3:03:52 Reports that we file with the government or whatever it is. That's valuable in there and people will start doing it, right? 3:03:58 corporates 3:04:00 whales 3:04:01 It's i'm talking about one person like this is a market for 3:04:07 He said there's gonna be how many billions of transactions backed up 3:04:11 I'm saying i'm saying that there's only 100 gigabytes worth of block space per year, right? 3:04:16 And you can you can have a thousand transactions occupying it or you can have 10 million transactions occupying it 3:04:22 But this this is like a hard 3:04:25 Unbreachable limit that once you fill up 100 gigabytes per year 3:04:29 this is exactly for the same reason that bitcoin itself is valuable because it's like 3:04:34 escalating adoption meets immovable scarcity 3:04:38 this is escalating adoption that 3:04:40 will also meet immovable scarcity and that's the 3:04:43 What's the tipping point in your opinion of where? 3:04:47 uh, the cost gets to be 3:04:50 So great that people go, okay, is there any other option? 3:04:55 Oh 3:04:56 It we already saw this process before this this exact what what we're theorizing has happened in a large ecosystem called ethereum 3:05:03 And the tipping point was that for six months 3:05:06 Ethereum blocks were full 3:05:08 And people would have to pay 10 or 20 dollars per transfer 3:05:12 Just to move ether around or your c20s. And then what happened was that the prices did not fall to zero but L2s appeared 3:05:19 And once L2s appeared that put a ceiling 3:05:22 on 3:05:23 Cost on L1, but the cost never goes down. It's like 3:05:27 This restaurant is no good because it's always crowded kind of effect, right? 3:05:31 So the same dynamics will play out like once you have ten dollars 3:05:35 Per transaction fees or twenty dollars per transaction fees that don't go down 3:05:40 This is what I call the fipocalypse and then we'll be scaled bitcoin now uprising and then L2s will appear but L2s 3:05:46 Might be arc it might be covenants, but L2s will not give you the same functionality as L1 in regards to ordinals, right? 3:05:52 Correct, but but but for most for but it will be better 3:05:56 You know, if we had validity roll-ups, you would have the same security guarantees for your actual bitcoin 3:06:02 So global south plebs could store their savings on a validity roll-up 3:06:06 with the same exact security guarantee that that l1s but they would pay one one penny or 3:06:12 Five cents to move the savings over there and once in their lifetime, they would move it 3:06:17 back to L1 3:06:18 Yeah, this is the weird realization that the transactional logs don't actually need to be kept forever. They don't need to have the same 3:06:27 Uh 3:06:28 Finality as some alternate use cases. It's very very weird, but 3:06:32 Uh, basically what people want is that the ledger to be immutable 3:06:36 But spent UTXOs are not really a big concern for anyone that uses bitcoin as money 3:06:52 All right, well I guess what i'm getting is, you know, maybe i'm a light corner, right but 3:06:56 You're saying is once ordinal fees 3:06:59 Get to be ten to twenty dollars on bitcoin 3:07:02 excess 3:07:03 uh demand spills over to another chain that is capable of providing the same level of 3:07:09 Security the same functionality until their fees get to be ten or twenty dollars and then on to a third 3:07:15 well, not the same but 3:07:17 Like if you want the same security, you need validity roll-ups essentially 3:07:22 But you can scale computation on a validity roll-up, but you cannot scale data, right? 3:07:30 Right 3:07:32 So it will be imagine 3:07:34 Like the visualization I have in mind is this multi-level water fountain where the highest level is like L1 3:07:40 Once that bucket is full then it starts overflowing to the next level 3:07:45 And that's exactly what we saw in ethereum 3:07:46 For example 3:07:48 All the ethereum L2s right now are executing six acts of transactions of ethereum itself 3:07:52 So there's like six scaling of ethereum on its own L2s 3:07:55 but they're launching an L2 right now called layer n which promises a million transactions per second and 3:08:02 500 millisecond finality 3:08:04 Without losing security guarantees of ethereum, for example 3:08:08 So there will be like this infinite amount of block space on L2s and l3s 3:08:13 But this highly desirable weblin good 3:08:17 block space 3:08:18 so, I mean central banks or you know, i'm assuming i'm also assuming institutional institute full institutionalization like 3:08:24 i'm assuming that it will not be controversial five ten years from now for 3:08:29 Eurodollar banks to hold bitcoin on their balance sheet, right and when they settle with each other once a day 3:08:34 They don't mind paying a thousand dollar per transaction fee because they're settling a billion dollars worth of bitcoin 3:08:40 so whales institutions and luxury ordinals, that's 3:08:44 That's the only things that can fit into this hundred gigabytes per year everything else has to overflow into this other buckets 3:08:50 If the roll-ups are just as good why why bother? 3:08:54 Why pay the fee if this roll-up is just as secure? 3:08:59 Because roll-ups can 3:09:03 Roll-ups have 3:09:05 immutability and double spend guarantees of the L1 3:09:09 but 3:09:11 Roll-ups are just like a different neighborhood, right? 3:09:15 I mean you can say that there's some neighborhoods in texas have no crime and you know, they have low taxes 3:09:19 But for some reason people want to live in hamptons not not in the middle of plano, texas 3:09:26 Yeah, this is just a commodity this is just block space right it's just transactions 3:09:31 It's just people want to be where other people are right? 3:09:33 Like if i'm if i'm leaving something to my heirs or corporate like if if all corporations and wealthy individuals use 3:09:39 Bitcoin for this kind of valuable document backup 3:09:43 then there is like 3:09:45 It becomes sort of like a country club. You want to use what other people of your and there's like 100 3:09:51 There's like millions of insurance companies. There's i'm in a town with eight country clubs 3:09:56 And i'm living a small rust city. I mean, it's not people are diverse and what they're looking for 3:10:02 And what why do you pay a thousand to ten thousand neighborhoods? 3:10:07 What's that? 3:10:08 Well, because it's not it's not it's not just about data backup. Like what about putting, you know deeds on a blockchain, right? 3:10:14 You know, yeah 3:10:16 You know chains of ownership and I I agree with you there can be demand for this long term 3:10:22 Uh forever what i'll call forever chains 3:10:25 and you may not think 3:10:26 script mining with 3:10:28 frankly script mining with dogecoin having unending block rewards is 3:10:33 Maybe more suitable because it has that tail emission 3:10:37 Or something like monero that has a forever tail emission may have some more 3:10:41 reality of being 3:10:43 Sustainable bitcoin has a tail emission in another commodity. It's called block space 3:10:48 There's a hundred gigabytes of it produced forever every year. Well, yeah, so that's the television dogecoin dogecoin has 3:10:55 10 times that right? No, but like no, I know but like so, you know bsv as well, but i'm saying like 3:11:03 Uh 3:11:04 Bitcoin is like beverly hills or you know, or bel-air and other chains are like other neighborhoods basically 3:11:12 Yeah, fair enough, I mean I I guess that's the 3:11:16 that's a lot to pin your 3:11:18 Uh pin your hopes, but the thing is again, my claim is is is weak. I'm not claiming trillion dollar size markets here 3:11:25 I'm claiming 3:11:26 Just enough fee pressure to catalyze a fee apocalypse. Yeah, I hope and that's not even much. I frankly hope there is like I think fees 3:11:33 Full blocks are 3:11:35 critical to any chain, you know 3:11:38 I certainly would love to see 3:11:40 I don't like paul's old arguments about you know fees being insufficient because 3:11:45 They all reflect pre-fee market era, which hopefully the fee market did actually begin on april 23rd a week ago. It came 3:11:54 within 20 or 30 blocks of clearing 3:11:57 But it didn't it started rising again. So I guess we still have that fee market 3:12:01 Hopeful, you know that started on april 23rd, but a week ago it looked like the blocks were going to clear again 3:12:08 But then the fee started rising again 3:12:11 Well, you know that my argument which of course may be wrong. Of course, it's very much a scientific 3:12:18 Argument, so it's very falsifiable. In fact, I literally give the 3:12:23 challenge 3:12:24 In the post the blog post I say I don't remember exactly what I said, but I said something like 3:12:29 Point to a two-month period where the bitcoin price isn't 3:12:33 rising where the fees were above two dollars and 3:12:38 And increased or something like that but um 3:12:43 The argument was based on the fact that people don't enjoy paying high fees every time it's not just like, you know 3:12:49 so you have a very 3:12:52 You have a view 3:12:53 But wealthy people enjoy paying high fees 3:12:56 That's that's the dublin. Yeah, you have a different this is your thing 3:12:59 so so but this is what i'm saying is if that's what i'm saying before is if you're right, then the fees will rise to like 3:13:05 some percentage of the 3:13:07 the average wealthy person's 3:13:09 Annual income or something. Don't you think you're also basing? No, I think 3:13:13 Wealth is based in a system that 3:13:16 Has people that where the wealth distribution is so bizarre in a fiat system 3:13:22 like that it's not gonna 3:13:24 exist in a bitcoin system 3:13:28 Just random 3:13:30 Everyone I just gotta tell you I could be worse because there's a the only book that you ever need to read 3:13:36 about 3:13:38 I mean i'm joking, of course 3:13:39 Read all the books you want 3:13:41 Every book you can get your hands on but the only one on equal inequality that's any good is called the great leveler 3:13:48 And I don't know if anyone here has read it, but it's fantastic 3:13:52 but the summary is 3:13:54 there are 3:13:57 If left left to left to ourselves inequality increases geometrically that's the norm but every now and then 3:14:05 Something really horrible happens like famine war catastrophe disease 3:14:11 And then it knocks everyone back down to the same spot and zero 3:14:16 And then it starts to become unequal all over again, but I highly recommend this book 3:14:24 I 3:14:26 Guys had his hand. I mean everything we're speculating about so has already happened, you know, so go ahead 3:14:33 So people could send them mad max basically 3:14:39 And then mad max you said 3:14:41 Yeah 3:14:43 Well, why it's not mad max. I think it's a huge 3:14:48 Yeah, it's not 3:14:49 i'm saying 3:14:51 That is the only thing that has ever caused equality 3:14:54 But that it won't necessarily happen. In fact quite the reverse if 3:14:58 bitcoin protects us from some kind of apocalypse then 3:15:01 normal apocalypse not fee apocalypse 3:15:04 Not to be confused 3:15:06 And if it protects us from that then it will just increase the geometric growth 3:15:09 I think the wealth inequality was kind of a tangent 3:15:12 Anyway, it was just saying what alex is saying is there's only 100 gigabytes of space 3:15:17 The population is huge. It has a certain number of like rich people 3:15:21 Something like that 3:15:23 Yeah 3:15:24 and also, I mean once once once we've hit the like right now, we're at equilibrium because 3:15:30 The the mempool is not clearing. So there's actually a valid price in the market for block space 3:15:36 Now imagine that this valid what happens to this valid price once 3:15:41 Gradually adoption escalates by 2x every year or a year and a half in bitcoin world 3:15:46 Simply due to gradual inertia of escalating adoption, right? 3:15:50 The price doesn't go up 2x might go up 8x or 16x, right? That's a non-linear response 3:15:57 Same same as scarcity of bitcoin itself, right? Bitcoin itself is highly scarce 21 million units 3:16:03 Once adoption keeps doubling every year and a half or two 3:16:07 There's a non-linear response in price. It's exactly the same. By the way, if you believe this was 3:16:12 This was my expectations of the entire ordinals inscription luxury good whatever inscribing thing 3:16:20 So that was my baseline assumption. That's what I expected to happen just from people adopting bitcoin 3:16:28 That's yeah, that that would be enough to raise the fees inscriptions just brought it up 3:16:31 Two or three years and said like the fees would go to 3:16:37 Yeah, of course i'm just saying that people do seem my experience has been 3:16:42 Since you brought my article, which is fine 3:16:44 Of course, obviously it's fair game 3:16:46 But i'm just saying my experience has been 3:16:49 People don't like paying these fees. So when the fees go up people complain and then they don't just complain they stop 3:16:54 Transacting in bitcoin. Sometimes they move to an altcoin. Sometimes they try to batch 3:16:58 Sometimes they just quit altogether and they say this crypto thing is stupid 3:17:02 And but whatever it is 3:17:04 But that's the equilibrium in the multi-level fountain, right? 3:17:07 Like people will go to the next level of the fountain, but that does not empty the bucket at the top 3:17:15 The pain has to get high enough which it did in ethereum, right and ethereum transactions went to ten dollars per transfer in 2019 3:17:23 and 3:17:24 They haven't gone to zero even though there's now all this 3:17:27 plentiful L2 space that can move 3:17:30 You know thousand times more transactions for some reason ethereum block space is not back to zero 3:17:37 It's the same the same is going to happen with bitcoin 3:17:40 well, I think it's 3:17:42 I think it's a fascinating open question. I mean, I think it's totally empirical which means that I really can see it 3:17:48 I can see it going any which way 3:17:51 It's very interesting that unlike most most bitcoin stuff is very theoretical but this I don't think this is this is really something where 3:18:00 I do think like 3:18:03 Anything could happen like we could wake up tomorrow and it could just start happening 3:18:07 but 3:18:10 It has to be something that requires this the digital governance 3:18:14 Right that to happen in a decentralized space, you know, because if i'm again like you bring up the will example 3:18:21 If I can go buy three usb drives and they cost me 15 bucks and I store it and pass them around 3:18:29 What's I don't i'm not sure what i'm gaining by putting it on on a bitcoin protocol 3:18:35 Well, I think there is a big difference between like total certainty and like high confidence 3:18:40 so I think that is 3:18:42 but 3:18:43 I guess i'd have to see from your average user why they would go pay 3:18:47 What you're gaining is that the devices that read your usb drives will change the standard of the interface in 5 10 20 years 3:18:54 Just like cds or cd-roms are hard to read these days 3:18:58 Whereas the data in the bitcoin block space will always be at the Schelling point and always readable 3:19:04 But no matter what happens to hardware 3:19:07 Well, i'll just put on pieces of paper, you know what i'm saying 3:19:10 Yeah, but pieces of paper can burn a lot. I just look at 3:19:16 I mean, this is like a classic laser 3:19:18 I i'm not accusing you of being a laser eye, but i'm saying like a classic laser eye rationalization goes something like this 3:19:24 Well, if this doesn't work for you, then just use x and next year x will be you know 3:19:28 Just get some exposure through blackrock and watch the ngu, you know 3:19:32 So that I mean so like there's always these excuses for but why can't you just use, you know taproot assets or why can't you? 3:19:39 just use 3:19:40 lightning with factories 3:19:42 And all of these post-factum rationalizations don't actually apply, right? 3:19:47 Because there's one place that I know that will be uncensorable and immortal, right? That's bitcoin 3:19:54 I think the use case is there but it's maybe not as 3:19:57 As 3:19:59 Use case is proving itself. The use case is proving itself since january because you've seen 38 million of them created 3:20:05 They essentially account for 50 to 70 percent of all transactions included in blocks 3:20:10 It's like it's like in that movie about the pirates, you know, look at me. I'm the captain now 3:20:14 So like the inscriptions look at me. I'm the bitcoin now, right? 3:20:18 That's because they they comprise 3:20:21 Of all the transactions, right? 3:20:23 It's only the block space if not the coins themselves. No, no actual transaction counts not just the block space but transaction counts 3:20:32 Well, to me 3:20:36 Guys there is a solution for for that 3:20:39 The for for some things you you can 3:20:42 You need to use encryption for some things you need to use a oracle 3:20:47 Which are more public, you know 3:20:49 inscribing data and by the way, we're I mean I and uh other people are we are doing exactly what you're talking now and 3:20:59 We are working on the client and um 3:21:03 Probably if we if we manage to 3:21:06 To make it quick enough. Uh, the protocol will be also as a drivechain 3:21:12 And I want to be on a testnet 3:21:14 also 3:21:16 but uh 3:21:17 if uh 3:21:19 if drivechain 3:21:22 Will not be enabled soon. Probably we will use a 3:21:26 Um bitcoin top root and uh, but we will not uh directly on ordinals 3:21:34 One thing that we don't have is the two-way peg, right? 3:21:38 That's the missing piece because if they had two-way peg that would be game over right basically for all other L2s. Yeah 3:21:44 But you know what ordinal say I already burned ordinals. It just sent to the legacy address 3:21:50 And uh, it's destroyed. I mean you can 3:21:54 You can destroy more, you know 3:21:56 Very easily. It's like you can destroy them. But just like it's just like burning bitcoin, right? 3:22:02 uh, no, I mean you can't you can't burn impossible to burn bitcoin at the moment, I don't know if 3:22:08 something happened in the future, but 3:22:10 Like I mean burning like destroying the this the the inscription 3:22:15 not the the sat is actually 3:22:18 only a 3:22:19 You know number of sat in the in the wallet 3:22:21 Right 3:22:25 Well the owner of that capability to do it, right 3:22:29 I think he was saying that it's a user interface 3:22:32 Makes it too easy to accidentally destroy 3:22:35 Oh, okay. Yeah, I mean the wallets don't support this stuff yet 3:22:39 So but the protocol is there so this is the year 2009 or early 2010 of of inscriptions. I mean 3:22:47 this time next year there will be 3:22:49 Like I expect inscription support and trezor actually 3:22:53 Sooner or later, right? And that's sort of that's the mainstreaming of inscriptions is when trezor and other hardware wallets start supporting them 3:23:04 People love these hardware wallets. I really don't but 3:23:11 I like your offline computer as a hardware wallet idea too 3:23:15 which is fine, you know, let's 3:23:17 Get an old iphone and you know, wipe it out and and disable wi-fi in it and stuff 3:23:25 And get the faraday cage as well and that's the real expense 3:23:41 No, it's like uh, the faraday cage is not that it's a faraday because the faraday cage 3:23:44 you can't easily open the phone and and unplug the 3:23:47 Bluetooth and the wi-fi thing whereas you can with a laptop 3:23:51 It's it sounds crazy, but it's really not trust me 3:23:54 There's plenty of videos online where you can watch someone you just take a knife 3:23:58 you open the laptop up and there's a little thing that says wi-fi on a little label and you just 3:24:03 Grab it with your fingers and unplug it and then you're then you're good to go. It's not enough 3:24:07 I mean someone can actually read uh your screen and your keyboard very easily. Uh from a 3:24:14 Slight distance 3:24:17 That's why you need it's also live in the mountains. No, i'm just kidding. Yeah. Yeah 3:24:23 That the whole mountain man ideology is wacky right like sit in a bunker in the mountains. It's irrational because we have 3:24:32 We have many different risks and you have to weigh them each proportionally 3:24:35 And so the idea that they would people would care so much about this one particular risk 3:24:40 When and also for example, we have social animals with friends and family and societies, right? 3:24:50 Of course the people are rational what they would care about is activating BIP300 as quickly as possible that take that for granted obviously 3:24:58 By the way, the best way to activate BIP300 is to start uploading your file systems into inscriptions 3:25:04 There's no better 3:25:05 There's no need to lobby for it. You just need to start raising the fee level to ten dollars for a few months 3:25:13 Pleb pleb uprising will take care of the rest 3:25:17 Yeah, it will help. Yeah, I think you're probably right about that 3:25:21 That probably would help more but of course you have to remember from my point of view 3:25:24 I kind of think that they won't raise it won't go up 3:25:27 But I hope I think you're right. Didn't I agree with you when you first brought it up? I said that would be great for me 3:25:32 No, I mean it's a good outcome for all concern 3:25:35 It's just that you have this perfect substitutability idea that one block space is perfectly substitutable for another 3:25:42 And that's not true about neighborhoods like a piece of land in plano 3:25:46 Texas is not the same as piece of land in bel-air california 3:25:49 Right, so that doesn't work number one number two. The fee market only started a few months ago. So all the past 3:25:55 you know 3:25:57 Arguments about how high the fees were are just completely invalid because the fee market never existed 3:26:03 You know, why do you think that land's more valuable? 3:26:07 Because other valuable people and their properties are there, you know, ultimately it's the it's the 3:26:14 It's the country club effect, you know birds of feather flock together. That's at the end of the day 3:26:19 That's the social desire. Where do you do you buy your car insurance from some from where rich people buy car insurance? 3:26:25 No car insurance is that factor into your that's real estate does not like car insurance is a commodity 3:26:32 Those block space 3:26:34 Well guys, do you know? 3:26:38 Guys do you know that the biggest insurance settlement company is using a blockchain for their settlement? 3:26:46 Settlement 3:26:49 Who's that ethereum, I don't know 3:26:52 Lemonade no, no subnet subnet on avalanche, which is the the the same setup as a drivechain 3:27:02 Subnet something like that 3:27:05 And uh 3:27:07 and uh, it's it's secured by 3:27:09 by validator nodes on avalanche blockchain and actually 3:27:14 the main chain is uh 3:27:16 decentralized and it's UTXO based 3:27:19 uh 3:27:20 Chain and uh, you can create a 3:27:24 Special application blockchains they call but it's like a sidechain 3:27:30 Yeah, guys we interrupt this uh feepocalypse meandering conversation because we have a new person on the stage 3:27:39 Saul is on the stage. Hello 3:27:41 I 3:27:44 Didn't mean to interrupt the flow of the uh conversation 3:27:48 How's it going paul 3:27:50 Yes, it's kind of okay 3:27:53 no, I mean I was just going to chime in a little bit with the uh, 3:27:56 the inscription thing just to remind people that uh 3:28:01 They are printable 3:28:05 Um 3:28:06 Yeah, that prunability thing is a pretty critical question alex because 3:28:12 I'm, not sure myself exactly how 3:28:15 If they can put a box around and say these things don't affect the UTXO set and these things do 3:28:21 And if they can box it out 3:28:24 then it is 3:28:27 You would still 3:28:30 Is 3:28:32 Every inscription creates an unprunable UTXO when it's 3:28:36 inscribed 3:28:38 But the witness data, which is the data is optionally prunable by nodes and it has been for years 3:28:44 While inscriptions do create new fresh UTXOs if you look at the chart of UTXO growth 3:28:50 The UTXOs from the beginning of the year double dropper from 60 million to 120 million 3:28:54 All that growth is due to brc20 and other inscriptions those UTXOs are not prunable 3:29:00 They're part of the UTXO unspent transaction output set today, but their witness data 3:29:07 May be prunable 3:29:11 Well the UTXOs 3:29:14 in the context of forever storage of data is kind of moot don't you think I mean, it's really the 3:29:21 I mean the ordinal part the trackability part is one thing but like there's a lot of 3:29:28 data that you're referring to that 3:29:31 Does it necessarily need to be movable tradable trackable? It just needs to be there, right? So 3:29:36 So it's not really ordinals. It's just inscriptions in general 3:29:40 Yes, and that's all prunable 3:29:42 There is no new strong assumptions here because like we discussed before you came on stage 3:29:47 Bitcoin has a single honest peer assumption if you're running a node 3:29:51 One out of a hundred peers you connect to at least one has to give you the heaviest change 3:29:56 Whereas the other 99 can be controlled by the chinese communist party and you don't need to trust this honest peer 3:30:02 So the same kind of assumption 3:30:05 Occurs here as well that you need to be able to connect to one node 3:30:10 That will not prune the witness data 3:30:12 And you don't need to trust that peer because you can validate that data when you get it and then you can become the archival 3:30:18 node yourself 3:30:21 Yeah 3:30:22 But then how decentralized is it, you know, how decentralized is the actual data then if only 3:30:28 a fraction of nodes actually store 3:30:32 no, no, it's incredibly decentralized because 3:30:35 A single node on the internet 3:30:38 Is as decentralized as a thousand nodes on the internet as a million nodes 3:30:43 Because a single archival node 3:30:46 No, I see a single archival node, right? It's just like getting blocks from the from the blockstream satellite 3:30:52 It implies no trust the blocks between because blockstream blocks those blocks are self-validating data, right? 3:30:59 So a single supplier of that data 3:31:02 is enough 3:31:04 What I wanted to say is that 3:31:06 Under the default configuration with asunvalid you actually don't need to download 3:31:12 The SegWit extension data and I think someone maybe already made a change in 3:31:18 In core or they are planning a change where nodes will not even ask for it when they sync up because it's basically 3:31:25 completely 3:31:26 Irrelevant data if they don't want to validate it 3:31:31 Yeah, and in the future the snapshot 3:31:34 It's okay for vitalik to be running a node that that does give you the SegWit data 3:31:40 Because even even vitalik or the pope or the chinese communist party as long as there's one node 3:31:46 That's giving you this data. You can clone that node and become an archival node yourself without any trust 3:31:53 Yeah, i'm just saying bitcoin network could become a network in response to this sorting that that simply 3:32:00 Explicitly does not care about old witness data 3:32:03 And the nodes don't keep it and don't propagate it and in that case 3:32:07 It is going to be pretty hard in a peer-to-peer network 3:32:11 If the nodes don't propagate the old SegWit data 3:32:14 You're going to have a hard time to find that one archival node and that one archival node 3:32:20 is not going to be as 3:32:22 permissionless and as 3:32:25 Peer-to-peer experience because they they can basically close shop anytime they can 3:32:31 Charge you for that data or whatever. That's entirely not the same as right now is with bitcoin 3:32:38 Actually, it's very similar to to the day most nodes pruning their old blocks 3:32:43 And yet somehow you're able to sync from block zero, right? 3:32:47 What percentage of of bitcoin nodes do not prune their blocks today? Probably a small percentage because 3:32:53 When you install bitcoin core, right it has like 3:32:57 Keep last couple of hundred blocks, but prune all the others. I think it's been that way by default for a long time 3:33:04 and nobody can charge you for this data because 3:33:07 If if one copy of it gets out 3:33:10 You don't need to trust the seller and you can just start selling and undercutting them, right? 3:33:14 Paul will will understand that that the marginal cost of that data is zero because 3:33:19 It's self-certifying data and a single archival node will clone 100 more 3:33:24 Within a day. So there's there's nothing you can charge for this data 3:33:28 And this is not about data availability. This is about data persistence for the long run 3:33:33 Like why do you say it's not a data availability? 3:33:35 Because isn't it sort of about data ability, isn't it? 3:33:39 Why do you say no because data availability is a technical term that refers to proof of publication 3:33:45 It does not refer to eternal storage. There's like a different term for that 3:33:49 Data, well, I think proof of publication basically everyone needs 3:33:54 To sync the blockchain. They need to download all the block data at some point when they you know 3:34:00 I'm talking normally maybe people invent shortcuts or whatever 3:34:04 But the only way to know if the shortcuts like zero sync or whatever if the only way to know that those are working 3:34:09 Yeah is and someone will always 3:34:12 We can't have any part of the blockchain go missing 3:34:16 Or I think the entire project 3:34:19 We are in that regime. We have been in that regime for years 3:34:22 The that's kind of sounds like bad news, but the good news 3:34:26 Is a single node that's actually serving you the blocks 3:34:30 Can can be sufficient to receive the network without any trust 3:34:34 A hundred fold when I agree with that, of course, of course, I completely agree with that 3:34:40 Um, which is 3:34:42 This is 3:34:44 This assumption is not stronger than the underlying assumption that some peer will actually give you the heaviest chain 3:34:52 right that 3:34:54 Though I I was kind of worried that maybe one day they would not or something I don't know but uh, 3:34:59 Alex, I agree with you, but I don't think I don't think people would have the same desire to inscribe 3:35:08 Data on the blockchain if it was a few nodes 3:35:12 And most of them were not even responsive or very weight limited for old witness data 3:35:18 So if you had a situation like that compared to what is today, I don't think that would be the same among the same 3:35:25 enthusiasm for uh 3:35:27 Inscriptions, so i'm not sure about that whole thing. But but what you are saying 3:35:32 Does that something is that there is a lot of enthusiasm for running conventional bitcoin nodes today, right? 3:35:37 There's allegedly like 15 000 reachable ones and maybe a hundred thousand all together 3:35:43 And people do not seem to be worried that 99% of their peers are pruning blocks because it seems like every node that comes up 3:35:51 Is able to sync from block zero today 3:35:54 Like there's been no no no reported failures of oh my god. The certain section of blocks are just inaccessible 3:36:02 That's I I don't think i've heard anyone 3:36:04 I I think I think a much larger much larger percent of bitcoin nodes today are full archiving nodes 3:36:12 partly from ideological reasons and partly from some default reasons from 3:36:18 for these uh, these uh 3:36:21 uh ready-made 3:36:23 uh 3:36:24 pre-packaged 3:36:26 lightning home nodes 3:36:28 That basically run with uh with full archiving mode out of books 3:36:33 so why why would you have ideological inscribers doing the same thing or libraries or 3:36:39 You know, they can or escrow companies 3:36:41 So basically the same kind, you know, you could have guerrilla artist collectives that run a node 3:36:47 You could have libraries, you know, the institutions we call libraries today 3:36:50 Simply writing archival nodes because every book worth reading has been inscribed in bitcoin 3:36:56 And they can just let you click and download that book, right 3:37:01 Like, you know people haven't thought about backing up all the books worthwhile reading, you know into into inscriptions 3:37:08 And that's what project gutenberg 3:37:11 Would only dream of when it was launched 20 30 years ago, right? 3:37:14 But now you can actually launch a real project gutenberg where you actually take a thousand books from civilization from old time 3:37:22 And you just inscribe them in various file formats 3:37:25 And that becomes like an open library for the world 3:37:28 Why not? 3:37:30 The problem is there's no incentive. The only incentive is for miners to to uh validate the transactions 3:37:37 But after the the file the data is stored, there's no further incentive to keep it there at all currently 3:37:45 But there's no incentive to keep old blocks either and yet they don't seem to disappear, right? 3:37:49 What i'm saying is the same talking dynamics if we're talking in the context of forever 3:37:55 The thing is if you're talking in the context of forever or a very long time, I mean in five years 3:38:01 10 years even 3:38:02 there could be ways 3:38:04 roll-ups and whatnot where 3:38:06 Pruning a majority if not all of the witness data would be perfectly fine 3:38:12 It would be fine, but who would care about pruning in in the next 10 years two terabytes of data will be added to the bitcoin blockchain 3:38:20 But 10 years from now two terabytes of data will be less than one percent of your, you know, $9.99 3:38:27 USB stick 3:38:29 So who cares about all these optimizations like nobody cares about a million transistors here and there these days or even a billion transistors 3:38:36 Who would care about two terabytes of data? 3:38:38 When today it's like pennies 3:38:40 so 3:38:41 So does this whole thing that we talked about for the past? I don't know how many hours 3:38:47 Does it like validate small blockerism 3:38:50 Is there a block size that is optimal? 3:38:54 from the user's perspective 3:38:56 Like if blocks are larger or smaller or the situation would be better or worse 3:39:02 In this sense. Well, I think I think it just changes the timeline like for example if the SegWit soft fork never happened 3:39:09 We would be in fipocalypse a year or two ago already because there will be no forex 3:39:14 Block size increase 3:39:16 So SegWit pushed it off a few years and now appearance of you know inscriptions has brought it forward again 3:39:22 But this is just an immovable wall 3:39:25 Being hit by this gradual sort of tidal way of escalating adoption. It's just a question of when 3:39:31 The hippocalypse happens. It's not it doesn't matter if the blocks are 3:39:35 10 percent of what they are now or 10 times what they are now. It just changes the timeline. It doesn't change the final outcome 3:39:42 Yeah, but if the burden grows large enough that actually incentivizes people to get rid of it or work around it more 3:39:52 So in that sense also the pruning network may come into existence when people realize that it is the ledger that is the most important 3:40:02 And all transaction data can be under certain circumstances safely discarded and that can become like a safe practice is what I mean 3:40:12 Because it's counterintuitive when people assumed back then that larger block size would lead to lesser replication of the Bitcoin blockchain 3:40:24 And they assume that causes like lower decentralization. I'm not sure if they consider that this actually might discourage people from using it as a graffiti wall 3:40:44 So my question is, is there an equilibrium size you think? 3:40:54 Well, it's the size that we have to live with, right? Whether it's optimal, I don't know. I mean, in my mind, any kind of block size soft fork to decrease the block size would be madness 3:41:06 And it would be opposed by, you know, because it essentially disables non-custodial lightning and ARK and everything else 3:41:15 But that's only a matter of time, you are saying. So that's only a matter of time to disable on L2 because on L3 they can exist just fine 3:41:23 Yes, but the thing is, but it's kind of like the old saying, it has to get worse before it gets better 3:41:30 So it has to go to the FIPOCALYPSE in order for the chokehold of the laser-eyed priests and podcasters who, you know, engage farm on Twitter 3:41:40 With their doomerism about never changing, you know, basically the chorus that's chanting ossify, ossify, that has to be essentially exposed for just what they are, which is just a cult 3:41:51 And the plebs should lose confidence in them first, and then, you know, confidence and real L2s will be possible, I think 3:41:59 Because after the pleb uprising, nothing that stands in the way of scaling Bitcoin can survive, I think 3:42:08 Because, I mean, Bitcoin loses all rationale and purpose if it becomes a plaything of whales and black rock, right? 3:42:16 And don't you find it plausible that the pleb uprising would cause such a chaos that it's already very hard to get consensus on anything 3:42:26 Or for people to get a good understanding, or most Bitcoiners won't get a good understanding on any of the proposed changes today 3:42:36 And in the chaos, don't you find it plausible that this actually gets worse? 3:42:44 No, I think ossification is the de facto status quo now, a premature ossification, right? 3:42:51 But the uprising is all about overturning the status quo 3:42:54 It's about, we need Covenant soft fork to scale L2s 3:42:58 We need drivechain soft fork to allow drivechains 3:43:02 We need a WASM opcode to verify proofs, right? 3:43:08 To enable ZK rollups with WASM, for example 3:43:13 There is something I want to mention 3:43:15 I mean, I completely agree with basically what you're saying 3:43:18 But I just thought I'd bring this up, which is, you know, people like Roger Ver, for example 3:43:23 He has been waiting and hoping for fees to rise in L1 3:43:28 I think maybe I brought this up months ago, when you first started to talk about Feebuckle 3:43:32 He's been waiting, I assume 3:43:36 I mean, I don't know, Boris, but I'm guessing he's been sitting down 3:43:41 He has been waiting for many years because of the 4x block size increase by SegWit, right? 3:43:45 And he is thinking something like, he needs the fees to go up 3:43:49 He needs people to be unhappy with BTC 3:43:51 And then he's hoping to swoop in and that everyone will switch to Bitcoin Cash 3:43:57 You know, that sort of... 3:43:59 No, that's madness 3:44:00 People will switch to validity rollups and drivechains and ARK and, you know, better scaled Lightning 3:44:09 All those things remain within the network effect, right? 3:44:14 The moment you switch the asset, you're exiled to another planet, basically 3:44:19 Nobody wants to be exiled to another planet 3:44:21 Everybody wants to... 3:44:22 If you cannot stay in Beverly Hills, you want to stay in Brentwood or Westwood or coastal LA, right? 3:44:28 If you can't stay there, you have to be like a few hours drive away from LAX or something 3:44:33 The point is that you don't want to be exiled to another planet 3:44:36 You want to go to a rollup where you can move your Bitcoin trustlessly or drivechains, you know 3:44:42 Which is, you know, crypto-economically secure 3:44:44 Nobody wants to, like, abandon the asset 3:44:47 That's something 3:44:48 I agree, but I just thought I would toss it out there as, like... 3:44:53 I mean, it will be an uncertain time, don't you think? 3:44:56 Maybe it wouldn't be Bitcoin Cash, but maybe someone would try something 3:45:01 It's like Game of Thrones, you know 3:45:03 Chaos is a ladder, it's an opportunity for soft forks to get through 3:45:09 That's the way I see it 3:45:11 I see chaos of the pleb uprising as a way that nobody can say, well, we shouldn't change Bitcoin 3:45:18 Because by that time, the ossification course will be completely discredited, right? 3:45:23 Because they've been telling the plebs just keep stacking sats 3:45:26 But then, you know, plebs are like, wait a second 3:45:28 You want me to spend 10% of my savings to move them somewhere now? 3:45:33 Because the fees are 50 bucks 3:45:34 I'm talking about global soft plebs 3:45:36 I'm not talking about, you know, first world, you know, CryptoRati or whatever 3:45:46 It's a time of opportunity, basically 3:45:48 And the sooner it comes, the better 3:45:50 Like, for example, the guy that spoke recently, Bitcode 3:45:54 That they're doing some kind of indexer or something with inscriptions 3:45:59 You know, there's just, like, a huge amount of activity in there 3:46:03 And we're, like, weeks from somebody launching, based on the new recently committed standard for the Ordinals server 3:46:11 We're, like, weeks from launching ability to, you know, to, like, open the firehose of fee pressure 3:46:17 Like, all the collections will want to be inscribed with hierarchical Ordinals 3:46:22 You know, uncensorable, decentralized namespaces, websites, all of that is coming 3:46:29 Yeah, yeah 3:46:31 No, Alex, we are doing exactly client for inscribing, not indexer 3:46:39 Inscribing the important data 3:46:41 So, and if you allow people to inscribe, you know, first to inscribe their identity Ordinal 3:46:47 And then to inscribe a whole file system underneath 3:46:51 You know, like, my creativity Ordinal, my important document 3:46:56 Basically, just allow people to create their identity first 3:46:59 And then allow people to create a structure in there 3:47:02 And once they can own that Ordinal for the identity 3:47:05 Then they, essentially, the provenance of all the other digital artifacts is provable trustlessly back to them 3:47:14 You know, this is major, right? 3:47:16 Yeah, yeah, exactly 3:47:20 By the way, basically 3:47:22 No, sorry 3:47:24 I just wanted to ask you, Alex, basically, things that I own 3:47:28 And that whole DID thing is basically getting one appended or how they say it 3:47:34 Well, I don't know if it will take off as an identity infrastructure 3:47:38 But, for example, if I was a heavy Nostr user 3:47:42 I would want my Nostr identity and my inscription identity to be the same thing 3:47:50 You can actually do it, right? 3:47:51 You can actually have a public key that has both your Nostr identity and your inscription identity at the same time 3:47:59 And you can have both of them secured by hardware wallet 3:48:03 With, right now, it's only like one or two wallets that don't burn your Ordinals 3:48:07 Like Sparrow or whatever 3:48:09 But once there's mainstream support a year or two from now 3:48:12 You know, now you're talking about, like, here's another use case for inscriptions 3:48:16 Imagine highly secure direct messages 3:48:20 Or just, you know, uncensored 3:48:22 Think of using Bitcoin blockchain as a Nostr relay 3:48:27 Right? 3:48:28 And that's a Nostr relay that you only pay once 3:48:31 And then the data stays there forever, right? 3:48:34 Yeah, but this totally does not scale, right? 3:48:38 No, but highly secure messages, highly secure valuable messages 3:48:43 It would be worth it, right? 3:48:45 If you want to send, like, if you want to communicate between secret agents 3:48:49 That are, like, around the world or whatever 3:48:51 With encrypted messages 3:48:53 That's, you know, that's like, spam bots do that 3:48:56 With Bitcoin blockchain 3:48:57 Nostr would just make it available to humans 3:49:03 Yeah 3:49:04 Honestly, that's 3:49:05 We can get back to that 3:49:06 But I will shut up about the other stuff 3:49:08 But I have something to say about that 3:49:11 I was just going to say 3:49:13 I don't think it makes sense for private highly encrypted messages 3:49:18 To be permanently on a ledger 3:49:21 You'd be better off using the mempool 3:49:23 And have a bfemoral 3:49:30 Well, I mean, I don't use Nostr 3:49:33 Go ahead, Monsadler 3:49:35 With this, just one 3:49:38 So, some people are expecting that there will be a cyber pandemic event 3:49:44 It is kind of telegraphed 3:49:46 That there will be something made up or real 3:49:49 And in that case, actually, we could see that 3:49:53 The Bitcoin network is weaponized 3:49:56 And as a defense measure 3:49:59 Might actually, they will put real effort into 3:50:03 Trying to filter out the Bitcoin protocol 3:50:06 As a national defense effort 3:50:08 What do you think about that? 3:50:10 This is just a side tale 3:50:14 I thought recently there was a merge of some encrypted communications 3:50:18 For peer-to-peer nodes 3:50:19 Maybe deep inspection firewalls 3:50:21 Like the Great Firewall of China can handle it 3:50:24 I don't know 3:50:28 No, I don't think you can do that with deep pocket inspection 3:50:31 But I think you have to use stateful inspection 3:50:38 And man-in-the-middle attacks to actually identify 3:50:42 But I think just general traffic shape analysis 3:50:45 And just identifying the node patterns and stuff 3:50:51 Will allow them to just drop those packets 3:50:54 And basically make the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network unable to function 3:51:00 I'm not sure if they have to go absolutely sure about it 3:51:09 What about using Tor? 3:51:10 Tor recently had an upgrade with Hashcash 3:51:14 I think Tor was unusable for about a year, a year and a half 3:51:19 Is it possible to communicate with nodes in North Korea over Tor or not today? 3:51:24 I don't know, honestly 3:51:27 Again, in a scenario where they are trying to cut off 3:51:32 The command and control capability of an adversarial superpower 3:51:40 Or a belligerent superpower from their infrastructure 3:51:43 Like stop from updating the bots 3:51:46 And stop from getting new instructions 3:51:48 In a situation like that, you might even see stuff like 3:51:52 Only HTTPS and DNS works 3:51:54 And nothing else really 3:51:55 Or it's very rate-limited and doesn't work between countries whatsoever 3:52:00 So it can get pretty wild, I think 3:52:03 It can, but people have been tunneling DNS traffic over HTTPS 3:52:10 And I suppose you could tunnel peer-to-peer traffic over HTTPS as well 3:52:17 Right 3:52:25 I'm curious, what's really going on? 3:52:30 I think the whole framing of drivechains is a little bit mistaken 3:52:36 In that it should not be marketed as a change to Bitcoin 3:52:40 Maybe the right audience is the miners 3:52:43 Yeah, I agree 3:52:46 Because nobody's talking about what these sovereign roll-ups are about to do 3:52:51 But they're about to have a much bigger MEV and offensive impact on Bitcoin 3:52:56 Than drivechains ever could 3:52:58 So this is kind of like a piece of software for the miners 3:53:02 To activate with a miner-activated soft fork 3:53:04 The only question is, what is the game theory on the stability of such a soft fork 3:53:10 If it has to be announced publicly 3:53:12 Because presumably somebody launches a drivechain 3:53:14 Which is advertised on the internet 3:53:16 And the claim implicitly is that the miners will reorg out blocks 3:53:20 That include transactions offending the BIP300 3:53:24 And URSF, User Rejection Soft Fork 3:53:29 I think would be very, very difficult to coordinate 3:53:33 And it would fail 3:53:34 I would love to see how this game theory would actually play out 3:53:41 So yeah, I 100% agree that 3:53:44 It's not me who's framing it as a change 3:53:47 It's the critics 3:53:50 The critics though, they're not real critics 3:53:52 Like Moon Settler is a real critic 3:53:54 But they're just like concern trolling 3:53:58 And they just want to kill the idea 3:54:00 And they don't know anything about the idea 3:54:02 Michael Saylor or someone told them that 3:54:05 Bitcoin has to be protected against change 3:54:08 Or it just evolved out of the SegWit2x momentum 3:54:12 And so there really are no critics of this idea 3:54:15 It's just using an opcode that counts to 13,000 3:54:18 It's not even really possible to criticize the idea 3:54:21 What do you think about the stability of a miner activated soft fork? 3:54:26 No, I think the miner activated soft fork will win instantly 3:54:30 And the users cannot resist it 3:54:34 If they do, they'll be breaking the... 3:54:36 Will it be stable or will it require continual policing of the cartel of the miners? 3:54:42 If the miners activate the soft fork 3:54:46 And then all that's necessary is a few other... 3:54:48 Anyone who's using BIP300 3:54:51 If they also run a node that speaks that language 3:54:56 That also enforces that 3:54:59 Which they would do because they just want the accounting 3:55:02 You'll have a challenge from a dissenting laser-eyed miner 3:55:07 So there will be a mining pool controlled by a laser-eyed ossifier priest 3:55:11 That will try to mine a block that includes an offending transaction 3:55:15 And then everybody will see that block 3:55:18 No, no, I know, but everybody will publicly see that block orphaned 3:55:22 And this is the essentially assassination of the prince in World War I 3:55:28 That's the starting point for the next war 3:55:32 The hot war to break out 3:55:34 The next war to break out of that block is like invading Poland or whatever 3:55:38 In 1939 3:55:40 Not really, because it's actually quite different in many, many ways 3:55:43 But even if it weren't, as you said before 3:55:46 No one wants to be exiled to a different planet 3:55:50 So I think... 3:55:52 And none of these laser-eyed people run nodes or do any mining 3:55:55 They're all just fake 3:55:57 It's just one guy with a Twitter bot farm, basically 3:56:00 They're farming engagement on Twitter to sell their podcast time, essentially 3:56:04 This is the whole nature of the laser-eyed cult 3:56:07 It's a bunch of people chanting ossify 3:56:10 As a way to cause outrage on Twitter 3:56:13 To engage farm audience for their podcasts 3:56:16 And these people will tell you a year from now 3:56:19 Just buy a Blackrock ETF and sleep well at night 3:56:22 Not worrying about multi-sig backups 3:56:25 But what I'm saying is... 3:56:27 The miner-activated soft fork should be marketed probably to the miners 3:56:32 Probably exclusively 3:56:34 But it's less stable than a regular soft fork, isn't it? 3:56:37 It's less stable, isn't it? 3:56:40 No, I don't think there's any difference 3:56:42 Because... 3:56:44 It's maybe unstable in the fact that it has... 3:56:52 Paul? 3:56:54 Are you there? 3:56:56 He's lagging, I think 3:57:02 While he's lagging, just want to say that miner activated soft fork is less stable than 3:57:08 a conventional soft fork, because conventional soft fork is, of course, is 3:57:12 enforced by nodes rejecting blocks, and the miner activity soft work has to maintain 3:57:18 the cartel of miners' orphaning blocks, which is continuous 3:57:22 sort of 3:57:26 It's to their benefit to do this 3:57:28 And their software will do this by default 3:57:30 Yes 3:57:32 Paul, are you back? 3:57:34 If you activate a soft fork, basically... 3:57:37 The miners have no choice but to do something 3:57:42 Because they have... 3:57:44 I believe they have two choices 3:57:46 They either enforce the rules themselves 3:57:49 Or if they really want to try to wiggle out from enforcing the rules 3:57:54 Then they have to reject all drivechain-related transactions from their mempool 3:57:59 Not to accidentally mine something that breaks the rules 3:58:02 Because at that point they would get orphaned 3:58:05 So they would need some mempool policy filter 3:58:08 At least, I believe, to... 3:58:10 You have to assume that one of the pools will be a laserite pool 3:58:13 And will intentionally mine a block as a challenge 3:58:17 To see if it gets orphaned or not 3:58:20 The activation means that the majority of them 3:58:23 85-90% enforces the rules 3:58:29 It is suicidal to try to challenge them 3:58:32 Unless it's a test 3:58:34 You're talking about a conventional BIP-9 soft fork 3:58:38 There's never been a miner-activated soft fork of this kind tried before 3:58:42 This is where none of the nodes have upgraded 3:58:45 But the miners have agreed to orphan blocks anyways 3:58:48 Yes, it's the same thing 3:58:52 You could do it with 55 or 60% 3:58:55 But the stability of the cartel is different 3:58:59 So the only difference is 3:59:01 That the miners could in theory stop enforcing the rules any day 3:59:05 That's the only difference in my view 3:59:07 So you have the same dynamics for activation 3:59:10 You have the same dynamics for enforcement 3:59:12 But the users can't really trust it 3:59:15 Because the miners can change their mind any day 3:59:18 If they are not enforcing the rules 3:59:20 So the users would have to wait for it to be merged into core 3:59:25 And be widely distributed 3:59:27 And then they can start relying on it in theory 3:59:30 Even if you're doing miner signaling for a miner-activated soft fork 3:59:35 Miners can lie or they can change their minds 3:59:38 And to what Alex was saying 3:59:42 Let's say that an economically significant portion of nodes start rejecting blocks that use whatever opcode it ends up being 3:59:54 Opnop5 or whatever, right? 3:59:56 A miner could say, alright, fine 3:59:58 I'm going to mine a block that bypasses the normal hashrate escrow counter 4:00:07 And just spends these anyone-can-spend coins 4:00:10 And at that point, the group of miners who want to enforce BIP300 have to actively reorg that block 4:00:16 So it's not just a matter of, like, they have to enforce the rules 4:00:19 They have to be able to reorg blocks out 4:00:22 It's pretty possibly happening 4:00:25 Every node that enforces the drivechain rules at that point 4:00:30 Automatically finds that block invalid 4:00:33 So it's not so much 4:00:35 Yes, but the problem is you have to assume the worst 4:00:38 Assume that no nodes have upgraded to drivechain because it hasn't been merged into core 4:00:46 But somebody created a fork of core and merged Luke Dashjr's patch into it 4:00:56 And then 60 or 70% of the miners are running that version 4:01:00 But that version also actively has to reorg offending blocks 4:01:04 And let's say that this reorg has actually happened 4:01:07 Which is proof to everybody 4:01:10 Because everybody can see this happening 4:01:12 This is proof that there is a cartel that's now enforcing drivechains 4:01:16 And this proof is highly offensive to the laser eyes 4:01:20 Who will then rally and start screaming 4:01:23 Sorry, I thought when we are talking about miners activating 4:01:27 Is that they have been signaling and they are enforcing 4:01:30 And that's pretty much already known to everyone 4:01:34 I think we were talking about a case where it's like 4:01:37 All in LayerTwo Labs go and talk to a bunch of miners 4:01:41 And say hey, why don't you guys just turn this on 4:01:44 And then in the extreme case 4:01:47 It's like the only people who are enforcing are the miners 4:01:50 And nobody else is enforcing 4:01:53 But that wouldn't really happen 4:01:56 Because what it would be 4:01:59 With the miner activated soft fork would be like 4:02:01 You release software that invalidates any block 4:02:04 That breaks the BIP300 rule 4:02:07 And then it only activates if like some threshold 4:02:10 Whatever, 75% 4:02:13 Of miners upgrade 4:02:16 In their whatever, if they signal in the 4:02:19 2000 block period or whatever it is 4:02:22 So if you did that 4:02:25 Then what would happen would be anyone who wanted to use 4:02:29 BIP300 like an end user who wanted whatever 4:02:32 Zcat sidechain, they would also be running it 4:02:35 Because the best way to just track all the deposits and withdrawals 4:02:38 Is just to straight up run the software 4:02:43 So it would start to accumulate users 4:02:46 But by the time that enough people 4:02:49 By the time there was any significant amount of money 4:02:52 In the chain there would be like some people 4:02:55 Running it and then of course 4:02:58 Well with the soft fork or even with the hard fork 4:03:01 The exchanges would play a pretty big role I would think 4:03:04 Because everyone cares so much about the liquidity 4:03:07 But I think 4:03:10 When some rogue pool that's not on board with drivechains 4:03:13 Decides to just take the coins 4:03:16 So they just decide to 4:03:19 The 75% will not build on that block 4:03:23 And then it will always be 4:03:26 That will trigger the outrage of the anti-drivechain crowd 4:03:29 To run and install URS clients 4:03:32 And the question is 4:03:35 What happens then 4:03:38 Because what that is is really a hard fork 4:03:41 Because they break the heaviest 4:03:44 You're asking people to do something where you're only on the chain that the upgraded people are on 4:03:47 You're going to break the heaviest chain 4:03:50 You're right that's a hard fork 4:03:53 And let's say that fails 4:03:56 However long term what is the stability of such a soft fork 4:03:59 When 99% of conventional nodes that are still running the unpatched core 4:04:02 Are not enforcing it 4:04:05 It seems like the miners have to keep coordinating 4:04:08 The cartel to stay active 4:04:11 They cannot have the center 4:04:14 So this is like the fragility of the cartel problem 4:04:17 It would be very difficult 4:04:20 To upgrade to the latest version of Bitcoin Core 4:04:23 Because Bitcoin Core might not have support for BIP300 4:04:26 And it would then maybe end the road of upgrades in that direction 4:04:29 They would have to 4:04:32 Yes 4:04:35 But in order to make it easy for them 4:04:38 You would have to have a tracking patch 4:04:41 That has no rebasing conflicts with core 4:04:45 You could just merge this patch on the side 4:04:48 And obtain the new version for miners 4:04:51 Because without that the cartel starts falling apart 4:04:54 As soon as the new core is released and some people upgrade and others don't 4:04:57 If you think about that though 4:05:00 Think about the fact that there are no soft forks anymore 4:05:03 And then you think maybe 4:05:06 It actually doesn't matter 4:05:09 Because Bitcoin Core is never going to ship anything 4:05:13 That actually makes any difference to anything 4:05:16 Jeremy Rubin was told by core maintainers 4:05:19 He was essentially told that if you want to do a soft fork 4:05:22 You should not do it within core now 4:05:25 You should just have alternative clients 4:05:28 Recently there was a submission about 4:05:31 Covenant tools that has three soft forks in one 4:05:34 And it's not clear 4:05:37 That the maintainers will merge it or not 4:05:41 If the ossification crowd is so strong 4:05:44 That no changes to consensus can get merged now 4:05:47 Without people losing all their privileges in core 4:05:50 Just being sort of silently shunned 4:05:53 Or losing their 4:05:56 Maintainer privileges or what have you 4:05:59 If no merging in the core is possible 4:06:02 Then somebody has to try what Jeremy Rubin didn't try 4:06:05 Which is to create this patch that can be tracking core 4:06:08 Without conflicts continuously 4:06:11 And then create core plus essentially 4:06:14 By the way 4:06:17 I was just going to say 4:06:20 I think that's what might be necessary for activation 4:06:23 But I think if a soft fork actually got activated 4:06:26 It would get merged into core 4:06:29 I think the thing that core maintainers are trying to 4:06:32 Get out of the business of doing 4:06:35 Is to get out of the business of 4:06:38 Neglecting the privacy 4:06:41 Or weighing in on consensus changes 4:06:44 But if the network has activated a consensus chain 4:06:47 Yeah, but they can plausibly argue 4:06:50 That if the nodes are not enforcing it 4:06:53 It's not a real soft fork 4:06:56 It's kind of like a censorship attack by the cartel 4:06:59 Yeah, so let's leave drivechains aside for a minute 4:07:02 But let's leave drivechains aside for a minute 4:07:05 network and nodes are enforcing it. 4:07:07 That's a scenario where I could see that being upstreamed into core after activation. 4:07:14 That's what they said, at least that was my understanding. 4:07:17 That was the communication that if it's activated properly, then it will get merged 4:07:23 into core, 4:07:24 But by activated they mean if 80 % of nodes are actually upgraded to 4:07:30 that soft fork. 4:07:31 don't mean cell owners are censoring. 4:07:33 nodes are not measurable really. 4:07:38 we all know that you can't really have consensus with nodes. 4:07:44 if somehow the users managed to go or 4:07:49 coerce or plead the miners into activating it, 4:07:56 bit -proper signaling and whatever activation parameters, and it is the understanding 4:07:59 that it is now enforced on the network, 4:08:02 than they would include it. 4:08:04 That was my understanding. 4:08:05 I don't actually know what the maintainers think, but it seemed like that's what they 4:08:11 are saying. 4:08:13 Paul, why haven't we seen the cartel of miners activate LayerTwo Southpork yet? 4:08:19 Are they afraid of the laser -eyed priests and 4:08:21 all the controversy? 4:08:23 they're for their revenues to come up. 4:08:24 a good idea. 4:08:25 But remember that we have yet to actually ship anything 4:08:31 that could be activated. 4:08:34 We have our testnet software, which is slightly different from 4:08:40 Luke's pull request. 4:08:42 How is that doing? 4:08:44 Well that one didn't, Luke's pull request did not have activation logic and it was 4:08:50 it was not reviewed or tested by anyone except Rhindahl. 4:08:56 like two other people. 4:08:57 by the core essentially. 4:08:58 shown by the 4:08:59 core. Well, it would be better if we had a pull request that 4:09:05 lots of people had actually looked at and had given a thought on. 4:09:11 Of course, the main goal with the pull request was to take the logic of the 4:09:17 BIP300 text 4:09:18 and the code that we had already written and acknowledge the fact that Bitcoin Core 4:09:24 has certain, you know, customs and rules and things about, like, know, like about 4:09:28 whether or not certain letters are capitalized and, you know, stuff like that. 4:09:35 And also everyone thinks I have to be easy to maintain 4:09:38 such and such. 4:09:40 there's these little idiosyncrasies. 4:09:43 So let's try to respect that, something that would really fit in. 4:09:47 So it's not like there is no code, but it is like there is nothing that 4:09:52 perhaps would be totally up to the 4:09:56 caliber, 4:09:58 but we're working on that. 4:10:01 Although it would help if people would look at Luke's pull request and give a real 4:10:06 opinion on it as far as actual code. 4:10:10 So maybe we should just give up on waiting for people in Bitcoin Core to do it and try 4:10:15 to hire the most expensive freelance C++ people we can find 4:10:21 and just have them go through it or something like that. 4:10:24 don't know what specifically would be done, but we have yet to actually produce, and I 4:10:29 personally have actually delayed intentionally producing such a thing for as 4:10:34 long as possible because I thought I'm not exactly sure what would happen after I did 4:10:39 that, you know. 4:10:40 So I did kind of want to not do that. 4:10:43 have a desire to be nice. 4:10:45 You've been delaying things since 2015, right? 4:10:49 Yes, that's true. 4:10:50 got to try something new now. 4:10:53 Yeah, 4:10:54 well, you know, 4:10:56 think you're right. 4:10:57 have tried a couple new things. 4:11:00 I think that some people, some people take offense if you open a pull request before 4:11:06 there is technical consensus, whatever the that means. 4:11:12 those are called 4:11:13 draft pull requests, right? 4:11:14 That's why you could be marked as a draft. 4:11:19 Yeah, of course. 4:11:21 But then you saw that even in the pull request, saw, obviously, anyone who looks 4:11:26 through the comments can see plenty of people, including Peter Todd and whatever they 4:11:30 were saying, basically, 4:11:32 this poor question never been opened. 4:11:34 So. Yeah, Luke has basically said that he is not looking for concept X, right? 4:11:40 That's not the point. 4:11:41 He asked this and that was pretty much all he got. 4:11:46 My point is like, you gotta stop asking for permission because those silver and roll up 4:11:50 people and the dark net roll up people that are about to deploy their roll ups, they 4:11:55 don't bother asking for permission. 4:11:58 Asking for permission is essentially asking to be told no. 4:12:06 the 4:12:10 whatever arguments apply against drivechains apply tenfold against sovereign rollups. 4:12:16 offensive, you know, impact on the MEV, whatever the hell you came up with. 4:12:21 Let's just be clear. 4:12:23 You are talking about when you say sovereign rollups, mean people in Ethereum 4:12:27 dumping a bunch of ETH data, using BTC as a parking lot. 4:12:33 No, no. It's actually a brand new deployment of the EVM compatible chain 4:12:38 that, in Ethereum world, they have a very well -developed terminology for kinds of 4:12:43 rollups, and the sexiest rollups are either base 4:12:46 is 4:12:54 the Bitcoin is way to create a two -way peg. 4:13:01 The Bitcoin is is to The a create a The good The Bitcoin 4:13:05 of what the data means and whether it's valid or not is left completely to the nodes of 4:13:10 the rollup. So there's a company called Chainway, which is about to deploy in a few 4:13:15 weeks or months a sovereign rollup with all the Ethereum tooling and probably cloned 4:13:20 all the Ethereum protocols onto Bitcoin. 4:13:23 and it will probably have 4:13:24 a shit coin in there because the two -way peg now they made some noises about some kind 4:13:29 of interesting novel two -way peg design that's kind of the secret sauce that they're 4:13:34 withholding until later which may may not be trust minimized enough but my point is 4:13:39 that these roll -ups will all whatever 4:13:44 criticism applies against Drivechain applies more so to the rollups because rollups 4:13:49 actually operate right on the Bitcoin blockchain, right? 4:13:52 They embed the data inside Bitcoin transactions. 4:13:55 So therefore, MEV and every other concern, you know, is much more acute 4:14:00 with with sovereign rollups than it is with Drivechains, 4:14:03 Drivechains including offensive content, M -V, whatever, miner incentives completely 4:14:09 change if the rollup becomes popular. 4:14:13 whatever objections apply to DC apply to sovereign rollups 10 times 10 4:14:19 to 10 fold, but nobody talks about them because Bitcoin or the 4:14:22 laser I call this impotent to do anything about them. 4:14:26 And therefore it's not even a subject to discussion, right? 4:14:33 Well, I agree with you. 4:14:36 I mean, I have occasionally said. 4:14:37 by lobbying, you created a shelling point for the laser I called 4:14:41 to criticize you and coordinate with each other by finger pointing and 4:14:47 saying that, look, Paul Sztorc is the devil here, he's trying to kill Bitcoin by 4:14:53 introducing this change X. 4:14:55 So you're just feeding their engagement farming on Twitter by being a personification 4:15:00 of the devil 4:15:01 that they all need in order to rally the faithful, Whereas the real devil, quote 4:15:06 unquote, is the sovereign roll ups and ordinals that don't bother asking permission and 4:15:10 they don't get personified and they don't parade themselves in front of their laser 4:15:14 eyed priest cult and then they just do what they want. 4:15:18 And that's, I think what you should, that's the, 4:15:20 that's your end game is to do what needs to be done, I think, playing nice has only 4:15:26 made things worse for Drivechains and for Bitcoin. 4:15:36 Well, stay tuned, know, because there's always 4:15:39 time to break bad, right? 4:15:41 I think you hinted that you want to do something around the time of the having, which 4:15:46 is not too far away, April next year, because maybe there'll be some kind of cut in 4:15:51 revenue and the miners will all of sudden become highly incentivized to do something. 4:15:56 But if you're to do that, then 4:15:58 you have to provide a client and test nets like now in order to do something early next 4:16:03 year around the time of the halving or 4:16:10 Right. 4:16:14 Well, I got disconnected there. 4:16:16 Now I have a green person, 4:16:19 a green Block6 backup. 4:16:23 hope they... we have Ryan Dahl, of course. 4:16:27 So I hope everyone got their questions answered or whatever. 4:16:44 We have been going for a little while, 4:16:49 so maybe we should start to wrap it up. 4:16:57 If you need to ask questions, quick 4:17:18 Okay, I don't hear any 4:17:26 Well, I guess we should call it here then 4:17:29 So this has been a very fun one 4:17:32 Still no critics or whatever decided to show up? 4:17:35 Still no critics or whatever decided to show up? 4:17:38 I hear you. Sorry, I just wanted to say I crashed in the previous minutes and I hear you 4:17:41 I hear you. Sorry, I just wanted to say I crashed in the previous minutes and I hear you 4:17:44 I hear you. Sorry, I just wanted to say I crashed in the previous minutes and I hear you 4:17:47 Okay, great 4:17:50 About to talk and he got disconnected, so 4:17:54 Oh 4:17:57 Space is a complete shit show 4:18:00 I crashed like 4 or 5 times 4:18:03 I don't understand why 4:18:06 people crash and so I crash myself a lot. 4:18:08 don't know why. 4:18:10 will putting this shit like this, Alo fire, 90 % of the employees on Twitter is working 4:18:15 fine. mean, it's not working fine. 4:18:20 Still though, is kind of, for not firing 90%, I mean, that's, 4:18:25 For firing 90%, it is kind of remarkable 4:18:28 It's pretty good 4:18:31 But they still can't deploy Spaces thing onto iPads 4:18:34 Yeah, Spaces doesn't really work that well 4:18:37 Yeah, Spaces doesn't really work that well 4:18:40 Can you imagine, when else would you even be able to... 4:18:43 What if a train company fired 90% of the staff 4:18:46 What if a train company fired 90% of the staff 4:18:49 Or like, I don't know 4:18:52 Well, most of our employees were probably political commissars 4:18:55 Well, most of our employees were probably political commissars 4:18:58 Policing political correctness and wokeism on the network 4:19:01 Policing political correctness and wokeism on the network 4:19:04 Democracy was at risk, it was absolutely essential that we hire those people full time 4:19:07 Democracy was at risk, it was absolutely essential that we hire those people full time 4:19:10 Benefits, healthcare, and remove disinformation 4:19:13 That could harm our society 4:19:16 our society. 4:19:18 Because, as we all know, if you hear about it on Twitter, that means it must be true. 4:19:31 Somebody needs to start mirroring Twitter in 4:19:34 Somebody needs to start mirroring Twitter inscriptions 4:19:37 That way it will actually become immutable 4:19:40 That way it will actually become immutable 4:19:42 You need like a good bird pun for that 4:19:45 You need like a good bird pun for that 4:19:46 Creative people, get on it 4:19:47 Creative people, get on it 4:19:48 What's a bird inscription pun? 4:19:49 What's a bird inscription? 4:19:51 No, should should should mirror only the tweets that have like that were published by 4:19:56 people with like 10 million or more followers into inscriptions automatically and then 4:20:01 nobody can delete a tweet. 4:20:03 So you have like eternal, eternal X. 4:20:07 So the 4:20:11 Unkillable Bird. There you go, that's a freebie. 4:20:17 I mean, that's just another unknown application of inscriptions that, along with 4:20:23 using inscriptions as a relay for Nostr, which is kind of like my fantasy, 4:20:28 ultra -secure 4:20:29 and ouster messaging with eternal messages. 4:20:36 Now you're turning into a Bitcoin SV guy. 4:20:40 I'm the original OG like you, is like the unknown unknown uses of digital scarcity, 4:20:46 as opposed to like monetarist, thematics, 4:20:49 the laser -eyed cult. 4:20:53 Yeah, they're very weird in that they think demand can only like 4:20:59 flow one direction or something. 4:21:01 don't even really get it. 4:21:03 They're literally like saying like it's bad if gold was discovered to cure cancer and 4:21:08 allow us to 4:21:12 It would only be bad for 4:21:18 their engagement on podcasts because they have to create dietary restrictions 4:21:24 to the religion. 4:21:26 like you must not do a million things otherwise all 4:21:29 the faithful are outraged because nothing like outrage drives engagement on Twitter 4:21:35 and so ultimately you know like like the Berkshire Hathaway 4:21:40 guy says show me the incentives and I'll show you the outcomes and now we're seeing 4:21:44 outcomes 4:21:47 we have two new people who may hit it up here 4:21:49 here. 4:21:52 What's up guys? 4:21:55 So you said about making Twitter little sensible. 4:22:01 You guys are not right? 4:22:03 I hope so. 4:22:05 I have this idea for a sidechain that's because 4:22:09 Because I think that's just like I said, fearpocalypse to come and people try to 4:22:15 escalate Bitcoin in some way. 4:22:18 one thing that I hate on our studies is that 4:22:24 it gives RIP to the release. 4:22:29 And I think 4:22:31 The Lightning is all Custodial. 4:22:34 Everyone uses Wotaputoshi, uses Albi. 4:22:40 For now it's good, but if you want to have a medium user, how many users do 4:22:46 have? So if 4:22:49 noster scales to that point, need to have, I think, my opinion, best way should 4:22:55 be have a sidechain with 4:22:58 nodes, 4:23:03 sidechain with relay effects of noster together. 4:23:07 and the 4:23:09 incentives of the sidechain come to the relay. 4:23:15 So the relay can be paid to host the data and we could 4:23:21 make something like a fork of Monero or 4:23:26 pick up the code of the Monero 4:23:30 or another ZSNARK, another thing for 4:23:35 anonymity. 4:23:40 Anonymity because... Is that possible? 4:23:43 Some of it is. 4:23:45 I think the problem with IP is, 4:23:49 at the end of the day you have to accomplish two contradictory things. 4:23:52 Everyone has to able to find your computer to message you and you have to find other 4:23:57 people's computer to message them. 4:23:59 But also everyone wants the location of their computer to be hidden. 4:24:05 So it's is a bit of a contradiction and there's ways around it. 4:24:09 what I think the way to go is I wrote a called Bit Names. 4:24:13 you search for it, you find on my blog, Truthcoin Bit Names. 4:24:17 And I have this little section in there about social media. 4:24:20 And what I think you should do is you should have your name on a sidechain and you 4:24:25 should have a fallback. 4:24:26 There should be like a fallback Twitter 4:24:28 there that's very rarely used. 4:24:31 only use it if you get like shadow banned or canceled or something, or you get like 4:24:36 demonetized or whatever. 4:24:38 They just delete your account, you know, then you use it to tell everyone where your 4:24:43 new account is. 4:24:45 And so it's sort of you're only 4:24:48 using it when, 4:24:52 it's basically the layer one of your Twitter. 4:24:56 And then everything else is like a custodial cached L2, Twitter, it's more server 4:25:02 -based or something like that. 4:25:04 So that's what I think is the way to go. 4:25:07 I don't 4:25:09 about putting every single tweet on the blockchain if that is actually ultimately going 4:25:14 to because of just... 4:25:16 The thing is, don't want put every single Twitch on a blockchain. 4:25:21 once, 4:25:23 instead of using Lightning on Oster, using Sidechain. 4:25:34 The release of the monster could be monetized through this network. 4:25:40 So they will be sent to buy us to host data. 4:25:48 create new project. 4:25:56 And create a what 4:26:02 create a new do project. 4:26:03 do And what would like create a new project. 4:26:07 create 4:26:08 anything because then you really are storing. 4:26:12 That is the case where you have an unlimited amount of data available. 4:26:15 It's not like immortal the way L1, ordinal inscription data is, but 4:26:21 it's at least unlimited in size. 4:26:24 It can be everything. 4:26:25 Like you could just flip the entire reality 4:26:29 where everything hosted by AWS, everything hosted by Linode, everything hosted 4:26:35 by whatever, DigitalOcean, all of that could be flipped to 4:26:40 go into the decentralized protocol because 4:26:44 it's not the storage itself, 4:26:48 it's on the blockchain, it's just these periodic proofs so it has this log -in scaling. 4:26:55 So that's a kind of ambitious idea, but I think something like that could happen and I 4:27:00 think the name coin thing that would do your identity. 4:27:03 Your identity would be like your actual name everywhere. 4:27:07 So you 4:27:08 wouldn't just have like a screen name on Twitter, a screen name on YouTube, screen name 4:27:12 on whatever, Instagram. 4:27:15 So I think that's a good place to actually have some kind of like on blockchain 4:27:21 social media thing. 4:27:23 Although of course it would not actually work for Scanlon to every single message. 4:27:28 But 4:27:28 the few key messages registering, letting people know what your public key is 4:27:34 so that they can communicate with you, letting people know where to find you, like what 4:27:38 is your onion address or your ITP address or something. 4:27:43 I think that, something like that could work, I think. 4:27:48 I 4:27:48 is one problem. 4:27:50 Nostr has that that is probably more important than the long -term 4:27:56 data availability. that is just you don't have any guarantees that 4:28:02 if you send someone a message, they will receive it. 4:28:07 That's kind of 4:28:08 intriguingly the opposite of if you use anything on chain, any message there, everyone 4:28:14 knows that everyone receives it, which is quite a very intriguing different 4:28:19 situation. That's exactly the bargain that the Nostr did with the is that 4:28:25 it gave up shared state 4:28:28 with good consensus and that's how it gets its decentralization and censorship 4:28:32 resistance. the cost of that is that there is no data availability 4:28:38 in the sense that there's not even a single unified view on NOSR from anywhere. 4:28:44 Right. And like you said, there is no guarantee of persistence either. 4:28:48 But that's the bargain with the devil that Noster did. 4:28:51 delivery because... 4:28:55 I mean, if the Noster protocol simply documented and enibbed saying for high value 4:28:59 messages that you want to be guaranteed to have data availability and guaranteed to 4:29:05 have persistence, use this Relay 4:29:08 Zero, which doesn't use WebSockets like every other relay, but instead simply 4:29:13 creates an inscription that then other nodes can read. 4:29:20 That's the Relay Zero kind of fallback. 4:29:23 people would, you know, high priority messages that need that data availability 4:29:27 persistence. would 4:29:28 say important message, you know, checkbox on, and it would go into Bitcoin 4:29:33 inscriptions, and then you would get what what you're not getting from NOSR today, 4:29:37 which is availability and persistence. 4:29:40 So on the unified, Nostr would have 4:29:45 like a very 4:29:48 nice use case of completely 4:29:52 sidestepping the whole problem we have with 4:29:57 domains and web servers and stuff like that. 4:30:02 And there is a possibility for it to used like 4:30:08 such a network that is an alternative to these JSON API 4:30:14 cores basically. instead of having an application where you 4:30:20 have a hard -coded domain port 4:30:25 in the 4:30:27 application. Everyone can see what it is and they can hunt down your server 4:30:33 and arrest you running a Chomany eCash 4:30:39 Mint. 4:30:41 Instead of you would have an amp up in the application and the 4:30:47 communication 4:30:50 The problem is that you run into this, maybe you 4:30:56 would not need store the data forever, would need to store it for a period of 4:31:01 time, you would need it to be available for proving things in 4:31:07 these 4:31:08 back and forth protocols. 4:31:09 But you don't really need it be stored forever. 4:31:11 If it's stored for a month by relays or whatever, that would be completely fine. 4:31:17 But you actually do need assurances of delivery and 4:31:22 provability. Because that would make a lot of 4:31:28 these off -chain scaling solutions be able to this for 4:31:34 communication, but I don't think it actually works. 4:31:37 And when you try to put this sort of communication on a blockchain, I think that just 4:31:43 doesn't scale unless the blockchain is pruning in its 4:31:47 nature, maybe not even then. 4:31:49 don't know. basically, don't see kind of it solving that 4:31:55 particular use case. 4:31:57 I don't see anything really solving that. 4:31:59 I think we need to find like a middle ground between static 4:32:05 web pages on blockchains 4:32:07 And I 4:32:08 think, 4:32:22 well thank you, I think you have a similar situation in Bitcoin. 4:32:25 And if you know when Bitcoin 4:32:27 Core starts, has to have a bunch of seed IP addresses to find peers. 4:32:32 This is what's missing from Nostr, is the ability to bootstrap using some external 4:32:38 system. And a perfect way to bootstrap would be to have some kind of 4:32:44 channel in inscriptions where you could just say, 4:32:48 if the public key also happens to have an inscription under it on 4:32:54 Bitcoin, that's where you can go to bootstrap, right? 4:32:58 And this is the bootstrapping semantics are not defined in NOSR, but if they were, then 4:33:03 after you bootstrap through Bitcoin inscriptions, you could then continue the protocol 4:33:07 by communicating whatever relays you have shared with all your peers later. 4:33:13 So this is similar to how Bitcoin has to have a list of 8 or 16 IP addresses 4:33:19 to give you the seeds, which is not specified in Nozter, but if it was 4:33:25 through Bitcoin, that would solve your 4:33:27 problem, I think. 4:33:32 I'm not sure, I will let others talk. 4:33:38 For you to host the data, we can run our own relays, but 4:33:43 the problem is that everyone has to connect to my relay 4:33:47 to see my messages. 4:33:49 And I think they will, like you said, pick up a relay that's 4:33:55 sent to relay zero that retransmit to other relays, for example. 4:34:00 don't know. But the problem with that is that... 4:34:03 has to be a well -known place that everybody knows how to get to. 4:34:06 It shouldn't have an IP 4:34:07 IP address, right? 4:34:08 It should be like an implicit shelling point, which my candidate for that is Bitcoin 4:34:14 Inscriptions. That's the Relay Zero is whenever you start your Noster, Relay or Noster 4:34:19 client, go there and see what this is like the meta Noster. 4:34:24 This is the, is for bootstrapping only, 4:34:27 right 4:34:29 yeah but that's just for the message 4:34:35 because the noster came is just for text messages and that's most 4:34:41 important and it's right about people are trying to do decentralized 4:34:47 communication protocols that cannot be censored like there's all these attempts to do 4:34:52 multi -stage coordination on Noster or Noster marketplaces where people instead of going 4:34:58 to Dark Web and being subjected to exit scams by guys running these, 4:35:03 you know, nodes on tour, you can just have a 4:35:07 noster marketplace that occurs spontaneously. 4:35:11 But what's missing is that little piece of coordination out of band, which is where do 4:35:17 you go to find the set of relays that this marketplace uses? 4:35:22 Yeah, not just that, not just that, because you need pro -proofs. 4:35:26 If you want to 4:35:27 do this peer -to -peer marketplace, or you want to do so many cash mints and stuff like 4:35:31 that, that is highly reputation -based. 4:35:35 And that is the main incentive not to cheat, You lose your reputation, you lose your 4:35:40 business. So you need fraud proofs, and for fraud proofs, you actually do need to make 4:35:45 sure that you can 4:35:47 prove either the existence of something at a given time or the absence 4:35:52 of a reply in a given time. 4:35:55 the NoSIR relay network right now absolutely doesn't work for that. 4:36:02 Well, because like you said, it's because NoSIR does not provide any guarantees that 4:36:05 your recipient will 4:36:07 get the message, right? 4:36:08 But there is a way to ensure that every recipient who wants to get important messages 4:36:14 gets those important messages, is that to hard code the behavior into every Nostr 4:36:19 client that says when you start up along with your usual list of relays that 4:36:25 are configurable, always 4:36:26 check relay zero, is, you know, Bitcoin inscriptions. 4:36:31 If Bitcoin inscription is always checked, 4:36:34 then the messages can get there, 4:36:38 Then those messages will have contain fraud proofs, etc., right, for marketplaces, but 4:36:43 at least they will get there. 4:36:45 But all those messages would 4:36:46 be public issue. 4:36:48 It's not a good way to do it. 4:36:51 No, they could be encrypted, Encrypted to the public key of the recipient. 4:36:55 Yeah, are by default and also the DMs are encrypted. 4:37:00 So that's not a problem. 4:37:03 Yeah, but you can see who sent your book. 4:37:06 The thing is, I don't want to bring up like shit coins, 4:37:13 I have to. 4:37:15 Oddscy is doing really, really good as substitute 4:37:21 for YouTube, because YouTube is a shit. 4:37:26 Yesterday I... It's a good thing, yes. 4:37:30 I don't know you remember whatever it is. 4:37:32 What was it called? 4:37:33 shit coin? 4:37:35 A library, I think. 4:37:37 No, library, yeah. 4:37:38 I remember that from back in the day. 4:37:39 Those people were in New Haven around the same time I was. 4:37:43 Yeah, the OC is really great. 4:37:48 The people there are still not censored. 4:37:55 Yesterday I uploaded a visual on YouTube called Out of Shadows. 4:38:01 YouTube just said it was conspiracy theory, 4:38:06 harmful of violence. 4:38:09 The document just said that you shouldn't trust the information that you are getting. 4:38:14 yeah. 4:38:17 And on one side, people have even this community of 3D printed guns 4:38:23 and people are sharing. 4:38:25 There's a guy called 4:38:26 3D printed general. 4:38:29 YouTube channel was completely banned just because he put a video 4:38:35 of the history of 3D printed guns. 4:38:38 And a lot of things that people are being banned from YouTube. 4:38:42 I'd say, I don't know how it works. 4:38:45 I have 4:38:46 to look it up, I think it's uncensorable. 4:38:51 I don't know, but the channels can be taken down. 4:38:55 The only thing that I know is that it's working and people are not getting banned, and 4:38:59 that's free of speech there. 4:39:02 And way it mostly is now is not working 4:39:06 the proper way because people are not incentivized to host videos, you know? 4:39:13 We did have, let me see, we lost Mar as 4:39:18 a speaker, 4:39:20 but maybe he will come back. 4:39:26 But yes, I think this topic is certainly of interest, like what will digital 4:39:32 scarcity be used for, and in particular, why is the 4:39:37 communication backbone of the internet so bad? 4:39:40 because it does feel very heavy -handed like 4:39:46 the YouTube seems to be very, I mean, 4:39:51 I'm sure there's an interesting flip side to it, which is just that they want to 4:39:55 protect the advertising dollars. 4:39:57 And so they don't want anything on there. 4:39:59 They want to discourage anything that's just too weird, you know? 4:40:03 Like I don't know if, does anyone want videos 4:40:06 of, like, people getting killed and stuff? 4:40:09 on YouTube? probably not. 4:40:13 So my guess is that that's part of it. 4:40:14 of Russians being killed, but not videos of Ukrainians being killed in the war. 4:40:21 Yeah, so that's obviously a double standard, but of course, 4:40:28 I think every time there's a war, people always move very quickly to boost all the 4:40:34 good news on their side. 4:40:35 you know what mean? 4:40:38 You don't want people to despair. 4:40:40 It's like you said, there's an added dynamic, but there's also the deep state dynamic. 4:40:45 So Twitter 4:40:46 is abandoning all the advertising revenue in favor of $8 a month. 4:40:50 And I think they're successfully transitioning from advertiser -driven revenue to the 4:40:54 subscription revenue. Once they do that, then they're immune from 4:41:00 pressure from advertisers, but they're still the deep state with all the 4:41:06 witch hunts and stuff. 4:41:10 Elon Musk was on the spaces, excusing himself for the ADL, the last 4:41:16 week, man. 4:41:18 They are everywhere, you know, and he just said about that, nice that 4:41:24 you approved the ad 4:41:26 every new year on Twitter. 4:41:29 Before Elon bought Twitter, after he bought Twitter, they released 4:41:35 these Twitter files, literally saying that CIA and all these are 4:41:41 very surprising. I it mean, it wasn't 4:41:46 I mean it wasn't literally surprising, but it was surprising 4:41:49 I mean it wasn't literally surprising, but it was surprising 4:41:52 Of course, but I just meant that it was surprising that it was so like explicit 4:41:55 Of course, but I just meant that it was surprising that it was so like explicit 4:41:58 Like there's emails where they're just like, here's a list of accounts we need taken care of 4:42:01 Like there's emails where they're just like, here's a list of accounts we need taken care of 4:42:04 And they're like, okay, we're on it 4:42:07 And they're like, okay, we're on it 4:42:13 Now we have David Bailey is here 4:42:16 Now we have David Bailey is here 4:42:19 magazine giving you some beef I don't know 4:42:24 maybe I should be asking you ha ha I don't know it's I hear it's 4:42:30 run by here to run badly I I think that's true news. 4:42:35 that's definitely true news was well -run when Vitalik was running it, right? 4:42:40 Vitalik was... yeah, bring back Vitalik 4:42:45 Vitalik is the biggest friend Bitcoin now 4:42:48 Vitalik is the big friend of Ordinal's in their 4 Bitcoin now, 4:42:52 you know. Well, you know Well, yeah, we were discussing earlier, if you 4:42:58 watch the recording, we talk about the article, yesterday's article, or whatever, 4:43:02 whatever day it was. 4:43:03 Well, I thought there was some interesting elements to it. 4:43:05 I thought there was other parts that made no sense to me, but I 4:43:08 I will say one of the nice things about having a platform is when 4:43:13 you let people call both ways, I feel like you get more credibility for the 4:43:19 platform in general. 4:43:21 I'm glad to have a diversity of thought and opinion there. 4:43:29 Yeah, I think I actually also I definitely think it's much better 4:43:35 to have long form articles 4:43:40 as critique of drivechain, rather than like tweets or whatever. 4:43:44 think that it's actually a lot better. 4:43:47 Yeah. Even though one was great. 4:43:51 But yeah, that's much better because I don't know. 4:43:55 just think that it's just like... 4:43:57 More substantive conversations. 4:44:00 actually kind of 4:44:01 feels like it has a direction or something. 4:44:06 Going somewhere. 4:44:08 There's also kind of like more of a sense that it's a finished thought because like a 4:44:13 tweet is always too little, so everyone knows that there's not enough context, when 4:44:17 it's like 4:44:17 someone has a long -form thing, 4:44:22 their reputation is kind of on the line where they say, this is the best I can do with 4:44:27 all the, I had as much space as I needed and I laid out my whole thing and this was the 4:44:32 best I can do. 4:44:35 Have you tried? It's possible to go to GPT-4 4:44:38 Have you tried? It's possible to go to GPT-4 4:44:41 and tell it to create a court where there is a pro and a con side and a judge 4:44:44 and tell it to create a court where there is a pro and a con side and a judge 4:44:47 and then you can stage an argument for and against any issue 4:44:50 and have the judge decide on the merits at the end 4:44:53 and GPT-4 will run the whole process for you 4:44:56 That's amazing 4:44:59 I was loving GPT-3 4:45:02 Everyone's been telling me how good GPT-4 is 4:45:05 So this is kind of like when you save a dessert 4:45:08 for a really long time 4:45:11 I've been trying to build it up 4:45:14 I'm trying to remember what was life like before GPT-4 4:45:17 Even though I still use GPT-3 4:45:20 I still haven't really used GPT-4 4:45:23 Peter Schiff's son said it was the greatest thing 4:45:26 You can go right now on GPT-4 and say 4:45:29 Please form a coherent argument 4:45:32 for why all criticism of drivechain is reducible to concern 4:45:35 trolling and misunderstanding of what it does 4:45:38 and it will go scour the web and it will summarize 4:45:41 the whole argument in one page point by point for you 4:45:44 We should do that 4:45:47 and then I'll send it over 4:45:50 David, that'll be new 4:45:53 He just said he likes both sides 4:45:56 That will be my new article 4:45:59 written completely by GPT-4 4:46:02 and my amazing prompt 4:46:05 is the seed of creativity 4:46:08 AI supports drivechains 4:46:11 The strangest thing is that you get the best answers 4:46:14 if you conclude every prompt that you make 4:46:17 by the following sentence 4:46:20 Take a deep breath and think it step by step 4:46:23 If you say take a deep breath 4:46:26 and think it out step by step carefully 4:46:29 for some reason that just drastically improves the quality of the output 4:46:32 I'll tell you the reason 4:46:35 This is me being an armchair psychologist 4:46:38 I think the implication is 4:46:41 obviously our brain has many different modes of thinking 4:46:44 but there must be a big edge 4:46:47 to some of the ones that involve not taking a deep breath 4:46:50 which is why they must work better in some cases 4:46:53 probably not a case where you want a written textual reply 4:46:59 but they must work in some cases that are online 4:47:02 where people go back and forth quickly 4:47:05 or something else is happening 4:47:08 like it's virtue signaling or it's flirting or something 4:47:11 and so that must automatically 4:47:14 discount all those 4:47:17 but it must be something 4:47:20 because otherwise it would be 4:47:23 it can't be the case that that always improves everything 4:47:26 because that doesn't really make any sense 4:47:29 it's already trying to do the best thing 4:47:32 so you must be cluing it in that you want a certain flavor of response 4:47:35 which is like a more rational flavor 4:47:38 Anyway, that's my theory 4:47:41 It's crazy how you can go and tell it to create personas 4:47:44 like you can actually formulate a demand 4:47:47 that it create a persona of a well-informed proponent 4:47:50 and well-informed opponent 4:47:53 and you can have them read all the cons and pros on the internet 4:47:56 for one side or the other 4:47:59 and once those personas have been fully created 4:48:02 and indoctrinated 4:48:05 then you can have them lay out their best arguments 4:48:08 and then have a third persona of an impartial judge 4:48:11 who will summarize both sides and render an opinion 4:48:14 and people have done that on political issues 4:48:17 but this drivechain 4:48:20 you can just basically go dump that into a paragraph-long prompt 4:48:23 and you will get some amazing output 4:48:26 And then inscribe on the blockchain 4:48:29 or will it be forever? 4:48:32 Inscribe it 4:48:35 Nice, I like that 4:48:38 Well, we should do it 4:48:41 That would be great 4:48:44 You need a plugin 4:48:47 Plugins are possible on GPT-4 4:48:50 So you need an inscription plugin 4:48:53 Inscription plugin 4:48:56 Yeah, that's good 4:48:59 You can just say, inscribe this answer 4:49:02 like you have shared this answer 4:49:05 That's not as catchy though, Alex 4:49:08 That's too wordy 4:49:11 Let's check GPT-4 to shorten that 4:49:14 Bit drive 4:49:17 Quick question for you, Paul 4:49:20 So, we have our panel next week 4:49:23 and we have a lot of questions 4:49:26 and we have a lot of questions 4:49:29 and we have a lot of questions 4:49:32 So, we have our panel next week 4:49:35 Curious if you 4:49:38 I haven't listened to the debate that you did with Peter 4:49:41 at 4:49:44 TabConf 4:49:47 TabConf 4:49:50 I'm going to before our session 4:49:53 but what do you think are 4:49:56 the most interesting 4:49:59 the most interesting questions to ask 4:50:02 Peter 4:50:05 like probe Peter's position 4:50:08 and after the past couple months 4:50:11 of you taking fire from all directions 4:50:14 what do you think are the most sensitive 4:50:17 questions for you to answer 4:50:20 Well, I mean, I asked 4:50:23 Peter's belief is that if miners are persuaded to do anything 4:50:26 it's a block size increase 4:50:29 so I asked him, is buying an ASIC 4:50:32 a block size increase 4:50:35 but he didn't answer it 4:50:38 the audience had sort of moved on 4:50:41 even though that sounds ridiculous 4:50:44 that's certainly, I was thinking 4:50:47 how far does he really take this idea 4:50:50 that anything that a miner is persuaded to do 4:50:53 to force a miner $50 to like dance or something 4:50:56 is that a block size increase 4:50:59 so I don't know 4:51:02 he also, one thing that he should be 4:51:05 sort of asked about is 4:51:08 we paid him to write this written critique 4:51:11 of Drivechain but he still has not produced it 4:51:14 so this was like many months ago 4:51:17 three, four months ago, I don't know exactly how long 4:51:20 and he has all this time 4:51:23 to do all this other stuff and he's been saying 4:51:26 he says like in Luke's pull request, this is a terrible idea 4:51:29 and he's tweeted that merge mine sidechains are Greg Maxwell's 4:51:32 biggest mistake and so he's tweeted 4:51:35 for years about this idea being terrible 4:51:38 but he's not producing any of this 4:51:41 and in fact, not only has he not produced the report 4:51:44 but he started actually tweeting in public 4:51:47 before the debate that he didn't really know the idea 4:51:50 and he would have to ask me some questions 4:51:53 live on stage in order to understand the idea 4:51:56 so if you watch the debate, you see that 4:51:59 Tidwell is a little confused 4:52:02 because what he thinks Peter is doing 4:52:05 he thinks that Peter is asking me some kind of like Socratic 4:52:08 question to like 4:52:11 tee me up or some kind of haymaker or whatever as Tidwell put it 4:52:14 but really he was just asking me about the protocol 4:52:17 which also made it kind of bizarre for me because 4:52:20 I was like now I have to play two roles 4:52:23 one is I have to like helpfully explain the idea 4:52:26 to him in addition to doing like a debate 4:52:29 opponent type thing and then Tidwell said that he didn't 4:52:32 he didn't realize that 4:52:35 he hadn't seen those tweets until after the debate and he didn't 4:52:38 realize that Peter had basically 4:52:41 become unprepared 4:52:44 so all of these are kind of mysterious constellations of things 4:52:47 so like 4:52:50 this idea of because that was all he could end up saying 4:52:53 was that it was a block size increase 4:52:56 but it's not a block size increase at all 4:52:59 the only thing that's a block size increase is what our layer one node 4:53:02 is required to do in order to 4:53:05 measure confirmations 4:53:08 Peter Todd says that and you can see how bizarre 4:53:11 I find it when I have to even ask him a question 4:53:14 that is like is buying an ASIC 4:53:17 a block size increase 4:53:20 so and then he's also maybe complained about like 4:53:23 his time he's like it might take miners 4:53:26 some time to set up the sidechains or something 4:53:29 but it's kind of like it's really absurd 4:53:32 you know because the miners do all kinds of things 4:53:35 all the time 4:53:38 like it takes them all kinds of time to do everything 4:53:41 when they plug in all the miners 4:53:44 when they research a new cooling system 4:53:47 so it's really this bizarre paternalism 4:53:50 on the part of the miners 4:53:53 Peter's view is that we should take a big interest in 4:53:56 what miners do all the time 4:53:59 as for myself 4:54:02 I mean I think the idea is 4:54:05 has enormous potential and is basically 4:54:08 harmless and that's just my point of view 4:54:11 I think probably I was too 4:54:14 polite in advocating for it 4:54:17 and I just kind of shrug people critique it 4:54:20 and I would say some people say this some people say that 4:54:23 even though the critiques don't make any sense 4:54:26 I don't know what I would be asked 4:54:29 what would I be asked? 4:54:32 maybe someone here can suggest something 4:54:35 one topic I know I want to drill into 4:54:38 is I want to go into the most controversial 4:54:41 part of the proposal 4:54:44 the conversation in general 4:54:47 which is activation and 4:54:50 miner activated soft forks 4:54:53 that is the most controversial part 4:54:56 it doesn't really have anything to do with drivechain specifically 4:54:59 it's more just about our defective 4:55:02 culture after all these years 4:55:05 is unable to regard 4:55:08 like progress 4:55:11 or even just 4:55:14 it's unable to 4:55:17 we have this complacency that I think is a huge mistake 4:55:20 we just think everyone thinks the current version of bitcoin core 4:55:23 is perfect 4:55:26 and I think that's a huge risk 4:55:29 yeah and it's like there's no 4:55:32 there's no 4:55:35 process for advancing things 4:55:38 and so when you just take the only process 4:55:41 that's known and pursue it 4:55:44 the critique and attack is well 4:55:47 how dare you follow this process 4:55:50 it's harder to even follow 4:55:53 I mean it was very disappointing that Luke put out the pull request 4:55:56 and he said it was a draft in the title 4:55:59 which is the proper thing to say and he had no activation logic in it at all 4:56:02 and in it he said he only wanted 4:56:05 people to comment 4:56:08 he said it very explicitly 4:56:11 that he only wanted people to comment on the approach he was using 4:56:14 and not on whether or not the idea was desirable 4:56:18 he made it crystal clear 4:56:21 but then that pull request was immediately overrun 4:56:24 by basically vandalism 4:56:27 but more than that very few people 4:56:30 participated in 4:56:33 reviewing it honestly which is even worse 4:56:36 so what it speaks to is basically 4:56:39 kind of a corruption and a hypocrisy 4:56:42 in the process which is kind of like 4:56:45 partially working 4:56:48 it just speaks to basically that 4:56:51 there is the unwritten rules or whatever 4:56:54 and that would seem to indicate 4:56:57 that there's plenty of room for 4:57:00 people involved in the process to advance their own 4:57:03 agenda at the expense of Bitcoin 4:57:10 by the way what I saw in the pull request 4:57:13 was that it is using 4:57:16 or trying to use the 4:57:19 UTXO database 4:57:22 to hold the drivechain databases 4:57:25 so that it does not add additional 4:57:28 databases to the transaction validation context 4:57:31 was that something like that going on? 4:57:34 yes that's correct there's like a kind of 4:57:37 different index there's like a negative index of some kind 4:57:43 and that's something that Luke 4:57:46 did this 4:57:49 yeah he came up with that 4:57:52 I mean he would certainly know much better than I 4:57:55 he probably thought there would be some combination of 4:57:58 easier to review, easier to understand 4:58:01 yeah I mean it was one technical criticism 4:58:04 I met 4:58:07 in regards to the drivechain is that 4:58:10 it wants the transaction validation context 4:58:13 and we might not want to do that 4:58:16 and when I looked at the code that Luke was writing 4:58:19 that's what occurred to me that this seems to be a different approach 4:58:22 and I was however not sure when this happened 4:58:25 and where this happened first and that's why I was 4:58:28 so wait can you re-explain that 4:58:31 what exactly is the critique? 4:58:34 so the critique was that you are adding 4:58:37 additional databases to the transaction validation context 4:58:40 this is a very developer view of things 4:58:43 like the users don't 4:58:46 understand this probably by running a node 4:58:49 but for developers the context 4:58:52 when you call a function or whatever the size of that context 4:58:55 does matter 4:58:58 and in the maintainability and the possible 4:59:01 errors in the complexity of the code 4:59:04 in the scope of the changes that need to be made 4:59:07 so if you can keep that 4:59:10 small and minimal 4:59:13 and every alternative to drivechain 4:59:16 that would use covenants 4:59:19 or covenant like primitives to do this 4:59:22 without explicit databases 4:59:24 because there are ways to less efficiently do things like with something like the Merkleizer the things proposal or something like that 4:59:34 you just basically implement a hash rate as scroll counter and the walking back and forth logic in the script 4:59:41 and you can do the blind merge mining with the covenants and so we basically could do this in a very different way 4:59:48 and those would have this advantage that they are not actually adding additional databases to the transaction validation context 4:59:55 and you basically just have the UTXO set as a database for evaluating the transactions in a block 5:00:02 and from what I saw Luke actually rewrote the BIP300 logic in a way that he did something very similar some clever hack where he actually put the data in the same database 5:00:19 yes but it is a very miner point I mean like I think I mean I don't know really what to say like it's kind of like if you had an Excel spreadsheet and you had instead of adding two new tabs 5:00:32 he could keep it all in the first tab or something like that you know so it's not really like a 5:00:40 yeah it's totally a core developer fixation or whatever 5:00:46 yeah but it wasn't like a technical critique like it's like a you know it's like you build a car and then you something under the hood is moved somewhere else 5:00:57 also under the hood but that is the type of productive thing that should happen whenever anyone 5:01:07 you know tries to contribute to Bitcoin Core so that would be like a good thing but very few people even commented on any of that you know like that was what Luke asked for comments about but 5:01:23 so what do you make of this argument of BIP300 makes miners custodians 5:01:34 I don't make really anything of it because the miners are already custodians of everything and the only way to change that is to remove proof of work from Bitcoin 5:01:46 so the it's true that the miners have slightly more what you might call well I don't even really believe that so because the idea is the miners have a narrow task which is to copy paste this hash from the sidechain to L1 once every three months 5:02:09 and they really have the choice between like conforming to that or rejecting that and trying to steal all the coins for themselves but that's the very same choice that they face when they support the lightning network or when they support regular L1 Bitcoin UTXO moving around 5:02:30 so I think it also doesn't matter the logic of the custodian question is the same as the terrible logic of caring about what other people think third parties think about the Bitcoin network such as the senator type thing which I think is just terrible 5:02:51 it's a very low quality idea you know because if you care about if you if you have like if we split Bitcoin into like compliant a hash that was like compliant with let's say the government of Russia or something and one that was just independent 5:03:10 the compliant it once it's compliant it's all the proof of work is useless because it's just saying it's all coming from whatever it is Washington DC or whatever if that makes any sense 5:03:23 yep 5:03:35 who people who have some kind of opinion on what people should do. 5:03:41 my view is that hashers don't even have any agency and the mining pools don't have any 5:03:45 agency either so leaving the question of whether or they should support drivechain is 5:03:49 kind of like 5:03:51 or whether or not they should support any Drivechain, the one that has a lot of coins 5:03:54 in it or steal from it. 5:03:56 All of this is just the mining pools will do whatever they think the hashers want them 5:04:01 to do because the hashers can switch mining pools at the drop of a hat 5:04:05 very easily and cheaply. 5:04:09 So the pools have to do what they think their clients do. 5:04:11 don't want them to do. 5:04:12 So the pools really have no agency. 5:04:14 They don't have any ability to like decide. 5:04:17 So they're not really custodians of anything because they can't, they're not, they 5:04:21 they temporarily run the show 5:04:23 is this 5:04:24 it's kind of like you said something like if you have you had a show if you were like whoever it is let's say you're Bill Maher or something in the in an instant the security guards are running Bill Maher show like in any given point in time but you know if you wanted to fire the security guards and replace 5:04:44 so how much agency does anyone really have and the hashes themselves they must do because of the difficulty adjustments they if they're not profitable if they're not in the upper half in terms of profitability they are fired and so they also have no agency so the whole idea about 5:05:03 I don't know you know the drivechain is a very simple offer to miners it offers them lots and lots and lots of fees in return it basically asks that they copy paste a hash 5:05:17 it's not really they they cannot do that but if they don't then they you know that's no different than just if they decide to stop supporting the lightning network or something moon settler yes hello 5:05:32 yeah it did it did occur to me when I read that article from the miners that they basically screwed the pooch if they have to worry about that already so they are overexposed oversized and positioned themselves badly jurisdictionally if that is a big concern but I didn't want to like really get into that with them 5:06:03 it's a very awkward thing to discuss I think would be a very good thing though if we had miner revenues that they wouldn't touch that would decentralize mining like this we mentioned before even though we think this would be very small but the Zcash drivechain if those were revenues that some kind of like KYC heavy miner if they couldn't touch those then that would actually be good because it would just melt that pool down 5:06:30 yeah and obviously they don't want that so they will argue about that as I mentioned that they don't actually want other miners to be more profitable and what I wanted to ask earlier from you is is it really true that the miners the hashers or the AC corners can just switch pools in this context like so what is going on in the United States 5:06:55 I like to call that thing Uncle Sodom for obvious reasons so I think they have this tendency where if ever 51% of the hash rate would be on American soil at one time they would just say that they now own the Bitcoin network and silly stuff like that it's just the nature of the beast 5:07:22 and in this case they can easily so if publicly traded miners are the majority of the hash there they can easily just mandate that they have to use offer compliant pools or something like that they can just make an executive order or whatever other regulation they can also try to use various subsidy tactics, tax exemptions or whatever for compliant miners 5:07:46 as you already know if that is economically detrimental then all it does is increase the ROI of non-compliant mining which means that if you are an enterprising person and you start mining in a different jurisdiction you will eventually be able to outcompete the other miners who will not only start to lose on a relative basis but because of the difficulty adjustment they will eventually go compliant 5:08:16 yeah in the ideal scenario where they leave money on the table it is if the government subsidy is significant enough for the opposite to happen for the hash rate to grow then that is very very bad for Bitcoin and I'm afraid it would cost almost nothing for the budget of the United States it would be like a joke so it's very weird for me when people boast about how nobody can do anything about Bitcoin 5:08:46 good question though I mean so like if it doesn't cost anything then what's really happening is not because remember the main bad thing that the miners would do would be to censor transactions so if the somehow the government is paying them more then what they're really doing is some kind of like complicated outbidding of the they're really like doing like an ordinals inscription thing they're outbidding the block but they're doing us the favor of not of not broadcasting their thing so it's kind of weirdly 5:09:14 but again they have to can only keep that up for as long as the people are unable to outbid them in terms of fees and it's only suppressed until the US government stops bribing them to not include these transactions and then all the transactions become up for grabs immediately 5:09:34 but let me ask answer your first question about how easy it is to switch pools which is to say it's very easy and they even admit that in article and on Twitter afterwards but we should make it even easier so one thing that I have been tinkering with recently is a piece of software that every like it's a plausible piece of software 5:10:00 where every single the goal would be to have every single miner run this software which is kind of like this big I mentioned it to you at the beginning Moon Settler what it does is it it's what it does is it organized it keeps track of who's in what pool 5:10:30 Oh can you guys hear me or I am frozen I can hear you I think Paul's Paul went out yeah I wanted to ask him that since he got his new phone did this Twitter got better but looks like not by much 5:10:56 this is big mining interfering in this Twitter space right now they're they're they're they're censoring and silencing Paul 5:11:05 you know I I will say like you know first off talking about anything mining is a little bit of a sensitive topic for me because a lot of miners are customers of mine that I do not want to I do not want to piss off my actual my actual customers and I also think you know in terms of selling drivechains and and advocating for it it is not going to be well received by miners 5:11:35 to say kind of like hey miners have gotten too big and really y'all need to be disrupted I think that that's going to be a sales pitch but that being said I do think it's true and I think that like if if let's just say hypothetically like Bitcoin mining was made illegal everywhere 5:12:02 I was like I started thinking this through the other day like what would happen and I honestly think that if we could get Bitcoin mining banned in every country Bitcoin would become much more robust like much stronger because the network wouldn't shut down you just drive all the activity underground on the mining side and from an end user perspective it's not like miners improve the user experience of Bitcoin 5:12:32 so the hash rate would just basically flow to the people that are best at hiding their activity which is kind of what we want like like compliant Bitcoin mining is really you know like quote legal Bitcoin mining is really a subsidy to those that do their mining out in public like out they do it out in where everyone knows what they're doing because that's the whole point of being compliant is that the 5:13:01 you don't have to worry about the authorities because you don't have to worry about the authorities you don't build that into your business model well one day we're gonna have to worry about the authorities one day Bitcoin mining is not going to be compliant when the government turns hostile against Bitcoin truly so like why wouldn't we want to start incentivizing the behavior of miners exactly what Paul was just saying it's like okay if there's all this extra revenue to be generated by 5:13:30 you know hiding your activity you're gonna get a lot more miners hiding their activity 5:13:41 so the only counter argument could be it is like 5:13:46 objectively not a nice thing and the very fiat thing to like change the rules 5:13:52 after people made their 5:13:54 business plans and investments, right? 5:13:56 to change the rules and change their profitability after they committed financially, 5:14:01 that's kind of like an asshole move. 5:14:05 I'm not overly sensitive to plight of US 5:14:10 miners, I have to say. 5:14:13 Yeah, it's definitely an asshole move. 5:14:15 I hear that and that's why miners also would not want to hear that message. 5:14:20 like, know, think we've, you know, it's 5:14:26 beleaguered point 5:14:27 that like home mining is not profitable. 5:14:32 And like you have to have like economies of scale. 5:14:35 like if Bitcoin mining, like nodes don't suffer from that same problem. 5:14:40 Anyone can run a node. 5:14:41 And like that's the value prop of 5:14:43 a node. what if by making 5:14:49 Bitcoin mining something that is 5:14:54 underground, you really return back to a dynamic where 5:15:00 the only kind of scale you can mine at is like from your home you know like now like now there's so few less institutional scale mining facilities that it actually can be profitable to mine at home I don't know I don't know just a thought 5:15:20 yeah sorry guys I got interrupted yet again by this crazy app that continues to crash but I was trying to say it's one software that everyone runs and then it it checks it can check for censored transactions and blame a pool so it's like a pool hopper software and since it's easy to see if a transaction is censored because if you if you've heard about a transaction for like 20 minutes 5:15:51 and it should have been in the made it into the blockchain you know if it had the highest fee but it didn't it misses like twice in a row or something then you can be pretty sure that something's sneaky going on so it can then ban they can figure out which pool is responsible and just everyone just disconnects from that pool 5:16:16 they join another pool and then you just have it so that this can keep happening forever and then as I mentioned you Moose Adler it's like if everyone ends up in one pool it just has everyone flip a coin or choose a random number and then it just splits them in randomly into new pools and software would be able to also create a new pool from scratch so it would also be able to do that so it'll be automated 5:16:47 and that is why the important thing with the pools is just how easy it is to switch and that can be made very very very easy the thing is we don't even really need to do any of that though because it's already so easy to do that I think the miners are already on a very short leash they have never when has any transaction really been censored 5:17:07 and when has there's when have have there been like you know reorganizations so that people can double spend like none of this stuff actually happens so so already they're on a very very very short leash and already it's very easy to switch pools I think it's interesting how stable the hash rate distribution is you know what I mean if you check it on one day you come back a month later it's still like foundry and pool whatever it's still Luxor with 3% 5:17:37 or something. So I find that to be kind of interesting. 5:17:41 But I can only assume that just because everyone's happy with where they are, and 5:17:44 there's nothing to disturb this equilibrium. 5:17:48 My theory about that, why we did not see like real campaigns 5:17:53 and stuff like 5:17:55 believe it's a big part that there is a huge coordination difficulty 5:18:00 that is basically unsolved for any such thing to happen. 5:18:06 the problem with that is actually reorg markets that solve this coordination 5:18:12 difficulty would cost basically almost nothing to set up. 5:18:17 when people start doing silly things where they try to build up 5:18:23 marketplaces for transactions and transaction acceleration outside the mempool, 5:18:29 they actually like basically are laying the foundations for for such a thing to happen and I don't see it not only I don't see it an unsolvable problem but I see it something that might actually just solve itself for those that want to pay for reorgs for whatever reason 5:18:48 and a lot of people can opportunistically jump on it by basically submitting double spend transactions to this mempool alternative and when there is a profitable set then it is offered to miners or any such thing 5:19:03 I kind of think this could emerge unless the mempool is so good that nobody even thinks about using alternatives I think that's kind of the direction that Bitcoin should go but it's not a popular idea right now for some reason 5:19:25 hey not to uh not to interrupt at all but Satoshi and Joyer did you get a 5:19:31 taproot wizard what is going on here 5:19:39 yeah he's out I guess he's not he's got a little icon look at that dude he got one damn dude 5:19:48 Udi what the fuck investor and Udi's thing I can't fucking get uh um I think I think my mic 5:19:56 is on oh I hear you did you get a taproot wizard yeah I just um just uh got one earlier today 5:20:03 really happy about that I think that the taproot wizards has been a monumental shift of like 5:20:08 Bitcoin culture brought a lot of uh like other people from other ecosystems back to Bitcoin and 5:20:13 more eyes on Bitcoin um I mean that's how I learned about ordinals and inscriptions obviously 5:20:18 I've been a Bitcoinist very very early on but uh I I think it's a good movement in general 5:20:24 you know I think that there's been a lot of like uh benefits to um the taproot wizards movement 5:20:32 well dude solid flex solid flex very jelly belly thank you thank you 5:20:39 yeah I'm super honored to to have one as silly as it seems just a pixel uh image but um I think 5:20:45 it it's it's more than just like you know just an NFT I think I really do think it's like it's 5:20:49 like a movement that hopefully will continue to do um good things for for Bitcoin I think 5:20:54 ordinals in general has onboarded a lot of people to to Bitcoin that were you know some people might 5:20:59 say for the wrong reasons or or whatever but these are people that have spun up nodes you know there's 5:21:05 been definitely thousands of nodes and at least hundreds um like that I've that I've held myself 5:21:10 in the order core there's definitely been people that are you know that been in other ecosystems 5:21:15 and now they're becoming Bitcoin maximalists and I've had plenty of conversations with people that 5:21:19 they're like wow everything else you know is uncomparable to Bitcoin and these are people 5:21:23 that didn't really touch Bitcoin but have been in the crypto ecosystem for you know over a year or 5:21:28 two years or whatever um so I think that's really good and just seeing people running full nodes 5:21:33 learning about UTXOs learning about self-custody and just seeing the benefits of you know Bitcoin 5:21:37 over other other you know other chains and just to see to understand why are Bitcoiners the way 5:21:42 they are why do they you know what do they value what is the culture of Bitcoin what are the values 5:21:47 of Bitcoin and like a lot of people are becoming more exposed to that I think that that that's a 5:21:51 benefit you know more people learning about Bitcoin is good for everybody that that are 5:21:55 Bitcoins uh Bitcoiners and no matter for what reason they use it and I think that that that 5:22:00 goes together with um like drivechains it shows that you know people can use Bitcoin for different 5:22:04 things but as long as we're all using the same thing we can all be under the same umbrella we 5:22:08 can all have like a common goal people that might use Bitcoin for something we don't like 5:22:13 you know that's okay because maybe other developers might help them out then and we don't have to 5:22:18 completely shun them out we can we can help them we can all be together and work towards a common 5:22:22 goal even if we have differences and we might want to use it in a different way so um yeah thanks uh 5:22:28 thanks for asking me I guess no we can't have any of that Bitcoin adoption people running nodes 5:22:37 people learning about what makes Bitcoin special no the Satoshi enjoyer what about 5:22:43 what about my podcast what about bro what about Bitcoin is my whole band and if we let people 5:22:50 find out about it it's going to not be cool anymore I think that like the podcast is you 5:22:54 know they're going to come crawling back they're going to one day when they'll be the only way 5:22:59 that they'll be able to buy food will be with Bitcoin and then Bitcoin will have saved like 5:23:06 there they definitely have a good to them right they definitely speak to a lot of people and 5:23:10 people resonate with it but not everybody there's going to be people that will not resonate with it 5:23:13 and you want them and you know what those people are the problem we need what we should do is we 5:23:19 need to melt those people down and pour them into a different cast that so that they're exactly like 5:23:26 the rest of us because that's what Bitcoin is about hey speaking about what Bitcoin's about 5:23:33 one last comment and I'll get out of here so I don't derail y'all's conversation um 5:23:39 but uh uh going back to Bitcoin miners being um uh compliant like I was also thinking about this 5:23:47 the other day on um like like what makes Bitcoin like more valuable and it kind of bothers me 5:23:56 that like we've allowed this narrative to take root that Bitcoin um is different or special 5:24:05 or Bitcoin is um like uh Bitcoin exists because you know we comply with the laws and so the 5:24:13 government like allows Bitcoin to exist and it it bothers me because yeah the unregistered 5:24:21 securities type yeah the whole point of Bitcoin is like like there's nothing the government can 5:24:27 fucking do about it like that's what makes Bitcoin valuable and powerful like like the 5:24:31 government's perception of Bitcoin even though they can cause a lot of pain is kind of irrelevant 5:24:37 like that's the point of it and so like in the power dynamic Bitcoin's more powerful than the 5:24:44 government like it like like Jesus that's a very moxie thing to say well I mean I guess what I'm 5:24:51 saying is like you've been to the will of Bitcoin Bitcoin doesn't bend to the will of some elected 5:24:56 politician and so from that perspective having them ban Bitcoin but it not fucking matter is 5:25:04 like a massive billboard that is displaying the power dynamic and so to allow them to like act 5:25:13 like oh they've blessed it to continue it's like you're like you're just some fucking old man who 5:25:18 shits in a diaper in Washington DC like you don't fucking matter like I don't know I just feel like 5:25:26 it's like Bitcoin becomes more powerful like more valuable when people come to appreciate that 5:25:34 its existence is independent entirely from the political system well of course I actually think 5:25:44 it's a little worse than that which is to say if we go down the road of saying that Bitcoin must 5:25:54 always be compliant with whatever Washington DC decides then the entire design is not going to 5:26:03 work the hall the proof of work is wasted the you know the data a database would be 5:26:10 more technically efficient and better easier to scale Venmo WeChat pay CBDCs they would all be 5:26:19 able to easily compete with Bitcoin in that dimension so unless Bitcoin has this kind of 5:26:25 subversive edge I think it will definitely go to zero well I feel like the government's going to 5:26:32 keep trying to like sanitize it's like subversive edge because the last thing the government wants 5:26:38 is to be shown to be powerless so it's like they'll figure out some contorted way to like 5:26:44 make it seem like these two things are like working in combination when in reality like 5:26:50 Bitcoin has no fucking clue what they're doing it doesn't fucking care their hanger-ons and the 5:26:57 sooner that we can have everyone else see that it's like just the the faster that we like I don't 5:27:03 know dissolve their power I I feel like this is a little bit out there but like I'm starting to 5:27:11 think that like we need to get Bitcoin mining banned you'll need to have vendor adoption for 5:27:18 any kind of like for anyone to kind of see what you're what you're proclaiming here because 5:27:25 if if you had the government's close off any fiat off and on ramps like peg in peg out so to speak 5:27:35 then then you that would have not a catastrophic effect because the network would continue but it 5:27:40 would it would certainly have an effect the only way that you make make everyone realize that 5:27:46 that governments have no effect on Bitcoin is to have a wider vendor adoption 5:27:52 yeah circular economy and and and uh and the most important thing is this centralized price 5:28:00 discovery for Bitcoin because so long it's it's uh the price is discovered on a few uh 5:28:06 centralized exchanges and and basically the the fiat wall street bro liquidity 5:28:15 is the main driver of Bitcoin price it reacts to the changes in available credit almost immediately 5:28:24 and the money the supply changes and doesn't really seem to care about anything else 5:28:30 these are very centrally controllable things so Bitcoin can hardly be free in in this uh setup 5:28:40 well I will what I will push back on with the the markets where these things trade 5:28:45 because we have examples of illicit goods that are banned basically universally and those markets 5:28:53 are massively liquid so like you know cocaine or fucking like hard drugs those are massively 5:29:00 liquid markets that are moving huge sums of money moving more money than Bitcoin's moving 5:29:05 and they're able to operate like just fine I mean you know like I I did not I did not say 5:29:13 I did not say that uh it would not be liquid without this I would say that it needs to it 5:29:21 needs to move off from this platform because these platforms have shown that they will bend over to 5:29:27 the regulators like almost immediately they will fold and they implemented this KSCM bullshit that 5:29:34 was pushed on them uh without much resistance they did not try to flee the jurisdiction they 5:29:39 did not try to uh I mean a few of them did try to ignore VPN users and and stuff like that but 5:29:48 even they got uh smacked down and and beaten into obedience and and somehow people seem to value 5:29:56 the large compliant uh semi-institutions and the whole thing basically went sideways there 5:30:05 in my view and now now the price discovery happens there and increasing beyond derivatives and 5:30:13 I I think what you are saying makes sense so um I was kind of hoping that Bitcoin gets banned in 5:30:20 the United States and especially mining I I kind of found it weird that the European Union was more 5:30:27 hardline on Bitcoin than the U.S. for up till now it was a bit weird and um I don't like this 5:30:34 situation that the miners are so much exposed to the U.S. uh legislators and um I too believe that 5:30:44 it would probably better long term if if Bitcoin was basically mining and the trading was banned 5:30:51 in the United States but uh that's not the world we live in one can hope one can dream that one day 5:30:58 we can be uh banned uh the you know I think Paul's point on the mining of like hey um uh compliance 5:31:09 is subsidizing one set of miners and it's and it's uh subsidizing one form of behavior and it's 5:31:16 basically taking away potential revenue from those that would mind in a non-compliant way 5:31:22 uh I think that that applies equally to fiat on-ramps as well like like the centralized exchanges 5:31:29 um that are compliant have have cannibalized the on-ramp market and taken business away 5:31:36 from what would be the non-compliant like peer-to-peer markets and I remember when I got 5:31:40 into Bitcoin like the peer-to-peer markets were were vibrant and now they basically all shut down 5:31:46 I mean there's an uh maybe there's a couple left but yeah it's it's um uh it's an interesting 5:31:55 kind of way to look at it of just like yeah I don't know it's interesting that speaks to my 5:32:01 point where if uh if fiat off-ramps and on-ramps were banned then all that we would have would be 5:32:07 uh illegal drugs and podcasts and whoever sells stickers uh with lightning on the internet 5:32:14 though we need to get more people you know selling crepes and and lattes um the reason 5:32:21 I came up here though was uh if I could bring it back to drivechains for a sec yeah sorry 5:32:27 sorry I just have a bit of a this is probably like quite beginner questions but I just want 5:32:32 to make sure that I'm grasping this correctly um when you have this uh the the miners who are all 5:32:42 like the word I think that has been used is kind of voting on a hash that they copied and pasted 5:32:48 it's it's not really uh voting so much as just making sure that there's like a 5:32:56 a sort of enough of a mass that agree um on this particular hash being what the drivechain 5:33:04 like the shitcoin enjoyers are saying um because it's it's it's supposed to operate more like a 5:33:12 protocol um yes it's not um I think I still stand by using the word vote even though I think it is 5:33:21 misleading I think it is actually the least misleading of all the words in context because 5:33:29 what it does it's supposed to highlight the fact that you are not when you run an L1 node you're 5:33:36 not required to run the L2 node so it could be anything and in that sense it's kind of arbitrary 5:33:44 what it is um and that is very important because it would be very very easy to design something 5:33:51 that works perfectly all the time and that miners could never steal from if we just made it mandatory 5:33:56 but the whole point of sidechains is that we're going to try to police a sidechain that we're not 5:34:00 looking at so we shrink it to this one arbitrary thing but then even though on L1 from L1's point 5:34:08 of view anything could go there any hash could go there any 32 byte hash could go there for this 5:34:14 three month period and if there were a disagreement or like a sort of a close vote that would that 5:34:21 would entirely be a side effect of the shitcoin um having some disagreement on their chain which 5:34:28 is sort of uh it's actually not possible I mean it actually is possible because it no matter how 5:34:34 well we've designed the sidechain template anyone could fork it and then just delete all the good 5:34:39 stuff and they could you could have it's theoretically possible to have a sidechain that 5:34:43 has no software and then no one knows what the withdrawal state is but it's theoretically possible 5:34:52 um that's so much free because again the goal with sidechains is to give people freedom 5:34:57 to try their own ideas and to also assign blame when the idea doesn't work blame the sidechain 5:35:04 developer don't blame like the bitcoin process or like the consensus or the people or the miners 5:35:11 it's all about nope you have your shot sidechain developer and if there's no bugs and if it's 5:35:17 popular then you've done well and the miners they also have their shot no one no one gets to say 5:35:24 no one gets to shirk the responsibility and say well what could I have done I was I'm only 5:35:31 David Bailey runner of a magazine what could I have done to fix this problem in bitcoin everyone 5:35:37 always has their opportunity to fix the problem and then they always get blamed if they don't do 5:35:40 it right so the so so but the what I'm trying to get is everyone is resisting the ideas because 5:35:48 you're the they don't want the accountability exactly I'm afraid that's probably the case 5:35:54 but um the what's happening is if you use our sidechain template there's no disagreement on 5:36:01 possible on the L2 the L2 will automatically calculate for everyone it's doing every single 5:36:08 thing when it does its sidechain node it tracks every sidechain block every sidechain transaction 5:36:14 and then as part of the BIB 300 rules it has carefully kept track of during this period 5:36:20 which withdrawals haven't been paid out yet it sources withdrawals based on the L1 fee 5:36:25 that they intended to pay if they make it through the gauntlet the 13 000 count and 5:36:35 and it will automatically calculate the one hash that is the hash for that sidechain for everyone 5:36:43 it's always it's the exact same and that is also the transaction id of the ultimate transaction 5:36:50 that would pay out on L1 that all those withdrawals so it's all the same hash and it's 5:36:56 exactly the same for everyone and it's procedurally calculated automatically and in fact then it's in 5:37:03 every single sidechain block and every single sidechain block header and it's in in our software 5:37:08 it shows up in a little ribbon in the bottom of the screen where everyone can look at it 5:37:13 for three months so that's that's the this is the technique is on L1 it's arbitrary 5:37:20 hash could be anything but on L2 it's it's the easiest thing to find in the entire world 5:37:26 you know you can't miss it and it's one hash it's the same for everyone and it's staring you in the 5:37:33 face all the time it's very easy to find okay so that's why it's so if if like some of the 5:37:40 opponent's arguments have been like about if there's a sort of split vote but that would 5:37:47 only occur if there was like some real maliciousness happening on the on the sidechain 5:37:52 where they were trying to go on it can never happen because it can only happen if what could 5:37:58 the only thing that could happen would be if you fork if you if the blockchain has some kind of 5:38:03 orphaned block situation or re-orging near the exact moment when the new epoch epoch is uh 5:38:12 is starting so when it's going to calculate it's going to switch it's been telling you this one 5:38:16 hash for january february march and now it's it's around april 1st and it's getting ready to click 5:38:23 over someone could do a last minute withdrawal just try and get jump jump the line to get on 5:38:31 the train in time you know before it leaves the station and if that block is like if there's 5:38:37 some weird blockchain split and it's re-orged out or something then that then it will change there 5:38:43 but there's actually never any point in time when it is not known because even if there is 5:38:52 even if that event happens there will always be one of the two chains that is long either longer 5:38:59 than the other or has the most recent block found so this everyone who runs a sidechain node will 5:39:05 see this exact same chain state and they will see the exact same hash and so i guess um the reason 5:39:13 that's why i hate to interrupt you but i just wanted to get in this last point about 5:39:17 that's why i began the answer by saying i stand by the word vote even though it's misleading 5:39:24 so maybe now you get a better idea of what i 5:39:27 meant by that which is what i meant was it's not really a vote at all a vote is like there's two groups of people and they each have their argument for like 5:39:35 why you should vote for them and they're kind of like vying for your support in this adversarial 5:39:42 situation but that's not what it is in the slightest however i still stand by it because 5:39:48 the most important thing to emphasize is that L1 is not required to do any of this i'm saying i 5:39:53 shrink the problem to just one hash and i sort of hope for the best and that's much better of 5:39:59 course then because otherwise we'd have to be responsible for every single sidechain message 5:40:05 every single sidechain block all the sidechain rules and dependencies and whatever else 5:40:11 and that would be uh that would not work at all because this is something that already is in L1 5:40:18 counting the 13 000 and checking if transaction id matches something else is already what it's done 5:40:25 so now i'll let you get back to asking whatever you're going to ask about no i think uh yeah i 5:40:30 better understand it and um yeah voting i don't know if that's the best word but confirmation 5:40:35 has already been used um it technically is a cross-chain confirmation of a kind in in the 5:40:41 sense that when a bitcoin miner builds a block when they try to find the next block they are 5:40:48 sort of voting on which block to extend just happens to be the case that in our situation 5:40:54 they almost always vote on the most recent block but of course they could try to go back and build 5:41:00 off some other block they just never do and that is really really similar to what is supposed to 5:41:07 be happening in BIP300 since everyone knows which hash should be upvoted but we cannot ever 5:41:16 you see the design has to be built around 5:41:21 the whole point of any like design is in this situation i think is like there are all these 5:41:27 things out there that are very big problems so you design it so that they don't become problems 5:41:32 and then i don't know if this explanation is making any sense moonsetter gave me the thumbs 5:41:36 up but it's kind of like the the whole point we the whole point that we extended the block 5:41:43 miners always find it in their interest to extend the latest block that's because the design is good 5:41:48 and it's only works because they could extend some other block and that's why for example the 5:41:55 block withhold withholding a block of ambiguous validity which is a problem we discussed earlier 5:42:00 which is a problem we discussed earlier in this space yeah that's how you beat that problem by 5:42:05 letting the miners extend any block so someone finds a block and they say they refuse to tell 5:42:09 you whether or not what's in the block or whether or not the block is valid you're not you're not 5:42:14 screwed you just go two blocks back and you just keep moving on and then you just orphan that block 5:42:21 so it's because the design is so good that the problem never comes up and similarly with bit 5:42:26 300 the goal is it's totally and completely unambiguous what the hash should be and that's 5:42:33 why it's not as big of a deal to let the miners put any hash there that they want because everyone 5:42:39 knows what it is and everyone knows that even if they don't know they could know and so if anyone 5:42:45 out there claims that's you know if anyone tries to claim some kind of dispute that person is 5:42:50 destroying their own reputation because it's going to be very very very easy 5:42:57 unbelievably easy for anyone to figure out what the true hash is and then they'll just wonder 5:43:02 why this person tried to tell them such a pointless and destructive lie anyone who runs a 5:43:08 sidechain node will know the real hash and that includes people who weren't running one before 5:43:14 listen to this dispute for five or six weeks and then just decide to run it on a random weekend 5:43:19 so anyone can it's that's why it's the way it is and the other other thing is even if there was 5:43:26 like controversy in in the in this voting process the entire thing in my understanding can't ever 5:43:36 come to a situation where where the layer one nodes experience the chain split by enforcing 5:43:45 drivechain rules so the most likely scenario if someone really uses on the wrong cache is that 5:43:51 the withdrawal just won't happen at least that's how I understand it and and the only only way that 5:43:59 a chain split could actually happen is if if the layer one nodes try to like 5:44:07 manually alter the outcome they would fork or or something like that 5:44:15 the drivechain rules themselves cannot cause and and that's a very important thing right so 5:44:22 yes it is it's very important that one of the things it does is it also prevents unexpected 5:44:30 miner related soft forks as a result of drama on the sidechain because the three month long 5:44:38 withdrawal is like a really really really slow measurement of the miners sentiment you know 5:44:46 what I mean like they're not going to carry it the full 13 000 you know votes or cross block 5:44:54 confirmations unless this is really what they are determined to do so by the time the withdrawal 5:45:02 actually happens there's no like ambiguity over what is supposed to be happening whereas of course 5:45:08 it's just much easier everyone what everyone can do is more easily just let the withdrawal 5:45:13 fail so that there's neither a theft nor a withdrawal and then the sidechain software 5:45:18 automatically it will automatically notice that it didn't fail it dumps everyone off the train 5:45:25 and back in line and reshuffles the line and it uh we have a program to wait as a sort of courtesy 5:45:32 since since something really weird happened it waits like I think like 200 blocks so that people 5:45:39 can decide if they want to get out of line or get more to get in line or something try to figure 5:45:44 out what's going on and then it will try again to load the train and it will just keep trying 5:45:51 because that's what it's supposed to do and again this is all about putting the blame 5:45:59 on the sidechain community the developers and the users of the sidechain if the sidechain is run 5:46:05 very well it will always be very easy to find very very very easy to find out which hash is real 5:46:14 as long as it's possible to run a node that's the cost and as long as the sidechain is generating 5:46:19 fees as long as it's generating useful activity for its members and for bitcoin as long as it's 5:46:26 increasing the price of bitcoin by offering a cool feature which is the zcash feature 5:46:32 as long as it's doing all of that then it will be something that the miners want to keep around 5:46:40 so no one there's no one who would be stopping the withdrawal process there's no one there's 5:46:45 absolutely no one in the whole system actually has any incentive whatsoever 5:46:52 to create a dispute over which hash is real 5:46:56 so given what you say about how the L1 is basically unaffected 5:47:06 am I correct in understanding that the reason that there still needs to be like kind of massive 5:47:11 buy-in on this is because if you don't have consensus across the board that drivechains 5:47:18 drivechains are happening if 300 and 301 are adopted then any any uh any transactions or 5:47:26 addresses created by uh drivechains are seen as everyone else who's not a drivechain enjoyer 5:47:33 as being anyone can spend well that's partially the case yes i'm afraid that it the true answer 5:47:41 involves a little bit of like history and uh just randomness and chaos i mean in terms of 5:47:49 the social element yeah the literal answer is that more than 51 percent of miners must must 5:47:56 be enforcing a soft fork and then as long as they are enforcing it plus the people using it 5:48:03 are enforcing it plus maybe like one or two other people like maybe like one coinbase 5:48:11 something you know coinbase the company then um no one will be able to do a withdrawal 5:48:20 early they all have to do the 13 000 counter and the point of that is keep the miners on a 5:48:26 short leash so it's kind of ironic that what BIP300 does is make it harder for miners to steal from 5:48:35 a drivechain and that is the whole point that is sort of why miners alone shouldn't activate it 5:48:45 it's because we could already do drivechain today with no soft fork by just doing like a 5:48:49 handshake deal with the miners where we just say okay miners let's just all do this now but the 5:48:54 miners would prefer to be able to prove that they can't do something you know what i mean like it's 5:49:01 uh it's kind of it's hard to you know i don't know if those are great metaphors but it's like 5:49:06 you know when people get together and they drink everyone lets their guard down it's kind of like a 5:49:11 disarmament the miners say listen if you send us these coins we'll be able to send them wherever 5:49:17 we want and then you're thinking well why would i do that that sounds crazy and the miners say well 5:49:25 listen we can send them wherever we want but we have to we have to first tell you exactly 5:49:33 where we're sending them and then we have to do this three month long dance 5:49:37 and so and during those three months who owns what hash or who's in what pool all that could 5:49:44 change a lot so it's going to be kind of hard for us to we're going to be sending it today to our 5:49:49 future selves three months from now which are not necessarily complete overlap and so that just 5:49:57 kind of makes it a little harder for us to take the coins and therefore it's sort of easier for 5:50:02 people to trust the miners who have handicapped themselves in this way that makes sense okay good 5:50:11 um just a final question and as to why you're not doing it in a super ordinate way like the 5:50:16 way ordinals are done sort of uh building up a a scaffolding outside of layer one i i assume 5:50:23 that's because in your in your view this uh this way is the the way to do it without introducing 5:50:29 any trust like the way you need to with liquid uh partly it's really because i was probably a little 5:50:38 too nice about the whole thing really which is i just well it's sort of like i invented this thing 5:50:42 and then it kind of felt like the community went like in the segway direction and i was kind of 5:50:47 like fine everyone's making money this whole time so i was just kind of like whatever and everyone 5:50:54 thought you know all the other the other thing that was happening was a lot of people who had 5:50:58 different ideas were shooting themselves in the foot and so all the other ideas sucked so 5:51:04 bitcoin was doing great the large blockers forked off and they would have been like good customers 5:51:11 of this project so that kind of stalled it all so the way in which they withheld SegWit created 5:51:17 this miners versus developers sort of drama so that was kind of just like this kind of 5:51:24 slowed it down i think and i was just kind of waiting around for you know like a better moment 5:51:31 i think but then what happened was recently i was kind of looking into more of what everyone 5:51:36 else was doing you know how are things going enlightening and whatever and i was like 5:51:42 oh this sucks actually so um i should better uh be a little do a little more advocacy 5:51:51 so that's a partly why um i think the the technical reason though is that you cannot 5:52:00 unilaterally do something like this uh the the op-nop five has to be redefined for everyone 5:52:06 at the same time or it just stays what it is so there is a tiny collective action problem where 5:52:14 like it would be nice if the first miners to switch over to doing this somehow got more money 5:52:21 than the miners to come later but i'm afraid that that is not i haven't figured out how to do that 5:52:26 yet so so right now no one wants to be like the people all want to just look around and wait 5:52:36 it's a shirking responsibility god bless them you know 5:52:43 yeah i get it um does this this doesn't interfere at all with op ctv or op vault like they're 5:52:49 completely unrelated in every way the uh the only relationship is actually that ctv 5:52:57 greatly improves the withdrawal from 20 000 to like 100 million or something so like the 5:53:05 withdrawal right now it's limited to one transaction since this is one hash as we've 5:53:10 already belabored this point so the miner is going to pay take this they're going to select 5:53:17 when the withdrawal ultimately goes through the transaction it'll select the UTXO that has all the 5:53:24 coins and pay it out to like this big list of like maybe like 20 000 people max but it can 5:53:30 never be more than the one megabyte block size limit since there's no witness discount in this 5:53:37 case and of course it shouldn't be anywhere near that because that's a little that's kind of cutting 5:53:43 it close and it's a little discourteous also so we made it like half that or something especially 5:53:49 since it's only one transaction every three months so it's not so bad to take up half of 5:53:53 a block and you know it can it can be at any block it can be at one that's in like three 5:53:57 three a.m in the morning or something once it crosses the 13 000 number i can keep going to 5:54:02 like 13 000 and one 13 000 and two and then it can still be included so but uh be that as it may it 5:54:10 can only pay out to those people but with ctv on layer one you could pay out to 20 000 ctv 5:54:21 outputs that could then each pay to whatever an unlimited number of uh not an unlimited but like a 5:54:28 it would be something like each of them would pay to up to maybe it's like 50 or 60 000 or something 5:54:35 so then it would go from 20 000 to uh 20 000 times 60 000 so that would actually be kind of 5:54:43 neat but i don't know how relevant that would be but that would be kind of a cool improvement 5:54:48 but they're real hard of your question yeah of course yeah yeah they're all unrelated all the 5:54:53 op vault op ctv op uh op drivechain are all unrelated and kind of orthogonal i don't think 5:55:03 well uh a quick question if the covenants are of soft 14 and it's possible to implement 5:55:10 a primitive drivechain without registration slots and with some inefficiency 5:55:15 there were uh ideas for how ctv or apo or other covenants enable kind of primitive 5:55:22 inefficient drivechains would you be willing to settle for that and well i don't know about settle 5:55:28 but i think we should maybe we would do that next but you see the thing is uh 5:55:35 to me that would just prove how extra pointless it was not to do the efficient version so i still 5:55:41 don't see i mean i understand it maybe it's just because i'm too autistic but i just think like you 5:55:46 know what i mean it's kind of like i'm building a screwdriver and people are saying well paul what 5:55:51 if we had this thing where we had like eight hammers in a row and then and then they each 5:55:55 toothpicks and then we could we could we could maybe get some screws and i would just be like 5:56:01 why are we not using the screwdriver that i have reason you expect reason and rational behavior 5:56:07 from a cult that's the main problem that's so but you know in general right like it's 5:56:13 uh yeah that's my big character flaw oh my gosh how will i ever how will i ever make it 5:56:20 through life but i think the other thing to mention though is that i just mentioned also 5:56:26 that you we could do BIP300 today with no soft fork is just like a handshake deal with the miners 5:56:33 but it would be it'd be a similar it'd be like an inverse case where nothing is enforced 5:56:38 by anyone that would be even less secure right but see you're saying something like 5:56:44 you're saying something like it's just as secure because it does the accounting 5:56:48 but it's more inefficient but i have the version that is totally efficient because 5:56:55 but but less secure and these these are all just weird versions of the same thing to me 5:57:00 but probably not to you 5:57:05 but yes it's what i settle for yeah i think you're right um what i would say is i would 5:57:12 not settle for that but i would probably just go to an intermediate step i mean the funnier 5:57:17 thing would be to do the first we'd do the handshake deal wait for a while have someone 5:57:23 steal the coins and then say it's only because we didn't have BIP300 that these coins were stolen 5:57:29 and then just blame that on the also i just want to point out because i guess i'm a little autistic 5:57:35 that when you say the whole uh benefit of drivechains is that L1 doesn't need to care about what's 5:57:41 going on in there while at the same time there's someone to blame technically validity roll-ups 5:57:47 even though the up you know zkr opcode or up zk verify opcode must be checked by every node on L1 5:57:58 what happens inside the checking is just proof checking there is no inspection of the state or 5:58:03 understanding of the rules or anything it's just like a dumb top to bottom proof checker that just 5:58:08 checks syntactic correctness of the proof without actually understanding anything that's going on 5:58:14 on the validity roll-up so one recent uh new innovation in how to bring validity roll-ups 5:58:21 to bitcoin was that um the problem with validity roll-ups is that uh there's like infinite amount 5:58:28 of bike shedding that you know arguing about what particular virtual machine to target with this 5:58:33 up code whether it should be you know stark or snark or this machine or that machine until 5:58:40 somebody just suggested to target you know wasm which is the web assembly language as the target 5:58:47 virtual machine because that's highly portable all languages compiled to it it's high performance it 5:58:53 already works in all the web browsers and then as long as the validity roll-up itself can can be 5:58:59 compiled to wasm which anything can be these days that solves the coordination problem of what 5:59:05 particular opcode to target it also retains that desirable property that you advertise for 5:59:11 drivechains of not needing to care about what happens on the L2 as far as blaming if something 5:59:21 goes wrong like who gets blamed today if something goes wrong on ethereum L2 like arbitrum or whatever 5:59:28 clearly it's the team that launched that 5:59:31 uh 5:59:32 roll-up that gets blamed right and if the roll-up is launched as some kind of satoshi style launch then well you know satoshi disappears and there's no one to blame uh so it's basically buyer beware all the way so if you know if you if you are not worried about lack of decentralization and roll-ups then send your coins there if you are don't send your coins there yes of course i mean i think that i wouldn't really even feel that bad if we fast forward 10 years into the future and 6:00:02 people don't use BIP300 but they use something that does functionally like the exact same thing 6:00:09 i would just think well of course i was right in 2015 and i was right the entire time and uh 6:00:16 all these people saying oh what about what about if we call a senator you will be validated one way 6:00:22 or the other either by roll-ups being or by covenants being soft 14 or by drivechains or 6:00:28 you know sooner or later a pleb you know pleb uprising because of the apocalypse will validate 6:00:34 your ideas i'm sure all i'm just saying that the interesting uh peculiar thing about roll-ups is that 6:00:41 any tom dick and harry can launch a roll-up on ethereum permissionlessly for a single app so 6:00:47 there's like app-centric roll-ups like for example you can have a decentralized exchange that becomes 6:00:53 a roll-up or for example the frax stable coin on ethereum is about to launch its own roll-up 6:00:59 just for that stable coin so you can see a world where there is like a million roll-ups all 6:01:05 leeching off of L1 and there's no need to have a few major ones yeah the really really upsetting 6:01:12 thing would be if the only thing which i could see this happening ethereum defeats bitcoin because of 6:01:21 the turn complete script and it's not even used it is not even actually used in terms of being like 6:01:28 turn complete it is just used for like the same thing that's already like that's already in the 6:01:35 roadmap like for example ethereum's roadmap says never do any computations on ethereum L1 anymore 6:01:41 move all computation to one of a million L2 roll-ups and ethereum L1 is nothing but settlement 6:01:48 and data availability but this is exactly what of course you know we bitcoiners would say 6:01:55 when we were comparing or contrasting bitcoin it's the biggest it's the biggest irony that ethereum 6:01:59 is becoming more bitcoin but they are going to be more like it that's what well that's what i'm 6:02:03 trying to say is that the disappointing thing would be if bitcoin decided it will because of 6:02:09 the ossification gang it will not like add this tiny thing which is BIP300 which is like counting 6:02:16 the 13 000 in like a reversible op code that you could just discard and you know like if so instead 6:02:26 bitcoin decides like it would be like an irony it's like you know what like ethereum is saying 6:02:31 we have this turn completeness but it was only ever used for this one thing the you know the 6:02:37 kravitz roll-up which ended up being the standardized roll-up that everyone uses you 6:02:44 know what i mean like maybe there's one or two flavors it's basically like it's going to be used 6:02:48 like a grand central train station which simply orders blobs of opaque data from a million other 6:02:55 roll-ups into a into a kind of canonical sequence and preserves immutability and you know double 6:03:03 spend resistance of the sequence of opaque blobs but there is one additional component which is 6:03:09 that these roll-ups want to tap into the liquidity of ethereum which they all get that two-way bridge 6:03:15 with no trust of moving not just ether but every token on ether to the roll-up and back with no 6:03:21 trust that's yeah but that's what i'm saying i'm saying is this tragedy would be ethereum 6:03:28 defeats bitcoin because they use turing completeness to basically add BIP300 only 6:03:35 ethereum and that's the only thing that ethereum during completeness is used for is like basically 6:03:41 like these you know asymmetric sidechains or roll-ups as they're now called and then bitcoin 6:03:49 could have could have decided at any time to just do that one thing but because 6:03:59 they didn't want to resemble ethereum 6:04:01 that just we just decided sort of not to for no real reason that would be like so weird 6:04:09 but that's not gonna stay right like i'm i'm very optimistic because uh of two two two basically 6:04:16 things which is i've already mentioned that if apocalypse with or without ordinals is unavoidable 6:04:21 simply because uh the the the the tidal wave of adoption is gonna hit the absolute scarcity 6:04:28 the absolute scarcity of blog space with with the ordinals is probably within 12 to 18 months 6:04:34 and once that happens the pleb uprising will sweep away the cult that's been chanting ossify 6:04:40 and engaged in and farmed the engagement on twitter that that's gonna all gonna be swept 6:04:47 away by the by the energy of the of the democratic crowd from below you know it's gonna be like a 6:04:53 color revolution basically i have a question for you alex because i also kind of see it where it's 6:04:59 inevitable where the people go up um you know ordinals or not um but i i'm sure you remember 6:05:05 like during ethereum's like there was a peak time where like uniswap transactions were like over 6:05:09 300 each for for sustainably for several weeks right for like at least a month that was their 6:05:15 right but you can see that like most of the you know um newcomers coming into the space they just 6:05:20 weren't even using ethereum right they were using like bsc and other chains um so i'm not sure if 6:05:26 like the pep no but i tried that when when i had to like collateralize my bitcoin in order not to 6:05:34 sell it not to pay taxes so i tried using other l1s like i tried using avalanche and other chains 6:05:41 and what i came to realize is that even though the transaction fees could be 100 times lower 6:05:46 on those other chains it was still dramatically cheaper to use ethereum simply because 6:05:52 liquidity was so much higher on ethereum that even though you're paying 20 to 50 transaction fee 6:05:57 you're actually getting a much significantly better price on swapping assets or doing any 6:06:02 kind of operation simply because that's where every all liquidity is right so there's actually 6:06:10 20 to 50 but when the cheese when the fees were like you know 300 plus just for a uniswap i'm 6:06:15 sure that's no but that's exactly what it means the same way it becomes unaffordable to 99 percent 6:06:21 of individuals but it remains affordable to the to the people who count which is namely whales and 6:06:27 institutions because they're the ones who actually provide the liquidity you think that the whales 6:06:32 will basically in short the whales will will sustain the the apocalypse on that's exactly 6:06:38 that's exactly what already happened on ethereum and that's exactly what's going to happen on 6:06:42 bitcoin i'm assuming that bitcoin gets fully institutionalized and you will have luxury 6:06:49 ordinals and you will have blackrock paying paypal settling bitcoin between euro dollar banks and 6:06:57 you know you will have like the average size of transaction in dollars will go to like a million 6:07:01 dollars and then the fees can go to a thousand dollars and nobody will care so in that scenario 6:07:07 like in the current um like in the current environment it looks like then most people 6:07:12 would just be using custodial bitcoin then and you know exactly what already because i know that 6:07:19 that all the podcasters and the laser ad priests have already been telling people to use custodial 6:07:24 lightning and lsps as long as they keep chanting you know we love bitcoin and bitcoin only right 6:07:31 they're told to use custodial lightning solutions i have no doubt that they will tell 6:07:36 their you know their bamboozled flock to go and use blackrock etf right they will say well you 6:07:43 can just buy bitcoin and not worry about multi-sig fragile but on the same at the same time you also 6:07:49 think that enough of these plebs are going to be like like we want to use fully a non-custodial 6:07:54 bitcoin and well the reason why right the reason why you will have enough of these plebs is because 6:08:00 like 50 million plebs have already bought in and they hold some bitcoin and once it becomes 6:08:05 unaffordable to use bitcoin L1 for these plebs that will be the outcry that we saw on ethereum 6:08:12 and this this constituency is about to get a rude awakening that they've been listening to 6:08:17 podcasters they've been essentially telling them that everything is fine bitcoin is perfect as is 6:08:23 you don't you don't need any covenant soft force or anything but when they see that they have to 6:08:27 pay fifty dollars or a hundred dollars to move you know five hundred dollars worth of savings in 6:08:32 nigeria right they they can tell that everything is not fine right and the feedback the the anger 6:08:39 from that will be overwhelming and the anger from that will essentially discredit every priest that's 6:08:44 been podcasting ossified chance you know 24 7 because this is already this is this is what 6:08:51 happened in ethereum is going to happen in bitcoin and there's there's already a way to fix all these 6:08:55 problems like for example simply enabling covenant soft fork enables arc scales lightning 6:09:01 enables primitive drivechains and you know i'm not even talking about you know drivechains proper 6:09:08 or validity roll-ups but it will all be up in the air once the chaos breaks out it will be like a 6:09:13 ladder you know yeah i wouldn't i wouldn't use the word right chains for what simple governance can 6:09:21 do that's not right let's just call them sidechains of some sort of space chains when that 6:09:26 they are closer to space chains than to drivechain but do they have the same semantics as 6:09:32 drivechains with counting etc you you can have stuff like that but you can't really have 6:09:38 like a true hash rate escrow and drivechain is the hash rate escrow plus the blind merge mining so 6:09:45 as far as i can tell there are only a few proposals or you need to make a tailor-made proposal 6:09:51 uh for for actually implementing the hash rate escrow with the covenant because ctv ap or vote 6:09:58 will not really do that if you can do something like tx hash plus opcast maybe can someone can 6:10:08 counting with that z-man had a proposal for how to turn in almost any covenant into a kind of uh 6:10:17 you know like primitive primitive counting of of like lambda expressions with you know the 6:10:23 count going to 13 000 yeah but but see doesn't everyone see this is again me being autistic of 6:10:28 course but doesn't it aren't people even listening to themselves like it's all just nonsense this is 6:10:32 all just like whether or not we can count to 13 000 that's why i did the right thing when i just 6:10:38 made it count to 13 000 explicitly this is all it needs to do it's like you suffer from a 6:10:44 philosopher's fallacy i call it which is expecting humans in general to exercise reason and rationality 6:10:52 when not even philosophers themselves exercise it right so basically philosophy can never work 6:10:58 because philosophy is not a solution to any problem it's just a symptom of the underlying 6:11:03 human condition and it doesn't actually solve anything right it's just symptom it's not a 6:11:08 solution right so you're expecting bitcoiners to be rational no don't do that that's like 6:11:13 a bad idea humans in general never mind cult indoctrinated ossifier chanting you know uh 6:11:21 basically peanut gallery plebs out there you know alex the um the scenario you laid out earlier 6:11:29 like you know you could kind of there was like a one week period where fees went high 6:11:34 during ordinals where you could kind of feel the fear setting in yeah because you know 6:11:40 lightning started falling apart you saw yeah this year right and then people started like uh 6:11:46 looking to their their their choice leaders for answers and i feel like that's part of the 6:11:53 reason the reaction was to ordinals was so negative so anti-ordinals like there's a 6:11:58 variety of reasons a part of it is because like they could demonize ordinals as the problem 6:12:06 no the real problem was that the priests were being seen to be helpless right yeah the emperor 6:12:12 had no clothes right so yes right now the priest can condemn you on twitter and they can character 6:12:18 assassinate paul and say he's the devil incarnate or whatever and it seems to be working in a sense 6:12:23 because you know whenever there is like a vote on twitter paul is like outvoted three to one 6:12:28 but when it comes to ordinals which is the priest themselves blast that taproot soft fork 6:12:33 and they're completely helpless they don't even know what's coming to them because like what 6:12:37 you've seen in ordinals and inscriptions is less than one percent of one percent of the fee pressure 6:12:42 i'm confident of this because i'm telling you that the flood of data that's coming like anybody like 6:12:49 i anybody can simply like you know start create a web page that allows people to upload folders 6:12:56 in there and that's going to create like gigabytes upon gigabytes of fee pressure by the way uh by 6:13:02 the way guys paul actually kind of performed worse than the devil if you are talking about paul's 6:13:10 he's like incompetent devil you know no i i mean i mean like 60 percent of bitcoin has voted that 6:13:17 they would consider activating the soft fork that the devil proposed and paul is usually 6:13:25 i think that it's also important to see that um like just ordinals aside completely aside 6:13:30 i feel like a lot of these the the nigerian plebs opening and closing lightning channels 6:13:34 and complaining that they can't i feel like they just did not understand that the fee market they 6:13:39 really just didn't understand the fee market or they believe that bitcoin will never be like you 6:13:43 know mass adopted because if it's mad those real nigerians are we talking about i mean i've heard 6:13:50 people that were saying that they can't open a lightning channel and i'm like well open it once 6:13:53 in a month and they're like well it's too much or it's too expensive well they're complaining 6:13:56 they bought the propaganda that was sold to them about learning networks so i think they just all 6:14:01 the scaling problems right yeah i feel like they just didn't understand how the fee market works 6:14:04 with with bitcoin adoption like the fees are going to go up you should understand that and 6:14:08 actually you should want that right like you desire bitcoin to be more used without ordinals 6:14:13 even like the fees should go yeah the fees are going to go the apocalypse is inevitable either 6:14:18 way the ordinals just brought it two three years so well it's gonna it's gonna be interesting when 6:14:23 the fees go astronomical just based on monetary transactions then the reaction is going to be to 6:14:29 demonize certain types of monetary transactions as being not as valuable of monetary transactions as 6:14:35 others like like that's like because what other they're gonna have the same existential crisis 6:14:41 it's gonna have to be this exact same emperor has no clothes scenario well i mean i can tell 6:14:47 you what narrative they'll bring along then they will basically say you shouldn't use L1 bitcoin 6:14:51 but instead sign up with uncle jim who's running your local Fedimint for your neighborhood or for 6:14:57 your for your you know surfing game and then transactions uncle jim's Fedimint will be on L1 6:15:03 right have you guys seen that cringe animation from blockstream where 40 million uh tps is uh 6:15:12 can happen on lightning right that's the lie that's the big lie in reality yeah in reality bitcoin 6:15:19 does like sweet tps uh on average and and lightning got like 0.1 that that is probably 6:15:26 closer to the reality of the situation but they are pushing this uh yeah i i'm wondering over here 6:15:34 because like it seems like a lot of us believe that the fees will go up even you know without 6:15:39 ordinals it's an inevitable thing but of course with ordinals even more but i believe poll has 6:15:44 like a different opinion where fees would not go up or they would go up to a certain amount 6:15:48 i mean i would love that if the fees went up that would be great your opinion my opinion is very 6:15:56 simple i'd love to try to explain it yet again which is that people don't like it when the fees 6:16:01 go up so when the fees go up they they change their behavior and so alex i don't know you seem 6:16:06 to have studied this on ethereum in detail but people have brought up to you that they go to 6:16:11 binance smart chain or they went to solana or whatever yeah no i'm saying that will definitely 6:16:15 occur but you know that's because ethereum but don't you think ethereum built ethereum built the 6:16:21 L2s to solve that problem right but this is a difference between ethereum and bitcoin though 6:16:26 which is that right now bitcoin is paralyzed no no hatred binance and ethereum L2 ecosystem which 6:16:33 is binance is a different planet with a different asset people don't want to leave ethereum 6:16:38 basically there is two flaws in your argument that fees can never go high the easier flaw is that 6:16:44 you've analyzed so-called fee market in the past where i claim it never existed until maybe april 6:16:50 23rd this year that's a simpler kind of fallacy which is to assume that the fee market has existed 6:16:55 at all and i claim that it just cannot be set to exist until the last day that the mempool clears 6:17:00 right that's a simpler objection the more complicated objection is that you argue for 6:17:05 kind of substitutability of block space it's kind of an idealization that doesn't hold in 6:17:10 the real world because listen you know the property values in beverly hills california 6:17:15 are skyrocketed to 20 million dollars per mansion but i don't see those people moving to plano texas 6:17:21 right so this is but there is some but there is some price at which they would 6:17:25 right like if it costs right infinite 9 million 999 trillion dollars absolutely right so yes 6:17:31 there's a kernel of truth in what you're saying as well but my model that reconciles both positions 6:17:36 is this this kind of picture of a multi-level fountain where the top level bucket fills up 6:17:42 and then it starts spilling over into the second and third levels after that and that's exactly 6:17:46 what we saw in ethereum and that's exactly what happened here you know it's not really relevant 6:17:51 that much but let me here's here's sorry one one last remark despite the fees being 100x smaller 6:17:58 on ethereum L2s i never operate on ethereum L2s precisely because all the prices and all 6:18:04 the liquidity is so much more favorable on ethereum proper that the fact that i can save 6:18:11 you know 19 on a 20 fee by going to avalanche is more than offset by me losing 500 because 6:18:20 the prices on a swap on avalanche are less favorable so even though some people for very 6:18:26 small amounts will go to these L2s there is like a captive audience for L1 where it simply makes 6:18:32 no financial sense to leave ethereum okay first of all let me just mention this is not really that 6:18:39 important at all but the my empirical which is only one part of seven the empirical research i 6:18:47 did on the fees in my article which is uh whatever a merge mining uh security budget to merge mining 6:18:56 whatever i'm sure people can find it but um that was in order to discredit the people who say 6:19:01 there's an automatic upward trend in in p and i think you and i agree that it doesn't really work 6:19:08 like that it's not like because what people will do is they'll draw some kind of graph and they'll 6:19:13 say oh fees have gone up and up and up and they will continue to go up and up and up but that's 6:19:17 not really uh that doesn't make any sense at all in any way you know what i mean like they go up 6:19:22 for a reason like it's not like um unless you're just considering inflation it's not like a price 6:19:29 of a carpet that goes up 6:19:30 and it's 10 cents and then it's 15 cents and then it's 20 cents and it's 25 cent like 6:19:35 that's not really what's happening here this is like a crazily dynamic so so i agree with you that 6:19:42 um but it doesn't really matter because the theoretical thing is is far more important and 6:19:49 the idea of the substitutability of the block space uh let me just throw a see this is i 6:19:56 introduced a new argument that you decided not to run with which is i said a moment ago 6:20:05 ethereum is the type of culture that would build in L2 to solve its problem but uh do you think 6:20:12 that's actually the case here in bitcoin because of course you could easily just have people say 6:20:19 um you know this is what bitcoin is supposed to be about we see in ethereum the culture only 6:20:27 developed after they had their apocalypse and i don't think that's the case i'm saying they would 6:20:32 ethereum bill would they would they would like move fast and break things the whole time no it's 6:20:37 true but the but but until they actually because i mean ethereum promised to scale in in 2015 16 17 6:20:46 18 but they had their apocalypse in 2019 and until 2019 there were all these research projects 6:20:53 that never amounted to anything i mean they considered sites sidechains they consider 6:20:58 state channels they considered uh plasma they considered lots of yes i remember that they had 6:21:04 their own version of lightning and their own version of lightning was like generalized lightning 6:21:09 because it was for arbitrary computations not just for financial transfers right they called 6:21:13 they called it uh state channels payment channels right so they tried all these things but none of 6:21:20 it got serious enough to be actually included in the proper ethereum or anything right until 6:21:26 everybody's feet got held to the fire when when their apocalypse happened and there wasn't because 6:21:31 ethereum has a socialistic kind of ethos so when they promised the world the world computer that 6:21:36 you know anybody in the world can use and all of a sudden only whales and institutions are using it 6:21:41 and everybody else is stuck with their ether that they cannot even send because it costs 10 dollars 6:21:45 so 15 20 dollars to send a hundred dollars worth of ether that was a real you know shock to the 6:21:51 system and only after that point they actually got serious about scaling and having tried everything 6:21:57 they settled on validity and optimistic roll-ups right but why do you think that we would in 6:22:03 bitcoin handle it the same way because you can easily see us saying that well it's supposed 6:22:07 the fees are supposed to be a hundred dollars well but you know as you were saying a moment 6:22:11 ago you would kick it over to maybe fetamint but you understand that fetamint is not really a 6:22:18 you can make all the rationalizations that you want but even fetamints have to use lightning 6:22:23 network for interoperability right you can always send people to the blockchain blackrock 6:22:29 kind of etf but the thing is you already have a captive audience of 50 million bitcoiners who 6:22:34 store some fats on L1 and those people will get frozen out so that's that's the revolutionary 6:22:41 force of the of the pleb uprising it's not trying to sell it to new plebs because you can send new 6:22:47 plebs to blackrock but you cannot by the time the uprising happens so you're talking about the dust 6:22:53 UTXO right it will be like this is the thruster captive you know like lumpen proletariat out there 6:23:01 i did not understand that that was such a key part of your argument but it's very interesting 6:23:05 i think you're certainly right about that one thing that is was interesting in the past was that 6:23:11 roger at some point tweeted a website where you could look up 6:23:15 if someone searches my twitter you can probably find it search for the term one thousand dollars 6:23:23 i think um because he i tweeted about it after he tweeted about it because i was fascinated by it 6:23:30 but he he he's documented you can search on this site through the bitcoin btc blockchain and find 6:23:37 how many people paid a transaction fee that was more than a thousand dollars um because it just 6:23:45 multiplies by the historical price for you oh yeah yeah and there were and there were very very 6:23:50 many and that must mean that there was a lot of people who had these inputs that were not 6:23:54 consolidated and as a result well exchanges will pay a thousand dollar transaction fee to consolidate 6:24:01 you know a hundred thousand UTXOs no problem right like where where are you but just the fact that 6:24:07 that is even possible like the fact that that you know you know the fact that it even happened 6:24:13 is like well what i'm saying is that you you basically have this kind of the the laserite 6:24:19 priests have sown the seeds of their own destruction because they've essentially evangelized 6:24:24 bitcoin to 50 million global south plebs and by the time the apocalypse hits it will probably be 6:24:29 100 million and those people are all going to become hostages of high fees right you can you 6:24:35 can tell them so much to go to the uncle jim's you know Fedimint or you can tell them to 6:24:40 they cannot buy the black rock etf their local banking system is hostile they have to do you 6:24:45 know back alley peer-to-peer transactions for cash but they can't transfer their bitcoin that's 6:24:51 already stuck and you will see this outcry which we kind of saw a preview of an ethereum 6:24:56 where 100 million global south plebs cry out you know there's like a disturbance in the force 6:25:01 you could feel it in may this year like people pointed out that when when transaction fees 6:25:07 peaked at twenty dollars per financial transfer for a few days and it was like above ten dollars 6:25:12 for like a week or two you could feel that like people who are running their own lightning nodes 6:25:17 all of a sudden had all their channels closed automatically and they couldn't reopen them and 6:25:21 they lost money and they couldn't send a punishment transaction because the amount of money in the 6:25:25 channel was less than the transaction fee this is how lightning dies this is how non-custodial 6:25:31 lightning dies and i'm all for you know bank of america and mitsubishi bank in japan settling 6:25:37 with lightning instantaneously and with instant finality billion dollar private fat pipes and not 6:25:43 caring about the fees but don't sell lightning as a solution to the plebs on their iphones because 6:25:48 lightning can never be that right so we you and i know this but this is just the hard facts of the 6:25:54 lightning design but of course the priests have sold lightning as the silver bullet solution to 6:25:59 scaling and that was just a lie i think there's also a difference where um uh doing a you know 6:26:09 complicated transactions on ethereum you require liquidity and you know several assets and things 6:26:13 like this where it's not as easy for you to just use a different layer or even a different chain 6:26:18 for that purpose but if you're just settling value it might be much easier to just use a different 6:26:23 chain right no well it's easier for you if you're moving a hundred dollars or less but if you're 6:26:28 moving a million dollars worth of bitcoin whether you pay ten dollars one dollar or a thousand 6:26:34 dollars makes no difference this is all around let's just say let's say i want to move um you 6:26:39 know a million dollars of bitcoin and the transaction fees on layer one bitcoin versus 6:26:43 the transaction fees on using wbcc on ethereum right and if it's cheaper on ethereum let's just 6:26:48 say then i would be incentivized to do it on ethereum maybe to a point unless i know but 6:26:52 but wbcc is a different planet right it's a custodial synthetic asset it's not bitcoin it's 6:26:57 and it's right never mind that it's sitting on the galaxy right right but for the majority of 6:27:03 plebs use cases right they might be okay with that well the majority of plebs have been told 6:27:09 to do the following they've been told to have a strike wallet that has like a hundred dollars 6:27:14 worth of usd stablecoin issued by strike and then they keep their savings that they stack into which 6:27:20 is uh in global south it's like a thousand bucks or less and in the middle income countries it's 6:27:25 like a thousand to ten thousand and high income countries is maybe more but that stash that's 6:27:30 sitting in savings that stash becomes a hostage of high fees and you know once the fees go high enough 6:27:38 they will hate moving that stash around and they have to move it around right because if they want 6:27:43 to sell or collateralize bitcoin or give it to their kids or whatever they have to do transactions 6:27:48 once the fees are perma high these people have become loom panthroletariat who've been duped by 6:27:53 the priests into storing their money in something that gets frozen into ice so you think one way or 6:28:01 another in the future we're going to get sidechains that have trustless swaps eventually 6:28:07 once this apocalypse happens and it you know catalyzes the pleb uprising you will essentially 6:28:13 have excitement in other words the reason why people in core core maintainers loathe to merge 6:28:21 any soft fork right now is because they will be condemned by the priest but once there's political 6:28:27 cover from the pleb uprising not merging a soft fork will be suicidal if it allows arc to get 6:28:33 launched you know you know what i mean if it allows scaling of lightning launching of arc 6:28:39 drivechain it will become very unpopular not to merge a non-controversial soft fork that's been 6:28:45 reviewed for 10 years like you know basically drivechains are coming up on 10 years you know 6:28:50 this is insane but i can't believe it that we're even like discussing this 10 years later what i'm 6:28:55 saying is it'll flip right now it's suicidal for core maintainers to merge something because 6:29:00 the ossifier chanters will have their skull on twitter but once the pleb uprising happens it 6:29:06 will be the opposite it will be suicidal to sit back and do nothing that's your point so the 6:29:12 political and like the social aspect would start to change yeah right because because people 6:29:16 underestimate politics because it's so structureless and diffuse inside core but core is 6:29:21 essentially a politics of prestige right there is like a hierarchy of prestigious devs that all 6:29:27 defer to other more prestigious devs until it you know that that thing terminates with g maxwell or 6:29:33 peter woolley or something but the point is that it's like a culture of fear based on lack of 6:29:39 information and and everybody holding their own belief about the prestige and right now in that 6:29:44 culture merging anything is suicidal because the priest and the laser eyes and and you know 6:29:49 sailor rights etc will will have your skull for this but once that whole thing the whole laser 6:29:55 right thing of don't touch bitcoin is shown to be bankrupt because it throws out 50 million 6:30:00 plebs in the global south once that whole ideology is bankrupt then the political environment will 6:30:07 change i think you're right i think you're very very right on this actually except for except 6:30:13 for one thing which is i don't think we need to wait for a play uprising of you know bitcoin users 6:30:21 in the global south then for fees to rise in that way um well you don't need to wait but you know 6:30:28 as i say it has to get worse before it gets better right because the cult is so strong 6:30:32 you essentially can't break the spell of the cult until it's shown to be completely bankrupt right 6:30:39 yeah it needs to get worse but but luckily it is so like the the fees are going up going up 6:30:45 no but it's not enough for fees to go up they have to break 10 to 20 dollars and then stay 6:30:50 there for a month or two i think that's a trigger that's a trigger point for for the 6:30:56 people that's a good goal for 2024 i think well i mean that would happen naturally in the bull 6:31:01 market but you know in the previous bull market the fees would spike high for a week or two 6:31:05 and then they would subside but this time it's like it's going to be a non-linear response 6:31:10 because in that bull market there will be you know inscription enjoyers you know dumping gigabytes of 6:31:16 data in there there will be financial transactions 10xing there'll be lightning activity you know 6:31:22 all of that i think i think yeah like the reason that you know in 2017 you had high fees for 6:31:29 in my opinion a more sustained period of time than in the last bull market and i think that's 6:31:33 because speculators were using bitcoin to move value between exchanges now now they use and now 6:31:40 they didn't yeah like exactly by the way but the nice thing is sorry but the nice thing is that 6:31:49 the speculators are back and they're back now in a bear market but they're not but they're 6:31:55 not moving value between exchanges using bitcoin right there you know but they're 6:31:59 moving all in all they're moving brc20s and they're moving like a bunch of stuff so the 6:32:02 speculators are back in a way that they were not in bitcoin for like what five six years 6:32:09 and now is the bear market but once a bull market starts the speculators are going to go crazy 6:32:15 oh yeah i mean that's inevitable you will definitely break a hundred dollar fee i mean 6:32:19 i can make a bet with anyone that in the next bull market you will have one day of hundred 6:32:22 dollar or higher fees there's also a few points i want to make that um one thing is i'm not an 6:32:30 expert on arc but from what i understand you still have to settle on chain uh like the shared UTXO 6:32:36 right so i'm not sure if that will definitely like help like no you don't have to you you don't have 6:32:42 to settle on chain with arc in the only the only case when you actually have to unroll an arc 6:32:49 pool transaction into the full ctv tree or whatever covenant is used the only the only time 6:32:56 is if the asp is trying to steal from the users if the users uh uh mobile clients or whatever 6:33:05 warn them that everybody accepts arc or lightning right but if you're still trying to send this to 6:33:11 somewhere that's not accepting arc or lightning you still have to settle on chain right i mean 6:33:15 you can you can send on lightning from arc and and and back so um okay great so and then just 6:33:23 one more point um as far as like all the other type of proposals for sidechains from what i've 6:33:28 seen and and maybe uh there's ones that i didn't look at or understand well um most of them do not 6:33:33 seem like they're they're they're giving the fees of the sidechain to the bitcoin miners on L1 6:33:38 is that correct yeah i think currently that's not a popular idea and i wanted to say i absolutely 6:33:45 love that you guys are making predictions on what will happen and nobody said that federated side 6:33:51 chains are going to uh get an uptake or get recommended we don't need to predict we don't 6:33:58 need to predict we have like 10 years of history and no one cares so there's no need to like make 6:34:02 predictions about federated sidechain i am but a fee apocalypse is is like putting a strong pressure 6:34:09 on this so i'm not sure it's the same situation exactly but but uh i i love the vibe 6:34:17 it's definitely an exciting time to be in bitcoin that's for sure i think it's a very bizarre 6:34:21 decision to not care about the fact that the fees don't go to miners which many people have have 6:34:29 taken up uh out of this weird misguided fear of not quote distorting mining incentives unquote 6:34:39 but that is a very bizarre thing to do because in order to enter sidechains i'm talking about 6:34:45 i'm talking about how people would maybe push for like arc or lightning or Fedimint 6:34:54 these things cut the miners out and and a federated sidechain they also cut the miners 6:35:00 out of course all of these things cut the miners out and even if you don't believe 6:35:05 in security budget i just find it strange that you would want to go blindly into something 6:35:14 where in order to get out and in you need the miners help but now they have no real reason 6:35:21 to help you and in fact they would love nothing more than to direct economic activity towards 6:35:27 something where they do collect the fees such as the merge-mined drivechain i wonder i don't know 6:35:34 if this is the case i have absolutely no idea whatsoever but i just tossed this out there for 6:35:38 your consideration if one day there will be a point where miners just say they will try to ban 6:35:46 transactions into and out of all the L2s that do not pay them to just kind of tilt people's 6:35:54 support into ones that do pay them 6:36:00 yeah this is a weird thing because uh like there is not enough block space 6:36:05 for people to be self-serving with the lightning use at a global scale already and 6:36:14 even even if you count solutions like arc they they take up a significant amount of block space 6:36:21 they pay fees to the miners at a pretty predictable rate by normal operation and they the esps also 6:36:29 have to maintain these lightning channels and these lightning channels need to be rebalanced 6:36:35 with splicing and whatever so at a sufficient scale i'm not sure uh that uh that uh the bitcoin 6:36:43 block size is anywhere near uh enough to support all these on on as a layer two so i kind of expect 6:36:51 that that a lot of this thing have to move to layer three on sidechains on on top of side 6:36:57 chains that have many advantages and cross-chain lightning is basically like pretty trivial to 6:37:03 implement and if people would not be worried about the uh the exchange rate risk with an 6:37:10 altcoin then it would be very easy to to uh hold your UTXOs on an altcoin chain and and still 6:37:19 interface with the lightning network that is also a pretty easy solution so 6:37:24 hey guys i got to bounce i just want to say uh enjoy the conversation uh paul look forward to 6:37:29 seeing you in amsterdam uh and uh we'll we'll try to have some fun catch y'all later enjoy 6:37:38 hey thanks for stopping by 6:37:43 perhaps we should wind it down it's been lots of fun um i can continue but i do think 6:37:51 but i do think we've been going for a while what do you guys think okay well let's have next week 6:37:59 actually next week i'll be in amsterdam doing the event so probably won't be here next week 6:38:09 no 6:38:12 a lot of people asked me uh before miami if i'm getting security 6:38:16 oh my god no people were ridiculous 6:38:22 but this does go to show how easily things get out of hand you know 6:38:28 say the least you know like where i'm talking about like people have certain ideas in mind 6:38:33 and the ideas spread and then they the idea sort of uh legitimize the dehumanization of people and 6:38:42 yeah like that crazy person you guys played at the beginning of your show like what is that 6:38:49 like what was that guy talking about and then people always think oh this is gonna hurt my 6:38:55 children's future because you're messing with my bitcoin you know like oh my god 6:39:03 yeah i wish there was less of that i wish people just like 6:39:07 that you know it's like hey listen i want bitcoin to be better just as much as you do right 6:39:12 yeah it's really you know like without actual knowledge who's to say it's not them them who's 6:39:17 ruining their own children's future like you know we're on the same team we want the same thing 6:39:22 we just have different ideas for what the best thing is right like hear me out i'll hear you 6:39:26 out let's all talk together let's be friends after let's give each other a handshake after 6:39:30 you know like oh my god alex we've got another one another one who believes in rationality 6:39:35 i think i think the most and i think the most like the vast majority of bitcoiners 6:39:43 yeah are kind of on the same page on those things but you've got people like you know 6:39:50 you've got people like saifedean i remember his his his tweets about how drivechains are 6:39:56 going to destroy his family's future in lebanon or something and like that's that's not that's 6:40:02 intentional like that is that's not like oh we we we all won uh 6:40:09 coin or not that's not it that's that's just pure politics yeah and you know some some of 6:40:16 these people are you know and of course many of these people are just such a horrible lie if they 6:40:20 just will lie about anything uh and it's it's not even you know like i don't know who's who lies 6:40:25 and who's saying the truth i'm just saying like it's not it's not it's it's unfortunately not 6:40:30 single person that you look at is has the same interests you know like some people are just here 6:40:36 to sell books and speaker slots you know they're not everyone is here to uh establish bitcoin's 6:40:42 future i think it's also part of it that they they talk among each other like not in public 6:40:49 they they talk about it among each other but uh reading the beep is not very popular among them 6:40:56 so they they kind of just just make shit up and they believe what each other is telling 6:41:07 anyways uh moonsetter are you a pro ctv person 6:41:13 i'm not particularly i'm very interested however in in in figuring out you know uh how things are 6:41:21 and uh and as i said before if it can if it cannot be demonstrated that it will hurt the 6:41:28 outcomes of those that don't opt in explicitly then i believe it is it does not stand on moral 6:41:35 opposite that that's my stance 6:41:49 all right guys it's late over here in europe so i'll probably go 6:41:53 but if you guys want to hang out then by all means hang out that's okay we'll we'll allow 6:41:59 you to end this yeah we'll be going on for like seven hours right it's been a nice space 6:42:06 really wow yeah i'm gonna like a lot of times i like to listen to these because i miss it i can't 6:42:11 like sit here for the whole seven hours yeah we put them on the website i think yeah we put 6:42:16 them on layer2labs.com someone make sure that they're all still going up on 2x speed and just 6:42:21 like you know blast through it real quick but yeah thanks for the spaces yeah all made possible 6:42:29 because we have great guests who come and ask a great question so thanks to all you guys as well 6:42:39 see you guys later i'll leave you guys if you all leave then i guess the space will end but 6:42:44 otherwise it will continue all right bye everyone bye good night later guys have a have a great 6:42:52 weekend
